[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 66 (Thursday, April 6, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 20616-20685]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-05774]



[[Page 20615]]

Vol. 88

Thursday,

No. 66

April 6, 2023

Part II





Securities and Exchange Commission





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17 CFR Parts 240, 248, 270, et al.





Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information and 
Safeguarding Customer Information; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 66 / Thursday, April 6, 2023 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 20616]]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 240, 248, 270, and 275

[Release Nos. 34-97141; IA-6262; IC-34854; File No. S7-05-23]
RIN 3235-AN26


Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information and 
Safeguarding Customer Information

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'' or 
``SEC'') is proposing rule amendments that would require brokers and 
dealers (or ``broker-dealers''), investment companies, and investment 
advisers registered with the Commission (``registered investment 
advisers'') to adopt written policies and procedures for incident 
response programs to address unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information, including procedures for providing timely notification to 
individuals affected by an incident involving sensitive customer 
information with details about the incident and information designed to 
help affected individuals respond appropriately. The Commission also is 
proposing to broaden the scope of information covered by amending 
requirements for safeguarding customer records and information, and for 
properly disposing of consumer report information. In addition, the 
proposed amendments would extend the application of the safeguards 
provisions to transfer agents. The proposed amendments would also 
include requirements to maintain written records documenting compliance 
with the proposed amended rules. Finally, the proposed amendments would 
conform annual privacy notice delivery provisions to the terms of an 
exception provided by a statutory amendment to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (``GLBA'').

DATES: Comments should be received on or before June 5, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number S7-05-23 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments to Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-05-23. The file number 
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the 
Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please 
use only one method of submission. The Commission will post all 
comments on the Commission's website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments are also available for website viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 
a.m. and 3 p.m. Operating conditions may limit access to the 
Commission's public reference room. All comments received will be 
posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal 
identifying information from submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly.
    Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the 
Commission or staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A 
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any such materials 
will be made available on the Commission's website. To ensure direct 
electronic receipt of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay 
Connected'' option at www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Poklemba, Brice Prince, or James 
Wintering, Special Counsels; Edward Schellhorn, Branch Chief; Devin 
Ryan, Assistant Director; John Fahey, Deputy Chief Counsel; Emily 
Westerberg Russell, Chief Counsel; Office of Chief Counsel, Division of 
Trading and Markets, (202) 551-5550; Jessica Leonardo or Taylor 
Evenson, Senior Counsels; Aaron Ellias, Acting Branch Chief; Marc 
Mehrespand, Branch Chief; Thoreau Bartmann, Co-Chief Counsel, Chief 
Counsel's Office, Division of Investment Management, (202) 551-6792, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is proposing for public 
comment amendments to 17 CFR 248 (``Regulation S-P'') \1\ under Title V 
of the GLBA [15 U.S.C. 6801-6827], the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(``FCRA'') [15 U.S.C. 1681-1681x], the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Exchange Act'') [15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.], the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 (``Investment Company Act'') [15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.], and the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (``Investment Advisers Act'') [15 
U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.].
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    \1\ Unless otherwise noted, all references below to rules 
contained in Regulation S-P are to Part 248 of Chapter 17 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (``CFR'').
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Table of Contents

I. Introduction
    A. Background
    B. 2008 Proposal
    C. Overview of the Proposal
II. Discussion
    A. Incident Response Program Including Customer Notification
    1. Assessment
    2. Containment and Control
    3. Service Providers
    4. Notice to Affected Individuals
    B. Remote Work Arrangement Considerations
    C. Scope of Information Protected Under the Safeguards Rule and 
Disposal Rule
    1. Definition of Customer Information
    2. Safeguards Rule and Disposal Rule Coverage of Customer 
Information
    3. Extending the Scope of the Safeguards Rule and the Disposal 
Rule To Cover All Transfer Agents
    4. Maintaining the Current Regulatory Framework for Notice-
Registered Broker-Dealers
    D. Recordkeeping
    E. Exception From the Annual Notice Delivery Requirement
    1. Current Regulation S-P Requirements for Privacy Notices
    2. Proposed Amendment
    F. Request for Comment on Limited Information Disclosure When 
Personnel Leave Their Firms
    G. Other Current Commission Rule Proposals
    1. Covered Institutions Subject to the Regulation SCI Proposal 
and the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal
    2. Investment Management Cybersecurity
    H. Existing Staff No-Action Letters and Other Staff Statements
    I. Proposed Compliance Date
III. Economic Analysis
    A. Introduction
    B. Broad Economic Considerations
    C. Baseline
    1. Safeguarding Customer Information--Risks and Practices
    2. Regulation
    3. Market Structure
    D. Benefits and Costs of the Proposed Rule Amendments
    1. Response Program
    2. Extend Scope of Customer Safeguards to Transfer Agents
    3. Recordkeeping
    4. Exception From Annual Notice Delivery Requirement
    E. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    F. Reasonable Alternatives Considered
    1. Reasonable Assurances From Service Providers
    2. Lower Threshold for Customer Notice

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    3. Encryption Safe Harbor
    4. Longer Customer Notification Deadlines
    5. Broader Law Enforcement Exception From Notification 
Requirements
    G. Request for Comment on Economic Analysis
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Introduction
    B. Amendments to the Safeguards Rule and Disposal Rule
    C. Request for Comment
V. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
    A. Reason for and Objectives of the Proposed Action
    B. Legal Basis
    C. Small Entities Subject to Proposed Rule Amendments
    D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    E. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
    F. Significant Alternatives
    G. Request for Comment
VI. Consideration of Impact on the Economy Statutory Authority

I. Introduction

    The Commission adopted Regulation S-P in 2000.\2\ Regulation S-P's 
provisions include, among other requirements, rule 248.30(a) 
(``safeguards rule''), which requires brokers, dealers, investment 
companies,\3\ and registered investment advisers to adopt written 
policies and procedures for administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards to protect customer records and information.\4\ Another 
provision of Regulation S-P, rule 248.30(b) (``disposal rule''), which 
applies to transfer agents registered with the Commission in addition 
to the institutions covered by the safeguards rule, requires proper 
disposal of consumer report information.\5\ Since Regulation S-P was 
adopted, evolving digital communications and information storage tools 
and other technologies have made it easier for firms to obtain, share, 
and maintain individuals' personal information. This evolution also has 
changed or exacerbated the risks of unauthorized access to or use of 
personal information,\6\ thus increasing the risk of potential harm to 
individuals whose information is not protected against unauthorized 
access or use.\7\
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    \2\ See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-
P), Exchange Act Release No. 42974 (June 22, 2000) [65 FR 40334 
(June 29, 2000)] (``Reg. S-P Release''). Regulation S-P is codified 
at 17 CFR Part 248, Subpart A.
    \3\ Regulation S-P applies to investment companies as the term 
is defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act (15 U.S.C. 
80a-3), whether or not the investment company is registered with the 
Commission. See 17 CFR 248.3(r). Thus, a business development 
company, which is an investment company but is not required to 
register as such with the Commission, is subject to Regulation S-P. 
Similarly, employees' securities companies--including those that are 
not required to register under the Investment Company Act--are 
investment companies and are, therefore, subject to Regulation S-P. 
By contrast, issuers that are excluded from the definition of 
investment company--such as private funds that are able to rely on 
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act--would not 
be subject to Regulation S-P.
    \4\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a).
    \5\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b). In this release, institutions to which 
Regulation S-P currently applies, or to which the proposed 
amendments would apply, are sometimes referred to as ``covered 
institutions.'' The term, ``covered institution'' is sometimes used 
in this release to refer to institutions to as ``you'' in Regulation 
S-P.
    \6\ Unauthorized use differs from unauthorized access in that a 
person making unauthorized use of customer information may or many 
not be authorized to access it. CF. Van Buren v. United States, 141 
S. Ct. 1648, 1652 (2021) (discussing how a person can access a 
computer without authorization or exceed authorized access). As 
described in more detail below, covered institutions would have to 
provide notice to affected individuals whose sensitive customer 
information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or 
used without authorization.
    \7\ See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2021 Internet 
Crime Report (Mar. 22, 2022), at 7-8, available at https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2021_IC3Report.pdf (stating that 
the FBI's internet Crime Complaint Center received 847,376 
complaints in 2021 (an increase of approximately 181% from 2017). 
The complaints included 51,629 related to identity theft and 51,829 
related to personal data breaches (increases of approximately 193% 
and 68% from 2017, respectively)); the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (``FINRA''), 2021 Report on FINRA's Examination and Risk 
Monitoring Program: Cybersecurity and Technology Governance (Feb. 
2021), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-report-finras-examination-risk-monitoring-program.pdf 
(noting increased cybersecurity or technology-related incidents at 
firms); Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (now the 
Division of Examinations) (``EXAMS''), Risk Alert, Cybersecurity: 
Safeguarding Client Accounts against Credential Compromise (Sept. 
15, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/Risk%20Alert%20-%20Credential%20Compromise.pdf (describing increasingly 
sophisticated methods used by attackers to gain access to customer 
accounts and firm systems). This Risk Alert, and any other 
Commission staff statements represent the views of the staff. They 
are not a rule, regulation, or statement of the Commission. 
Furthermore, the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved 
their content. These staff statements, like all staff statements, 
have no legal force or effect: they do not alter or amend applicable 
law; and they create no new or additional obligations for any 
person.
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    This environment of expanded risks supports our proposing updates 
to the requirements of Regulation S-P. Currently, the safeguards rule 
addresses protecting customer information against unauthorized access 
or use, but it does not include a requirement to notify affected 
individuals in the event of a data breach. In assessing firm and 
industry compliance with these requirements, Commission staff typically 
focus on information security controls, including whether firms have 
taken appropriate measures to safeguard customer accounts and to 
respond to data breaches.\8\ Commission staff have observed a number of 
practices with respect to the information safeguards requirements of 
Regulation S-P and have provided observations on several occasions to 
assist firms in improving their practices.\9\ Although many firms have 
improved their programs for safeguarding customer records and 
information in light of these observations, nonetheless we are 
concerned that some firms may not maintain plans for addressing 
incidents of unauthorized access to or use of data.\10\ We also are 
concerned the incident response programs that firms have implemented 
may be insufficient to respond to evolving threats or may not include 
well-designed plans for customer notification.\11\
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    \8\ See EXAMS, 2022 Examination Priorities, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/2022-exam-priorities.pdf; EXAMS, Investment 
Adviser and Broker-Dealer Compliance Issues Related to Regulation S-
P--Privacy Notices and Safeguard Policies (Apr. 16, 2019) (``Reg. S-
P Risk Alert''), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/OCIE%20Risk%20Alert%20-%20Regulation%20S-P.pdf.
    \9\ See Reg. S-P Risk Alert, supra note 8 (noting that examples 
of the most common deficiencies or weaknesses observed by EXAMS 
staff included that broker-dealer and investment adviser written 
incident response plans did not address, among other things, actions 
required to address a cybersecurity incident and assessments of 
system vulnerabilities); EXAMS, Observations from Cybersecurity 
Examinations (Aug. 7, 2017) (``Observations Risk Alert''), available 
at https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-from-cybersecurity-examinations.pdf.
    \10\ See Reg. S-P Risk Alert, supra note 8; Observations Risk 
Alert, supra note 9 (noting that some firms lacked plans for 
addressing access incidents).
    \11\ See Reg. S-P Risk Alert, supra note 8. Although broker-
dealers are subject to self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') rules 
requiring written supervisory procedures and written business 
continuity plans addressing subjects including data back-up and 
recovery, SRO rules do not require notification to customers whose 
information is compromised. See, e.g., FINRA Rule 3110 (Supervision) 
(requiring members to establish, maintain, and enforce written 
procedures to supervise the types of business in which they engage 
and the activities of their associated persons that are reasonably 
designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and 
regulations, and with applicable FINRA rules), and FINRA Rule 4370 
(Business Continuity Plans and Emergency Contact Information) 
(requiring members to create and maintain a written business 
continuity plan identifying procedures relating to an emergency or 
significant business disruption that must address specified topics 
including data back-up and recovery).
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    We therefore preliminarily believe specifically requiring a 
reasonably designed incident response program, including policies and 
procedures for assessment, control and containment, and customer 
notification, could help reduce or mitigate the potential for harm to 
individuals whose sensitive information is exposed or compromised in a 
data breach. Requiring firms to adopt incident response programs to 
address unauthorized access to or use of customer information, 
including

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customer notification and recordkeeping requirements, would enhance 
protections for customer information. The advance planning required 
under an incident response program should improve an institution's 
preparedness and the effectiveness of its response to data breaches 
while still being consistent with the requirements for safeguarding 
standards articulated in the GLBA.\12\
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    \12\ The GLBA's requirements for standards for safeguarding 
customer records and information are described in the Background 
section below. See infra section I.A.
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    In certain instances, some types of customer notification plans may 
already be required by existing state laws mandating customer 
notifications. While all 50 states have enacted laws in recent years 
requiring firms to notify individuals of data breaches, standards 
differ by state, with some states imposing heightened notification 
requirements relative to other states.\13\ Currently, broker-dealers, 
investment companies, and registered investment advisers respond to 
data breaches according to applicable state laws. For example, states 
differ in the types of information that, if accessed or used without 
authorization, may trigger a notification requirement.\14\ States also 
differ regarding a firm's duty to investigate a data breach when 
determining whether notice is required, deadlines to deliver notice, 
and the information required to be included in a notice, among other 
matters.\15\ As a result, a firm's notification obligations arising 
from a single data breach may vary such that customers in one state may 
receive notice while customers of the same institution in another state 
may not receive notice or may receive less information. In reviewing 
these state laws, we determined that certain aspects of these 
provisions would be appropriately adopted as components of a Federal 
minimum standard for customer notification, which would help affected 
customers understand how to respond to a data breach to protect 
themselves from potential harm that could result.
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    \13\ Upon its adoption, rule 248.17 essentially restated the 
then-current text of section 507 of the GLBA, and as such, 
referenced determinations made by the Federal Trade Commission. See 
Reg. S-P Release, supra note 2. The proposal would, however, update 
rule 248.17 to instead reference determinations made by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, consistent with changes made to section 
507 of the GLBA by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. See Public Law 111-203, sec. 1041, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010).
    \14\ For example, some states may require a firm to notify 
individuals when a data breach includes biometric information, while 
others do not. Compare Cal. Civil Code sec. 1798.29 (notice to 
California residents of a data breach generally required when a 
resident's personal information was or is reasonably believed to 
have been acquired by an unauthorized person; ``personal 
information'' is defined to mean an individual's first or last name 
in combination with one of a list of specified elements, which 
includes certain unique biometric data) with Ala. Stat. secs. 8-38-
2, 8-38-4, 8-38-5 (notice of a data breach to Alabama residents is 
generally required when sensitive personally identifying information 
has been acquired by an unauthorized person and is reasonably likely 
to cause substantial harm to the resident to whom the information 
relates; ``sensitive personally identifying information'' is defined 
as the resident's first or last name in combination with one of a 
list of specified elements, which does not include biometric 
information).
    \15\ See infra sections II.A.4 and III.C.2.a.
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    Our proposal would afford certain individuals greater protections 
by, for example, defining ``sensitive customer information'' more 
broadly than the current definitions used by at least 12 states, 
thereby requiring customers in those states to receive notice for a 
broader range of personal information included in a breach.\16\ 
Additionally, the 30-day notification deadline proposed in this release 
is shorter than the timing currently mandated by 15 states, and would 
also offer enhanced protections to individuals in 32 states with laws 
that do not include a notification deadline as well as those in states 
that mandate or permit delayed notifications for law enforcement 
purposes.\17\ A standardized notification deadline ensures timely 
notice to affected customers and would enhance their ability to take 
action quickly to protect themselves against the consequences of a 
breach. Further, consistent with 22 state laws, this proposal would 
require customer notification unless, after investigation, the covered 
institution finds no risk of harm.\18\ Twenty-one states currently have 
a presumption against notifying customers of a breach, and only require 
notice if, after investigation, the covered institution finds risk of 
harm.\19\ In addition, in the 11 states where state customer 
notification laws do not apply to entities subject to or in compliance 
with the GLBA, the proposal would help ensure customers of such 
institutions receive notice of a breach.\20\ As discussed more fully 
below, establishing a federal minimum standard would protect 
individuals in an environment of enhanced risk.\21\
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    \16\ See infra section II.C.1.
    \17\ See infra section II.A.4.e.
    \18\ See infra section II.A.4.a.
    \19\ See id.
    \20\ See id.
    \21\ The effect of any inconsistency between the proposed 
customer notification and state law requirements may, however, be 
mitigated because many states offer safe harbors from their 
notification laws for entities that are subject to or in compliance 
with requirements under Federal regulations. In particular, as 
noted, 11 states offer safe harbors for entities subject to or in 
compliance with the GLBA, while others offer safe harbors for 
compliance with the notification requirements of the entity's 
``primary federal regulator.'' See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 
section 12B-103 (providing that a person regulated by the GLBA and 
maintaining procedures for security breaches pursuant to the law 
established by its Federal regulator is deemed to be in compliance 
with the Delaware notification requirements if the person notifies 
affected Delaware residents in accordance with those procedures). 
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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    There are compelling reasons to revisit other aspects of the 
current safeguards regime as well. As noted above, the safeguards rule 
currently applies to broker-dealers, investment companies, and 
registered investment advisers. The safeguards rule does not currently 
apply to transfer agents, even though they also obtain, share, and 
maintain personal information on behalf of securityholders who hold 
securities in registered form (i.e., in their own name rather than 
indirectly through a broker). Securityholders whose personal 
information is maintained by transfer agents could be harmed by the 
unauthorized access or use of such information in the same manner as 
customers of broker-dealers, investment companies, and registered 
investment advisers, yet such securityholders are not currently 
protected by the safeguards rule. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that extending the safeguards rule to cover transfer agents is 
necessary to ensure that there is a Federal minimum standard for the 
notification of securityholders who are affected by a data breach that 
leads to the unauthorized access or use of their information, 
regardless of whether that data breach occurs at a broker-dealer, 
investment company, registered investment adviser, or transfer 
agent.\22\
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    \22\ See infra section II.C.3.
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    In addition, the safeguards rule currently requires only that 
institutions protect their own customers' information. This potentially 
overlooks information a broker-dealer, investment company, or 
registered investment adviser may have received from another financial 
institution about that financial institution's customers,\23\ such as

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nonpublic personal information from an introducing broker or dealer 
that clears transactions for its customers through a clearing broker on 
a fully disclosed basis.\24\ Applying the safeguards rule and the 
disposal rule to customer information that a covered institution 
receives from other financial institutions would better protect 
individuals by ensuring customer information safeguards are not lost 
when a third-party financial institution shares that information with a 
covered institution.\25\ Finally, applying the safeguards rule and the 
disposal rule to a broader set of information should enhance the 
security and confidentiality of customers' personal information.
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    \23\ Under section 501(b) of the GLBA, the standards to be 
established by the Commission must, among other things, ``protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of'' customer records or 
information ``which could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer.'' See 15 U.S.C. 6801(b)(3) (emphasis 
added). We agree with the Federal Trade Commission (``FTC'') that 
applying the safeguards rule to cover customer information that a 
financial institution receives pertaining to another institution's 
customers is consistent with the purpose and language of the GLBA. 
Further, the Commission agrees with the FTC that this approach is 
the most reasonable reading of the statutory language and clearly 
furthers the express congressional policy to respect the privacy of 
these customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of 
their nonpublic personal information. See FTC, Standards for 
Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 FR 36484, 36485-86 (May 23, 
2002); see also infra section II.C.2 (describing proposed new 
definition of ``customer information'' that would include both 
nonpublic personal information that a covered institution collects 
about its own customers and nonpublic personal information about 
customers of a third-party financial institution that the covered 
institution receives from the third-party financial institution).
    \24\ See 17 CFR 248.3(g)(2)(iii) (``An individual is not your 
consumer if he or she has an account with another broker or dealer 
(the introducing broker-dealer) that carries securities for the 
individual in a special omnibus account with you (the clearing 
broker-dealer) in the name of the introducing broker-dealer, and 
when you receive only the account numbers and transaction 
information of the introducing broker-dealer's consumers in order to 
clear transactions.'').
    \25\ See infra section II.C.2.
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    Therefore, the Commission is proposing amendments to Regulation S-P 
to enhance the protection of this information by: (1) requiring covered 
institutions to include incident response programs in their safeguards 
policies and procedures to address unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information, including procedures for providing timely 
notification to affected individuals; (2) extending the safeguards rule 
to all transfer agents registered with the Commission or another 
appropriate regulatory agency as defined in section 3(a)(34)(B) of the 
Exchange Act (unless otherwise noted, we refer to them collectively as 
``transfer agents'' for purposes of this release); (3) more closely 
aligning the information protected by the safeguards rule and the 
disposal rule; and (4) broadening the set of customers covered by those 
rules.

A. Background

    Title V of the GLBA,\26\ among other things, directed the 
Commission and other Federal financial regulators to establish and 
implement standards requiring financial institutions subject to their 
jurisdiction to adopt administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards for the protection of customer records and information.\27\ 
The GLBA specified that these standards were ``(1) to insure the 
security and confidentiality of customer records and information; (2) 
to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security 
or integrity of such records; and (3) to protect against unauthorized 
access to or use of such records or information which could result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.'' \28\
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    \26\ 15 U.S.C. 6801-6827.
    \27\ See 15 U.S.C. 6801(b) and 6804(a)(1).
    \28\ 15 U.S.C. 6801(b).
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    As noted above, the safeguards rule sets forth standards for 
safeguarding customer records and information and currently requires 
covered institutions to adopt written policies and procedures for 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect customer 
records and information.\29\ While the term ``customer records and 
information'' is not defined in the GLBA or in Regulation S-P,\30\ the 
safeguards must be reasonably designed to meet the GLBA's 
standards.\31\ This approach is designed to provide flexibility for 
covered institutions to safeguard customer records and information in 
accordance with their own privacy policies and practices and business 
models.
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    \29\ 17 CFR 248.30(a). Other sections of Regulation S-P 
implement the notice and opt out provisions of the GLBA. See 17 CFR 
248.1-248.18. In addition to the safeguards rule and the disposal 
rule (17 CFR 248.30(b)), the GLBA and Regulation S-P require 
brokers, dealers, investment companies and registered investment 
advisers to provide an annual notice of their privacy policies and 
practices to their customers (and notice to consumers before sharing 
their nonpublic customer information with nonaffiliated third 
parties outside certain exceptions). See 15 U.S.C. 6803(a); 17 CFR 
248.4; 17 CFR 248.5. We are also proposing an exception to the 
annual notice delivery requirement. See infra section II.E.
    \30\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a); 15 U.S.C. 6801(b)(1) (discussing but 
not defining ``customer records or information'').
    \31\ Specifically, the safeguards must be reasonably designed to 
insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and 
information, protect against anticipated threats to the security or 
integrity of those records and information, and protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of such records or information that 
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer. 
See 17 CFR 248.30(a). See also 15 U.S.C. 6801(b).
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    Pursuant to the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 
(``FACT Act''), the Commission amended Regulation S-P in 2004 by 
adopting the disposal rule to protect against the improper disposal of 
``consumer report information.'' \32\ ``Consumer report information'' 
is defined as ``any record about an individual, whether in paper, 
electronic or other form, that is a consumer report or is derived from 
a consumer report'' and also means ``a compilation of such records,'' 
but does not include ``information that does not identify individuals, 
such as aggregate information or blind data.'' \33\ The disposal rule 
currently applies to the financial institutions subject to the 
safeguards rule, except that it excludes ``notice-registered broker-
dealers,'' \34\ and it applies to transfer agents registered with the 
Commission.\35\ The disposal rule requires these entities that maintain 
or possess ``consumer report information'' for a business purpose, to 
take ``reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to or 
use of the information in connection with its disposal.'' \36\
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    \32\ 17 CFR 248.30(b). See Disposal of Consumer Report 
Information, Exchange Act Release No. 50781 (Dec. 2, 2004) [69 FR 
71322 (Dec. 8, 2004)] (``Disposal Rule Adopting Release''). Section 
216 of the FACT Act amended the FCRA by adding section 628 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. 1681w), which directed the Commission and other Federal 
financial regulators to adopt regulations ``requiring any person who 
maintains or possesses consumer information or any compilation of 
consumer information derived from a consumer report for a business 
purpose must properly dispose of the information.''
    \33\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(1)(ii).
    \34\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(1)(iv) (defining ``notice-registered 
broker-dealers'' as ``a broker or dealer registered by notice with 
the Commission under section 15(b)(11) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(11))''). See also infra section II.C.4 
further detailing the current regulatory framework for notice-
registered broker-dealers under the safeguards rule and the disposal 
rule.
    \35\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2)(i).
    \36\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b).
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    The GLBA and FACT Act oblige us to adopt regulations, to the extent 
possible, that are consistent and comparable with those adopted by the 
Banking Agencies and the FTC.\37\ Accordingly, in determining the scope 
of the proposed amendments contemplated in this proposal, including for 
example, the definitions of ``customer information'' and ``sensitive 
customer information'' described below, we are mindful of the need to 
set standards for safeguarding customer records and information that 
are consistent and comparable with the corresponding standards set by 
the Banking Agencies and the FTC.
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    \37\ See generally 15 U.S.C. 6804(a) (directing the agencies 
authorized to prescribe regulations under title V of the GLBA to 
assure to the extent possible that their regulations are consistent 
and comparable); 15 U.S.C. 1681w(a)(2)(A) (directing the agencies 
with enforcement authority set forth in 15 U.S.C. 1681s to consult 
and coordinate so that, to the extent possible, their regulations 
are consistent and comparable). The ``Banking Agencies'' include the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (``OCC''), the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (``FRB''), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (``FDIC''), and the former Office of 
Thrift Supervision.

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[[Page 20620]]

B. 2008 Proposal

    In 2008, the Commission proposed amendments to Regulation S-P 
primarily to help prevent information security breaches in the 
securities industry and to improve responsiveness when such breaches 
occur, with the goal of better protecting investors from identity theft 
and other misuse of what the proposal would have defined as ``personal 
information.'' \38\ The 2008 Proposal would have set out specific 
standards for safeguarding customer records and information, including 
requirements for procedures to respond to incidents of unauthorized 
access to or use of personal information. Those requirements would have 
included procedures for notifying the Commission (or a broker-dealer's 
designated examining authority \39\) of data breach incidents, and 
procedures for notifying individuals of incidents of unauthorized 
access to or misuse of sensitive personal information, if the misuse 
had occurred or was reasonably possible. The 2008 Proposal also would 
have amended the safeguards rule and the disposal rule so that both 
would have protected ``personal information,'' which would have 
included any record containing either ``nonpublic personal 
information'' or ``consumer report information.'' \40\ In addition, the 
2008 Proposal would have extended the safeguards rule to apply to 
transfer agents registered with the Commission, and would have extended 
the disposal rule to apply to natural persons who are associated 
persons of a broker or dealer, supervised persons of a registered 
investment adviser, and associated persons of any transfer agent 
registered with the Commission. The 2008 Proposal would have further 
required brokers, dealers, investment companies, registered investment 
advisers, and transfer agents registered with the Commission to 
maintain and preserve written records of their policies and procedures 
required under the disposal and safeguards rules and compliance with 
those policies and procedures.
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    \38\ See Part 248--Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer Financial 
Information and Safeguarding Customer information, Exchange Act 
Release No. 57427 (Mar. 4, 2008) [73 FR 13692, 13693-94 (Mar. 13, 
2008)] (``2008 Proposal''). The amendments to Regulation S-P 
referenced in the 2008 Proposal have not been adopted.
    \39\ A broker-dealer's designated examining authority is the SRO 
of which the broker-dealer is a member, or, if the broker-dealer is 
a member of more than one SRO, the SRO designated by the Commission 
pursuant to 17 CFR 240.17d-1 as responsible for examination of the 
member for compliance with applicable financial responsibility rules 
(including the Commission's customer account protection rules at 17 
CFR 240.15c3-3). See 2008 Proposal, supra note 38, at n.44.
    \40\ The 2008 Proposal would have made both the safeguards rule 
and the disposal rule, as amended, applicable to ``personal 
information,'' which would have been defined to include any record 
containing either ``nonpublic personal information'' or ``consumer 
report information'' that is identified with any consumer, or with 
any employee, investor, or securityholder who is a natural person, 
whether in paper, electronic, or other form, that is handled or 
maintained by or on behalf of a covered institution. See 2008 
Proposal, supra note 38, at 73 FR 13700.
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    The Commission received over 400 comment letters in response to the 
2008 Proposal.\41\ The current proposal to amend Regulation S-P has 
been informed by comments received on the 2008 Proposal. Most 
commenters supported requirements for comprehensive information 
security programs that are consistent and comparable to the rules and 
guidance of other Federal financial regulators.\42\ Many commenters, 
however, objected to changes in the scope of information and entities 
covered by the proposed amendments.\43\ Many commenters opposed or 
suggested modifying the proposed amendments' information security 
breach response provisions.\44\ Comments were mixed on the proposed 
exception for disclosures relating to transfers of representatives from 
one broker-dealer or registered investment adviser to another.\45\
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    \41\ Comments on the proposal, including comments referenced in 
this Release are available on the Commission website at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-08/s70608.shtml. Approximately 328 of the 
comments received contained substantially the same content. See 
example of Letter Type A available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-08/s70608typea.htm.
    \42\ See, e.g., Letter from Alan E. Sorcher, Managing Director 
and Associate General Counsel, Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (May 12, 2008) (``SIFMA Letter''); Letter from 
Tamara K. Salmon, Senior Associate Counsel, Investment Company 
Institute (May 2, 2008) (``ICI Letter''); Letter from Marcia E. 
Asquith, Senior Vice President and Corporate Secretary, Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (May 12, 2008) (``FINRA Letter'').
    \43\ See, e.g., SIFMA Letter; Letter from Charles V. Rossi, 
President, The Securities Transfer Association, Inc. (May 9, 2008) 
(``STA Letter'').
    \44\ See, e.g., SIFMA Letter; ICI Letter; Letter from Karen L. 
Barr, General Counsel, Investment Adviser Association (May 12, 2008) 
(``IAA Letter''); Letter from Sarah Miller, General Counsel, ABA 
Securities Association (May 22, 2008) (``ABASA Letter'').
    \45\ See, e.g., SIFMA Letter; IAA Letter (both in support); 
Letter from Julius L. Loeser, Chief Regulatory and Compliance 
Counsel, Comerica Securities, Inc. (May 9, 2008) (``Comerica 
Letter''); Letter from Steven French, President, MemberMap LLC (May 
11, 2008) (``MemberMap Letter'') (both opposed).
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C. Overview of the Proposal

    There are no Commission rules at this time expressly requiring 
broker-dealers, investment companies, or registered investment advisers 
to have policies and procedures for responding to data breach incidents 
or to notify customers of those breaches.\46\ As noted above, advance 
planning would be part of creating a reasonably designed incident 
response program, and its prompt implementation following a breach 
(including notification to affected individuals), is important in 
limiting potential harmful impacts to individuals. While we recognize 
that state laws require covered institutions to notify state residents 
of data breaches, those laws are not consistent and exclude some 
entities from certain requirements. Accordingly, a Federal minimum 
standard would provide notification to all customers of a covered 
institution affected by a data breach (regardless of state residency) 
and provide consistent disclosure of important information to help 
affected customers respond to a data breach. Other Federal regulators' 
GLBA safeguarding standards also include a requirement for a data 
breach response plan or program.\47\
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    \46\ As noted above, there are no SRO rules requiring 
notification to customers whose information has been compromised. 
See supra note 11. The Commission has pending proposals to address 
cybersecurity risk with respect to investment advisers, investment 
companies, and public companies. The Commission encourages 
commenters to review those proposals to determine whether it might 
affect their comments on this proposing release. See infra note 55.
    \47\ The FTC recently amended its Safeguards Rule by, among 
other things, adding a requirement for financial institutions under 
the FTC's GLBA jurisdiction to establish a written incident response 
plan designed to respond to information security events. See FTC, 
Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 86 FR 70272 (Dec. 
9, 2021) (``FTC Safeguards Release''). As amended, the FTC's rule 
requires that a response plan address security events materially 
affecting the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
customer information in the financial institution's control, and 
that the plan include specified elements that would include 
procedures for satisfying an institution's independent obligation to 
perform notification as required by state law. See FTC Safeguards 
Release, at 70297-98, n.295. Earlier, the Banking Agencies and the 
National Credit Union Administration (``NCUA'') jointly issued 
guidance on responding to incidents of unauthorized access to or use 
of customer information. See Interagency Guidance on Response 
Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and 
Customer Notice, 70 FR 15736, 15743 (Mar. 29, 2005) (``Banking 
Agencies' Incident Response Guidance''). The Banking Agencies' 
Incident Response Guidance provides, among other things, that when 
an institution becomes aware of an incident of unauthorized access 
to sensitive customer information, the institution should conduct a 
reasonable investigation to determine promptly the likelihood that 
the information has been or will be misused. If the institution 
determines that misuse of the information has occurred or is 
reasonably possible, it should notify affected customers as soon as 
possible.
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    The Commission is proposing amendments to Regulation S-P's 
safeguards rule. The proposed amendments would require covered 
institutions to develop, implement, and maintain written policies and

[[Page 20621]]

procedures for an incident response program that is reasonably designed 
to detect, respond to, and recover from unauthorized access to or use 
of customer information.\48\ The amendments would require that a 
response program include procedures to assess the nature and scope of 
any incident and to take appropriate steps to contain and control the 
incident to prevent further unauthorized access or use.\49\
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    \48\ See proposed rule 248.30(b).
    \49\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3).
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    The proposed response program procedures also would have to include 
notification to individuals whose sensitive customer information was, 
or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization.\50\ Notice would not be required if a covered 
institution determines, after a reasonable investigation of the facts 
and circumstances of the incident of unauthorized access to or use of 
sensitive customer information, that the sensitive customer information 
has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that 
would result in substantial harm or inconvenience.\51\ Under the 
proposed amendments, a customer notice must be clear and conspicuous 
and provided by a means designed to ensure that each affected 
individual can reasonably be expected to receive it.\52\ A covered 
institution would be required to provide notice as soon as practicable, 
but not later than 30 days, that the incident occurred or is reasonably 
likely to have occurred.\53\ To the extent a covered institution would 
have a notification obligation under both the proposed rules and a 
similar state law, a covered institution should be able to provide one 
notice to satisfy notification obligations under both the proposed 
rules and the state law, provided it included all information required 
under both the proposed rules and the state law.\54\
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    \50\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4). See proposed rule 
248.30(e)(9) for the definition of ``sensitive customer 
information.'' See also infra section II.A.4, which includes a 
discussion of ``sensitive customer information.''
    \51\ See id.
    \52\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(i).
    \53\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iii).
    \54\ We are not aware of any laws that would require the sending 
of multiple customer notices.
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    The Commission also is proposing amendments to Regulation S-P to 
enhance the protection of customers' nonpublic personal information. 
These proposed amendments would more closely align the information 
protected under the safeguards rule and the disposal rule by applying 
the protections of both rules to ``customer information,'' a newly 
defined term. We also propose to broaden the group of customers whose 
information is protected under both rules. Additionally, we propose to 
bring all transfer agents within the scope of the safeguards rule.
    The proposal is not inconsistent with other recent cybersecurity-
related rulemaking proposals.\55\ Additionally, as described in greater 
detail below,\56\ the Commission is also proposing rules and rule 
amendments related to cybersecurity risk and related disclosures as 
well as Regulation SCI.\57\ We encourage commenters to review those 
other cybersecurity-related rulemaking proposals to determine whether 
those proposals might affect comments on this proposing release.
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    \55\ See Cybersecurity Risk Management for Investment Advisers, 
Registered Investment Companies, and Business Development Companies, 
Securities Act Release No. 11028 (Feb. 9, 2022) [87 FR 13524 (Mar. 
9, 2022)] (``Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal''); see 
also Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and 
Incident Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 11038 (Mar. 9, 2022) 
[87 FR 16590 (Mar. 23, 2022) (``Corporation Finance Cybersecurity 
Proposal'').
    \56\ See infra section II.G.
    \57\ Regulation SCI is codified at 17 CFR 242.1000 through 1007. 
As described further below, while the overall nature of each 
cybersecurity-related proposal is similar given the topic, the scope 
of each proposal addresses different cybersecurity-related issues as 
they relate in different ways to different entities, types of 
covered information or systems, and products. See Cybersecurity Risk 
Management Proposed Rule for Broker-Dealers, Clearing Agencies, 
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board, National Securities Associations, National 
Securities Exchanges, Security-Based Swap Data Repositories, 
Security-Based Swap Dealers, and Transfer Agents, Exchange Act 
Release No. 97142 (Mar. 15, 2023), (``Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal'') and Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, 
Exchange Act Release No. 97143 (Mar. 15, 2023), (``Regulation SCI 
Proposal'').
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II. Discussion

A. Incident Response Program Including Customer Notification

    Security incidents can occur in different ways, such as through 
takeovers of online accounts by bad actors, improper disposal of 
customer information in areas that may be accessed by unauthorized 
persons, or the loss or theft of data that includes customer 
information. Whatever the means, unauthorized access to, or use of, 
customer information may result in misuse, exposure or theft of a 
customer's nonpublic personal information, which could result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience to individuals affected by a security 
incident. Exposure of customer information in a security incident, 
whether it results from unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information by an employee \58\ or external actor,\59\ could leave 
affected individuals vulnerable to having their information further 
compromised.\60\ Bad actors can use customer information to cause harm 
in a number of ways, such as by stealing

