
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 149 (Friday, August 4, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51896-51945]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-16194]



[[Page 51895]]

Vol. 88

Friday,

No. 149

August 4, 2023

Part II





Securities and Exchange Commission





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17 CFR Parts 229, 232, 239, et al.





Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident 
Disclosure; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 149 / Friday, August 4, 2023 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 51896]]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 229, 232, 239, 240, and 249

[Release Nos. 33-11216; 34-97989; File No. S7-09-22]
RIN 3235-AM89


Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident 
Disclosure

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') is 
adopting new rules to enhance and standardize disclosures regarding 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance, and incidents by 
public companies that are subject to the reporting requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, we are adopting 
amendments to require current disclosure about material cybersecurity 
incidents. We are also adopting rules requiring periodic disclosures 
about a registrant's processes to assess, identify, and manage material 
cybersecurity risks, management's role in assessing and managing 
material cybersecurity risks, and the board of directors' oversight of 
cybersecurity risks. Lastly, the final rules require the cybersecurity 
disclosures to be presented in Inline eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language (``Inline XBRL'').

DATES: 
    Effective date: The amendments are effective September 5, 2023.
    Compliance dates: See Section II.I (Compliance Dates).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nabeel Cheema, Special Counsel, at 
(202) 551-3430, in the Office of Rulemaking, Division of Corporation 
Finance; and, with respect to the application of the rules to business 
development companies, David Joire, Senior Special Counsel, at (202) 
551-6825 or [email protected], Chief Counsel's Office, Division of 
Investment Management, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F 
Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We are adopting amendments to:

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Commission reference                                        CFR citation (17 CFR)
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Regulation S-K.....................  .....................  Sec.  Sec.   229.10 through 229.1305.
                                     Items 106 and 601....  Sec.  Sec.   229.106 and 229.601.
Regulation S-T.....................  .....................  Sec.  Sec.   232.10 through 232.903.
                                     Rule 405.............  Sec.   232.405.
Securities Act of 1933               Form S-3.............  Sec.   239.13.
 (``Securities Act'') \1\.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934      Rule 13a-11..........  Sec.   240.13a-11.
 (``Exchange Act'') \2\.
                                     Rule 15d-11..........  Sec.   240.15d-11.
                                     Form 20-F............  Sec.   249.220f.
                                     Form 6-K.............  Sec.   249.306.
                                     Form 8-K.............  Sec.   249.308.
                                     Form 10-K............  Sec.   249.310.
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Table of Contents
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
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I. Introduction and Background
II. Discussion of Final Amendments
    A. Disclosure of Cybersecurity Incidents on Current Reports
    1. Proposed Amendments
    2. Comments
    3. Final Amendments
    B. Disclosures About Cybersecurity Incidents in Periodic Reports
    1. Proposed Amendments
    2. Comments
    3. Final Amendments
    C. Disclosure of a Registrant's Risk Management, Strategy and 
Governance Regarding Cybersecurity Risks
    1. Risk Management and Strategy
    a. Proposed Amendments
    b. Comments
    c. Final Amendments
    2. Governance
    a. Proposed Amendments
    b. Comments
    c. Final Amendments
    3. Definitions
    a. Proposed Definitions
    b. Comments
    c. Final Definitions
    D. Disclosure Regarding the Board of Directors' Cybersecurity 
Expertise
    1. Proposed Amendments
    2. Comments
    3. Final Amendments
    E. Disclosure by Foreign Private Issuers
    1. Proposed Amendments
    2. Comments
    3. Final Amendments
    F. Structured Data Requirements
    1. Proposed Amendments
    2. Comments
    3. Final Amendments
    G. Applicability to Certain Issuers
    1. Asset-Backed Issuers
    2. Smaller Reporting Companies
    H. Need for New Rules and Commission Authority
    I. Compliance Dates
III. Other Matters
IV. Economic Analysis
    A. Introduction
    B. Economic Baseline
    1. Current Regulatory Framework
    2. Affected Parties
    C. Benefits and Costs of the Final Rules
    1. Benefits
    a. More Timely and Informative Disclosure
    b. Greater Uniformity and Comparability
    2. Costs
    3. Indirect Economic Effects
    D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    E. Reasonable Alternatives
    1. Website Disclosure
    2. Disclosure Through Periodic Reports
    3. Exempt Smaller Reporting Companies
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Summary of the Collections of Information
    B. Summary of Comment Letters and Revisions to PRA Estimates
    C. Effects of the Amendments on the Collections of Information
    D. Incremental and Aggregate Burden and Cost Estimates for the 
Final Amendments
VI. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Final Amendments
    B. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
    1. Estimate of Affected Small Entities and Impact to Those 
Entities
    2. Consideration of Alternatives
    C. Small Entities Subject to the Final Amendments
    D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and other Compliance 
Requirements
    E. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
    Statutory Authority

I. Introduction and Background

    On March 9, 2022, the Commission proposed new rules, and rule and 
form amendments, to enhance and standardize disclosures regarding 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance, and cybersecurity 
incidents by public companies that are subject to the reporting 
requirements of the

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Exchange Act.\3\ The proposal followed on interpretive guidance on the 
application of existing disclosure requirements to cybersecurity risk 
and incidents that the Commission and staff had issued in prior years.
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    \3\ See Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and 
Incident Disclosure, Release No. 33-11038 (Mar. 9, 2022) [87 FR 
16590 (Mar. 23, 2022)] (``Proposing Release'').
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    In particular, in 2011, the Division of Corporation Finance issued 
interpretive guidance providing the Division's views concerning 
operating companies' disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity 
(``2011 Staff Guidance'').\4\ In that guidance, the staff observed that 
``[a]lthough no existing disclosure requirement explicitly refers to 
cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, a number of disclosure 
requirements may impose an obligation on registrants to disclose such 
risks and incidents,'' and further that ``material information 
regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents is required to be 
disclosed when necessary in order to make other required disclosures, 
in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading.'' \5\ The guidance pointed specifically to disclosure 
obligations under 17 CFR 229.503 (Regulation S-K ``Item 503(c)'') (Risk 
factors) (since moved to 17 CFR 229.105 (Regulation S-K ``Item 105'')), 
17 CFR 229.303 (Regulation S-K ``Item 303'') (Management's discussion 
and analysis of financial condition and results of operations), 17 CFR 
229.101 (Regulation S-K ``Item 101'') (Description of business), 17 CFR 
229.103 (Regulation S-K ``Item 103'') (Legal proceedings), and 17 CFR 
229.307 (Disclosure controls and procedures), as well as to Accounting 
Standards Codifications 350-40 (Internal-Use Software), 605-50 
(Customer Payments and Incentives), 450-20 (Loss Contingencies), 275-10 
(Risks and Uncertainties), and 855-10 (Subsequent Events).\6\
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    \4\ See CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2--Cybersecurity (Oct. 
13, 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
    \5\ Id.
    \6\ Id.
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    In 2018, ``[i]n light of the increasing significance of 
cybersecurity incidents,'' the Commission issued interpretive guidance 
to reinforce and expand upon the 2011 Staff Guidance and also address 
the importance of cybersecurity policies and procedures, as well as the 
application of insider trading prohibitions in the context of 
cybersecurity (``2018 Interpretive Release'').\7\ In addition to 
discussing the provisions previously covered in the 2011 Staff 
Guidance, the new guidance addressed 17 CFR 229.407 (Regulation S-K 
``Item 407'') (Corporate Governance), 17 CFR part 210 (``Regulation S-
X''), and 17 CFR part 243 (``Regulation FD'').\8\ The 2018 Interpretive 
Release noted that companies can provide current reports on Form 8-K 
and Form 6-K to maintain the accuracy and completeness of effective 
shelf registration statements, and it also advised companies to 
consider whether it may be appropriate to implement restrictions on 
insider trading during the period following an incident and prior to 
disclosure.\9\
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    \7\ See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company 
Cybersecurity Disclosures, Release No. 33-10459 (Feb. 21, 2018) [83 
FR 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018)], at 8167.
    \8\ Id.
    \9\ Id.
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    As noted in the Proposing Release, current disclosure practices are 
varied. For example, while some registrants do report material 
cybersecurity incidents, most typically on Form 10-K, review of Form 8-
K, Form 10-K, and Form 20-F filings by staff in the Division of 
Corporation Finance has shown that companies provide different levels 
of specificity regarding the cause, scope, impact, and materiality of 
cybersecurity incidents. Likewise, staff has also observed that, while 
the majority of registrants that are disclosing cybersecurity risks 
appear to be providing such disclosures in the risk factor section of 
their annual reports on Form 10-K, the disclosures are sometimes 
included with other unrelated disclosures, which makes it more 
difficult for investors to locate, interpret, and analyze the 
information provided.\10\
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    \10\ See infra Section IV.A (noting that current cybersecurity 
disclosures appear in varying sections of companies' periodic and 
current reports and are sometimes included with other unrelated 
disclosures).
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    In the Proposing Release, the Commission explained that a number of 
trends underpinned investors' and other capital markets participants' 
need for more timely and reliable information related to registrants' 
cybersecurity than was produced following the 2011 Staff Guidance and 
the 2018 Interpretive Release. First, an ever-increasing share of 
economic activity is dependent on electronic systems, such that 
disruptions to those systems can have significant effects on 
registrants and, in the case of large-scale attacks, systemic effects 
on the economy as a whole.\11\ Second, there has been a substantial 
rise in the prevalence of cybersecurity incidents, propelled by several 
factors: the increase in remote work spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic; 
the increasing reliance on third-party service providers for 
information technology services; and the rapid monetization of 
cyberattacks facilitated by ransomware, black markets for stolen data, 
and crypto-asset technology.\12\ Third, the costs and adverse 
consequences of cybersecurity incidents to companies are increasing; 
such costs include business interruption, lost revenue, ransom 
payments, remediation costs, liabilities to affected parties, 
cybersecurity protection costs, lost assets, litigation risks, and 
reputational damage.\13\
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    \11\ Proposing Release at 16591-16592. See also U.S. Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, Annual Report (2021), at 168, available 
at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2021AnnualReport.pdf (finding that ``a destabilizing 
cybersecurity incident could potentially threaten the stability of 
the U.S. financial system'').
    \12\ Proposing Release at 16591-16592.
    \13\ Id.
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    Since publication of the Proposing Release, these trends have 
continued apace, with significant cybersecurity incidents occurring 
across companies and industries. For example, threat actors repeatedly 
and successfully executed attacks on high-profile companies across 
multiple critical industries over the course of 2022 and the first 
quarter of 2023, causing the Department of Homeland Security's Cyber 
Safety Review Board to initiate multiple reviews.\14\ Likewise, state 
actors have perpetrated multiple high-profile attacks, and recent 
geopolitical instability has elevated such threats.\15\ A recent study 
by two cybersecurity firms found that 98 percent of organizations use 
at least one third-party vendor that

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has experienced a breach in the last two years.\16\ In addition, recent 
developments in artificial intelligence may exacerbate cybersecurity 
threats, as researchers have shown that artificial intelligence systems 
can be leveraged to create code used in cyberattacks, including by 
actors not versed in programming.\17\ Overall, evidence suggests 
companies may be underreporting cybersecurity incidents.\18\
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    \14\ See Department of Homeland Security, Cyber Safety Review 
Board to Conduct Second Review on Lapsus$ (Dec. 2, 2022), available 
at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/12/02/cyber-safety-review-board-conduct-second-review-lapsus; see also Tim Starks, The Latest Mass 
Ransomware Attack Has Been Unfolding For Nearly Two Months, Wash. 
Post (Mar. 27, 2023), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/27/latest-mass-ransomware-attack-has-been-unfolding-nearly-two-months/.
    \15\ See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
FBI Confirms Lazarus Group Cyber Actors Responsible for Harmony's 
Horizon Bridge Currency Theft (Jan. 23, 2023), available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-confirms-lazarus-group-cyber-actors-responsible-for-harmonys-horizon-bridge-currency-theft; Alert 
(AA22-257A), Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, Iranian 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploiting 
Vulnerabilities for Data Extortion and Disk Encryption for Ransom 
Operations (Sep. 14, 2022), available at https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-257a; National Security Agency et al., Joint 
Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber 
Threats to Critical Infrastructure (Apr. 20, 2022), available at 
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Apr/20/2002980529/-1/-1/1/joint_csa_russian_state-sponsored_and_criminal_cyber_threats_to_critical_infrastructure_20220420.pdf.
    \16\ SecurityScorecard, Cyentia Institute and SecurityScorecard 
Research Report: Close Encounters of the Third (and Fourth) Party 
Kind (Feb 1, 2023), available at https://securityscorecard.com/research/cyentia-close-encounters-of-the-third-and-fourth-party-kind/.
    \17\ Check Point Research, OPWNAI: AI that Can Save the Day or 
Hack it Away (Dec. 19, 2022), available at https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/opwnai-ai-that-can-save-the-day-or-hack-it-away.
    \18\ Bitdefender, Whitepaper: Bitdefender 2023 Cybersecurity 
Assessment (Apr. 2023), available at https://businessresources.bitdefender.com/bitdefender-2023-cybersecurity-assessment.
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    Legislatively, we note two significant developments occurred 
following publication of the Proposing Release. First, the President 
signed into law the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical 
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (``CIRCIA'') \19\ on March 15, 2022, as part 
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022.\20\ The centerpiece of 
CIRCIA is the reporting obligation placed on companies in defined 
critical infrastructure sectors.\21\ Once rules are adopted by the 
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (``CISA''), these 
companies will be required to report covered cyber incidents to CISA 
within 72 hours of discovery, and report ransom payments within 24 
hours.\22\ Importantly, reports made to CISA pursuant to CIRCIA will 
remain confidential; while the information contained therein may be 
shared across Federal agencies for cybersecurity, investigatory, and 
law enforcement purposes, the information may not be disclosed 
publicly, except in anonymized form.\23\ We note that CIRCIA also 
mandated the creation of a ``Cyber Incident Reporting Council . . . to 
coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize Federal incident reporting 
requirements'' (the ``CIRC''), of which the Commission is a member.\24\ 
Second, on December 21, 2022, the President signed into law the Quantum 
Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, which directs the Federal 
Government to adopt technology that is protected from decryption by 
quantum computing, a developing technology that may increase computer 
processing capacity considerably and thereby render existing computer 
encryption vulnerable to decryption.\25\
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    \19\ Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 
2022, Public Law 117-103, 136 Stat. 1038 (2022).
    \20\ Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, H.R. 2471, 117th 
Cong. (2022).
    \21\ The sectors are defined in Presidential Policy Directive/
PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 
2013), as: Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Communications; Critical 
Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services; 
Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government 
Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; Transportation Systems; 
Water and Wastewater Systems. Because these sectors encompass some 
private companies and do not encompass all public companies, 
CIRCIA's reach is both broader and narrower than the set of 
companies subject to the rules we are adopting.
    \22\ 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1).
    \23\ 6 U.S.C. 681e. See infra Section II.A.3 for a discussion of 
why our final rules serve a different purpose and are not at odds 
with the goals of CIRCIA.
    \24\ 6 U.S.C. 681f.
    \25\ Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, H.R. 
7535, 117th Cong. (2022). More recently, the White House released a 
National Cybersecurity Strategy to combat the ongoing risks 
associated with cyberattacks. The National Cybersecurity Strategy 
seeks to rebalance the responsibility for defending against cyber 
threats toward companies instead of the general public, and looks to 
realign incentives to favor long-term investments in cybersecurity. 
See Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris 
Administration Announces National Cybersecurity Strategy (Mar. 2, 
2023), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/02/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-national-cybersecurity-strategy/.
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    We received over 150 comment letters in response to the Proposing 
Release.\26\ The majority of comments focused on the proposed incident 
disclosure requirement, although we also received substantial comment 
on the proposed risk management, strategy, governance, and board 
expertise requirements. In addition, the Commission's Investor Advisory 
Committee adopted recommendations (``IAC Recommendation'') with respect 
to the proposal, stating that it: supports the proposed incident 
disclosure requirement; supports the proposed risk management, 
strategy, and governance disclosure requirements; recommends the 
Commission reconsider the proposed board of directors' cybersecurity 
expertise disclosure requirement; suggests requiring companies to 
disclose the key factors they used to determine the materiality of a 
reported cybersecurity incident; and suggests extending the proposed 17 
CFR 229.106 (Regulation S-K ``Item 106'') disclosure requirements to 
registration statements.\27\
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    \26\ The public comments we received are available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-22/s70922.htm. On Mar. 9, 2022, the 
Commission published the Proposing Release on its website. The 
comment period for the Proposing Release was open for 60 days from 
issuance and publication on SEC.gov and ended on May 9, 2022. One 
commenter asserted that the comment period was not sufficient and 
asked the Commission to extend it by 30 days. See letter from 
American Chemistry Council (``ACC''). In Oct. 2022, the Commission 
reopened the comment period for the Proposing Release and other 
rulemakings because certain comments on the Proposing Release and 
other rulemakings were potentially affected by a technological error 
in the Commission's internet comment form. See Resubmission of 
Comments and Reopening of Comment Periods for Several Rulemaking 
Releases Due to a Technological Error in Receiving Certain Comments, 
Release No. 33-11117 (Oct. 7, 2022) [87 FR 63016 (Oct. 18, 2022)] 
(``Reopening Release''). The Reopening Release was published on the 
Commission's website on Oct. 7, 2022 and in the Federal Register on 
Oct. 18, 2022, and the comment period ended on Nov. 1, 2022. A few 
commenters asserted that the comment period for the reopened 
rulemakings was not sufficient and asked the Commission to extend 
the comment period for those rulemakings. See, e.g., letters from 
Attorneys General of the states of Montana et al. (Oct. 24, 2022) 
and U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 1, 2022). We have considered all 
comments received since Mar. 9, 2022 and do not believe an 
additional extension of the comment period is necessary.
    \27\ See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Investor 
Advisory Committee, Recommendation of the Investor as Owner 
Subcommittee and Disclosure Subcommittee of the SEC Investor 
Advisory Committee Regarding Cybersecurity Risk Management, 
Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure (Sept. 21, 2022), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/20220921-cybersecurity-disclosure-recommendation.pdf. 
The Investor Advisory Committee also held a panel discussion on 
cybersecurity at its Mar. 10, 2022 meeting. See U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Investor Advisory Committee, Meeting Agenda 
(Mar. 10, 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee/iac031022-agenda.htm.
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    We are making a number of important changes from the Proposing 
Release in response to comments received. With respect to incident 
disclosure, we are narrowing the scope of disclosure, adding a limited 
delay for disclosures that would pose a substantial risk to national 
security or public safety, requiring certain updated incident 
disclosure on an amended Form 8-K instead of Forms 10-Q and 10-K for 
domestic registrants, and on Form 6-K instead of Form 20-F for foreign 
private issuers (``FPIs''),\28\ and omitting the proposed aggregation 
of immaterial incidents for materiality analyses. We are streamlining 
the proposed disclosure elements related to risk management, strategy, 
and governance, and we are not adopting the proposed requirement to 
disclose board cybersecurity expertise. The following

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table summarizes the requirements we are adopting, including changes 
from the Proposing Release, as described more fully in Section II 
below: \29\
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    \28\ An FPI is any foreign issuer other than a foreign 
government, except for an issuer that (1) has more than 50 percent 
of its outstanding voting securities held of record by U.S. 
residents; and (2) any of the following: (i) a majority of its 
executive officers or directors are citizens or residents of the 
United States; (ii) more than 50 percent of its assets are located 
in the United States; or (iii) its business is principally 
administered in the United States. 17 CFR 230.405. See also 17 CFR 
240.3b-4(c).
    \29\ The information in this table is not comprehensive and is 
intended only to highlight some of the more significant aspects of 
the final amendments. It does not reflect all of the amendments or 
all of the rules and forms that are affected by the final 
amendments, which are discussed in detail below. As such, this table 
should be read together with the entire release, including the 
regulatory text.

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                                 Summary description of the disclosure
             Item                           requirement \30\
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Regulation S-K Item 106(b)--   Registrants must describe their
 Risk management and strategy.  processes, if any, for the assessment,
                                identification, and management of
                                material risks from cybersecurity
                                threats, and describe whether any risks
                                from cybersecurity threats have
                                materially affected or are reasonably
                                likely to materially affect their
                                business strategy, results of
                                operations, or financial condition.
Regulation S-K Item 106(c)--   Registrants must:
 Governance.                   --Describe the board's oversight of risks
                                from cybersecurity threats.
                               --Describe management's role in assessing
                                and managing material risks from
                                cybersecurity threats.
Form 8-K Item 1.05--Material   Registrants must disclose any
 Cybersecurity Incidents.       cybersecurity incident they experience
                                that is determined to be material, and
                                describe the material aspects of its:
                               --Nature, scope, and timing; and
                               --Impact or reasonably likely impact.
                               An Item 1.05 Form 8-K must be filed
                                within four business days of determining
                                an incident was material. A registrant
                                may delay filing as described below, if
                                the United States Attorney General
                                (``Attorney General'') determines
                                immediate disclosure would pose a
                                substantial risk to national security or
                                public safety.
                               Registrants must amend a prior Item 1.05
                                Form 8-K to disclose any information
                                called for in Item 1.05(a) that was not
                                determined or was unavailable at the
                                time of the initial Form 8-K filing.
Form 20-F....................  FPIs must:
                               --Describe the board's oversight of risks
                                from cybersecurity threats.
                               --Describe management's role in assessing
                                and managing material risks from
                                cybersecurity threats.
Form 6-K.....................  FPIs must furnish on Form 6-K information
                                on material cybersecurity incidents that
                                they disclose or otherwise publicize in
                                a foreign jurisdiction, to any stock
                                exchange, or to security holders.
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    Overall, we remain persuaded that, as detailed in the Proposing 
Release: under-disclosure regarding cybersecurity persists despite the 
Commission's prior guidance; investors need more timely and consistent 
cybersecurity disclosure to make informed investment decisions; and 
recent legislative and regulatory developments elsewhere in the Federal 
Government, including those developments subsequent to the issuance of 
the Proposing Release such as CIRCIA \31\ and the Quantum Computing 
Cybersecurity Preparedness Act,32 while serving related purposes, will 
not effectuate the level of public cybersecurity disclosure needed by 
investors in public companies.
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    \30\ For purposes of this release, the terms ``public 
companies,'' ``companies,'' and ``registrants'' include issuers that 
are business development companies as defined in section 2(a)(48) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, which are a type of closed-end 
investment company that is not registered under the Investment 
Company Act, but do not include investment companies registered 
under that Act.
    \31\ Supra note 19.
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II. Discussion of Final Amendments

A. Disclosure of Cybersecurity Incidents on Current Reports

1. Proposed Amendments
    The Commission proposed to amend Form 8-K by adding new Item 1.05 
that would require a registrant to disclose the following information 
regarding a material cybersecurity incident, to the extent known at the 
time of filing:
     When the incident was discovered and whether it is 
ongoing;
     A brief description of the nature and scope of the 
incident;
     Whether any data were stolen, altered, accessed, or used 
for any other unauthorized purpose;
     The effect of the incident on the registrant's operations; 
and
     Whether the registrant has remediated or is currently 
remediating the incident.\33\
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    \33\ Proposing Release at 16595.
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    The Commission clarified in the Proposing Release that this 
requirement would not extend to specific, technical information about 
the registrant's planned response to the incident or its cybersecurity 
systems, related networks and devices, or potential system 
vulnerabilities in such detail as would impede the registrant's 
response or remediation of the incident.\34\
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    \34\ Id.
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    The Commission proposed to set the filing trigger for Item 1.05 as 
the date the registrant determines that a cybersecurity incident is 
material; as with all other Form 8-K items, the proposed filing 
deadline would be four business days after the trigger.\35\ To protect 
against any inclination on the part of a registrant to delay making a 
materiality determination with a view toward prolonging the filing 
deadline, the Commission proposed adding Instruction 1 to Item 1.05 
requiring that ``a registrant shall make a materiality determination 
regarding a cybersecurity incident as soon as reasonably practicable 
after discovery of the incident.'' \36\
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    \35\ Id.
    \36\ Id. at 16596.
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    The Commission affirmed in the Proposing Release that the 
materiality standard registrants should apply in evaluating whether a 
Form 8-K would be triggered under proposed Item 1.05 would be 
consistent with that set out in the numerous cases addressing 
materiality in the securities laws, including TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc.,\37\ Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,\38\ and Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,\39\ and likewise with that set forth 
in 17 CFR 230.405 (``Securities

[[Page 51900]]

Act Rule 405'') and 17 CFR 240.12b-2 (``Exchange Act Rule 12b-2''). 
That is, information is material if ``there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important'' \40\ in 
making an investment decision, or if it would have ``significantly 
altered the `total mix' of information made available.'' \41\ ``Doubts 
as to the critical nature'' of the relevant information should be 
``resolved in favor of those the statute is designed to protect,'' 
namely investors.\42\
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    \37\ TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
    \38\ Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
    \39\ Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
    \40\ TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
    \41\ Id.
    \42\ Id. at 448.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission explained that the timely disclosure of the 
information required by proposed Item 1.05 would enable investors and 
other market participants to assess the possible effects of a material 
cybersecurity incident on the registrant, including any short- and 
long-term financial effects or operational effects, resulting in 
information useful for their investment decisions.\43\ Aligning the 
deadline for Item 1.05 with that of the other Form 8-K items would, the 
Commission maintained, significantly improve the timeliness of 
cybersecurity incident disclosures as well as standardize those 
disclosures.\44\ The Commission did not propose to provide a reporting 
delay in cases of ongoing internal or external investigations of 
cybersecurity incidents.\45\ Nevertheless, the Proposing Release 
requested comment on whether to allow a delay in reporting where the 
Attorney General determines that a delay is in the interest of national 
security.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Proposing Release at 16595.
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ Id. at 16596.
    \46\ Id. at 16598.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    Proposed Item 1.05 received a significant amount of feedback from 
commenters. Some commenters supported Item 1.05 as proposed,\47\ saying 
that the current level of disclosure on cybersecurity incidents is 
inadequate to meet investor needs, and Item 1.05 would remedy this 
inadequacy by effectuating the disclosure of decision-useful 
information.\48\ One commenter also anticipated that Item 1.05 would 
reduce the risk of insider trading by shortening the time between 
discovery of an incident and public disclosure.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See letters from American Institute of CPAs (``AICPA''); 
Better Markets (``Better Markets''); BitSight Technologies, Inc. 
(``BitSight''); California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(``CalPERS''); Crindata, LLC (``Crindata''); Council of 
Institutional Investors (``CII''); Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation (``ITIF''); North American Securities 
Administrators Association Inc. (``NASAA''); Professor Jerry Perullo 
(``Prof. Perullo''); Professor Preeti Choudhary (``Prof. 
Choudhary''); Tessa Mishoe (``T. Mishoe''). See also IAC 
Recommendation.
    \48\ Id.
    \49\ See letter from Better Markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters opposed proposed Item 1.05, for several reasons. 
Some commenters said that if proposed Item 1.05 were to result in 
disclosure while an incident is still ongoing, it would tip off the 
threat actor and thus make successful neutralization of the incident 
more difficult.\50\ Commenters also expressed concern that public 
notice of a vulnerability could draw attacks from other threat actors 
who were previously unaware of the vulnerability; and such attacks 
could target the disclosing registrant or other companies with the same 
vulnerability, particularly if the vulnerability is with a third-party 
service provider used by multiple companies.\51\ Some of these 
commenters objected specifically to the requirement in Item 1.05 to 
disclose whether remediation has occurred, stating that this 
information could assist threat actors in their targeting or invite 
further targeted attacks,\52\ while others more generally stated that 
the Item 1.05 disclosure would be overly detailed, such that it would 
give a road map to threat actors for planning attacks.\53\ One 
commenter argued that the prospect of possibly having to file an Item 
1.05 Form 8-K could chill threat information sharing within industries, 
because companies would fear that any cybersecurity risk information 
they share could later be used to question their disclosure 
decisions.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See letters from ACC; American Gas Association and 
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (``AGA/INGAA''); 
BioTechnology Innovation Organization (``BIO''); Bank Policy 
Institute, American Bankers Association, and Mid-Size Bank Coalition 
of America (``BPI et al.''); BSA/The Software Alliance (``BSA''); 
Business Roundtable (``Business Roundtable''); Canadian Bankers 
Association (``CBA''); Edison Electric Institute (``EEI''); Energy 
Infrastructure Council (``EIC''); Federation of American Hospitals 
(``FAH''); Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council 
(``FSSCC''); Information Technology Industry Council (``ITI''); LTSE 
Services, Inc. (``LTSE''); National Association of Manufacturers 
(``NAM''); National Defense Industrial Association (``NDIA''); Quest 
Diagnostics Incorporated (``Quest''); Rapid7, Inc. (``Rapid7''); 
Society for Corporate Governance (``SCG''); Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (``SIFMA''); TransUnion; R Street 
Institute (``R Street''); U.S. Chamber of Commerce (``Chamber'').
    \51\ See letters from ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities (``ABA''); Aerospace Industries Association of America 
(``AIA''); Alliance for Automotive Innovation (``Auto Innovators''); 
AGA/INGAA; American Property Casualty Insurance Association 
(``APCIA''); BPI et al.; BSA; Business Roundtable; CBA; Chamber; 
Cellular Telecommunications and internet Assoc. (``CTIA''); 
Cybersecurity Coalition; EEI; EIC; Empire State Realty Trust, Inc. 
(``Empire''); Enbridge Inc. (``Enbridge''); FSSCC; internet Security 
Alliance; ITI; Microsoft Corporation (``Microsoft''); NDIA; PPG 
Industries, Inc. (``PPG''); PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (``PWC''); 
Rapid7; R Street; SCG; SIFMA; U.S. Senator Rob Portman (``Sen. 
Portman''); Virtu Financial (``Virtu'').
    \52\ See letters from ABA; AGA/INGAA; BPI et al.; Cybersecurity 
Coalition; Empire; Enbridge; PWC; SIFMA; SCG; Virtu.
    \53\ See letters from AGA/INGAA; BSA; EIC; ITI; PPG.
    \54\ See letter from Consumer Technology Association (``CTA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some of the commenters that disagreed with the level of disclosure 
required by proposed Item 1.05 recommended that the Commission narrow 
the disclosure requirements of the rule. For example, one such 
commenter advised dropping the proposed requirement to disclose ``when 
the incident was discovered,'' arguing that this detail may cause 
confusion, particularly where an incident was detected some time ago 
but a significant aspect rendering it material surfaced only 
recently.\55\ Another commenter opined that ``whether the registrant 
has remediated or is currently remediating the incident'' is 
duplicative of ``whether it is ongoing,'' so either of the two could be 
eliminated.\56\ One commenter contended that a materiality filter 
should be added to the details required by Item 1.05, such that 
companies would have to disclose only details that themselves are 
material, rather than immaterial details of a material incident.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See letter from Prof. Perullo.
    \56\ See letter from ABA.
    \57\ See letter from ITI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By contrast, there were also commenters that recommended expanding 
the disclosure requirements in the proposed rule. In this regard, some 
commenters recommended requiring that registrants disclose asset 
losses, intellectual property losses, and the value of business lost 
due to the incident.\58\ Other suggestions included requiring that 
incidents be quantified as to their severity and impact via 
standardized rating systems, and that registrants disclose how they 
became aware of the incident, as this may shed light on the 
effectiveness of a company's cybersecurity policies and procedures.\59\ 
Additionally, commenters suggested banning trading by insiders during 
the time between the materiality determination and disclosure of the 
incident.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See letters from Profs. Rajgopal & Sharpe; PWC.
    \59\ See letters from BitSight; Cloud Security Alliance 
(``CSA'').
    \60\ See letter from Prof. Mitts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters provided reactions to the application of Item 1.05 to 
incidents

[[Page 51901]]

connected with third-party systems. A number of commenters contended 
that registrants should be exempt from having to disclose cybersecurity 
incidents in third-party systems they use because of their reduced 
control over such systems.\61\ Similarly, several commenters advocated 
for a safe harbor for information disclosed about third-party systems, 
given registrants' reduced visibility into such systems.\62\ A few 
commenters suggested a longer reporting timeframe for third-party 
incidents, because the registrant may be dependent on the third party 
for information (which may not be provided in a timely manner), and to 
avoid harm to other companies reliant on the same third party.\63\ 
Commenters also recommended that Item 1.05 be phased in over a longer 
period of time with respect to third-party incidents, to give 
registrants time to develop information sharing processes with their 
third-party service providers.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See letters from ABA; AIA; APCIA; Business Roundtable; 
Cybersecurity Coalition; Chamber; EIC; FAH; ISA; ITI; NAM; NDIA; 
National Multifamily Housing Council and National Apartment 
Association (``NMHC''); Paylocity; SIFMA.
    \62\ See letters from Chevron Corporation (``Chevron''); APCIA; 
BPI et al.; BIO; CSA; Financial Executive International's Committee 
on Corporate Reporting (``FEI''); ITI; ISA; NMHC; SIFMA.
    \63\ See letters from ABA; R Street.
    \64\ See letters from Business Roundtable; Deloitte & Touche LLP 
(``Deloitte'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also requested guidance or otherwise raised concerns 
where the proposed requirements might trigger disclosures by third-
party service providers. A commenter requested clarity on whether an 
incident should be disclosed by the third-party service provider 
registrant that owns the affected system or the customer registrant 
that owns the affected information, or both.\65\ And two commenters 
argued that third-party service providers should simply pass along 
information to their end customers, who would then make their own 
materiality determination and disclose accordingly; this should 
particularly be the case, a commenter said, where an attack on a third-
party data center results in a data breach for an end customer but does 
not affect the services the data center provides.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See letter from Business Roundtable.
    \66\ See letters from BSA; ITI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed timing of incident disclosure also received a 
significant level of public comment. For example, a few commenters said 
the level of detail required by Item 1.05 is impractical to produce in 
the allotted time.\67\ Other commenters said that the proposed deadline 
would lead to the disclosure of tentative, unclear, or potentially 
inaccurate information that is not decision-useful to investors,\68\ 
resulting in the market mispricing the underlying securities.\69\ 
Commenters also argued that Item 1.05 is qualitatively different from 
all other Form 8-K items in that the trigger for Item 1.05 is largely 
outside the company's control.\70\ Some commenters worried the proposed 
deadline would lead to disclosure of ``false positives,'' that is, 
incidents that appear material at first but later on with the emergence 
of more information turn out not to be material.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See letters from ABA; NMHC; Quest.
    \68\ See letters from ABA; ACC; AIA; Auto Innovators; American 
Investment Council (``AIC''); BIO; Business Roundtable; CBA; 
Chamber; Confidentiality Coalition; CTIA; Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 
(``Davis Polk''); Debevoise & Plimpton (``Debevoise''); Federated 
Hermes; FSSCC; Microsoft; NAM; Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC 
(``Nasdaq''); NDIA; Quest; SCG; TransUnion; Wilson Sonsini Goodrich 
& Rosati (``Wilson Sonsini''); Virtu.
    \69\ See letters from ABA; ACC; AIA; AIC; BIO; BPI et al.; 
Business Roundtable; Confidentiality Coalition; Davis Polk; ISA; 
Nasdaq; PPG; Quest; Rapid7; SCG; Sen. Portman; SIFMA; Virtu.
    \70\ See letters from CTIA; Debevoise; EIC; LTSE; New York City 
Bar Association (``NYC Bar''); Quest.
    \71\ See letters from LTSE; PPG; SCG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters suggested a range of alternative reporting deadlines for 
Item 1.05. A common suggestion was to modify the measurement date from 
the determination of materiality to another point in the lifecycle of 
the incident when the incident is no longer a threat to the 
registrant--commenters variously termed this as ``containment,'' 
``remediation,'' ``mitigation,'' and comparable terms.\72\ One 
commenter recommended conditioning a reporting delay on the registrant 
being actively engaged in containing the incident and reasonably 
believing that containment can be completed in a timely manner.\73\ 
Similarly, several commenters recommended that the rule allow for a 
delay in providing Item 1.05 disclosure based on a registrant's 
assessment of the potential negative consequences of public disclosure, 
using a variety of measures they suggested.\74\ Another suggestion was 
to replace the proposed deadline with an instruction to disclose 
material incidents ``without unreasonable delay.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See letters from American Council of Life Insurers 
(``ACLI''); BCE Inc., Rogers Communications Inc., TELUS Corporation 
(``BCE''); BPI et al.; Business Roundtable; Chamber; CTA; 
Cybersecurity Coalition; Empire; FAH; Federated Hermes; FSSCC; ISA; 
ITI; NAM; Nasdaq; NDIA; NMHC; NYSE Group (``NYSE''); Quest; Rapid7; 
Sen. Portman; SCG; SIFMA; SM4RT Secure LLC (``SM4RT Secure''); 
TransUnion.
    \73\ See letter from Rapid7.
    \74\ See letters from BSA (suggesting a ``tailored, balancing 
test''); EEI (advocating delay ``to the extent . . . the registrant 
in good faith concludes that its disclosure will expose it or others 
to ongoing or additional risks of a cybersecurity incident''); EIC; 
Microsoft (requesting that companies be allowed to ``manage the 
timing'' of disclosure ``when compelling conditions exist such that 
premature disclosure would result in greater harm to the company, 
its investors, or the national digital ecosystem''); Nareit and The 
Real Estate Roundtable (``Nareit'') (stating delay should be 
permitted where disclosure ``would exacerbate injury to the company 
and/or its shareholders''); SIFMA (advocating a ```responsible 
disclosure' exception'' that applies ``where disclosure of a cyber 
incident or vulnerability could have a more damaging effect than 
delayed disclosure''); Wilson Sonsini (stating ``the Commission 
should allow board members to decide to delay reporting if doing so 
could cause material harm to the company'').
    \75\ See letters from CTIA; National Restaurant Association 
(``NRA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters recommended instead increasing the number of days 
between the reporting trigger and the reporting deadline. A few 
commenters recommended adding one business day to make the deadline 
five business days; \76\ one noted this would result in every 
registrant having at least a full calendar week to gather information 
and prepare the Form 8-K.\77\ Another commenter recommended a deadline 
of 15 business days, along with a cure period to allow registrants a 
defined period of time to fix potential reporting mistakes.\78\ A few 
commenters recommended a 30-day deadline,\79\ with their choice of 30 
days tending to be a proxy for some other factor, such as containment 
or remediation,\80\ or state notification requirements.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See letters from AIC; Debevoise; NYC Bar.
    \77\ See letter from AIC.
    \78\ See letter from R Street.
    \79\ See letters from APCIA; Hunton Andrews Kurth, LLP 
(``Hunton''); Rapid7.
    \80\ See letters from APCIA (``[w]e believe that permitting a 
registrant to delay the filing for a short period of time strikes an 
appropriate balance between timely disclosure to shareholders and an 
opportunity for a registrant to achieve the best resolution for 
itself and its shareholders''); Rapid7 (``[i]n Rapid7's experience, 
the vast majority of incidents can be contained and mitigated within 
that time frame [30 days]'').
    \81\ See letters from APCIA (``[a]llowing up to 30 days for 
disclosure would also bring the SEC's proposal in line with data 
breach disclosure requirements at the state level''); Hunton 
(``[w]hile state data breach notification laws vary from state to 
state, 30 days from the cybersecurity incident is the earliest date 
any state requires that notification to affected persons be made'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters recommended addressing the timing concerns by 
replacing current reporting on Form 8-K with periodic reporting on 
Forms 10-Q and 10-K, to allow additional time to assess an incident's 
impact before reporting to markets.\82\ In this vein, one commenter 
likened cybersecurity incident disclosure to the disclosure of