[[Page 20622]]

customer identities to sell to other bad actors on the dark web,\61\ 
publishing customer information on the dark web, using customer 
identities to carry out fraud themselves, or taking over a customer's 
account for malevolent purposes. For example, a bad actor could use 
compromised customer information such as login credentials (e.g., a 
username and password), as part of an account takeover scheme to obtain 
unauthorized entry to a customer's online brokerage account, putting 
customer assets at risk for unauthorized fund transfers or trades.\62\ 
Similarly, a bad actor could engage in new account fraud by using 
compromised customer information to establish a brokerage account 
without the customer's knowledge through identity theft. Once the bad 
actor has taken over the customer's account, or has opened a fraudulent 
new account, it could potentially use a separate account at another 
broker-dealer to trade against these accounts for profit, which could 
result in harm to the affected customer.\63\
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    \58\ For example, an employee might access and download 
confidential customer data to a personal server that is subsequently 
hacked by a third party. Once the customer data has been stolen, 
portions of the customer data could be posted on the internet along 
with an offer to sell a larger quantity of stolen data in exchange 
for payment. See, e.g., Commission Order, In the Matter of Morgan 
Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Release No. 34-78021 (June 8, 2016), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78021.pdf 
(settled order) (finding that an employee misappropriated data 
regarding approximately 730,000 customer accounts, associated with 
approximately 330,000 different households, by accessing two of the 
firm's portals. The misappropriated data included personally 
identifiable information (``PII'') such as customers' full names, 
phone numbers, street addresses, account numbers, account balances, 
and securities holdings).
    \59\ For example, unauthorized third parties could take over 
email accounts, resulting in exposure of customer information. An 
email account takeover occurs when an unauthorized third party gains 
access to the email account and, in addition to being able to view 
its contents, is also able to take actions of a legitimate user, 
such as sending and deleting emails or setting up forwarding rules. 
See, e.g., Commission Order, In the Matter of Cambridge Investment 
Research, Inc., et al., Release No. 34-92806 (Aug. 30, 2021) 
(``Cambridge Order''), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2021/34-92806.pdf (settled order) (finding that cloud-based 
email accounts of over 121 Cambridge independent contractor 
representatives were taken over by third parties resulting in the 
exposure of at least 2,177 customers' PII stored in the compromised 
email accounts and potential exposure of another 3,800 customers' 
PII); Commission Order, In the Matter of Cetera Advisor Networks 
LLC, et al., Release No. 34-92800 (Aug. 30, 2021), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2021/34-92800.pdf (settled 
order) (finding that email accounts of over 60 Cetera personnel were 
taken over by unauthorized third parties resulting in the exposure 
of over 4,388 of Cetera customers' PII stored in the compromised 
email accounts); Commission Order, In the Matter of KMS Financial 
Services, Inc., Release No. 34-92807 (Aug. 30, 2021) (``KMS 
Order''), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2021/34-92807.pdf (settled order) (finding that fifteen KMS financial 
adviser email accounts were accessed by unauthorized third parties 
resulting in the exposure of customer records and information, 
including PII, of approximately 4,900 KMS customers).
    \60\ Modes of compromise could include, for example, phishing or 
credential stuffing. ``Phishing'' is a means of gaining unauthorized 
access to a computer system or service by using a fraudulent or 
``spoofed'' email to trick a victim into taking action, such as 
downloading malicious software or entering his or her log-in 
credentials on a fake website purporting to be the legitimate log-in 
website for the system or service, while ``credential stuffing'' is 
a means of gaining unauthorized access to accounts by automatically 
entering large numbers of pairs of log-in credentials that were 
obtained elsewhere. See Cambridge Order, supra note 59, at 3, n.5 
and n.6.
    For example, individuals affected by a security incident might 
receive phishing emails requesting them to wire funds to a bank 
account or enter PII to access a document, among other things. See, 
e.g., KMS Order, supra note 59, at 4.
    \61\ The ``dark web'' is a part of the internet that requires 
specialized software to access and is specifically designed to 
facilitate anonymity by obscuring users' identities, including by 
hiding users' internet protocol addresses. The anonymity provided by 
the dark web has allowed users to sell and purchase illegal products 
and services. See, e.g., SEC v. Apostolos Trovias, Case 1:21-cv-
05925 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 2021) Dkt. No. 1 (complaint) at 1-2, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2021/comp-pr2021-122.pdf. The SEC obtained a final judgment against the 
defendant on July 19, 2022. See Litigation Release No. 25447 (July 
21, 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2022/judg25447.pdf.
    \62\ See, e.g., FINRA Regulatory Notice 20-32, FINRA Reminds 
Firms to Be Aware of Fraudulent Options Trading in Connection With 
Potential Account Takeovers and New Account Fraud (Sept. 17, 2020), 
available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/20-32 
(stating that FINRA recently observed an increase in fraudulent 
options trading being facilitated by account takeover schemes and 
the use of new account fraud); see also FINRA Regulatory Notice 20-
13, FINRA Reminds Firms to Beware of Fraud During the Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Pandemic (May 5, 2020), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/20-13 (stating that some firms 
have reported an increase in newly opened fraudulent accounts, and 
urging firms to be cognizant of the heightened threat of frauds and 
scams to which firms and their customers may be exposed during the 
COVID-19 pandemic).
    \63\ In 2017, the SEC charged an individual with engaging in an 
illegal brokerage account takeover and unauthorized trading scheme 
with at least one other person. The SEC's complaint alleged that, in 
furtherance of the scheme, the other person(s) accessed at least 110 
brokerage accounts of unwitting accountholders, secretly and without 
authorization, and used those accounts to place securities trades 
that artificially affected the stock prices of various publicly 
traded companies. At or about the same time, the charged individual 
used his brokerage accounts to trade the same securities, generating 
profits by taking advantage of the artificial stock prices that 
resulted from the unauthorized trades placed in the victims' 
accounts. The complaint alleged that the individual generated at 
least $700,000 in illicit profits through his participation in the 
scheme by buying or selling stock in his brokerage accounts in his 
name at artificially low or high prices generated by the 
unauthorized trading of stock in the victims' accounts. See SEC v. 
Joseph P. Willner, Case 1:17-cv-06305 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 30, 2017) 
(complaint), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2017/comp-pr2017-202.pdf. In Oct. 2020, the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York entered a final consent judgment 
against this individual for his role in the scheme. See Litigation 
Release No. 24947 (Oct. 19, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2020/lr24947.htm.
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    To help protect against harms that may result from a security 
incident involving customer information, the Commission is proposing to 
amend the safeguards rule to require that covered institutions' 
safeguards policies and procedures include a response program for 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, which would 
include customer notification procedures.\64\ The proposed amendments 
would require the response program to be reasonably designed to detect, 
respond to, and recover from both unauthorized access to and 
unauthorized use of customer information (for the purposes of this 
release, an ``incident'').\65\ As noted above, any instance of 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information would trigger a 
covered institution's incident response protocol. The amendments would 
also require that the response program include procedures for notifying 
affected individuals whose sensitive customer information was, or is 
reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization.\66\
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    \64\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3). For clarity, when the 
proposed amendments to the safeguards rule refer to ``unauthorized 
access to or use'', the word ``unauthorized'' modifies both 
``access'' and ``use.''
    \65\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3). See also infra section 
II.C.1 for a discussion of ``customer information.''
    \66\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(9) for the definition of 
``sensitive customer information.'' See also infra section II.A.4, 
which includes a discussion of ``sensitive customer information.'' 
Notice would have to be provided unless a covered institution 
determines, after a reasonable investigation of the facts and 
circumstances of the incident of unauthorized access to or use of 
sensitive customer information, that sensitive customer information 
has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner 
that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience.
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    In this regard, requiring covered institutions to have this type of 
incident response program could help mitigate the risk of harm to 
affected individuals stemming from such incidents. For example, having 
a response program should help covered institutions to be better 
prepared to respond to incidents, and providing notice to affected 
individuals should aid those individuals in taking protective measures 
that could mitigate harm that might otherwise result from unauthorized 
access to or use of their information. Further, a reasonably designed 
response program will help facilitate more consistent and systematic 
responses to customer information security incidents, and help avoid 
inadequate responses based on a covered institution's initial 
impressions of the scope of the information involved in the compromise. 
In addition, requiring the response program to address any incident 
involving customer information can help a covered institution better 
contain and control these incidents and facilitate a prompt recovery.
    The amendments would require that a covered institution's response 
program include policies and procedures containing certain general 
elements, but would not prescribe specific steps a covered institution 
must take when carrying out incident response activities. Instead, 
covered institutions may tailor their policies and procedures to their 
individual facts and circumstances. We recognize that given the number 
and varying characteristics (e.g., size, business, and complexity) of 
covered institutions, each such institution needs to be able to tailor 
its incident response program procedures based on its individual facts 
and circumstances. The proposed amendments therefore are intended to 
give covered institutions the flexibility to address the general 
elements in the response program based on the size and complexity of 
the institution and the nature and scope of its activities.
    Specifically, a covered institution's incident response program 
would be required to have written policies and procedures to:
    (i) assess the nature and scope of any incident involving 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information and identify the 
customer information systems and types of customer information that may 
have been accessed or used without authorization; \67\
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    \67\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(i). The term ``customer 
information systems'' would mean the information resources owned or 
used by a covered institution, including physical or virtual 
infrastructure controlled by such information resources, or 
components thereof, organized for the collection, processing, 
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of customer 
information to maintain or support the covered institution's 
operations. See proposed rule 248.30(e)(6).
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    (ii) take appropriate steps to contain and control the incident to 
prevent

[[Page 20623]]

further unauthorized access to or use of customer information; \68\ and
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    \68\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(ii).
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    (iii) notify each affected individual whose sensitive customer 
information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used 
without authorization in accordance with the notification obligations 
discussed below, unless the covered institution determines, after a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the incident 
of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information, 
that the sensitive customer information has not been, and is not 
reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience.\69\
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    \69\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(iii).
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    The proposed response program is designed to further the objectives 
of the safeguards rule, particularly protecting against unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information. We have also proposed rules 
that would more broadly address general cybersecurity risks, with which 
the response program proposed in Regulation S-P is not inconsistent, as 
discussed in more detail below.\70\ Our recent proposals would require 
investment advisers, investment companies, and certain market entities 
\71\ to adopt and implement written policies and procedures that 
require measures to detect, respond to, and recover from a 
cybersecurity incident.\72\ The Investment Management Cybersecurity 
Proposal, including the cybersecurity response measures, is more 
broadly focused on investment advisers and investment companies and 
their operations. Among other objectives, the proposed measures would 
include policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the 
protection of adviser (or fund) information systems and adviser (or 
fund) information residing therein.\73\ Similarly, the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, which includes cybersecurity response measures, 
is more broadly focused on Market Entities and their operations, and 
would include policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the 
protection of the Market Entities' information systems and the 
information residing on those systems.
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    \70\ See infra section II.G.1-II.G.2, which addresses areas that 
are related between the Regulation SCI Proposal and the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, as well as with the Investment Management 
Cybersecurity Proposal, respectively.
    \71\ The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal rules would be 
applicable to ``Market Entities'' including: broker-dealers; 
clearing agencies; major security-based swap participants; the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; national securities 
exchanges; national securities associations (i.e., FINRA); security-
based swap data repositories; security-based swap dealers; and 
transfer agents (collectively, ``Covered Entities'') as well as 
broker-dealers that are non-Covered Entities. See Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57.
    \72\ See Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra 
note 55; Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57.
    \73\ See Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra 
note 55, at 13589 for definitions of ``fund information system'' and 
``fund information.''
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    The response program proposed in Regulation S-P, however, is 
narrowly focused and the required incident response policies and 
procedures should be specifically tailored to address unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information, including procedures for 
assessing the nature and scope of such incidents and identifying the 
customer information and customer information systems that may have 
been accessed or used without authorization, as well as taking steps to 
contain and control the incident to prevent further unauthorized access 
to or use of customer information. Given the risk of harm posed to 
customers and other affected individuals by incidents involving 
customer information, it is important that covered institutions' 
policies and procedures be reasonably designed to implement an incident 
response under these circumstances.
    We request comment on the proposed rule's requirement that covered 
institutions' policies and procedures include an incident response 
program that is reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover 
from unauthorized access to or use of customer information, including 
the following:
    1. What best practices have commenters developed or become aware of 
with respect to the types of measures that can be implemented as part 
of an incident response program? Are there any measures commenters have 
found to be ineffective or relatively less effective? To the contrary, 
are there any measures that commenters have found to be effective, or 
relatively more effective?
    2. Should we require the response program procedures to set forth a 
specific timeframe for implementing incident response activities under 
Regulation S-P? For example, should the procedures state that incident 
response activities, such as assessment and containment, should 
commence promptly, or immediately, once an incident has been 
discovered?
    3. Are the proposed elements for the incident response program 
appropriate? Should we modify the proposed elements? For instance, 
should the rule prescribe more specific steps for incident response 
within the framework of the procedures, such as detailing the steps 
that an institution should take to assess the nature and scope of an 
incident, or to contain and control an incident? If so, please describe 
the steps and explain why they should be included. Alternatively, 
should the requirements for the incident response program be less 
prescriptive and more principles-based? If so, please describe how and 
why the requirements should be modified.
    4. Are there additional or different elements that should be 
included in an incident response program? For example, should the rule 
require procedures for taking corrective measures in response to an 
incident, such as securing accounts associated with the customer 
information at issue? Should the rule require procedures for monitoring 
customer information and customer information systems for unauthorized 
access to or use of those systems, and data loss as it relates to those 
systems? Should the rule require procedures for identifying the titles 
and roles of individuals or departments (e.g., managers, directors, and 
officers) who should be responsible for overseeing, implementing, and 
executing the incident response program, as well as procedures to 
determine compliance? If additional or different elements should be 
added, please describe the element, and explain why it should be 
included in the response program.
    5. Is the scope of the incident response program appropriate? For 
example, is the scope of the incident response program reasonably 
aligned with the vulnerability of the customer information at issue?
     Should the incident response program be more limited in 
scope, so that it would only address incidents that involve 
unauthorized access to or use of a subset of customer information 
(e.g., sensitive customer information)? If so, please explain the 
subset of customer information that should require an incident response 
program.
     Alternatively, should the incident response program be 
more expansive in scope, so that it would cover additional activity 
beyond unauthorized access to or use of customer information? For 
example, should the incident response program address cybersecurity 
incident response and recovery at large (i.e., should the rule require 
covered institutions to have a response program reasonably designed to 
detect, respond to, and recover from a cybersecurity incident)?
1. Assessment
    The Commission is proposing to require that the incident response 
program include procedures for: (1)

[[Page 20624]]

assessing the nature and scope of any incident involving unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information, and (2) identifying the 
customer information systems and types of customer information that may 
have been accessed or used without authorization.\74\ For example, a 
covered institution's assessment may include gathering information 
about the type of access, the extent to which systems or other assets 
have been affected, the level of privilege attained by any unauthorized 
persons, the operational or informational impact of the breach, and 
whether any data has been lost or exfiltrated.\75\ Examining a range of 
data sources could shed light on the incident timeline, and assessing 
affected systems and networks could help to identify additional 
anomalous activity that might be adversarial behavior.\76\
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    \74\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(i). The proposed 
requirements related to assessing the nature and scope of a security 
incident are consistent with the components of a response program as 
set forth in the Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance. See 
Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance, supra note 47, at 
15752.
    \75\ See Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
(``CISA''), Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response 
Playbooks (Nov. 2021), at 10-13 (``CISA Incident Response 
Playbook''), available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Federal_Government_Cybersecurity_Incident_and_Vulnerability_Response_Playbooks_508C.pdf. While the CISA Incident Response Playbook 
specifically provides Federal agencies with a standard set of 
procedures to respond to incidents impacting ``Federal Civilian 
Executive Branch'' networks, it may also be useful for the purpose 
of strengthening cybersecurity response practices and operational 
procedures for public and private sector entities in addition to the 
Federal government. See CISA, Press Release, CISA Releases Incident 
and Vulnerability Response Playbooks to Strengthen Cybersecurity for 
Federal Civilian Agencies (Nov. 16, 2021), available at https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/16/cisa-releases-incident-and-vulnerability-response-playbooks-strengthen. A list of the Federal 
Civilian Executive Branch agencies identified by CISA is available 
at https://www.cisa.gov/agencies. The National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (``NIST'') defines ``exfiltration'' as 
``the unauthorized transfer of information from a system.'' See NIST 
Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5, Security and Privacy 
Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, Appendix A at 
402 (Sept. 2020) available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf.
    \76\ See CISA Incident Response Playbook, supra note 75, at 10-
13. NIST defines ``adversary'' as ``[a]n entity that is not 
authorized to access or modify information, or who works to defeat 
any protections afforded the information.'' See NIST Special 
Publication 800-107, Recommendation for Applications Using Approved 
Hash Algorithms, Section 3.1 Terms and Definitions, at 3 (Aug. 
2012), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-107r1.pdf.
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    The assessment requirement is designed to require a covered 
institution to identify both the customer information systems and types 
of customer information that may have been accessed or used without 
authorization during the incident, as well as the specific customers 
affected, which would be necessary to fulfill the obligation to notify 
affected individuals. Covered institutions generally should evaluate 
and adjust their assessment procedures periodically, regardless of any 
specific regulatory requirement, to ensure they remain reasonably 
designed to accomplish their goals. In addition, assessment should help 
facilitate the evaluation of whether sensitive customer information has 
been accessed or used without authorization, which informs whether 
notice would have to be provided, as discussed below. A covered 
institution's assessment may also be useful for collecting other 
information that is required to populate the notice, such as 
identifying the date or estimated date of the incident, among other 
details. Information developed during the assessment process may also 
help covered institutions develop a contextual understanding of the 
circumstances surrounding an incident, as well as enhance their 
technical understanding of the incident, which should be helpful in 
guiding incident response activities such as containment and control 
measures. The assessment process may also be helpful for identifying 
and evaluating existing vulnerabilities that could benefit from 
remediation in order to prevent such vulnerabilities from being 
exploited in the future.
    We request comment on the proposed rule's requirements related to 
assessing the nature and scope of any incident involving unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information, including the following:
    6. Should we provide additional examples for consideration in 
assessing the nature and scope of an incident, beyond the examples 
provided above (e.g., type of access, the extent to which systems or 
other assets have been affected, the level of privilege attained by any 
unauthorized persons, the operational or informational impact of the 
breach, and whether any data has been lost or exfiltrated)?
    7. Should we require that the assessment include the specific 
components referenced in the above question?
    8. Should we require any specific training for personnel performing 
assessments of security incidents? Should the training have to 
encompass security updates and training sufficient to address relevant 
security risks?
    9. Various rules applicable to certain entities require, among 
other things, the review, testing, verification, and/or amendment of 
policies and procedures at regular intervals.\77\ Should we 
specifically require covered institutions to evaluate and adjust, as 
appropriate, the assessment procedures periodically in this rule? If 
so, how frequently should the evaluation occur? Should we require any 
testing (such as a practice exercise) of a covered institution's 
assessment process?
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    \77\ See e.g., Rule 38a-1(a)(3) under the Investment Company 
Act; FINRA Rule 3120 (Supervisory Control System) and FINRA Rule 
3130 (Annual Certification of Compliance and Supervisory Processes).
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    10. Would covered institutions expect to use third parties to 
conduct these assessments? If so, to what extent and in what manner? 
Should there be any additional or specific requirements for third 
parties that conduct assessments? Why or why not?
2. Containment and Control
    The Commission is proposing to require that the response program 
have procedures for taking appropriate steps to contain and control a 
security incident, to prevent further unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information.\78\ The objective of containment and control is 
to prevent additional damage from unauthorized activity and to reduce 
the immediate impact of an incident by removing the source of the 
unauthorized activity.\79\ Covered institutions generally should 
evaluate and revise their containment and control procedures 
periodically, regardless of any specific regulatory requirement, to 
ensure they remain reasonably designed to accomplish their goals. 
Strategies for containing and controlling an incident vary depending 
upon the type of incident and may include, for example, isolating 
compromised systems or enhancing the monitoring of intruder activities, 
searching for additional compromised systems, changing system 
administrator passwords, rotating private keys, and changing or 
disabling default user accounts and passwords, among other 
interventions. Some standards advise that after ensuring that all means 
of persistent access into the network have been accounted for, and any 
intrusive

[[Page 20625]]

activity has been sufficiently contained, the artifacts of the incident 
should also be eliminated (e.g., by removing malicious code or re-
imaging infected systems) and vulnerabilities or other conditions that 
were exploited to gain unauthorized access should be mitigated.\80\
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    \78\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(ii). These proposed 
requirements are consistent with the components of a response 
program as set forth in the Banking Agencies' Incident Response 
Guidance. See Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance, supra 
note 47, at 15752.
    \79\ For a further discussion of the purposes and practices of 
such containment measures, see generally CISA Incident Response 
Playbook, supra note 76, at 14; see also Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (``FFIEC''), Information Technology 
Examination Handbook--Information Security (Sept. 2016), at 52, 
available at https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/274793/ffiec_itbooklet_informationsecurity.pdf.
    \80\ See, e.g., CISA Incident Response Playbook, supra note 75, 
at 15.
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    Additional eradication activities may include, for example, 
remediating all infected IT environments (e.g., cloud, operational 
technology, hybrid, host, and network systems), resetting passwords on 
compromised accounts, and monitoring for any signs of adversary 
response to containment activities. Because incident response may 
involve making complex judgment calls, such as deciding when to shut 
down or disconnect a system, developing and implementing written 
containment and control policies and procedures will provide a 
framework to help facilitate improved decision making at covered 
institutions during potentially high-pressure incident response 
situations.
    We request comment on the proposed rule's requirement that the 
incident response program have procedures for taking appropriate steps 
to contain and control a security incident, including the following:
    11. Should there be additional or more specific requirements for 
containing and controlling a breach of a customer information system? 
Should the rule prescribe specific minimum steps that need to be taken 
to remediate any identified weaknesses in customer information systems 
and associated controls? For example, should we require that a covered 
institution's containment or control activities be consistent with any 
current governmental or industry standards or guidance, such as 
standards disseminated by NIST, guidance disseminated by CISA, or 
others? \81\
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    \81\ Examples of such standards and guidance include the NIST 
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (NIST Special Publication 
800-61, Revision 2, available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-61/rev-2/final) and the CISA Incident Response 
Playbook, supra note 75, among others.
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    12. Are the examples of steps that may be taken to contain and 
control an incident (e.g., isolating compromised systems or enhancing 
the monitoring of intruder activities, searching for additional 
compromised systems, changing system administrator passwords, rotating 
private keys, and changing or disabling default user accounts and 
passwords) appropriate? Are there any additional examples of steps that 
could be taken to contain and control an incident that should be 
provided?
    13. Are the examples of remediation and eradication activities 
provided (e.g., remediating all infected IT environments (such as 
cloud, operational technology, hybrid, host, and network systems, 
resetting passwords on compromised accounts, and monitoring for any 
signs of adversary response to containment activities) appropriate? Are 
there any additional examples of remediation or eradication activities 
that should be provided?
    14. Should the rule require that a covered institution evaluate and 
revise its incident response plan following a customer information 
incident?
    15. Various rules applicable to certain entities require, among 
other things, the review, testing, verification, and/or amendment of 
policies and procedures at regular intervals.\82\ Should we 
specifically require covered institutions to evaluate and revise 
containment and control procedures related to preventing unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information periodically? If so, how 
frequently should the evaluation occur? For example, should a covered 
institution be required to evaluate and revise these containment and 
control procedures at least annually?
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    \82\ See e.g., Rule 38a-1(a)(3) under the Investment Company 
Act; FINRA Rule 3120 (Supervisory Control System) and FINRA Rule 
3130 (Annual Certification of Compliance and Supervisory Processes).
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    16. Who should be responsible for making decisions related to 
containment and control? Should the rule require covered institutions 
to designate specific personnel to be responsible for making decisions 
related to containment and control? For example, should a covered 
institution have to identify specific personnel with sufficient 
cybersecurity qualifications and experience to either determine if an 
incident has been contained or controlled themselves, or hire a third 
party who has the requisite cybersecurity and recovery expertise to 
perform containment and control functions? If so, what type of 
qualifications or experience are useful for informing decisions related 
to containment and control? Or should it be the same individuals who 
are designated to perform incident response and recovery related 
functions for cybersecurity incidents under the Investment Management 
Cybersecurity Proposal and the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal?
3. Service Providers
    We understand that a covered institution may contract with third-
party service providers to perform certain business activities and 
functions, for example, trading and order management, information 
technology functions, and cloud computing services, among others, in a 
practice commonly referred to as outsourcing.\83\ As a result of this 
outsourcing, service providers may receive, maintain, or process 
customer information, or be permitted to access a covered institution's 
customer information systems. These outsourcing relationships or 
activities may expose covered institutions and their customers to risk 
through the covered institutions' service providers, including risks 
related to system resiliency and the ability of a service provider to 
protect customer information and systems (including service provider 
incident response programs). Moreover, a security incident at a service 
provider could lead to the unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information or customer information systems, which could potentially 
result in harm to customers. For example, a bad actor could use a 
service provider's access to a covered institution's systems to 
infiltrate the covered institution's network through a cybersecurity 
compromise in the supply chain,\84\ which is a vector that can be used 
to conduct a data breach, and thereby gain unauthorized access to the 
covered institution's customer information and customer information 
systems through

[[Page 20626]]

an initial compromise at the service provider.\85\
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    \83\ See, e.g., Outsourcing by Investment Advisers, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 6176 (Oct. 26, 2022) [87 FR 68816 (Nov. 16, 
2022)] (``Adviser Outsourcing Proposal''); FINRA Notice to Members 
05-48, Members' Responsibilities When Outsourcing Activities to 
Third-Party Service Providers (July 28, 2005), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/05-48.
    \84\ NIST defines a ``cybersecurity compromise in the supply 
chain'' as ``an occurrence within the supply chain whereby the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system or the 
information the system processes, stores, or transmits is 
jeopardized. A supply chain incident can occur anywhere during the 
life cycle of the system, product or service.'' See NIST, Special 
Publication NIST SP 800-161r1, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk 
Management Practices for Systems and Organizations, Glossary at 299, 
available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-161r1.pdf. According to NIST, key cybersecurity supply 
chain risks include risks from third-party service providers with 
physical or virtual access to information systems, software code, or 
intellectual property. See NIST, Best Practices in Cyber Supply 
Chain Risk Management, Conference Materials (``NIST Best Practices 
in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management''), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Supply-Chain-Risk-Management/documents/briefings/Workshop-Brief-on-Cyber-Supply-Chain-Best-Practices.pdf.
    \85\ For example, in a 2013 cyber supply chain attack, a bad 
actor breached the Target Corporation's network and was able to 
steal personal information for up to 70 million customers. The bad 
actor was able to gain a foothold in Target's network through a 
third-party vendor. See U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, A ``Kill Chain'' Analysis of the 2013 Target 
Data Breach, Majority Staff Report (Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/24d3c229-4f2f-405d-b8db-a3a67f183883.
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    Under the proposed amendments, we propose to define the term 
``service provider'' to mean any person or entity that is a third party 
and receives, maintains, processes, or otherwise is permitted access to 
customer information through its provision of services directly to a 
covered institution.\86\ This definition would include affiliates of 
covered institutions if they are permitted access to this information 
through their provision of services. The proposed scope is intended to 
help protect against the risk of harm that may arise from third-party 
access to a covered institution's customer information and customer 
information systems. For example, in 2015, Division of Examinations 
staff released observations following the examinations of some 
institutions' cybersecurity policies and procedures relating to vendors 
and other business partners, which revealed mixed results with respect 
to whether the firms incorporated requirements related to cybersecurity 
risk into their contracts with vendors and business partners.\87\
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    \86\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(10).
    \87\ See EXAMS, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, 
National Exam Program Risk Alert, Volume IV, Issue 4 (Feb. 3, 2015), 
at 4, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/cybersecurity-examination-sweep-summary.pdf.
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    Given the potential for bad actors to target third parties with 
access to a covered institution's systems, it is important to help 
mitigate the risk of harm posed by security compromises that may occur 
at service providers. For example, a covered institution could retain a 
cloud service provider to maintain its books and records.\88\ A 
security incident at this cloud service provider that resulted in 
unauthorized access to or use of these books and records could create a 
risk of substantial harm to the covered institution's customers and 
trigger a need for notification to allow the affected customers to 
address this risk. Because service providers would be obligated to 
notify a covered institution in the event of security breaches 
involving customer information systems, as discussed below, this could 
potentially help covered institutions implement their own incident 
response protocol more quickly and efficiently after such breaches, 
which would include notifying affected individuals as needed.
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    \88\ According to NIST, key cybersecurity supply chain risks 
include risks from third-party data storage or data aggregators. See 
NIST Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management, supra 
note 84.
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    The proposed amendments would require that a covered institution's 
incident response program include written policies and procedures that 
address the risk of harm posed by security compromises at service 
providers.\89\ Specifically, these policies and procedures would 
require covered institutions, pursuant to a written contract between 
the covered institution and its service providers, to require service 
providers to take appropriate measures that are designed to protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of customer information.\90\ 
Appropriate measures would include the obligation for a service 
provider to notify a covered institution as soon as possible, but no 
later than 48 hours after becoming aware of a breach, in the event of 
any breach in security that results in unauthorized access to a 
customer information system maintained by the service provider, in 
order to enable the covered institution to implement its incident 
response program expeditiously.\91\ In addition, we are not limiting 
entities that can provide customer notification for or on behalf of 
covered institutions. A covered institution may, as part of its 
incident response program, enter into a written agreement with its 
service provider to have the service provider notify affected 
individuals on its behalf in accordance with the notification 
obligations discussed below.\92\ In that circumstance, the covered 
institution could delegate performance of its notice obligation to a 
service provider through written agreement, but the covered institution 
would remain responsible for any failure to provide a notice as 
required by the proposed rules, if adopted.\93\
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    \89\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(5)(i).
    \90\ Id.
    \91\ Id.
    \92\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(5)(ii).
    \93\ Covered institutions may delegate other functions to 
service providers, such as reasonable investigation to determine 
whether sensitive customer information has not been and is not 
reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience. Covered institutions would remain 
responsible for these functions even if they are delegated to 
service providers.
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    We request comment on the proposed requirements related to service 
providers, including the following:
    17. Should we modify the proposed definition of ``service 
provider''? For example, should we exclude a covered institution's 
affiliates from the definition? Alternatively, should we define 
``service provider'' in this rule in a manner similar to proposed rule 
206(4)-11 under the Investment Advisers Act? Are there any other 
alternative definitions of ``service provider'' that should be used? 
\94\
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    \94\ See Adviser Outsourcing Proposal supra note 83. In proposed 
rule 206(4)-11, ``service provider'' would mean a person or entity 
that performs one or more covered functions, and is not a supervised 
person as defined in 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(25) of the Investment 
Advisers Act, of the investment adviser. In the proposal, a 
``covered function'' would mean a function or service that is 
necessary for the investment adviser to provide its investment 
advisory services in compliance with the Federal securities laws, 
and that, if not performed or performed negligently, would be 
reasonably likely to cause a material negative impact on the 
adviser's clients or on the adviser's ability to provide investment 
advisory services. In the proposal, a covered function would not 
include clerical, ministerial, utility, or general office functions 
or services.
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    18. Should there be additional or more specific requirements for 
entities that are included in the definition of ``service providers?''
    19. The proposed definition of service providers applies to 
entities that receive, maintain or process customer information, or are 
permitted access to a covered institution's customer information. Is 
this scope of activities appropriate? Should we exclude any of these 
activities? Should we include any other activities?
    20. To what extent do covered institutions already have written 
policies and procedures that include contractually requiring service 
providers to take appropriate measures designed to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information? For example, to 
what extent have contractual requirements been incorporated pursuant to 
an exception from Regulation S-P's opt-out requirements for service 
providers and joint marketing provided by 17 CFR 248.13, which is 
conditioned on having a contractual agreement prohibiting the service 
provider from disclosing or using customer information other than to 
carry out the purposes for which it is disclosed, or pursuant to 
Regulation S-ID's requirements \95\ at 17 CFR

[[Page 20627]]

248.201(d)(2)(iii) to respond appropriately to any detected identity 
theft red flags to prevent and mitigate identity theft, and under 17 
CFR 248.201(e)(4) to exercise appropriate and effective oversight of 
service provider arrangements?
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    \95\ See 17 CFR 248.201(d)(2)(iii) and (e)(4). As discussed 
further below, Regulation S-ID, among other things, requires 
financial institutions subject to the Commission's jurisdiction with 
covered accounts to develop and implement a written identity theft 
prevention program that is designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate 
identity theft in connection with covered accounts, which must 
include, among other things, policies and procedures to respond 
appropriately to any red flags that are detected pursuant to the 
program. See also infra note 547.
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    21. The proposed rule would require policies and procedures 
requiring a covered institution, by contract, to require that its 
service providers take appropriate measures designed to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, including 
notification to a covered institution in the event of certain types of 
breaches in security. Are there any contexts in which a written 
contract may be more feasible than others? Rather than using a 
contractual approach to implement this requirement that a covered 
institution take the required appropriate measures, should the rule 
require policies and procedures that require due diligence of or some 
type of reasonable assurances from its service providers? What should 
reasonable assurances include? For example, should they cover 
notification to the covered institution as soon as possible in the 
event of any breach in security resulting in unauthorized access to a 
customer information system maintained by the service provider to 
enable the covered institution to implement its response program? Are 
there other reasonable assurances we should require? Alternatively, 
should we only require disclosure of whether a covered institution has 
or does not have a written contract with service providers?
    22. Should there be a written contract requirement for certain 
service providers and not others? For example, should the rule identify 
a sub-set of service providers as critical service providers and 
require a written agreement in those circumstances only, and if so, 
what service providers should be included?
    23. Are there other methods that we should permit or require 
covered institutions to use to help ensure that service providers take 
appropriate measures that are designed to protect against unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information (for example, a security 
certification or representation)? Should we have different requirements 
for smaller covered institutions?
    24. The proposed rule would require policies and procedures 
requiring a covered institution, by contract, to require its service 
providers to provide notification to a covered institution as soon as 
possible, but no later than 48 hours after becoming aware of a breach, 
in the event of any breach in security resulting in unauthorized access 
to a customer information system maintained by the service provider. Is 
``as soon as possible, but no later than 48 hours after becoming aware 
of a breach'' an appropriate timeframe for service providers to provide 
notification to a covered institution after such a breach occurs? Why 
or why not? Should we use a different timeframe such as ``as soon as 
practicable''?
    25. Is it appropriate to permit covered institutions to delegate 
providing notice to service providers? If service providers are 
permitted to provide notice on behalf of covered institutions, should 
there be additional or specific requirements for a service provider 
that provides notification on behalf of a covered institution? If so, 
please describe those requirements and why they should be included.
    26. The proposed rule would set forth that as part of its incident 
response program, a covered institution may enter into a written 
agreement with its service provider for the service provider to notify 
affected individuals on its behalf (i.e., to delegate the notice 
functions required under the rule to service providers while remaining 
responsible for the notice obligation). Should we set forth that a 
covered institution may enter into a written agreement with its service 
provider for other potentially delegated functions as discussed in this 
proposal? For example, should we set forth that a covered institution 
may enter into a written agreement for delegating the performance of a 
reasonable investigation (e.g., to determine whether sensitive customer 
information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a 
manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience) to a 
service provider? Should we set forth that a covered institution may 
enter into a written agreement for delegating the performance of 
assessment activities, or containment and control activities, to a 
service provider? Additionally, is it appropriate for a service 
provider to assist with these functions, with the responsibility 
remaining with the covered institution? Why or why not?
    27. To what extent do service providers sub-delegate functions 
provided in this proposal to third parties? If so, how should the rule 
address sub-delegations between service providers and third parties?
4. Notice to Affected Individuals
    Under the proposed amendments, a covered institution must notify 
each affected individual whose sensitive customer information was, or 
was reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization, unless the covered institution has determined, after a 
reasonable investigation of the incident, that sensitive customer 
information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a 
manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience. The 
covered institution must provide a clear and conspicuous notice to each 
affected individual by a means designed to ensure that the individual 
can reasonably be expected to receive actual notice in writing. The 
notice must be provided as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 
days, after the covered institution becomes aware that unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information has occurred or is reasonably 
likely to have occurred.
a. Standard for Providing Notice
    The proposed amendments would create an affirmative requirement for 
a covered institution to provide notice to individuals whose sensitive 
customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, 
accessed or used without authorization.\96\ These notices would be 
designed to give affected individuals an opportunity to respond to and 
remediate issues arising from an information security incident, such as 
monitoring credit reports for unauthorized activity, placing fraud 
alerts on relevant accounts, or changing passwords used to access 
accounts.\97\ Such measures, when taken in a timely fashion, may help 
affected individuals avoid or mitigate the risk of substantial harm or 
inconvenience (``harm risk''),\98\ and in an environment of expanded 
risk of cyber incidents,\99\ taking such actions may be particularly 
important to protect individuals. Conversely, giving covered 
institutions greater discretion to determine whether and when to 
provide notices could jeopardize affected

[[Page 20628]]

individuals' ability to evaluate the risk of harm posed by an incident 
and choose how to respond to and remediate it.
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    \96\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(iii). As noted above, a 
covered institution could delegate its responsibility for providing 
notice to an affected individual to a service provider, by contract, 
but the covered institution would remain responsible for any failure 
to provide a notice as required by the proposed rules. See infra 
section II.A.
    \97\ Affected individuals include individuals with whom the 
covered institution has a customer relationship, or are individuals 
that are customers of other financial institutions whose information 
has been provided to the covered institution, and whose sensitive 
information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or 
used without authorization. See infra note 127.
    \98\ See infra section II.A.4.e (Timing Requirements); see also 
supra note 7 and accompanying text (addressing environment of 
expanded risks).
    \99\ See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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    A covered institution would not have to provide notice if, after a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the incident 
of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information, it 
determines that sensitive customer information has not been, and is not 
reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience.\100\ To be clear, although the 
incident response program would be required to address information 
security incidents involving any form of customer information, the 
notice requirement would only be triggered by unauthorized access to or 
use of sensitive customer information.\101\ Unauthorized access to or 
use of sensitive customer information presents an increased risk of 
harm to the affected individual and accordingly is the appropriate 
trigger for customer notification.\102\
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    \100\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(iii). In 2003, the Banking 
Agencies also proposed a similar standard for customer notification, 
though it was not ultimately adopted. See Interagency Guidance on 
Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information 
and Customer Notice, 68 FR 47954 (Aug. 12, 2003) (``Banking 
Agencies' Proposing Release''). The proposed guidance stated that an 
institution should notify affected customers whenever it becomes 
aware of unauthorized access to sensitive customer information, 
unless the institution, after an appropriate investigation, 
reasonably concludes that misuse of the information is unlikely to 
occur. See id. at 47960. In adopting the Banking Agencies' Incident 
Response Guidance, the Banking Agencies indicated that they wanted 
to give institutions greater discretion in determining whether to 
send notices, to avoid alarming customers with too many notices and 
not to require institutions to prove a negative. See the Banking 
Agencies' Incident Response Guidance, supra note 47, at 15743. We 
preliminarily believe, however, that a presumption that individuals 
would be timely provided with the information in the notifications 
would enable them to make their own determinations regarding the 
incident.
    \101\ See infra section II.A.4.a and section II.A.4.b.
    \102\ Customer information that is not disposed of properly 
could trigger the requirement to notify affected individuals under 
proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(i). For example, a covered institution 
whose employee leaves un-shredded customer files containing 
sensitive customer information in a dumpster accessible to the 
public would be required to notify affected customers, unless the 
institution has determined that sensitive customer information has 
not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that 
would result in substantial harm or inconvenience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendment is designed to permit covered institutions 
to rebut the affirmative presumption of notification based on a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the incident 
of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information. 
Such an investigation would have to provide a sufficient basis for the 
determination that sensitive customer information has not been, and is 
not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience. In these limited circumstances, the 
proposed amendments would not require the covered institution to 
provide a notice.
    In contrast, if a malicious actor has gained access to a customer 
information system and the covered institution simply lacked 
information indicating that any particular individual's data stored in 
that customer information system was or was not used in a manner that 
would result in substantial harm or inconvenience, a covered 
institution would not have a sufficient basis to make this 
determination.\103\ In order to have a sufficient basis to determine 
that notice is not required, a covered institution's investigation 
would need to have revealed information sufficient for the institution 
to conclude that sensitive customer information has not been, and is 
not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ See also infra section II.A.4.d (discussing the 
identification of affected individuals in such circumstances).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For any determination that a covered institution makes that notice 
is not required, the covered institution generally should maintain a 
record of the investigation and basis for its determination.\104\ 
Whether an investigation qualifies as reasonable would depend on the 
particular facts and circumstances of the unauthorized access or use. 
For example, unauthorized access that is the result of intentional 
intrusion by a bad actor may warrant more extensive investigation than 
inadvertent unauthorized access by an employee. The investigation may 
occur in parallel with an initial assessment and scoping of the 
incident and may build upon information generated from those 
activities, and the scope of the investigation may be refined by using 
available data and the results of ongoing incident response activities. 
Information related to the nature and scope of the incident may be 
relevant to determining the extent of the investigation, such as 
whether the incident is the result of internal unauthorized access or 
an external intrusion, the duration of the incident, what accounts have 
been compromised and at what privilege level, and whether and what type 
of customer information may have been copied, transferred, or retrieved 
without authorization.\105\
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    \104\ Proposed rules 248.30(d), 240.17a-4, 240.17ad-7, 270.31a-
1, 270.31a-2, and 275.204-2; see infra section II.C. The 
Commission's proposal includes an amendment to a CFR designation in 
order to ensure regulatory text conforms more consistently with 
section 2.13 of the Document Drafting Handbook. See Office of the 
Federal Register, Document Drafting Handbook (Aug. 2018 Edition, 
Revision 1.4, dated January 7, 2022), available at https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/write/handbook/ddh.pdf. In 
particular, the proposal is to amend the CFR section designation for 
Rule 17Ad-7 (17 CFR 240.17Ad-7) to replace the uppercase letter with 
the corresponding lowercase letter, such that the rule would be 
redesignated as Rule 17ad-7 (17 CFR 240.17ad-7).
    \105\ For example, depending on the nature of the incident, it 
may be necessary to consider how a malicious intruder might use the 
underlying information in light of current trends in identity theft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, while some state laws currently include similar 
standards for providing notifications, the proposed rules would impose 
a minimum standard to help ensure all individuals would presumptively 
receive notifications.\106\ Twenty-one states only require notice if, 
after an investigation, the institution finds that a risk of harm 
exists, and in eleven states, customer notification laws do not apply 
to entities subject to or in compliance with the GLBA.\107\ We 
preliminarily believe that setting a minimum standard based on an 
affirmative presumption of notification appropriately balances the need 
for transparency (i.e., the need for affected individuals to be 
informed so that they can take steps to protect themselves, including 
for example, by placing fraud alerts in credit reports) with concerns 
that the volume of notices that individuals would receive could erode 
their efficacy or lead to complacency by affected individuals. Notice 
of every incident could diminish the impact and effectiveness of the 
notice in a situation where enhanced vigilance is necessary.\108\ 
Covered institutions likely would be able to send a single notice that 
complies with multiple regulatory requirements, which may reduce the 
number of notices an individual

[[Page 20629]]

receives. In addition, the proposed standard would help to improve 
security outcomes in general by incentivizing covered institutions to 
conduct more thorough investigations after an incident occurs, because 
a reasonable investigation provides the only means to rebut the 
presumption of notification. Reasonably designed policies and 
procedures generally should include that a covered institution would 
revisit a determination whether a notification is required based on its 
investigation if new facts come to light. For example, if a covered 
institution determines that risk of use in a manner that would result 
in substantial harm or inconvenience is not reasonably likely based on 
the use of encryption in accordance with industry standards at the time 
of the incident, but subsequently the encryption is compromised or it 
is discovered that the decryption key was also obtained by the threat 
actor, the covered institution generally should consider revisiting its 
determination.
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    \106\ A risk of harm provision under a particular state's rules 
may either (i) require a notice only after an entity performs a 
required analysis to determine that there is a reasonable likelihood 
of harm, or (ii) require notice unless a permitted analysis 
determines that there is no reasonable likelihood of harm. This 
latter approach is a stricter standard imposed by 22 states and is 
consistent with the standard we are proposing. See National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Security Breach Notification Laws, 
(``NCSL Security Breach Notification Law Resource''), available at 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
    \107\ See NCSL Security Breach Notification Law Resource, supra 
note 106.
    \108\ Eight states do not have risk of harm provisions, 
including California and Texas. See NCSL Security Breach 
Notification Law Resource, supra note 106. In these states, notices 
must generally be provided in all cases of a breach.
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    We request comment on the proposed standard for notification to 
affected individuals, including the following:
    28. The proposed standard requires providing notice to affected 
individuals whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably 
likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization. Is the 
proposed standard for providing notification sufficiently clear? Is a 
standard of ``reasonably likely'' appropriate? Should the trigger for 
notification be a determination by a covered institution that the risk 
of unauthorized access or use of sensitive customer information has 
occurred or is ``reasonably possible'' which would suggest a more 
expansive standard than ``likely''?
    29. A covered institution can rebut the presumption of notification 
if it determines that, after a reasonable investigation of the facts 
and circumstances of the incident of unauthorized access to or use of 
sensitive customer information, sensitive customer information has not 
been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would 
result in substantial harm or inconvenience. Is this standard ``not 
reasonably likely to be'' for rebutting the presumption to notify the 
appropriate standard? Should the standard be ``not reasonably 
possible''?
    30. Should customer notification be required for any incident of 
unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information 
regardless of the risk of use in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience? Is there a risk that the volume of 
notices received under such a standard would inure affected individuals 
to notices of potentially harmful incidents and result in their not 
taking protective actions?
    31. Do covered institutions expect to be able to perform reasonable 
investigations in order to rebut the notification presumption? Why or 
why not? Would it be helpful to include specific requirements for a 
reasonable investigation? Are there other factors that would influence 
whether a covered institution decides to conduct a reasonable 
investigation or notify individuals? If additional clarity would assist 
covered institutions in making these determinations, please explain.
    32. Should we require a covered institution to revisit a 
determination that notification is not required based on its 
investigation if new facts come to light? If yes, should the rule 
provide specific requirements for a covered institution to revisit its 
determination?
    33. Should we incorporate any additional aspects of the protections 
offered to individuals under state laws into the proposed rules? 
Alternatively, should any components of the proposal that offer 
additional protections to individuals beyond some states' laws be 
omitted? Please explain.
    34. Under what scenarios would a covered institution be unable to 
comply with both the proposed rules and applicable state laws? Please 
explain.
    35. Should the proposed rules be modified in order to help ensure 
covered institutions would not need to provide multiple notices in 
order to satisfy obligations under the proposed rules and similar state 
laws?
b. Definition of ``Sensitive Customer Information''
    We propose to define the term ``sensitive customer information'' to 
mean ``any component of customer information alone or in conjunction 
with any other information, the compromise of which could create a 
reasonably likely risk of substantial harm or inconvenience to an 
individual identified with the information.'' \109\ This definition is 
intended to cover the types of information that could most likely be 
used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience, such as to commit fraud, including identify theft.\110\ 
We do not believe that notification would be appropriate if 
unauthorized access to customer information is not reasonably likely to 
cause a harm risk because a customer is unlikely to need to take 
protective measures. Moreover, the large volume of notices that 
individuals might receive in the event of unauthorized access to such 
customer information could erode their efficacy. Accordingly, the 
proposed definition is limited to information that, if compromised, 
could create a ``reasonably likely risk of substantial harm or 
inconvenience.'' \111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(9)(i). Our proposed definition 
is limited to information identified with customers of financial 
institutions. See proposed rule 248.30(e)(5)(i); infra section 
II.C.1. Information subject to the safeguards rule, including the 
incident response program and customer notice requirements would be 
information pertaining to a covered institution's customers and to 
customers of other financial institutions that the other 
institutions have provided to the covered institution. See proposed 
rule 248.30(a); infra section II.C.1.
    \110\ See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting increased 
risks of unauthorized access and use of personal information).
    \111\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(9)(i).
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    The definition also provides examples of the types of information 
included within the definition of ``sensitive customer information.'' 
\112\ These examples include certain customer information identified 
with an individual that, without any other identifying information, 
could create a substantial risk of harm or inconvenience to an 
individual identified with the information.\113\ For example, Social 
Security numbers alone, without any other information linked to the 
individual, would be sensitive because they have been used in ``Social 
Security number-only'' or ``synthetic'' identity theft. In this type of 
identity theft, a Social Security number,

[[Page 20630]]

combined with identifying information of another real or fictional 
person, is used to create a new (or ``synthetic'') identity, which then 
may allow the malicious actor to, among other things, open new 
financial accounts.\114\ A similar sensitivity exists with other types 
of identifying information that can be used alone to authenticate an 
individual's identity. A biometric record of a fingerprint or iris 
image would present a significant threat of account fraud, identity 
theft, or other substantial harm or inconvenience if the image is used 
to authenticate a customer of a financial institution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(9)(ii). While the information 
cited in these examples is sensitive customer information, when that 
information is encrypted, it would not necessarily be sensitive 
customer information. That cipher text (i.e., the data rendered in a 
format not understood by people or machines without an encryption 
key) may be analyzed as such (rather than as the decrypted sensitive 
customer information, e.g., a Social Security number referenced in 
the examples provided in 248.30(e)(9)(ii)(A)(1)-(4) or in 
248.30(e)(9)(ii)(B), and be determined not to be sensitive customer 
information). And as discussed infra note 119, a covered institution 
could consider the strength of the encryption and the security of 
the associated decryption key as factors in determining whether 
information is sensitive customer information. Accordingly, in 
certain circumstances, information that is an encrypted 
representation of, for example, a customer's Social Security number 
may not be sensitive customer information under the proposed 
definition.
    \113\ In this respect, our proposed definition is broader than 
the definition of ``sensitive customer information'' provided in the 
Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance. That definition 
includes a customer's name, address, or telephone number, only in 
conjunction with other pieces of information that would permit 
access to a customer account. Our proposed definition would also be 
broader than similar definitions of personal information used in 
some state statutes to determine the scope of information that, when 
subject to breaches, requires notification. See infra note 103 and 
accompanying text.
    \114\ See, e.g., generally Michael Kan, More Crooks Tapping 
``Synthetic Identity Fraud'' to Commit Financial Crimes, PCMag (June 
8, 2022), available at https://www.pcmag.com/news/more-crooks-tapping-synthetic-identity-fraud-to-commit-financial-crimes 
(describing recent increased frequency of synthetic identity fraud).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed definition also provides examples of combinations of 
identifying information and authenticating information that could 
create a harm risk to an individual identified with the information. 
These examples include information identifying a customer, such as a 
name or online user name, in combination with authenticating 
information such as a partial Social Security number, access code, or 
mother's maiden name. A mother's maiden name, for example, in 
combination with other identifying information, would present a harm 
risk because it may be so widely used for authentication purposes, even 
if the maiden name is not used as a password or security question at 
the covered institution. For these reasons, we are proposing that 
covered institutions should notify customers if this sensitive 
information is compromised.\115\
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    \115\ While some states currently define the scope of personal 
information incurring a notification obligation in ways that 
generally align with our proposed definition of ``sensitive customer 
information,'' at least 12 states generally do not include 
information we propose to include, such as identifying information 
that, in combination with authenticating information, would create a 
substantial risk of harm or inconvenience. See NCSL Security Breach 
Notification Law Resource, supra note 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In determining whether the compromise of customer information could 
create a reasonably likely harm risk to an individual identified with 
the information, a covered institution could consider encryption as a 
factor.\116\ Most states except encrypted information in certain 
circumstances, including, for example, where the covered institution 
can determine that the encryption offers certain levels of protection 
or the decryption key has not also been compromised.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ We also considered a safe harbor from the definition of 
sensitive customer information for encrypted information. See infra 
section III.F.
    \117\ See e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 11-49.3-3(a) (defining a 
security breach as unauthorized access to or acquisition of certain 
``unencrypted, computerized data information,'' and defining 
``encrypted'' as data transformed ``through the use of a one hundred 
twenty-eight (128) bit or higher algorithmic process into a form in 
which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of 
a confidential process or key'' unless the data was ``acquired in 
combination with any key, security code, or password that would 
permit access to the encrypted data.''). See also NCSL Security 
Breach Notification Law Resource, supra note 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, encryption of information using current industry 
standard best practices is a reasonable factor for a covered 
institution to consider in making this determination. To the extent 
encryption in accordance with current industry standards minimizes the 
likelihood that the cipher text could be decrypted, it would also 
reduce the likelihood that the cipher text's compromise could create a 
risk of harm, as long as the associated decryption key is secure. 
Covered institutions may also reference commonly used cryptographic 
standards to determine whether encryption does, in fact, substantially 
impede the likelihood that the cipher text's compromise could create 
such risks.\118\ As industry standards continue to develop in the 
future, covered institutions generally should review and update, as 
appropriate, their encryption practices.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ For example, we understand that standards included in 
Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 140-3 (FIPS 140-
3) are widely referenced by industry participants.
    \119\ Encryption alone does not determine whether data is 
``sensitive customer information.'' For example, to the extent a 
covered institution determines that cipher text is itself sensitive 
customer information, for example because the encryption was 
compromised, an investigation of the incident would likely indicate 
that there is a risk that the compromised information could be used 
in a way to result in substantial harm or inconvenience. A covered 
institution may, however, still be able to determine that the risk 
of use in this manner is not reasonably likely for reasons unrelated 
to the encryption, including for example, because the cipher text 
was only momentarily compromised. See generally supra note 115 and 
accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We request comment on the proposed rule's definition of sensitive 
customer information, including the following:
    36. Should we broaden the proposed definition of ``sensitive 
customer information'' to cover additional information? Alternatively, 
should we remove some information covered under the proposed definition 
or conform the definition to the Banking Agencies' Incident Response 
Guidance? \120\ Are there operational or compliance challenges to the 
proposed definition?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See supra note 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Should the rule limit the definition to information or data 
elements that alone or when linked would permit access to an 
individual's accounts? Should the rule specify the identifying 
information or data elements (e.g., name, address, Social Security 
number, driver's license or other government identification number, 
account number, credit or debit card number)?
    38. Is the proposed standard in the definition, which covers any 
component of customer information the compromise of which could create 
a ``reasonably likely'' risk of substantial harm or inconvenience, the 
appropriate standard? Do commenters believe that a different standard 
would be more appropriate for the proposed rule? For example, would a 
``reasonably foreseeable'' standard be more appropriate, even if harm 
is not likely to occur? Instead of covering any component of customer 
information the compromise of which ``could'' create a reasonably 
likely risk of substantial harm or inconvenience, should the standard 
cover components of customer information that ``would'' create such 
risk?
    39. Should we provide additional or alternative examples of what 
constitutes ``sensitive customer information'' in the rule text? Do 
covered persons or individuals widely use other pieces of information 
for authentication purposes, such that our examples should explicitly 
reference other authenticating or identifying information that, in 
combination, could create a harm risk?
    40. Is encryption a relevant factor to a covered institution's 
determination of the harm risk? Could encrypted information not present 
such risks because of the current strength of the relevant encryption 
algorithm, even if this could change in the future because, for 
example, of future developments in quantum computing? If a covered 
institution determines that encrypted information is not sensitive 
customer information, should the covered institution be required to 
monitor decryption risk based on, for example, advances in technology 
or a future compromise of a decryption key? If such risks do arise, 
should a covered institution be required to deliver a notice for a past 
incident?
    41. Do covered institutions' encryption practices commonly adhere 
to particular cryptographic standards, such as those included in FIPS 
140-3? \121\ Should we recognize adherence to

[[Page 20631]]

particular standards as a requirement when determining that encryption 
is relevant to a covered institution's determination that cipher text's 
compromise would not create a reasonably likely harm risk to an 
individual identified with the information?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ See supra note 121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. Should we except from the definition of ``sensitive customer 
information'' encrypted information, as certain states do? Should any 
such exception only apply in limited circumstances, including, for 
example, for certain types of information or where the covered 
institution can determine that the encryption offers certain levels of 
protection (including where the decryption key has not been 
compromised)? Would such an exception prevent individuals from 
receiving beneficial notifications, including where, for example, 
information could be easily decrypted? Should any other type of 
information be excepted?
c. Definition of ``Substantial Harm or Inconvenience''
    We propose to define ``substantial harm or inconvenience'' to mean 
``personal injury, or financial loss, expenditure of effort or loss of 
time that is more than trivial,'' and provide examples of included 
harms.\122\ As noted above, Regulation S-P requires a covered 
institution's policies and procedures to be reasonably designed to, 
among other things, protect against unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information that could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer.\123\ Although GLBA and the safeguards 
rule use the term ``substantial harm or inconvenience,'' neither 
defines the term. The proposed definition is intended to include a 
broad range of financial and non-financial harms and inconveniences 
that may result from failure to safeguard sensitive customer 
information.\124\ For example, a malicious actor could use sensitive 
customer information about an individual to engage in identity theft or 
as a means of extortion by threatening to make the information public 
unless the individual agrees to the malicious actor's demands.\125\ 
This could cause a customer to incur financial loss, or experience 
personal injury, such as physical harm or damaged reputation, or cause 
the customer to expend effort to remediate the breach or avoid losses. 
All of these effects would be included under our proposed definition.
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    \122\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(11).
    \123\ See supra section I.A.
    \124\ Data security incidents may result in varied types of 
harms. See generally Alex Scroxton, Data Breaches Are a Ticking 
Timebomb for Consumers, ComputerWeekly.com (Feb. 9, 2021), available 
at https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252496079/Data-breaches-are-a-ticking-timebomb-for-consumers (citing a report in which consumers 
reported financial loss, stress, and loss of time among other 
effects, from data breaches); Jessica Guynn, Anxiety, Depression and 
PTSD: The Hidden Epidemic of Data Breaches and Cyber Crimes, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 24, 2020), available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/conferences/2020/02/21/data-breach-tips-mental-health-toll-depression-anxiety/4763823002/ (describing significant psychological 
effects of data breach incidents); Eleanor Dallaway, #ISC2Congress: 
Cybercrime Victims Left Depressed and Traumatized, INFO. SEC. (Sept. 
12, 2016), available at https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/isc2congress-cybercrime-victims/ (describing mental health effects 
of cybercrime).
    \125\ The proposed definition of ``sensitive customer 
information'' is discussed supra in section II.A.4.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed definition would include all personal injuries due to 
the significance of their impact on customers. However, the proposed 
definition includes other harms or inconveniences only when they are, 
in each case, more than trivial. More than trivial financial loss, 
expenditure of effort, or loss of time would generally include harms 
that are likely to be of concern to customers and are of the nature 
such that customers are likely to take further action to protect 
themselves. By contrast, where a covered institution, its affiliate, or 
the individual simply changes the individual's account number as the 
result of an incident, this likely would be a trivial effect since it 
is not likely to be of concern to the individual or of the nature that 
the individual would be likely to take further action. Similarly, in 
the absence of additional effects, accidental access of information by 
an employee or other agent of the covered institution, its affiliate, 
or its service provider would also likely be trivial harms. We do not 
intend for covered institutions to design programs and incur costs to 
protect customers from harms of such trivial significance that the 
customer would be unconcerned with remediating. In this regard, our 
proposal to adopt standards that protect customers against substantial 
harm or inconvenience from failures to safeguard information is 
intended to be consistent with the purposes of the GLBA and Congress's 
goals.\126\
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    \126\ See 15 U.S.C. 6801(a) (stating that it is ``the policy of 
the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and 
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to 
protect the security and confidentiality of these customers' 
nonpublic personal information.''). See also supra note 26, infra 
note 160, and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We request comment on the proposed rule's definition of substantial 
harm or inconvenience, including the following:
    43. Should we expand the proposed definition of ``substantial harm 
or inconvenience''? Alternatively, should we exclude some harms covered 
under the proposed definition? Should we exclude some smaller (but more 
than trivial) effects? If so, please explain why the rule should not 
address these potential harms.
    44. Do commenters believe that the proposed rule should reference a 
term or terms other than ``substantial'' and ``more than trivial'' in 
describing the types of harms that meet our definition? Are additional 
or alternative clarifications needed? Is ``more than trivial'' the 
appropriate standard? Should we instead use a term such as 
``immaterial'' or ``insignificant''?
    45. Would a numerical or other objective standard for 
``substantial'' harm or inconvenience be appropriate, given the 
definition includes harms that would present substantial difficulty in 
quantifying, including damaged reputation? If so, please describe how 
such an objective standard could be designed and provide examples.
    46. Should a harm that is a ``personal injury,'' such as physical, 
emotional, or reputational harm, only be included in the proposed 
definition if it is more than ``trivial,'' similar to our proposed 
treatment of financial loss, expenditure of effort or loss of time? 
Should the standard for a harm that is a ``personal injury'' be 
something other than ``trivial?''
    47. What kinds of financial loss, expenditure of effort or loss of 
time would individuals likely be unconcerned with and/or likely not to 
try to mitigate? Please provide data, such as customer surveys, to 
support your response.
    48. Are the rule's proposed examples of certain effects that would 
be unlikely to meet the definition of substantial harm or inconvenience 
appropriate? If so, please provide examples and explain why.
d. Identification of Affected Individuals
    Under the proposed rules, covered institutions would be required to 
provide a clear and conspicuous notice to each affected individual 
whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to 
have been, accessed or used without authorization.\127\ We believe 
notices

[[Page 20632]]

should be provided to these affected individuals because they would 
likely need the information contained in the notices to respond to and 
remediate the incident.
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    \127\ As discussed below, proposed rule 248.30(a) explains that 
the safeguards rule, including the response program and customer 
notification, applies to all customer information that pertains to 
individuals with whom the covered institution has a customer 
relationship or to customers of other financial institutions and has 
been provided to the covered institution. See infra section II.C.1. 
Accordingly, proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(iii) and (b)(4)(i) refers to 
``affected individuals whose sensitive customer information was or 
is reasonably likely to have been accessed or used without 
authorization'' rather than ``customer.'' This is because the term 
``customer'' is defined in section 248.3(j) as ``a consumer that has 
a customer relationship with the [covered] institution,'' and would 
not include customers of financial institutions that had provided 
information to the covered institution (within the scope of proposed 
rule 248.30(a)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We understand, however, that notwithstanding a covered 
institution's determination to provide notices, the identification of 
affected individuals may be difficult in circumstances where a 
malicious actor has accessed or used information without authorization 
in a customer information system. It may, for example, be clear that a 
malicious actor gained access to the entire customer information 
system, but the covered institution may not be able to determine which 
specific individuals' data has been accessed or used. In such cases, we 
preliminarily believe that all individuals whose sensitive customer 
information is stored in that system should be notified so that they 
may have an opportunity to review the information in the required 
notification, and take remedial action as they deem appropriate. For 
example, individuals may be more vigilant in reviewing account 
statements or place fraud alerts in a credit report. They may also be 
able to place a hold on opening new credit in their name, or take other 
protective actions. Accordingly, the proposed rule would require a 
covered institution that is unable to identify which specific 
individuals' sensitive customer information has been accessed or used 
without authorization to provide notice to all individuals whose 
sensitive customer information resides in the affected system that was, 
or was reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization.\128\
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    \128\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We request comment on the proposed rule's requirements for the 
identification of affected individuals, including the following:
    49. Does the standard ``all individuals whose sensitive customer 
information resides in the customer information system'' adequately 
cover all of the individuals who are potentially at risk as a result of 
unauthorized access to or use of a customer information system? Should 
the rule require notice to additional or different individuals?
    50. To the extent covered institutions are not able to determine 
which individuals are affected with certainty, should the rule require 
notice only to those individuals whose sensitive customer information 
was ``reasonably likely'' to have been accessed or used without 
authorization? Alternatively, should the rule require notice unless it 
is ``unlikely'' that the information was not accessed, or would some 
other standard be appropriate? Please address how any such standard 
would help ensure that all individuals potentially at risk because of 
unauthorized access to or use of the customer information system 
receive notice.
    51. The proposed rule would require covered institutions to provide 
notice to each affected individual whose sensitive customer information 
was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization, including customers of other financial institutions 
where information has been provided to the covered institution. Do 
covered institutions have the contact information for customers of 
other financial institutions necessary to send the notices as required? 
Alternatively, should the rule require only that a covered institution 
provide notices to their own customers or to the institution that 
provided the covered institution the sensitive customer information? 
Are there other operational or compliance challenges to identifying 
affected individuals? Would this requirement result in the practical 
effect of requiring covered institutions to send notices to all 
individuals potentially subject to a breach of their systems 
(regardless of whether they are a customer or not) due to the 
difficulty of determining an affected individual's status?
e. Timing Requirements
    As proposed, the rule would require covered institutions to provide 
notices as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days, after the 
covered institution becomes aware that unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have 
occurred except under limited circumstances, discussed below.\129\ We 
propose that covered institutions provide notices ``as soon as 
practicable'' to expeditiously notify individuals whose information is 
compromised, so that these individuals may take timely action to 
protect themselves from identity theft or other harm. The amount of 
time that would constitute ``as soon as practicable'' may vary based on 
several factors, such as the time required to assess, contain, and 
control the incident, and if the institution conducts one, the time 
required to investigate the likelihood the information could be used in 
a manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience. For 
example, ``as soon as practicable'' may be longer with an incident 
involving a significant number of customers.
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    \129\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iii).
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    Consistent with the approach taken by many states, we have included 
an outside date to ensure that all covered institutions meet a minimum 
standard of timeliness. We preliminarily believe that a 30-day period 
after becoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred would 
permit customers to take actions in response to an incident, including 
by placing fraud alerts on relevant accounts or changing passwords used 
to access accounts.\130\ The proposal's 30-day period would establish a 
shorter notification deadline than those currently used in 15 states, 
and would also offer enhanced protections to individuals in 32 states 
with laws that do not include an outside date.\131\ At the same time, 
this 30-day period would generally allow sufficient time for covered 
institutions to perform their assessments, take remedial measures, 
conclude any investigation, and prepare notices.\132\ Accordingly, we 
preliminarily believe that establishing a minimum requirement to 
provide notifications as soon as practicable, together with a 30-day 
outside date, strikes the appropriate balance between promoting timely 
notice to affected individuals and allowing institutions sufficient 
time to implement their incident response programs.\133\
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    \130\ Nineteen states provide an outside date for providing 
customer notification, which range from 30 to 90 days. See, e.g., 
Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 6-1-716(2) (providing that notifications be 
provided not later than thirty days after the date of determination 
that a security breach occurred); Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 36a-701b 
(b)(1) (providing that notifications be provided not later than 
ninety days after the date of determination that a security breach 
occurred).
    \131\ See NCSL Security Breach Notification Law Resource, supra 
note 106.
    \132\ See supra section II.A.4.a (discussing the standard of 
notice, including that a covered institution must provide clear and 
conspicuous notice unless it has determined, after a reasonable 
investigation of the facts and circumstances of the incident of 
unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information, 
that sensitive customer information has not been, and is not 
reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience). See proposed rule 
284.30(b)(4)(i).
    \133\ An institution that has completed the required tasks and 
has undertaken an investigation before the end of the 30-day period 
would be required to provide notices to affected customers ``as soon 
as practicable.'' For example, an incident of unauthorized access by 
a single employee to a limited set of sensitive customer information 
may take only a few days to assess, remediate, and investigate. In 
those circumstances we believe a covered institution generally 
should provide notices to affected individuals at the conclusion of 
those tasks and as soon as the notices have been prepared.

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[[Page 20633]]

    Further, the proposed requirement that a covered institution have 
written policies and procedures that provide for a systematic response 
to each incident also may facilitate the institution's preparation and 
ability to perform an assessment, remediation, and investigation in a 
timely manner and within the 30-day period required for providing 
customer notices. At the same time, a covered institution would be 
required to provide notice within 30 days after becoming aware that an 
incident occurred even if the institution had not completed its 
assessment or control and containment measures.
    Similarly, the proposal would effectively impose a uniform 30-day 
notification time-period and would not generally provide for a 
notification delay. For example, when there is an ongoing internal or 
external investigation related to an incident involving sensitive 
customer information.\134\ On-going internal or external 
investigations--which often can be lengthy--on their own would not 
provide a basis for delaying notice to customers that their sensitive 
customer information has been compromised.\135\ Additionally, any such 
delay provision could undermine timely and uniform customer 
notification that customers' sensitive customer information has been 
compromised, as investigations and resolutions of incidents may occur 
over an extended period of time and may vary widely in timing and 
scope.
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    \134\ Internal investigation refers to an investigation 
conducted by a covered institution or a third party selected by a 
covered institution. An external investigation refers to any 
investigation not conducted by, or at the request of, a covered 
institution.
    \135\ See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company 
Cybersecurity Disclosures, Release No. 33-10459 (Feb. 26, 2018) [83 
FR 8166, 8169 (Feb. 26, 2018)].
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    At the same time, we recognize that a delay in customer 
notification may facilitate law enforcement investigations aimed at 
apprehending the perpetrators of the incident and preventing future 
incidents. Many states have laws that either mandate or allow entities 
to delay providing customer notifications regarding an incident if law 
enforcement determines that notification may impede its 
investigation.\136\ The principal function of such a delay would be to 
allow a law enforcement or national security agency to keep a 
cybercriminal unaware of their detection.
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    \136\ Of the 40 states that allow entities to delay providing 
notices to individuals for law enforcement investigations, 11 deem 
entities to be in compliance with state notification laws if the 
entity is subject to or in compliance with GLBA, and nine states 
mandate the delay of notices to individuals for law enforcement 
investigations, with forty states permitting such delays. See NCSL 
Security Breach Notification Law Resource, supra note 106. See supra 
note 14 for information regarding the interaction between Regulation 
S-P and state laws.
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    The proposed rule would allow a covered institution to delay 
providing notice after receiving a written request from the Attorney 
General of the United States that the notice required under this rule 
poses a substantial risk to national security.\137\ The covered 
institution may delay such a notice for an initial period specified by 
the Attorney General of the United States, but not for longer than 15 
days. The notice may be delayed an additional 15 days if the Attorney 
General of the United States determines that the notice continues to 
pose a substantial risk to national security. This would allow a 
combined delay period of up to 30 days, upon the expiration of which 
the covered institution must provide notice immediately.
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    \137\ Any such written request from the Attorney General of the 
United States would be subject to the recordkeeping requirements for 
covered institutions discussed in section II.D.
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    A covered institution, in certain instances, may be required to 
notify customers under the proposal even though that covered 
institution could have separate delay reporting requirements under a 
particular state law. On balance, it is our current view that timely 
customer notification would allow the customer to take remedial actions 
and, thereby, would justify providing only for a limited delay.\138\
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    \138\ For example, after timely notice of a breach, individuals 
can take important steps to safeguard their information, including 
changing passwords, freezing their accounts, and putting a hold on 
their credit.
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    We request comment on the proposed rule's notification timing 
requirements, including the following:
    52. Does this proposed requirement provide covered institutions 
with sufficient time to perform assessments, collect the information 
necessary to include in customer notices, perform an investigation if 
appropriate, and provide notices? Alternatively, does the proposed ``as 
soon as practicable'' or 30 day outside date provide too much time? 
Should the rule require institutions to provide notice ``as soon as 
possible,'' for example? Should the rule provide parameters to define 
``as soon as practicable,'' ``as soon as possible,'' ``as soon as 
reasonably practicable'' or an alternate standard? If so, please 
describe the parameters or other standard. Should the rule require less 
time for an outside date, such as 10, 15, or 20 days? Should the rule 
provide more time for an outside date, such as 45, 60, or 90 days? 
Please be specific on the appropriate outside date and the basis for 
the shorter or longer time period. Also, please specify the potential 
costs and benefits to a different outside date.
    53. Should the proposed timing requirement begin to run upon an 
event other than ``becoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have 
occurred''? Should the timing requirement begin to run, for example, 
after the covered institution ``reasonably should have been aware'' of 
the incident or, alternatively, after completing its assessment of the 
incident or containment? If the timing requirement should begin upon 
``becoming aware that that unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred,'' 
should we provide covered institutions with examples of what would 
constitute becoming aware?
    54. Should the proposed rules incorporate any exceptions from the 
timing requirement that would allow for delays under limited 
circumstances? If so, what restrictions or conditions should apply to 
any such delay and why?
    55. Are there other challenges to meeting the proposed timing 
requirements, including the requirement to provide notices within 30 
days of becoming aware of the incident? If yes, please describe.
    56. What operational or compliance challenges arise from the 
proposed limited delay for notice or its expiration? Should the 
proposed rule have a different delay for notice, for example, by 
providing that the Commission shall allow covered institutions to delay 
notification to customers where any law enforcement agency requests 
such a delay from the covered institution? If so, what restrictions or 
conditions should apply to any such law enforcement delay, for example, 
a certification, or a different outside time limit on the delay?
f. Notice Contents and Format
    We are proposing to require that notices include key information 
with details about the incident, the breached data, and how affected 
individuals could respond to the breach to protect themselves. This 
requirement is