[[Page 51902]]

legal proceedings under Regulation S-K Item 103.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ See letters from ABA; Davis Polk; Debevoise; LTSE; NYC Bar; 
Quest; SCG.
    \83\ See letter from Quest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters recommended instead that the materiality trigger 
be replaced with a quantifiable trigger; for example, an incident 
implicating a specified percentage of revenue, or the costs of an 
incident exceeding a specified benchmark, could trigger disclosure.\84\ 
Other commenters advocated for the disclosure trigger to be tied to any 
legal obligation that forces a registrant to notify persons outside the 
company.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See letters from BIO; Bitsight; EIC; Paylocity.
    \85\ See letters from ABA; Business Roundtable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also recommended a number of exceptions to the filing 
deadline. The most common recommendation was to include a provision 
allowing for delayed filing where there is an active law enforcement 
investigation or the disclosure otherwise implicates national security 
or public safety.\86\ A representative comment in this vein advanced a 
provision whereby registrants may ``delay reporting of a cybersecurity 
incident that is the subject of a bona fide investigation by law 
enforcement,'' because such ``delay in reporting may not only 
facilitate such an investigation, it may be critical to its success.'' 
\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See letters from ABA; ACC; ACLI; AGA/INGAA; AIA; AICPA; 
APCIA; Auto Innovators; Rep. Banks; BPI et al.; BIO; BSA; Business 
Roundtable; CBA; Chamber; Chevron; CII; CSA; CTA; CTIA; 
Cybersecurity Coalition; Debevoise; EEI; EIC; Empire; Enbridge; FAH; 
FedEx Corporation (``FedEx''); FEI; FSSCC; Global Privacy Alliance 
(``GPA''); Hunton; ISA; ITI; ITIF; Microsoft; NAM; Nareit; NASAA; 
NDIA; NMHC; NRA; NYC Bar; Prof. Perullo; Sen. Portman; PPG; PWC; 
Quest; R Street; Profs. Rajgopal & Sharpe; Rapid7; SCG; SIFMA; 
TransUnion; Virtu; USTelecom--The Broadband Association 
(``USTelecom''); U.S. Chamber of Commerce & various associations 
(``Chamber et al.'').
    \87\ See letter from Debevoise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In calling for a law enforcement delay, associations for industries 
in critical sectors emphasized the national security implications of 
public cybersecurity incident disclosure. For example, one association 
explained that disclosure ``may alert malicious actors that we have 
uncovered their illegal activities in circumstances where our defense 
and intelligence agencies wish to keep that information secret.'' \88\ 
Likewise, another association pointed out that, in its industry, 
companies ``are likely to possess some of the nation's most critical 
confidential information, including cybersecurity threat information 
furnished by government entities, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the 
National Security Agency (NSA),'' and therefore, disclosure may not be 
possible.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See letter from AIA.
    \89\ See letter from EEI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters largely advocated for ``a broad law enforcement 
exception that applies not only in the interest of national security 
but also when law enforcement believes disclosure will hinder their 
efforts to identify or capture the threat actor.'' \90\ Many commenters 
that responded to the Commission's request for comment regarding a 
provision whereby the Attorney General determines that a delay is in 
the interest of national security indicated that such a provision 
should be more expansive and extend to other law enforcement 
authorities.\91\ One of these commenters questioned whether the 
Attorney General would opine on matters ``that are under the ambit of 
other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of State and the Department of Defense.'' \92\ Another 
commenter pointed out that ``the Department of Justice is not the 
primary, or even the lead, organization in the Federal Government for 
cybersecurity response, rather the Department of Homeland Security's 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is often the first 
call that companies make,'' while ``[f]or defense contractors, the 
Department of Defense is likely to have the highest interest in the 
timing of an announcement.'' \93\ For the financial industry 
specifically, one suggestion was to permit a delay if the Federal 
Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency finds that disclosure would compromise the 
safety or soundness of the financial institution or of the financial 
system as a whole.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ See letter from ABA.
    \91\ See letters from BPI et al.; CBA; CSA; Hunton; ITIF; SCG; 
Wilson Sonsini.
    \92\ See letter from Hunton. This commenter also questioned 
whether law enforcement would be inclined to provide a written 
determination, particularly within four business days, because in 
its experience with State data breach laws, ``the relevant state and 
federal law enforcement agencies seldom (if ever) provide written 
instructions when the relevant exception comes into play.''
    \93\ See letter from Wilson Sonsini.
    \94\ See letter from BPI et al. Cf. letter from FSSCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters specifically urged that state law enforcement be 
included within any delay provision,\95\ and one commenter appeared to 
contemplate inclusion of foreign law enforcement.\96\ A few commenters 
advocated for a confidential reporting system, whereby a registrant 
would initially file a nonpublic report with the Commission while a law 
enforcement investigation is ongoing, and then unseal the report upon 
the investigation's completion.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See, e.g., letter from ITIF.
    \96\ See letter from CBA (stating ``the scope of the 
contemplated exemption is indefensibly narrow, particularly for 
registrants with operations outside of the United States . . . there 
should be an exemption to permit delayed disclosure upon the request 
of any competent national, state or local law enforcement 
authority'').
    \97\ See letters from CSA; Hunton; SCG. See also letter from 
LTSE (positing the Regulation SCI disclosure framework as a model 
for Item 1.05).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters provided feedback regarding proposed 
Instruction 1, which would have directed registrants to make their 
materiality determination regarding an incident ``as soon as reasonably 
practicable after discovery of the incident.'' Several commenters 
recommended removing the instruction altogether as, in their view, it 
would place unnecessary pressure on companies to make premature 
determinations before they have sufficient information.\98\ Other 
commenters stated that the instruction is too ambiguous for registrants 
to ascertain whether they have complied with it.\99\ Conversely, one 
commenter advised the Commission not to provide further guidance on the 
meaning of ``as soon as reasonably practicable,'' explaining that doing 
so would interfere with each registrant's individual assessment of what 
is practicable given its specific context, resulting in pressure to 
move more quickly than may be appropriate.\100\ Another commenter 
likewise found that ``as soon as reasonably practicable'' is a 
``reasonable approach'' that ``provides public companies with the 
appropriate degree of flexibility to conduct a thorough assessment 
while ensuring that the markets get timely and relevant information.'' 
\101\ One commenter recommended a safe harbor for actions and 
determinations made in good faith to satisfy Instruction 1 that later 
turn out to be mistaken.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See letters from ABA; AGA/INGAA; Federated Hermes; ISA; 
Paylocity; Quest; SCG.
    \99\ See letter from Center for Audit Quality (``CAQ''); CSA; 
Institute of Internal Auditors (``IIA''); LTSE; NYC Bar.
    \100\ See letter from Cybersecurity Coalition.
    \101\ See letter from NASAA.
    \102\ See letter from Nasdaq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to a request for comment in the Proposing Release, 
several commenters recommended registrants be permitted to furnish 
rather than file an Item 1.05 Form 8-K, so that filers of an Item 1.05 
Form 8-K would not be subject to liability under Section 18 of the 
Exchange Act.\103\ A significant number of commenters also endorsed the 
proposal to amend 17 CFR 240.13a-

[[Page 51903]]

11(c) (``Rule 13a-11(c)'') and 17 CFR 240.15d-11(c) (``Rule 15d-
11(c)'') under the Exchange Act to include Item 1.05 in the list of 
Form 8-K items eligible for a limited safe harbor from liability under 
Section 10(b) or 17 CFR 240.10b-5 (``Rule 10b-5'') under the Exchange 
Act.\104\ Likewise, the proposal to amend General Instruction I.A.3.(b) 
of Form S-3 and General Instruction I.A.2 of Form SF-3 to provide that 
an untimely filing on Form 8-K regarding new Item 1.05 would not result 
in loss of Form S-3 or Form SF-3 eligibility received much 
support.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ See letters from BPI et al.; Business Roundtable; Chevron; 
CSA; EEI; LTSE; NAM; SCG.
    \104\ See letters from ABA; APCIA; BIO; Business Roundtable; 
Chevron; CTIA; Cybersecurity Coalition; Debevoise; EEI; LTSE; NYC 
Bar; PWC; SCG.
    \105\ See letters from ABA; APCIA; BIO; Business Roundtable; 
Chevron; CTIA; Cybersecurity Coalition; Debevoise; EEI; LTSE; NYC 
Bar; PWC; SCG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, a number of commenters averred that Item 1.05 would 
conflict with other Federal and state cybersecurity reporting or other 
regulatory regimes. For example, one commenter stated Item 1.05 would 
counteract the goals of CIRCIA by requiring public disclosure of 
information the act would keep confidential, and went on to assert that 
CIRCIA was intended as the primary means for reporting incidents to the 
Federal Government.\106\ Also related to CIRCIA, a number of commenters 
urged harmonization of the Commission's proposal with forthcoming 
regulations expected from CISA pursuant to CIRCIA.\107\ Several 
commenters alleged Item 1.05 would conflict with rules the Department 
of Health and Human Services (``HHS'') has adopted pursuant to the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (``HIPAA'') 
regarding the reporting of private health information breaches.\108\ A 
few commenters likewise said Item 1.05 would conflict with the 
reporting regime set forth in Federal Communications Commission 
(``FCC'') regulations for breaches of customer proprietary network 
information.\109\ Conflicts were also alleged with regulations and 
programs of the Department of Defense (``DOD''),\110\ Department of 
Energy (``DOE''),\111\ and Department of Homeland Security 
(``DHS'').\112\ Commenters called for harmonization of Item 1.05 with 
regulations issued by Federal banking regulators,\113\ as well as with 
regulations of the Federal Trade Commission (``FTC'').\114\ Some 
commenters noted the potential interaction between the proposed rules 
and state laws.\115\ One commenter noted the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
which provides that a state law preempts a Federal statute if the state 
law was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance 
and the Federal statute does not specifically relate to the business of 
insurance.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ See letter from Sen. Portman.
    \107\ See letters from ACC; ACLI; APCIA; BPI et al.; BIO; 
Confidentiality Coalition; Chamber; CTA; CTIA; Cybersecurity 
Coalition; EIC; FEI; FSSCC; Insurance Coalition (``IC''); ISA; ITI; 
ITIF; Nareit; NAM; NRA; R Street; SCG; SIFMA; USTelecom.
    \108\ See letters from Chamber; Confidentiality Coalition; FAH; 
R Street.
    \109\ See letters from Chamber; CTIA; USTelecom.
    \110\ See letter from Chamber et al.
    \111\ See letter from EEI.
    \112\ See letter from ACC. This letter additionally alleged 
conflicts with regulations of the Department of Energy, 
Transportation Security Agency, Department of Defense, and 
Environmental Protection Agency, but did not explain specifically 
where those conflicts lie.
    \113\ See letters from FSSCC; Structured Finance Association 
(``SFA''); SIFMA.
    \114\ See letters from BIO; CTIA.
    \115\ See letters from IC (noting ``[a]n important issue will be 
to ensure harmonized regulation between the federal government and 
the several states with proposed or preexisting cybersecurity 
regulations''); R Street (noting that state privacy laws ``mandate 
reporting of incidents across very different timelines''); SIFMA 
(noting that ``many state financial services and/or insurance 
regulators already require regulated entities certify cybersecurity 
compliance'').
    \116\ See letter from IC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Amendments
    Having considered the comments, we remain convinced that investors 
need timely, standardized disclosure regarding cybersecurity incidents 
materially affecting registrants' businesses, and that the existing 
regulatory landscape is not yielding consistent and informative 
disclosure of cybersecurity incidents from registrants.\117\ However, 
we are revising the proposal in two important respects in response to 
concerns raised by commenters. First, we are narrowing the amount of 
information required to be disclosed, to better balance investors' 
needs and registrants' cybersecurity posture. And second, we are 
providing for a delay for disclosures that would pose a substantial 
risk to national security or public safety, contingent on a written 
notification by the Attorney General, who may take into consideration 
other Federal or other law enforcement agencies' findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ As the Commission has previously stated, markets rely on 
timely dissemination of information to accurately and quickly value 
securities. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and 
Acceleration of Filing Date, Release No. 33-8400 (Mar. 16, 2004) [69 
FR 15593 (Mar. 25, 2004)] (``Additional Form 8-K Disclosure 
Release''). Congress recognized that the ongoing dissemination of 
accurate information by issuers about themselves and their 
securities is essential to the effective operation of the markets, 
and specifically recognized the importance of current reporting in 
this regard by requiring that ``[e]ach issuer reporting under 
Section 13(a) or 15(d) . . . disclose to the public on a rapid and 
current basis such additional information concerning material 
changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer . . . 
as the Commission determines . . . is necessary or useful for the 
protection of investors and in the public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 
78m(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described above, commenters' criticisms of Item 1.05 generally 
arose from two aspects of the proposal: (1) the scope of disclosure; 
and (2) the timing of disclosure. With respect to disclosure scope, we 
note in particular commenter concerns that the disclosure of certain 
details required by proposed Item 1.05 could exacerbate security 
threats, both for the registrants' systems and for systems in the same 
industry or beyond, and could chill threat information sharing within 
industries. We agree that a balancing of concerns consistent with our 
statutory authority is necessary in crafting Item 1.05 to avoid 
empowering threat actors with actionable information that could harm a 
registrant and its investors. However, we are not persuaded, as some 
commenters suggested,\118\ that we should forgo requiring disclosure of 
the existence of an incident while it is ongoing to avoid risks, such 
as the risk of tipping off threat actors. Some companies already 
disclose material cybersecurity incidents while they are ongoing and 
before they are fully remediated, but the timing, form, and substance 
of those disclosures are inconsistent. Several commenters indicated 
both that investors look for information regarding registrants' 
cybersecurity incidents and that current disclosure levels are 
inadequate to their needs in making investment decisions.\119\ In 
addition, we note below in Section IV evidence showing that delayed 
reporting of cybersecurity incidents can result in mispricing of 
securities, and that such mispricing can be exploited by threat actors, 
employees, related third parties, and others through trades made before 
an incident becomes public.\120\ Accordingly, we believe it is 
necessary to adopt a requirement for uniform current reporting of 
material cybersecurity incidents.
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    \118\ See supra note 50.
    \119\ See letters from Better Markets; CalPERS; CII.
    \120\ See infra notes 413 and 462.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To that end, and to balance investors' needs with the concerns 
raised by commenters, we are streamlining Item 1.05 to focus the 
disclosure primarily on the impacts of a material cybersecurity 
incident, rather than on requiring details regarding the incident 
itself. The final rules will require the registrant to ``describe the 
material aspects of the nature, scope, and timing of the

[[Page 51904]]

incident, and the material impact or reasonably likely material impact 
on the registrant, including its financial condition and results of 
operations.'' We believe this formulation more precisely focuses the 
disclosure on what the company determines is the material impact of the 
incident, which may vary from incident to incident. The rule's 
inclusion of ``financial condition and results of operations'' is not 
exclusive; companies should consider qualitative factors alongside 
quantitative factors in assessing the material impact of an 
incident.\121\ By way of illustration, harm to a company's reputation, 
customer or vendor relationships, or competitiveness may be examples of 
a material impact on the company. Similarly, the possibility of 
litigation or regulatory investigations or actions, including 
regulatory actions by state and Federal Governmental authorities and 
non-U.S. authorities, may constitute a reasonably likely material 
impact on the registrant.
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    \121\ See also Proposing Release at 16596 (stating that ``[a] 
materiality analysis is not a mechanical exercise'' and not solely 
quantitative, but rather should take into consideration ``all 
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the cybersecurity 
incident, including both quantitative and qualitative factors'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are not adopting, as proposed, a requirement for disclosure 
regarding the incident's remediation status, whether it is ongoing, and 
whether data were compromised. While some incidents may still 
necessitate, for example, discussion of data theft, asset loss, 
intellectual property loss, reputational damage, or business value 
loss, registrants will make those determinations as part of their 
materiality analyses. Further, we are adding an Instruction 4 to Item 
1.05 to provide that a ``registrant need not disclose specific or 
technical information about its planned response to the incident or its 
cybersecurity systems, related networks and devices, or potential 
system vulnerabilities in such detail as would impede the registrant's 
response or remediation of the incident.'' While the Commission 
provided this assurance in the Proposing Release,\122\ we agree with 
some commenters that codifying it in the Item 1.05 instructions should 
provide added clarity to registrants on the type of disclosure required 
by Item 1.05.
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    \122\ Id. at 16595.
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    With respect to commenters' questions concerning the application of 
Item 1.05 to incidents occurring on third-party systems, we are not 
exempting registrants from providing disclosures regarding 
cybersecurity incidents on third-party systems they use, nor are we 
providing a safe harbor for information disclosed about third-party 
systems. While we appreciate the commenters' concerns about a 
registrant's reduced control over such systems, we note the centrality 
of the materiality determination: whether an incident is material is 
not contingent on where the relevant electronic systems reside or who 
owns them. In other words, we do not believe a reasonable investor 
would view a significant breach of a registrant's data as immaterial 
merely because the data were housed on a third-party system, especially 
as companies increasingly rely on third-party cloud services that may 
place their data out of their immediate control.\123\ Instead, as 
discussed above, materiality turns on how a reasonable investor would 
consider the incident's impact on the registrant.
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    \123\ See Deloitte, Global Third-Party Risk Management Survey 
2022, at 15, available at https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/risk/deloitte-uk-global-tprm-survey-report-2022.pdf (discussing results of a global survey of 1,309 ``senior 
leaders from a variety of organizations'' indicating that ``73% of 
respondents currently have a moderate to high level of dependence on 
[cloud-service providers]'' and ``[t]hat is expected to increase to 
88% in the years ahead'').
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    Depending on the circumstances of an incident that occurs on a 
third-party system, disclosure may be required by both the service 
provider and the customer, or by one but not the other, or by neither. 
We appreciate that companies may have reduced visibility into third-
party systems; registrants should disclose based on the information 
available to them. The final rules generally do not require that 
registrants conduct additional inquiries outside of their regular 
channels of communication with third-party service providers pursuant 
to those contracts and in accordance with registrants' disclosure 
controls and procedures. This is consistent with the Commission's 
general rules regarding the disclosure of information that is difficult 
to obtain.\124\
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    \124\ See 17 CFR 230.409 and 17 CFR 240.12b-21, which provide 
that information need only be disclosed insofar as it is known or 
reasonably available to the registrant. Accordingly, we are not 
providing additional time to comply with Item 1.05 as it relates to 
third-party incidents, as requested by some commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Turning to disclosure timing, we believe that the modifications 
from the proposed rules regarding the disclosures called for by Item 
1.05 alleviate many of the concerns some commenters had regarding the 
proposed disclosure deadline of four business days from the materiality 
determination. Because the streamlined disclosure requirements we are 
adopting are focused on an incident's basic identifying details and its 
material impact or reasonably likely material impact, the registrant 
should have the information required to be disclosed under this rule as 
part of conducting the materiality determination. For example, most 
organizations' materiality analyses will include consideration of the 
financial impact of a cybersecurity incident, so information regarding 
the incident's impact on the registrant's financial condition and 
results of operations will likely have already been developed when Item 
1.05 is triggered.\125\ Thus, we believe that the four business day 
timeframe from the date of a materiality determination will be 
workable.
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    \125\ To the extent any required information is not determined 
or is unavailable at the time of the required filing, Instruction 2 
to Item 1.05, as adopted, directs the registrant to include a 
statement to this effect in the Form 8-K and then file a Form 8-K 
amendment containing such information within four business days 
after the registrant, without unreasonable delay, determines such 
information or within four business days after such information 
becomes available. See infra Section II.B.3.
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    The reformulation of Item 1.05 also addresses the concern among 
commenters that the disclosure may be tentative and unclear, resulting 
in false positives and mispricing in the market. In the majority of 
cases, the registrant will likely be unable to determine materiality 
the same day the incident is discovered. The registrant will develop 
information after discovery until it is sufficient to facilitate a 
materiality analysis.\126\ At that point, we believe investors are best 
served knowing, within four business days after the materiality 
determination, that the incident occurred and what led management to 
conclude the incident is material. While it is possible that 
occasionally there may be incidents that initially appear material but 
developments after the filing of the Item 1.05 Form 8-K reveal to be 
not material, the alternative of delaying disclosure beyond the four 
business day period after a materiality determination has the potential 
to lead to far more mispricing and will negatively impact investors 
making investment and voting decisions without the benefit of knowing 
that there is a material cybersecurity incident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ As discussed below, registrants should develop such 
information without unreasonable delay.
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    Commenters posited an array of alternative deadlines for the Item 
1.05 Form 8-K, as recounted above. We are not persuaded by commenters' 
arguments that disclosure should be delayed until companies mitigate,

[[Page 51905]]

contain, remediate, or otherwise diminish the harm of the incident, 
because, as discussed above, Item 1.05 does not require disclosure of 
the types of details that have the potential to be exploited by threat 
actors, but rather focuses on the incident's material impact or 
reasonably likely material impact on the registrant. While there may 
be, as commenters noted, some residual risk of the disclosure of an 
incident's existence tipping off threat actors, such risk is justified, 
in our view, by investors' need for timely information, and similar 
risk already exists today with some companies' current cybersecurity 
incident disclosure practices. We are also not persuaded that Item 1.05 
is sufficiently different from other Form 8-K items such that deviating 
from the form's four business day deadline following the relevant 
trigger would be indicated. While some commenters argued that Item 1.05 
is qualitatively different from all other Form 8-K filings in that its 
trigger is largely outside the company's control, we disagree because 
other Form 8-K items may also be triggered unexpectedly, such as Item 
4.01 (Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountants) and Item 5.02 
(Departure of Directors or Principal Officers). And as compared to 
those items, the information needed for Item 1.05 may be further along 
in development when the filing is triggered, whereas, for example, a 
company may have no advance warning that a principal officer is 
departing.
    With respect to the five business day deadline suggested by a few 
commenters to allow registrants a full calendar week from the 
materiality determination to the disclosure, we note that in the 
majority of cases registrants will have had additional time leading up 
to the materiality determination, such that disclosure becoming due 
less than a week after discovery should be uncommon. More generally 
with respect to the various alternative timing suggestions, we observe 
that the Commission adopted the uniform four business day deadline in 
2004 to simplify the previous bifurcated deadlines, and we find 
commenters have not offered any compelling rationale to return to 
bifurcated deadlines.\127\ Form 8-K provides for current reporting of 
events that tend to be material to investor decision-making, and we see 
no reason to render the reporting of Item 1.05 less current than other 
Form 8-K items.
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    \127\ See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Release. See also 
Proposed Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and 
Acceleration of Filing Date, Release No. 33-8106 (June 17, 2002) [67 
FR 42914 (June 25, 2002)].
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    In the Proposing Release, the Commission requested comment on 
whether to allow registrants to delay filing an Item 1.05 Form 8-K 
where the Attorney General determines that a delay is in the interest 
of national security.\128\ In response to comments, we are adopting a 
delay provision in cases where disclosure poses a substantial risk to 
national security or public safety. Pursuant to Item 1.05(c), a 
registrant may delay making an Item 1.05 Form 8-K filing if the 
Attorney General determines that the disclosure poses a substantial 
risk to national security or public safety and notifies the Commission 
of such determination in writing.\129\ Initially, disclosure may be 
delayed for a time period specified by the Attorney General, up to 30 
days following the date when the disclosure was otherwise required to 
be provided. The delay may be extended for an additional period of up 
to 30 days if the Attorney General determines that disclosure continues 
to pose a substantial risk to national security or public safety and 
notifies the Commission of such determination in writing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Proposing Release at 16598.
    \129\ We note that the delay provision we are adopting does not 
relieve a company's obligations under Regulation FD or with respect 
to the securities laws' antifraud prohibitions that proscribe 
certain insider trading, including Exchange Act Section 10(b). Under 
Regulation FD, material nonpublic information disclosed to any 
investor, for example, through investor outreach activities, would 
be required to be disclosed publicly, subject to limited exceptions. 
See 17 CFR 243.100 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In extraordinary circumstances, disclosure may be delayed for a 
final additional period of up to 60 days if the Attorney General 
determines that disclosure continues to pose a substantial risk to 
national security and notifies the Commission of such determination in 
writing. We are providing for the final additional delay period in 
recognition that, in extraordinary circumstances, national security 
concerns may justify additional delay beyond that warranted by public 
safety concerns, due to the relatively more critical nature of national 
security concerns. Beyond the final 60-day delay, if the Attorney 
General indicates that further delay is necessary, the Commission will 
consider additional requests for delay and may grant such relief 
through Commission exemptive order.\130\
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    \130\ Any exercise of exemptive authority in these circumstances 
would need to meet all of the standards of Section 36 of the 
Exchange Act. Furthermore, Item 1.05 of Form 8-K in no way limits 
the Commission's general exemptive authority under Section 36.
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    We have consulted with the Department of Justice to establish an 
interagency communication process to allow for the Attorney General's 
determination to be communicated to the Commission in a timely manner. 
The Department of Justice will notify the affected registrant that 
communication to the Commission has been made, so that the registrant 
may delay filing its Form 8-K.
    We agree with commenters that a delay is appropriate for the 
limited instances in which public disclosure of a cybersecurity 
incident may cause harm to national security or public safety. The 
final rules appropriately balance such security concerns against 
investors' informational needs. In particular, the provision's 
``substantial risk to national security or public safety'' bases are 
sufficiently expansive to ensure that significant risks of harm from 
disclosure may be protected against, while also ensuring that investors 
are not denied timely access to material information.\131\ With respect 
to commenters who recommended that other Federal agencies and non-
Federal law enforcement agencies also be permitted to trigger a delay 
or who argued that other agencies may be the primary organization in 
the Federal Government for the response, we note that the rule does not 
preclude any such agency from requesting that the Attorney General 
determine that the disclosure poses a substantial risk to national 
security or public safety and communicate that determination to the 
Commission. However, we believe that designating a single law 
enforcement agency as the Commission's point of contact on such delays 
is critical to ensuring that the rule is administrable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ The delay provision for substantial risk to national 
security or public safety is separate from Exchange Act Rule 0-6, 
which provides for the omission of information that has been 
classified by an appropriate department or agency of the Federal 
Government for the protection of the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy. If the information a registrant would otherwise 
disclose on an Item 1.05 Form 8-K or pursuant to Item 106 of 
Regulation S-K or Item 16K of Form 20-F is classified, the 
registrant should comply with Exchange Act Rule 0-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Turning to other timing-related issues raised by commenters, we are 
not adopting commenters' suggestion to replace Item 1.05 with periodic 
reporting of material cybersecurity incidents on Forms 10-Q and 10-K 
because such an approach may result in significant variance as to when 
investors learn of material cybersecurity incidents. Based on when an 
incident occurs during a company's reporting

[[Page 51906]]

cycle, the timing between the materiality determination and reporting 
on the next Form 10-Q or Form 10-K could vary from a matter of months 
to a matter of weeks or less. For example, if two companies experience 
a similar cybersecurity incident, but one determines the incident is 
material early during a quarterly period and the other makes such 
determination at the end of the quarterly period, commenters' suggested 
approach would have both companies report the incident around the same 
time despite the first company having determined the incident was 
material weeks or months sooner, which would result in a significant 
delay in this information being provided to investors. Such variance 
would therefore reduce comparability across registrants and may put 
certain registrants at a competitive disadvantage.
    We also decline to use a quantifiable trigger for Item 1.05 because 
some cybersecurity incidents may be material yet not cross a particular 
financial threshold. We note above that the material impact of an 
incident may encompass a range of harms, some quantitative and others 
qualitative. A lack of quantifiable harm does not necessarily mean an 
incident is not material. For example, an incident that results in 
significant reputational harm to a registrant may not be readily 
quantifiable and therefore may not cross a particular quantitative 
threshold, but it should nonetheless be reported if the reputational 
harm is material. Similarly, whereas a cybersecurity incident that 
results in the theft of information may not be deemed material based on 
quantitative financial measures alone, it may in fact be material given 
the impact to the registrant that results from the scope or nature of 
harm to individuals, customers, or others, and therefore may need to be 
disclosed.
    In another change from the proposal, and to respond to commenters' 
concerns that the proposed ``as soon as reasonably practicable'' 
language in Instruction 1 could pressure companies to draw conclusions 
about incidents with insufficient information, we are revising the 
instruction to state that companies must make their materiality 
determinations ``without unreasonable delay.'' As explained in the 
Proposing Release, the instruction was intended to address any concern 
that some registrants may delay making such a determination to avoid a 
disclosure obligation.\132\ We understand commenter concerns that the 
proposed instruction could result in undue pressure to make a 
materiality determination before a registrant has sufficient 
information to do so, and we recognize that a materiality determination 
necessitates an informed and deliberative process. We believe the 
revised language should alleviate this unintended consequence, while 
providing registrants notice that, though the determination need not be 
rushed prematurely, it also cannot be unreasonably delayed in an effort 
to avoid timely disclosure. For example, for incidents that impact key 
systems and information, such as those the company considers its 
``crown jewels,'' \133\ as well as incidents involving unauthorized 
access to or exfiltration of large quantities of particularly important 
data, a company may not have complete information about the incident 
but may know enough about the incident to determine whether the 
incident was material. In other words, a company being unable to 
determine the full extent of an incident because of the nature of the 
incident or the company's systems, or otherwise the need for continued 
investigation regarding the incident, should not delay the company from 
determining materiality. Similarly, if the materiality determination is 
to be made by a board committee, intentionally deferring the 
committee's meeting on the materiality determination past the normal 
time it takes to convene its members would constitute unreasonable 
delay.\134\ As another example, if a company were to revise existing 
incident response policies and procedures in order to support a delayed 
materiality determination for or delayed disclosure of an ongoing 
cybersecurity event, such as by extending the incident severity 
assessment deadlines, changing the criteria that would require 
reporting an incident to management or committees with responsibility 
for public disclosures, or introducing other steps to delay the 
determination or disclosure, that would constitute unreasonable delay. 
In light of the revision to Instruction 1, we find that a safe harbor, 
as suggested by some commenters, is unnecessary; adhering to normal 
internal practices and disclosure controls and procedures will suffice 
to demonstrate good faith compliance. Importantly, we remind 
registrants, as the Commission did in the Proposing Release, that 
``[d]oubts as to the critical nature'' of the relevant information 
``will be commonplace'' and should ``be resolved in favor of those the 
statute is designed to protect,'' namely investors.\135\
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    \132\ Proposing Release at 16596.
    \133\ See National Cybersecurity Alliance, Identify Your ``Crown 
Jewels'' (July 1, 2022), available at https://staysafeonline.org/cybersecurity-for-business/identify-your-crown-jewels/ (explaining 
that ``[c]rown jewels are the data without which your business would 
have difficulty operating and/or the information that could be a 
high-value target for cybercriminals'').
    \134\ We note that Form 8-K Item 1.05 does not specify whether 
the materiality determination should be performed by the board, a 
board committee, or one or more officers. The company may establish 
a policy tasking one or more persons to make the materiality 
determination. Companies should seek to provide those tasked with 
the materiality determination information sufficient to make 
disclosure decisions.
    \135\ Proposing Release at 16596 (quoting TSC Indus. v. 
Northway, 426 U.S. at 448). The Court's opinion in TSC Indus. has a 
nuanced discussion of the balance of considerations in setting a 
materiality standard. 426 U.S. at 448-450.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Revised Instruction 1 should also reassure registrants that they 
should continue sharing information with other companies or government 
actors about emerging threats. Such information sharing may not 
necessarily result in an Item 1.05 disclosure obligation. The 
obligation to file the Item 1.05 disclosure is triggered once a company 
has developed information regarding an incident sufficient to make a 
materiality determination, and a decision to share information with 
other companies or government actors does not in itself necessarily 
constitute a determination of materiality. A registrant may alert 
similarly situated companies as well as government actors immediately 
after discovering an incident and before determining materiality, so 
long as it does not unreasonably delay its internal processes for 
determining materiality.
    As proposed, we are adding Item 1.05 to the list of Form 8-K items 
in General Instruction I.A.3.(b) of Form S-3, so that the untimely 
filing of an Item 1.05 Form 8-K will not result in the loss of Form S-3 
eligibility.\136\ We note the significant support from commenters 
regarding this proposal, and as noted in the Proposing Release, 
continue to believe that the consequences of the loss of Form S-3 
eligibility would be unduly severe given the circumstances that will 
surround Item 1.05 disclosures. Likewise, as supported by many 
commenters, we are adopting as proposed amendments to Rules 13a-11(c) 
and 15d-11(c) under the Exchange Act to include new Item 1.05 in the 
list of Form 8-K items eligible for a limited safe harbor from 
liability under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act. 
This accords with the view the Commission articulated in 2004 that the 
safe harbor is appropriate if the triggering event for the Form 8-K

[[Page 51907]]

requires management to make a rapid materiality determination.\137\
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    \136\ Because of our decision to exempt asset-backed issuers 
from the new rules (see infra Section II.G.1), we are not amending 
Form SF-3.
    \137\ Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Release at 15607.
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    We decline to permit registrants to furnish rather than file the 
Item 1.05 Form 8-K, as suggested by some commenters. While we 
understand commenters' points that reducing liability may ease the 
burden on registrants, we believe that treating Item 1.05 disclosures 
as filed will help promote the accuracy and reliability of such 
disclosures for the benefit of investors. Of the existing Form 8-K 
items, only Items 2.02 (Results of Operations and Financial Condition) 
and 7.01 (Regulation FD Disclosure) are permitted to be furnished 
rather than filed. The Commission created exceptions for those two 
items to allay concerns that do not pertain here. Specifically, with 
respect to Item 2.02, the Commission was motivated by concerns that 
requiring the information to be filed would discourage registrants from 
proactively issuing earnings releases and similar disclosures.\138\ 
Similarly, with respect to Item 7.01, the Commission decided to allow 
the disclosure to be furnished to address concerns that, if required to 
be filed, the disclosure could be construed as an admission of 
materiality, which might lead some registrants to avoid making 
proactive disclosure.\139\ By contrast, Item 1.05 is not a voluntary 
disclosure, and it is by definition material because it is not 
triggered until the registrant determines the materiality of an 
incident. It is thus more akin to the Form 8-K items other than Items 
2.02 and 7.01, in that it is a description of a material event that has 
occurred about which investors need adequate information. Therefore, 
the final rules require an Item 1.05 Form 8-K to be filed.
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    \138\ See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 
Release No. 33-8176 (Jan. 22, 2003) [68 FR 4819 (Jan. 30, 2003)].
    \139\ See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release No. 
33-7881 (Aug. 15, 2000) [65 FR 51715 (Aug. 24, 2000)].
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    We are not including a new rule to ban trading by insiders during 
the materiality determination time period, as suggested by some 
commenters. Those with a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust 
and confidence are already prohibited from trading while in possession 
of material, nonpublic information.\140\ And because we are adopting 
the four business days from materiality determination deadline, we 
agree with the point raised by some commenters that the risk of insider 
trading is low given the limited time period between experiencing a 
material incident and public disclosure. We also note that we recently 
adopted amendments to 17 CFR 240.10b5-1 (``Rule 10b5-1'') that added a 
certification condition for directors and officers wishing to avail 
themselves of the rule's affirmative defense; specifically, if relying 
on the amended affirmative defense, directors and officers need to 
certify in writing, at the time they adopt the trading plan, that they 
are unaware of material nonpublic information about the issuer or its 
securities, and are adopting the plan in good faith and not as part of 
a plan or scheme to evade the insider trading prohibitions.\141\ 
Therefore, given the timing of the incident disclosure requirement as 
well as the recently adopted amendments to Rule 10b5-1, we do not find 
need for a new rule banning trading by insiders during the time period 
between the materiality determination and disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
    \141\ See Insider Trading Arrangements and Related Disclosures, 
Release No. 33-11138 (Dec. 14, 2022) [87 FR 80362 (Dec. 29, 2022)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters raised concerns about conflicts with other 
Federal laws and regulations. Of the Federal laws and regulations that 
we reviewed and commenters raised concerns with, we have identified one 
conflict, with the FCC's notification rule for breaches of customer 
proprietary network information (``CPNI'').\142\ Of the remaining 
Federal laws and regulations noted by commenters as presenting 
conflicts, our view is that Item 1.05 neither directly conflicts with 
nor impedes the purposes of other such laws and regulations.
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    \142\ 47 CFR 64.2011. CPNI is defined in 47 CFR 222(h)(1) as: 
``(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical 
configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use of a 
telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a 
telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the 
carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer 
relationship; and (B) information contained in the bills pertaining 
to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service received by 
a customer of a carrier; except that such term does not include 
subscriber list information.''
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    The FCC's rule for notification in the event of breaches of CPNI 
requires covered entities to notify the United States Secret Service 
(``USSS'') and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI'') no later 
than seven business days after reasonable determination of a CPNI 
breach, and further directs the entities to refrain from notifying 
customers or disclosing the breach publicly until seven business days 
have passed following the notification to the USSS and FBI.\143\ To 
accommodate registrants who are subject to this rule and may as a 
result face conflicting disclosure timelines,\144\ we are adding 
paragraph (d) to Item 1.05 providing that such registrants may delay 
making a Form 8-K disclosure up to the seven business day period 
following notification to the USSS and FBI specified in the FCC 
rule,\145\ with written notification to the Commission.\146\
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    \143\ We note that the FCC recently proposed amending its rule; 
among other things, the proposal would eliminate the seven-business 
day waiting period, potentially eliminating the conflict. Federal 
Communications Commission, Data Breach Reporting Requirements, 88 FR 
3953 (Jan. 23, 2023).
    \144\ Commission staff consulted with FCC staff about a 
potential delay provision to address any conflict between the FCC 
rule and the Form 8-K reporting requirements.
    \145\ The exception we are creating does not apply to 47 CFR 
64.2011(b)(3), which provides that the USSS or FBI may direct the 
entity to further delay notification to customers or public 
disclosure beyond seven business days if such disclosure ``would 
impede or compromise an ongoing or potential criminal investigation 
or national security.'' If the USSS or FBI believes that disclosure 
would result in a substantial risk to national security or public 
safety, it may, as explained above, work with the Department of 
Justice to seek a delay of disclosure.
    \146\ Such notice should be provided through correspondence on 
EDGAR no later than the date when the disclosure required by Item 
1.05 was otherwise required to be provided.
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    We also considered the conflicts commenters alleged with CIRCIA. 
Specifically, they stated that Item 1.05 is at odds with the goals of 
CIRCIA, and that it may conflict with forthcoming regulations from 
CISA. The confidential reporting system established by CIRCIA serves a 
different purpose from Item 1.05 and through different means; the 
former focuses on facilitating the Federal Government's preparation for 
and rapid response to cybersecurity threats, while the latter focuses 
on providing material information about public companies to investors 
in a timely manner. While CISA has yet to propose regulations to 
implement CIRCIA, given the statutory authority, text, and legislative 
history of CIRCIA, it appears unlikely the regulations would affect the 
balance of material information available to investors about public 
companies, because the reporting regime CIRCIA establishes is 
confidential.\147\ Nonetheless, the Commission participates in 
interagency working groups on cybersecurity regulatory implementation, 
and will continue to monitor developments in this area to determine if 
modification to Item 1.05 becomes appropriate in light of future 
developments.\148\
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    \147\ 6 U.S.C. 681e.
    \148\ Should a conflict arise in the future with CISA 
regulations or regulations of another Federal agency, the Commission 
can address such conflict via rulemaking or other action at that 
time.
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    We also considered the HIPAA-related conflict alleged by 
commenters,