[[Page 20634]]

designed to help ensure that covered institutions provide basic 
information to affected individuals that would help them avoid or 
mitigate substantial harm or inconvenience.
    More specifically, some of the information required, including 
information regarding a description of the incident, type of sensitive 
customer information accessed or used without authorization, and what 
has been done to protect the sensitive customer information from 
further unauthorized access or use, would provide customers with basic 
information to help them understand the scope of the incident and its 
potential ramifications.\139\ We also propose to require covered 
institutions to include contact information sufficient to permit an 
affected individual to contact the covered institution to inquire about 
the incident, including a telephone number (which should be a toll-free 
number if available), an email address or equivalent method or means, a 
postal address, and the name of a specific office to contact for 
further information and assistance, so that individuals can more easily 
seek additional information from the covered institution.\140\ All of 
this information may help an individual assess the risk posed and 
whether to take additional measures to protect against harm from 
unauthorized access or use of their information.
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    \139\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(A)-(B).
    \140\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(D). A method or means 
equivalent to email generally, for example, includes an internet web 
page easily allowing for the submission of inquiries.
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    Similarly, if the information is reasonably possible to determine 
at the time the notice is provided, information regarding the date of 
the incident, the estimated date of the incident, or the date range 
within which the incident occurred would help customers understand the 
circumstances related to the breach.\141\ We understand that a covered 
institution may have difficulty determining a precise date range for 
certain incidents because it may only discover an incident well after 
an initial time of access. As a result, similar to the approach taken 
by California, the covered institution would only be required to 
include a date, or date range, if it is possible to determine at the 
time the notice is provided.\142\
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    \141\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(C).
    \142\ See Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1798.29(d)(2).
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    Finally, we propose that covered institutions include certain 
information to assist individuals in evaluating how they should respond 
to the incident. Specifically, if the individual has an account with 
the covered institution, the proposed rule would require inclusion of a 
recommendation that the customer review account statements and 
immediately report any suspicious activity to the covered 
institution.\143\ The proposed rule would also require covered 
institutions to explain what a fraud alert is and how an individual may 
place a fraud alert in credit reports.\144\ Further, the proposed rule 
would require inclusion of a recommendation that the individual 
periodically obtain credit reports from each nationwide credit 
reporting company and have information relating to fraudulent 
transactions deleted, as well as explain how a credit report can be 
obtained free of charge.\145\ In particular, information addressing 
potential protective measures could help individuals evaluate how they 
should respond to the incident. We also propose for notices to include 
information regarding FTC and usa.gov guidance on steps an individual 
can take to protect against identity theft, a statement encouraging the 
individual to report any incidents of identity theft to the FTC, and 
include the FTC's website address.\146\ This would give individuals 
resources for additional information regarding how they can respond to 
an incident.
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    \143\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(E).
    \144\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(F). We recognize that, 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)), 
individuals may obtain ``consumer reports'' from consumer reporting 
agencies. Nevertheless, we refer to ``credit reports'' in proposed 
rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(G), in part, because the Banking Agencies' 
Incident Response Guidance also includes a requirement that notices 
include a recommendation that customers obtain ``credit reports,'' 
and in part, because we believe individuals would generally be more 
familiar with this term than the term ``consumer reports.'' See, 
e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (``CFPB''), Check your 
credit, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/owning-a-home/prepare/check-your-credit/ (explaining how to check credit reports); CFPB, Credit 
reports and scores, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/consumer-tools/credit-reports-and-scores/ (explaining how to understand credit 
reports and scores, how to correct errors and improve a credit 
record).
    \145\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(G)-(H).
    \146\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv)(I). See, e.g., Identity 
Theft: How to Protect Yourself Against Identity Theft and Respond if 
it Happens, available at https://www.usa.gov/identity-theft.
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    We propose that covered institutions should be required to provide 
the information specified in proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv) in each 
required notice. While we recognize that relevant information may vary 
based on the facts and circumstances of the incident, we believe that 
customers would benefit from the same minimum set of basic information 
in all notices. We propose, therefore, to permit covered institutions 
to include additional information, but the rule would not permit 
omission of the prescribed information in the notices provided to 
affected individuals.
    The proposed rule would require covered institutions to provide the 
notice in a clear and conspicuous manner and by means designed to 
ensure that the customer can reasonably be expected to receive actual 
notice in writing.\147\ Notices, therefore, would be required to be 
reasonably understandable and designed to call attention to the nature 
and significance of the information required to be provided in the 
notice.\148\ Accordingly, to the extent that a covered institution 
includes information in the notice that is not required to be provided 
to customers under the proposed rules or provides notice 
contemporaneously with other disclosures, the covered institution would 
still be required to ensure that the notice is designed to call 
attention to the important information required to be provided under 
the proposed rule; additional information generally should not prevent 
covered institutions from presenting required information in a clear 
and conspicuous manner. The requirement to provide notices in writing, 
further, would ensure that customers receive the information in a 
format appropriate for receiving important information, with 
accommodation for those customers who agree to receive the information 
electronically. This proposed requirement to provide notice ``in 
writing'' could be satisfied either through paper or electronic means, 
consistent with existing Commission guidance on electronic delivery of 
documents.\149\ Notification in other formats, including, for example, 
by a recorded telephone message, may not be retained and referenced as 
easily as a notification in writing. These requirements would help 
ensure that customers are provided notifications and alerted to their 
importance.
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    \147\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(i); see also 17 CFR 
248.9(a) (delivery requirements for privacy and opt out notices) and 
17 CFR 248.3(c)(1) (defining ``clear and conspicuous'').
    \148\ See 17 CFR 248.3(c)(2) (providing examples explaining what 
is meant by the terms ``reasonably understandable'' and ``designed 
to call attention'').
    \149\ See Use of Electronic Media by Broker Dealers, Transfer 
Agents, and Investment Advisers for Delivery of Information; 
Additional Examples Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and Investment Company Act of 1940, 61 FR 
24644 (May 15, 1996); Use of Electronic Media, 65 FR 25843 (May 4, 
2000).
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    We request comment on the notification content, format, and 
delivery requirements, including the following:
    57. Should we require that notices include additional information? 
If so, what specific information should we

[[Page 20635]]

include? Please explain why any recommended additional information 
would be important to include.
    58. Is there prescribed notice information that we should eliminate 
or revise? Please explain. For example, should we add information about 
security freezes on credit reports, and should that replace fraud alert 
information? Should the required information on the notice to assist 
individuals in evaluating how they should respond to the incident be 
replaced? Please explain. For example, should the notice instead be 
required to include an appropriate website that describes then-current 
best practices in how to respond to an incident? Are there other 
websites, for example, IdentityTheft.gov, that should be included in 
the notice?
    59. Should some of the information we propose to include in the 
notices only be required in limited circumstances? For example, should 
we only require including information relating to credit reports if the 
underlying incident relates to access or use of a subset of sensitive 
customer information (perhaps only information of a particular 
financial nature)? Should covered institutions be able to determine 
whether to provide certain information ``as appropriate'' on a case-by-
case basis? If so, please explain which information and why.
    60. In what other formats, if any, should we permit covered 
institutions to provide notices? What formats do covered institutions 
customarily use to communicate with individuals (e.g., text messages or 
some other abbreviated format that might require the use of hyperlinks) 
and for which types of communications are those formats generally used? 
To the extent we allow such additional formats, would such notices 
adequately signal the significance of the information to the 
individual--or otherwise present disadvantages to covered institutions 
or individuals?
    61. The proposed rule amendments would require that covered 
institutions provide certain contact information sufficient to permit 
an individual to contact the covered institution to inquire about the 
incident. Should we require additional or different contact 
information? Is the required contact information appropriate or would a 
general customer service number suffice? Should the amendments also 
require that covered institutions ensure that they have reasonable 
policies and procedures in place, including trained personnel, to 
respond appropriately to customer inquiries and requests for 
assistance?
    62. Should we require that covered institutions include specific 
and standardized information about steps to protect against identity 
theft, instead of requiring inclusion of information about online 
guidance from the FTC and usa.gov?
    63. Should we require that covered institutions reference 
``consumer reports'' instead of ``credit reports'' in notifications 
under the proposed rules? Would individuals be more familiar with the 
term ``credit report''?
    64. To the extent that a covered institution determines it is not 
reasonably possible to provide in the notice information regarding the 
date of the incident, the estimated date of the incident, or the date 
range within which the incident occurred, should that financial 
institution be required to state this to customers? In addition, should 
the institution be required to state why it is not possible to make 
such a determination?
    65. Should the notice require that covered institutions describe 
what has been done to protect the sensitive customer information from 
further unauthorized access or use? Would this description provide a 
roadmap for further incidents? If yes, is there other information 
rather than this description that may help an individual understand 
what has been done to protect their information?
    66. Should we incorporate other prescriptive formatting 
requirements (e.g., length of notice, size of font, etc.) for the 
notice requirement under the proposed rules?
    67. Should we require covered institutions to follow plain English 
or plain writing principles?

B. Remote Work Arrangement Considerations

    Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States 
in 2020, the use of remote work arrangements has expanded significantly 
throughout the labor force. The U.S. Census Bureau recently announced 
that the number of people primarily working from home tripled between 
2019 and 2021, from 5.7% to 17.9% of all workers.\150\ In the financial 
services industry specifically, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found in 
its 2021 Business Response Survey that firms reported 27.5% of jobs in 
the industry currently involve full-time telework, with a total of 45% 
of jobs involving teleworking ``at least some of the time.'' \151\
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    \150\ Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau releases new 2021 
American Community Survey 1-year estimates for all geographic areas 
with populations of 65,000 or more (Sept.15, 2022), available at 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/people-working-
from-home.html#:~:text=SEPT.,by%20the%20U.S.%20Census%20Bureau.
    \151\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, Telework during the COVID-19 
pandemic: estimates using the 2021 Business Response Survey (Mar. 
2022), available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2022/article/telework-during-the-covid-19-pandemic.htm#_edn6.
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    Although recent reports indicate that a growing number of workers 
are returning to the office,\152\ as certain members of the securities 
industry have previously noted, when covered institutions permit their 
own employees to work from remote locations, rather than one of the 
firm's offices, it raises particular compliance questions under 
Regulation S-P.\153\ In the case of the proposed rule, a covered 
institution's policies and procedures under the safeguards rule would 
need to be reasonably designed to ensure the security and 
confidentiality of customer information, protect against any threats or 
hazards to the security or integrity of customer information, and 
protect against the unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to 
any customer.\154\ Similarly, under the proposed amendments to the 
disposal rule, covered institutions, other than notice-registered 
broker-dealers, would need to adopt and implement written policies and 
procedures under the disposal rule that address the proper disposal of 
consumer information and customer information according to a standard 
of taking reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to 
or use of the information in connection with its disposal.\155\ In 
satisfying each of these proposed obligations, covered institutions 
will need to consider any additional challenges raised by the use of 
remote work locations within their policies and procedures.
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    \152\ See Joseph Pisiani and Kailyn Rhone, U.S. Return-to-Office 
Rate Rises Above 50% for First Time Since Pandemic Began, Wall 
Street Journal (Feb. 1, 2023), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-return-to-office-rate-rises-above-50-for-first-time-since-pandemic-began-11675285071.
    \153\ See e.g., Letter from Michael Decker, Senior Vice 
President, Bond Dealers of America, to Jennifer Piorko Mitchell, 
Office of the Corporate Secretary, FINRA, re FINRA Regulatory Notice 
20-42 (Feb. 16, 2021), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeComment/Bond%20Dealers%20of%20America%20%5BMichael%20Decker%5D%20-%20FINRA_COVID_lessons_final.pdf; letter from Kelli McMorrow, Head 
of Government Affairs, American Securities Association, to Jennifer 
Piorko Mitchell, Office of the Corporate Secretary, FINRA, re FINRA 
Regulatory Notice 20-42 (Feb. 16, 2021), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeComment/American%20Securities%20Association%20%5BKelli%20McMorrow%5D%20-%202021.02.16%20-%20ASA%20FINRA%20Covid%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf.
    \154\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(2).
    \155\ See proposed rule 240.30(c).

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[[Page 20636]]

    In light of these considerations, we request comment on whether the 
remote work arrangements of the personnel of covered institutions 
should be addressed under both the safeguards rule and the disposal 
rule, including as to the following:
    68. Should the proposed safeguards rule and/or the proposed 
disposal rule be amended in any way to account for the use of remote 
work arrangements by covered institutions? If so, how? How would such 
amendments impact the costs and benefits of the proposed rule?
    69. Are there any additional costs and/or benefits of the proposed 
rule related to remote work arrangements that the Commission should be 
aware of? If so, in particular, how would those be impacted by whether 
or not remote work arrangements by covered institutions have increased, 
decreased, or remained the same? If so, please explain, and please 
provide any data available.
    70. Are there any specific aspects of the proposed safeguards rule 
or the disposal rule, relating to compliance with either rule where the 
covered institution permits employees to work remotely, on which the 
Commission should provide guidance to covered institutions? If so, 
please explain.

C. Scope of Information Protected Under the Safeguards Rule and 
Disposal Rule

    The Commission adopted the safeguards rule and the disposal rule at 
different times under different statutes--respectively, the GLBA and 
the FACT Act--that differ in the scope of information they cover. We 
are proposing to broaden and more closely align the information covered 
by the safeguards rule and the disposal rule by applying the 
protections of both rules to ``customer information,'' a newly defined 
term. We also propose to add a new section that describes the extent of 
information covered under both rules, which includes nonpublic personal 
information that a covered institution collects about its own customers 
and that it receives from a third party financial institution about a 
financial institution's customers.
    We preliminarily believe the scope of information protected by the 
safeguards rule and the disposal rule should be broader and more 
closely aligned to provide better protection against unauthorized 
disclosure of personal financial information, consistent with the 
purposes of the GLBA \156\ and the FACT Act.\157\ Applying both the 
safeguards rule and the disposal rule to a more consistent set of 
defined ``customer information'' also could reduce any burden that may 
have been created by the application of the safeguards rule and the 
disposal rule to different scopes of information. Further, protecting 
nonpublic personal information of customers that a financial 
institution shares with a covered institution furthers congressional 
policy to protect personal financial information on an ongoing 
basis.\158\ Applying the safeguards rule and the disposal rule to 
customer information that a covered institution receives from other 
financial institutions should ensure customer information safeguards 
are not lost because a third party financial institution shares that 
information with a covered institution.
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    \156\ The Commission has ``broad rulemaking authority'' to 
effectuate ``the policy of the Congress that each financial 
institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect 
the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and 
confidentiality of these customers' nonpublic personal 
information.'' Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 6801(a)).
    \157\ The disposal rule was intended to reduce the risk of fraud 
or related crimes, including identity theft, by ensuring that 
records containing sensitive financial or personal information are 
appropriately redacted or destroyed before being discarded. See 108 
Cong. Rec. S13,889 (Nov. 4, 2003) (statement of Sen. Nelson).
    \158\ See 15 U.S.C. 6801(a) (``It is the policy of the Congress 
that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing 
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect 
the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic 
personal information.'') (emphasis added).
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1. Definition of Customer Information
    Currently, Regulation S-P's protections under the safeguards rule 
and disposal rule apply to different, and at times overlapping, sets of 
information.\159\ Specifically, as required under the GLBA, the 
safeguards rule requires broker-dealers, investment companies, and 
registered investment advisers (but not transfer agents) to maintain 
written policies and procedures to protect ``customer records and 
information,'' \160\ which is not defined in the GLBA or in Regulation 
S-P. The disposal rule requires every covered institution properly to 
dispose of ``consumer report information,'' a different term, which 
Regulation S-P defines consistently with the FACT Act provisions.\161\
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    \159\ See Disposal Rule Adopting Release, supra note 32, at 69 
FR 71323 n.13.
    \160\ See 17 CFR 248.30; 15 U.S.C. 6801(b)(1).
    \161\ 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2). Section 628(a)(1) of the FCRA 
directed the Commission to adopt rules requiring the proper disposal 
of ``consumer information, or any compilation of consumer 
information, derived from consumer reports for a business purpose.'' 
15 U.S.C. 1681w(a)(1). Regulation S-P currently uses the term 
``consumer report information'' and defines it to mean a record in 
any form about an individual ``that is a consumer report or is 
derived from a consumer report.'' 17 CFR 248.30(b)(1)(ii). 
``Consumer report'' has the same meaning as in section 603(d) of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681(d)). 17 CFR 
248.30(b)(1)(i). We are proposing to change the term ``consumer 
report information'' currently in Regulation S-P to ``consumer 
information'' (without changing the definition) to conform to the 
term used by other Federal financial regulators in their guidance 
and rules. See, e.g. 16 CFR 682.1(b) (FTC); 17 CFR 162.2(g) (CFTC); 
12 CFR Appendix B to Part 30: Interagency Guidelines Establishing 
Information Security Standards (``OCC Information Security 
Guidance''), at I.C.2.b; 12 CFR Appendix D-2 to Part 208 (``FRB 
Information Security Guidance''), at I.C.2.b.
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    To align more closely the information protected by both rules, we 
propose to amend rule 248.30 by replacing the term ``customer records 
and information'' in the safeguards rule with a newly defined term 
``customer information'' and by adding customer information to the 
coverage of the disposal rule.
    For covered institutions other than transfer agents,\162\ the 
proposed rule would define ``customer information'' to encompass any 
record containing ``nonpublic personal information'' (as defined in 
Regulation S-P) about ``a customer of a financial institution,'' 
whether in paper, electronic or other form that is handled or 
maintained by the covered institution or on its behalf.\163\ This 
definition in the coverage of the safeguards rule is intended to be 
consistent with the objectives of the GLBA, which focuses on protecting 
``nonpublic personal information'' of those who are ``customers'' of 
financial institutions.\164\ The proposed definition would also conform 
more closely to the definition of ``customer information'' in the 
safeguards rule adopted by the FTC.\165\
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    \162\ We propose a separate definition of ``customer 
information'' applicable to transfer agents. See infra section 
II.C.3.
    \163\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(5)(i). As noted below in note 
175, transfer agents typically do not have consumers or customers 
for purposes of Regulation S-P because their clients generally are 
not individuals, but are the issuer in which investors, including 
individuals, hold shares. With respect to a transfer agent 
registered with the Commission, under the proposal customer means 
any natural person who is a securityholder of an issuer for which 
the transfer agent acts or has acted as transfer agent. See proposed 
rule 248.30(e)(4)(ii).
    \164\ See 15 U.S.C. 6801(a).
    \165\ See 16 CFR 314.2(d) (FTC safeguards rule defining 
``customer information'' to mean ``any record containing nonpublic 
personal information, as defined in 16 CFR 313.3(n) about a customer 
of a financial institution, whether in paper, electronic, or other 
form, that is handled or maintained by or on behalf of you or your 
affiliates''). The proposed rules would not require covered 
institutions to be responsible for their affiliates' policies and 
procedures for safeguarding customer information because we believe 
that covered institutions affiliates generally are financial 
institutions subject to the safeguards rules of other Federal 
financial regulators.

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[[Page 20637]]

    Additionally, adding customer information to the coverage of the 
disposal rule is also intended to be consistent with the objectives of 
the GLBA. Under the GLBA, an institution has a ``continuing 
obligation'' to protect the security and confidentiality of customers' 
nonpublic personal information.\166\ The proposed rule clarifies that 
this obligation continues through disposal of customer information. The 
proposed rule is also intended to be consistent with the objectives of 
the FACT Act. The FACT Act focuses on protecting ``consumer 
information,'' a category of information that will remain within the 
scope of the disposal rule.\167\ Adding customer information to the 
disposal provisions will simplify compliance with the FACT Act by 
eliminating an institution's need to determine whether its customer 
information is also consumer information subject to the disposal rule. 
Institutions should also be less likely to fail to dispose of consumer 
information properly by misidentifying it as customer information only. 
In addition, including customer information in the coverage of the 
disposal rule would conform the rule more closely to the Banking 
Agencies' Safeguards Guidance.\168\ These proposed amendments are 
intended to be consistent with the Commission's statutory mandates 
under the GLBA and the FACT Act to adopt final financial privacy 
regulations and disposal regulations, respectively, that are consistent 
with and comparable to those adopted by other Federal financial 
regulators.\169\
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    \166\ See 15 U.S.C. 6801(a).
    \167\ See 15 U.S.C. 1681w(a)(1) and proposed rule 248.30(c)(1). 
``Consumer information'' is not included within the scope of the 
safeguards rule, except to the extent it overlaps with any 
``customer information,'' because the safeguards rule is adopted 
pursuant to the GLBA and therefore is limited to information about 
``customers.''
    \168\ See, e.g., OCC Information Security Guidance, supra note 
161 (OCC guidelines providing that national banks and Federal 
savings associations' must develop, implement, and maintain 
appropriate measures to properly dispose of customer information and 
consumer information.''); FRB Information Security Guidance, supra 
note 161 (similar Federal Reserve Board provisions for state member 
banks).
    \169\ See 15 U.S.C. 6804(a) (directing the agencies authorized 
to prescribe regulations under title V of the GLBA to assure to the 
extent possible that their regulations are consistent and 
comparable); and 15 U.S.C. 1681w(2)(B) (directing the agencies with 
enforcement authority set forth in 15 U.S.C. 1681s to consult and 
coordinate so that, to the extent possible, their regulations are 
consistent and comparable).
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    We request comment on the proposed definition of ``customer 
information,'' including the following:
    71. Is the proposed definition of ``customer information,'' which 
includes any records containing nonpublic personal information about a 
customer of a financial institution that is handled or maintained by 
the covered institution or on its behalf, too narrow? If so, how should 
we expand the definition? Should the definition also include customer 
information maintained on behalf of a covered institutions' affiliates?
    72. Do covered institutions share customer information with 
affiliates that are neither financial institutions subject to the 
safeguards rules of other Federal financial regulators nor service 
providers? If so, please explain. If so, should customer information be 
subject to the same protections when a covered institution shares it 
with such an affiliate?
    73. Are there any aspects of the proposed definition that may be 
too broad? If so, how is it broad? For example, should the definition 
limit customer information to nonpublic personal information about an 
institution's own customers that is maintained by or on behalf of the 
covered institution?
    74. Is the safeguards rule too narrow? Should it extend to consumer 
information that is not customer information (e.g., information from a 
consumer report about an employee or prospective employee)?
    75. Under the proposed amendments, the disposal rule would apply to 
both customer information and consumer information. Is the proposed 
amended disposal rule too broad? If so, how should we narrow the 
coverage? For example, should the disposal rule protect customer 
information that is not consumer information, i.e., nonpublic personal 
information, such as transaction information, that does not appear in a 
consumer report? Are there benefits to having the safeguards rule and 
the disposal rule apply to a more consistent set of information?
    76. For covered institutions that are owned or controlled by 
affiliates based in another jurisdiction, what is the risk that 
customer information, including sensitive customer information, may be 
shared and used by such other affiliates? Would such practices raise 
concerns about potential harm related to the use or possession of 
customer information by such foreign affiliates? Should the rule 
include additional requirements that would restrict the transmission of 
such customer information to foreign affiliates and others? If so, what 
should these be?
2. Safeguards Rule and Disposal Rule Coverage of Customer Information
    We also propose to amend rule 248.30 to add a new section that 
would provide that the safeguards rule and disposal rule apply to both 
nonpublic personal information that a covered institution collects 
about its own customers and to nonpublic personal information it 
receives from a third party financial institution about that 
institution's customers. Currently, Regulation S-P defines ``customer'' 
as ``a consumer who has a customer relationship with you.'' The 
safeguards rule, therefore, only protects the ``records and 
information'' of individuals who are customers of the particular 
institution and not others, such as individuals who are customers of 
another financial institution. The disposal rule, on the other hand, 
requires proper disposal of certain records about individuals without 
regard to whether the individuals are customers of the particular 
institution.
    Proposed new paragraph (a) would provide that the safeguards rule 
and the disposal rule apply to all customer information in the 
possession of a covered institution, and all consumer information that 
a covered institution maintains or otherwise possesses for a business 
purpose, as applicable,\170\ regardless of whether such information 
pertains to the covered institution's own customers or to customers of 
other financial institutions and has been provided to the covered 
institution.\171\ For example, information that a registered investment 
adviser has received from the custodian of a former client's assets 
would be covered under both rules if the former client remains a 
customer of either the custodian or of another financial institution, 
even though the individual no longer has a customer relationship with 
the investment adviser. Similarly, any individual's customer 
information or consumer information that a transfer agent has received 
from a broker-dealer holding an omnibus account with the transfer agent 
would be covered under both rules, even where the individual has no 
account in her own name at the transfer agent, as long as the 
individual is a customer of the broker-dealer or another financial 
institution. This

[[Page 20638]]

approach is consistent with the FTC's safeguards rule.\172\
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    \170\ The safeguards rule is applicable to ``consumer 
information'' only to the extent it overlaps with ``customer 
information.'' See supra note 166.
    \171\ Regulation S-P defines ``financial institution'' generally 
to mean any institution the business of which is engaging in 
activities that are financial in nature or incidental to such 
financial activities as described in section 4(k) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)). Rule 248.3(n).
    \172\ 15 CFR 314.1(b) (providing that the FTC's safeguards rule 
``applies to all customer information in your possession, regardless 
of whether such information pertains to individuals with whom you 
have a customer relationship, or pertains to the customers of other 
financial institutions that have provided such information to 
you'').
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    We request comment on the proposed scope of customer information 
covered under the safeguards rule and the disposal rule, including the 
following:
    77. Is the proposed scope too broad or too narrow? If so, how 
should we broaden or narrow the scope? For example, should the rules' 
protections for ``customer information'' only extend to nonpublic 
personal information of the customers of another financial institution 
if the covered institution received the information from that financial 
institution (e.g., an employee's or former customer's bank account 
information that the covered institution received directly from the 
individual, or prospective customers' information that the covered 
institution purchased or otherwise acquired from a third party would 
not be covered)?
    78. Should employees' nonpublic personal information be protected 
under the safeguards rule? Why or why not? Would such coverage reduce 
the risk that unauthorized access to employee nonpublic personal 
information, such as a user name or password, could facilitate 
unauthorized access to customer information?
    79. Do covered institutions receive nonpublic personal information 
about individuals who are not their customers from other financial 
institutions, such as custodians? If so, please provide examples. Do 
covered institutions take the same or different measures in 
safeguarding and disposing of information of individuals who are not 
their customers, such as employees or former customers? Please explain.
    80. If covered institutions receive nonpublic personal information 
about individuals who are not their customers, are covered institutions 
able to determine whether such individuals are customers of other 
financial institutions? Would that be known as a result of any existing 
legal obligations?
    81. Would the proposed rule result in covered institutions treating 
all nonpublic personal information about individuals as subject to the 
safeguards and disposal rules?
    82. Should the proposed rule include a section describing scope? 
Does the scope section help clarify the information that a covered 
institution would have to protect under the safeguards rule and the 
disposal rule? Would the rule be clearer if it defined the scope of 
information protected within the definition of customer information?
3. Extending the Scope of the Safeguards Rule and the Disposal Rule To 
Cover All Transfer Agents
    The proposed amendments would extend both the safeguards rule and 
the disposal rule to apply to any transfer agent registered with the 
Commission or another appropriate regulatory agency.\173\ As discussed 
above, the safeguards rule currently applies to brokers, dealers, 
registered investment advisers, and investment companies, while the 
disposal rule currently applies to those entities as well as to 
transfer agents registered with the Commission.
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    \173\ The term ``transfer agent'' would be defined by proposed 
rule 248.30(e)(12) to have the same meaning as in section 3(a)(25) 
of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(25)).
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The Safeguards Rule
    Among other functions, transfer agents: (i) track, record, and 
maintain on behalf of issuers the official record of ownership of such 
issuer's securities; (ii) cancel old certificates, issue new ones, and 
perform other processing and recordkeeping functions that facilitate 
the issuance, cancellation, and transfer of both certificated 
securities and book-entry only securities; (iii) facilitate 
communications between issuers and securityholders; and (iv) make 
dividend, principal, interest, and other distributions to 
securityholders.\174\ To perform these functions, transfer agents 
maintain records and information related to securityholders that may 
include names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, employers, 
employment history, bank and specific account information, credit card 
information, transaction histories, securities holdings, and other 
detailed and individualized information related to the transfer agents' 
recordkeeping and transaction processing on behalf of issuers. With 
advances in technology and the expansion of book-entry ownership of 
securities, transfer agents today increasingly rely on technology and 
automation to perform the core recordkeeping, processing, and transfer 
services described above, including the use of computer systems to 
store, access, and process the customer information related to 
securityholders they maintain on behalf of issuers.
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    \174\ See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Concept 
Release, Transfer Agent Regulations, Exchange Act Release No. 76743 
(Dec. 22, 2015) [80 FR 81948, 81949 (Dec. 31, 2015)] (``2015 ANPR 
Concept Release'').
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    Like other market participants, systems maintained by transfer 
agents are subject to threats and hazards to the security or integrity 
of customer information,\175\ which could create a reasonably likely 
risk of harm to an individual identified with the information. 
Specifically, the systems maintained by transfer agents are subject to 
similar types of risks of breach as other covered institutions, and as 
a consequence, the individuals whose customer information is maintained 
by transfer agents are subject to similar risks of substantial harm and 
inconvenience as individuals whose customer information is maintained 
by other covered institutions. To account for this, the proposed 
definition of ``customer information'' with respect to a transfer agent 
would include ``any record containing nonpublic personal information . 
. . identified with any natural person, who is a securityholder of an 
issuer for which the transfer agent acts or has acted as transfer 
agent, that is handled or maintained by the transfer agent or on its 
behalf.'' \176\
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    \175\ As noted above in note 163, transfer agents typically do 
not have consumers or customers for the purposes of Regulation S-P, 
because their clients generally are not individual securityholders, 
but rather the issuers (e.g., companies) in which the individual 
securityholders invest. However, as noted above, they maintain 
extensive securityholder records in connection with performing 
various processing, recordkeeping, and other services on behalf of 
their issuer clients.
    \176\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(5)(ii).
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    In light of these risks, the proposed amendments would require 
transfer agents to protect the customer information they maintain by 
adopting and implementing appropriate safeguards in addition to taking 
measures to dispose of the information properly. Transfer agents would 
be required to develop, implement, and maintain written policies and 
procedures that address administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards for the protection of customer information. They would also 
be required to develop, implement, and maintain an incident response 
program, including customer notifications, for unauthorized access to 
or use of customer information.
The Disposal Rule
    Currently, the disposal rule only applies to those transfer agents 
``registered with the Commission.'' \177\ However, the proposed 
amendments would also extend the application of the disposal rule to 
all transfer agents, including those transfer agents that are 
registered with another appropriate regulatory agency other than the 
Commission, by defining transfer agent in the proposed definition of a 
``covered institution'' as ``a transfer agent

[[Page 20639]]

registered with the Commission or another appropriate regulatory 
agency.'' \178\
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    \177\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2)(i).
    \178\ Proposed rule 248.30(e)(3). See also discussion of 
Exchange Act Section 17A(d)(1) authority infra note 189.
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    When the Commission initially proposed the disposal rule, it noted 
that the purpose of section 216 of the FACT Act was to ``prevent 
unauthorized disclosure of information contained in a consumer report 
and to reduce the risk of fraud or related crimes, including identity 
theft.'' \179\ Through the disposal rule, the Commission asserted that 
covered entities' consumers would benefit by reducing the incidence of 
identity theft losses.\180\ At the same time, the Commission indicated 
that the disposal rule as proposed would impose ``minimal costs'' on 
firms in the form of providing employee training, or establishing clear 
procedures for consumer report information disposal.\181\ Further, the 
Commission proposed that covered entities satisfy their obligations 
under the disposal rule through the taking of ``reasonable measures'' 
to protect against unauthorized access or use of the related customer 
information, the rule was designed to ``minimize the burden of 
compliance for smaller entities.'' \182\ At adoption, a majority of 
commenters supported the flexible standard for disposal that the 
Commission proposed, and no commenter opposed the standard.\183\
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    \179\ Disposal of Consumer Report Information, Exchange Act 
Release No. 50361 (Sept. 14, 2004) [69 FR 56304 (Sept. 20, 2004)] 
(``2004 Proposing Release''), at 56308.
    \180\ Id. at 56308-09.
    \181\ Id.
    \182\ Id.
    \183\ See Disposal Rule Adopting Release, supra note 32.
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    The Commission believes that extending the disposal rule now to 
cover those transfer agents registered with another appropriate 
regulatory agency would provide the same investor protection benefits 
and impose the same minimal costs on such firms as in the case of 
transfer agents registered with the Commission. When coupled with the 
additional benefit of providing a minimum industry standard for the 
proper disposal of all customer information or consumer information 
that any transfer agent maintains or possesses for a business purpose, 
the Commission preliminarily believes that extending the disposal rule 
to now cover all transfer agents would be appropriate for the 
protection of investors, and in the public interest.
Statutory Authority Over Transfer Agents
    When the Commission initially proposed and adopted the disposal 
rule, it did so to implement the congressional directive in section 216 
of the FACT Act to adopt regulations to require any person who 
maintains or possesses a consumer report or consumer information 
derived from a consumer report for a business purpose to properly 
dispose of the information.\184\ The Commission determined at that time 
that, through the FACT Act, Congress intended to instruct the 
Commission to adopt a disposal rule to apply to transfer agents 
registered with the Commission.\185\ The Commission also stated at that 
time that the GLBA did not include transfer agents within the list of 
covered entities for which the Commission was required to adopt privacy 
rules.\186\ Accordingly, the Commission extended the disposal rule only 
to those transfer agents registered with the Commission to carry out 
its directive under the FACT Act, while deferring to the FTC to utilize 
its ``residual jurisdiction'' under the same congressional mandate, to 
enact both a disposal rule and broader privacy rules that might apply 
to transfer agents registered with another appropriate regulatory 
agency.\187\
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    \184\ See 15 U.S.C. 1681w.
    \185\ See 2004 Proposing Release, supra note 179, at n.23.
    \186\ Id. at n.27.
    \187\ Id.
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    Separate from these conclusions, however, under section 17A of the 
Exchange Act, the Commission has broad authority, independent of either 
the FACT Act or the GLBA, to prescribe rules and regulations for 
transfer agents as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for 
the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of securities and 
funds, or otherwise in furtherance of funds, or otherwise in 
furtherance of the purposes of Title I of the Exchange Act.\188\ 
Specifically, regardless of whether transfer agents initially register 
with the Commission or another appropriate regulatory agency,\189\ 
section 17A(d)(1) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to 
prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act with respect to any 
transfer agents, so registered. Once a transfer agent is registered, 
the Commission ``is empowered with broad rulemaking authority over all 
aspects of a transfer agent's activities as a transfer agent.'' \190\
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    \188\ 15 U.S.C 78q-1.
    \189\ See Exchange Act Section 17A(d)(1), 15 U.S.C 78q-1(d)(1) 
(providing that ``no registered clearing agency or registered 
transfer agent shall . . . engage in any activity as . . . transfer 
agent in contravention of such rules and regulations'' as the 
Commission may prescribe); Exchange Act Section 17A(d)(3)(b), 15 
U.S.C 78q-1(d)(3)(b) (providing that ``Nothing in the preceding 
subparagraph or elsewhere in this title shall be construed to impair 
or limit . . . the Commission's authority to make rules under any 
provision of this title or to enforce compliance pursuant to any 
provision of this title by any . . . transfer agent . . . with the 
provisions of this title and the rules and regulations 
thereunder.'').
    \190\ See Senate Report on Securities Act Amendments of 1975, S. 
Rep. No. 94-75, at 57.
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    Accordingly, as the FTC has not adopted similar disposal and 
privacy rules to govern transfer agents registered with another 
appropriate regulatory agency, the Commission is proposing to extend 
the safeguards rule to apply to any transfer agent registered with 
either the Commission or another appropriate regulatory agency and 
extend the disposal rule to apply to transfer agents registered with 
another appropriate regulatory agency (i.e., not the Commission). Here, 
the Commission has an interest in addressing the risks of market 
disruptions and investor harm posed by cybersecurity and other 
operational risks faced by transfer agents, and extending the 
safeguards rule and disposal rule to address those risks is in the 
public interest and necessary for the protection of investors and 
safeguarding of funds and securities.
    Transfer agents are subject to many of the same risks of data 
system breach or failure that other market participants face. For 
example, transfer agents are vulnerable to a variety of software, 
hardware, and information security risks that could threaten the 
ownership interest of securityholders or disrupt trading within the 
securities markets.\191\ Yet, based on the Commission's experience 
administering the transfer agent examination program, we are aware that 
practices among transfer agents related to information security and 
other operational risks vary widely.\192\ A transfer agent's failure to 
account for such risks and take appropriate steps to mitigate them can

[[Page 20640]]

directly lead to the loss of funds or securities, including through 
theft or misappropriation.
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    \191\ For example, a software or hardware glitch, technological 
failure, or processing error by a transfer agent could result in the 
corruption or loss of securityholder information, erroneous 
securities transfers, or the release of confidential securityholder 
information to unauthorized individuals. A concerted cyber-attack or 
other breach could have the same consequences, or result in the 
theft of securities and other crimes. See generally, SEC 
Cybersecurity Roundtable transcript (Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-roundtable/cybersecurity-roundtable-transcript.txt.
    \192\ See 2015 ANPR Concept Release, supra note 174, at 81985.
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    At the same time, the scope and volume of funds and securities that 
are processed or held by transfer agents have increased dramatically. 
The risk of loss of such funds and securities presents significant 
risks to issuers, securityholders, other industry participants, and the 
U.S. financial system as a whole. Transfer agents that provide paying 
agent services on behalf of issuers play a significant role within that 
system.\193\ According to Form TA-2 filings in 2021, transfer agents 
distributed approximately $3.8 trillion in securityholder dividends and 
bond principal and interest payments. Critically, because Form TA-2 
does not include information relating to the value of purchase, 
redemption, and exchange orders by mutual fund transfer agents, the 
$3.8 trillion amount noted above does not include these amounts. If the 
value of such transactions by mutual fund transfer agents was captured 
by Form TA-2 it is possible that the $3.8 trillion number would be 
significantly higher.\194\
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    \193\ We use the term ``paying agent services'' here to refer to 
administrative, recordkeeping, and processing services related to 
the distribution of cash and stock dividends, bond principal and 
interest, mutual fund redemptions, and other payments to 
securityholders. There are numerous, often complex, administrative, 
recordkeeping, and processing services that are associated with, and 
in many instances are necessary prerequisites to, the acceptance and 
distribution of such payments.
    \194\ For example, our staff has observed that, aggregate gross 
purchase and redemption activity for some of the larger mutual fund 
transfer agents has ranged anywhere from $3.5 trillion to nearly $10 
trillion just for a single entity in a single year.
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    By extending the safeguards rule and disposal rule to cover all 
transfer agents, the Commission anticipates the rules would be in the 
public interest and would help protect investors and safeguard their 
securities and funds. Specifically, extending the safeguards rule to 
cover any transfer agent in order to address the risks to the security 
or integrity of customer information found on the systems they maintain 
will help prevent securityholders' customer information from being 
compromised, which, as noted above, could threaten the ownership 
interest of securityholders or disrupt trading within the securities 
markets. It also would help establish minimum nationwide standards for 
the notification of securityholders who are affected by a transfer 
agent data breach that leads to the unauthorized access or use of their 
information so that affected securityholders could take additional 
mitigating actions to protect their customer information, ownership 
interest in securities, and trading activity. Similarly, extending the 
disposal rule to cover those transfer agents registered with another 
appropriate regulatory agency would help protect investors and 
safeguard their securities and funds by reducing the risk of fraud or 
related crimes, including identity theft, which can lead to the loss of 
securities and funds.
    The Commission acknowledges that if the proposal is adopted it 
would also impose costs on transfer agents that would be subject to 
both the safeguards rule and the disposal rule for the first time.\195\ 
For all transfer agents, such costs would include the development and 
implementation of the policies and procedures required under the 
safeguards rule, the ongoing costs of complying with required 
recordkeeping and maintenance requirements, and, in the event of the 
unauthorized access or use of their customer information, the costs 
necessary to comply with the customer notification requirements of the 
proposal. With respect to transfer agents registered with another 
appropriate regulatory agency that are not currently subject to the 
disposal rule, such costs would also include the same costs incurred by 
the transfer agents registered with the Commission that are currently 
subject to the disposal rule to establish written policies and 
procedures for consumer and customer information disposal, as well as 
the minimal employee training costs necessary to address adherence to 
those policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ See infra section III.D.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, because many of the transfer agents registered with 
another appropriate regulatory agency that are not currently subject to 
the disposal rule are banking entities subject to Federal and state 
banking laws and other requirements, it is likely that a large 
percentage of them already train their employees and have procedures 
for consumer report information disposal that likely would comply with 
the disposal rule.\196\ Further, although transfer agents would face 
higher costs of compliance from this proposal than those covered 
institutions already subject to the safeguards rule and the disposal 
rule, the Commission believes the additional cost to such transfer 
agents will be comparable to the costs of compliance that was incurred 
by covered institutions (such as registered investment advisers and 
broker dealers) when they first became subject to these rules.\197\ 
When considered in the context of protecting investors and safeguarding 
securities and funds, as discussed above, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that such costs are appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ See infra text accompanying notes 367-373.
    \197\ See Reg. S-P Release, supra note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We seek comment on the proposal to extend the application of the 
safeguards rule and the disposal rule to both cover all transfer 
agents.
    83. What would be the comparative advantages and disadvantages and 
costs and benefits of expanding the definition of customer information 
with respect to transfer agents? Is the proposed definition of 
``customer information'' appropriate with respect to transfer agents?
    84. Are some transfer agents, for example those that are registered 
with another appropriate regulatory agency, subject to duplicative or 
conflicting requirements as those that would be imposed under the 
safeguards rule? If so, please explain.
    85. Should the definition of ``customer information'' be expanded 
to cover other stakeholders or individuals whose information may be 
handled or maintained by a transfer agent, such as employees, investors 
or contractors? If so, please explain why.
    86. Are there particular concerns that transfer agents might have 
in implementing or meeting the requirements of the safeguards rule? 
Should we modify any of the requirements of the safeguards rule to take 
into account other regulatory requirements to which some transfer 
agents might be subject, or the differences between the operations of 
transfer agents and other covered institutions?
    87. Are there other registrants or market participants to whom we 
should extend the safeguards rule and the disposal rule? If so, which 
ones?
    88. Would transfer agents be subject to any compliance costs under 
this proposed rule that differ materially from those costs that covered 
institutions that are already subject to the safeguards rule and the 
disposal rule will have incurred through both past compliance, as well 
as the additional costs associated with this proposed rule? If so, 
please explain why and quantify these costs.
4. Maintaining the Current Regulatory Framework for Notice-Registered 
Broker-Dealers
    The proposed amendments would also continue to maintain the same 
regulatory treatment for notice-registered broker-dealers as they do 
under the current safeguards rule and the disposal rule. Notice-
registered broker-dealers are futures commission merchants and 
introducing brokers

[[Page 20641]]

registered with the CFTC that are permitted to register as broker-
dealers by filing a notice with the Commission for the limited purpose 
of effecting transactions in security futures products.\198\ These 
notice-registered broker-dealers are currently explicitly excluded from 
the scope of the disposal rule,\199\ but subject to the safeguards 
rule. However, under substituted compliance provisions, notice-
registered broker-dealers are deemed to comply with the safeguards rule 
where they are subject to, and comply with, the financial privacy rules 
of the CFTC,\200\ including similar obligations to safeguard customer 
information.\201\ The Commission adopted substituted compliance 
provisions with regard to the safeguards rule in acknowledgment that 
notice-registered broker-dealers are subject to primary oversight by 
the CFTC, and to mirror similar substituted compliance provisions 
afforded by the CFTC to broker-dealers registered with the 
Commission.\202\ When the Commission thereafter adopted the disposal 
rule, it excluded notice-registered broker-dealers from the rule's 
scope noting its belief that Congress did not intend for the 
Commission's FACT Act rules to apply to entities subject to primary 
oversight by the CFTC.\203\
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    \198\ See Registration of Broker-Dealers Pursuant to section 
15(b)(11) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act 
Release No. 44730 (Aug. 21, 2001) [66 FR 45138 (Aug. 27, 2001)] 
(``Notice-Registered Broker-Dealer Release'').
    \199\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2)(i).
    \200\ See 17 CFR 248.2(c) and 248.30(b). Under the substituted 
compliance provision in rule 248.2(c), notice-registered broker-
dealers operating in compliance with the financial privacy rules of 
the CFTC are deemed to be in compliance with Regulation S-P, except 
with respect to Regulation S-P's disposal rule (currently rule 
248.30(b)).
    \201\ See 17 CFR 160.30.
    \202\ See Notice-Registered Broker-Dealer Release, supra note 
198; see also CFTC, Privacy of Customer Information [66 FR 21236 at 
21252 (Apr. 27, 2001)].
    \203\ See 2004 Proposing Release, supra note 179, at n.23 
(stating ``There is no legislative history on this issue. As 
discussed in our recent proposal for rules implementing section 214 
of the FACT Act, Congress' inclusion of the Commission as one of the 
agencies required to adopt implementing regulations suggests that 
Congress intended that our rules apply to brokers, dealers, 
investment companies, registered investment advisers, and registered 
transfer agents. Consistent with that proposal, however, notice-
registered broker-dealers would be excluded from the scope of the 
proposed disposal rule.''); see also Limitations on Affiliate 
Marketing (Regulation S-AM), Exchange Act Release No. 49985 (July 8, 
2004); [69 FR 42302 (July 14, 2004)], at n.22 (stating ``We 
interpret Congress' exclusion of the CFTC from the list of financial 
regulators required to adopt implementing regulations under section 
214(b) of the FACT Act to mean that Congress did not intend for the 
Commission's rules under the FACT Act to apply to entities subject 
to primary oversight by the CFTC.'').
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    For these reasons, the Commission has tailored the proposed 
amendments to ensure there will be no change in the treatment of 
notice-registered broker-dealers under the safeguards rule and the 
disposal rule. First, the proposed rule would define a ``covered 
institution'' to include ``any broker or dealer,'' without excluding 
notice-registered broker-dealers, thus ensuring that Regulation S-P's 
substituted compliance provisions would still apply to notice-
registered broker-dealers with respect to the safeguards rule.\204\ 
Second, although the proposed disposal rule would also employ this 
proposed definition of a ``covered institution,'' it would retain the 
disposal rule's current exclusion for notice-registered broker-
dealers.\205\
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    \204\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(3); see also 17 CFR 248.2(c).
    \205\ See proposed rule 248.30(c)(1). The proposed rule would 
also include a technical amendment to 17 CFR 248.2(c), which, as to 
the disposal rule, provides an exception from the substituted 
compliance regime afforded to notice-registered broker-dealers for 
Regulation S-P. Specifically, section 248.2(c) would include an 
amended citation to the disposal rule, to reflect its shift from 17 
CFR 248.30(b) to proposed rule 248.30(c). See proposed rule 
248.2(c).
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    This approach will provide notice-registered broker-dealers with 
the benefit of consistent regulatory treatment under Regulation S-P, 
without imposing any additional costs, while also maintaining the same 
investor protections that the customers of notice-registered broker-
dealers currently receive. To the extent notice-registered broker-
dealers opt to comply with Regulation S-P and the proposed safeguards 
rule rather than avail themselves of substituted compliance by 
complying with the CFTC's financial privacy rules, the Commission 
believes the benefits and costs of complying with the proposed rule 
would be the same as those for other broker-dealers. Notice-registered 
broker-dealers should not face additional costs under the proposed 
amendments to the disposal rule, as they would remain excluded from its 
scope.
    We seek comment on the proposal to maintain the same regulatory 
framework for notice-registered broker-dealers under the safeguards 
rule and the disposal rule:
    89. Does the current regulatory framework for notice-registered 
broker-dealers under the safeguards rule and the disposal rule 
adequately protect investors who are clients of such institutions? If 
not, how is the current regulatory framework for notice-registered 
broker-dealers inadequate in this regard?
    90. Should the rule alter the scope of either rule's application to 
notice-registered broker-dealers? If so, what alterations should be 
considered, and why? What would the costs and benefits be of such 
alterations in approach?

D. Recordkeeping

    The proposed amendments would require covered institutions to make 
and maintain written records documenting compliance with the 
requirements of the safeguards rule and of the disposal rule. 
Specifically, the proposal would amend (i) Investment Company Act rules 
31a-1(b) and 31a-2(a) for investment companies that are registered 
under the Investment Company Act,\206\ (ii) Investment Advisers Act 
rule 204-2 for registered investment advisers,\207\ (iii) Exchange Act 
rule 17a-4 for broker-dealers,\208\ and (iv) Exchange Act rule 17Ad-7 
for transfer agents.\209\ The proposal would also include a 
recordkeeping provision in proposed rule 248.30(d) under Regulation S-P 
for investment companies that are not registered under the Investment 
Company Act (``unregistered investment companies'').\210\ In each case, 
the proposed amendments would require the covered institution to 
maintain written records documenting the covered institution's 
compliance with the requirements set forth in proposed rule 248.30(b) 
(procedures to safeguard customer information) and (c)(2) (disposal of 
consumer information and customer information).
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    \206\ See proposed rule 270.31a-1(b) and proposed rule 270.31a-
2(a).
    \207\ See proposed rule 275.204-2(a).
    \208\ See proposed rule 240.17a-4(e).
    \209\ See proposed rule 240.17ad-7(k). See also discussion on 
redesignation of 17 CFR 240.17Ad-7 as 17 CFR 240.17ad-7 supra note 
104.
    \210\ See proposed rule 248.30(d). Certain investment companies, 
such as some employees' securities companies, are not required to 
register under the Investment Company Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The records required pursuant to Investment Company Act proposed 
rules 31a-1(b) and 31a-2(a), proposed rule 248.30(d) under Regulation 
S-P, Investment Advisers Act proposed rule 204-2, Exchange Act proposed 
rule 17a-4, and Exchange Act proposed rule 17ad-7 would include, for 
example, records of policies and procedures under the safeguards rule 
that address administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the 
protection of customer information as well as the proposed incident 
response program for unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information, including customer notice. Covered institutions would also 
be required to make and maintain written records documenting, among 
other things: (i) its assessments of the nature and scope of any 
incidents involving unauthorized access to or use

[[Page 20642]]

of customer information; (ii) steps taken to contain and control such 
incidents; and (iii) its notifications to affected individuals whose 
sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have 
been, accessed or used without authorization, including, where 
applicable, any determinations, after a reasonable investigation of the 
facts and circumstances of an incident of unauthorized access to or use 
of sensitive customer information, that the sensitive customer 
information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a 
manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience, and the 
basis for that determination.\211\
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    \211\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(i)-(iii).
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    The rule proposals would also require covered institutions to keep 
records of those written policies and procedures requiring any service 
providers to take appropriate measures that are designed to protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of customer information, 
including notification to the covered institution as soon as possible, 
but no later than 48 hours after becoming aware of a breach, in the 
event of any breach in security resulting in unauthorized access to a 
customer information system maintained by the service provider to 
enable the covered institution to implement its response program, as 
well as related records of written contracts and agreements between the 
covered institution and the service provider.\212\ These records would 
help covered institutions periodically reassess the effectiveness of 
their policies and procedures, and determine whether they are 
reasonably designed, and would help our examiners and enforcement 
program to monitor compliance with the requirements of the amended 
rules.
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    \212\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(5)(i)-(ii).
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    With respect to the disposal rule, the proposed rules require that 
every covered institution adopt and implement written policies and 
procedures that address the proper disposal of consumer information and 
customer information.\213\ The proposed recordkeeping requirements are 
not intended to require covered institutions to document every act of 
disposing of an item of information. For example, a covered 
institution's periodic review and written documentation of its disposal 
practices generally should be sufficient to satisfy the proposed 
recordkeeping requirements as they relate to the disposal rule.
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    \213\ See proposed rule 248.30(c)(2). While the disposal rule 
does not currently require covered institutions to adopt and 
implement written policies and procedures, those adopted pursuant to 
the current safeguards rule should already cover disposal. See 
Disposal Rule Adopting Release, supra note 32, at 69 FR 71325 
(``proper disposal policies and procedures are encompassed within, 
and should be a part of, the overall policies and procedures 
required under the safeguard rule.''). Therefore, proposed rule 
248.30(c)(2) is intended primarily to seek sufficient documentation 
of policies and practices addressing the specific provisions of the 
disposal rule.
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    Under the proposed rules, the time periods for preserving records 
would vary by covered institution to be consistent with existing 
recordkeeping rules. Broker-dealers would have to preserve the records 
for a period of not less than three years, in an easily accessible 
place.\214\ Transfer agents would have to preserve the records for a 
period of not less than three years, in an easily accessible 
place.\215\ Investment companies registered under the Investment 
Company Act and unregistered investment companies would have to 
preserve the records, apart from any policies and procedures, for a 
period of not less than six years, the first two years in an easily 
accessible place; and in the case of any policies and procedures, 
preserve a copy of such policies and procedures in effect, or that at 
any time within the past six years were in effect, in an easily 
accessible place.\216\ Registered investment advisers would have to 
preserve the records for five years, the first two years in an 
appropriate office of the investment adviser.\217\ These proposed 
recordkeeping provisions, while varying among covered institutions, 
should result in the maintenance of the proposed records for 
sufficiently long periods of time and in locations in which they would 
be useful to staff examiners and the enforcement program. The proposal 
to conform the retention periods to existing requirements is intended 
to allow covered institutions to minimize their compliance costs by 
integrating the proposed requirements into their existing recordkeeping 
systems and record retention timelines.
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    \214\ See proposed rule 240.17a-4(e)(14).
    \215\ See proposed rule 270.31a-2(a)(8) (registered investment 
companies) and proposed rule 248.30(d)(2) (unregistered investment 
companies). Unregistered investment companies may have a third party 
maintain and preserve the records required by the proposed rule, but 
any such unregistered investment company will remain fully 
responsible for compliance with the recordkeeping requirements under 
the proposed rule.
    \216\ See id.
    \217\ See proposed rule 275.204-2(a)(20) and current rule 
275.204-2(e)(1).
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    We request comment on the proposed requirements for making and 
maintaining records, including the following:
    91. Are the records that we propose to require appropriate? Should 
covered institutions be required to keep any additional or fewer 
records? If so, what records and why?
    92. Should the rule limit the list of required records to 
assessments, containment or control measures or investigations only for 
certain information security incidents? Are some information security 
incidents not sufficiently consequential as compared to the amount of 
time required to record the institution's response? If so, please 
explain. How should the rule distinguish between information security 
incidents that require a record to be made and maintained and those 
that do not? If a record is not required for certain investigations, 
should a covered institution nevertheless be required to record a 
determination that sensitive customer information has not been, and is 
not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience?
    93. Are the proposed periods of time for preserving records 
appropriate, or should certain records be preserved for different 
periods of time? Should the recordkeeping time periods be the same 
across covered institutions? Would the costs associated with preserving 
records for periods of time consistent with covered institutions' 
existing recordkeeping requirements be less than if all covered 
institutions were required to keep these records for the same period of 
time?
    94. Are the rule proposals sufficiently explicit about the specific 
records that covered institutions must maintain? The proposed 
amendments for investment companies and registered investment advisers 
require these covered institutions to make and maintain written records 
documenting compliance with paragraphs (b)(1) and (c)(2) of Regulation 
S-P. In contrast, the proposed amendments for broker-dealers and 
transfer agents, specifically identify the records that should be 
maintained and preserved. Would investment companies and registered 
investment advisers benefit from additional specificity, such as 
requiring that investment companies and registered advisers keep the 
same records as those proposed to be required for broker-dealers and 
transfer agents? On the other hand, are the proposed rules for broker-
dealers and transfer agents too granular? Please explain why or why 
not. Should the rule specifically require that a covered institution 
keep records of requests to delay notice from the Attorney General of 
the United States or any other specific records? In what respect should 
the rule proposals be made more or less explicit?

[[Page 20643]]

E. Exception From the Annual Notice Delivery Requirement

    The GLBA requires financial institutions to provide customers with 
annual notices informing them about the institution's privacy 
policies.\218\ In certain circumstances, institutions must also provide 
their customers with an opportunity to opt out before the institution 
shares their information.\219\ Regulation S-P includes provisions 
implementing these notice and opt out requirements for broker-dealers, 
investment companies and registered investment advisers.\220\
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    \218\ 15 U.S.C. 6803(a). GLBA provisions regarding disclosure of 
nonpublic personal information are set forth in Title V, Subtitle A 
of GLBA, sections 501-509, codified at 15 U.S.C. 6801-6809.
    \219\ 15 U.S.C. 6802(b). Under Regulation S-P, an institution's 
customer is a ``consumer'' that has a continuing relationship with 
the institution. 17 CFR 248.3(j). Regulation S-P defines a 
``consumer'' as ``an individual who obtains or has obtained a 
financial product or service from you that is to be used primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes, or that individual's 
legal representative.'' 17 CFR 248.3(g).
    \220\ Regulation S-P provisions requiring institutions to 
provide notice and opt out to customers are set forth in 17 CFR 
248.1 through 248.18. Rule 248.5 sets forth requirements for annual 
notices and their delivery. See Reg. S-P Release, supra note 2.
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    In the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (``FAST 
Act''), Congress added new section 503(f) to GLBA (``statutory 
exception'').\221\ This provision provides an exception to the annual 
notice delivery requirements for a financial institution that meets 
certain requirements, and became effective when it was enacted on 
December 4, 2015.\222\
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    \221\ See FAST Act, Public Law 114094, section 75001, adding 
section 503(f) to the GLBA, codified at 15 U.S.C. 6803(f).
    \222\ Id.
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    We are proposing amendments to the annual notice provision 
requirement in Regulation S-P to include the exception to the annual 
notice delivery added by the statutory exception.\223\ In addition, we 
propose to provide timing requirements for delivery of annual privacy 
notices if a broker-dealer, investment company, or registered 
investment adviser that qualifies for the annual notice exception later 
changes its policies and practices in such a way that it no longer 
qualifies for the exception.\224\
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    \223\ See proposed rule 248.5(e)(1).
    \224\ See proposed rule 248.5(e)(2). In developing this 
proposal, as directed by GLBA, we consulted and coordinated with the 
CFTC, CFPB, FTC and the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, including regarding consistency and comparability 
with the regulations prescribed by these entities. See 15 U.S.C 
6804(a)(2). The proposed amendment implementing the exception under 
GLBA section 503(f) is designed to be consistent and comparable to 
those of the CFTC, CFPB, and FTC.
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1. Current Regulation S-P Requirements for Privacy Notices
    Currently, Regulation S-P generally requires a broker-dealer, 
investment company or registered investment adviser to provide an 
initial privacy notice to its customers not later than when the 
institution establishes the customer relationship and annually after 
that for as long as the customer relationship continues.\225\ If an 
institution chooses to share nonpublic personal information with a 
nonaffiliated third party other than as disclosed in an initial privacy 
notice, the institution must send a revised privacy notice to its 
customers.\226\
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    \225\ 17 CFR 248.4; 248.5.
    \226\ 17 CFR 248.8. Regulation S-P provides certain exceptions 
to the requirement for a revised privacy notice, including if the 
institution is sharing as permitted under rules 248.13, 248.14, and 
248.15 or to a new nonaffiliated third party that was adequately 
disclosed in the prior privacy notice.
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    Regulation S-P also requires that before an institution shares 
nonpublic personal information with nonaffiliated third parties, the 
institution must provide the customer with an opportunity to opt out of 
sharing, except in certain circumstances.\227\ A broker-dealer, 
investment company, or registered investment adviser is not required to 
provide customers the opportunity to opt out if the institution shares 
nonpublic personal information with nonaffiliated third parties (i) 
pursuant to a joint marketing arrangement with third party service 
providers, subject to certain conditions,\228\ (ii) related to 
maintaining and servicing customer accounts, securitization, effecting 
certain transactions, and certain other exceptions \229\ and (iii) 
related to protecting against fraud and other liabilities, compliance 
with certain legal and regulatory requirements, consumer reporting, and 
certain other exceptions.\230\
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    \227\ 17 CFR 248.10.
    \228\ 17 CFR 248.13.
    \229\ 17 CFR 248.14.
    \230\ 17 CFR 248.15.
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    The types of information required to be included in the initial, 
annual, and revised privacy notices are identical. Each privacy notice 
must describe the categories of information the institution shares and 
the categories of affiliates and nonaffiliates with which it shares 
nonpublic personal information.\231\ The privacy notices also must 
describe the type of information the institution collects, how it 
protects the confidentiality and security of nonpublic personal 
information, a description of any opt out right, and certain 
disclosures the institution makes under the FCRA.\232\
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    \231\ See 17 CFR 248.6(a)(2)-(5) and 248.6(a)(9).
    \232\ See 17 CFR 248.6(a)(1) (information collection); 
248.6(a)(8) (protecting nonpublic personal information), 248.6(a)(6) 
(opt out rights); 248.6(a)(7) (disclosures the institution makes 
under section 603(d)(2)(A)(iii) of the FCRA (15 U.S.C. 
1681a(d)(2)(A)(iii)), notices regarding the ability to opt out of 
disclosures of information among affiliates).
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2. Proposed Amendment
    Section 248.5 of Regulation S-P sets forth the requirements for an 
annual privacy notice, including delivery. We are proposing to add a 
new paragraph (e) to the section, which would include the statutory 
exception from the annual privacy notice requirement.\233\
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    \233\ The proposal also would clarify that the rule includes an 
exception by amending the general requirement in paragraph 
248.5(a)(1) that institutions provide the annual privacy notices to 
add the words ``Except as provided by paragraph (e) of this section 
. . .''.
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a. Conditions for the Exception
    To qualify for the statutory exception, a financial institution 
must satisfy two conditions.\234\ First, an institution must share 
nonpublic personal information only in accordance with the exceptions 
in GLBA sections 502(b)(2) and (e).\235\ These sections set forth 
exceptions to the requirement to provide customers an opportunity to 
opt out of the institution's information sharing with nonaffiliated 
third parties. Second, an institution relying on the exception cannot 
have changed its policies and practices with regard to disclosing 
nonpublic personal information from those that were disclosed in the 
most recent disclosure sent to consumers.\236\
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    \234\ See 15 U.S.C. 6803(f).
    \235\ See 15 U.S.C. 6803(f)(1).
    \236\ See 15 U.S.C. 6803(f)(2).
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    Our proposed amendment to Regulation S-P would implement the 
statutory exception. In particular, our proposed amendment would 
provide that a broker-dealer, investment company, or registered 
investment adviser is not required to deliver an annual privacy notice 
if it satisfies two conditions that reflect those the FAST Act added to 
the GLBA. First, an institution relying on the exception could only 
provide nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties 
in accordance with the exceptions set forth in Regulation S-P sections 
248.13, 248.14 and 248.15, which implement the exceptions to the opt 
out requirement in GLBA sections 502(b) and (e).\237\
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    \237\ Proposed rule 248.5(e)(1)(i).
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    Second, an institution cannot have changed its policies and 
practices with regard to disclosing nonpublic personal information from 
those it most recently

[[Page 20644]]

disclosed to the customer.\238\ Specifically, an institution would 
satisfy this condition if the institution's policies and practices 
regarding the information described under paragraphs 248.6(a)(2) 
through (5) and (9), each of which relates to the disclosure of 
nonpublic personal information, are unchanged from those included in 
the institution's most recent privacy notice sent to customers. We are 
not including in the exception the other information that an 
institution is required to include in its privacy notices pursuant to 
paragraph 248.6(a) because such other information either does not 
relate to the disclosure of nonpublic personal information \239\ or is 
not relevant to the exception.\240\ Our proposed approach to the 
condition is designed to be consistent with and comparable to that of 
the CFTC, CFPB, and FTC, which reference the same disclosures of 
nonpublic personal information in the conditions to the exceptions to 
their annual privacy notice delivery requirements.\241\
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    \238\ Proposed rule 248.5(e)(1)(ii).
    \239\ See paragraph 248.6(a)(1) (categories of information the 
institution collects) and paragraph 248.6(a)(8) (policies and 
practices with respect to confidentiality and security).
    \240\ See paragraph 248.6(a)(6) (requiring the notice to 
describe the customer's right to opt out of the information sharing, 
which would not be applicable for institutions that qualify for the 
proposed exception) and paragraph 248.6(a)(7) (requiring an 
institution's privacy notice to include any disclosures the 
institution makes under FCRA section 603(d)(2)(A)(iii), which 
describe sharing with an institution's affiliates and do not affect 
whether the statutory exception is satisfied); see also 15 U.S.C. 
603(d)(2)(iii) (excluding from the term ``consumer report'' 
communication of other information among persons related by common 
ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if it is clearly and 
conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may be 
communicated among such persons and the consumer is given the 
opportunity, before the time that the information is initially 
communicated, to direct that such information not be communicated 
among such persons).
    \241\ See CFTC, Privacy of Consumer Financial Information--
Amendment to Conform Regulations to the Fixing America's Surface 
Transportation Act, 83 FR 63450 (Dec. 10, 2018), at n.17; CFPB, 
Amendment to the Annual Privacy Notice Requirement Under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (Regulation P) 83 FR 40945 (Aug. 17, 2018), at 
40950; FTC, Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule Under the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 84 FR 13150 (Apr. 4, 2019), at 13153.
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b. Resumption of Annual Privacy Notice Delivery
    The statutory exception states that a financial institution that 
meets the requirements for the annual privacy notice exception will not 
be required to provide annual privacy notices ``until such time'' as 
that financial institution fails to comply with the conditions to the 
exception, but does not specify a date by which the annual privacy 
notice delivery must resume.\242\ Under our proposed amendment, when an 
institution would need to resume delivering annual privacy notices 
depends on whether or not it must issue a revised privacy notice.\243\
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    \242\ See supra note 231.
    \243\ Proposed rule 248.5(e)(2).
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    First, if a financial institution changes its policies so that it 
triggers the existing requirement to issue a revised privacy notice 
under rule 248.8, that institution would be required to provide an 
annual privacy notice in accordance with the timing requirement in 
paragraph 248.5(a).\244\ As noted above, Regulation S-P generally 
requires an institution to provide an initial privacy notice to an 
individual who becomes the institution's customer no later than when it 
establishes a customer relationship.\245\ Paragraph 248.5(a) requires a 
financial institution to provide a privacy notice to its customers 
``not less than annually'' during the continuation of any customer 
relationship. Thus, the rule provides institutions with the flexibility 
to select a specific date during the year to provide annual privacy 
notices to all customers, regardless of when a particular customer 
relationship began.\246\
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    \244\ Proposed rule 248.5(e)(2)(i).
    \245\ Rule 248.5(a)(1).
    \246\ Paragraph 248.5(a)(1) requires privacy notices to be 
delivered annually, which means at least once in any period of 12 
consecutive months during which the relationship exists. An 
institution can define the 12-consecutive-month period, but must 
apply it to the customer on a consistent basis. Paragraph 
248.5(a)(2) illustrates how to apply a 12-consecutive-month period 
to a given customer.
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    We propose to use the same approach to the resumption of delivery 
of annual privacy notices when a change in practice requires an 
institution to send a revised notice to customers.\247\ The revised 
privacy notice would be treated as analogous to an initial notice for 
purposes of determining the timing of the subsequent delivery of annual 
privacy notices. This would allow institutions to preserve their 
existing approach to selecting a delivery date for annual privacy 
notices, thereby avoiding the potential burdens of determining delivery 
dates based on a new approach.
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    \247\ See 17 CFR 248.8.
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    In the second circumstance, if the institution's change in policies 
or practices does not require a revised privacy notice, the institution 
would be required to provide an annual privacy notice to customers 
within 100 days of the change.\248\ This 100-day period is intended to 
provide timely delivery of the updated privacy notice to customers who 
were not informed prior to the institution's change in policies or 
practices. Moreover, we preliminarily believe that a 100-day period 
also generally avoids imposing significant additional costs on the 
institution. Any 100-day period will accommodate the institution 
delivering the privacy notice alongside any quarterly reporting to 
customers. Proposed paragraph 248.5(e)(2)(iii) provides an example for 
each scenario described above in which an institution must resume 
delivering annual privacy notices.
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    \248\ Proposed rule 248.5(e)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed timing requirements for when an institution no longer 
meets requirements for the exception and must resume delivering annual 
privacy notices are designed to be consistent with the existing timing 
requirements for privacy notice delivery in Regulation S-P, where 
applicable. The proposed timing requirements also are intended to be 
consistent with parallel CFTC, CFPB, and FTC rules.\249\ They also are 
intended to provide clarity to institutions when a change in policies 
and practices prevent an institution from relying on the annual privacy 
notice delivery exception. In addition, providing timing provisions 
consistent with those of the CFTC, CFPB, and FTC would facilitate 
privacy notice delivery for affiliated financial institutions subject 
to GLBA that are not broker-dealers, investment companies, or 
registered investment advisers.
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    \249\ See 17 CFR 160.5(D) (CFTC); 12 CFR 1016.5(e)(2) (CFPB); 16 
CFR 313.5(e)(2) (FTC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We request comment on the proposed exception to the annual privacy 
notice delivery requirement provisions, including the following:
    95. The proposed annual privacy notice exception is conditioned on 
a broker-dealer, investment company, or registered investment adviser 
not changing policies and practices related to the disclosure of 
nonpublic personal information (i.e., information on policies and 
practices required to be in a privacy notice under paragraphs 
248.6(a)(2) through (5) and (9)). Should the exception remain available 
when the institution makes minor or non-substantive changes to its 
policies and practices? If so, how should we define the scope of 
changes that would allow use of the exception?
    96. Should the proposed amendment include a provision for timing in 
these circumstances? Should the rule require an institution to provide 
notice by the time it has changed its disclosure policies and practices 
so that it no longer meets the proposed conditions of the rule in all 
circumstances? Should the proposed 100-day time period for

[[Page 20645]]

resumption of delivery of annual privacy notices be shorter or longer? 
For example, should the period be shorter, such as 30, 60, or 90 days? 
Should the period be longer, such as 120 or 150 days? Should it be a 
qualitative standard? Or a qualitative standard with an upper ceiling? 
Please explain.

F. Request for Comment on Limited Information Disclosure When Personnel 
Leave Their Firms

    The Commission requests comment on adding an exception from the 
notice and opt out requirements that would permit limited information 
disclosure when personnel move from one brokerage or advisory firm to 
another. The 2008 Proposal included an exception from the notice and 
opt out requirements to permit limited disclosures of investor 
information when a registered representative of a broker-dealer or a 
supervised person of a registered investment adviser (collectively, 
``departing personnel'') moved from one brokerage or advisory firm to 
another. The exception that was previously proposed would have 
permitted firms with departing personnel to share certain limited 
customer contact information and supervise the information transfer, 
and required them to retain the related records.\250\ To limit the risk 
of identity theft or other abuses, the shared information could not 
include any customer's account number, Social Security number, or 
securities positions.\251\ In the 2008 Proposal, the Commission noted 
that most firms seeking to rely on this proposed exception would not 
have needed to revise their GLBA privacy notices, because they already 
state in the notices that their disclosures of information not 
specifically described include disclosures permitted by law, which 
would include disclosures made pursuant to the proposed exception and 
the other exceptions provided in section 15 of Regulation S-P.\252\ 
Although a few commenters supported the exception as proposed, many 
expressed concerns about at least certain aspects of the 
exception.\253\
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    \250\ See 2008 Proposal, supra note 38, at 13702-04.
    \251\ See id. See 2008 Proposal, supra note 38, at 13703, n.94.
    \252\ See 2008 Proposal, supra note 38, at 13703, n.94.
    \253\ See e.g., Letter from Brendan Daly, Compliance Manager, 
Commonwealth Financial Network (May 12, 2008); Letter from Alan E. 
Sorcher, Managing Director and Associate General Counsel, SIFMA (May 
12, 2008); Letter from Michael J. Mungenast, Chief Executive Officer 
and President, ProEquities, Inc.; Julius L. Loeser, Chief Regulatory 
and Compliance Counsel, Comerica Tower at Detroit Center, Corporate 
Legal Department (May 9, 2008); and Letter from Becky Nilsen, Chief 
Executive Officer, Desert Schools Federal Credit Union (May 12, 
2008).
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    As noted above, the Commission is not adding an exception from the 
notice and opt out requirements in connection with this proposal. 
However, the Commission requests comment on whether to permit the 
limited disclosure of certain investor information when departing 
personnel move from one brokerage or advisory firm to another, 
including whether an exception from this proposal's notice and opt out 
requirements would be appropriate:
    97. Would adopting such an exception from the notice and opt out 
provisions of Regulation S-P be appropriate in light of the GLBA's 
goals? If so, is there a need for an exception to permit a limited 
disclosure of investor information when departing personnel moves from 
one brokerage or advisory firm to another? If so, what are other 
limitations, benefits, risks, or other considerations related to such 
an exception?