[[Page 51908]]

specifically with respect to HHS's rule on Notification in the Case of 
Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information. That rule provides, 
in the event of a breach of unsecured protected health information, for 
the covered entity to provide notification to affected individuals 
``without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days 
after discovery of a breach.'' \149\ If the breach involves more than 
500 residents of a state or jurisdiction, the rule directs the covered 
entity to also notify prominent media outlets within the same 
timeframe.\150\ The rule further provides that if a company receives 
written notice from ``a law enforcement official'' requesting a delay 
and specifying the length of the delay, then the company ``shall . . . 
delay such notification, notice, or posting for the time period 
specified by the official.'' \151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ 45 CFR 164.404(b). The notification must describe the 
breach, the types of unsecured protected health information 
involved, steps the individuals should take to protect themselves, 
what the entity is doing to mitigate harm and remediate, and where 
the individuals can seek additional information. Id.
    \150\ 45 CFR 164.406.
    \151\ 45 CFR 164.412.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We do not view Form 8-K Item 1.05 as implicated by the HHS rule. 
Importantly, the HHS rule's delay provision applies specifically to any 
``notification, notice, or posting required under this subpart,'' or in 
other words notice to affected individuals, media, and the Secretary of 
HHS.\152\ Such notification focuses on the consequences of the breach 
for the affected individuals; for example, individuals must be told 
what types of protected health information were accessed, and what 
steps they should take to protect themselves from harm.\153\ This is 
different from the disclosure required by Item 1.05, which focuses on 
the consequences for the company that are material to investors, and 
whose timing is tied not to discovery but to a materiality 
determination. The HHS rule does not expressly preclude the latter type 
of public disclosure, or other potential communications companies 
experiencing a breach may make. Therefore, we believe that a registrant 
subject to the HHS rule will not face a conflict in complying with Item 
1.05.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Id.
    \153\ 45 CFR 164.404(c).
    \154\ For the same reason, the Federal Trade Commission's Health 
Breach Notification rule, which is similar to HHS's rule, does not 
present a conflict either. See 16 CFR part 318.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also considered the conflicts commenters alleged with 
regulations and programs of DOD, DOE, DHS, the Federal banking 
regulatory agencies, state insurance laws, and miscellaneous other 
Federal agencies or laws. We find that, while there may be some overlap 
of subject matter, Item 1.05 neither conflicts with nor impedes the 
purpose of those regulations and programs.\155\ We disagree with one 
commenter's assertion that cybersecurity incident disclosure ``falls 
squarely within the jurisdiction of state insurance commissioners'' as 
state cybersecurity incident reporting regulations would not pertain to 
the ``business of insurance'' as courts have interpreted the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, and the commenter did not note any particular state 
insurance laws that would present a conflict.\156\ With respect to 
Federal banking regulatory agencies specifically, we note that, in the 
event they believe that the disclosure of a material cybersecurity 
incident would threaten the health of the financial system in such a 
way that results in a substantial risk to national security or public 
safety, they may, as explained above, work with the Department of 
Justice to seek to delay disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ For example, one commenter alleged conflicts with DHS's 
Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards program (``CFATS'') and 
with the Maritime Transportation Security Act (``MTSA''). See letter 
from American Chemistry Council. Both CFATS and MTSA provide for the 
protection of certain sensitive information, but neither is 
implicated by cybersecurity incident disclosure to the Commission.
    \156\ See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 
(1969).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It would not be practical to further harmonize Item 1.05 with other 
agencies' cybersecurity incident reporting regulations, as one 
commenter suggested,\157\ because Item 1.05 serves a different 
purpose--it is focused on the needs of investors, rather than the needs 
of regulatory agencies, affected individuals, or the like. With respect 
to state insurance and privacy laws, commenters did not provide any 
evidence sufficient to alter the Commission's finding in the Proposing 
Release that, to the extent that Item 1.05 would require disclosure in 
a situation where state law would excuse or delay notification, we 
consider prompt reporting of material cybersecurity incidents to 
investors critical to investor protection and well-functioning, 
orderly, and efficient markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ See letter from BIO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Disclosures About Cybersecurity Incidents in Periodic Reports

1. Proposed Amendments
    The Commission proposed to add new Item 106 to Regulation S-K to, 
among other things, require updated cybersecurity disclosure in 
periodic reports. If a registrant previously provided disclosure 
regarding one or more cybersecurity incidents pursuant to Item 1.05 of 
Form 8-K, proposed 17 CFR 229.106(d)(1) (Regulation S-K ``Item 
106(d)(1)'') would require such registrant to disclose ``any material 
changes, additions, or updates'' on the registrant's quarterly report 
on Form 10-Q or annual report on Form 10-K.\158\ In addition, proposed 
Item 106(d)(1) would require disclosure of the following information:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ Proposing Release at 16598.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Any material effect of the incident on the registrant's 
operations and financial condition;
     Any potential material future impacts on the registrant's 
operations and financial condition;
     Whether the registrant has remediated or is currently 
remediating the incident; and
     Any changes in the registrant's policies and procedures as 
a result of the cybersecurity incident, and how the incident may have 
informed such changes.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission explained that it paired current reporting under 
Item 1.05 of Form 8-K with periodic reporting under 17 CFR 229.106(d) 
(Regulation S-K ``Item 106(d)'') to balance investors' need for timely 
disclosure with their need for complete disclosure.\160\ When an Item 
1.05 Form 8-K becomes due, the Commission noted, a registrant may not 
possess complete information about the material cybersecurity incident. 
Accordingly, under the proposed rules, a registrant would provide the 
information known at the time of the Form 8-K filing and follow up in 
its periodic reports with more complete information as it becomes 
available, along with any updates to previously disclosed information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposed 17 CFR 229.106(d)(2) (Regulation S-K 
``Item 106(d)(2)'') to require disclosure in a registrant's next 
periodic report when, to the extent known to management, a series of 
previously undisclosed individually immaterial cybersecurity incidents 
become material in the aggregate.\161\ The Proposing Release explained 
that this requirement may be triggered where, for example, a threat 
actor engages in a number of smaller but continuous related 
cyberattacks against the same company and collectively they become 
material.\162\ Item 106(d)(2) would require disclosure of essentially 
the

[[Page 51909]]

same information required in proposed Item 1.05 of Form 8-K, as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ Id. at 16599.
    \162\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A general description of when the incidents were 
discovered and whether they are ongoing;
     A brief description of the nature and scope of the 
incidents;
     Whether any data were stolen or altered in connection with 
the incidents;
     The effect of the incidents on the registrant's 
operations; and
     Whether the registrant has remediated or is currently 
remediating the incidents.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ Id. at 16619-16620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    Reaction among commenters to proposed Item 106(d)(1) was mixed. 
Some wrote in support, noting that updated incident disclosure is 
needed to avoid previously disclosed information becoming stale and 
misleading as more information becomes available, and saying that 
updates help investors assess the efficacy of companies' cybersecurity 
procedures.\164\ Others took issue with specific aspects of the 
proposed rule. For example, some commenters stated that the proposed 
requirement to disclose ``any potential material future impacts'' is 
vague and difficult to apply, and urged removing or revising it.\165\ 
Similarly, other commenters said that registrants should not be 
required to describe progress on remediation, noting that such 
information could open them up to more attacks.\166\ In the same vein, 
one commenter suggested that no updates be required until remediation 
is sufficiently complete.\167\ One commenter said the requirement to 
disclose changes in policies and procedures is unnecessary and overly 
broad,\168\ and another commenter said the requirement should be 
narrowed to ``material changes.'' \169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ See letters from AICPA; Crindata; R Street. See also IAC 
Recommendation.
    \165\ See letters from EEI; Prof. Perullo; PWC; SCG.
    \166\ See letters from BCE; BPI et al.; Enbridge. See also 
letter from EEI (suggesting narrowing the rule to ``material 
remediation,'' and delaying such disclosure until remediation is 
complete).
    \167\ See letter from EEI.
    \168\ See letter from Prof. Perullo.
    \169\ See letter from EEI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More generally, commenters sought clarification on how to 
differentiate instances where updates should be included in periodic 
reports from instances where updates should be filed on Form 8-K; they 
found the guidance in the Proposing Release on this point ``unclear.'' 
\170\ And one commenter argued that, regardless of where the update is 
filed, the incremental availability of information would make it 
difficult for companies to determine when the update requirement is 
triggered.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ See letter from PWC; accord letter from Deloitte. The 
Proposing Release stated: ``Notwithstanding proposed Item 106(d)(1), 
there may be situations where a registrant would need to file an 
amended Form 8-K to correct disclosure from the initial Item 1.05 
Form 8-K, such as where that disclosure becomes inaccurate or 
materially misleading as a result of subsequent developments 
regarding the incident. For example, if the impact of the incident 
is determined after the initial Item 1.05 Form 8-K filing to be 
significantly more severe than previously disclosed, an amended Form 
8-K may be required.'' Proposing Release at 16598.
    \171\ See letter from Quest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to proposed Item 106(d)(2), a large number of 
commenters expressed concern about the aggregation requirement, saying, 
for example, that companies experience too many events to realistically 
communicate internally upward to senior management, and that retaining 
and analyzing data on past events would be too costly.\172\ A number of 
other commenters relatedly said that, for the aggregation requirement 
to be workable, companies need more guidance on the nature, timeframe, 
and breadth of incidents that should be collated.\173\ In this regard, 
one supporter of the requirement explained in its request for 
additional guidance that ``cybersecurity incidents are so unfortunately 
common that a strict reading of this section could cause overreporting 
to the point that it is meaningless for shareholders.'' \174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ See letters from ABA; ACLI; AIA; Business Roundtable; EEI; 
Enbridge; Ernst & Young LLP (``E&Y''); FAH; FedEx; Center on Cyber 
and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies (``FDD''); GPA; Hunton; ITI; ISA; LTSE; Microsoft; 
Nareit; NAM; NDIA; NRA; Prof. Perullo; SCG; SIFMA.
    \173\ See letters from ACC; APCIA; BDO USA, LLP (``BDO''); BPI 
et al.; CAQ; Chamber; Chevron; Deloitte; EIC; FEI; M. Barragan; PWC; 
R Street.; TransUnion.
    \174\ See letter from R Street.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters suggested revising the rule to cover only 
``related'' incidents.\175\ Possible definitions offered for 
``related'' incidents included those ``performed by the same malicious 
actor or that exploited the same vulnerability,'' \176\ and those 
resulting from ``attacks on the same systems, processes or controls of 
a registrant over a specified period of time.'' \177\ Suggestions for 
limiting the time period over which aggregation should occur included 
the preceding one year,\178\ and the preceding two years.\179\ One 
commenter requested the Commission clarify that a company's Item 
106(d)(2) disclosure need describe only the aggregate material impact 
of the incidents, rather than describing each incident individually; 
the commenter was concerned with threat actors becoming informed of a 
company's vulnerabilities through overly detailed disclosure.\180\ 
Another commenter suggested granting registrants additional time to 
come into compliance with Item 106(d)(2) after Commission adoption, so 
that they can develop system functionality to retain details about 
immaterial incidents.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ See letters from ABA; APCIA; EEI; E&Y PWC.
    \176\ See letter from ABA.
    \177\ See letter from E&Y.
    \178\ See letter from APCIA.
    \179\ See letter from EEI.
    \180\ See letter from AGA/INGAA.
    \181\ See letter from Deloitte.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also wrote in support of the aggregation 
requirement.\182\ One of these commenters stated that aggregation is 
needed especially where an advanced persistent threat actor \183\ seeks 
to exfiltrate data or intellectual property over time.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ See letters from CII; CSA; R Street; NASAA.
    \183\ The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
explains that an advanced persistent threat ``is an adversary or 
adversarial group that possesses the expertise and resources that 
allow it to create opportunities to achieve its objectives by using 
multiple attack vectors, including cyber, physical, and deception. 
The APT objectives include establishing a foothold within the 
infrastructure of targeted organizations for purposes of 
exfiltrating information; undermining or impeding critical aspects 
of a mission, function, program, or organization; or positioning 
itself to carry out these objectives in the future. The APT pursues 
its objectives repeatedly over an extended period, adapts to 
defenders' efforts to resist it, and is determined to maintain the 
level of interaction needed to execute its objectives.'' National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-
172, Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled 
Unclassified Information (Feb. 2021), at 2.
    \184\ See letter from CSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Amendments
    In response to comments, we are not adopting proposed Item 
106(d)(1) and instead are adopting a new instruction to clarify that 
updated incident disclosure must be provided in a Form 8-K amendment. 
Specifically, we are revising proposed Instruction 2 to Item 1.05 of 
Form 8-K to direct the registrant to include in its Item 1.05 Form 8-K 
a statement identifying any information called for in Item 1.05(a) that 
is not determined or is unavailable at the time of the required filing 
and then file an amendment to its Form 8-K containing such information 
within four business days after the registrant, without unreasonable 
delay, determines such information or within four business days after 
such information becomes available. This change mitigates commenters' 
concerns with Item 106(d)(1). In particular, under the final rules, 
companies will not have to distinguish whether information

[[Page 51910]]

regarding a material cybersecurity incident that was not determined or 
was unavailable at the time of the initial Form 8-K filing should be 
included on current reports or periodic reports, as the reporting would 
be in an amended Form 8-K; details that commenters suggested raised 
security concerns, such as remediation status, are not required; and 
concerns that the proposed rule was vague or overbroad have been 
addressed by narrowing the required disclosure to the information 
required by Item 1.05(a). We also believe that use of a Form 8-K 
amendment rather than a periodic report will allow investors to more 
quickly identify updates regarding incidents that previously were 
disclosed.
    We appreciate that new information on a reported cybersecurity 
incident may surface only in pieces; the final rules, however, do not 
require updated reporting for all new information. Rather, Instruction 
2 to Item 1.05 directs companies to file an amended Form 8-K with 
respect to any information called for in Item 1.05(a) that was not 
determined or was unavailable at the time of the initial Form 8-K 
filing. Other than with respect to such previously undetermined or 
unavailable information, the final rules do not separately create or 
otherwise affect a registrant's duty to update its prior statements. We 
remind registrants, however, that they may have a duty to correct prior 
disclosure that the registrant determines was untrue (or omitted a 
material fact necessary to make the disclosure not misleading) at the 
time it was made \185\ (for example, if the registrant subsequently 
discovers contradictory information that existed at the time of the 
initial disclosure), or a duty to update disclosure that becomes 
materially inaccurate after it is made \186\ (for example, when the 
original statement is still being relied on by reasonable investors). 
Registrants should consider whether they need to revisit or refresh 
previous disclosure, including during the process of investigating a 
cybersecurity incident.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (en banc) (finding that the duty to correct applies ``if 
a disclosure is in fact misleading when made, and the speaker 
thereafter learns of this'').
    \186\ See id. at 17 (describing the duty to update as 
potentially applying ``if a prior disclosure `becomes materially 
misleading in light of subsequent events''' (quoting Greenfield v. 
Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984))). But see 
Higginbotham v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 
2007) (rejecting duty to update before next quarterly report); 
Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories, 269 F.3d 806, 808-11 (7th Cir. 
2001) (explaining that securities laws do not require continuous 
disclosure).
    \187\ Relatedly, registrants should be aware of the requirement 
under Item 106(b)(2) of Regulation S-K to describe ``[w]hether any 
risks from cybersecurity threats, including as a result of any 
previous cybersecurity incidents, have materially affected or are 
reasonably likely to materially affect the registrant'' (emphasis 
added). See infra Section II.C.1.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are not adopting proposed Item 106(d)(2), in response to 
concerns that the proposed aggregation requirement was vague or 
difficult to apply. We are persuaded by commenters that the proposed 
requirement might be difficult to differentiate from Item 1.05 
disclosure, or by contrast, could result in the need for extensive 
internal controls and procedures to monitor all immaterial events to 
determine whether they have become collectively material. The intent of 
the proposed requirement was to capture the material impacts of related 
incidents, and prevent the avoidance of incident disclosure through 
disaggregation of such related events. However, upon further 
reflection, and after review of comments, we believe that the proposed 
requirement is not necessary based on the scope of Item 1.05.
    To that end, we emphasize that the term ``cybersecurity incident'' 
as used in the final rules is to be construed broadly, as the 
Commission stated in the Proposing Release.\188\ The definition of 
``cybersecurity incident'' we are adopting extends to ``a series of 
related unauthorized occurrences.'' \189\ This reflects that 
cyberattacks sometimes compound over time, rather than present as a 
discrete event. Accordingly, when a company finds that it has been 
materially affected by what may appear as a series of related cyber 
intrusions, Item 1.05 may be triggered even if the material impact or 
reasonably likely material impact could be parceled among the multiple 
intrusions to render each by itself immaterial. One example was 
provided in the Proposing Release: the same malicious actor engages in 
a number of smaller but continuous cyberattacks related in time and 
form against the same company and collectively, they are either 
quantitatively or qualitatively material.\190\ Another example is a 
series of related attacks from multiple actors exploiting the same 
vulnerability and collectively impeding the company's business 
materially.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ Proposing Release at 16601.
    \189\ See infra Section II.C.3.
    \190\ Proposing Release at 16599.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Disclosure of a Registrant's Risk Management, Strategy and 
Governance Regarding Cybersecurity Risks

1. Risk Management and Strategy
a. Proposed Amendments
    The Commission proposed to add 17 CFR 229.106(b) (Regulation S-K 
``Item 106(b)'') to require registrants to provide more consistent and 
informative disclosure regarding their cybersecurity risk management 
and strategy in their annual reports. The Commission noted the Division 
of Corporation Finance staff's experience that most registrants 
disclosing a cybersecurity incident do not describe their cybersecurity 
risk oversight or any related policies and procedures, even though 
companies typically address significant risks by developing risk 
management systems that often include written policies and 
procedures.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Item 106(b) would require a description of the 
registrant's policies and procedures, if any, for the identification 
and management of cybersecurity threats, including, but not limited to: 
operational risk (i.e., disruption of business operations); 
intellectual property theft; fraud; extortion; harm to employees or 
customers; violation of privacy laws and other litigation and legal 
risk; and reputational risk. As proposed, registrants would be required 
to include a discussion, as applicable, of:
     Whether the registrant has a cybersecurity risk assessment 
program and if so, a description of the program ((b)(1));
     Whether the registrant engages assessors, consultants, 
auditors, or other third parties in connection with any cybersecurity 
risk assessment program ((b)(2));
     Whether the registrant has policies and procedures to 
oversee, identify, and mitigate the cybersecurity risks associated with 
its use of any third-party service provider (including, but not limited 
to, those providers that have access to the registrant's customer and 
employee data), including whether and how cybersecurity considerations 
affect the selection and oversight of these providers and contractual 
and other mechanisms the company uses to mitigate cybersecurity risks 
related to these providers ((b)(3));
     Whether the registrant undertakes activities to prevent, 
detect, and minimize effects of cybersecurity incidents ((b)(4));
     Whether the registrant has business continuity, 
contingency, and recovery

[[Page 51911]]

plans in the event of a cybersecurity incident ((b)(5));
     Whether previous cybersecurity incidents have informed 
changes in the registrant's governance, policies and procedures, or 
technologies ((b)(6));
     Whether cybersecurity related risk and incidents have 
affected or are reasonably likely to affect the registrant's results of 
operations or financial condition and if so, how ((b)(7)); and
     Whether cybersecurity risks are considered as part of the 
registrant's business strategy, financial planning, and capital 
allocation and if so, how ((b)(8)).\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ Id. at 16599-16600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission anticipated that proposed Item 106(b) would benefit 
investors by requiring more consistent disclosure of registrants' 
strategies and actions to manage cybersecurity risks.\193\ Such risks, 
the Commission observed, can affect registrants' business strategy, 
financial outlook, and financial planning, as companies increasingly 
rely on information technology, collection of data, and use of digital 
payments as critical components of their businesses.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ Id. at 16599.
    \194\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission noted that the significant number of cybersecurity 
incidents pertaining to third-party service providers prompted the 
proposal to require disclosure of registrants' selection and oversight 
of third-party entities.\195\ The Commission also proposed requiring 
discussion of how prior cybersecurity incidents have affected or are 
reasonably likely to affect the registrant, because such disclosure 
would equip investors to better comprehend the level of cybersecurity 
risk the company faces and assess the company's preparedness regarding 
such risk.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ Id.
    \196\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    Many commenters supported proposed Item 106(b) for requiring 
information that is vital to investors as they assess companies' risk 
profiles and make investment decisions.\197\ One said cybersecurity 
disclosures now are ``scattered and unpredictable'' rather than 
``uniform,'' which ``diminishes their effectiveness.'' \198\ Similarly, 
another found that current disclosures ``do not provide investors with 
the information necessary to evaluate whether companies have adequate 
governance structures and measures in place to deal with cybersecurity 
challenges.'' \199\ The IAC recommended extending the proposed Item 
106(b) disclosure requirements (as well as the proposed Item 106(c) 
disclosure requirements) to registration statements, stating that 
``pre-IPO companies may face heightened [cybersecurity] risks.'' \200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See letters of AICPA; BuildingCyberSecurity.org (``BCS''); 
Better Markets; Bitsight; Blue Lava, Inc. (``Blue Lava''); CalPERS; 
ITIF; National Association of Corporate Directors (``NACD''); NASAA; 
PWC; PRI; R Street; SecurityScorecard; Tenable Holdings Inc. 
(``Tenable''). See also IAC Recommendation.
    \198\ See letter from Better Markets.
    \199\ See letter from PRI.
    \200\ See IAC Recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By contrast, a number of commenters opposed proposed Item 106(b). 
In particular, they commented that much of the proposed Item 106(b) 
disclosure could increase a company's vulnerability to cyberattacks; 
they expressed particular concern regarding the potential harms from 
disclosures about whether cybersecurity policies are in place, incident 
response processes and techniques, previous incidents and what changes 
they spurred, and third-party service providers.\201\ Another criticism 
was that proposed Item 106(b) would effectively force companies to 
model their cybersecurity policies on the rule's disclosure elements, 
rather than the practices best suited to each company's context.\202\ 
One commenter saw proposed Item 106(b) as counteracting the 
streamlining accomplished in the Commission's 2020 release modernizing 
Regulation S-K.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ See letters from ABA; ACLI; APCIA; BIO; BPI et al.; 
Business Roundtable; Chamber; CSA; CTIA; EIC; Enbridge; FAH; 
Federated Hermes; GPA; ITI; ISA; Nareit; NAM; NMHC; NRA; National 
Retail Federation (``NRF''); SIFMA; Sen. Portman; TechNet; 
TransUnion; USTelecom; Virtu.
    \202\ See letters from BPI et al.; Chamber; EIC; Nareit; NRF; 
NYSE; SCG; SIFMA; Virtu.
    \203\ See letter from Nasdaq (citing Modernization of Regulation 
S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, Release No. 33-10825 (Aug. 26, 2020) 
[85 FR 63726 (Oct. 8, 2020)]).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters offered suggestions to narrow proposed Item 106(b) 
to address their concerns. On proposed paragraph (b)(1), one commenter 
recommended allowing a registrant to forgo describing its risk 
assessment program if it confirms that it ``uses best practices and 
standards'' to identify and protect against cybersecurity risks and 
detect and respond to such events.\204\ On proposed paragraph (b)(3), a 
few commenters said that registrants should be required to disclose 
only high-level information relating to third parties, such as 
confirmation that policies and procedures are appropriately applied to 
third-party selection and oversight, and should not have to identify 
the third parties or discuss the underlying mechanisms, controls, and 
contractual requirements.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ See letter from Cybersecurity Coalition.
    \205\ See letters from BPI et al.; Chamber; SIFMA. Other 
commenters supported the level of detail required in (b)(3). See 
letters from AICPA; PRI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters opposed proposed paragraph (b)(6)'s requirement to 
discuss whether ``previous cybersecurity incidents informed changes in 
the registrant's governance, policies and procedures, or technologies'' 
entirely, stating it would undermine a registrant's cybersecurity.\206\ 
One commenter recommended the proposed (b)(6) disclosure be required 
only at a high level, without specific details,\207\ while two 
commenters appeared to propose only requiring disclosure as it pertains 
to previous material incidents.\208\ Commenters suggested a materiality 
filter for proposed paragraph (b)(7)'s requirement to discuss whether 
``cybersecurity-related risks and previous cybersecurity-related 
incidents have affected or are reasonably likely to affect the 
registrant's strategy, business model, results of operations, or 
financial condition and if so, how,'' so that the requirement would 
apply only where a registrant has been materially affected or is 
reasonably likely to be materially affected.\209\
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    \206\ See letters from ITI; SCG; Tenable.
    \207\ See letter from Cybersecurity Coalition.
    \208\ See letters from AGA/INGA; American Public Gas Association 
(``APGA'').
    \209\ See letter from PWC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More broadly, one commenter recommended replacing the rule's 
references to ``policies and procedures'' with ``strategy and 
programs,'' because in the commenter's experience companies may not 
codify their cybersecurity strategy in the same way they codify other 
compliance policies and procedures.\210\ One commenter also suggested 
offering companies the choice to place the proposed Item 106(b) 
disclosures in either the Form 10-K or the proxy statement.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ See letter from Prof. Perullo.
    \211\ See letter from Nasdaq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters supported requiring registrants that lack 
cybersecurity policies and procedures to explicitly say so, commenting, 
for example, that ``investors should not be left to intuit the meaning 
of a company's silence in its disclosures.'' \212\ One

[[Page 51912]]

commenter further stated that registrants should be required to explain 
why they have not adopted cybersecurity policies and procedures.\213\ 
By contrast, two commenters opposed requiring registrants that lack 
cybersecurity policies and procedures to explicitly say so,\214\ with 
one commenter saying that ``a threat actor may target registrants they 
perceive to have unsophisticated cybersecurity programs,'' \215\ and 
the other commenter saying ``it is highly unlikely that any SEC 
registrants would not have `established any cybersecurity policies and 
procedures.'' \216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ See letters from Blue Lava; CSA; Cybersecurity Coalition; 
ITI; NASAA; Prof. Perullo; Tenable. The quoted language is from 
NASAA's letter. See also IAC Recommendation (recommending ``that 
issuers that have not developed any cybersecurity policies or 
procedures be required to make a statement to that effect'' because 
``the vast majority of investors . . . would view the complete 
absence of cybersecurity risk governance as overwhelmingly material 
to investment decision-making'').
    \213\ See letter from NASAA.
    \214\ See letters from EIC; IIA.
    \215\ See letter from EIC.
    \216\ See letter from IIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the Commission's request for comment about whether 
to require a registrant to specify whether any cybersecurity assessor, 
consultant, auditor, or other service provider that it relies on is 
through an internal function or through an external third-party service 
provider, several commenters opposed the idea as not useful, with one 
saying that ``a significant majority--possibly the entirety--of SEC 
registrants'' rely on third-party service providers for some portion of 
their cybersecurity.\217\ Conversely, another commenter supported the 
third-party specification, and suggested requiring registrants to name 
the third parties, as over time, this would create more transparency in 
whether breaches correlate with specific third parties.\218\
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    \217\ See letters from BCS; Chevron; EIC; IIA; Prof. Perullo. 
The quoted language is from the letter of IIA.
    \218\ See letter from Blue Lava.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also offered a range of recommended additions to the 
rule. One commenter recommended modifying proposed paragraph (b)(1) to 
require registrants to specify whether their cybersecurity programs 
assess risks continuously or periodically, arguing the latter approach 
leaves companies more exposed.\219\ The same commenter suggested 
paragraph (b)(2) require ``a description of the class of services and 
solutions'' provided by third parties.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ See letter from Tenable.
    \220\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters recommended that we direct registrants to quantify 
their cybersecurity risk exposure through independent risk 
assessments.\221\ Similarly, one commenter urged us to require 
registrants to explain how they quantify their cybersecurity risk,\222\ 
while another said we should set out quantifiable metrics against which 
companies measure their cybersecurity systems, though it did not 
specify what these metrics should be.\223\ Two commenters suggested 
that we require companies to disclose whether their cybersecurity 
programs have been audited by a third party.\224\ And one commenter 
recommended that we require registrants to disclose whether they use 
the cybersecurity framework of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (``NIST''), to ease comparison of registrant risk 
profiles.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ See letters from BitSight; Kovrr Risk Modeling Ltd.; 
SecurityScorecard.
    \222\ See letter from Safe Security.
    \223\ See letter from FDD.
    \224\ See letters from BCS; Better Markets.
    \225\ See letter from SandboxAQ. This commenter also recommended 
registrants be required to disclose whether they use post-quantum 
cryptography as part of their risk mitigation efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Final Amendments
    We continue to believe that investors need information on 
registrants' cybersecurity risk management and strategy, and that 
uniform, comparable, easy to locate disclosure will not emerge absent 
new rules. Commenters raised concerns with proposed Item 106(b)'s 
security implications and what they saw as its prescriptiveness. We 
agree that extensive public disclosure on how a company plans for, 
defends against, and responds to cyberattacks has the potential to 
advantage threat actors. Similarly, we acknowledge commenters' concerns 
that the final rule could unintentionally affect a registrant's risk 
management and strategy decision-making. In response to those comments, 
we confirm that the purpose of the rules is, and was at proposal, to 
inform investors, not to influence whether and how companies manage 
their cybersecurity risk. Additionally, to respond to commenters' 
concerns about security, the final rules eliminate or narrow certain 
elements from proposed Item 106(b). We believe the resulting rule 
requires disclosure of information material to the investment decisions 
of investors, in a way that is comparable and easy to locate, while 
steering clear of security sensitive details.
    As adopted, 17 CFR 229.106(b)(1) (Regulation S-K ``Item 
106(b)(1)'') requires a description of ``the registrant's processes, if 
any, for assessing, identifying, and managing material risks from 
cybersecurity threats in sufficient detail for a reasonable investor to 
understand those processes.'' We believe this revised formulation of 
the rule should help avoid levels of detail that may go beyond 
information that is material to investors and address commenters' 
concerns that those details could increase a company's vulnerability to 
cyberattack. We have also substituted the term ``processes'' for the 
proposed ``policies and procedures'' to avoid requiring disclosure of 
the kinds of operational details that could be weaponized by threat 
actors, and because the term ``processes'' more fully compasses 
registrants' cybersecurity practices than ``policies and procedures,'' 
which suggest formal codification.\226\ We still expect the disclosure 
to allow investors to ascertain a registrant's cybersecurity practices, 
such as whether they have a risk assessment program in place, with 
sufficient detail for investors to understand the registrant's 
cybersecurity risk profile. The shift to ``processes'' also obviates 
the question of whether to require companies that do not have written 
policies and procedures to disclose that fact. We believe that, to the 
extent a company discloses that it faces a material cybersecurity risk 
in connection with its overall disclosures of material risks,\227\ an 
investor can ascertain whether such risks have resulted in the adoption 
of processes to assess, identify, and manage material cybersecurity 
risks based on whether the company also makes such disclosures under 
the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ See letter from Prof. Perullo (distinguishing the 
formality of ``policies and procedures'' from the informality of 
``strategy or program''). We have adopted ``processes'' in place of 
the commenter's suggestion of ``strategy or program'' because 
``processes'' is broader and commonly understood. We decline the 
suggestion from another commenter to allow registrants to avoid this 
disclosure altogether by confirming they adhere to ``best practices 
and standards,'' because there is no single set of widely accepted 
best practices and standards, and industry practices may evolve. See 
letter from Cybersecurity Coalition.
    \227\ See Item 105 of Regulation S-K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also added a materiality qualifier to the proposed 
requirement to disclose ``risks from cybersecurity threats,'' and have 
removed the proposed list of risk types (i.e., ``intellectual property 
theft; fraud; extortion; harm to employees or customers; violation of 
privacy laws and other litigation and legal risk; and reputational 
risk''), to foreclose any perception that the rule prescribes 
cybersecurity policy. We continue to believe these are the types of 
risks that registrants may face in this context, and enumerate them 
here as guidance. We note that registrants will continue to tailor 
their cybersecurity processes to threats as they perceive them. The 
rule requires registrants to describe those processes insofar as they 
relate to material cybersecurity risks.
    We have also revised Item 106(b)'s enumerated disclosure elements 
in

[[Page 51913]]

response to commenters that raised concerns regarding the level of 
detail required by some elements of the proposal. Specifically, we are 
not adopting proposed paragraphs (4) (prevention and detection 
activities), (5) (continuity and recovery plans), and (6) (previous 
incidents). We have similarly revised proposed paragraph (3) to 
eliminate some of the detail it required, consistent with commenter 
suggestions to require only high-level disclosure regarding third-party 
service providers. The enumerated elements that a registrant should 
address in its Item 106(b) disclosure, as applicable, are:
     Whether and how the described cybersecurity processes in 
Item 106(b) have been integrated into the registrant's overall risk 
management system or processes;
     Whether the registrant engages assessors, consultants, 
auditors, or other third parties in connection with any such processes; 
and
     Whether the registrant has processes to oversee and 
identify material risks from cybersecurity threats associated with its 
use of any third-party service provider.
    We have also revised the rule text to clarify that the above 
elements compose a non-exclusive list of disclosures; registrants 
should additionally disclose whatever information is necessary, based 
on their facts and circumstances, for a reasonable investor to 
understand their cybersecurity processes.
    We have moved proposed paragraph (7) into a separate paragraph, at 
17 CFR 229.106(b)(2) (Regulation S-K ``Item 106(b)(2)''), instead of 
including it in the enumerated list in Item 106(b)(1), and have added a 
materiality qualifier in response to a comment.\228\ Item 106(b)(2) 
requires a description of ``[w]hether any risks from cybersecurity 
threats, including as a result of any previous cybersecurity incidents, 
have materially affected or are reasonably likely to materially affect 
the registrant, including its business strategy, results of operations, 
or financial condition and if so, how.'' \229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \228\ See letter from PWC.
    \229\ With respect to the Item 106(b)(2)'s requirement to 
describe any risks as a result of any previous cybersecurity 
incidents, see supra Section II.B.3 for a discussion of the duties 
to correct or update prior disclosure that registrants may have in 
certain circumstances. As we note in that section, registrants 
should consider whether they need to revisit or refresh previous 
disclosure, including during the process of investigating a 
cybersecurity incident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rules will require disclosure of whether a registrant 
engages assessors, consultants, auditors, or other third parties in 
connection with their cybersecurity because we believe it is important 
for investors to know a registrant's level of in-house versus 
outsourced cybersecurity capacity. We understand that many registrants 
rely on third-party service providers for some portion of their 
cybersecurity, and we believe this information is accordingly necessary 
for investors to assess a company's cybersecurity risk profile in 
making investment decisions. However, we are not persuaded, as one 
commenter contended, that registrants should be required to name the 
third parties (though they may choose to do so), because we believe 
this may magnify concerns about increasing a company's cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities. For the same reason, we decline the commenter 
suggestion to require a description of the services provided by third 
parties.
    We are also not persuaded that risk quantification or other 
quantifiable metrics are appropriate as mandatory elements of a 
cybersecurity disclosure framework. While such metrics may be used by 
registrants and investors in the future, commenters did not identify 
any such metrics that would be appropriate to mandate at this time. 
Additionally, to the extent that a registrant uses any quantitative 
metrics in assessing or managing cybersecurity risks, it may disclose 
such information voluntarily. For similar reasons, we decline 
commenters' recommendations to require disclosure of independent 
assessments and audits, as well as commenters' recommendations on 
disclosure of use of the NIST framework, and on distinguishing between 
continuous and periodic risk assessment.
    We decline the commenter suggestion to allow Item 106(b) disclosure 
to be provided in the proxy statement, as the proxy statement is 
generally confined to information pertaining to the election of 
directors. We are also not requiring Item 106 disclosures in 
registration statements as recommended by the IAC, consistent with our 
efforts to reduce the burdens associated with the final rule. However, 
as discussed further below,\230\ we reiterate the Commission's guidance 
from the 2018 Interpretive Release that ``[c]ompanies should consider 
the materiality of cybersecurity risks and incidents when preparing the 
disclosure that is required in registration statements.'' \231\ 
Finally, we note that registrants may satisfy the Item 106 disclosure 
requirements through incorporation by reference pursuant to 17 CFR 
240.12b-23 (``Rule 12b-23'').\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ See infra text accompanying notes 355 and 356.
    \231\ 2018 Interpretive Release at 8168.
    \232\ As required by Rule 12b-23, in order to incorporate 
information by reference in answer, or partial answer, to Item 106, 
a registrant must, among other things, include an active hyperlink 
if the information is publicly available on EDGAR.
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2. Governance
a. Proposed Amendments
    The Commission proposed to add 17 CFR 229.106(c) (Regulation S-K 
``Item 106(c)'') to require a description of management and the board's 
oversight of a registrant's cybersecurity risk. This information would 
complement the proposed risk management and strategy disclosure by 
clarifying for investors how a registrant's leadership oversees and 
implements its cybersecurity processes.\233\ Proposed 17 CFR 
229.106(c)(1) (Regulation S-K ``Item 106(c)(1)'') would focus on the 
board's role, requiring discussion, as applicable, of:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \233\ Proposing Release at 16600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Whether the entire board, specific board members, or a 
board committee is responsible for the oversight of cybersecurity 
risks;
     The processes by which the board is informed about 
cybersecurity risks, and the frequency of its discussions on this 
topic; and
     Whether and how the board or board committee considers 
cybersecurity risks as part of its business strategy, risk management, 
and financial oversight.
    Proposed 17 CFR 229.106(c)(2) (Regulation S-K ``Item 106(c)(2)'') 
meanwhile would require a description of management's role in assessing 
and managing cybersecurity-related risks, as well as its role in 
implementing the registrant's cybersecurity policies, procedures, and 
strategies, including at a minimum discussion of:
     Whether certain management positions or committees are 
responsible for measuring and managing cybersecurity risk, specifically 
the prevention, mitigation, detection, and remediation of cybersecurity 
incidents, and the relevant expertise of such persons or members;
     Whether the registrant has a designated chief information 
security officer, or someone in a comparable position, and if so, to 
whom that individual reports within the registrant's organizational 
chart, and the relevant expertise of any such persons;
     The processes by which such persons or committees are 
informed about and monitor the prevention, mitigation, detection, and 
remediation of cybersecurity incidents; and

[[Page 51914]]

     Whether and how frequently such persons or committees 
report to the board of directors or a committee of the board of 
directors on cybersecurity risk.
    The Proposing Release explained that proposed Item 106(c)(1) would 
reinforce the Commission's 2018 Interpretive Release,\234\ which said 
that disclosure on how a board engages management on cybersecurity 
helps investors assess the board's exercise of its oversight 
responsibility.\235\ The Proposing Release noted that proposed Item 
106(c)(2) would be of importance to investors in that it would help 
investors understand how registrants are planning for cybersecurity 
risks and inform their decisions on how best to allocate their 
capital.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ Id. (citing 2018 Interpretive Release at 8170).
    \235\ 2018 Interpretive Release at 8170.
    \236\ Proposing Release at 16600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    A few commenters supported proposed Item 106(c) as providing 
investors with more uniform and informed understanding of registrants' 
governance of cybersecurity risks.\237\ A number of commenters opposed 
proposed Item 106(c). They contended that the proposed Item 106(c) 
disclosures would be too granular to be decision-useful; instead, some 
of these commenters recommended that we limit the rule to a high-level 
explanation of management and the board's role in cybersecurity risk 
oversight.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ See, e.g., letters from Better Markets; CalPERS.
    \238\ See letters from ABA; AGA/INGAA; EEI; Nareit; NYSE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter said proposed Item 106(c)(1) should be dropped 
because it duplicates existing 17 CFR 229.407(h) (Regulation S-K ``Item 
407(h)''), which requires reporting of material information regarding a 
board's leadership structure and role in risk oversight, including how 
it administers its oversight function.\239\ Others saw similarities 
with Item 407(h) as well and suggested instead that proposed Item 
106(c) be subsumed into Item 407, thus co-locating governance 
disclosures.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ See letter from Davis Polk. The commenter went on to say 
that, to the extent Item 106(c) requires disclosure of immaterial 
information regarding the board, it should be dropped.
    \240\ See letters from ABA; BDO; PWC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to a request for comment in the Proposing Release on 
whether the Commission should expressly provide for the use of 
hyperlinks or cross-references in Item 106, one commenter supported the 
use of hyperlinks and cross-references, but sought clarification of 
whether the practice is already permitted under Commission rules.\241\ 
Another commenter opposed, saying Item 407(h)'s more general discussion 
of board governance is distinct from Item 106(c)(1)'s specific focus on 
cybersecurity.\242\ The commenter cautioned that allowing registrants 
to employ hyperlinks and cross-references in Item 106 would lead to 
``less detail,'' resulting in disclosure insufficient to investor 
needs.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ See letter from E&Y.
    \242\ See letter from Tenable.
    \243\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter recommended that we move proposed Item 106(c)(2) to 
the enumerated list of topics called for in proposed Item 106(b).\244\ 
Another commenter suggested expanding the rule to include disclosure of 
management and staff training on cybersecurity, asserting that the 
information is useful to investors because policies depend on staff for 
successful implementation.\245\ Two commenters suggested allowing the 
Item 106(c) disclosures to be made in the proxy statement.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ See letter from Davis Polk.
    \245\ See letter from PRI.
    \246\ See letters from Business Roundtable; Nasdaq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Final Amendments
    In response to comments, and aligned with our changes to Item 
106(b), we have streamlined Item 106(c) to require disclosure that is 
less granular than proposed. Under Item 106(c)(1) as adopted, 
registrants must ``[d]escribe the board's oversight of risks from 
cybersecurity threats,'' and, if applicable, ``identify any board 
committee or subcommittee responsible'' for such oversight ``and 
describe the processes by which the board or such committee is informed 
about such risks.'' We have removed proposed Item 106(c)(1)(iii), which 
had covered whether and how the board integrates cybersecurity into its 
business strategy, risk management, and financial oversight. While we 
have also removed the proposed Item 106(c)(1)(ii) requirement to 
disclose ``the frequency of [the board or committee's] discussions'' on 
cybersecurity, we note that, depending on context, some registrants' 
descriptions of the processes by which their board or relevant 
committee is informed about cybersecurity risks may include discussion 
of frequency.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ For example, if the board or committee relies on periodic 
(e.g., quarterly) presentations by the registrant's chief 
information security officer to inform its consideration of risks 
from cybersecurity threats, the registrant may, in the course of 
describing those presentations, also note their frequency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given these changes, we find that Item 407(h) and Item 106(c)(1) as 
adopted serve distinct purposes and should not be combined, as 
suggested by some commenters--the former requires description of the 
board's leadership structure and administration of risk oversight 
generally, while the latter requires detail of the board's oversight of 
specific cybersecurity risk. As noted by one commenter,\248\ to the 
extent these disclosures are duplicative, a registrant would be able to 
incorporate such information by reference.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ See letter from E&Y.
    \249\ Rule 12b-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have also modified Item 106(c)(2) to add a materiality 
qualifier, to make clear that registrants must ``[d]escribe 
management's role in assessing and managing the registrant's material 
risks from cybersecurity threats'' (emphasis added).\250\ The 
enumerated disclosure elements now constitute a ``non-exclusive list'' 
registrants should consider including. We have revised the first 
element to require the disclosure of management positions or committees 
``responsible for assessing and managing such risks, and the relevant 
expertise of such persons or members in such detail as necessary to 
fully describe the nature of the expertise.'' Because this requirement 
would typically encompass identification of whether a registrant has a 
chief information security officer, or someone in a comparable 
position, we are not adopting the proposed second element that would 
have specifically called for disclosure of whether the registrant has a 
designated chief information security officer. Given our purpose of 
streamlining the disclosure requirements, we also are not adopting the 
proposed requirement to disclose the frequency of management-board 
discussions on cybersecurity, though, as noted above, discussion of 
frequency may in some cases be included as part of describing the 
processes by which the board or relevant committee is informed about 
cybersecurity risks in compliance with Item 106(c)(1), to the extent it 
is relevant to an understanding of the board's oversight of risks from 
cybersecurity threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ We have not added a materiality qualifier to Item 
106(c)(1) because, if a board of directors determines to oversee a 
particular risk, the fact of such oversight being exercised by the 
board is material to investors. By contrast, management oversees 
many more matters and management's oversight of non-material matters 
is likely not material to investors, so a materiality qualifier is 
appropriate for Item 106(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, as adopted, Item 106(c)(2) directs registrants to consider 
disclosing the following as part of a description of management's role 
in assessing and managing the registrant's material risks from 
cybersecurity threats:
     Whether and which management positions or committees are 
responsible

[[Page 51915]]

for assessing and managing such risks, and the relevant expertise of 
such persons or members in such detail as necessary to fully describe 
the nature of the expertise;
     The processes by which such persons or committees are 
informed about and monitor the prevention, detection, mitigation, and 
remediation of cybersecurity incidents; and
     Whether such persons or committees report information 
about such risks to the board of directors or a committee or 
subcommittee of the board of directors.
    As many commenters recommended, these elements are limited to 
disclosure that we believe balances investors' needs to understand a 
registrant's governance of risks from cybersecurity threats in 
sufficient detail to inform an investment or voting decision with 
concerns that the proposal could inadvertently pressure registrants to 
adopt specific or inflexible cybersecurity-risk governance practices or 
organizational structures. We do not believe these disclosures should 
be subsumed into Item 106(b), as one commenter recommended, because 
identifying the management committees and positions responsible for 
risks from cybersecurity threats is distinct from describing the 
cybersecurity practices management has deployed. We also decline the 
commenter suggestion to require disclosure of management and staff 
training on cybersecurity; registrants may choose to make such 
disclosure voluntarily. Finally, we decline the commenter suggestion to 
allow Item 106(c) disclosure to be provided in the proxy statement; 
governance information in the proxy statement is generally meant to 
inform shareholders' voting decisions, whereas Item 106(c) disclosure 
informs investors' assessment of investment risk.
3. Definitions
a. Proposed Definitions
    The Commission proposed to define three terms to delineate the 
scope of the amendments: ``cybersecurity incident,'' ``cybersecurity 
threat,'' and ``information systems.'' \251\ Proposed 229 CFR 
229.106(a) (Regulation S-K ``Item 106(a)'') would define them as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ Proposing Release at 16600-16601.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Cybersecurity incident means an unauthorized occurrence on 
or conducted through a registrant's information systems that 
jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a 
registrant's information systems or any information residing therein.
     Cybersecurity threat means any potential occurrence that 
may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely affect the 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of a registrant's 
information systems or any information residing therein.
     Information systems means information resources, owned, or 
used by the registrant, including physical or virtual infrastructure 
controlled by such information resources, or components thereof, 
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, 
dissemination, or disposition of the registrant's information to 
maintain or support the registrant's operations.
    As noted above, the Commission explained that what constitutes a 
``cybersecurity incident'' should be construed broadly, encompassing a 
range of event types.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ Id. at 16601.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    Most commenters that offered feedback on the proposed definitions 
suggested narrowing them in some fashion. On ``cybersecurity 
incident,'' many commenters urged limiting the definition to cases of 
actual harm, thereby excluding incidents that had only the potential to 
cause harm.\253\ They suggested accomplishing this by replacing 
``jeopardizes'' with phrases such as ``adversely affects'' or ``results 
in substantial loss of.'' \254\ One of these commenters noted that such 
a change would more closely align the definition with that in 
CIRCIA.\255\ Other commenters objected to the definition's use of ``any 
information'' as overbroad, saying it would lead to inconsistent 
application.\256\ One commenter sought clarification of whether the 
definition encompasses accidental incidents, such as chance technology 
outages, that do not involve a malicious actor,\257\ while another 
commenter advocated broadening the definition to any incident 
materially disrupting operations, regardless of what precipitated 
it.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ See letters from ABA; BPI et al.; Chamber et al.; Davis 
Polk; Enbridge; FDD; FEI; Hunton; PWC; SCG; SIFMA.
    \254\ See letters from BPI et al.; Hunton.
    \255\ See letter from BPI et al. (``The word `jeopardizes' 
should be replaced with `results in substantial loss of' to capture 
incidents that are causing some actual harm, and to better harmonize 
the definition with the reporting standard set forth by Congress in 
CIRCIA.'').
    \256\ See letters from Deloitte; SIFMA.
    \257\ See letter from CSA.
    \258\ See letter from Crindata.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On ``cybersecurity threat,'' commenters urged narrowing the rule by 
replacing the language ``may result in'' with ``could reasonably be 
expected to result in'' or some other probability threshold.\259\ One 
stated that ``the use of a `may' standard establishes an unhelpfully 
low standard that would require registrants to establish policies and 
procedures to identify threats that are potentially overbroad and not 
appropriately tailored to those threats that are reasonably 
foreseeable.'' \260\ In a similar vein, two commenters objected to the 
language ``any potential occurrence'' as over-inclusive and lacking 
``instructive boundaries.'' \261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ See letters from Chevron; Debevoise; NYC Bar.
    \260\ See letter from Debevoise.
    \261\ See letters from Chevron; Deloitte.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On ``information systems,'' many commenters favored replacing 
``owned or used by'' with ``owned or operated by,'' ``owned or 
controlled by,'' or like terms, so that registrants' reporting 
obligations stop short of incidents on third-party information 
systems.\262\ A few commenters said the definition could be construed 
to cover hard-copy information and should be revised to foreclose such 
a reading.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See letters from ABA; APCIA; Business Roundtable; Chamber; 
Cybersecurity Coalition; ISA; ITI; NAM; NDIA; Paylocity. Other 
commenters made similar arguments about third party systems without 
speaking specifically to the definition, saying, for example, that 
registrants may not have sufficient visibility into third-party 
systems and may be bound by confidentiality agreements. See letters 
from AIA; EIC; FAH; NMHC; SIFMA.
    \263\ See letters from ABA; BPI et al.; Enbridge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More broadly, many commenters advised the Commission to align these 
definitions with comparable definitions in other Federal laws and 
regulations, such as CIRCIA and NIST.\264\ One commenter explained that 
``[a]ligning definitions with those in existing federal laws and 
regulations would help ensure that the defined terms are consistently 
understood, interpreted and applied in the relevant disclosure.'' \265\ 
However, another commenter cautioned against aligning with definitions, 
such as those of NIST, that were developed with a view toward internal 
risk management and response rather than external reporting; the 
commenter identified CIRCIA and the Federal banking regulators' 
definitions as more apposite.\266\ One commenter noted that additional 
proposed defined terms were included in the Commission's rulemaking 
release Cybersecurity Risk Management for Investment Advisers, 
Registered Investment Companies, and Business Development Companies 
\267\ that were not included in the Proposing Release and recommended 
that we

[[Page 51916]]

``consider whether the defined terms should be consistent.'' \268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ See letters from ABA; CAQ; Chevron; FEI; IC; IIA; 
Microsoft; PWC; SandboxAQ; SIFMA.
    \265\ See letter from ABA.
    \266\ See letter from SCG.
    \267\ Release No. 33-11028 (Feb. 9, 2022) [87 FR 13524 (Mar. 9, 
2022)].
    \268\ See letter from Deloitte.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Proposing Release, the Commission asked whether to define 
other terms used in the proposed amendments, and specifically sought 
comment on whether a definition of ``cybersecurity'' would be 
useful.\269\ Several commenters supported defining ``cybersecurity,'' 
\270\ reasoning, for example, that any rulemaking on cybersecurity 
should define that baseline term; \271\ that, left undefined, the term 
would be open to varying interpretations; \272\ and that details such 
as whether hardware is covered should be resolved.\273\ Separately, two 
commenters recommended the Commission define ``operational 
technology,'' \274\ with one explaining that the ``proposed definitions 
understandably focus on data breaches, which are a major cybersecurity 
threat, but we believe an operational technology breach could have even 
more detrimental effects in certain cases (such as for ransomware 
attacks that have impacted critical infrastructure) and warrants 
disclosure guidance from the Commission.'' \275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ Proposing Release at 16601.
    \270\ See letters from BCS; Blue Lava; EIC; R. Hackman; R 
Street.
    \271\ See letter from R Street.
    \272\ See letter from Blue Lava.
    \273\ See letter from BCS.
    \274\ See letters from Chevron; EIC.
    \275\ See letter from Chevron.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters also sought either a formal definition or more 
guidance on the term ``material'' specific to the cybersecurity 
space.\276\ Some read the proposal, particularly the incident examples 
provided in the Proposing Release, as lowering the bar for materiality 
and being overly subjective, which they indicated may result in over-
reporting of cybersecurity incidents or introduce uncertainty, and they 
urged the Commission to affirm the standard materiality 
definition.\277\ Another commenter sought cybersecurity-specific 
guidance on materiality, including ``concrete thresholds to assist 
registrants in determining materiality.'' \278\ A few commenters 
recommended conditioning the materiality determination on the 
underlying information being verified to ``a high degree of 
confidence'' and ``unlikely to materially change,'' \279\ while one 
commenter looked to replace materiality altogether with a significance 
standard like that in CIRCIA.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ See letters from ACLI; AIC; AICPA; APCIA; Bitsight; Harry 
Broadman, Eric Matrejek, and Brad Wilson (``Broadman et al.''); 
Debevoise; EIC; International Information System Security 
Certification Consortium (``ISC2''); M. Barragan; NYC Bar; Prof. 
Perullo; R Street; SIFMA; TransUnion; Virtu.
    \277\ See letters from APCIA; ACLI; EIC; Virtu.
    \278\ See letter from SIFMA.
    \279\ See letters from Debevoise; NYC Bar. See also letter from 
AIC (suggesting ``unlikely to change,'' without ``materially'').
    \280\ See letter from National Electrical Manufacturers 
Association (``NEMA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Final Definitions
    We are adopting definitions for ``cybersecurity incident,'' 
``cybersecurity threat,'' and ``information systems'' largely as 
proposed, with three modifications.
    First, on ``cybersecurity incident,'' we are adding the phrase ``or 
a series of related unauthorized occurrences'' to the ``cybersecurity 
incident'' definition. This reflects our guidance in Section II.B.3 
above that a series of related occurrences may collectively have a 
material impact or reasonably likely material impact and therefore 
trigger Form 8-K Item 1.05, even if each individual occurrence on its 
own would not rise to the level of materiality. Second, we are making a 
clarifying edit to ``information systems.'' Some commenters said the 
definition could be construed to cover hard-copy resources.\281\ We 
recognize that reading is possible, if unlikely and unintended, and we 
are therefore inserting ``electronic'' before ``information 
resources,'' to ensure the rules pertain only to electronic resources. 
Third, we are making minor revisions to the ``cybersecurity threat'' 
definition for clarity and to better align it with the ``cybersecurity 
incident'' definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ See letters from ABA; BPI et al.; Enbridge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the definitions are as follows:
     Cybersecurity incident means an unauthorized occurrence, 
or a series of related unauthorized occurrences, on or conducted 
through a registrant's information systems that jeopardizes the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a registrant's 
information systems or any information residing therein.
     Cybersecurity threat means any potential unauthorized 
occurrence on or conducted through a registrant's information systems 
that may result in adverse effects on the confidentiality, integrity or 
availability of a registrant's information systems or any information 
residing therein.
     Information systems means electronic information 
resources, owned or used by the registrant, including physical or 
virtual infrastructure controlled by such information resources, or 
components thereof, organized for the collection, processing, 
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of the 
registrant's information to maintain or support the registrant's 
operations.
    We recognize commenters' concern regarding the term ``jeopardizes'' 
in the proposed ``cybersecurity incident'' definition and the resulting 
scope of the definition. Nonetheless, we note that the definition is 
not self-executing; rather it is operationalized by Item 1.05, which is 
conditioned on the incident having been material to the registrant. 
Typically that would entail actual harm, though the harm may sometimes 
be delayed, and a material cybersecurity incident may not result in 
actual harm in all instances. For example, a company whose intellectual 
property is stolen may not suffer harm immediately, but it may foresee 
that harm will likely occur over time as that information is sold to 
other parties, such that it can determine materiality before the harm 
occurs. The reputational harm from a breach may similarly increase over 
time in a foreseeable manner. There may also be cases, even if 
uncommon, where the jeopardy caused by a cybersecurity incident 
materially affects the company, even if the incident has not yet caused 
actual harm. In such circumstances, we believe investors should be 
apprised of the material effects of the incident. We are therefore 
retaining the word ``jeopardizes'' in the definition.
    We are not persuaded that the proposed ``cybersecurity incident'' 
definition's use of ``any information'' would lead to inconsistent 
application of the definition among issuers or cause a risk of over-
reporting, as suggested by some commenters. As noted above, the 
``cybersecurity incident'' definition is operationalized by Item 1.05. 
Item 1.05 does not require disclosure whenever ``any information'' is 
affected by an intruder. Disclosure is triggered only when the 
resulting effect of an incident on the registrant is material.
    We are also retaining ``unauthorized'' in the incident definition 
as proposed. In general, we believe that an accidental occurrence is an 
unauthorized occurrence. Therefore, we note that an accidental 
occurrence may be a cybersecurity incident under our definition, even 
if there is no confirmed malicious activity. For example, if a 
company's customer data are accidentally exposed, allowing unauthorized 
access to such data, the data breach would constitute a ``cybersecurity 
incident'' that would necessitate a materiality analysis to determine 
whether disclosure under Item 1.05 of Form 8-K is required.
    On ``cybersecurity threat,'' we appreciate commenters' concerns 
with

[[Page 51917]]

the proposed definition's use of ``may result in'' and ``any potential 
occurrence.'' Unlike with ``cybersecurity incident,'' where the 
interplay of the proposed definition with proposed Item 1.05 ensured 
only material incidents would become reportable, proposed Item 106(b)'s 
reference to ``the identification and management of risks from 
cybersecurity threats'' was not qualified by materiality. We are 
therefore adding a materiality condition to Item 106(b). As adopted, 
Item 106(b) will require disclosure of registrants' processes to 
address the material risks of potential occurrences that could 
reasonably result in an unauthorized effort to adversely affect the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a registrant's 
information systems. Given the addition of a materiality condition to 
Item 106(b), we do not believe that further revision to the 
``cybersecurity threat'' definition is warranted.
    On ``information systems,'' we decline to change ``owned or used 
by'' to ``owned or operated by,'' ``owned or controlled by,'' or 
similar terms advanced by commenters. Commenters recognized that ``used 
by'' covers information resources owned by third parties. That is by 
design: covering third party systems is essential to the working of 
Item 106 of Regulation S-K and Item 1.05 of Form 8-K. As we explain 
above, in Section II.A.3, the materiality of a cybersecurity incident 
is contingent neither on where the relevant electronic systems reside 
nor on who owns them, but rather on the impact to the registrant. We do 
not believe that a reasonable investor would view a significant data 
breach as immaterial merely because the data are housed on a cloud 
service. If we were to remove ``used by,'' a registrant could evade the 
disclosure requirements of the final rules by contracting out all of 
its information technology needs to third parties. Accordingly, the 
definition of ``information systems'' contemplates those resources 
owned by third parties and used by the registrant, as proposed.
    In considering commenters' suggestion to align our definitions with 
CIRCIA, NIST, and other Federal regulations, we observe that there is 
no one standard definition for these terms, and that regulators have 
adopted definitions based on the specific contexts applicable to their 
regulations. Nonetheless, we also observe that the final 
``cybersecurity incident'' definition is already similar to the CIRCIA 
and NIST incident definitions, in that all three focus on the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information 
systems.\282\ Our definition of ``information systems'' also tracks 
CIRCIA and NIST, as all three cover ``information resources'' that are 
``organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, 
dissemination, or disposition'' of information.\283\ Of course, the 
definitions do not match precisely, but some variation is inevitable 
where various Federal laws and regulations have different purposes, 
contexts, and goals. We therefore find that further alignment is not 
needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \282\ For CIRCIA, see supra note 19, at sec. 103, 136 Stat. 
1039; and 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(i). For NIST, see Incident, 
Glossary, NIST Computer Security Resource Center, available at 
https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/incident.
    \283\ For CIRCIA, see supra note 19, at sec. 103, 136 Stat. 
1039; and 44 U.S.C. 3502(8). For NIST, see Information System, 
Glossary, NIST Computer Security Resource Center, available at 
https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/information_system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We decline to define any other terms. We acknowledge commenters who 
asked for additional guidance regarding the application of a 
materiality determination to cybersecurity or sought to replace 
materiality with a significance standard. As noted in the Proposing 
Release, however, we expect that registrants will apply materiality 
considerations as would be applied regarding any other risk or event 
that a registrant faces. Carving out a cybersecurity-specific 
materiality definition would mark a significant departure from current 
practice, and would not be consistent with the intent of the final 
rules.\284\ Accordingly, we reiterate, consistent with the standard set 
out in the cases addressing materiality in the securities laws, that 
information is material if ``there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important'' \285\ in making an 
investment decision, or if it would have ``significantly altered the 
`total mix' of information made available.'' \286\ Because 
materiality's focus on the total mix of information is from the 
perspective of a reasonable investor, companies assessing the 
materiality of cybersecurity incidents, risks, and related issues 
should do so through the lens of the reasonable investor. Their 
evaluation should take into consideration all relevant facts and 
circumstances, which may involve consideration of both quantitative and 
qualitative factors. Thus, for example, when a registrant experiences a 
data breach, it should consider both the immediate fallout and any 
longer term effects on its operations, finances, brand perception, 
customer relationships, and so on, as part of its materiality analysis. 
We also note that, given the fact-specific nature of the materiality 
determination, the same incident that affects multiple registrants may 
not become reportable at the same time, and it may be reportable for 
some registrants but not others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 
(1988) (``[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or occurrence 
as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such 
as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or 
underinclusive'').
    \285\ TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Matrixx 
Initiatives v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38-40 (2011); Basic, 485 
U.S. at 240.
    \286\ Id. See also the definition of ``material'' in 17 CFR 
230.405 [Securities Act Rule 405]; 17 CFR 240.12b-2 [Exchange Act 
Rule 12b-2].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also decline to separately define ``cybersecurity,'' as 
suggested by some commenters. We do not believe such further definition 
is necessary, given the broad understanding of this term. To that end, 
we note that the cybersecurity industry itself appears not to have 
settled on an exact definition, and because the field is quickly 
evolving and is expected to continue to evolve over time, any 
definition codified in regulation could soon become stale as technology 
develops. Likewise, the final rules provide flexibility by not defining 
``cybersecurity,'' allowing a registrant to determine meaning based on 
how it considers and views such matters in practice, and on how the 
field itself evolves over time.
    We decline to define ``operational technology'' as suggested by 
some commenters because the term does not appear in the rules we are 
adopting.

D. Disclosure Regarding the Board of Directors' Cybersecurity Expertise

1. Proposed Amendments
    Congruent with proposed Item 106(c)(2) on the board's oversight of 
cybersecurity risk, the Commission proposed adding 17 CFR 229.407(j) 
(Regulation S-K ``Item 407(j)'') to require disclosure about the 
cybersecurity expertise, if any, of a registrant's board members.\287\ 
The proposed rule did not define what constitutes expertise, given the 
wide-ranging nature of cybersecurity skills, but included a non-
exclusive list of criteria to consider, such as prior work experience, 
certifications, and the like. As proposed, paragraph (j) would build on 
existing 17 CFR 229.401(e) (Regulation S-K ``Item 401(e)'') (business 
experience of directors) and Item 407(h) (board risk oversight), and 
would be required in the annual report on Form 10-K and in the proxy or 
information statement when action is to be taken on the election of 
directors. Thus, the Proposing Release said,

[[Page 51918]]

proposed Item 407(j) would help investors in making both investment and 
voting decisions.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ Proposing Release at 16601.
    \288\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposed to include a safe harbor in 17 CFR 
229.407(j)(2) (Regulation S-K ``Item 407(j)(2)'') providing that any 
directors identified as cybersecurity experts would not be deemed 
experts for liability purposes, including under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act.\289\ This was intended to clarify that identified 
directors do not assume any duties, obligations, or liabilities greater 
than those assumed by non-expert directors.\290\ Nor would such 
identification decrease the duties, obligations, and liabilities of 
non-expert directors relative to identified directors.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ Id. at 16602.
    \290\ Id.
    \291\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    Proposed Item 407(j) garnered significant comment. Supporters wrote 
that understanding a board's level of cybersecurity expertise is 
important to assessing a company's ability to manage cybersecurity 
risk.\292\ For example, one commenter said ``[b]oard cybersecurity 
expertise serves as a useful starting point for investors to assess a 
company's approach to cybersecurity;'' \293\ while another commenter 
said investors need the Item 407(j) disclosure ``[t]o cast informed 
votes on directors.'' \294\ One comment letter submitted an academic 
study by the authors of the letter and noted that its findings 
``underscore the importance of understanding the role of boards in 
cybersecurity oversight.'' \295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ See letters from O. Borges; CalPERS; Prof. Choudhary; CII; 
Digital Directors Network (``DDN''); ISC2; Prof. Lowry et al.; NACD; 
PRI; SANS Institute; SM4RT Secure.
    \293\ See letter from PRI.
    \294\ See letter from CII.
    \295\ See letter from Prof. Lowry et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By contrast, many commenters argued cybersecurity risk is not 
intrinsically different from other risks that directors assess with or 
without specific technical expertise.\296\ For example, one reasoned 
that, given the ``ever-changing range of risks confronting a company,'' 
directors require ``broad-based skills in risk and management 
oversight, rather than subject matter expertise in one particular type 
of risk.'' \297\ Commenters also predicted the disclosure requirement 
would pressure companies to retain cybersecurity experts on their 
board, and submitted there is not enough cybersecurity talent in the 
marketplace at this time for all or most companies to do so.\298\ One 
of these commenters further contended that finding such expertise will 
be harder for smaller reporting companies.\299\ Another commenter 
warned that, given the current cybersecurity talent pool, the end 
result may be lower diversity on boards; \300\ and one said hiring 
cybersecurity experts to the board may come at the expense of spending 
on a company's cybersecurity defenses.\301\ Commenters also expressed 
concern that the identified expert directors would face elevated risks, 
such as being targeted by nation states for surveillance or hackers 
attempting to embarrass them, thus creating a disincentive to board 
service.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \296\ See letters from ABA; ACC; AGA/INGAA; AICPA; Auto 
Innovators; BDO; BPI et al.; Business Roundtable; CAQ; CBA; Chamber; 
CTA; CTIA; Davis Polk; Deloitte; EEI; EIC; Hunton; ITI; IC; LTSE; 
Microsoft; Nareit; NAM; NDIA; NRA; NYSE; PPG; Safe Security; SCG; 
SIFMA; TechNet; USTelecom; Virtu; Wilson Sonsini. See also IAC 
Recommendation.
    \297\ See letter from ABA.
    \298\ See letters from ACC; APCIA; BIO; Blue Lava; Chamber; FDD; 
ITI (May 9, 2022); NDIA; NYSE; SCG (May 9, 2022). In this vein, a 
commenter requested the Commission affirm Item 407(j) is only a 
disclosure provision and is not intended to mandate cybersecurity 
expertise on the board. See letter from Federated Hermes.
    \299\ See letter from BIO.
    \300\ See letter from Chamber (``An unintended consequence of 
the SEC proposal is likely to create new barriers for 
underrepresented groups to move into cybersecurity leadership roles 
largely due to the expense of obtaining credentials and other formal 
certifications. The costs associated with obtaining cybersecurity-
related degrees and other credentials could hinder the advancement 
of individuals who could otherwise rise through the ranks within the 
field of cybersecurity.'').
    \301\ See letter from Wilson Sonsini.
    \302\ See letters from BIO; Chevron; EEI; EIC; Hunton; Profs. 
Rajgopal & Sharp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More generally, sentiment among those opposed to Item 407(j) was 
that the rule is overly prescriptive and in effect would direct how 
companies operate their cybersecurity programs.\303\ As an alternative, 
some commenters pushed for other ways to show competency, such as 
identifying outside experts the board relies on for cybersecurity 
expertise, disclosing how frequently the board meets with the chief 
information security officer, listing relevant director training, and 
relying on adjacent technology skills.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \303\ See, e.g., letter from ACC.
    \304\ See letters from AGA/INGAA; BPI et al.; Business 
Roundtable; DDN; LTSE; PRI; Wilson Sonsini.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Whether they supported or opposed the proposed disclosure 
requirement, commenters largely endorsed the proposed Item 407(j)(2) 
safe harbor; its absence, they said, could make candidates with 
cybersecurity expertise reluctant to serve on boards.\305\ Two 
commenters requested the Commission define ``cybersecurity expertise;'' 
\306\ one of them said being ``duly accredited and certified as a 
cybersecurity professional'' should be a prerequisite, and posited 
specific industry certifications to establish expertise.\307\ Another 
commenter suggested adding participation in continuing education to the 
17 CFR 229.407(j)(1)(i) factors considered in assessing expertise.\308\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \305\ See letters from ABA; BIO; CII; CSA; A. Heighington; NACD; 
Paylocity; Prof. Perullo.
    \306\ See letters from Federated Hermes; ISC2.
    \307\ See letter from ISC2.
    \308\ See letter from SandboxAQ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Amendments
    After considering the comments, we are not adopting proposed Item 
407(j). We are persuaded that effective cybersecurity processes are 
designed and administered largely at the management level, and that 
directors with broad-based skills in risk management and strategy often 
effectively oversee management's efforts without specific subject 
matter expertise, as they do with other sophisticated technical 
matters. While we acknowledge that some commenters indicated that the 
proposed Item 407(j) information would be helpful to investors, we 
nonetheless agree that it may not be material information for all 
registrants. We believe investors can form sound investment decisions 
based on the information required by Items 106(b) and (c) without the 
need for specific information regarding board-level expertise. And to 
that end, a registrant that has determined that board-level expertise 
is a necessary component to the registrant's cyber-risk management 
would likely provide that disclosure pursuant to Items 106(b) and (c).

E. Disclosure by Foreign Private Issuers

1. Proposed Amendments
    The Commission proposed to establish disclosure requirements for 
FPIs parallel to those proposed for domestic issuers in Regulation S-K 
Items 106 and 407(j) and Form 8-K Item 1.05.\309\ Specifically, the 
Commission proposed to amend Form 20-F to incorporate the requirements 
of proposed Item 106 and 407(j) to disclose information regarding an 
FPI's cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance.\310\ 
With respect to

[[Page 51919]]

incident disclosure, the Commission proposed to: (1) amend General 
Instruction B of Form 6-K to reference material cybersecurity incidents 
among the items that may trigger a current report on Form 6-K,\311\ and 
(2) amend Form 20-F to require updated disclosure regarding incidents 
previously disclosed on Form 6-K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \309\ Proposing Release at 16602. The Commission did not propose 
to amend Form 40-F, choosing rather to maintain the 
multijurisdictional disclosure system (``MJDS'') whereby eligible 
Canadian FPIs use Canadian disclosure standards and documents to 
satisfy SEC registration and disclosure requirements.
    \310\ As noted in the Proposing Release, FPIs would include the 
expertise disclosure only in their annual reports, as they are not 
subject to Commission rules for proxies and information statements.
    \311\ A registrant is required under Form 6-K to furnish copies 
of all information that it: (i) makes or is required to make public 
under the laws of its jurisdiction of incorporation, (ii) files, or 
is required to file under the rules of any stock exchange, or (iii) 
otherwise distributes to its security holders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    A few commenters agreed that the Commission should not exempt FPIs 
from the proposed disclosure requirements, given they face the same 
threats as domestic issuers.\312\ Another commenter said the Commission 
should not delay compliance for FPIs, for similar reasons.\313\ On the 
other hand, one commenter said the proposal would disproportionately 
burden FPIs because, under its reading of the proposed amendment to 
General Instruction B, Form 6-K would require disclosure of all 
cybersecurity incidents, not just those that are material.\314\ The 
commenter went on to say that the interplay of the European Union's 
Market Abuse Regulation (``MAR'') would render the proposed Form 6-K 
amendment particularly taxing, because MAR requires immediate 
announcement of non-public price sensitive information.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \312\ See letters from CSA; Cybersecurity Coalition; Prof. 
Perullo; Tenable.
    \313\ See letter from Crindata.
    \314\ See letter from SIFMA.
    \315\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On MJDS filers, commenters endorsed the Commission's determination 
not to propose to amend Form 40-F, maintaining that Canadian issuers 
eligible to use MJDS should be permitted to follow their domestic 
disclosure standards, consistent with other disclosure requirements for 
those registrants.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \316\ See letters from ACLI; BCE; Cameco Corporation; CBA; Sun 
Life Financial Inc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Amendments
    We are adopting the Form 20-F and Form 6-K amendments as proposed, 
with modifications that are consistent with those being applied to Item 
106 of Regulation S-K and Item 1.05 of Form 8-K. We continue to believe 
that FPIs' cybersecurity incidents and risks are not any less important 
to investors' capital allocation than those of domestic registrants. We 
also do not find that the Form 6-K amendments unduly burden FPIs. 
Importantly, the language the Commission proposed to add to General 
Instruction B (``cybersecurity incident'') of Form 6-K would be 
modified by the existing language ``that which is material with respect 
to the issuer and its subsidiaries concerning.'' Nonetheless, for added 
clarity, we are including the word ``material'' before ``cybersecurity 
incident.'' Thus, for a cybersecurity incident to trigger a disclosure 
obligation on Form 6-K, the registrant must determine that the incident 
is material, in addition to meeting the other criteria for required 
submission of the Form.\317\ Even registrants subject to the European 
Union's MAR will first have developed the relevant information for 
foreign disclosure or publication under MAR, so any added burden for 
preparing and furnishing the Form 6-K should be minor. As the 
Commission stated in the Proposing Release, we do not find reason to 
adopt prescriptive cybersecurity disclosure requirements for Form 40-F 
filers, given that the MJDS generally permits eligible Canadian FPIs to 
use Canadian disclosure standards and documents to satisfy the 
Commission's registration and disclosure requirements.\318\ We note 
that such filers are already subject to the Canadian Securities 
Administrators' 2017 guidance on the disclosure of cybersecurity risks 
and incidents.\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \317\ See supra note 311 for the other criteria.
    \318\ Proposing Release at 16603.
    \319\ Canadian Securities Administrators, CSA Multilateral Staff 
Notice 51-347--Disclosure of cyber security risks and incidents 
(Jan. 19, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Structured Data Requirements

1. Proposed Amendments
    The Commission proposed to mandate that registrants tag the new 
disclosures in Inline XBRL, including by block text tagging narrative 
disclosures and detail tagging quantitative amounts.\320\ The Proposing 
Release explained that the structured data requirements would make the 
disclosures more accessible to investors and other market participants 
and facilitate more efficient analysis.\321\ The proposed requirements 
would not be unduly burdensome to registrants, the release posited, 
because they are similar to the Inline XBRL requirements for other 
disclosures.\322\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \320\ Proposing Release at 16603.
    \321\ Id.
    \322\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    Commenters largely supported the proposal to require Inline XBRL 
tagging of the new disclosures, as structured data would enable 
automated extraction and analysis.\323\ Opposition to the requirement 
centered on filer burden, including an argument that, given the time-
sensitive nature of the Item 1.05 Form 8-K disclosure, mandating 
structured data tagging would unduly add to companies' burden in 
completing timely reporting.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \323\ See letters from AICPA; CAQ; Crowe LLP; E&Y FDD; K. 
Fuller; NACD; PWC; Professors Lawrence Trautman & Neal Newman; XBRL 
US.
    \324\ See letters from NYC Bar; SFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Amendments
    After considering comments, we are adopting the structured data 
requirements as proposed, with a staggered compliance date of one 
year.\325\ We are not persuaded that Inline XBRL tagging will unduly 
add to companies' burden in preparing and filing Item 1.05 Form 8-K in 
a timely fashion, and we believe such incremental costs are appropriate 
given the significant benefits to investors. Compared to the Inline 
XBRL tagging companies will already be performing for their financial 
statements, the tagging requirements here are less extensive and 
complex. Inline XBRL tagging will enable automated extraction and 
analysis of the information required by the final rules, allowing 
investors and other market participants to more efficiently identify 
responsive disclosure, as well as perform large-scale analysis and 
comparison of this information across registrants.\326\ The Inline XBRL 
requirement will also enable automatic comparison of tagged disclosures 
against prior periods. If we were not to adopt the Inline XBRL 
requirement as suggested by some commenters, some of the benefit of the 
new rules would be diminished. However, we are delaying compliance with 
the structured data requirements for one year beyond initial compliance 
with the disclosure requirements. This

[[Page 51920]]

approach should both help lessen any compliance burden and improve 
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \325\ We have incorporated modifications of a technical nature 
to the regulatory text.
    \326\ These considerations are generally consistent with 
objectives of the recently enacted Financial Data Transparency Act 
of 2022, which directs the establishment by the Commission and other 
financial regulators of data standards for collections of 
information, including with respect to periodic and current reports 
required to be filed or furnished under Exchange Act Sections 13 and 
15(d). Such data standards must meet specified criteria relating to 
openness and machine-readability and promote interoperability of 
financial regulatory data across members of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council. See James M. Inhofe National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Public Law 117-263, tit. 
LVIII, 136 Stat. 2395, 3421-39 (2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Applicability to Certain Issuers

1. Asset-Backed Issuers
    The Commission proposed to amend Form 10-K to clarify that an 
asset-backed issuer, as defined in 17 CFR 229.1101 (Regulation AB 
``Item 1101''), that does not have any executive officers or directors 
may omit the information required by proposed Item 106(c).\327\ The 
Commission noted that asset-backed issuers would likewise be exempt 
from proposed Item 407(j) pursuant to existing Instruction J to Form 
10-K.\328\ The Commission further requested comment on whether to 
generally exempt asset-backed issuers from the proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \327\ Proposing Release at 16600.
    \328\ Id. at 16601.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter stated that the proposed rules should not apply to 
issuers of asset-backed securities, given that they are limited purpose 
or passive special purpose vehicles with limited activities, no 
operations or businesses, and no information systems.\329\ The 
commenter also opposed applying the proposed rules to other transaction 
parties (such as the sponsor, servicer, originator, and trustee), 
because such parties are neither issuers of nor obligors on an asset-
backed security, and ``it is extraordinarily unlikely that a 
transaction party's financial performance or position would be impacted 
by a cybersecurity incident to such an extent as to impede its ability 
to perform its duties and responsibilities to the securitization 
transaction.'' \330\ The commenter acknowledged that cybersecurity 
disclosure rules may make sense for servicers of asset-backed 
securities, but counseled that any new rules should be tailored to such 
entities, rather than applying the proposed rules.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \329\ See letter from SFA.
    \330\ Id.
    \331\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are exempting asset-backed securities issuers from the final 
rules.\332\ We agree with the commenter that the final rules would not 
result in meaningful disclosure by asset-backed issuers. In particular, 
we are persuaded by the fact that asset-backed issuers are typically 
special purpose vehicles whose activities are limited to receiving or 
purchasing, and transferring or selling, assets to an issuing entity 
\333\ and, accordingly, do not own or use information systems, whereas 
the final rules are premised on an issuer's ownership or use of 
information systems.\334\ To the extent that a servicer or other party 
to an asset-backed security transaction is a public company, it will be 
required to comply with the final rules with respect to information 
systems it owns or uses. Therefore, an investor in an asset-backed 
security who wants to assess the cybersecurity of transaction parties 
will be able to do so for those that are public companies. The 
Commission may consider cybersecurity disclosure rules specific to 
asset-backed securities at a later date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ See General Instruction G to Form 8-K, and General 
Instruction J to Form 10-K.
    \333\ See letter from SFA (citing the definitions contained in 
17 CFR 229.1101(b), 17 CFR 230.191, and 17 CFR 240.3b-19).
    \334\ The definition of ``cybersecurity incident'' focuses on 
``a registrant's information systems.'' Likewise, the definition of 
``cybersecurity threat'' concerns ``a registrant's information 
systems or any information residing therein.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Smaller Reporting Companies
    In the Proposing Release, the Commission did not include an 
exemption or alternative compliance dates or transition accommodations 
for smaller reporting companies, but it did request comment on whether 
to do so.\335\ The Commission noted that smaller companies may face 
equal or greater cybersecurity risk than larger companies, such that 
cybersecurity disclosures may be particularly important for their 
investors.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \335\ Proposing Release at 16601.
    \336\ Id. at 16613.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters advocated an exemption for smaller reporting 
companies, asserting that they face outsized costs from the proposal 
and lower cybersecurity risk.\337\ And some commenters called for a 
longer compliance phase-in period for smaller reporting companies, to 
help them mitigate their cost burdens and benefit from the compliance 
and disclosure experience of larger companies.\338\ Other commenters 
opposed an exemption for smaller reporting companies,\339\ in part 
because they may face equal \340\ or greater \341\ cybersecurity risk 
than larger companies, or because investors' relative share in a 
smaller company may be higher, such that small companies' cybersecurity 
risk ``may actually embody the most pressing cybersecurity risk to an 
investor.'' \342\
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    \337\ See letters from BIO; NDIA.
    \338\ See letters from BIO; BDO; NACD; Nasdaq. In addition, the 
Commission's Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee 
highlights generally in its parting perspectives letter that 
``exemptions, scaling, and phase-ins for new requirements where 
appropriate, allows smaller companies to build their businesses and 
balance the needs of companies and investors while promoting strong 
and effective U.S. public markets.'' See Parting Perspectives 
Letter, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Small Business 
Capital Formation Advisory Committee (Feb. 28, 2023), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/files/committee-perspectives-letter-022823.pdf. 
See also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Office of the 
Advocate for Small Business Capital Formation, Annual Report Fiscal 
Year 2022 (``2022 OASB Annual Report''), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/2022-oasb-annual-report.pdf, at 83 (recommending 
generally that in engaging in rulemaking that affects small 
businesses, the Commission tailor the disclosure and reporting 
framework to the complexity and size of operations of companies, 
either by scaling obligations or delaying compliance for the 
smallest of the public companies).
    \339\ See letters from CSA; Cybersecurity Coalition; NASAA; 
Prof. Perullo; Tenable.
    \340\ See letter from Cybersecurity Coalition.
    \341\ See letters from NASAA and Tenable.
    \342\ See letter from Prof. Perullo.
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    Consistent with the proposal, we decline to exempt smaller 
reporting companies. We believe the streamlined requirements of the 
final rules will help reduce some of the costs associated with the 
proposal for all registrants, including smaller reporting companies. 
Also, we do not believe that an additional compliance period is needed 
for smaller reporting companies with respect to Item 106, as this 
information is factual in nature regarding a registrant's existing 
cybersecurity strategy, risk management, and governance, and so should 
be readily available to those companies to assess for purposes of 
preparing disclosure. Finally, given the significant cybersecurity 
risks smaller reporting companies face and the outsized impacts that 
cybersecurity incidents may have on their businesses, their investors 
need access to timely disclosure on material cybersecurity incidents 
and the material aspects of their cybersecurity risk management and 
governance. However, we agree with commenters that stated smaller 
reporting companies would likely benefit from additional time to comply 
with the incident disclosure requirements. Accordingly, as discussed 
below, we are providing smaller reporting companies an additional 180 
days from the non-smaller reporting company compliance date before they 
must begin complying with Item 1.05 of Form 8-K.