G. Other Current Commission Rule Proposals

1. Covered Institutions Subject to the Regulation SCI Proposal and the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal
a. Discussion
i. Introduction
    In addition to the Regulation S-P proposal, the Commission is 
proposing the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and is proposing to 
amend Regulation SCI.\254\ As discussed in more detail below, certain 
types of entities that would be subject to the proposed amendments to 
Regulation S-P would also be subject to those proposed rules, if 
adopted.\255\ As a result, such entities could be subject to multiple 
requirements to maintain policies and procedures that address certain 
types of cybersecurity risk,\256\ as well as obligations to provide 
multiple forms of disclosure or notification related to a cybersecurity 
event under the various proposals.\257\ While the Commission 
preliminarily believes that these requirements are nonetheless 
appropriate, it is seeking comment on the proposed amendments, given 
the following: (1) each proposal has a different scope and purpose; (2) 
the policies and procedures related to cybersecurity that would be 
required under each of the proposed rules would not be inconsistent; 
(3) the public disclosures or notifications required by the proposed 
rules would require different types of information to be disclosed, 
largely to different audiences at different times; and (4) it should be 
appropriate for entities to comply with the proposed requirements.
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    \254\ See Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and Regulation SCI 
Proposal, supra note 57.
    \255\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 through 1007 (Regulation SCI); 
Regulation SCI Proposal, supra note 57; 17 CFR 248.1 through 248.30 
(Regulation S-P); and Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, supra 
note 57.
    \256\ As discussed in more detail in the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, NIST defines ``cybersecurity risk'' as ``an 
effect of uncertainty on or within information and technology.'' See 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57.
    \257\ For example, with respect to cybersecurity, both 
Regulation SCI (currently and as it would be amended) and the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal have or would have provisions 
requiring policies and procedures to address certain types of 
cybersecurity risks. The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P also 
would require policies and procedures regarding cybersecurity risks 
to the extent that customer information or consumer information is 
stored on an electronic information system that could potentially be 
compromised (e.g., on a computer).
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    The specific instances in which the regulations, currently and as 
proposed to be amended, may relate to each other are discussed briefly 
below. In addition, we encourage interested persons to provide comments 
on the discussion below.
    More specifically, the Commission encourages commenters to identify 
any areas where they believe the requirements of the proposed 
amendments to Regulation S-P and the requirements of Regulation SCI 
(currently and as it would be amended) and the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal is particularly costly or creates practical 
implementation difficulties, provide details on what in particular 
about implementation would be difficult, and how the duplication will 
be costly or create such difficulties, and to make recommendations on 
how to minimize these potential impacts. In addition, the Commission 
encourages comments that explain how to achieve the goal of this 
proposal to reduce or help mitigate the potential for harm to 
individuals whose sensitive customer information has been accessed or 
used without authorization. To assist this effort, the Commission is 
seeking specific comment below on this topic.
b. Covered Institutions That Are or Would Also Be Subject to Regulation 
SCI and the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal
    Various covered institutions under this proposal are or would be 
subject to Regulation SCI (currently and as it would be amended) and 
the Exchange

[[Page 20646]]

Act Cybersecurity Proposal.\258\ For example, alternative trading 
systems (``ATSs'') that trade certain stocks exceeding specific volume 
thresholds are SCI Entities \259\ and would also be covered 
institutions subject to the requirements of the proposed amendments to 
Regulation S-P.\260\ Therefore, if the proposed amendments to 
Regulation S-P are adopted (as proposed), broker dealers that operate 
ATSs would be subject to its requirements in addition to the 
requirements of Regulation SCI that apply to the ATS (currently and as 
it would be amended).
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    \258\ See supra note 3 and surrounding text as to the meaning of 
``covered institution.''
    \259\ An ``SCI Entity'' is currently defined to include an ATS 
that trades certain stocks exceeding specific volume thresholds. As 
noted below, the Commission is proposing in the Regulation SCI 
Proposal to expand the scope of entities that would be considered 
SCI Entities. See 17 CFR 242.1000 and Regulation SCI Proposal, supra 
note 57.
    \260\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining the terms ``SCI alternative 
trading system,'' ``SCI self-regulatory system,'' and ``Exempt 
clearing agency subject to ARP,'' and including all of those defined 
terms in the definition of ``SCI Entity''). The definition of ``SCI 
Entities'' also includes plan processors and SCI competing 
consolidators.
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    The Commission is also proposing to revise Regulation SCI to expand 
the definition of ``SCI entity'' to include broker-dealers that exceed 
an asset-based size threshold or a volume-based trading threshold in 
national market system (``NMS'') stocks, exchange-listed options, 
agency securities, or U.S. treasury securities.\261\ These entities 
would also be Market Entities \262\ for the purposes of the Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal, if adopted as proposed. If the amendments 
to Regulation SCI are adopted and the proposed amendments to Regulation 
S-P are adopted (as proposed), these additional Market Entities would 
be subject to Regulation SCI and also would be subject to the 
requirements of the proposed amendments to Regulation S-P as well as 
the requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal (if 
adopted).
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    \261\ See Regulation SCI Proposal, supra note 57. See paragraph 
(a)(1)(i)(D) of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal proposed 
Rule. To be subject to the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, the 
broker-dealer would either be a carrying broker-dealer, have 
regulatory capital equal to or exceeding $50 million, have total 
assets equal to or exceeding $1 billion, or operate as a market 
maker. See also paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A), (C), (D), and (E) of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal proposed rule.
    \262\ See supra note 71 for a description of the entities 
subject to the definition of ``Market Entity'' under the Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal.
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    Additionally, broker-dealers and transfer agents that would be 
subject to the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal also would be 
subject to some or all of the requirements of Regulation S-P (currently 
and as it would be amended).\263\
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    \263\ Broadly, Regulation S-P's requirements apply to all 
broker-dealers, except for ``notice-registered broker-dealers'' (as 
defined in 17 CFR 248.30), who in most cases will be deemed to be in 
compliance with Regulation S-P where they instead comply with the 
financial privacy rules of the CFTC, and are otherwise explicitly 
excluded from certain of Regulation S-P's obligations. See 17 CFR 
248.2(c). For the purposes of this section II.G. of this release, 
the term ``broker-dealer'' when used to refer to broker-dealers that 
are subject to Regulation S-P (currently and as it would be amended) 
excludes notice-registered broker-dealers. Currently, transfer 
agents registered with the Commission (``registered transfer 
agents'') (but not transfer agents registered with another 
appropriate regulatory agency) are subject to Regulation S-P's 
disposal rule. See 17 CFR 248.30(b). However, no transfer agent is 
currently subject to any other portion of Regulation S-P, including 
the safeguards rule. See 17 CFR 248.30(a). Under the proposed 
amendments to Regulation S-P, both those transfer agents registered 
with the Commission, as well as those registered with another 
appropriate regulatory agency (as defined in 15 U.S.C. 78c(34)(B)) 
would be subject to both the disposal rule and the safeguards rule.
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c. Policies and Procedures To Address Cybersecurity Risks
i. Different Scope of the Policies and Procedures Requirements
    Each of the policies and procedures requirements has a different 
scope and purpose. Regulation SCI (currently and as it would be 
amended) limits the scope of its requirements to certain systems of the 
SCI Entity that support securities market related functions. 
Specifically, it does and would require an SCI Entity to have 
reasonably designed policies and procedures applicable to its SCI 
systems and, for purposes of security standards, its indirect SCI 
systems.\264\ While certain aspects of the policies and procedures 
required by Regulation SCI (as it exists today and as proposed to be 
amended) are designed to address certain cybersecurity risks (among 
other things),\265\ the policies and procedures required by Regulation 
SCI focus on the SCI entities' operational capability and the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets.
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    \264\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(1). Regulation SCI also requires 
that each SCI Entity's policies and procedures must, at a minimum, 
provide for, among other things, regular reviews and testing of SCI 
systems and indirect SCI systems, including backup systems, to 
identify vulnerabilities from internal and external threats. 17 CFR 
242.1001(a)(2)(iv).
    \265\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining ``indirect SCI systems''). 
The distinction between SCI systems and indirect SCI systems seeks 
to encourage SCI Entities that their SCI systems, which are core 
market-facing systems, should be physically or logically separated 
from systems that perform other functions (e.g., corporate email and 
general office systems for member regulation and recordkeeping). See 
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Release No. 34-73639 
(Dec. 5, 2014) [79 FR 72251], at 79 FR at 72279-81 (``Regulation SCI 
2014 Adopting Release''). Indirect SCI systems are subject to 
Regulation SCI's requirements with respect to security standards.
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    Similarly, Regulation S-P (currently and as it would be amended) 
also has a distinct focus. The policies and procedures required under 
Regulation S-P, both currently and as proposed to be amended, are 
limited to protecting a certain type of information--customer records 
or information and consumer report information \266\--and they apply to 
such information even when stored outside of SCI systems or indirect 
SCI systems. Furthermore, these policies and procedures need not 
address other types of information stored on the systems of the broker-
dealer or transfer agent. Consequently, while Regulation SCI and 
Regulation S-P may relate to each other, each serves a distinct 
purpose, and the Commission believes it would be appropriate to apply 
both requirements to SCI Entities that are covered institutions.
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    \266\ Or as proposed herein, ``customer information'' and 
``consumer information.'' See proposed rules 248.30(e)(5) and 
(e)(1), respectively.
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    The policies and procedures requirements of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal are broader in scope with respect to 
cybersecurity than either the current or proposed forms of Regulation 
SCI or Regulation S-P. The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would 
require Market Entities to establish, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to address their 
cybersecurity risks.\267\ Unlike Regulation SCI, these requirements 
would therefore cover both SCI systems and information systems that are 
not SCI systems. And, unlike Regulation S-P, the proposed requirements 
would also encompass information beyond customer information and 
consumer information. As discussed below, however, the narrower scope 
of the cybersecurity-related requirements discussed in this proposal 
are not intended to be inconsistent with the policies and procedures 
that would be required under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, 
despite the differences in scope and purpose, which could reduce 
duplicative burdens for entities to comply with both requirements.\268\
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    \267\ See paragraphs (b) and (e) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal (setting forth the requirements of Covered 
Entities and Non-Covered Entities, respectively, to have policies 
and procedures to address their cybersecurity risks).
    \268\ See infra section III.D.1.a.
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    To illustrate, a covered institution could use one comprehensive 
set of policies and procedures to satisfy the cybersecurity-related 
requirements of the Regulation S-P proposed

[[Page 20647]]

amendments and the cybersecurity-related policies and procedures 
requirements of the Regulation SCI Proposal and the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, so long as the cybersecurity-related policies 
and procedures required under Regulation S-P and Regulation SCI fit 
within and are consistent with the scope of the policies and procedures 
required under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, and the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal policies and procedures also 
address the more narrowly-focused cybersecurity-related policies and 
procedures requirements under the Regulation S-P and Regulation SCI 
proposals.
ii. Consistency of the Policies and Procedures Requirements
    The safeguards rule currently requires broker-dealers (but not 
transfer agents) to adopt written policies and procedures that address 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection 
of customer records and information.\269\ The safeguards rule further 
provides that these policies and procedures must: (1) insure the 
security and confidentiality of customer records and information; (2) 
protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or 
integrity of customer records and information; and (3) protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of customer records or information that 
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.\270\ 
Additionally, the disposal rule currently requires broker-dealers and 
transfer agents that maintain or otherwise possess consumer report 
information for a business purpose to properly dispose of the 
information by taking reasonable measures to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of the information in connection with its 
disposal.\271\
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    \269\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a).
    \270\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a)(1) through (3).
    \271\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2). Regulation S-P currently defines 
the term ``disposal'' to mean: (1) the discarding or abandonment of 
consumer report information; or (2) the sale, donation, or transfer 
of any medium, including computer equipment, on which consumer 
report information is stored. See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(1)(iii).
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    The proposed amendments to the Regulation S-P safeguards rule would 
require policies and procedures to include a response program for 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information. Further, the 
response program would need to be reasonably designed to detect, 
respond to, and recover from unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information, including procedures, among others, to: (1) assess the 
nature and scope of any incident involving unauthorized access to or 
use of customer information and identify the customer information 
systems and types of customer information that may have been accessed 
or used without authorization; \272\ and (2) take appropriate steps to 
contain and control the incident to prevent further unauthorized access 
to or use of customer information.\273\
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    \272\ Regulation SCI's obligation to take corrective action may 
include a variety of actions, such as determining the scope of the 
SCI event and its causes, among others. See Regulation SCI 2014 
Adopting Release, supra note 265, at 72251, 72317. See also 
Regulation SCI sec. 242.1002(a).
    \273\ See supra section II.A. As discussed, the response program 
also would need to have procedures to notify each affected 
individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is 
reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization unless the covered institution determines, after a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the 
incident of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer 
information, the sensitive customer information has not been, and is 
not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience. See id.
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    The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would have several policies 
and procedures requirements that are designed to address similar 
cybersecurity-related risks to these proposed requirements of 
Regulation S-P. First, under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, a 
Covered Entity's \274\ policies and procedures would require measures 
designed to detect, mitigate, and remediate any cybersecurity threats 
and vulnerabilities with respect to the Covered Entity's information 
systems and the information residing on those systems.\275\ Second, 
under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, a Covered Entity's 
policies and procedures would require incident response measures 
designed to detect, respond to, and recover from a cybersecurity 
incident, including policies and procedures that are reasonably 
designed to ensure, among other things, the protection of the Covered 
Entity's information systems and the information residing on those 
systems.\276\ Therefore, the incident response program policies and 
procedures requirements under the Regulation S-P proposal, which are 
specifically tailored to address unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information, would serve a different purpose than, and are not 
intended to be inconsistent with, the broader cybersecurity and 
information protection requirements of the incident response policies 
and procedures required under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal.
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    \274\ See supra note 71 for a description of the entities 
proposed as ``Covered Entities'' under the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal.
    \275\ See paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal proposed Rule; see also Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing this requirement in more 
detail).
    \276\ See paragraph (b)(1)(v) of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal proposed Rule; see also Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing this requirement in more 
detail).
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    Accordingly, policies and procedures implemented by a broker-dealer 
that are reasonably designed in compliance with the requirements of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal discussed above also should 
generally satisfy the existing policies and procedures requirements of 
the Regulation S-P safeguards rule to protect customer records or 
information against unauthorized access or use that could result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer, to the extent that 
such information is stored electronically and, therefore, falls within 
the scope of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal.\277\ In addition, 
reasonably designed policies and procedures implemented by a broker-
dealer or transfer agent in compliance with the requirements of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal also should generally satisfy the 
existing requirements of the disposal rule related to properly 
disposing of consumer report information, to the extent that such 
information is stored electronically and, therefore, falls within the 
scope of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal.
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    \277\ To the extent an entity's policies and procedures under 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would, or do, not satisfy 
the policies and procedures requirements in this proposal, we 
believe that the requirements proposed here, such as procedures to 
notify affected individuals whose sensitive customer information 
was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization, could be added to and should fit within the policies 
and procedures required under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal that more comprehensively address cybersecurity risks to 
the extent that such information is stored electronically. 
Furthermore, any burdens from the proposal that do not fit within 
the requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal may 
relate to the scope of Regulation S-P and would be appropriate given 
their purpose.
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    In addition, with respect to service providers, the proposed 
amendments to the safeguards rule would require broker-dealers, other 
than notice-registered broker-dealers, and transfer agents registered 
with the Commission or another appropriate regulatory agency to include 
written policies and procedures within their response programs that 
require their service providers, pursuant to a written contract, to 
take appropriate measures that are designed to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, including

[[Page 20648]]

notification to the broker-dealer or transfer agent as soon as 
possible, but no later than 48 hours after becoming aware of a breach, 
in the event of any breach in security resulting in unauthorized access 
to a customer information system maintained by the service provider to 
enable the broker-dealer or transfer agent to implement its response 
program expeditiously.\278\
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    \278\ See supra section II.A.3.
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    The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal also would have several 
policies and procedures requirements that are designed to address 
similar cybersecurity-related risks that relate to service providers. 
First, as part of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal's risk 
assessment requirements, a Covered Entity's policies and procedures 
under that proposal would need to require periodic assessments of 
cybersecurity risks associated with the Covered Entity's information 
systems and information residing on those systems.\279\ This element of 
the policies and procedures would need to require that the Covered 
Entity identify its service providers that receive, maintain, or 
process information, or are otherwise permitted to access the Covered 
Entity's information systems and any of the Covered Entity's 
information residing on those systems, and assess the cybersecurity 
risks associated with the Covered Entity's use of these service 
providers.\280\
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    \279\ See paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule; see also Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57, at section II.B.1.a. 
(discussing this requirement in more detail).
    \280\ See paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A)(2) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule.
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    Second, under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, a Covered 
Entity's policies and procedures would require oversight of service 
providers that receive, maintain, or process the Covered Entity's 
information, or are otherwise permitted to access the Covered Entity's 
information systems and the information residing on those systems, 
pursuant to a written contract between the Covered Entity and the 
service provider. Through that written contract the service providers 
would be required to implement and maintain appropriate measures that 
are designed to protect the Covered Entity's information systems and 
information residing on those systems.\281\ Unlike the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, however, Regulation S-P's proposed policy and 
procedure requirements related to service providers would specifically 
require notification to a covered institution as soon as possible, but 
no later than 48 hours after becoming aware of a breach, in the event 
of any breach in security resulting in unauthorized access to a 
customer information system maintained by the service provider, in 
order to enable the covered institution to implement its response 
program. Therefore, reasonably designed policies and procedures 
implemented by a broker-dealer or transfer agent pursuant to the 
requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal largely would 
satisfy these proposed requirements of Regulation S-P, to the extent 
that such information is stored electronically.\282\
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    \281\ See paragraphs (b)(1)(iii)(B) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule; see also Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing this requirement 
in more detail).
    \282\ See supra section II.A.3.
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    The proposed amendments to the disposal rule would require broker-
dealers, other than notice-registered broker-dealers, and transfer 
agents registered with the Commission or another appropriate regulatory 
agency that maintain or otherwise possess consumer information or 
customer information for a business purpose, to properly dispose of 
this information by taking reasonable measures to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of the information in connection with its 
disposal. Any broker-dealer or transfer agent subject to the disposal 
rule would be required to adopt and implement written policies and 
procedures that address the proper disposal of consumer information and 
customer information in accordance with this standard.\283\
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    \283\ See proposed rule 248.30(c).
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    The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would have several policies 
and procedures requirements that are designed to address similar 
cybersecurity-related risks as this proposed requirement of the 
disposal rule. First, a Covered Entity's policies and procedures under 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would need to include controls: 
(1) requiring standards of behavior for individuals authorized to 
access the Covered Entity's information systems and the information 
residing on those systems, such as an acceptable use policy; \284\ (2) 
identifying and authenticating individual users, including but not 
limited to implementing authentication measures that require users to 
present a combination of two or more credentials for access 
verification; \285\ (3) establishing procedures for the timely 
distribution, replacement, and revocation of passwords or methods of 
authentication; \286\ (4) restricting access to specific information 
systems of the Covered Entity or components thereof and the information 
residing on those systems solely to individuals requiring access to the 
systems and information as is necessary for them to perform their 
responsibilities and functions on behalf of the covered entity; \287\ 
and (5) securing remote access technologies.\288\
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    \284\ See paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule.
    \285\ See paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule.
    \286\ See paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(C) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule.
    \287\ See paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(D) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule.
    \288\ See paragraphs (b)(1)(ii)(A) through (E) of the Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule; see also Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing these requirements 
in more detail).
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    Second, under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, a Covered 
Entity's policies and procedures would need to include measures 
designed to protect the Covered Entity's information systems and 
protect the information residing on those systems from unauthorized 
access or use, based on a periodic assessment of the Covered Entity's 
information systems and the information that resides on the 
systems.\289\ The periodic assessment would need to take into account: 
(1) the sensitivity level and importance of the information to the 
Covered Entity's business operations; (2) whether any of the 
information is personal information; (3) where and how the information 
is accessed, stored and transmitted, including the monitoring of 
information in transmission; (4) the information systems' access 
controls and malware protection; and (5) the potential effect a 
cybersecurity incident involving the information could have on the 
Covered Entity and its customers, counterparties, members, registrants, 
or users, including the potential to cause a significant cybersecurity 
incident.\290\ A broker-dealer or transfer agent that implements these 
requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal should 
generally satisfy the proposed requirements of the disposal rule that 
customer information or consumer information held for a business 
purpose must be properly disposed of, to the extent that such 
information is stored electronically and, therefore, falls within the 
scope of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal.
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    \289\ See paragraph (b)(1)(iii)(A) of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule; see also Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing these requirements 
in more detail).
    \290\ See paragraphs (b)(1)(iii)(A)(1) through (5) of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal proposed Rule.
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    For these reasons, the more narrowly focused existing and proposed 
policies and procedures requirements of Regulation S-P that address 
particular

[[Page 20649]]

cybersecurity risks should fit within and are not intended to be 
inconsistent with the broader policies and procedures required under 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal that more comprehensively 
address cybersecurity risks. Therefore, it should be appropriate for a 
broker-dealer or transfer agent to comply with the policies and 
procedures requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal (if 
adopted) and the existing and proposed cybersecurity-related policies 
and procedures requirements of Regulation S-P with an augmented set of 
policies and procedures that addresses the requirements of both rules, 
to the extent that such information is stored electronically and, 
therefore, falls within the scope of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal.
d. Disclosure
    The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P and Regulation SCI, and 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal also have similar, but 
distinct, requirements related to notification about certain 
cybersecurity incidents. The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P 
would require broker-dealers, other than notice-registered broker-
dealers, and transfer agents registered with the Commission or another 
appropriate regulatory agency to notify affected individuals whose 
sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have 
been, accessed or used without authorization.\291\ These broker-dealers 
and transfer agents would not have to provide notice if, after a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the incident 
of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information, 
they determine that the sensitive customer information has not been, 
and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result 
in substantial harm or inconvenience.\292\ Moreover, if the 
cybersecurity incident is or would be an SCI event under the current or 
proposed requirements of Regulation SCI, a Covered Entity that is or 
would be subject to the current and proposed requirements of Regulation 
SCI also could be required to disseminate certain information about the 
SCI event to certain of its members, participants, or in the case of an 
SCI broker-dealer, customers, as applicable, promptly after any 
responsible SCI personnel has a reasonable basis to conclude that an 
SCI event has occurred.
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    \291\ See supra section II.A.4.
    \292\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, a Market Entity that 
is a Covered Entity would, if it experiences a ``significant 
cybersecurity incident,'' be required to disclose a summary description 
of each such incident that has occurred during the current or previous 
calendar year and to provide updated disclosures if the information 
required to be disclosed materially changes, including after the 
occurrence of a new significant cybersecurity incident or when 
information about a previously disclosed significant cybersecurity 
incident materially changes. These disclosures would be required to be 
made by filing Part II of proposed Form SCIR on EDGAR,\293\ posting a 
copy of the form on its corporate internet website, and, in the case of 
a carrying or introducing broker-dealer, by sending the disclosure to 
its customers using the same means that the customer elects to receive 
account statements.
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    \293\ The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would also require 
Covered Entities to publicly disclose summary descriptions of the 
cybersecurity risks that could materially affect the covered 
entity's business and operations and how the covered entity 
assesses, prioritizes, and addresses those cybersecurity risks on 
Part II of proposed Form SCIR. See Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing this requirement in more 
detail).
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    However, despite these similarities, there are distinct 
differences. First, the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, Regulation 
SCI (currently and as proposed to be amended), and Regulation S-P (as 
proposed to be amended) require different types of information to be 
disclosed. Second, the disclosures generally would be made to different 
persons: (1) the public at large in the case of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal; \294\ (2) members, participants, or customers, 
as applicable, of the SCI entity in the case of the Regulation SCI 
Proposal; \295\ and (3) affected individuals whose sensitive customer 
information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used 
without authorization or, in some cases, all individuals whose 
information resides in the customer information system that was 
accessed or used without authorization in the case of Regulation S-P 
(as proposed to be amended).\296\
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    \294\ A carrying broker-dealer would be required to make the 
disclosures to its customers as well through the means by which they 
receive account statements. As discussed above, the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal would require Covered Entities to make the 
public disclosures by (1) filing Part II of Form SCIR with the 
Commission electronically through the EDGAR system, and (2) posting 
a copy of the Part II of Form SCIR most recently filed on an easily 
accessible portion of its business internet website that can be 
viewed by the public without the need of entering a password or 
making any type of payment or other consideration. See Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing this requirement 
in more detail).
    \295\ Regulation SCI, as amended, would require SCI entities to 
disseminate information required under sec. 242.1002(c)(1) and 
(c)(2) of Regulation SCI promptly to those members, participants, or 
in the case of an SCI broker-dealer, customers, of the SCI entity 
that any responsible SCI personnel has reasonably estimated may have 
been affected by the SCI event, or to any additional members, 
participants, or in the case of an SCI broker-dealer, customers, 
that any responsible SCI personnel subsequently reasonably estimates 
may have been affected by the SCI event. See Regulation SCI 
Proposal, supra note 57 (discussing this requirement in more 
detail).
    \296\ Under the Regulation S-P and Regulation SCI proposals, 
there could be circumstances in which a compromise involving 
sensitive customer information at a broker-dealer that is an SCI 
entity could result in two forms of notification being provided to 
customers for the same incident. In addition, under the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, the broker-dealer also may need to publicly 
disclose a summary description of the incident via EDGAR and the 
entity's business internet website, and, in the case of an 
introducing or carrying broker-dealer, send a copy of the disclosure 
to its customers.
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    Additionally, the notification provided about certain cybersecurity 
incidents is different under each of these proposals given the distinct 
goals of each proposal. For example, the requirement to disclose 
summary descriptions of certain cybersecurity incidents from the 
current or previous calendar year publicly on EDGAR under the Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal serves a different purpose than the customer 
notification obligation proposed by the Regulation S-P amendments, 
which would provide more specific information to individuals affected 
by a security compromise involving their sensitive customer 
information, so that those individuals may take remedial actions if 
they so choose.\297\ For these reasons, the customer notification 
requirements of the proposed amendments to Regulation S-P are proposed 
to apply to covered institutions even if they would be subject to the 
disclosure requirements of Regulation SCI and/or the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal (as proposed).
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    \297\ Among other things, the disclosure requirements for 
certain cybersecurity incidents under the other proposals would 
serve the following purposes: (1) with respect to the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, the public disclosure would provide greater 
transparency about the Covered Entity's exposure to material harm as 
a result of the cybersecurity incident, and provide a way for market 
participants to evaluate the Covered Entity's cybersecurity risks 
and vulnerabilities; (2) with respect to the Regulation SCI 
Proposal, the dissemination would provide market participants who 
have been affected by an SCI event, including customers of an SCI 
broker-dealer, with information they can use to evaluate the event's 
impact on their trading and other activities to develop an 
appropriate response.

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[[Page 20650]]

a. Request for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on the multiple requirements under 
Regulation S-P (as currently exists and as proposed to be amended), the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, and Regulation SCI (as currently 
exists and as proposed to be amended). In addition, the Commission is 
requesting comment on the following matters:
    98. Would it be costly or create practical implementation 
difficulties to apply the proposed requirements of Regulation S-P to 
have policies and procedures related to addressing cybersecurity risks 
to covered institutions if these institutions also would be required to 
have policies and procedures under Regulation SCI (currently and as it 
would be amended) and/or the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal (if it 
is adopted) that address certain cybersecurity risks? If so, explain 
why. If not, explain why not. Conversely, would there be benefits to 
this approach? Why or why not? Are there ways the policies and 
procedures requirements of the proposed amendments to Regulation S-P 
could be modified to minimize these potential impacts while achieving 
the separate goals of this proposal? If so, explain how and suggest 
specific modifications.
    99. Would it be costly or create practical implementation 
difficulties to require covered institutions to provide notification to 
affected individuals under Regulation S-P (as proposed), as well as 
requiring disclosure for certain cybersecurity-related incidents under 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and Regulation SCI? If so, 
explain why. If not, explain why not. Conversely, would there be 
benefits to this approach? Why or why not? Are there ways the 
notification requirements of the proposed amendments to Regulation S-P 
could be modified to minimize the potential impacts while achieving the 
separate goals of this proposal? If so, explain how and suggest 
specific modifications.
2. Investment Management Cybersecurity
    On February 9, 2022, the Commission proposed new rules and 
amendments relating to the cybersecurity practices and response 
measures of registered investment advisers, registered investment 
companies, and business development companies (``covered IM 
entities'').\298\ The Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal 
would require written cybersecurity policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to address cybersecurity risks; disclosures regarding certain 
cybersecurity risks and significant cybersecurity incidents; 
confidential reporting to the Commission within 48 hours of having a 
reasonable basis to conclude that a significant cybersecurity incident 
has occurred or is occurring; and certain cybersecurity-related 
recordkeeping.\299\
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    \298\ See Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra 
note 55. The Commission has pending proposals to reopen comments for 
the Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, and to address 
cybersecurity risk with respect to different entities, types of 
covered information or systems, and products. The Commission 
encourages commenters to review those proposals to determine whether 
it might affect their comments on this proposal. See also 
Corporation Finance Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 55; Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal and Regulation SCI Proposal, supra note 
57.
    \299\ See Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra 
note 55, for a full description of the proposed requirements. The 
Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal includes recordkeeping 
requirements for advisers and funds--proposed amendments to rule 
204-2 under the Advisers Act and new rule 38a-2 under the Investment 
Company Act would require copies of cybersecurity policies and 
procedures, annual review and written report, documentation related 
to cybersecurity incidents, including those reported or disclosed, 
and cybersecurity risk assessments. These recordkeeping requirements 
center around cybersecurity incidents that jeopardize the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an adviser or fund's 
information or information systems, which may include customer 
information, but also includes other information, such as trading or 
investment information. In contrast, as discussed in section II.C, 
the proposed amendments to Regulation S-P require written records 
documenting compliance with the requirements of the safeguards rule 
and of the disposal rule.
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    If the Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal and this 
proposal are both adopted as proposed, covered IM entities would be 
required to comply with certain similar requirements under both sets of 
rules. Both sets of rules would require covered IM entities to have 
policies and procedures regarding measures to detect, respond to, and 
recover from certain security incidents. Both also address oversight 
over certain service providers as a part of the required policies and 
procedures, specifically, requiring the service provider to have 
appropriate measures that are designed to protect customer, fund, or 
adviser information, as applicable, pursuant to a written 
contract.\300\
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    \300\ The Commission proposed the Adviser Outsourcing Proposal 
in October 2022, which would prohibit registered investment advisers 
from outsourcing certain services or functions without first meeting 
minimum due diligence and monitoring requirements. See Advisers 
Outsourcing Proposal, supra note 94. Registered investment advisers 
that would be subject to the Adviser Outsourcing Proposal, if 
adopted, would also be subject to Regulation S-P, as proposed to be 
amended. The Adviser Outsourcing Proposal is meant to address 
service providers that perform covered functions (those necessary 
for the investment adviser to provide its investment advisory 
services in compliance with the Federal securities laws, and that, 
if not performed or performed negligently, would be reasonably 
likely to cause a material negative impact on the adviser's clients 
or on the adviser's ability to provide investment advisory 
services). See id. The Commission encourages commenters to review 
the Adviser Outsourcing Proposal to determine whether it might 
affect their comments on this proposal.
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    In addition to similar policies and procedures requirements, 
covered IM entities would potentially be required to make disclosures 
to the public and report to the Commission under the Investment 
Management Cybersecurity Proposal, as well as provide notice to an 
affected individual under Regulation S-P, for the same incident. The 
disclosure and reporting that would be required under the Investment 
Management Cybersecurity Proposal, however, differ in purpose from the 
notification that would be provided to individuals whose sensitive 
customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, 
accessed or used without authorization under the proposed amendments to 
Regulation S-P.\301\
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    \301\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4).
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    The disclosures and reporting contemplated in the Investment 
Management Cybersecurity Proposal would generally require disclosure of 
information appropriate to a wider audience of current and prospective 
advisory clients and fund shareholders, and would better inform their 
investment decisions, as well as provide reporting to the Commission of 
significant cybersecurity incidents.\302\ For example, advisers would 
be required to describe cybersecurity risks that could materially 
affect the advisory services they offer and how they assess, 
prioritize, and address cybersecurity risks created by the nature and 
scope of their business. The Investment Management Cybersecurity 
Proposal would also require disclosure about significant cybersecurity 
incidents to prospective and current clients, shareholders, and 
prospective shareholders. These disclosures are intended to improve 
such persons' ability to evaluate and understand relevant cybersecurity 
risks and incidents and their potential effect on adviser and fund 
operations. In contrast, as discussed in section II.A.4.f, the notices 
required under this proposal would provide more specific information to 
individuals whose

[[Page 20651]]

sensitive customer information notification was, or is reasonably 
likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization, so that 
they can take remedial actions as they deem appropriate.\303\ In other 
words, the Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal would provide 
more general information appropriate to the wider audience of current 
and prospective clients, shareholders, and prospective shareholders, 
where this proposal would provide more specific information to 
individual customers about their customer information.
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    \302\ See Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra 
note 55, proposed Form ADV-C reporting to the Commission includes 
both general and specific questions related to the significant 
cybersecurity incident, such as the nature and scope of the incident 
as well as whether any disclosure has been made to any clients and/
or investors.
    \303\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv) (includes information 
regarding a description of the incident, type of sensitive customer 
information accessed or used without authorization, and what has 
been done to protect the sensitive customer information from further 
unauthorized access or use, as well as contact information 
sufficient to permit an affected individual to contact the covered 
institution).
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    We intend that even if this proposal as well as the Investment 
Management Cybersecurity are adopted as proposed, covered IM entities 
would be able to avoid duplicative compliance efforts, including by, 
for example, developing one set of policies and procedures addressing 
all of the requirements from these proposals, using similar 
descriptions in the disclosures regarding the same incident, or 
providing the required disclosures as a single notice, where 
appropriate.\304\
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    \304\ See infra section III.D.1.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We request comment on the application of the proposal and the 
Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, including the following:
    100. How would covered IM entities comply with the policies and 
procedures requirements contemplated in this proposal? Would they do so 
by having an integrated set of cybersecurity policies and procedures? 
If not, what costs and burdens would covered IM entities incur? If so, 
what operational or practical difficulties may arise because of these 
combined policies and procedures?
    101. Should we modify any of the proposed requirements under this 
proposal for policies and procedures, service provider oversight, and/
or notification of certain incidents, in order to minimize potential 
duplication of similar requirements under the Investment Management 
Cybersecurity Proposal?
    102. What operational or practical difficulties, if any, may arise 
for covered IM entities that choose to comply with the disclosure 
requirements contemplated in this proposal and the Investment 
Management Cybersecurity Proposal by making substantially similar 
disclosures to market participants and customers? To the extent the 
proposed disclosure and notification requirements would result in 
duplication of effort, what revisions would minimize such duplication 
but also ensure investors and customers receive the information 
necessary to protect themselves and make investment decisions?
    103. Should we require notice to the Commission when notification 
is provided to individuals under this proposal? If yes, what form 
should that notification take (for example, a copy of what is provided 
to affected individuals under this proposal, or something similar to 
the significant cybersecurity incident reporting that would be required 
under the Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal for covered IM 
entities)? \305\ Should the timing of any such notification to the 
Commission be the same, before or later than notification to the 
affected individuals? \306\
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    \305\ See supra note 302.
    \306\ The Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal would 
require advisers to provide information regarding a significant 
cybersecurity incident in a structured format through a series of 
check-the-box and fill-in-the-blank questions on new Form ADV-C. See 
Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 55, at 
section II.B.
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    104. Do commenters believe there are additional areas of potential 
duplication or similarities between this proposal and the Investment 
Management Cybersecurity Proposal that we should address in this 
proposal? If so, please provide specific examples and whether the 
duplication or similarities should be addressed and if so, how.

H. Existing Staff No-Action Letters and Other Staff Statements

    Staff is reviewing certain of its no-action letters and other staff 
statements addressing Regulation S-P to determine whether any such 
letters, statements, or portions thereof, should be withdrawn in 
connection with any adoption of this proposal. We list below the 
letters and other staff statements that are being reviewed as of the 
date of any adoption of the proposed rules or following a transition 
period after such adoption. If interested parties believe that 
additional letters or other staff statements, or portions thereof, 
should be withdrawn, they should identify the letter or statement, 
state why it is relevant to the proposed rule, and how it or any 
specific portion thereof should be treated and the reason therefor. To 
the extent that a letter or statement listed relates both to the 
proposal and another topic, the portion unrelated to the proposal is 
not being reviewed in connection with any adoption of this proposal.

                  Letters and Statements To Be Reviewed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Name of letter or statement                  Date issued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Staff Responses to Questions about          January 23, 2003.
 Regulation S-P.
Certain Disclosures of Information to the   March 11, 2011; December 11,
 CFP Board.                                  2014.
Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer        April 16, 2019.
 Compliance Issues Related to Regulation S-
 P--Privacy Notices and Safeguard Policies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Proposed Compliance Date

    We propose to provide a compliance date twelve months after the 
effective date of any adoption of the proposed amendments in order to 
give covered institutions sufficient time to develop and adopt 
appropriate procedures to comply with any of the proposed changes and 
associated disclosure and reporting requirements, if adopted. The 
Commission recognizes that many covered institutions would review their 
policies and procedures at least annually. This compliance date would 
allow covered institutions to develop and adopt appropriate procedures 
in alignment with a regularly scheduled review. Based on our 
experience, we believe the proposed compliance date would provide an 
appropriate amount of time for covered institutions to comply with the 
proposed rules, if adopted.
    We request comment on the proposed compliance date, and 
specifically on the following items:
    105. Is the proposed compliance date appropriate? If not, why not? 
Is a longer or shorter period necessary to allow covered institutions 
to comply with one or more of these particular amendments, if adopted 
(for example, 18 months if longer, 6 months if shorter)? If so, what 
would be a recommended compliance date?
    106. Should we provide a different compliance date for different 
types of entities? For example, should we provide a later compliance 
date for smaller entities, and if so what should this be (for example, 
18 or 24 months)? How should we define a ``smaller entities'' for this 
purpose? Should any such definition be different depending on the type 
of covered institution and, if so, how?