H. Need for New Rules and Commission Authority

    Some commenters argued that the 2011 Staff Guidance and 2018 
Interpretive Release are sufficient to compel adequate cybersecurity 
disclosure, obviating the need for new rules.\343\ In this regard, two 
commenters highlighted the Proposing Release's statement that 
cybersecurity disclosures ``have improved since the issuance of

[[Page 51921]]

the 2011 Staff Guidance and the 2018 Interpretive Release.'' \344\ 
Another commenter said that Commission staff's findings that certain 
cybersecurity incidents were reported in the media but not disclosed in 
a registrant's filings and that registrants' disclosures provide 
different levels of specificity suggested that ``existing guidance is 
working, because each registrant should always be conducting an 
individualized, case-by-case analysis'' and therefore disclosures 
``should expectedly vary significantly.'' \345\ One commenter 
questioned whether the materials cited in the Proposing Release support 
the Commission's conclusion there that current cybersecurity reporting 
may be inconsistent, not timely, difficult to locate, and contain 
insufficient detail.\346\ Two commenters recommended that the 
Commission ``reemphasize'' the prior guidance and ``utilize its 
enforcement powers to ensure public companies continue to report 
material cyber incidents.'' \347\ One commenter provided the results 
from a survey it conducted of its members, finding that ``only 10-20% 
of the 192 respondents reported that their shareholders have requested 
information or asked a question on'' various cybersecurity topics, 
while ``64.3% of the respondents indicated that their investors had not 
engaged with them'' on those topics.\348\ Another commenter pointed to 
a 2022 study finding that less than 1% of cybersecurity breaches are 
``material,'' and asserted that current disclosures adequately reflect 
such a level of material breaches.\349\ Some commenters also stated 
that the Commission should forgo regulation of cybersecurity disclosure 
because other agencies' regulations are sufficient.\350\
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    \343\ See letters from BPI et al.; CTIA; ISA; ITI; SCG; SIFMA; 
Virtu.
    \344\ See letters from Virtu (citing Proposing Release at 
16594); BPI et al. (pointing to the Proposing Release's citation of 
Stephen Klemash and Jamie Smith, What companies are disclosing about 
cybersecurity risk and oversight, EY (Aug. 10, 2020), available at 
https://www.ey.com/en_us/board-matters/whatcompanies-are-disclosing-about-cybersecurity-riskand-oversight).
    \345\ See letter from ITI.
    \346\ See letter from BPI et al. (discussing Moody's Investors 
Service, Research Announcement, Cybersecurity disclosures vary 
greatly in high-risk industries (Oct. 3, 2019); NACD et al., The 
State of Cyber-Risk Disclosures of Public Companies (Mar. 2021), at 
3).
    \347\ See letters from Virtu; SIFMA.
    \348\ See letter from SCG.
    \349\ See letter from ISA.
    \350\ See, e.g., letters from CTIA (``The wireless industry is 
also regulated by the FCC, in several relevant respects . . . In 
addition to FCC requirements, wireless carriers comply with 
disclosure obligations under state law, which may require notices to 
individual consumers and state regulators. Providers are also 
subject to FCC reporting requirements regarding network outages.''); 
Sen. Portman (``Congress intended that the Cyber Incident Reporting 
for Critical Infrastructure Act be the primary means for reporting 
of cyber incidents to the Federal Government, that such reporting be 
through CISA, and that the required rule occupy the space regarding 
cyber incident reporting''); SIFMA (stating the proposal ``is 
unwarranted in light of other, existing regulations and the 
Commission's lack of statutory responsibility for cybersecurity 
regulation of public companies'').
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    Other commenters, by contrast, stated that the 2011 Staff Guidance 
and the 2018 Interpretive Release, while helpful, have not been 
sufficient to provide investors with the material information they 
need. One such commenter explained that ``[t]he Commission's past 
guidance, while in line with our views, does not go far enough. The 
Proposed Rule is needed to provide clarity regarding what, when, and 
how to disclose material cybersecurity incident information . . . The 
improved standardization of disclosures included in the Proposed Rule 
adds clarity to the reporting process.'' \351\ Another commenter stated 
that ``[t]he lack of timely, comprehensive disclosure of material cyber 
events exposes investors and the community at large to potential 
harm.'' \352\
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    \351\ See letter from CalPERS. Accord letter from Better Markets 
(``Even in instances where a company discloses relevant 
cybersecurity incidents, board and management oversights and 
abilities, and policies and procedures in a comprehensive manner, 
the information is scattered throughout various sections of the Form 
10-K. While the 2018 guidance adopted by the Commission successfully 
identified potential disclosure requirements for companies to think 
about when disclosing cybersecurity risks, governance, and 
incidents, it did not solve the problem confronting investors who 
must search various sections of the Form 10-K for the 
disclosures.'').
    \352\ See letter from CII.
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    As the Commission explained in the Proposing Release, Commission 
staff has observed insufficient and inconsistent cybersecurity 
disclosure notwithstanding the prior guidance.\353\ Here, in response 
to commenters, we emphasize that the final rules supplement the prior 
guidance but do not replace it. The final rules are aimed at remedying 
the lack of material cybersecurity incident disclosure, and the 
scattered, varying nature of cybersecurity strategy, risk management, 
and governance disclosure, the need for which some commenters 
confirmed.\354\ The final rules therefore add an affirmative 
cybersecurity incident disclosure obligation, and they centralize 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance disclosure. 
While we acknowledge commenters who noted the improvements to certain 
cybersecurity-related disclosures in response to the 2018 Interpretive 
Release, and we agree there have been improvements in the areas that 
the guidance touched upon, we note that the guidance does not mandate 
consistent or comparable public disclosure of material incidents or 
otherwise address the topics that are the subject of the final rules. 
And in response to commenters who suggested that other agencies' rules 
on cybersecurity reporting are sufficient, we note that, unlike the 
final rules, such rules are not tailored to the informational needs of 
investors; instead, they focus on the needs of regulators, customers, 
and individuals whose data have been breached. Accordingly, we believe 
the final rules are necessary and appropriate in the public interest 
and for the protection of investors, consistent with the Commission's 
authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \353\ Proposing Release at 16594, 16599, 16603.
    \354\ See supra notes 351 and 352.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also note that the 2018 Interpretive Release remains in place, 
as it treats a number of topics not covered by the new rules. Those 
topics include, for instance, incorporating cybersecurity-related 
information into risk factor disclosure under Regulation S-K Item 105, 
into management's discussion and analysis under Regulation S-K Item 
303, into the description of business disclosure under Regulation S-K 
Item 101, and, if there is a relevant legal proceeding, into the 
Regulation S-K Item 103 disclosure.\355\ The 2018 Interpretive Release 
also notes the Commission's expectation that, consistent with 
Regulation S-X, a company's financial reporting and control systems 
should be designed to provide reasonable assurance that information 
about the range and magnitude of the financial impacts of a 
cybersecurity incident would be incorporated into its financial 
statements on a timely basis as that information becomes 
available.\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \355\ See 2018 Interpretive Release.
    \356\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the Commission's authority to adopt the final 
rules, some commenters asserted that the Commission does not have the 
authority to regulate cybersecurity disclosure.\357\ These commenters 
argued that the Proposing Release did not adequately explain which 
statutory provisions the Commission was relying on to propose the 
disclosure requirements, that the statutory provisions the Commission 
did identify do not provide a legal basis to require the proposed 
disclosures, that the release did not show the requirements were 
necessary or appropriate to achieve statutory goals,

[[Page 51922]]

and that the requirements implicate the major questions doctrine and 
non-delegation principles. Additionally, one commenter stated that 
``Congress intended that [CIRCIA] be the primary means for reporting of 
cyber incidents to the federal government.'' \358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \357\ See letters from International Association of Drilling 
Contractors; NRF; Virtu.
    \358\ See letter from Sen. Portman. We address this comment in 
Section II.A.3, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We disagree. Disclosure to investors is a central pillar of the 
Federal securities laws. The Securities Act of 1933 ``was designed to 
provide investors with full disclosure of material information 
concerning public offerings of securities.'' \359\ In addition, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes ``regular reporting 
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities 
exchanges.'' \360\ Together, the provisions of the Federal securities 
laws mandating release of information to the market--and authorizing 
the Commission to require additional disclosures--have prompted the 
Supreme Court to ``repeatedly'' describe ``the fundamental purpose'' of 
the securities laws as substituting ``a philosophy of full disclosure 
for the philosophy of caveat emptor.'' \361\ This bedrock principle of 
``[d]isclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate 
information, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress.'' \362\ 
Moreover, ``[u]nderlying the adoption of extensive disclosure 
requirements was a legislative philosophy: `There cannot be honest 
markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices 
of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.''' \363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \359\ Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); 
accord Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (``[t]he primary purpose 
of the Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring 
publication of material information thought necessary to allow them 
to make informed investment decisions concerning public offerings of 
securities in interstate commerce'').
    \360\ Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (1976); see also Lawson v. 
FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 451 (2014) (referring to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act's ``endeavor to `protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities 
laws''' (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745, 745 (2002))).
    \361\ Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1103 (2019); accord Santa 
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-778 (1977); Affiliated Ute 
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
    \362\ Basic, 485 U.S. at 234. Congress also legislated on the 
core premise that ``public information generally affects stock 
prices,'' Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 
272 (2014), and those prices can significantly affect the economy, 
15 U.S.C. 78b(2) and (3).
    \363\ Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 
11 (1934)); accord SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) 
(``Among Congress' objectives in passing the [Exchange] Act was `to 
insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor 
confidence' after the market crash of 1929'' (quoting United States 
v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997))); Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (the Securities 
Act and Exchange Act ``were passed during an unprecedented economic 
crisis in which regulation of the securities markets was seen as an 
urgent national concern,'' and the Commission ``was necessarily 
given very broad discretion to promulgate rules governing corporate 
disclosure,'' which is ``evident from the language in the various 
statutory grants of rulemaking authority'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several provisions of the Federal securities laws empower the 
Commission to carry out these fundamental Congressional objectives. 
Under the Securities Act, the Commission has authority to require, in a 
publicly filed registration statement, that issuers offering and 
selling securities in the U.S. public capital markets include 
information specified in Schedule A of the Act, including the general 
character of the issuer's business, the remuneration paid to its 
officers and directors, details of its material contracts and certain 
financial information, as well as ``such other information . . . as the 
Commission may by rules or regulations require as being necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.'' \364\ In addition, under the Exchange Act, issuers of 
securities traded on a national securities exchange or that otherwise 
have total assets and shareholders of record that exceed certain 
thresholds must register those securities with the Commission by filing 
a registration statement containing ``[s]uch information, in such 
detail, as to the issuer'' in respect of, among other things, ``the 
organization, financial structure and nature of the [issuer's] 
business'' as the Commission by rule or regulation determines to be in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.\365\ These same 
issuers must also provide ``such information and documents . . . as the 
Commission shall require to keep reasonably current the information and 
documents required to be included in or filed with [a] . . . 
registration statement'' as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure 
fair dealing in the security.\366\ Separately, these issuers also must 
disclose ``on a rapid and current basis such additional information 
concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of 
the issuer . . . as the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or 
useful for the protection of investors and in the public interest.'' 
\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \364\ Securities Act Section 7(a)(1) and Schedule A.
    \365\ Exchange Act Sections 12(b) and 12(g).
    \366\ Exchange Act Section 13(a). Other issuers that are 
required to comply with the reporting requirements of Section 13(a) 
include those that voluntarily register a class of equity securities 
under Exchange Act Section 12(g)(1) and, pursuant to Exchange Act 
15(d), issuers that file a registration statement under the 
Securities Act that becomes effective.
    \367\ Exchange Act Section 13(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These grants of authority are intentionally broad.\368\ Congress 
designed them to give the Commission, which regulates dynamic aspects 
of a market economy, the power and ``flexibility'' to address problems 
of inadequate disclosure as they arose.\369\ As the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained, ``[r]ather 
than casting disclosure rules in stone, Congress opted to rely on the 
discretion and expertise of the SEC for a determination of what types 
of additional disclosure would be desirable.'' \370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \368\ See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 
F.2d 1031, 1045 (1979); see also H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 6-7 
(1934).
    \369\ Courts have routinely applied and interpreted the 
Commission's disclosure regulations without suggesting that the 
Commission lacked the authority to promulgate them. See, e.g., SEC 
v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 854 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(applying regulations regarding disclosure of risks and revenue 
recognition); SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying 
Regulation S-K provisions regarding related-party transactions and 
executive compensation); Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, 
Inc., 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying Item 303 of Regulation 
S-K, which requires disclosure of management's discussion and 
analysis of financial condition); SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 
758 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying disclosure requirements for 
certain legal proceedings).
    \370\ Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 606 F.2d at 1045.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has long relied on the broad authority in these and 
other statutory provisions \371\ to prescribe rules to ensure that the 
public company disclosure regime provides investors with the 
information they need to make informed investment and voting decisions, 
in each case as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.\372\ Indeed, the Commission's predecessor 
agency,\373\ immediately upon enactment of the Securities Act, relied 
upon such authority to adopt Form A-1, precursor

[[Page 51923]]

to today's Form S-1 registration statement, to require disclosure of 
information including, for example, a list of states where the issuer 
owned property and was qualified to do business and the length of time 
the registrant had been engaged in its business--topics that are not 
specifically enumerated in Schedule A of the Securities Act.\374\ Form 
A-1 also required disclosures related to legal proceedings, though 
there is no direct corollary in Schedule A.\375\
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    \371\ Securities Act Section 19(a); Exchange Act Section 3(b); 
and Exchange Act Section 23(a).
    \372\ In considering whether a particular item of disclosure is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors, the Commission considers both the 
importance of the information to investors as well as the costs to 
provide the disclosure. In addition, when engaged in rulemaking that 
requires it to consider or determine whether an action is necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission also must 
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
See Section 2(b) of the Securities Act and Section 3(f) of the 
Exchange Act.
    \373\ Prior to enactment of the Exchange Act, the Federal Trade 
Commission was empowered with administration of the Securities Act.
    \374\ Items 3 through 5 of Form A-1; see Release No. 33-5 (July 
6, 1933) [not published in the Federal Register]. The Commission's 
disclosure requirements no longer explicitly call for this 
information.
    \375\ This early requirement called for a statement of all 
litigation that may materially affect the value of the security to 
be offered, including a description of the origin, nature, and names 
of parties to the litigation. Item 17 of Form A-1. The Commission 
has retained a disclosure requirement related to legal proceedings 
in both Securities Act registration statements and in Exchange Act 
registration statements and periodic reports. 17 CFR 229.103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the statutory scheme that Congress enacted, the 
Commission has continued to amend its disclosure requirements over time 
in order to respond to marketplace developments and investor needs. 
Accordingly, over the last 90 years, the Commission has eliminated 
certain disclosure items and adopted others pursuant to the authority 
in Sections 7 and 19(a) of the Securities Act and Sections 3(b), 12, 
13, 15, and 23(a) of the Exchange Act. Those amendments include the 
adoption of an integrated disclosure system in 1982, which reconciled 
the various disclosure items under the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act and was intended to ensure that ``investors and the marketplace 
have been provided with meaningful, nonduplicative information upon 
which to base investment decisions.'' \376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \376\ See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Release No. 
33-6383 (Mar. 3, 1982) [47 FR 11380 (Mar. 16, 1982)]. Even prior to 
the adoption of the integrated disclosure system in 1982, the 
Commission addressed anticipated disclosure issues in particular 
areas through the use of Guides for the Preparation and Filing of 
Registration Statements. See Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K and 
Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements and 
Reports, Release No. 33-6276 (Dec. 23, 1980) [46 FR 78 (Jan. 2, 
1981)] (discussing the use of Guides); see also Notice of Adoption 
of Guide 59 and of Amendments to Guides 5 and 16 of the Guides for 
Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 33-5396 (Jun. 1, 1973) 
(discussing, in response to fuel shortages in 1974, the obligation 
to disclose any material impact that potential fuel shortages might 
have and adding a new paragraph relating to disclosure by companies 
engaged in the gathering, transmission, or distribution of natural 
gas).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In keeping with Congressional intent, the Commission's use of its 
authority has frequently focused on requiring disclosures that will 
give investors enhanced information about risks facing registrants. For 
example, in 1980, the Commission adopted Item 303 of Regulation S-K to 
require registrants to include in registration statements and annual 
reports a management's discussion and analysis of financial condition 
(``MD&A''). This discussion is intended to allow investors to 
understand the registrant's ``financial condition, changes in its 
financial condition and results of operation'' through the eyes of 
management.\377\ Item 303 includes a number of specific disclosure 
items, such as requiring the identification of any known trends or 
uncertainties that will result in, or that are reasonably likely to 
result in, a material change to the registrant's liquidity,\378\ a 
material change in the mix and relative cost of the registrant's 
capital resources,\379\ or a material impact on net sales, revenues, or 
income from continuing operations.\380\ Item 303 also requires 
registrants to ``provide such other information that the registrant 
believes to be necessary to an understanding of its financial 
condition, changes in financial condition, and results of operation.'' 
\381\ The Commission developed the MD&A disclosure requirements to 
supplement and provide context to the financial statement disclosures 
previously required by the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \377\ See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company 
Disclosures, Release No. 33-6231 (Sept. 2, 1980) [45 FR 63630 (Sept. 
25, 1980)]; see also 17 CFR 229.303(a).
    \378\ See 17 CFR 229.303(b)(1)(i).
    \379\ See 17 CFR 229.303(b)(1)(ii)(B).
    \380\ See 17 CFR 229.303(b)(2)(ii).
    \381\ 17 CFR 229.303(b).
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    A few years later, in 1982, the Commission codified a requirement 
that dated back to the 1940s for registrants to include a ``discussion 
of the material factors that make an investment in the registrant or 
offering speculative or risky,'' commonly referred to as ``risk 
factors.'' \382\ By definition, these disclosures encompass a 
discussion of risks, or prospective future events or losses, that might 
affect a registrant or investment. The initial risk factor disclosure 
item provided examples of possible risk factors, such as the absence of 
an operating history of the registrant, an absence of profitable 
operations in recent periods, the nature of the business in which the 
registrant is engaged or proposes to engage, or the absence of a 
previous market for the registrant's common equity.\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \382\ See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Release No. 
33-6383 (Mar. 3, 1982) [47 FR 11380 (Mar. 16, 1982)] (``Release No. 
33-6383'') (codifying the risk factor disclosure requirement as Item 
503(c) of Regulation S-K); see also 17 CFR 229.105(a). Prior to 
1982, the Commission stated in guidance that, if the securities to 
be offered are of a highly speculative nature, the registrant should 
provide ``a carefully organized series of short, concise paragraphs 
summarizing the principal factors that make the offering 
speculative.'' See Release No. 33-4666 (Feb. 7, 1964) [29 FR 2490 
(Feb. 15, 1964)]. A guideline to disclose a summary of risk factors 
relating to an offering was first set forth by the Commission in 
1968 and included consideration of five factors that may make an 
offering speculative or risky, including with respect to risks 
involving ``a registrant's business or proposed business.'' See 
Guide 6, in Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration 
Statements, Release No. 33-4936 (Dec. 9, 1968) [33 FR 18617 (Dec. 
16, 1968)] (``Release No. 33-4936'').
    \383\ See Release No. 33-6383.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In subsequent years, the Commission expanded both the scope of 
risks about which registrants must provide disclosures and the 
granularity of those disclosures. For example, in 1997, the Commission 
first required registrants to disclose quantitative information about 
market risk.\384\ That market risk disclosure included requirements to 
present ``separate quantitative information . . . to the extent 
material'' for different categories of market risk, such as ``interest 
rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, commodity price risk, 
and other relevant market risks, such as equity price risk.'' \385\ 
Under these market risk requirements, registrants must also disclose 
various metrics such as ``value at risk'' and ``sensitivity analysis 
disclosures.'' In addition, registrants must provide certain 
qualitative disclosures about market risk, to the extent material.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \384\ See Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative 
Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and 
Disclosure of Quantitative and Qualitative Information About Market 
Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments, Other Financial 
Instruments, and Derivative Commodity Instruments, Release No. 33-
7386 (Jan. 31, 1997) [62 FR 6044 (Feb. 10, 1997)] (``Release No. 33-
7386'') (``In light of those losses and the substantial growth in 
the use of market risk sensitive instruments, the adequacy of 
existing disclosures about market risk emerged as an important 
financial reporting issue.''); see also 17 CFR 229.305.
    \385\ 17 CFR 229.305(a)(1).
    \386\ See 17 CFR 229.305(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Each of these disclosure items reflects the Commission's long-
standing view that understanding the material risks faced by a 
registrant and how the registrant manages those risks can be just as 
important to assessing its business operations and financial condition 
as knowledge about its physical assets or material contracts. Indeed, 
investors may be unable to assess the value of those assets or 
contracts adequately without appreciating the material risks to which 
they are subject.\387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \387\ As early as the 1940s, the Commission issued stop order 
proceedings under Section 8(d) of the Securities Act in which the 
Commission suspended the effectiveness of previously filed 
registration statements due, in part, to inadequate disclosure about 
speculative aspects of the registrant's business. See In the Matter 
of Doman Helicopters, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 431 (Mar. 27, 1963); In the 
Matter of Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (June 28, 1945); see 
also Release No. 33-4936.

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[[Page 51924]]

    In addition to risk-focused disclosures, over the decades, the 
Commission has also required registrants to provide information on a 
diverse range of topics that emerged as significant to investment or 
voting decisions, such as the extent of the board's role in the risk 
oversight of the registrant,\388\ the effectiveness of a registrant's 
disclosure controls and procedures,\389\ related-party 
transactions,\390\ corporate governance,\391\ and compensation 
discussion and analysis,\392\ among many other topics, including on 
topics related to particular industries,\393\ offering structures,\394\ 
and types of transactions.\395\ In all these instances, the 
Commission's exercise of its authority was guided by the baseline of 
the specific disclosures articulated by Congress. But, as Congress 
expressly authorized,\396\ the Commission's exercise of its disclosure 
authority has not been narrowly limited to those statutorily prescribed 
disclosures--instead, it has been informed by both those disclosures 
and the need to protect investors.\397\ Many of these disclosures have 
since become essential elements of the public company reporting regime 
that Congress established.
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    \388\ See 17 CFR 229.407.
    \389\ See 17 CFR 229.307.
    \390\ 17 CFR 229.404.
    \391\ 17 CFR 229.407.
    \392\ 17 CFR 229.402.
    \393\ See 17 CFR 229.1200-1208 (Disclosure by Registrants 
Engaged in Oil and Gas Activities); 17 CFR 1300-1305 (Disclosure by 
Registrants Engaged in Mining Operations); 17 CFR 1400-1406 
(Disclosure by Bank and Savings and Loan Registrants).
    \394\ See 17 CFR Subpart 1100 (Asset-Backed Securities).
    \395\ See 17 CFR subpart 900 (Roll-Up Transactions); 17 CFR 
229.1000-1016 (Mergers and Acquisitions).
    \396\ See supra notes 364 to 366 and accompanying text.
    \397\ For example, Item 303(b)(2) of Regulation S-K calls for 
information well beyond the basic profit and loss statement 
specified in Schedule A by requiring issuers to disclose any unusual 
or infrequent events or transactions or any significant economic 
changes that materially affected the amount of reported income--and 
the extent to which income was so affected--so that investors can 
better understand the reported results of operations.
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    To ensure the transparency that Congress intended when it 
authorized the Commission to promulgate disclosure regulations in the 
public interest or to protect investors,\398\ the Commission's 
regulations must--as they have over time--be updated to account for 
changing market conditions, new technologies, new transaction 
structures, and emergent risks. In this regard, we disagree with one 
commenter's assertion that the Commission's disclosure authority is 
``limited to specific types of information closely related to the 
disclosing company's value and financial condition.'' \399\ The 
commenter misstates the scope and nature of the Commission's authority. 
There is a wealth of information about a company apart from that which 
appears in the financial statements that is related to a company's 
value and financial condition, including the material risks 
(cybersecurity and otherwise) a company faces. Nor did Congress dictate 
that the Commission limit disclosures only to information that is 
``closely related'' to a company's ``value and financial condition.'' 
By also empowering the Commission to require ``such other information . 
. . as the Commission may by rules or regulations require as being 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors,'' \400\ Congress recognized that there is information 
that is vital for investors to understand in making informed investment 
decisions but does not directly relate to a company's value and 
financial condition.\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \398\ See supra notes 368 to 370 and accompanying text.
    \399\ See letter from NRF.
    \400\ Securities Act Section 7(a).
    \401\ For example, Schedule A calls for information regarding, 
among other things: the names of the directors or persons performing 
similar functions, the disclosure of owners of record of more than 
10% of any class of stock of an issuer; commissions paid to 
underwriters; the renumeration paid to directors and certain 
officers; and information about certain material contracts.
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    The narrow reading of the Commission's authority advocated by the 
commenter would foreclose many of these longstanding elements of 
disclosure that market participants have come to rely upon for investor 
protection and fair dealing of securities.\402\ Moreover, Congress 
itself has amended, or required the Commission to amend, the Federal 
securities laws many times. But Congress has not restricted the 
Commission's disclosure authority; rather, Congress has typically 
sought to further expand and supplement that authority with additional 
mandated disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \402\ See letter from NRF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also reject the commenter's suggestion that the final rules are 
an attempt to ``usurp the undelegated role of maintaining cyber safety 
in America.'' \403\ The final rules are indifferent as to whether and 
to what degree a registrant may have identified and chosen to manage a 
cybersecurity risk. Rather, the final rules reflect the reality, as 
acknowledged by the same commenter, that ``[c]ybersecurity is . . . an 
area of growing importance to companies across the world.'' \404\ When 
those companies seek to raise capital from investors in U.S. public 
markets, we believe it is appropriate that they share information about 
whether and, if so, how they are managing material cybersecurity risks 
so that investors can make informed investment and voting decisions 
consistent with their risk tolerance and investment objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \403\ Id.
    \404\ Id.
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    Finally, with respect to the commenter's contention that a broad 
reading of the Commission's disclosure authority could raise separation 
of powers concerns,\405\ we note that a statutory delegation is 
constitutional as long as Congress lays down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to 
exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform.\406\ In this 
instance, Congress has required that any new disclosure requirements be 
``necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors,'' \407\ which has guided the Commission's rulemaking 
authority for nearly a century. We therefore believe that the final 
rules are fully consistent with constitutional principles regarding 
separation of powers.
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    \405\ Id.
    \406\ Gundy v. U.S., 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (plurality op.).
    \407\ See Securities Act Section 19(a) and Exchange Act Section 
23(a); accord Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 606 F.2d at 1045, 1050-52.
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I. Compliance Dates
    The final rules are effective September 5, 2023. With respect to 
Item 106 of Regulation S-K and item 16K of Form 20-F, all registrants 
must provide such disclosures beginning with annual reports for fiscal 
years ending on or after December 15, 2023. With respect to compliance 
with the incident disclosure requirements in Item 1.05 of Form 8-K and 
in Form 6-K, all registrants other than smaller reporting companies 
must begin complying on DECEMBER 18, 2023. As discussed above, smaller 
reporting companies are being given an additional 180 days from the 
non-smaller reporting company compliance date before they must begin 
complying with Item 1.05 of Form 8-K, on June 15, 2024.

[[Page 51925]]

    With respect to compliance with the structured data requirements, 
as noted above, all registrants must tag disclosures required under the 
final rules in Inline XBRL beginning one year after the initial 
compliance date for any issuer for the related disclosure requirement. 
Specifically:
     For Item 106 of Regulation S-K and item 16K of Form 20-F, 
all registrants must begin tagging responsive disclosure in Inline XBRL 
beginning with annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after 
December 15, 2024; and
     For Item 1.05 of Form 8-K and Form 6-K all registrants 
must begin tagging responsive disclosure in Inline XBRL beginning on 
DECEMBER 18, 2024.

III. Other Matters

    If any of the provisions of these rules, or the application thereof 
to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, such invalidity 
shall not affect other provisions or application of such provisions to 
other persons or circumstances that can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application.
    Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs has designated these rules as not a ``major 
rule,'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

IV. Economic Analysis

A. Introduction

    We are mindful of the costs imposed by, and the benefits to be 
obtained from, our rules. Section 2(b) of the Securities Act \408\ and 
Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act \409\ direct the Commission, when 
engaging in rulemaking where it is required to consider or determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
Further, Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act \410\ requires the 
Commission, when making rules under the Exchange Act, to consider the 
impact that the rules would have on competition, and prohibits the 
Commission from adopting any rule that would impose a burden on 
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the Exchange 
Act. The discussion below addresses the economic effects of the final 
rules, including the likely benefits and costs, as well as the likely 
effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
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    \408\ 15 U.S.C. 77b(b).
    \409\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \410\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
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    Where possible, we have attempted to quantify the benefits, costs, 
and effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation expected 
to result from the final rules. In some cases, however, we are unable 
to quantify the potential economic effects because we lack information 
necessary to provide a reasonable estimate. For example, we lack the 
data to estimate any potential decrease in mispricing that might result 
from the rule, because we do not know how registrants' disclosures of 
cybersecurity risk and governance will change or which cybersecurity 
incidents that would go undisclosed under the current guidance will be 
disclosed under the final rules. Where we are unable to quantify the 
economic effects of the final rules, we provide a qualitative 
assessment of the effects, and of the impacts of the final rule on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. To the extent 
applicable, the views of commenters relevant to our analysis of the 
economic effects, costs, and benefits of these rules are included in 
the discussion below.
    While cybersecurity incident disclosure has become more frequent 
since the issuance of the 2011 Staff Guidance and 2018 Interpretive 
Release, there is concern that variation persists in the timing, 
content, and format of registrants' existing cybersecurity disclosure, 
and that such variation may harm investors (as further discussed 
below).\411\ When disclosures about cybersecurity breaches are made, 
they may not be timely or consistent. Because of the lack of 
consistency in when and how companies currently disclose incidents, it 
is difficult to assess quantitatively the timeliness of disclosures 
under current practices. According to Audit Analytics data, in 2021, it 
took on average of 42 days for companies to discover breaches, and then 
it took an average of 80 days and a median of 56 days for companies to 
disclose a breach after its discovery.\412\ These data do not tell us 
when disclosure occurs relative to companies' materiality 
determinations. That said, the report notes that some breaches were 
disclosed for the first time to investors in periodic reports, the 
timing of which are unrelated to the timing of the incident or the 
company's assessment of the materiality of the incident. This implies 
at least some cybersecurity incident disclosures were not timely with 
respect to determination of materiality. Because cybersecurity 
incidents can significantly affect registrants' stock prices, delayed 
disclosure results in mispricing of securities, harming investors.\413\ 
Incident disclosure practices, with respect to both location and 
content, currently vary across registrants. For example, some 
registrants disclose incidents through Form 10-K, others Form 8-K, and 
still others on a company website, or in a press release. Some 
disclosures do not discuss whether the cybersecurity incident had 
material impact on the company.\414\ Additionally, evidence suggests 
registrants may be underreporting cybersecurity incidents.\415\ More 
timely, informative, and standardized disclosure of material 
cybersecurity incidents may help investors to assess an incident's 
impact better.
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    \411\ See supra Section I. See also supra note 18 and 
accompanying text; Eli Amir, Shai Levi, & Tsafrir Livne, Do Firms 
Underreport Information on Cyber-Attacks? Evidence from Capital 
Markets, 23 Rev. Acct. Stud. 1177 (2018).
    \412\ Audit Analytics, Trends in Cybersecurity Breaches (Apr. 
2022), available at https://www.auditanalytics.com/doc/AA_Trends_in_Cybersecurity_Report_April_2022.pdf (``Audit 
Analytics'') (looking specifically at disclosures by companies with 
SEC filing requirements and stating that: ``[c]ybersecurity breaches 
can result in a litany of costs, such as investigations, legal fees, 
and remediation. There is also the risk of economic and reputational 
costs that can directly impact financial performance, such as 
reduced revenue due to lost sales.'').
    \413\ See Shinichi Kamiya, et al., Risk Management, Firm 
Reputation, and the Impact of Successful Cyberattacks on Target 
Firms, 139 J. Fin. Econ. 721 (2021).
    \414\ Based on staff analysis of the current and periodic 
reports in 2022 for companies identified by having been affected by 
a cybersecurity incident.
    \415\ See Bitdefender, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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    While disclosures about cybersecurity risk management, strategy, 
and governance have been increasing at least since the issuance of the 
2018 Interpretive Release, they are not currently provided by all 
registrants. Despite the increasing prevalence of references to 
cybersecurity risks in disclosures, however, registrants do not 
consistently or uniformly disclose information related to cybersecurity 
risk management, strategy, and governance.\416\ Registrants currently 
make such disclosures in varying sections of a company's periodic and 
current reports, such as in risk factors, in management's discussion 
and analysis, in a description of business and legal proceedings, or in 
financial statement disclosures, and sometimes include them with other 
unrelated disclosures.\417\ One commenter noted

[[Page 51926]]

that current disclosure is ``piecemeal'' in nature and that the varying 
content and placement make it difficult for investors and other market 
participants to locate and understand the cybersecurity risks that 
registrants face and their preparedness for an attack, and to make 
comparisons across registrants.\418\
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    \416\ See supra Section II.C.1.b. and c.; see also letter from 
Better Markets.
    \417\ See Proposing Release at 16606 (Table 1. Incidence of 
Cybersecurity-Related Disclosures by 10-K Location).
    \418\ See letter from Better Markets.
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    As we discuss in more detail below, some commenters supported the 
proposed rule. Specifically, one commenter noted that markets responded 
negatively to delayed cybersecurity disclosures, suggesting that 
timeliness in disclosing incidents is valuable to investors.\419\ 
Further, some academic commenters submitted papers that they authored 
finding that evidence suggests that companies experiencing data 
breaches subsequently experience higher borrowing costs.\420\ On the 
other hand, other commenters contended that the proposed rules would 
hinder capital formation, particularly for small registrants,\421\ or 
that a more cost-effective alternative to the proposed rules would be 
to look to existing rules to elicit relevant disclosures, as 
articulated by the 2011 Staff Guidance and the 2018 Interpretive 
Release.\422\ Several commenters pointed out that the proposed 
disclosures on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance 
might be overly prescriptive and would potentially provide a roadmap 
for threat actors, and that these rules could increase, not decrease 
costs.\423\ In response to those comments, these provisions have been 
modified in the final rule, which should reduce the perceived risk of 
providing a roadmap for threat actors compared with the proposal.
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    \419\ See letter from Prof. Choudhary.
    \420\ See letters from Profs. Huang & Wang; Prof. Sheneman.
    \421\ See letter from BIO.
    \422\ See letter from NRF.
    \423\ See letters from ABA; ACLI; APCIA; BIO; BPI et al.; 
Business Roundtable; Chamber; CSA; CTIA; EIC; Enbridge; FAH; 
Federated Hermes; GPA; ITI; ISA; Nareit; NAM; NMHC; NRA; NRF; SIFMA; 
Sen. Portman; TechNet; TransUnion; USTelecom; Virtu.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Economic Baseline

1. Current Regulatory Framework
    To assess the economic impact of the final rules, the Commission is 
using as its baseline the existing regulatory framework and market 
practice for cybersecurity disclosure. Although a number of Federal and 
State rules and regulations obligate registrants to disclose 
cybersecurity risks and incidents in certain circumstances, the 
Commission's regulations currently do not explicitly address 
cybersecurity.\424\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \424\ See Proposing Release at 16593-94 for a detailed 
discussion of the existing regulatory framework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted in the Proposing Release, cybersecurity threats and 
incidents continue to increase in prevalence and seriousness, posing an 
ongoing and escalating risk to public registrants, investors, and other 
market participants.\425\ The number of reported breaches disclosed by 
public companies has increased almost 600 percent over the last decade, 
from 28 in 2011 to 131 in 2020 and 188 in 2021.\426\ Although 
estimating the total cost of cybersecurity incidents is difficult, as 
many events may be unreported, some estimates put the economy-wide 
total costs as high as trillions of dollars per year in the U.S. 
alone.\427\ The U.S. Council of Economic Advisers estimated that in 
2016 the total cost of cybersecurity incidents was between $57 billion 
and $109 billion, or between 0.31 and 0.58 percent of U.S. GDP in that 
year.\428\ A more recent estimate suggests the average cost of a data 
breach in the U.S. is $9.44 million.\429\ Executives, boards of 
directors, and investors remain focused on the emerging risk of 
cybersecurity. A 2022 survey of bank Chief Risk Officers found that 
they identified managing cybersecurity risk as the top strategic 
risk.\430\ In 2022, a survey of audit committee members again 
identified cybersecurity as a top area of focus in the coming 
year.\431\
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    \425\ Unless otherwise noted, when we discuss the economic 
effects of the final rules on ``other market participants,'' we mean 
those market participants that typically provide services for 
investors and who rely on the information in companies' filings 
(such as financial analysts, investment advisers, and portfolio 
managers).
    \426\ Audit Analytics, supra note 412.
    \427\ See Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency, Cost of a 
Cyber Incident: Systemic Review and Cross-Validation (Oct. 26, 
2020), available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA-OCE_Cost_of_Cyber_Incidents_Study-FINAL_508.pdf 
(based on a literature review of publications discussing incidents 
that occurred in the United States or to U.S.-based companies).
    \428\ Council of Econ. Advisers, The Cost of Malicious Cyber 
Activity to the U.S. Economy (Feb. 2018), available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/cea-report-cost-malicious-cyber-activity-u-s-economy/ (estimating total costs, rather than 
costs of only known and disclosed incidents).
    \429\ Ponemon Institute & IBM Security, Cost of a Data Breach 
Report 2022 (July 2022), available at https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/3R8N1DZJ (estimating based on analysis of 550 organizations 
impacted by data breaches that occurred between Mar. 2021 and Mar. 
2022).
    \430\ EY and Institute of International Finance, 12th Annual EY/
IIF Global Bank Risk Management Survey, at 14 (2022), available at 
https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/content/32370132_ey-iif_global_bank_risk_management_survey_2022_final.pdf (stating 58% 
of surveyed banks' Chief Risk Officers cite ``inability to manage 
cybersecurity risk'' as the top strategic risk). See also EY, EY CEO 
Imperative Study (July 2019), available at https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/growth/ey-ceo-imperative-exec-summ-single-spread-final.pdf.
    \431\ Center for Audit Qual. & Deloitte, Audit Committee 
Practices Report: Priorities and Committee Composition (Jan. 2023) 
available at https://www.thecaq.org/audit-committee-practices-report-2023/. See also Center for Audit Qual. & Deloitte, Audit 
Committee Practices Report: Common Threads Across Audit Committees 
(Jan. 2022), available at https://www.thecaq.org/2022-ac-practices-report/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2011, the Division of Corporation Finance issued interpretive 
guidance providing the Division's views concerning operating 
registrants' disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and 
incidents.\432\ This 2011 Staff Guidance provided an overview of 
existing disclosure obligations that may require a discussion of 
cybersecurity risks and cybersecurity incidents, along with examples of 
potential disclosures.\433\ Building on the 2011 Staff Guidance, the 
Commission issued the 2018 Interpretive Release to assist operating 
companies in preparing disclosure about cybersecurity risks and 
incidents under existing disclosure rules.\434\ In the 2018 
Interpretive Release, the Commission reiterated that registrants must 
provide timely and ongoing information in periodic reports (Form 10-Q, 
Form 10-K, and Form 20-F) about material cybersecurity risks and 
incidents that trigger disclosure obligations.\435\ Additionally, the 
2018 Interpretive Release encouraged registrants to continue to use 
current reports (Form 8-K or Form 6-K) to disclose material information 
promptly, including disclosure pertaining to cybersecurity 
matters.\436\ Further, the 2018 Interpretive Release noted that to the 
extent cybersecurity risks are material to a registrant's business, the 
Commission believes that the required disclosure of the registrant's 
risk oversight should include the nature of the board's role in 
overseeing the management of that cybersecurity risk.\437\ The 2018 
Interpretive Release also stated that a registrant's controls and 
procedures should enable it to, among other things, identify 
cybersecurity risks and incidents and make timely disclosures regarding 
such risks and incidents.\438\ Finally, the 2018 Interpretive Release 
highlighted the importance of insider trading

[[Page 51927]]

prohibitions and the need to refrain from making selective disclosures 
of cybersecurity risks or incidents.\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \432\ See 2011 Staff Guidance.
    \433\ Id.
    \434\ See 2018 Interpretive Release.
    \435\ Id. at 8168-8170.
    \436\ Id. at 8168.
    \437\ Id. at 8170.
    \438\ Id. at 8171.
    \439\ Id. at 8171-8172.
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    In keeping with existing obligations, companies are increasingly 
acknowledging cybersecurity risks in their disclosures. One analysis of 
disclosures made by Fortune 100 companies that filed 10-Ks and proxy 
statements found 95 percent of those companies disclosed a focus on 
cybersecurity risk in the risk oversight section of their proxy 
statements filed in the period ending in May 2022, up from 89 percent 
of filings in 2020 and 76 percent in 2018.\440\ Disclosures of efforts 
to mitigate cybersecurity risk were found in 99 percent of proxy 
statements or Forms 10-K, up from 93 percent in 2020 and 85 percent in 
2018.\441\ The Fortune 100 list is composed of the highest-revenue 
companies in the United States. As discussed later in this economic 
analysis, we observed the overall rate of disclosure across not just 
the largest, but all filers, approximately 8,400, to be approximately 
73 percent.\442\ Further, one commenter noted that current disclosures 
are ``scattered and unpredictable'' rather than ``uniform,'' which 
``diminishes their effectiveness,'' and so the final rule should 
improve investors' ability to find and compare disclosures.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \440\ See EY Ctr for Bd Matters, How Cyber Governance and 
Disclosures are Closing the Gaps in 2022 (Aug. 2022), available at 
https://www.ey.com/en_us/board-matters/how-cyber-governance-and-disclosures-are-closing-the-gaps-in-2022.
    \441\ Id.
    \442\ See infra note 456 (describing textual analysis) and 
accompanying text.
    \443\ See letter from Better Markets. Although uniformity should 
improve investors' ability to find and compare disclosures, within 
that structure the final rule allows customization to capture 
complexity and avoid unnecessarily simplifying issues for the sake 
of standardization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Registrants currently are and may continue to be subject to other 
cybersecurity incident disclosure requirements developed by various 
industry regulators and contractual counterparties. As discussed in 
Section II, CIRCIA was passed in March 2022 and requires CISA to 
develop and issue regulations on cybersecurity reporting. As set forth 
in CIRCIA, once those regulations are adopted, covered entities will 
have 72 hours to report covered cybersecurity incidents to CISA and 
will also be required to report a ransom payment as the result of a 
ransomware attack within 24 hours of the payment being made.\444\ In 
addition, Federal contractors may be required to monitor and report 
cybersecurity incidents and breaches or face liability under the False 
Claims Act.\445\ An FCC rule directs covered telecommunications 
providers on how and when to disclose breaches of certain customer 
data.\446\ HIPAA requires covered entities and their business 
associates to provide notification following a breach of unsecured 
protected health information.\447\ Similar rules require vendors of 
personal health records and related entities to report data breaches to 
affected individuals and the FTC.\448\ All 50 states have data breach 
laws that require businesses to notify individuals of security breaches 
involving their personally identifiable information.\449\ There are 
other rules that registrants must follow in international 
jurisdictions. For example, in the European Union, the General Data 
Protection Regulation mandates disclosure of cybersecurity 
breaches.\450\
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    \444\ 6 U.S.C. 681b. See also supra notes 21 to 23 and 
accompanying text.
    \445\ See Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice 
News: Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco Announces New Civil 
Cyber-Fraud Initiative, (Oct. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-o-monaco-announces-new-civil-cyber-fraud-initiative; see, e.g., FAR 52.239-1 
(requiring contractors to ``immediately'' notify the Federal 
Government if they become aware of ``new or unanticipated threats or 
hazards . . . or if existing safeguards have ceased to function'').
    \446\ See 47 CFR 64.2011; see also supra Section II.A.3.
    \447\ See 45 CFR 164.400 through 414 (Notification in the Case 
of Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information).
    \448\ See 16 CFR 318 (Health Breach Notification Rule).
    \449\ Note that there are carve-outs to these rules, and not 
every company may fall under any particular rule. See Nat'l 
Conference of State Legislatures, Security Breach Notification Laws 
(updated Jan. 17, 2022), available at https://www.ncsl.org/technology-and-communication/security-breach-notification-laws.
    \450\ See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation), arts. 33 (Notification of a personal 
data breach to the supervisory authority), 34 (Communication of a 
personal data breach to the data subject), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 
(``GDPR'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These other cybersecurity incident disclosure requirements may 
cover some of the material incidents that registrants will need to 
disclose under the final rules. However, not all registrants are 
subject to each of these other incident disclosure requirements and the 
timeliness and public reporting elements of these requirements vary, 
making it difficult for investors and other market participants to be 
alerted to the breaches and to gain an adequate understanding of the 
impact of such incidents on a registrant.
    Some registrants are also subject to other mandates regarding 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance. For instance, 
government contractors may be subject to the Federal Information 
Security Modernization Act, and use the NIST framework to manage 
information and privacy risks.\451\ Certain financial institutions may 
be subject to the FTC's Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information 
Rule, requiring an information security program, including a qualified 
individual to oversee the security program, and the provision of 
periodic reports on the cybersecurity program to a company's board of 
directors or equivalent governing body.\452\ Under HIPAA regulations, 
covered entities are subject to rules that require protection against 
reasonably anticipated threats to electronic protected health 
information.\453\ International jurisdictions also have cybersecurity 
risk mitigation measures and governance requirements (see, for example, 
the GDPR).\454\ These rules and regulations provide varying standards 
and requirements for disclosing cybersecurity risk management, 
strategy, and governance, and may not provide investors with public or 
clear and comparable disclosure regarding how a particular registrant 
manages its cybersecurity risk profile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ See NIST, NIST Risk Management Framework (updated Jan. 31, 
2022), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/risk-management/fisma-background.
    \452\ See 16 CFR 314.
    \453\ See 45 CFR 164 (Security and Privacy); see also supra 
Section II.A.3.
    \454\ See, e.g., GDPR, arts. 32 (Security of processing), 37 
(Designation of the data protection officer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Affected Parties
    The parties that are likely to be affected by the final rules 
include investors, registrants, other market participants that use the 
information provided in company filings (such as financial analysts, 
investment advisers, and portfolio managers), and external stakeholders 
such as consumers and other companies in the same industry as affected 
companies.
    We expect the final rules to affect all registrants with relevant 
disclosure obligations on Forms 10-K, 20-F, 8-K, or 6-K. This includes 
(1) approximately 7,300 operating companies filing on domestic forms 
(of which, approximately 120 are business development companies) and 
(2) 1,174 FPIs filing on foreign forms, based on all companies that 
filed such forms or an amendment thereto during calendar

[[Page 51928]]

year 2022.\455\ Our textual analysis \456\ of all calendar year 2022 
Form 10-K filings and amendments reveals that approximately 73 percent 
of domestic filers made some kind of cybersecurity-related disclosures, 
whether of incidents, risk, or governance.
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    \455\ Estimates of affected companies here are based on the 
number of unique CIKs with at least one periodic report, current 
report, or an amendment to one of the two filed in calendar year 
2022.
    \456\ In performing this analysis, staff executed computer 
program-based keyword (and combination of key words) searches. This 
analysis covered 8,405 Forms 10-K and 10-K/A available in 
Intelligize (a division of RELX Inc.) filed in calendar year 2022 by 
7,486 companies as identified by unique CIK.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also analyzed calendar year 2022 Form 8-K and Form 6-K filings. 
There were 71,505 Form 8-K filings in 2022, involving 7,416 filers, out 
of which 35 filings reported material cybersecurity incidents.\457\ 
Similarly, there were 27,296 Form 6-K filings in 2022, involving 1,161 
filers, out of which 22 filings reported material cybersecurity 
incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \457\ The number of filers in our sample is larger than the 
number of estimated affected parties because, among other reasons, 
it includes 8-K filings by companies that have not yet filed their 
first annual report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Benefits and Costs of the Final Rules

    The final rules will benefit investors, registrants, and other 
market participants, such as financial analysts, investment advisers, 
and portfolio managers, by providing more timely and informative 
disclosures relating to cybersecurity incidents and cybersecurity risk 
management, strategy, and governance, facilitating investor decision-
making and reducing information asymmetry in the market. The final 
rules also will entail costs. A discussion of the anticipated economic 
costs and benefits of the final rules is set forth in more detail 
below. We first discuss benefits, including benefits to investors and 
other market participants. We subsequently discuss costs, including the 
cost of compliance with the final rules. We conclude with a discussion 
of indirect economic effects on investors, external stakeholders such 
as consumers, and companies in the same industry with registrants 
subject to this rule, or those facing similar cybersecurity threats.
1. Benefits
    Existing shareholders, and those seeking to purchase shares in 
registrants subject to the final rules, will be the main beneficiaries 
of the enhanced disclosure of both cybersecurity incidents and 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance as a result of 
the final rules. Specifically, investors will benefit because: (1) more 
informative and timely disclosure will improve investor decision-making 
by allowing investors to better understand a registrant's material 
cybersecurity incidents, material cybersecurity risks, and ability to 
manage such risks, reducing information asymmetry and the mispricing of 
securities in the market; and (2) more uniform and comparable 
disclosures will lower search costs and information processing costs. 
Other market participants that rely on financial statement information 
to provide services to investors, such as financial analysts, 
investment advisers, and portfolio managers, will also benefit.
a. More Timely and Informative Disclosure
    The final rules provide more timely and informative disclosures, 
relative to the current disclosure environment, which will allow 
investors to better understand registrants' cybersecurity incidents, 
risks, and ability to manage such risks as well as reduce mispricing of 
securities in the market. Timeliness benefits to investors will result 
from the requirement to disclose cybersecurity incidents within four 
business days of determining an incident was material, as well as the 
requirement to amend the disclosure to reflect material changes. 
Information benefits to investors will result from the disclosure of 
both (1) cybersecurity incidents and (2) cybersecurity risk management, 
strategy, and governance. Together, the timeliness and information 
benefits created by the final rules will reduce market mispricing and 
information asymmetry and potentially lower firms' cost of capital.
    We anticipate Item 1.05, governing cybersecurity incident 
disclosure on Form 8-K, will lead to more timely disclosure to 
investors.\458\ Currently, there is not a specific requirement for a 
registrant to disclose a cybersecurity incident to investors in a 
timely manner after its discovery and determination of material 
impact.\459\ Item 1.05's requirement to disclose a material 
cybersecurity incident on Form 8-K within four business days after 
determining the incident is material will improve the overall 
timeliness of the disclosure offered to investors--disclosure that is 
relevant to the valuation of registrants' securities. It is well-
documented in the academic literature that the market reacts negatively 
to announcements of cybersecurity incidents. For example, one study 
finds a statistically significant mean cumulative abnormal return of -
0.84 percent in the three days following cyberattack announcements, 
which, according to the study, translates into an average value loss of 
$495 million per attack.\460\ One commenter argued that the magnitude 
of stock market reaction to cybersecurity incidents from this study 
would not be considered significant by market participants, stating 
that ``if a stock had a historical standard deviation of 1 percent and 
moved 0.8 percent on news, most market participants would suggest that 
the news was either not significant or the market had priced in that 
news so the reaction was muted.'' \461\ We note, however, that a 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -0.84 percent refers not to the 
total return but to the return relative to how stocks in similar 
industries and with similar risk profiles moved; thus, indeed, a 
statistically significantly negative CAR represents a meaningful 
reaction and change to how the stock price would have moved that day 
absent the announcement of the cybersecurity incident. By allowing 
investors to make decisions based on more current, material, 
information, Item 1.05 will reduce mispricing of securities and 
information asymmetry in the market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \458\ For foreign issuers, the disclosure is made via Form 6-K.
    \459\ See supra Sections I and IV.B.1.
    \460\ See Shinichi Kamiya, et al., supra note 413, at 719-749. 
See also Lawrence A. Gordon, Martin P. Loeb, & Lei Zhou, The Impact 
of Information Security Breaches: Has There Been a Downward Shift in 
Costs?, 19 (1) J. of Comput. Sec. 33, 33-56 (2011) (finding ``the 
impact of the broad class of information security breaches on stock 
market returns of firms is significant''); Georgios Spanos & 
Lefteris Angelis, The Impact of Information Security Events to the 
Stock Market: A Systematic Literature Review, 58 Comput. & Sec. 216-
229 (2016) (documenting that the majority (75.6%) of the studies the 
paper reviewed report statistical significance of the impact of 
security events to the stock prices of companies). But see Katherine 
Campbell, et al., The Economic Cost of Publicly Announced 
Information Security Breaches: Empirical Evidence From the Stock 
Market, 11 (3) J. of Comput. Sec. 432, 431-448 (2003) (while finding 
limited evidence of an overall negative stock market reaction to 
public announcements of information security breaches, they also 
find ``the nature of the breach affects this result,'' and ``a 
highly significant negative market reaction for information security 
breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential data, but no 
significant reaction when the breach does not involve confidential 
information;'' they thus conclude that ``stock market participants 
appear to discriminate across types of breaches when assessing their 
economic impact on affected firms'').
    \461\ See letter from BIO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Information asymmetries due to timing could also be exploited by 
the malicious actors who caused a cybersecurity incident, those who 
could access and trade on material information stolen during a

[[Page 51929]]

cybersecurity incident, or those who learn about the incident before 
public disclosure, causing further harm to investors who trade 
unknowingly against those with inside information.\462\ Malicious 
actors may trade ahead of an announcement of a data breach that they 
caused or pilfer material information to trade on ahead of company 
announcements. Trading on undisclosed cybersecurity information is 
particularly pernicious, because profits generated from this type of 
trading provide incentives for malicious actors to ``create'' more 
incidents and proprietary information to trade on, further harming the 
shareholders of impacted companies.\463\ Employees or related third-
party vendors of a company experiencing a cybersecurity incident may 
also learn of the incident and trade against investors in the absence 
of disclosure. More timely disclosure as a result of Item 1.05 will 
reduce mispricing by reducing windows of information asymmetry in 
connection with a material cybersecurity incident, thereby reducing 
opportunities to exploit the mispricing, enhancing investor protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \462\ See Joshua Mitts & Eric Talley, Informed Trading and 
Cybersecurity Breaches, 9 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2019) (``In many 
respects, then, the cyberhacker plays a role in creating and 
imposing a unique harm on the targeted company--one that (in our 
view) is qualitatively different from `exogenous' information shocks 
serendipitously observed by an information trader. Allowing a 
coordinated hacker-trader team to capture these arbitrage gains 
would implicitly subsidize the very harm-creating activity that is 
being `discovered' in the first instance.'').
    \463\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter noted that there is risk the rule could, under certain 
conditions, aid stock manipulation efforts by malicious actors, 
offsetting these benefits.\464\ One commenter suggested that mandated 
disclosure timing could make public cybersecurity incident disclosure 
dates more predictable, and thus trading strategies based on the 
accompanying negative stock price reaction more consistent, to the 
extent malicious actors can monitor or control discovery of breaches 
they cause and correctly anticipate materiality determination timing. 
Their ability to do this is unclear, but we note that if the final 
rules increase the precision of strategies by attackers that involve 
shorting the stock of their targets, that would reduce the benefit of 
the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \464\ See letter from ISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Item 1.05 allows registrants to delay filing for up to 30 days if 
the Attorney General determines that the incident disclosure would pose 
a substantial risk to national security or public safety and notifies 
the Commission of such determination in writing. The delay may be 
extended up to an additional 30 days if the Attorney General determines 
disclosure continues to pose a substantial risk to national security or 
public safety and notifies the Commission of such determination in 
writing. In extraordinary circumstances, disclosure may be delayed for 
a final additional period of up to 60 days if the Attorney General 
determines that disclosure continues to pose a substantial risk to 
national security and notifies the Commission of such determination in 
writing. Beyond the final 60-day delay, if the Attorney General 
indicates that further delay is necessary, the Commission will consider 
additional requests for delay and may grant such relief through 
Commission exemptive order. These delay periods and possible exemptive 
relief would curb the timeliness benefits discussed above but would 
reduce the costs of premature disclosure such as alerting malicious 
actors targeting critical infrastructure that their activities have 
been discovered.
    By requiring all material cybersecurity incidents to be disclosed, 
Item 1.05 will also provide investors more informative disclosure by 
increasing material cybersecurity incident disclosure.\465\ There are 
currently reasons that registrants do not disclose cybersecurity 
incidents. For example, a registrant's managers may be reluctant to 
release information that they expect or anticipate will cause their 
stock price to suffer.\466\ Thus an agency problem prevents investors 
from receiving this useful information. In addition, registrants may 
consider only the benefits and costs that accrue to them when deciding 
whether to disclose an incident. As discussed in Section IV.C.3, 
incident disclosure can create indirect economic effects that accrue to 
parties other than the company itself. Companies focused on direct 
economic benefits, however, may not factor in this full range of 
effects resulting from disclosing cybersecurity incidents, resulting in 
less reporting and less information released to the market. The 
mandatory disclosure in Item 1.05 should thus lead to more incidents 
being disclosed, reducing mispricing of securities and information 
asymmetry in the market as stock prices will more accurately reflect 
registrants having experienced a cybersecurity incident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \465\ See Amir, Levi, & Levine, supra note 411.
    \466\ See, e.g., Kamiya, et al., supra note 413, at 719-749.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Item 1.05 will also improve the informativeness of the content of 
cybersecurity incident disclosures. In 2022, when registrants filed a 
Form 8-K to report an incident, the Form 8-K did not necessarily state 
whether the incident was material, and in some cases, the Form 8-K 
stated that the incident was immaterial.\467\ Item 1.05 will require 
registrants to describe in an 8-K filing the material aspects of the 
nature, scope, and timing of a material cybersecurity incident and the 
material impact or reasonably likely material impact on the registrant, 
including on its financial condition and results of operations. The 
disclosure must also identify any information called for in Item 
1.05(a) that is not determined or is unavailable at the time of the 
required filing. Registrants will then need to disclose this 
information in a Form 8-K amendment containing such information within 
four business days after the information is determined or becomes 
available. Item 1.05 is thus expected to elicit more pertinent 
information to aid investor decision-making. Additionally, the 
materiality requirement should minimize immaterial incident disclosure 
that might divert investor attention, which should reduce mispricing of 
securities. Numerous commenters on the Proposing Release agreed that 
more informative incident disclosure would be useful for 
investors.\468\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \467\ Based on staff analysis of the 10,941 current and periodic 
reports in 2022 for companies available in Intelligize and 
identified as having been affected by a cybersecurity incident using 
a keyword search.
    \468\ See, e.g., letters from Better Markets; CalPERS; PWC; 
Prof. Perullo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulation S-K Items 106(b) and (c) of the final rules provide 
further benefits by requiring registrants to disclose, in their annual 
reports on Form 10-K, information about their cybersecurity risk 
management, strategy, and governance. The final rules require 
disclosure regarding a registrant's processes, if any, for assessing, 
identifying, and managing material risks from cybersecurity threats, as 
well as disclosure of the registrant's board of directors' oversight of 
risks from cybersecurity threats and management's role in assessing and 
managing material risks from cybersecurity threats.\469\ There are 
currently no disclosure requirements on Forms 10-K or 10-Q that 
explicitly refer to cybersecurity risks or governance, and thus Item 
106 will benefit investors by eliciting relevant information about how 
registrants are managing their material cybersecurity risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \469\ See supra Sections II.B and C. For foreign issuers, the 
disclosure is made via Form 20-F.

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[[Page 51930]]

    One commenter took issue with the usefulness of the proposed 
disclosures, arguing, for example, that the particular requirement to 
disclose whether a registrant engages assessors, consultants, auditors, 
or other third parties in connection with any cybersecurity risk 
assessment program was unnecessary because there was no evidence that 
such third parties improved a registrant's cyber risk management, and 
some companies have internal cybersecurity risk management 
capabilities.\470\ Some, however, have noted that the use of 
independent third-party advisors may be ``vital to enhancing cyber 
resiliency'' by validating that the risk management program is meeting 
its objectives.\471\ As discussed in Section II.C.1.c., it may be 
important for investors to know a registrant's level of in-house versus 
outsourced cybersecurity capacity. Another commenter suggested that the 
requirement to disclose governance and risk management practices would 
be of limited value to investors, while being administratively 
burdensome.\472\ Other commenters said that the required disclosures 
about cybersecurity governance and risk management were too granular to 
be useful and suggested that the specific disclosures be replaced with 
a more high-level explanation of management's and the board's roles in 
cybersecurity risk management and governance.\473\ One such commenter 
stated that the proposed disclosures would create pressures to provide 
boilerplate responses to the specific items that would need to be 
disclosed instead of providing a robust discussion of the way a 
registrant would manage cybersecurity risk management and 
governance.\474\ Another commenter stated that granular disclosures 
``may result in overly detailed filings that have little utility to 
investors.'' \475\ These commenters suggested that the specific 
disclosures should be replaced with a more high-level explanation of 
management's and the board's roles in cybersecurity risk management and 
governance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \470\ See letter from NRF.
    \471\ See Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance Blog, 
posted by Steve W. Klemash, Jamie C. Smith, and Chuck Seets, What 
Companies are Disclosing About Cybersecurity Risk and Oversight, 
(posted Aug. 25, 2020), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/25/what-companies-are-disclosing-about-cybersecurity-risk-and-oversight/.
    \472\ See letter from SIMFA.
    \473\ See letters from ABA; AGA/INGAA; EEI; Nareit; NYSE.
    \474\ See letter from ABA.
    \475\ See letter from NYSE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to these comments, the Commission is not adopting 
certain proposed disclosure requirements, such as disclosure of whether 
the registrant has a designated chief information security officer. 
However, Items 106(b) and (c) still require risk, strategy and 
governance disclosures as we continue to believe disclosures of 
cybersecurity risk oversight and processes, as well as management's 
role and relevant expertise, are important to investors.
    Improved timeliness and informativeness of cybersecurity 
disclosures may provide further benefit by lowering companies' cost of 
capital.\476\ As detailed above, the final rules should reduce 
information asymmetry and mispricing of securities. In an asymmetric 
information environment, investors are less willing to hold shares, 
reducing liquidity. Registrants may respond by issuing shares at a 
discount, increasing their cost of capital. By providing more and more 
credible disclosure, however, companies can reduce the risk of adverse 
selection faced by investors and the discount they demand, ultimately 
increasing liquidity and decreasing the company's cost of capital.\477\ 
Investors benefit when the companies they are invested in enjoy higher 
liquidity. Item 1.05 enables companies to provide more credible 
disclosure because currently, investors do not know whether an absence 
of incident disclosure means no incidents have occurred, or one has but 
the company has not yet chosen to reveal it. By requiring all material 
incidents to be reported, Item 1.05 supplies investors greater 
assurance that, indeed, barring extraordinary circumstances, no 
disclosure means the company has not been aware for more than four 
business days of a material incident having occurred. Similarly, Item 
106 should also generate more credible disclosure. Currently, voluntary 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance disclosures 
lack standardization and consistency, reducing their comparability and 
usefulness for investors. Without set topics that must be addressed, 
companies may disclose only the strongest aspects of their 
cybersecurity processes, if they disclose at all. By clarifying what 
registrants must disclose with respect to their cybersecurity risk 
management, strategy, and governance, Item 106 will reduce information 
asymmetry and provide investors and other market participants more 
certainty and easier comparability of registrants' vulnerability to and 
ability to manage cybersecurity breaches, reducing adverse selection 
and increasing liquidity. Thus, the final rules could decrease cost of 
capital across registrants and increase company value, benefiting 
investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \476\ See Leuz & Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of 
Increased Disclosure, 38 J. Acct. Res. 91 (2000) (``A brief sketch 
of the economic theory is as follows. Information asymmetries create 
costs by introducing adverse selection into transactions between 
buyers and sellers of firm shares. In real institutional settings, 
adverse selection is typically manifest in reduced levels of 
liquidity for firm shares (e.g., Copeland and Galai [1983], Kyle 
[1985], and Glosten and Milgrom [1985]). To overcome the reluctance 
of potential investors to hold firm shares in illiquid markets, 
firms must issue capital at a discount. Discounting results in fewer 
proceeds to the firm and hence higher costs of capital. A commitment 
to increased levels of disclosure reduces the possibility of 
information asymmetries arising either between the firm and its 
shareholders or among potential buyers and sellers of firm shares. 
This, in turn, should reduce the discount at which firm shares are 
sold, and hence lower the costs of issuing capital (e.g., Diamond 
and Verrecchia [1991] and Baiman and Verrecchia [1996]).'').
    \477\ See Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Disclosure, 
Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital, 46 J. Fin. 1325, 1325-1359 
(1991) (finding that revealing public information to reduce 
information asymmetry can reduce a company's cost of capital through 
increased liquidity). See also Christian Leuz & Robert E. 
Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 38 J. 
Acct. Res. 91 (2000) (providing empirical evidence that increased 
disclosure lowers the information asymmetry component of the cost of 
capital in a sample of German companies); see also Christian Leuz & 
Peter D. Wysocki, The Economics of Disclosure and Financial 
Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research, 
54 J. Acct. Res. 525 (2016) (providing a comprehensive survey of the 
literature on the economic effect of disclosure). Although 
disclosure could be beneficial for the company, several conditions 
must be met for companies to voluntarily disclose all their private 
information. See Anne Beyer, et al., The Financial Reporting 
Environment: Review Of The Recent Literature, 50 J. Acct. & Econ. 
296, 296-343 (2010) (discussing conditions under which companies 
voluntarily disclose all their private information, and these 
conditions include ``(1) disclosures are costless; (2) investors 
know that companies have, in fact, private information; (3) all 
investors interpret the companies' disclosure in the same way and 
companies know how investors will interpret that disclosure; (4) 
managers want to maximize their companies' share prices; (5) 
companies can credibly disclose their private information; and (6) 
companies cannot commit ex-ante to a specific disclosure policy''). 
Increased reporting could also help determine the effect of 
investment on company value. See Lawrence A. Gordon, et al., The 
Impact of Information Sharing on Cybersecurity Underinvestment: A 
Real Options Perspective, 34 (5) J. Acct. & Pub. Policy 509, 509-519 
(2015) (arguing that ``information sharing could reduce the tendency 
by firms to defer cybersecurity investments'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter argued that smaller registrants are less likely than 
larger registrants to experience cybersecurity incidents and that 
cyberattacks are not material for smaller registrants.\478\ This

[[Page 51931]]

could imply that the degree of cybersecurity-driven adverse selection 
faced by investors in small registrants might be less severe. If so, 
the potential benefit from improvement in liquidity and cost of capital 
due to the timeliness and information benefits from the final rules 
might be smaller for small registrants and their investors. The 
research this commenter cited to support this assertion found larger 
companies were more susceptible than smaller companies to a particular 
category of cybersecurity incidents--those involving personal 
information lost through hacking by an outside party--which composed 
less than one-quarter of all cyber incidents in the sample (1,580 out 
of 6,382).\479\ It is possible that malicious strategies that target 
personal information are particularly suited to larger, well-known 
companies, and thus the research may overstate the degree to which 
large companies are more susceptible to cybersecurity incidents 
generally. These strategies explicitly harm companies' customers, and 
customer ill will is potentially more newsworthy and consequential for 
a larger, well-known company as compared to a smaller one. In contrast, 
ransomware attacks that target non-personal, internal company 
operations such as an information technology network, for example, are 
less concerned with causing reputational loss and thus may have an 
optimal target profile that favors smaller firms as much as larger 
firms. Additionally, smaller companies may have fewer resources and 
weaker processes in place to prevent cybersecurity attacks.\480\ Hence, 
it is not clear that smaller companies experience fewer material 
cybersecurity incidents generally. Others have noted that small 
companies are frequently targeted victims of cyberattacks, potentially 
leading to dissolution of the business.\481\ Thus, overall, we maintain 
that cybersecurity attacks are material for smaller reporting companies 
and that the final rules will serve to benefit them and their 
investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \478\ See comment letter from BIO. The letter argues that the 
Commission, when citing the study by Kamiya, et al. (2021) in the 
Proposing Release, ``ignored and omitted'' the fact that the mean 
market capitalization of impacted companies in this study was $58.9 
billion, much higher than the average for small companies, and thus 
``cyberattacks mainly affect large companies and are not material 
for smaller companies.'' We observe that an average market 
capitalization of impacted companies of $58.9 billion would 
generally indicate that companies both larger and smaller than that 
size were impacted by cyberattacks.
    \479\ See Kamiya, et al., supra note 413.
    \480\ See letter from Tenable.
    \481\ See Testimony of Dr. Jane LeClair, Chief Operating 
Officer, National Cybersecurity Institute at Excelsior College, 
before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Small Business 
(Apr. 22, 2015), available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/SM/SM00/20150422/103276/HHRG-114-SM00-20150422-SD003-U4.pdf (describing 
the cybersecurity risks small businesses face and noting ``fifty 
percent of SMB's have been the victims of cyberattack and over 60 
percent of those attacked go out of business'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Overall, Form 8-K Item 1.05 and Regulation S-K Item 106 provide for 
timely, informative, and up-to-date disclosure of cybersecurity 
incidents, as well as disclosure that may provide insight into whether 
a registrant is prepared for risks from cybersecurity threats and has 
adequate cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance 
measures in place to reduce the likelihood of future incidents, 
reducing the likelihood of delayed or incomplete disclosure and 
benefiting investors and the market.
    We believe enhanced information, timing, and completeness of 
disclosures as a result of Form 8-K Item 1.05 and Regulation S-K Item 
106 will benefit not only investors but also other market participants 
that rely on registrant disclosures to provide services to investors. 
They, too, will be able to better evaluate registrants' cybersecurity 
preparations and risks and thus provide better recommendations. We note 
that the potential benefit of these amendments could be reduced because 
some registrants already provide relevant disclosures. That said, we 
expect this same information will become more useful due to added 
context from, and easier comparisons with, the increased number of 
other registrants now providing these disclosures.
    We are unable to quantify the potential benefit to investors and 
other market participants as a result of the increase in disclosure and 
improvement in pricing under the final rules. Such estimation requires 
information about the fundamental value of securities and the extent of 
the mispricing. We do not have access to such information and therefore 
cannot provide a reasonable estimate. One commenter suggested we use 
existing cyber disclosure models to ``empirically determine'' the 
current degree of market mispricing, but did not suggest what data the 
Commission could use to do so.\482\ The Commission cannot estimate the 
effects of undisclosed cybersecurity incidents that are creating market 
mispricing, as the relevant information was never released and the 
market was unable to react.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \482\ See letter from ISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Greater Uniformity and Comparability
    The final rules requiring disclosure about cybersecurity incidents 
and cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance should also 
lead to more uniform and comparable disclosures, in terms of both 
content and location, benefiting investors by lowering their search and 
information processing costs. Currently, registrants do not always use 
Form 8-K to report cybersecurity incidents. Even among registrants that 
do, reporting practices vary widely.\483\ Some provide a discussion of 
materiality, the estimated costs of an incident, or the remedial steps 
taken as a result of an incident, while others do not provide such 
disclosure or provide much less detail. Disclosures related to risk 
management, strategy, and governance also vary significantly across 
registrants--such information could be disclosed in places such as the 
risk factors section, the management's discussion and analysis section, 
or not at all. For both types of disclosures, the final rules specify 
the topics that registrants should disclose. As a result, both incident 
disclosure and risk management, strategy, and governance disclosure 
should become more uniform across registrants, making them easier for 
investors and other market participants to compare. The final rules 
also specify the disclosure locations (e.g., Item 1C of Form 10-K), 
benefiting investors and other market participants further by reducing 
the time, cost, and effort it takes them to search for and retrieve 
information (as pointed out by commenters \484\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \483\ See Proposing Release at 16594.
    \484\ See, e.g., letters from Better Markets; CalPERS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We note that to the extent that the disclosures related to 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance become too 
uniform or ``boilerplate,'' the benefit of comparability may be 
diminished. However, we believe that Item 106 requires sufficient 
specificity, tailored to the registrant's facts and circumstances, to 
help mitigate any tendency towards boilerplate disclosures. Item 106 
also provides a non-exclusive list of information that registrants 
should disclose, as applicable, which should help in this regard.
    The requirement to tag the cybersecurity disclosure in Inline XBRL 
will likely augment the informational and comparability benefits by 
making the disclosures more easily retrievable and usable for 
aggregation, comparison, filtering, and other analysis. XBRL 
requirements for public operating company financial statement 
disclosures have been observed to mitigate information asymmetry by 
reducing information processing costs, thereby making the disclosures 
easier to access and analyze.\485\ While these