[[Page 20652]]

III. Economic Analysis

A. Introduction

    The Commission is mindful of the economic effects, including the 
costs and benefits, of the proposed rules and amendments. Section 3(f) 
of the Exchange Act, section 2(c) of the Investment Company Act, and 
section 202(c) of the Investment Advisers Act provide that when 
engaging in rulemaking that requires us to consider or determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in or consistent with the 
public interest, to also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation. Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act also requires 
us to consider the effect that the rules would have on competition, and 
prohibits us from adopting any rule that would impose a burden on 
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the Exchange 
Act. The analysis below addresses the likely economic effects of the 
proposed amendments, including the anticipated and estimated benefits 
and costs of the amendments and their likely effects on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation. The Commission also discusses the 
potential economic effects of certain alternatives to the approaches 
taken in this proposal.
    The proposed amendments would require every broker-dealer,\307\ 
every investment company, every registered investment adviser, and 
every transfer agent to notify affected customers \308\ of certain data 
breaches.\309\ To that end, the proposed amendments would require these 
covered institutions to develop, implement, and maintain written 
policies and procedures that include an incident response program that 
is reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover from 
unauthorized access or use of customer information, and that includes a 
customer notification component for cases where sensitive customer 
information has been, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or 
used without authorization.\310\ The proposal would also extend 
existing rules for safeguarding customer records and information by 
broadening the scope of covered records to ``customer information'' and 
extending the covered population to transfer agents,\311\ impose 
various related recordkeeping requirements,\312\ and include in the 
regulation an existing statutory exception to annual privacy notice 
requirements.\313\
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    \307\ Notice registered broker-dealers subject to and complying 
with the financial privacy rules of the CFTC would be deemed to be 
in compliance with the proposed provision through the substituted 
compliance provisions of Regulation S-P. See supra section II.C.4.
    \308\ As discussed above, ``customers'' includes not only 
customers of the aforementioned SEC-registered entities, but also 
customers of other financial institutions whose information comes 
into the possession of covered institutions. In addition, with 
respect to a transfer agent, ``customers'' refers to ``any natural 
person who is a shareholder securityholder of an issuer for which 
the transfer agent acts or has acted as a transfer agent.'' See 
proposed rule 248.30(e)(4).
    \309\ Notification would be required in the event that the 
sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have 
been, accessed or used without authorization, unless such covered 
institution determines, after a reasonable investigation of the 
facts and circumstances of the incident of unauthorized access to or 
use of sensitive customer information, that of the sensitive 
customer information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to 
be, used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience. See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(i).
    \310\ See id.; see also supra section II.A.
    \311\ See proposed rule 248.30(a) and 248(e)(3).
    \312\ See proposed rule 248.30(d).
    \313\ See proposed rule 248.5(e).
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    The proposed amendments would affect the aforementioned covered 
institutions as well as customers who would receive the proposed 
notices. The proposed amendments would also have indirect effects on 
third-party service providers that receive, maintain, process or 
otherwise are permitted access to customer information on behalf of 
covered institutions: under the proposed amendments, unauthorized use 
of or access to sensitive customer information via third-party service 
providers would fall under the proposed customer notification 
requirement and covered institutions would be required to enter into a 
written contract with these service providers regarding measures to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer information 
and notification to the covered institution in the event of a 
breach.\314\
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    \314\ See infra section III.D.1.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the main economic effects of the proposal would 
result from the proposed notification and incident response program 
requirements applicable to all covered institutions.\315\ For reasons 
discussed later in this section, we believe the proposed extension of 
existing provisions of Regulation S-P to transfer agents would have 
more limited economic effects.\316\ Finally, we anticipate the proposed 
recordkeeping requirements, and the proposed incorporation of the 
existing statutory exception to annual privacy notice requirements, to 
have minimal economic effects as discussed further below.\317\
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    \315\ See infra section III.D.1.
    \316\ See infra section III.D.2.
    \317\ See infra sections III.D.3 and III.D.4.
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    Broadly speaking, we believe the main economic benefits of the 
proposed notification and incident response program requirements, as 
well as the proposed extension of Regulation S-P to all transfer 
agents, would result from reduced exposure of the broader financial 
system to cyberattacks. These benefits would result from covered 
institutions allocating additional resources towards information 
safeguards and cybersecurity to comply with the proposed new 
requirements and/or to avoid reputational harm resulting from the 
mandated notifications.\318\ More directly, customers would benefit 
from reduced risk of their information being compromised, and--insofar 
as the proposed notices improve customers' ability to take mitigating 
actions--by allowing customers to mitigate the effects of compromises 
that occur nonetheless. The main economic costs from these new 
requirements would be reputational costs borne by firms that would not 
otherwise have notified customers of a data breach, increased 
expenditures on safeguards to avoid such reputational costs, and 
compliance costs related to the development and implementation of 
required policies and procedures.\319\
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    \318\ While the scope of the safeguards rule and the proposed 
amendments is not limited to cybersecurity, in the contemporary 
context, their main economic effects are realized through their 
effects on cybersecurity. See infra note 343.
    \319\ Throughout this economic analysis, ``compliance costs'' 
refers to the direct costs that must be borne in order to avoid 
violating the Commission's rules. This includes costs related to the 
development of policies and procedures required by the regulation, 
costs related to delivery of the required notices, and the direct 
costs of any other required action. As used here, ``compliance 
costs'' excludes costs that are not required, but may nonetheless 
arise as a consequences of the Commission's rules (e.g., reputation 
costs resulting from disclosure of data breach, or increased 
cybersecurity spending aimed at avoiding such reputation costs).
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    Because all states require some form of customer notification of 
certain data breaches,\320\ and many entities are likely to already 
have response programs in place,\321\ we generally anticipate that the 
economic benefits and costs of the proposed notification requirements 
will--in the aggregate--be limited. Our proposal would, however, afford 
many individuals greater protections by, for example, defining 
``sensitive customer information'' more broadly than the current 
definitions used by certain

[[Page 20653]]

states; \322\ providing for a 30-day notification deadline that is 
shorter than the timing currently mandated by many states, including in 
states providing for no deadline or those allowing for various delays; 
and providing for a more sensitive notification trigger than in most 
states.\323\
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    \320\ See infra section III.C.2.a.
    \321\ See infra section III.C.3.
    \322\ See supra section II.A.4.b and infra section 
III.D.1.c.iii.
    \323\ See infra section III.D.1.c.iv.
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    Further, in certain states, state customer notification laws do not 
apply to entities subject to or in compliance with the GLBA, and our 
proposal would help ensure customers receive notice of a breach in 
these circumstances.\324\
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    \324\ See infra section III.D.1.c.ii.
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    For these reasons, the requirements being proposed here would 
improve customers' knowledge of when their sensitive information has 
been compromised. Specifically, we expect that the proposed minimum 
nationwide standard for notifying customers of data breaches, along 
with the preparation of written policies and procedures for incident 
response, would result in more customers being notified of data 
breaches as well as faster notifications for some customers, and that 
both these effects would improve customers' ability to act to protect 
their personal information. Moreover, such improved notification 
would--in many cases--become public and impose additional reputational 
costs on covered institutions that fail to safeguard customers' 
sensitive information. We expect that these potential additional 
reputational costs would increase the disciplining effect on covered 
institutions, incentivizing them to improve customer information 
safeguards, reduce their exposure to data breaches, and thereby improve 
the cyber-resilience of the financial system more broadly.
    To the extent that a covered institution does not currently have 
policies and procedures to safeguard customer information and respond 
to unauthorized access to or use of customer information, it would bear 
costs to develop and implement the required policies and procedures for 
the proposed incident response program. Moreover, transfer agents--who 
have heretofore not been subject to any of the customer safeguard 
provisions of Regulation S-P--would face additional compliance costs 
related to the development of policies and procedures that address 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection 
of customer information as already required by current Regulation S-
P.\325\
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    \325\ That is, the existing provisions of Regulation S-P not 
currently applicable to registered transfer agents. See 17 CFR 
248.30(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As adopting policies and procedures involves fixed costs, doing so 
is almost certain to impose a proportionately larger compliance cost on 
smaller covered institutions, which would--in principle--reduce smaller 
covered institutions' ability to compete with their larger peers (i.e., 
for whom the fixed costs are spread over more customers).\326\ However, 
given the considerable competitive challenges arising from economies of 
scale and scope already faced by smaller firms, we do not anticipate 
that the costs associated with this proposal would significantly alter 
these challenges. Similarly, although the proposed amendments may lead 
to improvements to economic efficiency and capital formation, existing 
state rules are similar in many respects to this proposal and so we do 
not expect the proposed amendments to have a significant impact on 
economic efficiency or capital formation vis-[agrave]-vis the baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \326\ See infra section III.D.1.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many of the benefits and costs discussed below are difficult to 
quantify. Doing so would involve estimating the losses likely to be 
incurred by a customer in the absence of mitigation measures, the 
efficacy of mitigation measures implemented with a given delay, and the 
expected delay before notification can be provided under the proposed 
rules. In general, data needed to arrive at such estimates are not 
available to the Commission. Thus, while we have attempted to quantify 
economic effects where possible, much of the discussion of economic 
effects is qualitative in nature. The Commission seeks comment on all 
aspects of the economic analysis, including submissions of data that 
could be used to quantify some of these economic effects.

B. Broad Economic Considerations

    In a perfectly competitive market, market forces would lead firms 
to ``efficiently'' safeguard customers' information: firms that fail to 
provide the level of safeguards demanded by customers would be driven 
out of the market by those that do.\327\ Among the several assumptions 
required to obtain this efficient outcome is that of customers having 
complete and perfect information about the firm's product or service 
and the processes and service provider relationships by which they are 
being provided, including customer information safeguards. In the 
context of covered institutions--firms whose services frequently 
involve custody of highly-sensitive customer information--this 
assumption is unrealistic. Customers have little visibility into the 
internal processes of a firm and its service providers, so it is 
impossible for them to directly observe whether a firm is employing 
adequate customer information safeguards.\328\ Moreover, firms often 
lack incentives to disclose when such information is compromised (and 
likely have substantial incentives to avoid such disclosures), limiting 
customers' (current or prospective) ability to penalize (i.e., avoid) 
covered institutions who fail to protect customer information.\329\ The 
resulting information asymmetry prevents market forces from yielding 
economically efficient outcomes. This market failure serves as the 
economic rationale for the proposed regulatory intervention.
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    \327\ In the highly stylized standard model of perfect 
competition presented in many introductory micro-economic texts, 
this ``efficient'' safeguarding of customer information would 
correspond to producing the one homogenous good (i.e., a service of 
a certain quality) demanded by the representative customer at its 
marginal cost. See, e.g., David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic 
Theory, Princeton University Press (1990).
    \328\ Here, ``adequate safeguards'' can be thought of as the 
level of safeguards that would be demanded by the representative 
customer in a world where the level of firms' efforts (and the costs 
of these efforts) were observable.
    \329\ The release of information about data breaches can lead to 
loss of customers, reputational harm, litigation, or regulatory 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Press release, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Equifax 
to Pay $575 Million as Part of Settlement with FTC, CFPB, and States 
Related to 2017 Data Breach (July 22, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-part-settlement-ftc-cfpb-states-related-2017-data-breach.
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    The information asymmetry about specific information breaches that 
have occurred, and--more generally--about covered institutions' efforts 
at avoiding such breaches, can lead to two inefficiencies. First, the 
information asymmetry prevents individual customers whose information 
has been compromised from taking timely actions (e.g., increased 
monitoring of account activity, or placing blocks on credit reports) 
necessary to mitigate the consequences of such compromises. Second, the 
information asymmetry can lead covered institutions to generally devote 
too little effort (i.e., ``underspend'') toward safeguarding customer 
information, thereby increasing the probability of information being 
compromised in the first place.\330\

[[Page 20654]]

In other words, information asymmetry prevents covered institutions 
that spend more effort on safeguarding customer information from having 
customers recognize their extra efforts.
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    \330\ For example, in a recent survey of financial firms, 58% of 
the respondents self-reported ``underspending'' on cybersecurity. 
See McKinsey & Co. and Institute of International Finance, IIF/
McKinsey Cyber Resilience Survey (Mar. 2020) (``IIF/McKinsey 
Report''), https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/content/cyber_resilience_survey_3.20.2020_print.pdf. A total of 27 companies 
participated in the survey, with 23 having a global footprint. 
Approximately half of respondents were European or U.S. Globally 
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). See also Investment 
Management Cybersecurity Proposal supra note 55.
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    The proposed amendments could mitigate these inefficiencies in 
three ways. First, by ensuring customers receive timely notice when 
their information is compromised, they would allow customers to take 
appropriate remedial actions. Second, by revealing when such events 
occur, they would help customers to draw inferences about a covered 
institution's efforts toward protecting customer information which 
could help inform their choice of covered institution,\331\ and in so 
doing influence firms' efforts toward protecting customer 
information.\332\ Third, by imposing a regulatory requirement to 
develop, implement, and maintain policies and procedures, the proposed 
amendments might further enhance firms' cybersecurity preparations and 
would restrict firms' ability to limit efforts in these areas and 
thereby mitigate the inefficiency from a competitive ``race to the 
bottom.'' \333\
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    \331\ In the case of transfer agents such effects would be 
mediated through firms' choice of transfer agents and therefore less 
direct. Nonetheless we believe that, all else being equal, firms 
would prefer to avoid employing the services of transfer agents that 
allow their investors' information to be compromised.
    \332\ See, e.g., Richard J. Sullivan & Jesse Leigh Maniff, Data 
Breach Notification Laws, 101 Econ. Rev. 65 (2016) (``Sullivan & 
Maniff'').
    \333\ The ``bottom'' in such a race is a level of cybersecurity 
spending that is too low from an efficiency standpoint.
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    The effectiveness of the proposed amendments at mitigating these 
problems would depend on several factors. First, it would depend on the 
degree to which customer notification provides actionable information 
to customers that helps mitigate the effects of the compromise of 
sensitive customer information. Second, it would also depend on the 
degree to which the prospect of issuing such notices--and the prospect 
of resulting reputational harm, litigation, and regulatory scrutiny--
helps alleviate underspending on safeguarding customer 
information.\334\ Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed amendments 
would also depend on the extent to which they induce improvements to 
existing practices (i.e., the extent to which they strengthen customer 
safeguards and increase notification relative to the baseline).
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    \334\ Although empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
notification breach laws is quite limited, extant studies suggest 
that such laws protect consumers from harm. See Sasha Romanosky, 
Rahul Telang, & Alessandro Acquisti, Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws 
Reduce Identity Theft?, 30 J. Pol'y. Ansys & Mgmt 256 (2011). See 
also Sullivan & Maniff, supra note 332.
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C. Baseline

    The market risks and practices, regulation, and market structure 
relevant to the affected parties in place today form the baseline for 
our economic analysis. The parties directly affected by the proposed 
amendments (``covered institutions'' \335\) include every broker-dealer 
(3,509 entities),\336\ every investment company (13,965 distinct legal 
entities),\337\ every investment adviser (15,129 entities) \338\ 
registered with the Commission, and every transfer agent (402 entities) 
\339\ registered with the Commission or another appropriate regulatory 
agency. In addition, the proposed amendments would affect current and 
prospective customers of covered institutions as well as certain 
service providers to covered institutions.\340\
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    \335\ See infra section III.C.3.
    \336\ Of these, 502 are dually-registered as investment 
advisers. See infra section III.C.3.a.
    \337\ Many of these distinct legal entities represent different 
series of a common registrant. Moreover, many of the registrants are 
themselves part of a larger family of companies. We estimate there 
are 1,093 such families. See infra section III.C.3.c.
    \338\ See infra section III.C.3.b.
    \339\ See infra section III.C.3.d.
    \340\ See infra section III.C.3.e.
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1. Safeguarding Customer Information--Risks and Practices
    Over the last two decades, the widespread adoption of digitization 
and the migration toward internet-based products and services has 
radically changed the manner in which firms interact with customers. 
The financial services industry has been at the forefront of these 
trends and now represents one the most digitally mature sectors of the 
economy.\341\ This progress came with a cost: increased exposure to 
cyberattacks that threaten not only the financial firms themselves, but 
also their customers. Cyber threat intelligence surveys consistently 
find the financial sector to be among the most attacked 
industries.\342\
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    \341\ See Michael Grebe, et al., Digital Maturity Is Paying Off, 
BCG (June 7, 2008), available at https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/digital-maturity-is-paying-off.
    \342\ See, e.g., IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2022 
(Feb. 2022), available at https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach/threat-intelligence.
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    The trend toward digitization has increasingly turned the problem 
of safeguarding customer records and information into one of 
cybersecurity.\343\ Because financial firms are part of one of the most 
attacked industries, the problem of cybersecurity is acute, as the 
customer records and information in their possession can be quite 
sensitive (e.g., personal identifying information, bank account 
numbers, financial transactions) and the compromise of which could lead 
to substantial harm.\344\ Not surprisingly, the financial sector is one 
of the biggest spenders on cybersecurity measures: a recent survey 
found that non-bank financial firms spent an average of approximately 
0.4% of revenues--or $2,348/employee/year--on cybersecurity.\345\
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    \343\ This is not to say that this is exclusively a problem of 
cybersecurity. Generally however, the risks associated with purely 
physical forms of compromise are of a smaller magnitude, as large-
scale compromise using physical means is cumbersome. The largest 
publicly known incidents of compromised information have appeared to 
involve electronic access to digital records, as opposed to physical 
access to records or computer hardware. For a partial list of recent 
data breaches and their causes see, e.g., Michael Hill and Dan 
Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO (Nov. 
8, 2022), available at https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2022); Drew Todd, Top 10 Data Breaches of All Time, 
SecureWorld (Sept. 14, 2022), available at https://www.secureworld.io/industry-news/top-10-data-breaches-of-all-time 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2022).
    \344\ See supra note 342.
    \345\ Julie Bernard et al., Reshaping the Cybersecurity 
Landscape, Deloitte Insights (July 24, 2020), available at https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/financial-services/cybersecurity-maturity-financial-institutions-cyber-risk.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2023). These spending totals represent self-
reported shares of information technology budgets devoted to 
cybersecurity. As such they are unlikely to include additional 
indirect costs such as the cost of employee time spent on compliance 
with cybersecurity procedures.
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    While spending on cybersecurity measures in the financial services 
industry is considerable, it may nonetheless be inadequate--even in the 
estimation of financial firms themselves. According to one recent 
survey, 58% of financial firms self-reported ``underspending'' on 
cybersecurity measures.\346\ And while adoption of cybersecurity best 
practices has been accelerating overall, some firms continue to lag in 
their adoption.\347\
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    \346\ See IIF/McKinsey Report, supra note 330.
    \347\ See EY and Institute of International Finance, 12th Annual 
EY/IIF Global Bank Risk Management Survey (2022), available at 
https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/content/32370132_ey-iif_global_bank_risk_management_survey_2022_final.pdf (stating 58% 
of surveyed banks' Chief Risk Officers cite ``inability to manage 
cybersecurity risk'' as the top strategic risk); see also Sage 
Lazzaro, Public cloud security `just barely adequate,' experts say, 
VentureBeat (July 9, 2021), available at https://venturebeat.com/business/public-cloud-security-just-barely-adequate-experts-say/ 
(noting that the majority of surveyed security professionals believe 
the cloud service providers ``should be doing more on security.'')

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[[Page 20655]]

    As discussed in more detail below, the Commission does not 
currently require covered institutions to notify customers (or the 
Commission) in the event of a data breach, so statistics relating to 
data breaches at covered institutions are not readily available. 
However, data compiled from notifications required under various state 
laws \348\ indicates that in 2021 the number of data breaches reported 
in the U.S. rose sharply to 1,862--a 68% increase over the prior 
year.\349\ Of these, 279 (15%) were reported by firms in the financial 
services industry. It is estimated that the average total cost of a 
data breach for a U.S. firm in 2022 was $9.44/million.\350\ The bulk of 
these costs is attributed to detection and escalation (33%), lost 
business (32%), and post-breach response (27%); customer notification 
is estimated to account for only a small fraction (7%) of these 
costs.\351\ Thus, for the U.S. financial industry as a whole, this 
implies aggregate notification costs under the baseline on the order of 
$200 million, which--given the greater exposure of financial firms to 
cyber threats--almost surely represent a lower bound.\352\
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    \348\ See infra section II.A.4.
    \349\ See Identity Theft Resource Center, Data Breach Annual 
Report (Jan. 2022) (``ITRC Data Breach Annual Report''), available 
at https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ITRC_2021_Data_Breach_Report.pdf.
    \350\ An increase of 4% over the prior year; see IBM, Cost of a 
Data Breach Report 2022 (July 2022) (``IBM Cost of Data Breach 
Report''), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/3R8N1DZJ. While the 
report does not provide estimates for U.S. financial services firms 
specifically, it estimates that world-wide, the cost of a data 
breach for financial services firms averaged $5.97 million, and that 
average costs for U.S. firms are approximately twice the world-wide 
average.
    \351\ See id.
    \352\ The $200 million figure is based on 7% (the customer 
notification portion) of an average cost of $9.44 million multiplied 
by 279 data breaches. See supra notes 349 and 350.
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2. Regulation
    Two features of the existing regulatory framework are most relevant 
to the proposed amendments. First are the regulations already in place 
that require covered institutions to notify customers in the event that 
their information is compromised in some way. Second are regulations 
that affect covered institutions' efforts toward safeguarding 
customers' information. While the relevance of the former is obvious, 
the latter is potentially more significant: regulations aimed at 
increasing firms' efforts toward safeguarding customer information 
reduce the need for data breach notifications in the first place. In 
this section, we summarize these two aspects of the regulatory 
framework.
a. Customer Notification Requirements
    All 50 states and the District of Columbia impose some form of data 
breach notification requirement under state law. These laws vary in 
detail from state to state, but have certain common features. State 
laws trigger data breach notification obligations when some type of 
``personal information'' of a state's resident is either accessed or 
acquired in an unauthorized manner, subject to various common 
exceptions. For the vast majority of states (47), a notification 
obligation is triggered only when there is unauthorized acquisition, 
while a handful of states (4) require notification whenever there is 
unauthorized access.\353\
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    \353\ See, e.g., notification requirements in California (Cal. 
Civ. Code sec. 1798.82(a)) and Texas (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code sec. 
521.002) triggered by the acquisition of certain information by an 
unauthorized person, as compared to notification requirements in 
Florida (Fla. Stat. sec. 501.171) and New York (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 
sec. 899-AA) triggered by unauthorized access to personal 
information. ``States'' in this discussion includes the 50 U.S. 
states and the District of Columbia, for a total of 51. All state 
law citations are to the August 2022 versions of state codes.
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    Generally, states can be said to adopt either a basic or an 
enhanced definition of personal information. A typical example of a 
basic definition specifies personal information as the customer name 
linked to one or more pieces of nonpublic information such as Social 
Security number, driver's license number (or other state identification 
number), or financial account number together with any required 
credentials to permit access to said account.\354\ A typical enhanced 
definition will include additional types of nonpublic information that 
trigger the notification requirement; examples include: passport 
number, military identification number, or other unique identification 
number issued on a government document commonly used to verify the 
identity of a specific individual; unique biometric data generated from 
measurements or technical analysis of human body characteristics, such 
as a fingerprint, retina, or iris image, used to authenticate a 
specific individual.\355\ Enhanced definitions would also trigger 
notification when a username or email address in combination with a 
password or security question and answer that would permit access to an 
online account is compromised.\356\ Most states (39) adopt some form of 
enhanced definition, while a minority (12) adopt a basic definition.
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    \354\ See, e.g., Kan. Stat. sec. 50-7a01(g) or Minn. Stat. sec. 
325E.61(e).
    \355\ See, e.g., Md. Comm. Code sec. 14-3501, (defining 
``personal information'' to include credit card numbers, health 
information, health insurance information, and biometric data such 
as retina or fingerprint).
    \356\ See, e.g., Arizona Code sec. 18-551 (defining ``personal 
information'' to include an individual's user name or email address, 
in combination with a password or security question and answer, that 
allows access to an online account).
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    Most states (43) provide an exception to the notification 
requirement if, following a breach of security, the entity investigates 
and determines that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
individual whose personal information was breached has experienced or 
will experience certain harms (``no-harm exception'').\357\ Although 
the types of harms vary by state, they most commonly include: ``harm'' 
generally (12), identity theft or other fraud (10), misuse of personal 
information (8). Figure 1 plots the frequency of the various types of 
harms referenced in states' no-harm exceptions.
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    \357\ See, e.g., Fla. Stat. sec. 501.171(4)(c). A variation on 
this exception provides for notification only if the investigation 
reveals a risk of misuse. See, e.g., Utah Code 13-44-202(1). Eight 
states, including California and Texas, do not have a no-harm 
exception.

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[[Page 20656]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AP23.000

    In general, state laws provide a general principle for timing of 
notification (e.g., delivery shall be made ``without unreasonable 
delay,'' or ``in the most expedient time possible and without 
unreasonable delay'').\358\ Some states augment the general principle 
with a specific deadline (e.g., notice must be made ``in the most 
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, but not later 
than 30 days after the date of determination that the breach occurred'' 
unless certain exceptions apply.'' \359\ Figure 2 plots the frequency 
of different notification deadlines in state laws.
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    \358\ See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1798.82(a) (disclosure to 
be made ``in the most expedient time possible and without 
unreasonable delay'' but allowing for needs of law enforcement and 
measures to determine the scope of the breach and restore the 
system).
    \359\ See, e.g., Colo. Reg. Stat. sec. 6-1-716 (notice to be 
made ``in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable 
delay, but not later than thirty days after the date of 
determination that a security breach occurred, consistent with the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement and consistent with any measures 
necessary to determine the scope of the breach and to restore the 
reasonable integrity of the computerized data system''); Fla. Stat. 
sec. 501.171(4)(a) (notice to be made ``as expeditiously as 
practicable and without unreasonable delay . . . but no later than 
30 days after the determination of a breach'' unless delayed at the 
request of law enforcement or waived pursuant to the state's no-harm 
exception).

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[[Page 20657]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AP23.002


    State laws generally require persons or entities that own or 
license computerized data that includes private information to notify 
residents of the state when a data breach results in the compromise of 
their private information. In addition, state laws generally require 
persons and entities that do not own or license such computerized data, 
but that maintain such computerized data for other entities, to notify 
the affected entity in the event of a data breach (so as to allow that 
entity to notify affected individuals).\360\ Therefore, we understand 
that all proposed covered institutions are already complying with one 
or more state notification laws. Variations in these state laws, 
however, could result in residents of one state receiving notice while 
residents of another receive no notice, or receive it later, for the 
same data breach incident.
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    \360\ See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1798.82(b); DC Code 28-
3852(b); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law sec. 899-AA(3); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 
sec. 521.053(c). South Dakota does not have such a provision (SDCL 
sec. 22-40-19 through 22-40-26). In some states, notification from 
the service provider to the information owner is required only in 
the case of fraud or misuse. See, e.g., Miss. Code sec. 75-24-29 
(requiring notification if the information was or is reasonably 
believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person for 
fraudulent purposes); Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 6-1-716 (requiring 
notification if misuse of personal information about a Colorado 
resident occurred or is likely to occur).
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    Covered institutions may use service providers to perform certain 
business activities and functions, such as trading and order 
management, information technology functions and cloud computing 
services. As a result of this outsourcing, service providers may 
receive, maintain, or process customer information, or be permitted to 
access it, and therefore a security incident at the service provider 
could expose information at or belonging to the covered institution. In 
some cases, these service providers may be required to notify customers 
directly under state notification laws (i.e., when the service provider 
owns or licenses the customer data). We anticipate however, that more 
frequently service providers would fall under provisions of state laws 
that require persons and entities that maintain computerized data to 
notify the data owners in the event of a breach.\361\ We also 
understand contracts between covered institutions and service providers 
could, and may already, call for the service provider to notify the 
covered institution of a data breach. Thus, we anticipate that most 
service providers contracting with covered institutions that would be 
affected by this proposal are already notifying covered institutions of 
data breaches, pursuant to either contract or state law.\362\
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    \361\ Many service providers may not own the data and may not 
have knowledge as to which customers are potentially affected by a 
data breach (e.g., database, email, or server hosting providers). In 
such cases, it would generally not be possible for service providers 
to notify affected customers directly.
    \362\ Several state laws provide that a covered institution may 
contract with the service provider such that the service provider 
directly notifies affected individuals of a data breach. We do not 
have information on the frequency of such arrangements. See, e.g., 
Fla. Stat. sec. 501.171(6)(b); Ala. Code sec. 8-38-8.
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b. Customer Information Safeguards
    Regulation S-P currently requires all currently covered 
institutions to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to: (i) insure the security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information; (ii) protect against any anticipated threats 
or hazards to the security or integrity of customer records and 
information; and (iii) protect against unauthorized access to or use of 
customer records and information that could result in substantial harm 
or inconvenience to any customer.\363\
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    \363\ See Reg. S-P Release, supra note 2; see also Disposal Rule 
Adopting Release, supra note 32 (requiring written policies and 
procedures under Regulation S-P). See Compliance Programs of 
Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2204 (Dec. 17, 2003) [68 FR 74714 (Dec. 24, 2003)], 
at n.22 (``Compliance Program Release'') (stating expectation that 
policies and procedures would address safeguards for the privacy 
protection of client records and information and noting the 
applicability of Regulation S-P).
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    Covered institutions that hold transactional accounts for consumers 
may also be subject to Regulation S-ID.\364\ Such entities must develop 
and

[[Page 20658]]

implement a written identity theft program that includes policies and 
procedures to identify relevant types of identity theft red flags, 
detect the occurrence of those red flags, and respond appropriately to 
the detected red flags.\365\ As some compromise of customer information 
is generally a prerequisite for identity theft, it is reasonable to 
expect that some of the policies and procedures implemented to effect 
compliance with Regulation S-ID incorporate red flags related to the 
potential compromise of customer information.\366\
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    \364\ Regulation S-ID applies to ``financial institutions'' or 
``creditors'' that offer or maintain ``covered accounts.'' Entities 
that are likely to qualify as financial institutions or creditors 
and maintain covered accounts include most registered brokers, 
dealers, and investment companies, and some registered investment 
advisers. See Reg. S-P Release, supra note 2; see also Identity 
Theft Red Flag Rules, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3582 (Apr. 
10, 2013) [78 FR 23637 (Apr. 19, 2013)] (``Identity Theft 
Release'').
    \365\ In addition, affected entities must also periodically 
update their identity theft programs. See Reg. S-P Release, supra 
note 2. Other rules also require updates to policies and procedures 
at regular intervals: see, e.g., Rule 38a-1 under the Investment 
Company Act; FINRA Rule 3120 (Supervisory Control System); and FINRA 
Rule 3130 (Annual Certification of Compliance and Supervisory 
Processes).
    \366\ In a 2017 Risk Alert, the SEC Office of Compliance 
Inspections and Examinations noted that in a sampling of 
registrants, nearly all broker-dealers and most advisers had 
specific cybersecurity and Regulation S-ID policies and procedures. 
See EXAMS Risk Report, Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations 
(Aug. 7, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-from-cybersecurity-examinations.pdf. See also Identity Theft 
Release, supra note 364.
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    Some covered institutions may also be subject to other regulators' 
rules implicating customer information safeguards. Transfer agents 
supervised by one of the banking agencies, would be subject to the 
Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance.\367\ The Banking 
Agencies' guidelines require covered financial institutions to develop 
a response program covering assessment, notification to relevant 
regulators and law enforcement, incident containment, and customer 
notice.\368\ The guidelines require customer notification if misuse of 
sensitive customer information ``has occurred or is reasonably 
possible.'' \369\ They also require notices to occur ``as soon as 
possible,'' but permit delays if ``an appropriate law enforcement 
agency determines that notification will interfere with a criminal 
investigation and provides the institution with a written request for 
the delay.'' \370\ Under the guidelines, ``sensitive customer 
information'' means ``a customer's name, address, or telephone number, 
in conjunction with the customer's Social Security number, driver's 
license number, account number, credit or debit card number, or a 
personal identification number or password that would permit access to 
the customer's account.'' \371\ In addition ``any combination of 
components of customer information that would allow someone to log onto 
or access the customer's account, such as user name and password or 
password and account number'' is also considered sensitive customer 
information under the guidelines.\372\ The guidelines also state that 
the OCC Information Security Guidance directs every financial 
institution to require its service providers by contract to implement 
appropriate measures designed to protect against unauthorized access to 
or use of customer information that could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer.\373\
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    \367\ See Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance, supra 
note 47.
    \368\ See id. at Supplement A, section II.A.
    \369\ See id. at Supplement A, section III.A.
    \370\ See id. at Supplement A, section III.A.
    \371\ See id. at Supplement A, section III.A.1.
    \372\ See id. at Supplement A, section III.A.1.
    \373\ See id. at Supplement A, section I.C.
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    In addition, certain ATSs are subject to obligations regarding 
their systems that relate to securities market functions under 
Regulation SCI aimed at enhancing the capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security of those systems.\374\
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    \374\ See Rule 1001 of Regulation SCI. See supra note 57.
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    We also understand that advisers to private funds may be subject to 
the Federal Trade Commission's recently amended Standards for 
Safeguarding Customer Information (``FTC Safeguards Rule'') that 
contains a number of modifications to the existing rule with respect to 
data security requirements to protect customer financial 
information.\375\ The FTC Safeguards Rule generally requires financial 
institutions to develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive 
information security program that consists of the administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards the financial institution uses to 
access, collect, distribute, process, protect, store, use, transmit, 
dispose of, or otherwise handle customer information.\376\ The rule 
also requires financial institutions to design and implement a 
comprehensive information security program with various elements, 
including incident response. In addition, it requires financial 
institutions to take reasonable steps to select and retain service 
providers capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards for customer 
information and require those service providers by contract to 
implement and maintain such safeguards.\377\
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    \375\ Issuers that are excluded from the definition of 
investment company--such as private funds that are able to rely on 
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act--would not 
be subject to Regulation S-P. However, registered investment 
advisers are covered institutions for purposes of this proposal.
    \376\ 16 CFR 314.2(c). The FTC Safeguards Rule does not contain 
a notification requirement.
    \377\ 16 CFR 314.4(d).
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    A variety of guidance is available to institutions seeking to 
address information security risk, particularly through the development 
of policies and procedures. These include the NIST and CISA voluntary 
standards \378\ discussed elsewhere in this release, both of which 
include assessment, containment, and notification elements similar to 
this proposal. We do not have extensive data spanning all types of 
covered institutions on their use of these or similar guidelines or on 
their development of written policies and procedures to address 
incident response. However, past Commission examination sweeps of 
broker-dealers and investment advisers suggest that such practices are 
widespread.\379\ Thus, we believe that institutions seeking to develop 
written policies and procedures likely would have encountered these and 
similar standards and may have included the critical elements of 
assessment and containment, as well as notification; we request public 
comment on this assumption.
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    \378\ See NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide and 
CISA Cybersecurity Incident Response Playbook supra note 81.
    \379\ See OCIE, SEC, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary 
(Feb. 3, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/cybersecurity-examination-sweep-summary.pdf (written policies and 
procedures, for both the broker-dealers (82%) and the advisers 
(51%), discuss mitigating the effects of a cybersecurity incident 
and/or outline the plan to recover from such an incident. Similarly, 
most of the broker-dealers (88%) and many of the advisers (53%) 
reference published cybersecurity risk management standards).
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c. Annual Notice Delivery Requirement
    Under the baseline,\380\ a broker-dealer, investment company, or 
registered investment adviser must generally provide an initial privacy 
notice to its customers not later than when the institution establishes 
the customer relationship and annually after that for as long as the 
customer relationship continues.\381\ If an institution chooses to 
share nonpublic personal information with a nonaffiliated third party 
other than as disclosed in an initial privacy notice, the institution 
must generally send a revised privacy notice to its customers.\382\
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    \380\ For the purposes of the economic analysis, the baseline 
does not include the exception to the annual notice delivery 
requirement provided by the FAST Act. This statutory exception was 
self-effectuating and became effective on Dec. 4, 2015. See supra 
note 221 and accompanying text.
    \381\ 17 CFR 248.4 and 248.5.
    \382\ 17 CFR 248.8. Regulation S-P provides certain exceptions 
to the requirement for a revised privacy notice, including if the 
institution is sharing as permitted under rules 248.13, 248.14, and 
248.15 or to a new nonaffiliated third party that was adequately 
disclosed in the prior privacy notice.

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[[Page 20659]]

    The types of information required to be included in the initial, 
annual, and revised privacy notices are identical. Each privacy notice 
must describe the categories of information the institution shares and 
the categories of affiliates and non-affiliates with which it shares 
nonpublic personal information.\383\ The privacy notices also must 
describe the type of information the institution collects, how it 
protects the confidentiality and security of nonpublic personal 
information, a description of any opt out right, and certain 
disclosures the institution makes under the FCRA.\384\
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    \383\ See 17 CFR 248.6(a)(2)-(5) and 248.6(a)(9).
    \384\ See 17 CFR 248.6(a)(1) (information collection); 
248.6(a)(8) (protecting nonpublic personal information), 248.6(a)(6) 
(opt out rights); 248.6(a)(7) (disclosures the institution makes 
under section 603(d)(2)(A)(iii) of the FCRA (15 U.S.C. 
1681a(d)(2)(A)(iii)), notices regarding the ability to opt out of 
disclosures of information among affiliates).
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3. Market Structure
    The amendments being proposed here would affect four categories of 
covered institutions: broker-dealers other than notice-registered 
broker-dealers, registered investment advisers, investment companies, 
and transfer agents registered with the Commission or another 
appropriate regulatory agency. These institutions compete in several 
distinct markets and offer a wide range of services, including: 
effecting customers' securities transactions, providing liquidity, 
pooling investments, transferring ownership in securities, advising on 
financial matters, managing portfolios, and consulting to pension 
funds. Many of the larger covered institutions belong to more than one 
category (e.g., a dually-registered broker-dealer/investment adviser), 
and thus operate in multiple markets. In the rest of this section we 
first outline the market for each class of covered institution and then 
consider service providers.
a. Broker-Dealers
    Registered broker-dealers include both brokers (persons engaged in 
the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others) \385\ as well as dealers (persons engaged in the business of 
buying and selling securities for their own accounts).\386\ Most 
brokers and dealers maintain customer relationships, and are thus 
likely to come into the possession of sensitive customer 
information.\387\ In the market for broker-dealer services, a 
relatively small set of large- and medium-sized broker-dealers dominate 
while thousands of smaller broker-dealers compete in niche or regional 
segments of the market.\388\ Broker-dealers provide a variety of 
services related to the securities business, including (1) managing 
orders for customers and routing them to various trading venues; (2) 
providing advice to customers that is in connection with and reasonably 
related to their primary business of effecting securities transactions; 
(3) holding customers' funds and securities; (4) handling clearance and 
settlement of trades; (5) intermediating between customers and 
carrying/clearing brokers; (6) dealing in corporate debt and equities, 
government bonds, and municipal bonds, among other securities; (7) 
privately placing securities; and (8) effecting transactions in mutual 
funds that involve transferring funds directly to the issuer. Some 
broker-dealers may specialize in just one narrowly defined service, 
while others may provide a wide variety of services.
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    \385\ See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(4).
    \386\ See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5).
    \387\ Such information would include the customers' names, tax 
numbers, telephone numbers, broker, brokerage account numbers, etc.
    \388\ See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard 
of Conduct, Release No. 34-86031 (June 5, 2019) [84 FR 33318 (July 
12, 2019)], at 33406.
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    Based on an analysis of FOCUS filings from year-end 2021, there 
were 3,509 registered broker-dealers. Of these, 502 were dually-
registered as investment advisers. There were over 72 million customer 
accounts reported by carrying brokers.\389\ However, the majority of 
broker-dealers are not ``carrying broker-dealers'' and therefore do not 
report the numbers of customer accounts.\390\ Therefore, we expect that 
this figure of 72 million understates the total number of customer 
accounts because many of the accounts at carrying broker dealers have 
corresponding accounts with non-carrying brokers. Both carrying and 
non-carrying broker-dealers potentially possess sensitive customer 
information for the accounts that they maintain.\391\ Because non-
carrying broker-dealers do not report on the numbers of customer 
accounts, it is not possible to ascertain with any degree of confidence 
the distribution of customer accounts across the broader broker-dealer 
population.
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    \389\ Form X-17A-5 Schedule I, Item I8080 (as of July 1, 2022).
    \390\ See General Instructions to Form CUSTODY (as of Sept. 30, 
2022).
    \391\ This information includes name, address, age, and tax 
identification or Social Security number. See FINRA Rule 4512.
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b. Investment Advisers
    Registered investment advisers provide a variety of services to 
their clients, including: financial planning advice, portfolio 
management, pension consulting, selecting other advisers, publication 
of periodicals and newsletters, security rating and pricing, market 
timing, and conducting educational seminars.\392\ Although advisers 
engaged in any of these activities are likely to possess sensitive 
customer information, the degree of sensitivity will vary widely across 
advisers. An adviser that offers advice only on personalized investment 
advice may not hold much customer information beyond address, payment 
details, and the customer's overall financial condition. On the other 
hand, an adviser that performs portfolio management services will 
possess account numbers, tax identification numbers, access credentials 
to brokerage accounts, and other highly sensitive information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \392\ See Form ADV.
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    Based on Form ADV filings received up to June 1, 2022, there were 
15,129 SEC-registered investment advisers with a total of 51 million 
individual clients \393\ and $128 trillion in assets under 
management.\394\ Practically all (97%) of these advisers reported 
providing portfolio management services to their clients.\395\ Over 
half (56%) reported having custody \396\ of clients' cash or securities 
either directly or through a related person with client funds in 
custody totaling $46 trillion.\397\
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    \393\ Form ADV, Items 5D(a-b) (as of June 1 2022).
    \394\ Broadly, regulatory assets under management is the current 
value of assets in securities portfolios for which the adviser 
provides continuous and regular supervisory or management services. 
See Form ADV, Part 1A Instruction 5.b.
    \395\ Form ADV, Items 5G(2-5) (as of June 1 2022).
    \396\ Here, ``custody'' means ``holding, directly or indirectly, 
client funds or securities, or having any authority to obtain 
possession of them.'' An adviser also has ``custody'' if ``a related 
person holds, directly or indirectly, client funds or securities, or 
has any authority to obtain possession of them, in connection with 
advisory services [the adviser] provide[s] to clients.'' See 17 CFR 
275.206(4)-2(d)(2).
    \397\ Form ADV, Items 9A and 9B (as of June 1 2022).