[[Page 51932]]

observations are specific to operating company financial statement 
disclosures and not to disclosures outside the financial statements, 
such as the cybersecurity disclosures, they suggest that the Inline 
XBRL requirements should directly or indirectly (i.e., through 
information intermediaries such as financial media, data aggregators, 
and academic researchers) provide investors with increased insight into 
cybersecurity-related information at specific companies and across 
companies, industries, and time periods.\486\ Also, unlike XBRL 
financial statements (including footnotes), which consist of tagged 
quantitative and narrative disclosures, the cybersecurity disclosures 
consist largely of tagged narrative disclosures.\487\ Tagging narrative 
disclosures can facilitate analytical benefits such as automatic 
comparison or redlining of these disclosures against prior periods and 
the performance of targeted artificial intelligence or machine learning 
assessments (tonality, sentiment, risk words, etc.) of specific 
cybersecurity disclosures rather than the entire unstructured 
document.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \485\ See, e.g., J.Z. Chen, et al., Information processing costs 
and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from the SEC's XBRL mandate, 
40 J. of Acct. and Pub. Pol'y 2 (finding XBRL reporting decreases 
likelihood of company tax avoidance because ``XBRL reporting reduces 
the cost of IRS monitoring in terms of information processing, which 
dampens managerial incentives to engage in tax avoidance 
behavior''). See also P.A. Griffin, et al., The SEC's XBRL Mandate 
and Credit Risk: Evidence on a Link between Credit Default Swap 
Pricing and XBRL Disclosure, 2014 American Accounting Association 
Annual Meeting (2014) (finding XBRL reporting enables better outside 
monitoring of companies by creditors, leading to a reduction in 
company default risk); E. Blankespoor, The Impact of Information 
Processing Costs on Firm Disclosure Choice: Evidence from the XBRL 
Mandate, 57 J. of Acc. Res. 919, 919-967 (2019) (finding ``firms 
increase their quantitative footnote disclosures upon implementation 
of XBRL detailed tagging requirements designed to reduce information 
users' processing costs,'' and ``both regulatory and non-regulatory 
market participants play a role in monitoring firm disclosures,'' 
suggesting ``that the processing costs of market participants can be 
significant enough to impact firms' disclosure decisions'').
    \486\ See, e.g., N. Trentmann, Companies Adjust Earnings for 
Covid-19 Costs, but Are They Still a One-Time Expense?, Wall St. J. 
(2020) (citing an XBRL research software provider as a source for 
the analysis described in the article). See also Bloomberg Lists BSE 
XBRL Data, XBRL.org (2018); R. Hoitash, and U. Hoitash, Measuring 
Accounting Reporting Complexity with XBRL, 93 Account. Rev. 259 
(2018).
    \487\ The cybersecurity disclosure requirements do not expressly 
require the disclosure of any quantitative values; if a company 
includes any quantitative values that are nested within the required 
discussion (e.g., disclosing the number of days until containment of 
a cybersecurity incident), those values will be individually detail 
tagged, in addition to the block text tagging of the narrative 
disclosures.
    \488\ To illustrate, without Inline XBRL, using the search term 
``remediation'' to search through the text of all companies' filings 
over a certain period of time, so as to analyze the trends in 
companies' disclosures related to cybersecurity incident remediation 
efforts during that period, could return many narrative disclosures 
outside of the cybersecurity incident discussion (e.g., disclosures 
related to potential environmental liabilities in the risk factors 
section). Inline XBRL, however, enables a user to search for the 
term ``remediation'' exclusively within the required cybersecurity 
disclosures, thereby likely reducing the number of irrelevant 
results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, by formalizing the disclosure requirements related to 
cybersecurity incidents and cybersecurity risk management, strategy, 
and governance, the final rules could reduce compliance costs for those 
registrants that are currently providing disclosure about these topics. 
The compliance costs would be reduced to the extent that those 
registrants may be currently over-disclosing information out of 
caution, to increase the perceived credibility of their disclosures, or 
to signal to investors that they are diligent with regard to 
cybersecurity. For instance, the staff has observed that some 
registrants provide Form 8-K filings even when they do not anticipate 
the incident will have a material impact on their business operations 
or financial results.\489\ By specifying that only material incidents 
require disclosure, the final rules should ease some of these concerns 
and reduce costs to the extent those costs currently exist.\490\ 
Investors will benefit to the extent the registrants they invest in 
enjoy lower compliance costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \489\ Based on staff analysis of the 10,941 current and periodic 
reports in 2022 for companies available in Intelligize and 
identified as having been affected by a cybersecurity incident using 
a keyword search.
    \490\ We note that registrants may still over-disclose due to 
uncertainty over when a cybersecurity incident crosses the threshold 
of materiality. This may impact how fully costs from immaterial 
incident disclosure are reduced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Costs
    We also recognize that enhanced cybersecurity disclosure would 
result in costs to registrants, borne by investors. These costs include 
potential increases in registrants' vulnerability to cybersecurity 
incidents and compliance costs. We discuss these costs below.
    First, the disclosure about cybersecurity incidents and 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance could 
potentially increase the vulnerability of registrants. Since the 
issuance of the 2011 Staff Guidance, concerns have been raised that 
providing detailed disclosures of cybersecurity incidents could, 
potentially, provide a road map for future attacks, and, if the 
underlying security issues are not completely resolved, could 
exacerbate the ongoing attack.\491\ The concern is that malicious 
actors could use the disclosures to potentially gain insights into a 
registrant's practices on cybersecurity. As a result, the final 
incident disclosure rules could potentially impose costs on registrants 
and their investors, if, for example, additional threat actors steal 
more data or hamper breach resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \491\ See, e.g., Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, The SEC 
Staff's Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance: Will It Help Investors or 
Cyber-Thieves More, 2011 Bus. L. Today 2, 1-4 (2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rules have been modified from the Proposing Release to 
mitigate disclosure of details that could aid threat actors, while 
remaining informative for investors. Form 8-K Item 1.05 will require 
registrants to timely disclose material cybersecurity incidents, 
describe the material aspects of the nature, scope, and timing of the 
incident, and, importantly, describe the material impact or reasonably 
likely material impact of the incident on the registrant. Focusing on 
the material impact or reasonably likely material impact of the 
incident rather than the specific or technical details of the incident 
should reduce the likelihood of providing a road map that threat actors 
can exploit for future attacks, and should reduce the risks and costs 
stemming from threat actors acting in this manner.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \492\ Instruction 4 to Item 1.05 provides that a ``registrant 
need not disclose specific or technical information about its 
planned response to the incident or its cybersecurity systems, 
related networks and devices, or potential system vulnerabilities in 
such detail as would impede the registrant's response or remediation 
of the incident.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar concerns were raised by commenters about the required risk 
management, strategy, and governance disclosure.\493\ Items 106(b) and 
(c) require registrants to provide specified disclosure regarding their 
cybersecurity risk management processes and cybersecurity governance by 
the management and board. The required disclosure could provide 
malicious actors information about which registrants have weak 
processes related to cybersecurity risk management and allow such 
malicious actors to determine their targets accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \493\ See letters from ABA; ACLI; APCIA; BIO; BPI et al.; 
Business Roundtable; Chamber; CSA; CTIA; EIC; Enbridge; FAH; 
Federated Hermes; GPA; ITI; ISA; Nareit; NAM; NMHC; NRA; NRF; SIFMA; 
Sen. Portman; TechNet; TransUnion; USTelecom; Virtu; see also supra 
note 201 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, academic research so far has not provided evidence that 
more detailed cybersecurity risk disclosures necessarily lead to more 
attacks. For example, one study finds that measures for specificity 
(e.g., the uniqueness of the disclosure) do not have a

[[Page 51933]]

statistically significant relation with subsequent cybersecurity 
incidents.\494\ Another study finds that cybersecurity risk factor 
disclosures that involve terms about processes are less likely to be 
related to future breach announcements than disclosures that employ 
more general language.\495\ On the other hand, we note that the final 
rules will require more details of cybersecurity processes than what is 
explicitly required under the current rules, and the uniformity of the 
final rules might also make it easier for malicious actors to identify 
registrants with relatively weaker processes. Therefore, these academic 
findings might not be generalizable to the effects of the final 
rules.\496\ However, we also note that we have streamlined the 
disclosure obligations for Items 106 (b) and (c), in response to 
commenters' concerns, to require a more principles-based discussion of 
a registrant's processes instead of detailed disclosures on a specific 
set of items. This change should help ease concerns that the required 
cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance disclosures 
will help malicious actors choose targets. In addition, the potential 
costs resulting from the disclosure requirements might be partially 
mitigated to the extent that registrants decide to enhance their 
cybersecurity risk management in anticipation of the increased 
disclosure. This possibility is discussed below under Indirect Economic 
Effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \494\ See He Li, Won Gyun No, & Tawei Wang, SEC's Cybersecurity 
Disclosure Guidance and Disclosed Cybersecurity Risk Factors, 30 
Int'l. J. of Acct. Info. Sys. 40-55 (2018) (``while Ferraro (2013) 
criticizes that the SEC did little to resolve the concern about 
publicly revealing too much information [that] could provide 
potential hackers with a roadmap for successful attacks, we find no 
evidence supporting such claim'').
    \495\ See Tawei Wang, Karthik N. Kannan, & Jackie Rees Ulmer, 
The Association Between the Disclosure and the Realization of 
Information Security Risk Factors, 24.2 Info. Sys. Res. 201, 201-218 
(2013).
    \496\ We note that the papers we cited above study the effect of 
voluntary disclosure and the 2011 Staff Guidance, which could also 
reduce the generalizability of these studies to the mandatory 
disclosures under the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rules will also impose compliance costs. Registrants, and 
thus their investors, will incur one-time and ongoing costs to fulfill 
the new disclosure requirements under Item 106 of Regulation S-K. These 
costs will include costs to gather the information and prepare the 
disclosures. Registrants will also incur compliance costs to fulfill 
the disclosure requirements related to Form 8-K (Form 6-K for FPIs) 
incident disclosure.\497\ These costs include one-time costs to 
implement or revise their incident disclosure practices, so that any 
registrant that determines it has experienced a material cybersecurity 
incident will disclose such incident with the required information 
within four business days. Registrants may also incur ongoing costs to 
disclose in a Form 8-K report any material changes or updates relating 
to previously disclosed incidents, and we expect these costs to be 
higher for registrants with more incidents to disclose. The costs will 
be mitigated for registrants whose current disclosure practices match 
or are similar to those that are in the final rules. One commenter 
suggested that companies could incur costs to reconcile their existing 
cybersecurity activities and NIST-based best practices with the 
requirements of the final rules \498\ but, as discussed in Section 
II.C.3.c, the final rules are not in conflict with NIST and we do not 
anticipate that significant reconciliation will be needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \497\ We note that the compliance costs related to Form 6-K 
filings will be mitigated, because a condition of the form is that 
the information is disclosed or required to be disclosed elsewhere.
    \498\ See letter from SIFMA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The compliance costs will also include costs attributable to the 
Inline XBRL tagging requirements. Many commenters supported the XBRL 
tagging requirement,\499\ while one commenter suggested that it would 
be burdensome to add tagging given the time-sensitive nature of the 
disclosure requirements.\500\ Various preparation solutions have been 
developed and used by operating companies to fulfill XBRL requirements, 
and some evidence suggests that, for smaller companies, XBRL compliance 
costs have decreased over time.\501\ The incremental compliance costs 
associated with Inline XBRL tagging of cybersecurity disclosures will 
also be mitigated by the fact that most companies that will be subject 
to the requirements are already subject to other Inline XBRL 
requirements for other disclosures in Commission filings, including 
financial statement and cover page disclosures in certain periodic 
reports and registration statements.\502\ Such companies may be able to 
leverage existing Inline XBRL preparation processes and expertise in 
complying with the cybersecurity disclosure tagging requirements. 
Moreover, the one-year XBRL compliance period extension could further 
assuage concerns about the transition for registrants to comply with 
the new requirements.\503\
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    \499\ See letters from E&Y CAQ; PWC; NACD; AICPA; XBRL.
    \500\ See letter from NYC Bar.
    \501\ An AICPA survey of 1,032 reporting companies with $75 
million or less in market capitalization in 2018 found an average 
cost of $5,850 per year, a median cost of $2,500 per year, and a 
maximum cost of $51,500 per year for fully outsourced XBRL creation 
and filing, representing a 45% decline in average cost and a 69% 
decline in median cost since 2014. See AICPA, XBRL Costs for Small 
Companies Have Declined 45% since 2014 (2018), available at https://us.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/frc/accountingfinancialreporting/xbrl/downloadabledocuments/xbrl-costs-for-small-companies.pdf. See also Letter from Nasdaq, Inc. (Mar. 21, 
2019) (responding to Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and 
Quarterly Reports, Release No. 33-10588 (Dec. 18, 2018) [83 FR 65601 
(Dec. 21, 2018)]) (stating that a 2018 NASDAQ survey of 151 listed 
companies found an average XBRL compliance cost of $20,000 per 
quarter, a median XBRL compliance cost of $7,500 per quarter, and a 
maximum XBRL compliance cost of $350,000 per quarter).
    \502\ See 17 CFR 229.601(b)(101) and 17 CFR 232.405 (for 
requirements related to tagging financial statements, including 
footnotes and schedules in Inline XBRL). See 17 CFR 229.601(b)(104) 
and 17 CFR 232.406 (for requirements related to tagging cover page 
disclosures in Inline XBRL).
    \503\ See supra Section II.I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters contended that the Proposing Release failed to 
consider the costs of the proposed rules adequately.\504\ We are 
generally unable to quantify costs related to the final rules due to a 
lack of data. For example, we are unable to quantify the impact of any 
increased vulnerability to existing or new threat actors arising from 
the required incident or risk management, strategy, or governance 
disclosures. Moreover, costs related to preparing cyber-related 
disclosures are generally private information known only to the issuing 
firm, hence such data are not readily available to the Commission. 
There is also likely considerable variation in these costs depending on 
a given firm's size, industry, complexity of operations, and other 
characteristics, which makes comprehensive estimates difficult to 
obtain. We note that the Commission has provided certain estimates for 
purposes of compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, as 
further discussed in Section V below. Those estimates, while useful to 
understanding the collection of information burden associated with the 
final rules, do not purport to reflect the full costs associated with 
making the required disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \504\ See, e.g., letters from Chamber and SIFMA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter provided a numerical cost estimate, stating the 
initial costs of complying with the proposed rules would be $317.5 
million to $523.4 million ($38,690 to $69,151 per regulated company), 
and future annual costs would be $184.8 million to $308.1 million 
($22,300 to $37,500 per regulated company).\505\ We cannot directly 
evaluate the accuracy of these

[[Page 51934]]

estimates because the commenter did not provide any explanation for how 
they were derived. We believe, however, these estimates likely 
significantly overstate the costs of the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \505\ See letter from Chamber.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, the commenter overestimates the number of registrants who 
are likely to bear the full costs of new disclosures. Converting the 
total and per company cost estimates to registrant counts implies the 
commenter assumed these costs would be borne by approximately 8,000 
companies, which would be nearly every registrant.\506\ As stated in 
Section IV.B.2 above, however, 73 percent of domestic filers in 2022 
already made cybersecurity-related disclosures in Form 10-K filings and 
amendments, and 35 Form 8-K filings disclosed material cybersecurity 
incidents.\507\ While the degree to which registrants' existing 
disclosures already may be in line with the requirements of the final 
rules varies--some registrants may need to make significant changes 
while others may not, especially given the guidance from the 2018 
Interpretive Release--most registrants should not bear the full costs 
of compliance. In addition, while cybersecurity incident disclosure is 
expected to increase as a result of Item 1.05, we do not expect that 
most companies will need to report in any given year. Extrapolating 
from the current numbers of incidents reported--for example, public 
companies disclosed 188 reported breaches in 2021 \508\--we expect that 
the overwhelming majority of registrants will not experience a material 
breach and will not need to disclose cybersecurity incidents and incur 
the ongoing associated costs.\509\ They may, however, revisit their 
disclosure controls initially, to ensure they are capturing what the 
rule requires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \506\ $317.5 million divided by $38,690 per registrant equals 
8,206 registrants; $523.4 million divided by $69,151 per registrant 
equals 7,569 registrants; $184.8 million divided by $22,300 per 
registrant equals 8,287 registrants; $308.1 million divided by 
$37,500 per registrant equals 8,216 registrants. In Section IV.B.2, 
supra, we find the number of affected parties to include 
approximately 7,300 operating companies filing on domestic forms and 
1,174 FPIs filing on foreign forms.
    \507\ See supra notes 456 and 457 and accompanying text.
    \508\ See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
    \509\ This conclusion is based on relative quantities. Note that 
188 is very small relative to the total number of registrants, 
8,474, from Section IV.B.2 (188 divided by 8,474 is roughly 2%).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, we have made changes from the proposed rules that would 
also reduce costs as compared with the proposal. Some of these changes 
concerned aspects of the proposed rules that the commenter noted would 
be burdensome. For example, the commenter states that ``potential 
material incidents in the aggregate would be difficult to identify and 
operationally challenging to track.'' \510\ The commenter also states 
``the SEC underestimates the burdens related to tracking `several small 
but continuous cyberattacks against a company,' which may or may not 
prove to be material.'' \511\ These comments refer to proposed Item 
106(d)(2), which would have required disclosure when a series of 
previously undisclosed individually immaterial cybersecurity incidents 
become material in the aggregate. In response to comments, we are not 
adopting this aspect of the proposal and instead have added ``a series 
of related unauthorized occurrences'' to the definition of 
``cybersecurity incident,'' which may help address this concern about 
the burden of the proposal. The comment letter also stated that 
``cybersecurity talent is scar[c]e globally. From a personnel 
standpoint, it's unclear where companies would get the so-called 
cybersecurity experts that the proposed regulation would mandate. There 
is a well-documented lack of cybersecurity talent for the public and 
private sectors that would unquestionably affect companies' recruitment 
of board cybersecurity experts.'' \512\ We are not adopting proposed 
407(j) about the cybersecurity expertise, if any, of a registrant's 
board members, which may have factored into the commenter's cost 
estimates. Additionally, the proposal would not have mandated 
recruitment of cybersecurity experts, only disclosure of their 
presence. Additional streamlining of requirements in the final rules 
(e.g., reduced granularity of cybersecurity incident disclosure 
requirements) should further reduce costs from what might have been 
estimated using the Proposing Release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \510\ See letter from Chamber.
    \511\ Id.
    \512\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter stated that the Commission's calculation of costs 
and benefits does not adequately address the impact of different but 
overlapping disclosure and reporting requirements that may escalate 
burdens and costs.\513\ We acknowledge the possibility that to the 
extent different information has to be reported pursuant to different 
regulations, laws, or other requirements, there could be a greater cost 
because of the demands to keep track of and manage the multiple 
different disclosure regimes. However, to the extent that certain other 
existing requirements may involve monitoring cybersecurity incidents or 
assessing an incident's impact on the registrant, the registrant may be 
able to leverage existing disclosures to reduce the burden of complying 
with the final rules. Additionally, as noted in Section II.A.3 those 
other regulations generally serve different purposes than the final 
rules, and we believe that the benefits of the final rules justify the 
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \513\ See letter from SIFMA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter raised a concern that the costs of the rules reached 
the threshold of an ``economically significant rulemaking'' under the 
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (``UMRA'') and the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, thus requiring an ``enhanced 
economic analysis.'' \514\ The requirement to issue an analysis under 
the UMRA does not apply to rules issued by independent regulatory 
agencies.\515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \514\ See letter from Chamber.
    \515\ See 2 U.S.C. 658 (``The term `agency' has the same meaning 
as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code, but 
does not include independent regulatory agencies.''). See also 
Congressional Research Service, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: 
History, Impact, and Issues (July 17, 2020), available at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R40957.pdf (noting ``[UMRA] does not apply to 
duties stemming from participation in voluntary federal programs 
[or] rules issued by independent regulatory agencies'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The compliance costs of the final rules could be disproportionately 
burdensome to smaller registrants, as some of these costs may have a 
fixed component that does not scale with the size of the 
registrant.\516\ Also, smaller registrants may have fewer resources 
with which to implement these changes.\517\ One commenter suggested 
this could lead some small companies seeking to conduct an initial 
public offering to reconsider.\518\ Commenters also noted that smaller 
companies may not yet have a mature reporting regime and organizational 
structure and would benefit from an onramp to compliance.\519\ We are 
not adopting some proposed requirements (e.g., disclosing whether the 
board includes a cybersecurity expert), and thus the cost burden of the 
final rules should not be as high as initially proposed. We also are 
delaying compliance for incident disclosure for smaller reporting 
companies by providing an additional phase-in period of 180 days after 
the non-smaller reporting company compliance date for smaller reporting 
companies, which will delay compliance with these requirements for 270 
days from effectiveness of the rules.\520\ To the extent smaller 
reporting

[[Page 51935]]

companies are less likely than larger companies to have incident 
disclosure processes in place, they could benefit from additional time 
to comply. An extended compliance date may also permit smaller 
reporting companies to benefit from seeing how larger companies 
implement these disclosures. Investors in these smaller registrants 
could benefit from higher disclosure quality afforded by the delay, 
although some benefits, such as the reduction in asymmetric information 
and mispricing, would also be delayed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \516\ See infra Section VI.
    \517\ See, e.g., letter from SBA.
    \518\ See letter from BIO.
    \519\ See, e.g., letter from BIO.
    \520\ See supra Section II.I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Indirect Economic Effects
    While the final rules only require disclosures--not changes to risk 
management practices--the requirement to disclose and the disclosures 
themselves could result in certain indirect benefits and costs. In 
anticipating investor reactions to the required disclosures, for 
example, registrants might devote more resources to cybersecurity 
governance and risk management in order to be able to disclose those 
efforts. Although not the purpose of this rule, registrants devoting 
resources to cybersecurity governance and risk management could reduce 
both their susceptibility to a cybersecurity attack, reducing the 
likelihood of future incidents, as well as the degree of harm suffered 
from an incident, benefiting registrants and investors. The choice to 
dedicate these resources would also represent an indirect cost of the 
final rules, to the extent registrants do not already have governance 
and risk management measures in place. As with compliance costs, the 
cost of improving cybersecurity governance and risk management could be 
proportionally higher for smaller companies if these registrants have 
fewer resources to implement these changes, and to the extent these 
costs do not scale with registrant size.
    In addition, the requirement to tag the cybersecurity disclosure in 
Inline XBRL could have indirect effects on registrants. As discussed in 
Section III.C.1.a.(ii), XBRL requirements for public operating company 
financial statement disclosures have been observed to reduce 
information processing cost. This reduction in information processing 
cost has been observed to facilitate the monitoring of registrants by 
other market participants, and, as a result, to influence registrants' 
behavior, including their disclosure choices.\521\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \521\ See supra note 485.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirement in Item 1.05 that registrants timely disclose 
material cybersecurity incidents could also indirectly affect 
consumers, and external stakeholders such as other registrants in the 
same industry and those facing similar cybersecurity threats. 
Cybersecurity incidents can harm not only the company that suffers the 
incident but also other businesses and consumers. For example, a 
cybersecurity breach at one company, such as a gas pipeline, or a power 
company, may cause a major disruption or shutdown of a critical 
infrastructure industry, resulting in broad losses throughout the 
economy.\522\ Timely disclosure of cybersecurity incidents required by 
Item 1.05 could increase awareness by those external stakeholders and 
companies in the same industry that the malicious activities are 
occurring, giving them more time to mitigate any potential damage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \522\ See Lawrence A. Gordon, et al., Externalities and the 
Magnitude of Cyber Security Underinvestment by Private Sector Firms: 
A Modification of the Gordon-Loeb Model, 6 J. Info. Sec. 24, 25 
(2015) (``Firms in the private sector of many countries own a large 
share of critical infrastructure assets. Hence, cybersecurity 
breaches in private sector firms could cause a major disruption of a 
critical infrastructure industry (e.g., delivery of electricity), 
resulting in massive losses throughout the economy, putting the 
defense of the nation at risk.''). See also Collin Eaton and Dustin 
Volz, U.S. Pipeline Cyberattack Forces Closure, Wall St. J. (May 8, 
2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/cyberattack-forces-closure-of-largest-u-s-refined-fuel-pipeline-11620479737.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that Item 1.05 increases incident disclosure, 
consumers may learn about a particular cybersecurity breach and 
therefore take appropriate actions to limit potential economic harm 
that they may incur from the breach. For example, there is evidence 
that increased disclosure of cybersecurity incidents by companies can 
reduce the risk of identity theft for individuals.\523\ Also, consumers 
may be able to make better informed decisions about which companies to 
entrust with their personal information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \523\ See Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang, and Alessandro 
Acquisti, Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?, 30 
(2) J. of Pol'y. Analysis and Mgmt. 272, 256-286 (2011) (finding 
that the adoption of State-level data breach disclosure laws reduced 
identity theft by 6.1%).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, to the extent that registrants may decide to 
enhance their cybersecurity risk management in anticipation of the 
increased disclosure, that could reduce registrants' susceptibility to 
and damage incurred from a cybersecurity attack. This reduced 
likelihood of and vulnerability to future incidents could reduce the 
negative externalities of those incidents, leading to positive 
spillover effects and a reduction in overall costs to society from 
these attacks.
    However, the magnitude of this and the other indirect effects 
discussed above would depend upon factors outside of the specific 
disclosures provided in response to the final rule, and therefore it is 
difficult to assess with certainty the likelihood or extent of these 
effects.

D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation

    We believe the final rules should have positive effects on market 
efficiency. As discussed above, the final rules should improve the 
timeliness and informativeness of cybersecurity incident and risk 
disclosure. As a result of the disclosure required by the final rules, 
investors and other market participants should better understand the 
cybersecurity threats registrants are facing, their potential impact, 
and registrants' ability to respond to and manage risks. Investors and 
other market participants should thereby better evaluate registrants' 
securities and make more informed decisions. As a result, the required 
disclosures should reduce information asymmetry and mispricing in the 
market, improving market efficiency. More efficient prices should 
improve capital formation by increasing overall public trust in 
markets, leading to greater investor participation and market 
liquidity.
    The final rules also could promote competition among registrants 
with respect to improvement in both their cybersecurity risk management 
and transparency in communicating their cybersecurity processes. To the 
extent investors view strong cybersecurity risk management, strategy, 
and governance favorably, registrants disclosing more robust processes, 
more clearly, could benefit from greater interest from investors, 
leading to higher market liquidity relative to companies that do not. 
Customers may also be more likely to entrust their business to 
companies that protect their data. Registrants that to date have 
invested less in cybersecurity preparation could thus be incentivized 
to invest more, to the benefit of investors and customers, in order to 
become more competitive. To the extent that increased compliance costs 
resulting from the final rules prevent smaller companies from entering 
the market, as a commenter suggested,\524\ the final rules could reduce 
the ability of smaller companies to compete and thereby reduce 
competition overall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \524\ See letter from BIO.

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[[Page 51936]]

E. Reasonable Alternatives

1. Website Disclosure
    As an alternative to Form 8-K disclosure of material cybersecurity 
incidents, we considered providing registrants with the option of 
disclosing this information instead through company websites, if the 
company disclosed its intention to do so in its most recent annual 
report, and subject to information availability and retention 
requirements. While this approach may be less costly for the company 
because it may involve fewer compliance costs, disclosures made on 
company websites would not be located in a central depository, such as 
the EDGAR system,\525\ and would not be in the same place as other 
registrants' disclosures of material cybersecurity incidents, nor would 
they be organized into the standardized sections found in Form 8-K and 
could thus be less uniform. Even if we required registrants to announce 
the disclosure, or to alert the Commission to it, the information would 
still be more difficult for investors and market participants to locate 
and less uniform than Form 8-K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \525\ EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval system, is the primary system for companies and others 
submitting documents under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the 
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and the Investment Company Act. EDGAR's 
public database can be used to research a public company's financial 
information and operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The lack of a central repository, and a lack of uniformity of 
website disclosures, could increase the costs for investors and other 
market participants to search for and process the information to 
compare cybersecurity risks across registrants. Additionally, such 
disclosure might not be preserved on the company's website for as long 
as it would be on the EDGAR system when the disclosure is filed with 
the Commission, because registrants may not keep historical information 
available on their websites indefinitely and it could be difficult to 
determine whether the website information had moved or changed. 
Therefore, this approach would be less beneficial to investors, other 
market participants, and the overall efficiency of the market.
2. Disclosure Through Periodic Reports
    We also considered requiring disclosure of material cybersecurity 
incidents through quarterly or annual reports, as proposed, instead of 
Form 8-K. Reporting material cybersecurity incidents at the end of the 
quarter or year would allow registrants more time to assess the 
financial impact of such incidents. The resulting disclosure might be 
more specific or informative for investors and other market 
participants to value the securities and make more informed decisions. 
The compliance costs would be less under this alternative, because 
registrants would not have to file as frequently. And, it might further 
reduce the risk that disclosure could provide timely information to 
attackers.
    However, this alternative also would lead to less timely reporting 
on material cybersecurity incidents. As a result, the market would not 
be able to incorporate the information related to cybersecurity risk 
into securities prices in as timely a manner, and investors and other 
market participants would not be able to make as informed decisions as 
they could under the requirements of Item 1.05. Additionally, as 
previously discussed, less timely reporting could adversely impact 
external stakeholders, such as other registrants in the same industry 
and those facing similar cybersecurity threats, and consumers whose 
data were compromised.
    Relatedly, we proposed requiring registrants to disclose material 
changes and additions to previously reported cybersecurity incidents on 
Forms 10-K and 10-Q instead of on an amended Form 8-K. However, as 
discussed above, we believe using Form 8-K would be more timely and 
consistent; \526\ all disclosures concerning material cybersecurity 
incidents, whether new or containing information not determined or 
unavailable initially, will be disclosed on the same form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \526\ See supra Section II.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Exempt Smaller Reporting Companies
    We also considered exempting smaller reporting companies from the 
final rules.\527\ Exempting smaller reporting companies from the 
disclosure requirements of the final rules would avoid compliance costs 
for smaller companies, including those compliance costs that could 
disproportionately affect smaller companies.\528\ As noted earlier, 
however, we are not adopting some proposed requirements (e.g., 
disclosing whether the board includes a cybersecurity expert) and 
modifying others (e.g., requiring a description of cybersecurity 
``processes'' instead of more formal ``policies and procedures''), and 
thus the cost burden of the final rules should not be as high as 
initially proposed. This should mitigate some of the concerns raised by 
commenters and would also reduce the potential value of an exemption. 
Moreover, an exemption would remove the benefit to investors of 
informative, timely, uniform, and comparable disclosure with regard to 
smaller companies. And although one commenter argued for an exemption 
based on a perception that smaller companies are less likely to 
experience cybersecurity incidents,\529\ for the reasons explained in 
Section IV.C.1.b, we believe that smaller companies are still at risk 
for material cybersecurity incidents. This aligns with comments we 
received opposing an exemption for smaller reporting companies.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \527\ See supra Section II.G.2.
    \528\ See supra Section II.G.2.
    \529\ See letter from BIO.
    \530\ See, e.g., letters from Cybersecurity Coalition; Tenable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, one commenter that argued for an exemption cited the 
Proposing Release, which noted a potential for increased cost of 
capital for registrants that do not have cybersecurity programs once 
disclosures are mandated; the commenter stated that these would 
disproportionately be smaller registrants.\531\ We have reconsidered 
the argument that registrants without robust cybersecurity processes in 
place might face a higher cost of capital and as a result would be 
priced unfavorably, and no longer believe it to be accurate. It is 
indeed possible that companies that reveal what investors consider to 
be less robust cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance 
processes may experience a decline in stock price. However, because the 
risk of cybersecurity attacks should be idiosyncratic, this decline 
would likely be due to investors updating their expectations of future 
cash flows for this firm to incorporate higher likelihood of a future 
incident--moderating the decline should future incidents occur--not an 
increase in fundamental market risk and thus cost of capital. In 
addition, to the extent investors already rationally anticipate that 
smaller registrants or registrants that have not previously disclosed 
such information have less robust policies, there may be less or no 
stock price decline as a result of Item 106, as these disclosures would 
merely confirm expectations. Thus, increases in cost of capital should 
not be prevalent in this regard and should not be a reason to exempt 
small firms from the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \531\ See letter from BIO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Summary of the Collections of Information

    Certain provisions of our rules and forms that will be affected by 
the final rules contain ``collection of information'' requirements 
within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction

[[Page 51937]]

Act (``PRA'').\532\ The Commission published a notice requesting 
comment on changes to these collections of information in the Proposing 
Release and submitted these requirements to the Office of Management 
and Budget (``OMB'') for review in accordance with the PRA.\533\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \532\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \533\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The hours and costs associated with preparing, filing, and sending 
the forms constitute reporting and cost burdens imposed by each 
collection of information. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a 
person is not required to comply with, a collection of information 
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. Compliance 
with the information collections is mandatory. Responses to the 
information collections are not kept confidential and there is no 
mandatory retention period for the information disclosed. The titles 
for the affected collections of information are: \534\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \534\ The Proposing Release also listed ``Schedule 14A'' (OMB 
Control No. 3235-0059), ``Schedule 14C'' (OMB Control No. 3235-
0057), and ``Form 10-Q'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0070) as affected 
collections of information. However, under the final rules, these 
schedules and form are no longer affected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     ``Form 8-K'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0060);
     ``Form 6-K'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0116);
     ``Form 10-K'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0063); and
     ``Form 20-F'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0288).
    The Commission adopted all of the existing regulations and forms 
pursuant to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The regulations 
and forms set forth disclosure requirements for current reports and 
periodic reports filed by registrants to help shareholders make 
informed voting and investment decisions.
    A description of the final amendments, including the need for the 
information and its use, as well as a description of the likely 
respondents, can be found in Section II above, and a discussion of the 
economic effects of the final amendments can be found in Section IV 
above.

B. Summary of Comment Letters and Revisions to PRA Estimates

    In the Proposing Release, the Commission requested comment on the 
PRA burden hour and cost estimates and the analysis used to derive the 
estimates.\535\ While a number of parties commented on the potential 
costs of the proposed rules, only one commenter spoke specifically to 
the PRA analysis, arguing that the proposal ``cannot be justified under 
the Paperwork Reduction Act'' because of an ``unreasonable'' number of 
separate disclosures and because ``the amount of information the 
Proposal would require to be produced is unwarranted in light of other, 
existing regulations.'' \536\ The commenter further alleged that the 
Proposing Release's ``calculation of costs and benefits is skewed'' 
because ``[d]ifferent but overlapping disclosure and reporting 
requirements do not correlate with lower burdens on information 
providers, but rather, escalated burdens and costs.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \535\ Proposing Release at 16616-16617.
    \536\ See letter from SIFMA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While we acknowledge the commenter's concerns about costs of the 
proposal, for the reasons discussed in Section II.H and elsewhere 
throughout this release, we believe the information required by the 
final rules is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for 
the protection of investors. Further, a discussion of the economic 
effects of the final amendments, including consideration of comments 
that expressed concern about the expected costs associated with the 
proposed rules, can be found in Section IV above. With regard to the 
calculation of paperwork burdens, we note that both the Proposing 
Release's PRA analysis and our PRA analysis of the final amendments 
here estimate the incremental burden of each new or revised disclosure 
requirement individually and fully comport with the requirements of the 
PRA. Our estimates reflect the modifications to the proposed rules that 
we are adopting in response to commenter concerns, including 
streamlining some of the proposed rule's elements to address concerns 
regarding the level of detail required and the anticipated costs of 
compliance.

C. Effects of the Amendments on the Collections of Information

    The following PRA Table 1 summarizes the estimated effects of the 
final amendments on the paperwork burdens associated with the affected 
collections of information listed in Section V.A.

                           PRA Table 1--Estimated Paperwork Burden of Final Amendments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Estimated burden       Number of  estimated
     Final amendments and effects           Affected forms              increase          affected  responses *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Form 8-K:
     Add Item 1.05 requiring   Form 8-K...............  9 hour increase in       200 Filings.
     disclosure of material                                      compliance burden per
     cybersecurity incidents within                              form.
     four business days following
     determination of materiality.
Form 6-K:
     Add ``cybersecurity       Form 6-K...............  9 hour increase in       20 Filings.
     incident'' to the list in                                   compliance burden per
     General Instruction B of                                    form.
     information required to be
     furnished on Form 6-K.
Regulation S-K Item 106:
     Add Item 106(b)           Form 10-K and..........  Form 10-K: 10 hour       8,292 Filings.
     requiring disclosure regarding                              increase in compliance
     cybersecurity risk management                               burden per form.
     and strategy.
     Add Item 106(c)           Form 20-F..............  Form 20-F: 10 hour       729 Filings.
     requiring disclosure regarding                              increase in compliance
     cybersecurity governance.                                   burden per form.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The OMB PRA filing inventories represent a three-year average. Averages may not align with the actual number
  of filings in any given year.


[[Page 51938]]

    The estimated burden increases for Forms 8-K, 10-K, and 20-F 
reflect changes from the estimates provided in the Proposing Release. 
There, the Commission estimated that the average incremental burden for 
an issuer to prepare the Form 8-K Item 1.05 disclosure would be 10 
hours. The proposed estimate included the time and cost of preparing 
the disclosure, as well as tagging the data in XBRL. The changes we are 
making to Item 1.05 in the final rules should generally reduce the 
associated burden by an incremental amount in most cases. We therefore 
estimate that Form 8-K Item 1.05 will have a burden of 9 hours, on par 
with the average burdens of existing Form 8-K items, which is 9.21 
hours.
    In the Proposing Release, the Commission estimated that the average 
incremental burden for preparing Form 10-K stemming from proposed Item 
106 would be 15 hours. Similarly, the Commission estimated that 
proposed Item 106 would result in an average incremental burden for 
preparing Form 20-F of 16.5 hours. The proposed estimates included the 
time and cost of preparing the disclosure, as well as tagging the data 
in XBRL. We estimate the changes we are making to Item 106 in the final 
rules should generally reduce the associated burden by one-third due to 
the elimination of many of the proposed disclosure items; accordingly, 
we have reduced the estimated burden to 10 hours from 15 hours for Form 
10-K, and to 10 hours from 16.5 hours for Form 20-F.\537\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \537\ Note that, in the proposal, a portion of the burden for 
companies reporting on Form 10-K was allocated to Schedule 14A, as a 
result of certain disclosure items being proposed to be included in 
Rule 407 of Regulation S-K. By contrast, since registrants reporting 
on Form 20-F do not have an analogous form to Schedule 14A, the 
comparable burden to Schedule 14A was attributable to Form 20-F. 
Since we are not adopting Item 407 as proposed, and we do not expect 
any disclosures on Schedule 14A, the estimates for Form 10-K and 
Form 20-F are now aligned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have not modified the estimated number of estimated affected 
responses for Form 8-K and Form 6-K from what was proposed. As noted in 
the Proposing Release, not every filing of these forms would include 
responsive disclosures. Rather, these disclosures would be required 
only when a registrant has made the determination that it has 
experienced a material cybersecurity incident. Further, in the case of 
Form 6-K, the registrant would only have to provide the disclosure if 
it is required to disclose such information elsewhere.

D. Incremental and Aggregate Burden and Cost Estimates for the Final 
Amendments

    Below we estimate the incremental and aggregate increase in 
paperwork burden as a result of the final amendments. These estimates 
represent the average burden for all respondents, both large and small. 
In deriving our estimates, we recognize that the burdens will likely 
vary among individual respondents and from year to year based on a 
number of factors, including the nature of their business.
    The burden estimates were calculated by multiplying the estimated 
number of responses by the estimated average amount of time it would 
take a registrant to prepare and review disclosure required under the 
final amendments. For purposes of the PRA, the burden is to be 
allocated between internal burden hours and outside professional costs. 
PRA Table 2 below sets forth the percentage estimates we typically use 
for the burden allocation for each collection of information. We also 
estimate that the average cost of retaining outside professionals is 
$600 per hour.\538\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \538\ We recognize that the costs of retaining outside 
professionals may vary depending on the nature of the professional 
services, but for purposes of this PRA analysis, we estimate that 
such costs would be an average of $600 per hour. At the proposing 
stage, we used an estimated cost of $400 per hour. We are increasing 
this cost estimate to $600 per hour to adjust the estimate for 
inflation from Aug. 2006.

     PRA Table 2--Standard Estimated Burden Allocation for Specified
                       Collections of Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Outside
     Collection of information           Internal        professionals
                                        (percent)          (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Form 10-K, Form 6-K, and Form 8-K.                 75                 25
Form 20-F.........................                 25                 75
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PRA Table 3 below illustrates the incremental change to the total 
annual compliance burden of affected collections of information, in 
hours and in costs, as a result of the final amendments.

             PRA Table 3--Calculation of the Incremental Change in Burden Estimates of Current Responses Resulting From the Final Amendments
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Number of
                                        estimated    Burden hour   Change in burden                            Change in  professional      Change in
      Collection of information         affected    increase per         hours        Change in company hours           hours             professional
                                        responses     response                                                                                costs
                                             (A) *           (B)  (C) = (A) x (B) **  (D) = (C) x 0.75 or .25  (E) = (C) x 0.25 or .75  (F) = (E) x $600
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8-K.................................           200             9               1,800                    1,350                      450          $270,000
6-K.................................            20             9                 180                      135                       45            27,000
10-K................................         8,292            10              82,920                   62,190                   20,730        12,438,000
20-F................................           729            10               7,290                 1,822.50                 5,467.50         3,280,500
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The number of estimated affected responses is based on the number of responses in the Commission's current OMB PRA filing inventory. The OMB PRA
  filing inventory represents a three-year average.
** The estimated changes in Columns (C), (D), and (E) are rounded to the nearest whole number.

    The following PRA Table 4 summarizes the requested paperwork 
burden, including the estimated total reporting burdens and costs, 
under the final amendments.

[[Page 51939]]



                                                               PRA Table 4--Requested Paperwork Burden Under the Final Amendments
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Current burden                          Program change                              Revised burden
                                                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                           Change in
                              Form                                  Current     Current    Current cost    number of   Change in     Change in        Annual
                                                                    annual      burden        burden       affected     company    professional      responses     Burden hours     Cost burden
                                                                   responses     hours                     responses     hours         costs
                                                                         (A)         (B)             (C)         (D)         (E)    (F) [Dagger]     (G) = (A) +     (H) = (B) +     (I) = (C) +
                                                                                                                        [dagger]                             (D)             (E)             (F)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Form 8-K........................................................     118,387     818,158    $108,674,430         200       1,350        $270,000         118,587         819,508    $108,944,430
Form 6-K........................................................      34,794     227,031      30,270,780          20         135          27,000          34,814         227,166      30,297,780
Form 10-K.......................................................       8,292  13,988,770   1,835,588,919  ..........      62,190      12,438,000           8,292      14,050,960   1,848,026,919
Form 20-F.......................................................         729     478,983     576,490,625  ..........    1,822.50       3,280,500             729      480,805.50     579,771,125
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[dagger] From Column (D) in PRA Table 3.
[Dagger] From Column (F) in PRA Table 3.

VI. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') requires the Commission, 
in promulgating rules under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act,\539\ to consider the impact of those rules on small entities. We 
have prepared this Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``FRFA'') in 
accordance with Section 604 of the RFA.\540\ An Initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'') was prepared in accordance with the RFA 
and was included in the Proposing Release.\541\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \539\ 5 U.S.C. 553.
    \540\ 5 U.S.C. 604.
    \541\ Proposing Release at 16617.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Final Amendments

    The purpose of the final amendments is to ensure investors and 
other market participants receive timely, decision-useful information 
about registrants' material cybersecurity incidents, and periodic 
information on registrants' approaches to cybersecurity risk 
management, strategy, and governance that is standardized and 
comparable across registrants. The need for, and objectives of, the 
final rules are described in Sections I and II above. We discuss the 
economic impact and potential alternatives to the amendments in Section 
IV, and the estimated compliance costs and burdens of the amendments 
under the PRA in Section V.

B. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments

    In the Proposing Release, the Commission requested comment on any 
aspect of the IRFA, and particularly on the number of small entities 
that would be affected by the proposed amendments, the existence or 
nature of the potential impact of the proposed amendments on small 
entities discussed in the analysis, how the proposed amendments could 
further lower the burden on small entities, and how to quantify the 
impact of the proposed amendments.
    We received one comment letter on the IRFA, from the U.S. Small 
Business Administration's Office of Advocacy (``Advocacy'').\542\ 
Advocacy's letter expressed concern that ``the IRFA does not adequately 
describe the regulated small entities and potential impacts on those 
entities.'' \543\ In the Proposing Release, the Commission estimated 
that the proposed amendments would apply to 660 issuers and 9 business 
development companies that may be considered small entities.\544\ 
Advocacy's comment letter stated that this estimate did ``not provide 
additional information, such as the North American Industry 
Classification System (``NAICS'') classifications of the affected 
entities'' and did not ``break down the affected entities into smaller 
size groups (e.g., based on total assets).'' \545\ It also stated that 
the IRFA did not ``adequately analyze the relative impact of costs to 
small entities.'' \546\ In this vein, it suggested that emerging growth 
companies (``EGCs'') may face particular challenges complying with the 
proposed rules.\547\ In particular, Advocacy's comment letter stated 
that ``[e]merging growth companies may have little or no revenue to 
afford the additional cost burden of the proposed rules and may not 
have access to the cybersecurity expertise necessary to comply with the 
new disclosure requirements.'' \548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \542\ See letter from U.S. Small Business Administration Office 
of Advocacy. We also received some comments that, while not 
specifically addressed to the IRFA, did concern the impact of the 
proposed rules on smaller reporting companies. See letters from BDO; 
BIO; CSA; Cybersecurity Coalition; NACD; NASAA; Nasdaq; NDIA; Prof. 
Perullo; Tenable. We have addressed those comments in Section 
II.G.2, supra, and incorporate those responses here as applicable to 
our RFA analysis. We also note the recommendations for all 
Commission rulemakings from the Office of the Advocate for Small 
Business Capital Formation. See 2022 OASB Annual Report.
    \543\ Id.
    \544\ Proposing Release at 16617.
    \545\ See letter from Advocacy.
    \546\ Id.
    \547\ Id.
    \548\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The comment letter from Advocacy also addressed the discussion of 
alternatives within the IRFA and the Commission's explanation of why it 
did not ultimately propose such alternatives. Advocacy stated that 
``[t]he RFA requires that an IRFA provide significant, feasible 
alternatives that accomplish an agency's objectives,'' and stated that 
the IRFA did not satisfy this requirement because it listed ``broad 
categories of potential alternatives to the proposed rules but [did] 
not analyze any specific alternative that was considered by the SEC,'' 
and because it did not ``contain a description of significant 
alternatives which accomplish the stated SEC objectives and which 
minimize the significant economic impact of the proposal on small 
entities.''
1. Estimate of Affected Small Entities and Impact to Those Entities
    With respect to the adequacy of the Proposing Release's estimate of 
affected small entities, the RFA requires ``a description of and, where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities to which the 
proposed rule will apply.'' \549\ Advocacy's published guidance 
recommends agencies use NAICS classifications to help in ``identifying 
the industry, governmental and nonprofit sectors they intend to 
regulate.'' \550\ Here, given that the rulemaking applies to and 
impacts all public company registrants, regardless of industry or 
sector, we do not believe that further breakout of such registrants by 
industry classification is necessary or would otherwise be helpful to 
such entities understanding the impact of the

[[Page 51940]]

proposed or final rules. This is not a case in which small entities in 
certain industries and sectors would be affected more than others, as 
cybersecurity risks exist across industries.\551\ For the same reasons 
we are not breaking down the affected entities into smaller size groups 
(e.g., based on total assets) as recommended by Advocacy. Given the 
nature of the final rules, we believe that our estimate of the number 
of small entities to which the final rules will apply adequately 
describes and estimates the small entities that will be affected.\552\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \549\ 5 U.S.C. 603(b)(3).
    \550\ U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, A 
Guide for Government Agencies: How to Comply with the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (Aug. 2017), at 18, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/How-to-Comply-with-the-RFA-WEB.pdf.
    \551\ A breakout would be relevant where, for example, the 
Commission finds that small entities generally would not be affected 
by a rule but small entities in a particular industry would be 
affected.
    \552\ See infra Section VI.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to Advocacy's suggestion that the proposed rule may be 
``particularly problematic'' for EGCs, we have discussed in Section 
IV.C.2 above the anticipated costs of the final rules, including their 
impact on EGCs. We also note that the category of EGC is not the same 
as the category of ``small entity'' for purposes of the RFA, and indeed 
EGC status is not a reliable indicator of whether a registrant is a 
small entity.\553\ While EGC status does include a revenue component, 
it importantly considers whether the issuer is seasoned, meaning, 
whether it is a new registrant (rather than a registrant with a longer 
public reporting history). Accordingly, while many EGCs are small 
entities, there are many that are not. Likewise, many small entities 
are not EGCs. For purposes of the FRFA, our focus is on the impact on 
small entities, regardless of whether or not they are EGCs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \553\ An EGC is defined as a company that has total annual gross 
revenues of less than $1.235 billion during its most recently 
completed fiscal year and, as of Dec. 8, 2011, had not sold common 
equity securities under a registration statement. A company 
continues to be an EGC for the first five fiscal years after it 
completes an initial public offering, unless one of the following 
occurs: its total annual gross revenues are $1.235 billion or more; 
it has issued more than $1 billion in non-convertible debt in the 
past three years; or it becomes a ``large accelerated filer,'' as 
defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We disagree with the statement in the Advocacy comment letter that 
``SEC expects that the costs associated with the proposed amendments to 
be similar for large and small entities.'' The Commission explained in 
the IRFA that the proposed amendments would apply to small entities to 
the same extent as other entities, irrespective of size, and that 
therefore, the Commission expected that ``the nature of any benefits 
and costs associated with the proposed amendments to be similar for 
large and small entities'' (emphasis added).\554\ The analysis with 
respect to the nature of the costs (and benefits) of the proposed rules 
detailed in the Economic Analysis of the Proposing Release was 
referenced in the IRFA to help small entities understand such impacts, 
not to imply that small entities face the same degree of costs as large 
entities. Indeed, the Commission went on to state in both the IRFA and 
the Economic Analysis of the Proposing Release that, while it was 
unable to project the economic impacts on small entities with 
precision, it recognized that ``the costs of the proposed amendments 
borne by the affected entities could have a proportionally greater 
effect on small entities, as they may be less able to bear such costs 
relative to larger entities.'' \555\ Additionally, in Section IV, 
above, we discuss the economic effects, including costs, of the final 
amendments across all entities. We recognize that to the extent the 
costs are generally uniform across all entities, they would have a 
relatively greater burden on smaller entities. That said, as discussed 
both above and below, to help mitigate that relatively greater burden 
and to respond to comment letters including the letter from Advocacy, 
we have extended the compliance date for smaller reporting companies so 
as to provide additional transition time and allow them to benefit from 
the experience of larger companies. Accordingly, we believe that both 
this FRFA and our prior IRFA adequately describe and analyze the 
relative impact of costs to small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \554\ Proposing Release at 16617 (emphasis added).
    \555\ Proposing Release at 16617-16618. See also id. at 16613 
(``smaller companies might incur a cost that is disproportionally 
high, compared to larger companies under the proposed rules'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Consideration of Alternatives
    The IRFA's discussion of significant alternatives, and our 
discussion of alternatives below, satisfy the RFA. The relevant RFA 
requirement provides that an IRFA ``shall also contain a description of 
any significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the 
stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any 
significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities.'' 
\556\ In the Proposing Release, the Commission discussed each of the 
types of significant alternatives noted in Section 603 of the RFA and 
concluded that none of these alternatives would accomplish the stated 
objectives of the rulemaking while minimizing any significant impact on 
small entities. In addition, Section III.E of the Proposing Release 
discussed reasonable alternatives to the proposed rules and their 
economic impacts. Similarly, in addition to the discussion in Section 
VI.E below, in Section IV.E of this release we also discuss reasonable 
alternatives of the final rules and their economic impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \556\ 5 U.S.C. 603(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While not commenting on the alternatives raised in the IRFA 
specifically, two commenters stated that the final rules should exempt 
smaller businesses. One of these commenters stated that small companies 
in the biotechnology industry ``do not have the capacity, nor the 
business need, to have institutional structures related to the 
management, planning, oversight, and maintenance of cybersecurity 
related systems and suppliers. These companies should not have to hire 
extra employees specifically for the purposes of implementing 
cybersecurity related programs.'' \557\ The other commenter noted that, 
with respect to the proposed requirement to require disclosure about 
the cybersecurity expertise of board members, small companies ``have 
limited resources to begin with, and may find it more difficult than 
large companies to identify board members with requisite cyber 
expertise given that there already is a lack of talent in this area.'' 
\558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \557\ See letter from BIO.
    \558\ See letter from NDIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the first of these commenters, we note that neither 
the proposed nor the final rules require any company to ``implement new 
management structures'' or otherwise adopt or change ``institutional 
structures related to the management, planning, oversight, and 
maintenance of cybersecurity related systems and suppliers.'' \559\ The 
final rules instead call for disclosure of a registrant's processes, if 
any, for assessing, identifying, and managing material cybersecurity 
risks. To the extent that a registrant does not have such processes, 
the final rules do not impose any additional costs. With respect to the 
second of these commenters, we note that, consistent with commenter 
feedback and for the reasons discussed above, we have not adopted the 
proposed requirement related to disclosure of board cybersecurity 
expertise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \559\ The quoted language is from the BIO letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, we note that many commenters explicitly opposed exempting 
smaller businesses from the proposed rules,\560\ in part because they 
may face equal \561\ or greater \562\

[[Page 51941]]

cybersecurity risk than larger companies, or because investors' 
relative share in a smaller company may be higher, such that small 
companies' cybersecurity risk ``may actually embody the most pressing 
cybersecurity risk to an investor.'' \563\ We agree with these 
analyses,\564\ and accordingly are not exempting small entities from 
the final rules. However, as discussed above, in response to concerns 
about the impact of the rules on smaller companies and in order to 
provide smaller reporting companies with additional time to prepare to 
comply with the incident disclosure requirements, we are providing such 
registrants with an additional 180 days from the non-smaller reporting 
company compliance date before they must comply with the new Form 8-K 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \560\ See letters from CSA; Cybersecurity Coalition; NASAA; 
Prof. Perullo; Tenable.
    \561\ See letter from Cybersecurity Coalition.
    \562\ See letters from NASAA and Tenable.
    \563\ See letter from Prof. Perullo.
    \564\ We note that one commenter stated its conclusion that 
``cyberattacks mainly affect larger companies.'' See letter from 
BIO. The basis of the commenter's assertion is that mean market 
capitalization of impacted companies in the relevant study cited in 
the Proposing Release is $58.9 billion (Kamiya, et al. (2021)), 
which it notes is much higher than the average for small companies, 
and thus concludes that ``cyberattacks mainly affect large companies 
and are not material for smaller companies.'' As noted in Section 
IV, supra, an average market capitalization of $58.9 billion does 
not preclude the existence of numerous companies much smaller (and 
larger) than that amount. See supra note 478. The commenter 
additionally notes that the relevant study states that ``firms are 
more likely to experience cyberattacks when they are larger.'' To 
the extent that smaller entities face fewer cyber incidents, that 
would result in a less frequent need to analyze whether disclosure 
of such incidents is required under the final rules. However, even 
if smaller entities are less likely to experience a cyberattack, 
this would not negate the analysis that such attacks, when they do 
occur, are more likely to be material for the reasons discussed 
above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Small Entities Subject to the Final Amendments

    The final amendments would apply to registrants that are small 
entities. The RFA defines ``small entity'' to mean ``small business,'' 
``small organization,'' or ``small governmental jurisdiction.'' \565\ 
For purposes of the RFA, under our rules, a registrant, other than an 
investment company, is a ``small business'' or ``small organization'' 
if it had total assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its 
most recent fiscal year and is engaged or proposing to engage in an 
offering of securities that does not exceed $5 million.\566\ An 
investment company, including a business development company,\567\ is 
considered to be a ``small business'' if it, together with other 
investment companies in the same group of related investment companies, 
has net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its most recent 
fiscal year.\568\ We estimate that, as of December 31, 2022, there were 
approximately 800 issuers and 10 business development companies that 
may be considered small entities that would be subject to the final 
amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \565\ 5 U.S.C. 601(6).
    \566\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(a) [Exchange Act Rule 0-10(a)].
    \567\ Business development companies are a category of closed-
end investment company that are not registered under the Investment 
Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(48) and 80a-53 through 64].
    \568\ 17 CFR 270.0-10(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and other Compliance 
Requirements

    Per the final rules, registrants will be required to report 
material cybersecurity incidents on Form 8-K and Form 6-K for FPIs, and 
will be required to describe in their annual reports on Forms 10-K and 
20-F certain aspects of their cybersecurity risk management, strategy, 
and governance, if any. The final amendments are described in more 
detail in Section II above. These requirements generally will apply to 
small entities to the same extent as other entities, irrespective of 
size or industry classification, although we are adopting a later 
compliance date for smaller reporting companies in response to concerns 
raised by commenters. We continue to expect that the nature of any 
benefits and costs associated with the amendments to be similar for 
large and small entities, and so we refer to the discussion of the 
amendments' economic effects on all affected parties, including small 
entities, in Section IV above. Also consistent with the discussion in 
Sections II and IV above, we acknowledge that, in particular to the 
extent that a smaller entity would be required to provide disclosure 
under the final rules, it may face costs that are proportionally 
greater as they may be less able to bear such costs relative to larger 
entities. However, as discussed in in Section IV, we anticipate that 
the economic benefits and costs likely could vary widely among small 
entities based on a number of factors, such as the nature and conduct 
of their businesses, including whether the company actively manages 
material cybersecurity risks, which makes it difficult to project the 
economic impact on small entities with precision. To the extent that 
the disclosure requirements have a greater effect on small registrants 
relative to large registrants, they could result in adverse effects on 
competition. The fixed component of the legal costs of preparing the 
disclosure would be a primary contributing factor. Compliance with 
certain provisions of the final amendments may require the use of 
professional skills, including legal, accounting, and technical skills.

E. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities

    The RFA directs us to consider alternatives that would accomplish 
our stated objectives, while minimizing any significant adverse impact 
on small entities. Accordingly, we considered the following 
alternatives:
     Exempting small entities from all or part of the 
requirements;
     Establishing different compliance or reporting 
requirements that take into account the resources available to small 
entities;
     Using performance rather than design standards; and
     Clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and 
reporting requirements under the rules for small entities.
    The rules are intended to better inform investors about 
cybersecurity incidents and, if any, the cybersecurity risk management, 
strategy, and governance of registrants of all types and sizes that are 
subject to the Exchange Act reporting requirements. We explain above in 
Sections II and IV that current requirements and guidance are not 
yielding uniform, comparable disclosure sufficient to meet investors' 
needs. The disclosure that does exist is scattered in various parts of 
registrants' filings, making it difficult for investors to locate, 
analyze, and compare across registrants. Staff has also observed that 
smaller reporting companies generally provide less cybersecurity 
disclosure as compared to larger registrants, and commenters agreed 
that there is a need for cybersecurity disclosure from small 
companies.\569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \569\ See supra notes 339 to 342 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the current disclosure landscape, exempting small entities or 
otherwise clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and 
reporting requirements under the rules for small entities would 
frustrate the rulemaking's goal of providing investors with more 
uniform and timely disclosure about material cybersecurity incidents 
and about cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance 
practices across all registrants. That said, as discussed in Section II 
above, we have consolidated and simplified the disclosure requirements 
for all entities, which should ease small entities' compliance as well. 
Further, as noted above, smaller companies may face equal or greater 
cybersecurity risk than

[[Page 51942]]

larger companies, making the disclosures important for investors in 
these companies.
    On the other hand, we believe the rulemaking's goals can be 
achieved by providing smaller reporting companies with additional time 
to come into compliance. Therefore, we are delaying smaller reporting 
companies' required compliance date with the Form 8-K incident 
disclosure requirement by an additional 180 days from the non-smaller 
reporting company compliance date. This delay will benefit smaller 
reporting companies both by giving them extra time to establish 
disclosure controls and procedures and by allowing them to observe and 
learn from best practices as they develop among larger registrants.
    Similarly, the final rules incorporate a combination of performance 
and design standards with respect to all subject entities, including 
small entities, in order to balance the objectives and compliance 
burdens of the rules. While the final rules do use design standards to 
promote uniform compliance requirements for all registrants and to 
address the concerns underlying the amendments, which apply to entities 
of all size, they also incorporate elements of performance standards to 
give registrants sufficient flexibility to craft meaningful disclosure 
that is tailored to their particular facts and circumstances. For 
example, the final rules require a registrant to describe its 
``processes, if any, for assessing, identifying, and managing material 
risks from cybersecurity threats in sufficient detail for a reasonable 
investor to understand those processes.'' The rule also provides a non-
exclusive list of disclosure items that a registrant should include in 
providing responsive disclosure to this performance standard; this 
design element provides registrants with additional guidance with 
respect to the type of disclosure topics that could be covered and 
promotes consistency.

Statutory Authority

    The amendments contained in this release are being adopted under 
the authority set forth in Sections 7 and 19(a) of the Securities Act 
and Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 15, and 23(a) of the Exchange Act.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 229, 232, 239, 240, and 249

    Reporting and record keeping requirements, Securities.

Text of Amendments

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Commission amends 
title 17, chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 229--STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING FORMS UNDER SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND ENERGY POLICY AND 
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1975--REGULATION S-K

0
1. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77e, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77k, 77s, 77z-2, 
77z-3, 77aa(25), 77aa(26), 77ddd, 77eee, 77ggg, 77hhh, 77iii, 77jjj, 
77nnn, 77sss, 78c, 78i, 78j, 78j-3, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78u-
5, 78w, 78ll, 78mm, 80a-8, 80a-9, 80a-20, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-31(c), 
80a-37, 80a-38(a), 80a-39, 80b-11 and 7201 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; 
sec. 953(b), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1904 (2010); and sec. 
102(c), Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 310 (2012).


0
2. Add Sec.  229.106 to read as follows:


Sec.  229.106  (Item 106) Cybersecurity.

    (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
    Cybersecurity incident means an unauthorized occurrence, or a 
series of related unauthorized occurrences, on or conducted through a 
registrant's information systems that jeopardizes the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of a registrant's information systems or any 
information residing therein.
    Cybersecurity threat means any potential unauthorized occurrence on 
or conducted through a registrant's information systems that may result 
in adverse effects on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
of a registrant's information systems or any information residing 
therein.
    Information systems means electronic information resources, owned 
or used by the registrant, including physical or virtual infrastructure 
controlled by such information resources, or components thereof, 
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, 
dissemination, or disposition of the registrant's information to 
maintain or support the registrant's operations.
    (b) Risk management and strategy. (1) Describe the registrant's 
processes, if any, for assessing, identifying, and managing material 
risks from cybersecurity threats in sufficient detail for a reasonable 
investor to understand those processes. In providing such disclosure, a 
registrant should address, as applicable, the following non-exclusive 
list of disclosure items:
    (i) Whether and how any such processes have been integrated into 
the registrant's overall risk management system or processes;
    (ii) Whether the registrant engages assessors, consultants, 
auditors, or other third parties in connection with any such processes; 
and
    (iii) Whether the registrant has processes to oversee and identify 
such risks from cybersecurity threats associated with its use of any 
third-party service provider.
    (2) Describe whether any risks from cybersecurity threats, 
including as a result of any previous cybersecurity incidents, have 
materially affected or are reasonably likely to materially affect the 
registrant, including its business strategy, results of operations, or 
financial condition and if so, how.
    (c) Governance. (1) Describe the board of directors' oversight of 
risks from cybersecurity threats. If applicable, identify any board 
committee or subcommittee responsible for the oversight of risks from 
cybersecurity threats and describe the processes by which the board or 
such committee is informed about such risks.
    (2) Describe management's role in assessing and managing the 
registrant's material risks from cybersecurity threats. In providing 
such disclosure, a registrant should address, as applicable, the 
following non-exclusive list of disclosure items:
    (i) Whether and which management positions or committees are 
responsible for assessing and managing such risks, and the relevant 
expertise of such persons or members in such detail as necessary to 
fully describe the nature of the expertise;
    (ii) The processes by which such persons or committees are informed 
about and monitor the prevention, detection, mitigation, and 
remediation of cybersecurity incidents; and
    (iii) Whether such persons or committees report information about 
such risks to the board of directors or a committee or subcommittee of 
the board of directors.
    Instruction 1 to Item 106(c): In the case of a foreign private 
issuer with a two-tier board of directors, for purposes of paragraph 
(c) of this section, the term ``board of directors'' means the 
supervisory or non-management board. In the case of a foreign private 
issuer meeting the requirements of Sec.  240.10A-3(c)(3) of this 
chapter, for purposes of paragraph (c) of this Item, the term ``board 
of directors'' means the issuer's board of auditors (or similar body) 
or statutory auditors, as applicable.
    Instruction 2 to Item 106(c): Relevant expertise of management in 
Item 106(c)(2)(i) may include, for example: Prior work experience in 
cybersecurity; any relevant degrees or certifications; any knowledge, 
skills, or other background in cybersecurity.

[[Page 51943]]

    (d) Structured Data Requirement. Provide the information required 
by this Item in an Interactive Data File in accordance with Rule 405 of 
Regulation S-T and the EDGAR Filer Manual.

0
3. Amend Sec.  229.601 by revising paragraph (b)(101)(i)(C)(1) as 
follows:


Sec.  229.601  (Item 601) Exhibits.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (101) * * *
    (i) * * *
    (C) * * *
    (1) Only when:
    (i) The Form 8-K contains audited annual financial statements that 
are a revised version of financial statements that previously were 
filed with the Commission and that have been revised pursuant to 
applicable accounting standards to reflect the effects of certain 
subsequent events, including a discontinued operation, a change in 
reportable segments or a change in accounting principle. In such case, 
the Interactive Data File will be required only as to such revised 
financial statements regardless of whether the Form 8-K contains other 
financial statements; or
    (ii) The Form 8-K includes disclosure required to be provided in an 
Interactive Data File pursuant to Item 1.05(b) of Form 8-K; and
* * * * *

PART 232--REGULATION S-T--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR 
ELECTRONIC FILINGS

0
4. The general authority citation for part 232 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s(a), 77z-3, 
77sss(a), 78c(b), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78w(a), 78ll, 80a-6(c), 
80a-8, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-37, 80b-4, 80b-6a, 80b-10, 80b-11, 7201 
et seq.; and 18 U.S.C. 1350, unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *

0
5. Amend Sec.  232.405 by adding paragraph (b)(4)(v) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  232.405  Interactive Data File submissions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (v) Any disclosure provided in response to: Sec.  229.106 of this 
chapter (Item 106 of Regulation S-K); Item 1.05 of Sec.  249.308 of 
this chapter (Item 1.05 of Form 8-K); and Item 16K of Sec.  249.220f of 
this chapter (Item 16K of Form 20-F).
* * * * *

PART 239--FORMS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

0
6. The general authority citation for part 239 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77sss, 78c, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78o-7 note, 78u-5, 78w(a), 78ll, 
78mm, 80a-2(a), 80a-3, 80a-8, 80a-9, 80a-10, 80a-13, 80a-24, 80a-26, 
80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-37, and sec. 71003 and sec. 84001, Pub. L. 114-
94, 129 Stat. 1321, unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *

0
7. Amend Sec.  239.13 by revising paragraph (a)(3)(ii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  239.13  Form S-3, for registration under the Securities Act of 
1933 of securities of certain issuers offered pursuant to certain types 
of transactions.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) Has filed in a timely manner all reports required to be filed 
during the twelve calendar months and any portion of a month 
immediately preceding the filing of the registration statement, other 
than a report that is required solely pursuant to Item 1.01, 1.02, 
1.05, 2.03, 2.04, 2.05, 2.06, 4.02(a), 6.01, 6.03, or 6.05 of Form 8-K 
(Sec.  249.308 of this chapter). If the registrant has used (during the 
twelve calendar months and any portion of a month immediately preceding 
the filing of the registration statement) Sec.  240.12b-25(b) of this 
chapter with respect to a report or a portion of a report, that report 
or portion thereof has actually been filed within the time period 
prescribed by that section; and
* * * * *

0
8. Amend Form S-3 (referenced in Sec.  239.13) by adding General 
Instruction I.A.3(b).

    Note: Form S-3 is attached as Appendix A to this document. Form 
S-3 will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

0
9. The authority citation for part 240 continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78j-4, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 
78o-4, 78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll, 
78mm, 80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, 7201 et 
seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 
1350; and Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 
112-106, sec. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise 
noted.
* * * * *

    Section 240.15d-11 is also issued under secs. 3(a) and 306(a), 
Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
* * * * *

0
10. Amend Sec.  240.13a-11 by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  240.13a-11  Current reports on Form 8-K (Sec.  249.308 of this 
chapter).

* * * * *
    (c) No failure to file a report on Form 8-K that is required solely 
pursuant to Item 1.01, 1.02, 1.05, 2.03, 2.04, 2.05, 2.06, 4.02(a), 
5.02(e), or 6.03 of Form 8-K shall be deemed to be a violation of 15 
U.S.C. 78j(b) and Sec.  240.10b-5.


0
11. Amend Sec.  240.15d-11 by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  240.15d-11  Current reports on Form 8-K (Sec.  249.308 of this 
chapter).

* * * * *
    (c) No failure to file a report on Form 8-K that is required solely 
pursuant to Item 1.01, 1.02, 1.05, 2.03, 2.04, 2.05, 2.06, 4.02(a), 
5.02(e), or 6.03 of Form 8-K shall be deemed to be a violation of 15 
U.S.C. 78j(b) and Sec.  240.10b-5.

PART 249--FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

0
12. The authority citation for part 249 continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. and 7201 et seq.; 12 U.S.C. 
5461 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; Sec. 953(b) Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1904; Sec. 102(a)(3) Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 309 (2012), Sec. 107 
Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 313 (2012), Sec. 72001 Pub. L. 114-94, 
129 Stat. 1312 (2015), and secs. 2 and 3 Pub. L. 116-222, 134 Stat. 
1063 (2020), unless otherwise noted.

    Section 249.220f is also issued under secs. 3(a), 202, 208, 302, 
306(a), 401(a), 401(b), 406 and 407, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 
and secs. 2 and 3, Pub. L. 116-222, 134 Stat. 1063.
* * * * *
    Section 249.308 is also issued under 15 U.S.C. 80a-29 and 80a-
37.
* * * * *
    Section 249.310 is also issued under secs. 3(a), 202, 208, 302, 
406 and 407, Public Law 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
* * * * *

0
13. Revise Form 20-F (referenced in Sec.  249.220f) by adding Item 16K.

    Note: Form 20-F is attached as Appendix B to this document. Form 
20-F will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.


0
14. Amend Form 6-K (referenced in Sec.  249.306) by adding, in the 
second paragraph of General Instruction B, the phrase ``material 
cybersecurity incident;'' before the phrase ``and any

[[Page 51944]]

other information which the registrant deems of material importance to 
security holders.''


0
15. Revise Form 8-K (referenced in Sec.  249.308) by:
0
a. Revising General Instruction B.1.;
0
b. Revising General Instruction G.1.; and
0
c. Adding Item 1.05.

    Note: Form 8-K is attached as Appendix C to this document. Form 
8-K will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.



0
16. Revise Form 10-K (referenced in Sec.  249.310) by:
0
a. Revising General Instruction J(1)(b); and
0
b. Adding Item 1C to Part I.

    Note: Form 10-K is attached as Appendix D to this document. Form 
10-K will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.

* * * * *

    By the Commission.

    Dated: July 26, 2023.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.

    Note: The following appendices will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendix A--Form S-3

FORM S-3

* * * * *

INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE REPORT

* * * * *

General Instructions

I. Eligibility Requirements for Use of Form S-3

* * * * *

A. Registrant Requirements

* * * * *
    3. * * *
    (b) has filed in a timely manner all reports required to be 
filed during the twelve calendar months and any portion of a month 
immediately preceding the filing of the registration statement, 
other than a report that is required solely pursuant to Item 1.01, 
1.02, 1.04, 1.05, 2.03, 2.04, 2.05, 2.06, 4.02(a) or 5.02(e) of Form 
8-K (Sec.  249.308 of this chapter). If the registrant has used 
(during the twelve calendar months and any portion of a month 
immediately preceding the filing of the registration statement) Rule 
12b-25(b) (Sec.  240.12b-25(b) of this chapter) under the Exchange 
Act with respect to a report or a portion of a report, that report 
or portion thereof has actually been filed within the time period 
prescribed by that rule.
* * * * *

Appendix B--Form 20-F

FORM 20-F

* * * * *

PART II

* * * * *

Item 16K. Cybersecurity

    (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
    (1) Cybersecurity incident means an unauthorized occurrence, or 
a series of related unauthorized occurrences, on or conducted 
through a registrant's information systems that jeopardizes the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a registrant's 
information systems or any information residing therein.
    (2) Cybersecurity threat means any potential unauthorized 
occurrence on or conducted through a registrant's information 
systems that may result in adverse effects on the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of a registrant's information systems or 
any information residing therein.
    (3) Information systems means electronic information resources, 
owned or used by the registrant, including physical or virtual 
infrastructure controlled by such information resources, or 
components thereof, organized for the collection, processing, 
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of the 
registrant's information to maintain or support the registrant's 
operations.
    (b) Risk management and strategy. (1) Describe the registrant's 
processes, if any, for assessing, identifying, and managing material 
risks from cybersecurity threats in sufficient detail for a 
reasonable investor to understand those processes. In providing such 
disclosure, a registrant should address, as applicable, the 
following non-exclusive list of disclosure items:
    (i) Whether and how any such processes have been integrated into 
the registrant's overall risk management system or processes;
    (ii) Whether the registrant engages assessors, consultants, 
auditors, or other third parties in connection with any such 
processes; and
    (iii) Whether the registrant has processes to oversee and 
identify such risks from cybersecurity threats associated with its 
use of any third-party service provider.
    (2) Describe whether any risks from cybersecurity threats, 
including as a result of any previous cybersecurity incidents, have 
materially affected or are reasonably likely to materially affect 
the registrant, including its business strategy, results of 
operations, or financial condition and if so, how.
    (c) Governance. (1) Describe the board of directors' oversight 
of risks from cybersecurity threats. If applicable, identify any 
board committee or subcommittee responsible for the oversight of 
risks from cybersecurity threats and describe the processes by which 
the board or such committee is informed about such risks.
    (2) Describe management's role in assessing and managing the 
registrant's material risks from cybersecurity threats. In providing 
such disclosure, a registrant should address, as applicable, the 
following non-exclusive list of disclosure items:
    (i) Whether and which management positions or committees are 
responsible for assessing and managing such risks, and the relevant 
expertise of such persons or members in such detail as necessary to 
fully describe the nature of the expertise;
    (ii) The processes by which such persons or committees are 
informed about and monitor the prevention, detection, mitigation, 
and remediation of cybersecurity incidents; and
    (iii) Whether such persons or committees report information 
about such risks to the board of directors or a committee or 
subcommittee of the board of directors.

Instructions to Item 16K(c)

    1. In the case of a foreign private issuer with a two-tier board 
of directors, for purposes of paragraph (c) of this Item, the term 
``board of directors'' means the supervisory or non-management 
board. In the case of a foreign private issuer meeting the 
requirements of Sec.  240.10A-3(c)(3) of this chapter, for purposes 
of paragraph (c) of this Item, the term ``board of directors'' means 
the issuer's board of auditors (or similar body) or statutory 
auditors, as applicable.
    2. Relevant expertise of management in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of 
this Item may include, for example: Prior work experience in 
cybersecurity; any relevant degrees or certifications; any 
knowledge, skills, or other background in cybersecurity.
    (d) Structured Data Requirement. Provide the information 
required by this Item in an Interactive Data File in accordance with 
Rule 405 of Regulation S-T and the EDGAR Filer Manual.
    Instruction to Item 16K. Item 16K applies only to annual 
reports, and does not apply to registration statements on Form 20-F.
* * * * *

Appendix C--Form 8-K

FORM 8-K

* * * * *

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

* * * * *

B. Events To Be Reported and Time for Filing of Reports

    1. A report on this form is required to be filed or furnished, 
as applicable, upon the occurrence of any one or more of the events 
specified in the items in Sections 1 through 6 and 9 of this form. 
Unless otherwise specified, a report is to be filed or furnished 
within four business days after occurrence of the event. If the 
event occurs on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday on which the 
Commission is not open for business, then the four business day 
period shall begin to run on, and include, the first business day 
thereafter. A registrant either furnishing a report on this form 
under Item 7.01 (Regulation FD Disclosure) or electing to file a 
report on this form under Item 8.01 (Other Events) solely to satisfy 
its obligations under Regulation FD (17 CFR 243.100 and 243.101) 
must furnish such report or make such filing, as applicable, in 
accordance with the requirements of Rule 100(a) of Regulation FD (17 
CFR 243.100(a)), including the deadline for furnishing or filing 
such report. A report pursuant to Item 5.08 is to be filed within 
four business days after the registrant determines the anticipated 
meeting date. A report pursuant to Item 1.05 is to be filed within 
four business days after the registrant determines that it has 
experienced a material cybersecurity incident.
* * * * *

[[Page 51945]]

G. Use of This Form by Asset-Backed Issuers

* * * * *
    1. * * *
    (a) Item 1.05, Cybersecurity Incidents;
    (b) Item 2.01, Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of 
Assets;
    (c) Item 2.02, Results of Operations and Financial Condition;
    (d) Item 2.03, Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an 
Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet Arrangement of a Registrant;
    (e) Item 2.05, Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal 
Activities;
    (f) Item 2.06, Material Impairments;
    (g) Item 3.01, Notice of Delisting or Failure to Satisfy a 
Continued Listing Rule or Standard; Transfer of Listing;
    (h) Item 3.02, Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities;
    (i) Item 4.01, Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountant;
    (j) Item 4.02, Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financial 
Statements or a Related Audit Report or Completed Interim Review;
    (k) Item 5.01, Changes in Control of Registrant;
    (l) Item 5.02, Departure of Directors or Principal Officers; 
Election of Directors; Appointment of Principal Officers;
    (m) Item 5.04, Temporary Suspension of Trading Under 
Registrant's Employee Benefit Plans; and
    (n) Item 5.05, Amendments to the Registrant's Code of Ethics, or 
Waiver of a Provision of the Code of Ethics.
* * * * *

INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE REPORT

Section 1--Registrant's Business and Operations

* * * * *

Item 1.05 Material Cybersecurity Incidents

    (a) If the registrant experiences a cybersecurity incident that 
is determined by the registrant to be material, describe the 
material aspects of the nature, scope, and timing of the incident, 
and the material impact or reasonably likely material impact on the 
registrant, including its financial condition and results of 
operations.
    (b) A registrant shall provide the information required by this 
Item in an Interactive Data File in accordance with Rule 405 of 
Regulation S-T and the EDGAR Filer Manual.
    (c) Notwithstanding General Instruction B.1. to Form 8-K, if the 
United States Attorney General determines that disclosure required 
by paragraph (a) of this Item 1.05 poses a substantial risk to 
national security or public safety, and notifies the Commission of 
such determination in writing, the registrant may delay providing 
the disclosure required by this Item 1.05 for a time period 
specified by the Attorney General, up to 30 days following the date 
when the disclosure required by this Item 1.05 was otherwise 
required to be provided. Disclosure may be delayed for an additional 
period of up to 30 days if the Attorney General determines that 
disclosure continues to pose a substantial risk to national security 
or public safety and notifies the Commission of such determination 
in writing. In extraordinary circumstances, disclosure may be 
delayed for a final additional period of up to 60 days if the 
Attorney General determines that disclosure continues to pose a 
substantial risk to national security and notifies the Commission of 
such determination in writing. Beyond the final 60-day delay under 
this paragraph, if the Attorney General indicates that further delay 
is necessary, the Commission will consider additional requests for 
delay and may grant such relief through Commission exemptive order.
    (d) Notwithstanding General Instruction B.1. to Form 8-K, if a 
registrant that is subject to 47 CFR 64.2011 is required to delay 
disclosing a data breach pursuant to such rule, it may delay 
providing the disclosure required by this Item 1.05 for such period 
that is applicable under 47 CFR 64.2011(b)(1) and in no event for 
more than seven business days after notification required under such 
provision has been made, so long as the registrant notifies the 
Commission in correspondence submitted to the EDGAR system no later 
than the date when the disclosure required by this Item 1.05 was 
otherwise required to be provided.

Instructions to Item 1.05

    1. A registrant's materiality determination regarding a 
cybersecurity incident must be made without unreasonable delay after 
discovery of the incident.
    2. To the extent that the information called for in Item 1.05(a) 
is not determined or is unavailable at the time of the required 
filing, the registrant shall include a statement to this effect in 
the filing and then must file an amendment to its Form 8-K filing 
under this Item 1.05 containing such information within four 
business days after the registrant, without unreasonable delay, 
determines such information or within four business days after such 
information becomes available.
    3. The definition of the term ``cybersecurity incident'' in 
229.106(a) [Item 106(a) of Regulation S-K] applies to this Item.
    4. A registrant need not disclose specific or technical 
information about its planned response to the incident or its 
cybersecurity systems, related networks and devices, or potential 
system vulnerabilities in such detail as would impede the 
registrant's response or remediation of the incident.
* * * * *

Appendix D--Form 10-K

FORM 10-K

* * * * *

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

* * * * *

J. Use of This Form by Asset-Backed Issuers

* * * * *
    (1) * * *
    (b) Item 1A, Risk Factors and Item 1C, Cybersecurity;
* * * * *

Part I

* * * * *

Item 1C Cybersecurity

    (a) Furnish the information required by Item 106 of Regulation 
S-K (229.106 of this chapter).
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2023-16194 Filed 8-3-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