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[[Page 20660]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AP23.003


    Figure 3 plots the cumulative distribution of the number of 
individual clients handled by SEC-registered investment advisers. The 
distribution is highly skewed: thirteen advisers each have more than 
one million clients while 95% of advisers have fewer than 2,000 
clients. Many such advisers are quite small, with half reporting fewer 
than 62 clients.\398\
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    \398\ Form ADV, Item 5.A (as of June 1, 2022).
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    Similarly, most SEC-registered investment advisers are limited 
geographically. SEC-registered investment advisers must generally make 
a ``notice filing'' with a state in which they have a place of business 
or six or more clients.\399\ Figure 4 plots the frequency distribution 
of the number the number of such filings. Based on notice filings, half 
of SEC-registered investment advisers operate in fewer than four 
states, and 38% operate in only one state.\400\
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    \399\ See General Instructions to Form ADV (as of June 1, 2022).
    \400\ Form ADV, Item 2.C (as of June 1 2022). This includes 
1,867 advisers who do not make any notice filings.

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[[Page 20661]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AP23.004

c. Investment Companies
    Investment companies are companies that issue securities and are 
primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities. 
Investment companies invest money they receive from investors on a 
collective basis, and each investor shares in the profits and losses in 
proportion to that investor's interest in the investment company. 
Investment companies that would be subject to the proposed rules 
include registered open-end and closed-end funds, business development 
companies (``BDCs''), Unit Investment Trusts (``UITs''), and employee 
securities' companies. Because they are not operating companies, 
investment companies do not have ``customers'' as such, and thus are 
unlikely to possess significant amounts of nonpublic ``customer'' 
information in the conventional sense. They may, however, have access 
to nonpublic information about their investors.
    Table 1 summarizes the investment company universe that would be 
subject to the proposed rules. In total, as of the end of 2021, there 
were 13,965 investment companies, including 12,420 open-end management 
investment companies, 681 closed-end managed investment companies, 662 
UITs, 103 BDCs, and 43 employees' securities companies. Many of the 
investment companies that would be subject to the proposed rules are 
part of a ``family'' of investment companies.\401\ Such families often 
share infrastructure for operations (e.g., accounting, auditing, 
custody, legal) and potentially marketing and distribution. We believe 
that many of the compliance costs and other economic costs discussed in 
the following sections would likely be borne at the family level.\402\ 
We estimate that there were up to 1,144 distinct operational entities 
(families and unaffiliated investment companies) in the investment 
company universe.
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    \401\ As used here, ``family'' refers to a set of funds 
reporting the same family investment company name (Form N-CEN Item 
B.5), or filing under the same registrant name (Form N-CEN Item 
B.1.A).
    \402\ For example, each investment company in a family is likely 
to share common policies and procedures.

              Table 1--Investment Companies Subject to Proposed Rule Amendments, Summary Statistics
  [For each type of investment company, this table presents estimates of the number of investment companies and
  investment company families. Data sources: 2021 N-CEN filings,\a\ Division of Investment Management Business
                                     Development Company Report (2022).\b\]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  # Unaffiliated
                  Inv. Co. type                     # Inv. Co.    # Families \c\        \d\       # Entities \e\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Open-End \f\....................................          12,420             426             106             532
Closed-End \g\..................................             681              89             142             231
UIT \h\.........................................             662              51             216             267
BDC \i\.........................................             103  ..............  ..............             103
ESC \j\.........................................              43  ..............  ..............              43
Other \k\.......................................              56              12              12              24
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20662]]

 
    Total \l\...................................          13,965             578             476           1,144
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Year 2021 Form N-CEN filings (as of Nov 8, 2022).
\b\ SEC, Business Development Company Report (updated June 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/open/datasets-bdc.html.
\c\ Number of families calculated from affiliation reported by registrants on Item B.5 of Form N-CEN.
\d\ Number of registrants reporting no family affiliation.
\e\ Number of distinct entities, i.e., the sum of distinct families (# Families) and unaffiliated registrants (#
  Unaffiliated).
\f\ Form N-1A filers; includes all open-end funds, including ETFs registered on Form N-1A.
\g\ Form N-2 filers not classified as BDCs.
\h\ Form N-3, N-4, N-6, N-8[Bgr]-2, and S-6 filers.
\i\ BDCs listed in the Business Development Company Report (note b) which have made a filing in 2022 (as of Aug.
  9 2022).
\j\ Form 40-APP filers [not classified as BDCs].
\k\ Includes N-3 and S-6 filers.
\l\ Cells do not sum to totals as investment company families may span multiple investment company types.

d. Transfer Agents
    Transfer agents maintain records of security ownership and are 
responsible for processing changes of ownership (``transfers''), 
communicating information from the firm to its security-holders (e.g., 
sending annual reports), replacing lost stock certificates, etc. 
However, in practice most U.S.-registered securities are held in 
``street name,'' where the ultimate ownership information is not 
maintained by the transfer agent, but rather in a hierarchal ledger. In 
this structure, securities owned by individuals are not registered in 
the name of the individual with the transfer agent. Rather the 
individual's broker maintains the records of the individual's ownership 
claim on securities. Brokers, in turn, have claims on securities held 
by a single nominee owner \403\ who maintains records of the claims of 
the various brokers. This arrangement makes securities lending feasible 
and facilitates rapid transfers. In such cases, the transfer agent is 
not aware of the ultimate owner of the securities and therefore does 
not hold sensitive information belonging to those owners.
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    \403\ In the U.S., this is generally Cede & Co, a partnership 
organized by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite the prevalence of securities held in street name, a large 
number of individuals nonetheless hold securities directly through the 
transfer agent. Securities held directly may be held either in the form 
of a physical stock certificate or in book-entry form through the 
Direct Registration System (``DRS''). In either case, the transfer 
agent would need to maintain sensitive information about the 
individuals who own the securities. For example, to handle a request 
for replacement certificate, the transfer agent would need to confirm 
the identity of the individual making such a request and to maintain a 
record of such confirmation. Similarly, to effect DRS transfers a 
transfer agent would need to provide a customer's identification 
information in the message to DRS.
    In 2022, there were 335 transfer agents registered with the 
Commission, with an additional 67 registered with the Banking 
Agencies.\404\ On average, each transfer agent reported 1.2 million 
individual accounts, with the largest reporting 56 million.\405\ Figure 
5 plots the cumulative distribution of the number of individual 
accounts reported by transfer agents registered with the Commission. 
Approximately one third of SEC-registered transfer agents reported no 
individual accounts,\406\ and half reported fewer than ten thousand 
individual accounts.
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    \404\ Form TA-1 (as of June 20, 2022).
    \405\ Form TA-2 Items 5(a) (as of June 20, 2022).This analysis 
is limited to the 151 transfer agents that filed form TA-2.
    \406\ Some registered transfer agents outsource many functions--
including tracking the ownership of securities in individual 
accounts--to other transfer agents (``service companies''). See Form 
TA-1 Item 6 (as of June 20, 2022).

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[[Page 20663]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AP23.005

e. Service Providers
    The proposed policies and procedures provisions would require 
covered institutions, pursuant to a written contract between the 
covered institution and its service providers, to require the service 
providers to take appropriate measures that are designed to protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of customer information.\407\ 
These contracting requirements on a covered institution would affect a 
third party service provider that ``receives, maintains, processes, or 
otherwise is permitted access to customer information through its 
provision of services directly to [the] covered institution.'' \408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \407\ See infra section III.D.1.b.
    \408\ Proposed rule 248.30(e)(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Covered institutions' relationships with a wide range of service 
providers would be affected. Specialized service providers with 
offerings geared toward outsourcing of covered institutions' core 
functions would generally fall under the proposed contracting 
requirements. Those offering of customer relationship management, 
customer billing, portfolio management, customer portals (e.g., 
customer trading platforms), customer acquisition, tax document 
preparation, proxy voting, and regulatory compliance (e.g., AML/KYC) 
would likely fall under the proposed contracting requirements. In 
addition, various less-specialized service providers could potentially 
fall under these requirements. Service providers offering Software-as-
a-Service (SaaS) solutions for email, file storage, and similar 
general-purpose services could potentially be in a position to receive, 
maintain, or processes customer information. Similarly, providers of 
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), as 
well as those offering more ``traditional'' consulting services (e.g., 
IT contractors) would in many cases be ``otherwise [ ] permitted access 
to customer information'' and could fall under the contracting 
provisions.
    Due to data limitations, we are unable to quantify or characterize 
in much detail the structure of these various service provider 
markets.\409\ However, it has long been recognized that the financial 
services industry is increasingly relying on service providers through 
various forms of outsourcing.\410\
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    \409\ As noted above, potential service providers include a wide 
range of firms fulfilling a variety of functions. The internal 
organization of covered entities, including their reliance on 
service providers, is not generally publicly observable. Although 
certain regulatory filings shed a limited light on the use of third-
party service providers (e.g., transfer agents' reliance on third 
parties for certain functions), we are unaware of any data sources 
that provide detail on the reliance of covered institutions on 
third-party service providers.
    \410\ See Bank for International Settlements, Outsourcing in 
Financial Services (Feb. 15, 2005), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/joint12.htm.
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D. Benefits and Costs of the Proposed Rule Amendments

    The proposed amendments can be divided into four main components. 
First, they would create a requirement for covered institutions to 
adopt incident response programs, including notification to customers 
in the event sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably 
likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization. Second, 
they would broaden the scope of information covered by the safeguards 
rule and the disposal rule \411\ and extend the application of the 
safeguards rule to transfer agents. Third, they would require covered 
institutions to maintain and retain records related to the foregoing. 
Fourth, they would include in regulation an existing statutory 
exemption for annual privacy

[[Page 20664]]

notices. We discuss costs and benefits of each provision in turn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \411\ 17 CFR 248.30(a) and 17 CFR 248.30(b), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Response Program
    The proposed amendments would require covered institutions to 
``develop, implement, and maintain written policies and procedures that 
address administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the 
protection of customer information'' \412\ which must include a 
response program ``designed to detect, respond to, and recover from 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, including 
customer notification procedures.'' \413\ Under the proposal, covered 
institutions' response programs would be required to address incident 
assessment, containment, as well as customer notification.\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \412\ Proposed rule 248.30(b)(1).
    \413\ Proposed rule 248.30(b)(3).
    \414\ Proposed rule 248.30(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The question of how best to structure the response to a cyber-
incident has received considerable attention from firms, IT 
consultancies, government agencies, standards bodies, and industry 
groups, resulting in numerous reports with recommendations and 
summaries of best practices.\415\ While the emphasis of these reports 
varies, certain key components are common across many cybersecurity 
incident response programs. For example, NIST's Computer Security 
Incident Handling Guide identifies four main phases to cyber incident 
handling: (1) preparation; (2) detection and analysis; (3) containment, 
eradication, and recovery; and (4) post-incident activity.\416\ The 
assessment, containment, and notification prongs of the proposed 
policies and procedures requirement correspond to the latter three 
phases of the NIST recommendations. Similar analogues are found in 
other reports, recommendations, and other regulators' guidelines.\417\ 
Thus, the proposed procedures of the incident response program are 
substantially consistent with industry best practices and these other 
regulatory documents that seek to develop effective policies and 
procedures in this area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \415\ See supra section III.C.1.
    \416\ See NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, supra 
note 81.
    \417\ See text accompanying note 367.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to helping ensure that customers are notified when 
their data is breached, the proposed requirements for policies and 
procedures to address assessment and containment of incidents are 
likely to have various other benefits. Having reasonably-designed 
strategies for incident assessment and containment ex ante could reduce 
the frequency and scale of breaches through more effective intervention 
and improved managerial awareness. Any such improvements to covered 
institutions' processes would benefit their customers (i.e. by reducing 
harms to customers resulting from data breaches), as well as the 
covered institutions themselves (i.e. by reducing the expected costs of 
handling data breaches).
    In the remainder of this section, we first consider the benefits 
and costs associated with requiring covered institutions to develop, 
implement, and maintain written policies and procedures for a response 
program generally. We then consider costs and benefits of the proposed 
service provider provisions. We conclude this section with an analysis 
of the proposed notification requirements vis-[agrave]-vis the 
notification requirements already in force under the various existing 
state laws.
a. Written Policies and Procedures
    Written policies and procedures are a practical prerequisite for 
organizations to implement standard operating procedures, which have 
long been recognized as necessary to improving outcomes in critical 
environments.\418\ While we are not aware of any studies that assess 
the efficacy of written policies and procedures specifically in the 
context of financial regulation, we expect that requiring written 
policies and procedures for the proposed response program would improve 
its effectiveness in a number of ways. Although data breach incidents 
are increasingly common,\419\ they are nonetheless a relatively rare 
event for any given covered institution. As the process for handling 
them is unlikely to be routine for a covered institution' staff, 
written policies and procedures can help ensure that the covered 
institution's personnel know what corrective actions to take and when. 
Moreover, written policies and procedures can help ensure that the 
incident is handled in an optimal manner. Finally, establishing 
incident response procedures ex ante can facilitate discussion among 
the covered institution's staff and expose flaws in the incident 
response procedures before they are used in a real response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \418\ Other Commission regulations, such as the Investment 
Company Act and Investment Advisers Act compliance rules, require 
policies and procedures. 17 CFR 270.38a-1(a)(1), 275.206(4)-7(a). 
The utility of written policies and procedures is recognized outside 
the financial sector as well; for example, standardized written 
procedures have been increasingly embraced in the field of medicine. 
See e.g., Robert L. Helmreich, Error Management as Organizational 
Strategy, In Proceedings of the IATA Human Factors Seminar, Vol. 1. 
Citeseer (1998); see also Alex, Joseph Chaparro Keebler, Elizabeth 
Lazzara & Anastasia Diamond, Checklists: A Review of Their Origins, 
Benefits, and Current Uses as a Cognitive Aid in Medicine, 
Ergonomics in Design: 2019 Q. Hum. Fac. App. 27 (2019): 
106480461881918.
    \419\ See ITRC Data Breach Annual Report, supra note 349 (noting 
that in 2021, there were more data compromises reported in the 
United States than in any year since the first state data breach 
notice law became effective in 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted in section III.C , all states and the District of Columbia 
generally require businesses to notify their customers when certain 
customer information is compromised, but they do not typically require 
the adoption of written policies and procedures for the handling of 
such incidents.\420\ However, despite the lack of explicit statutory 
requirements, covered institutions--especially those with a national 
presence--may have developed and implemented written policies and 
procedures for a response program that incorporates various standard 
elements, including the ones being proposed here: assessment, 
containment, and notification.\421\ Given the numerous and distinct 
state data breach laws, it would be difficult for larger covered 
institutions operating in multiple states to comply effectively with 
existing state laws without having some written policies and procedures 
in place. As such covered institutions are generally larger, they are 
more likely to have compliance staff dedicated to designing and 
implementing regulatory policies and procedures, which could include 
policies and procedures regarding incident response. Moreover, to the 
extent covered institutions that have already developed written 
policies and procedures for incident response have based such policies 
and procedures on common cyber incident response frameworks (e.g., NIST 
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, CISA Cybersecurity Incident 
Response Playbook),\422\ generally accepted industry best practices, or 
other applicable regulatory guidelines,\423\ these large covered 
institutions' written policies and procedures are likely to

[[Page 20665]]

include the proposed elements of assessment, containment, and 
notification, and to be substantially consistent with the proposed 
rule's requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \420\ See e.g., Cal. Civil Code sec. 1798.82 and N.Y. Gen. Bus. 
Law. sec. 899-AA.
    \421\ Various industry guidebooks, frameworks, and government 
recommendations share many common elements, including the ones being 
proposed here. See e.g. NIST Computer Security Incident Handling 
Guide, supra note 81; see also CISA Incident Response Playbook, 
supra note 75.
    \422\ See supra notes 75 and 81.
    \423\ For example, the Banking Agencies' Guidance states that 
covered institutions that are subsidiaries of U.S. bank holdings 
companies should develop response programs that include assessment, 
containment, and notification elements. See supra discussion of 
Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance in text accompanying 
note 367.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, we do not anticipate that the proposed requirement for 
written policies and procedures would result in substantial new 
benefits from its application to large covered institutions, those with 
a national presence, or those already subject to comparable Federal 
regulations.\424\ For the same reasons, it is unlikely to impose 
significant new costs for these institutions. Here, we expect the main 
cost associated with the proposed requirement to be the cost of 
reviewing existing policies and procedures to verify that they satisfy 
the new requirement. We further expect that these costs--although not 
significant--would ultimately be passed on to customers of these 
institutions.\425\
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    \424\ The nature of the transfer agent and registered investment 
company business largely precludes geographic catering and that 
these entities will all have a ``national presence.''
    \425\ Costs incurred by larger covered institutions as a result 
of the proposed amendments will generally be passed on to their 
customers in the form of higher fees. However, smaller covered 
institutions--which are likely to face higher average costs--may not 
be able to do so. See infra section III.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We expect that the proposed written policies and procedures 
requirement would have more substantial benefits and costs for smaller 
covered institutions without a national presence, such as small 
registered investment advisers and broker-dealers who cater to a 
clientele based on geography, as compared to larger covered 
institutions. For smaller covered institutions the potential 
reputational cost of a cybersecurity breach is likely to be relatively 
small,\426\ while the cost of developing and implementing written 
policies and procedures for a response program is proportionately 
large.\427\ Moreover, these smaller covered institutions could 
potentially comply effectively with the relevant state data breach 
notification laws without adopting written policies and procedures to 
deal with customer notification: they may only need to consider--on an 
ad hoc basis--the notification requirements of the small number of 
states in which their customers reside.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \426\ Smaller firms generally have a lower franchise value (the 
present value of the future profits that a firm is expected to earn 
as a going concern) and lower brand equity (the value of potential 
customers' perceptions of the firm). Thus, the costs of potential 
reputational harm are typically lower than at larger firms.
    \427\ See supra discussion in section III.A following note 317.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, we expect that for such covered institutions, the proposed 
amendments would likely impose additional compliance costs related to 
amending their existing written policies and procedures for 
safeguarding customer information.\428\ While these smaller covered 
institutions could potentially pass some of these costs on to customers 
in the form of higher fees, their ability to do so may be limited due 
to the presence of larger competitors with more customers.\429\ In 
addition, covered institutions that improve their customer notification 
procedures in response to the proposed amendments could suffer 
reputational costs resulting from the additional notifications.\430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \428\ As required under existing Regulation S-P, 17 CFR 248.30.
    \429\ See supra section III.C.3.
    \430\ See supra section III.B; see also infra section III.D.1.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the relevant baseline for the analysis of this proposal 
incorporates only regulations currently in place, we note that several 
concurrent Commission proposals would impose broader policies and 
procedures requirements relating to cybersecurity and data protection 
on some covered institutions.\431\ Insofar as these related proposals 
are adopted, the response program being proposed here would represent a 
refinement of elements addressing incident response and recovery found 
in the concurrent proposals.\432\ Thus, we anticipate that costs of 
developing the response programs being proposed here could largely be 
subsumed in the costs of developing policies and procedures for these 
concurrent proposals (if adopted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \431\ See Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra 
note 55, Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and Regulation SCI 
Proposal, supra note 57. See also supra section II.G.
    \432\ For example, the response program proposed here provides 
further specificity to the ``Cybersecurity Incident Response and 
Recovery'' element of the policies and procedure required under the 
Investment Management Cybersecurity Proposal. See Investment 
Management Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 55, at section 
II.A.1.e.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The benefits ensuing from smaller, more geographically limited 
covered institutions incorporating incident response programs to their 
written policies and procedures can be expected to arise from improved 
efficacy in notifying affected customers and--more generally--from 
improvements in the manner in which such incidents are handled with 
aforementioned attendant benefits to customers and to the covered 
institutions themselves.\433\
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    \433\ See supra text accompanying notes 415-418.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lacking data on the improvements to efficacy--whether it be 
efficacy of customer notification, incident assessment, or incident 
containment--that would result from widespread adoption of written 
response programs, we cannot quantify the economic benefits of the 
proposed requirements. Similarly, quantifying the indirect economic 
costs such as reputational cost of any potential increased efficacy in 
customer notification is not feasible. However, as noted earlier, the 
effects of these requirements are likely to be small for covered 
institutions with a national presence who--we understand--are likely to 
already have such programs in place. For such institutions, we expect 
direct compliance costs to be largely limited to reviews of existing 
policies and procedures.\434\ Smaller, more geographically limited 
covered institutions--which are less likely to have written policies 
and procedures to address incident response--we expect would be more 
likely to bear the full costs associated with adopting and implementing 
such procedures.\435\
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    \434\ We expect these reviews to be generally smaller than the 
costs of adopting and implementing said procedures as discussed in 
section IV.
    \435\ Administrative costs associated with developing and 
implementing policies and procedures are estimated to be $11,375. 
See infra section IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed requirements could potentially provide great benefit 
in a specific incident, for example in the case of a data breach at an 
institution that does not currently have written policies and 
procedures and was unprepared to promptly respond in keeping with law, 
and best practice. Such an institution would also bear the highest cost 
in complying with the proposal. In the aggregate, however, considering 
the proposed amendments in the context of the baseline, these benefits 
and costs are likely to be limited. As we have noted above, all states 
have previously enacted data breach notification laws with 
substantially similar aims and, therefore, we think it likely that many 
institutions have written policies and procedures to support compliance 
with these laws. In addition, we anticipate that larger covered 
institutions with a national presence--who account for the bulk of 
covered institutions' customers--have already developed written 
incident response programs consistent with the proposed requirements in 
most respects.\436\ Thus, the benefits and costs of requiring written 
incident response programs would largely be limited to smaller covered 
institutions without a national

[[Page 20666]]

presence--institutions whose policies affect relatively few customers.
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    \436\ See supra discussion in this section.
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b. Service Provider Provisions
    The proposed amendments would require that a covered institution's 
incident response program include written policies and procedures that 
cover activity by service providers.\437\ Specifically, these policies 
and procedures would require covered institutions, pursuant to a 
written contract between the covered institution and its service 
providers, to require the service providers to take appropriate 
measures that are designed to protect against unauthorized access to or 
use of customer information, including notification to the covered 
institution in the event of any breach in security resulting in 
unauthorized access to a customer information system maintained by the 
service provider to enable the covered institution to implement its 
response program. Under the proposed amendments, ``service provider'' 
is defined broadly, as ``any person or entity that is a third party and 
receives, maintains, processes, or otherwise is permitted access to 
customer information through its provision of services directly to a 
covered institution.'' \438\ Thus, the proposed requirement could 
affect contracts with a broad range of entities, including potentially 
email providers, customer relationship management systems, cloud 
applications, and other technology vendors.
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    \437\ Proposed rule 248.30(b)(5)(i).
    \438\ Proposed rule 248.30(e)(10).
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    As modern business processes increasingly rely on third-party 
service providers, ensuring consistency in regulatory requirements 
increasingly requires consideration of the functions performed by 
service providers, and how these functions interact with the regulatory 
regime. Ignoring such aspects would create opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage through outsourcing of functions to unregulated service 
providers. Thus, the proposed requirement would function to strengthen 
the benefits of the proposal by helping ensure that the proposed 
requirements have similar effects regardless of how a covered 
institution chooses to implement its business processes (i.e., whether 
those processes are implemented in-house or outsourced).
    For service providers that provide specialized services aimed at 
covered institutions, the proposed requirement would create additional 
market pressure to enhance service offerings so as to facilitate 
covered institutions' compliance with the proposed requirements.\439\ 
These service providers would have increased market pressure to adapt 
their services to facilitate covered institutions' compliance with the 
proposed amendments. This would entail costs for the service providers, 
including the actual cost of adapting business processes to accommodate 
the requirements, as well as costs related to renegotiating service 
agreements with covered institutions to include the required 
contractual provisions. It is difficult for us to quantify these costs, 
as we have no data on the number of specialized service providers used 
by covered institutions and on the ease with which they could adapt 
business processes to satisfy the new contractual provisions. That 
said, we preliminarily believe that these costs are justified and would 
not represent an undue cost as both the specialized service providers 
and the covered institutions contracting with them are adapted to 
operating in a highly-regulated industry, and would be accustomed to 
adapting their business processes to meet regulatory requirements. We 
further expect that such costs would largely be passed on to covered 
institutions and ultimately their customers.\440\
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    \439\ A service provider involved in any business-critical 
function likely ``receives, maintains, processes, or otherwise is 
permitted access to customer information''. See proposed rule 
248.30(e)(10).
    \440\ See supra note 425.
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    With respect to more generic service providers (e.g., email, 
customer-relationship management), the situation could be quite 
different. For these providers, covered institutions are likely to 
represent a small fraction of their customer base. These generic 
service providers may be unwilling to adapt their business processes to 
the regulatory requirements of a small subset of their customers. Under 
the proposed requirement, some covered institutions could find that 
some of their existing generic service providers would be unwilling to 
take the steps necessary to facilitate covered institutions' compliance 
with the proposed amendments. In such cases, the covered institutions 
would need to switch service providers and bear the associated 
switching costs, while the service providers would suffer loss of 
customers.\441\ Although these costs would be offset by benefits 
arising from enhanced efficacy of the regulation,\442\ they would be 
particularly acute for smaller covered institutions which lack 
bargaining power with generic service providers and would in many cases 
be forced to switch providers.
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    \441\ These costs include the direct costs associated with 
reviewing and renegotiating existing agreements as well as indirect 
costs arising from service providers requiring additional 
compensation for providing the required contractual guarantees.
    \442\ From the perspective of current or potential customers, 
the implications of customer information safeguard failures are 
similar whether the failure occurs at a covered institution, or at 
one of its third-party service providers.
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    Moreover, in some cases generic service providers may have the 
business processes in place to facilitate covered institutions' 
compliance, but may be unwilling to enter into suitable written 
contracts. This situation is likely to arise with large, best-of-breed 
generic service providers with large market share, and could lead to 
perverse outcomes where the aims of the proposed amendments are 
undermined.\443\ For example, large, established server hosting 
providers could be particularly unwilling to make contractual 
accommodations.\444\ At the same time, these hosting providers would 
have the greatest economic incentive--and means--to reduce generic 
vulnerabilities within their control.\445\ Thus, if a covered 
institution is forced to switch away from a large, established hosting 
provider unwilling to amend its contractual terms, it is likely to end 
up relying on a smaller, less established hosting provider that--while 
more amenable to specific contractual language--may be less capable of 
addressing the generic vulnerabilities within its control.\446\ Given 
the increasing reliance of firms on such generic service 
providers,\447\ switching could generate substantial costs and bring 
with it reduced ability to protect customer information if such generic 
service providers are either unwilling to contractually agree to 
certain provisions or unable to address the vulnerabilities within 
their control.
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    \443\ For example, it is unlikely that a small investment 
adviser would be able to effect any changes in its contracts with 
large providers of generic services.
    \444\ For such service providers, the profits earned from 
covered institutions may not be sufficient to justify creating a 
separate contractual regime. Moreover, actually adapting business 
processes--processes that apply to many different types of 
customers--to satisfy the contractual terms applicable to only a 
small subset of customers is likely to be cost prohibitive and 
impracticable.
    \445\ While a hosting provider can address ``generic'' 
vulnerabilities that apply to all customers (e.g., vulnerabilities 
in the physical and virtual access controls to the servers), it may 
not be able to mitigate vulnerabilities ``specific'' to a given 
customer (e.g., security flaws in applications deployed by 
customers).
    \446\ Smaller, ``upstart'' service providers may be more willing 
to provide unrealistic contractual assurances as the risk to their 
(more limited) reputations is lower.
    \447\ See supra section III.C.3.e.

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[[Page 20667]]

    Finally, even in cases where service providers are willing to adapt 
processes and contractual terms to meet covered institutions 
requirements, the task of renegotiating service agreements could--in 
itself--impose substantial contracting costs on the parties. 
Contracting costs are likely to be most acute for larger covered 
institutions, which may have hundreds of contracts that would require 
renegotiation. These additional costs would likely be passed on to 
customers in the form of higher fees.
c. Notification Requirements
    The proposed requirements would provide for a strong minimum 
standard for data breach notification, applicable to the sensitive 
customer information of all customers of covered institutions 
(including customers of other financial institutions whose information 
has been provided to a covered institution) \448\ regardless of their 
state of residence. The ``strength'' of a data breach notification 
standard is a function of its various provisions and how these 
provisions interact to provide customers with thorough, timely, and 
accurate information about when their information has been compromised. 
Customers receiving notices that are more thorough, timely, and 
accurate have a better chance of taking effective remedial actions, 
such as placing holds on credit reports, changing passwords, and 
monitoring account activity. These customers would also be better able 
to abandon institutions that have allowed their information to be 
compromised. Similarly, non-customers who learn of a data breach, for 
example from individuals notified as a result of the minimum standard, 
could use this information to avoid covered institutions that allow 
compromises to occur.
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    \448\ See proposed rule 248.30(a); see also infra section 
III.D.1.c.i.
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    As discussed in section III.C.2.a all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia already have data breach laws generally applicable to 
compromises of their residents' information. Thus, the benefits of the 
proposed minimum standard for notification to customers (vis-[agrave]-
vis the baseline) would vary depending on each customer's state of 
residence, with the greatest benefits accruing to customers that reside 
in states with ``weaker'' data breach laws.
    Unfortunately, with the data available, it is not practicable to 
decompose the marginal contributions of the various state law 
provisions to the overall ``strength'' of state data breach laws. 
Consequently, it is not possible for us to quantify the benefits of the 
proposed minimum standard to customers residing in the various states. 
Thus, in considering the benefits of the proposed notification 
requirement, we limit consideration to the ``strength'' of individual 
provisions of the proposal vis-[agrave]-vis the corresponding 
provisions under state laws, and consider the number of customers that 
could potentially benefit from each.
    Similarly--albeit to a somewhat lesser extent--the costs to covered 
institutions will also vary depending on the geographical distribution 
of each covered institution's customers. Generally, the costs 
associated with this proposal will be greater for covered institutions 
whose customers reside in states with weaker data breach laws than for 
those whose customers reside in states with stronger data breach laws. 
In particular, smaller covered institutions whose customers are 
concentrated in states with weak state data breach laws are likely to 
face proportionately higher costs.
    In the rest of this section, we consider key provisions of the 
proposed notification requirements, their potential benefits to 
customers (vis-[agrave]-vis existing state notification laws), and 
their costs.
i. Effect With Respect to Customers of Other Financial Institutions
    The scope of customer information subject to protection under the 
proposed amendments extends to ``all customer information in the 
possession of a covered institutions, and all consumer information that 
a covered institution maintains or otherwise possesses for a business 
purpose, as applicable, regardless of whether such information pertains 
to individuals with whom the covered institution has a customer 
relationship, or pertains to the customers of other financial 
institutions and has been provided to the covered institution.'' \449\
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    \449\ Proposed rule 248.30(a).
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    This aspect of the proposal would generally extend the benefits of 
the proposed amendments, and in particular of the proposed notification 
requirements,\450\ to a wide range of individuals such as prospective 
customers, account beneficiaries, recipients of wire transfers, or any 
other individual whose customer information a covered institution comes 
to possess, so long as the individuals are customers of a financial 
institution.
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    \450\ As described in more detail in the following subsections.
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    We do not anticipate that extending the scope of information 
covered by the proposed amendments to include these additional 
individuals would have a significant effect on costs faced by covered 
institutions resulting from a data breach.\451\ We further anticipate 
that costs of preventative measures taken by covered institutions to 
protect customers in response to the proposed amendments would 
generally be effective at protecting these additional individuals.\452\ 
However, we acknowledge that in certain instances, this may not be the 
case. For example, information about prospective customers used for 
sales or marketing purposes may be housed in separate systems from the 
covered institution's ``core'' customer account management systems and 
require additional efforts to secure. That said, given that the 
distinction between customers and other individuals is generally not 
relevant under existing state notification laws--which apply to 
information pertaining to residents of a given state--we expect that 
most covered institutions will have already undertaken to protect and 
provide notifications of data breaches to these additional individuals.
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    \451\ These costs would include additional reputational harm and 
litigation as well as increased notice delivery costs.
    \452\ For example, measures aimed at strengthening information 
safeguards such as improved user access control.
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ii. Effect With Respect to GLBA Safe Harbors
    A number of state data breach laws provide exceptions to 
notification for entities subject to and in compliance with the GLBA. 
These ``GLBA Safe Harbors'' may result in customers not receiving any 
data breach notification from registered investment advisers, broker 
dealers, investment companies, or transfer agents. The proposal would 
help ensure customers receive notice of breach in cases where they may 
not currently because notice is not required under state law.
    Based on an analysis of state laws, we found that 11 states provide 
a GLBA Safe Harbor.\453\ Together, these states account for 15% of the 
U.S. population, or approximately 8 million customers who may 
potentially benefit from this provision.\454\ While we do not have data

[[Page 20668]]

on the exact geographical distribution of customers across all covered 
institutions, we are able to identify registered investment advisers 
whose customers reside exclusively in GLBA Safe Harbor states.\455\ We 
estimate that there are 215 such advisers, representing 1.4% of the 
adviser population.\456\ These advisers represent up to 11,000 clients, 
and tend to be small, with a median regulatory assets under management 
of $223 million. We expect that a similar percentage of broker-dealers 
would be found to be operating exclusively in GLBA Safe Harbor states.
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    \453\ States with GLBA Safe Harbors include Arizona, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah.
    \454\ Estimates of the numbers of potential customers based on 
state population adjusted by the percentage of households reporting 
direct stock ownership (15.2%). See U.S. Census Bureau, 
Apportionment Report (2020), available at https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/data/apportionment/apportionment-2020-table01.xlsx; see also Federal Reserve Board, Survey of 
Consumer Finances (2019), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm.
    \455\ Based on Form ADV, Item 2.C; see also supra note 399.
    \456\ See id.
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    Changing the effect of the GLBA Safe Harbors is not likely to 
impose significant direct compliance costs on most covered 
institutions. For the reasons outlined above, most covered institutions 
have customers from states without a GLBA Safe Harbor and we therefore 
expect they have existing procedures for notifying customers under 
state law. However, covered institutions whose customer base is limited 
to these GLBA Safe Harbor states may not have implemented any 
procedures to notify customers in the event of a data breach. These 
covered institutions would face proportionately higher costs than 
entities with some notification procedures already in place.
iii. Accelerating Timing of Customer Notification
    Under the proposed amendments, a covered institution would be 
required to provide notice to customers in the event of a data breach 
as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days after becoming aware 
that a data breach has occurred. As discussed in section III.C.2.a, 
existing state laws vary in terms of notification timing. Most states 
(32) do not include a specific deadline, but rather require that the 
notice be given in an expedient manner and/or that it be provided 
without unreasonable delay; these states account for 61% of the U.S. 
population with approximately 31 million potential customers residing 
in these states.\457\ Four states have a 30-day deadline; we estimate 
that 5 million customers reside in these states. The remaining 15 
states provide for longer notification deadlines; we estimate that 14 
million customers reside in these states. For the 14 million customers 
residing in these 15 states, the proposed 30-day deadline would tighten 
the notification timeframes by between 15 to 60 days.\458\ In addition, 
the 30-day deadline we are proposing is likely to tighten notification 
timeframes for approximately 31 million customers residing in states 
with no specific deadline; however, the aggregate effects on these 31 
million customers may be limited insofar as the relevant state laws are 
not generally interpreted as allowing delays in notification greater 
than 30 days.\459\ Finally, because the proposal would not provide for 
broad exceptions to the 30-day notification requirement,\460\ in many 
cases it would tighten notification timeframes even for the 5 million 
customers residing in states with a 30-day deadline.\461\
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    \457\ See supra Figure 2.
    \458\ State deadlines are either 30, 45, 60, or 90 days.
    \459\ The timing language in state laws without specific 
language varies, but generally suggests that notices must be prompt. 
For example, California requires that such notice be given ``in the 
most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay;'' see 
Cal. Civil Code sec. 1798.82.
    \460\ See supra note 359.
    \461\ For example, in Washington the median notification delay 
in 2021 was 37 days, even though the state statute requires notice 
be given ``without unreasonable delay, and no more than thirty 
calendar days after the breach was discovered, unless the delay is 
at the request of law enforcement as provided in subsection (3) of 
this section, or the delay is due to any measures necessary to 
determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable 
integrity of the data system'' RCW 19.255.010(8).
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    Tighter notification deadlines should increase customers' ability 
to take effective measures to counter threats resulting from their 
sensitive information being compromised. Such measures may include 
placing holds on credit reports or engaging in more active monitoring 
of account and credit report activity. In practice, however, when it 
takes a long time to discover a data breach, a relatively short delay 
between discovery and customer notification may have little impact on 
customers' ability to take effective countermeasures.\462\
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    \462\ In other words, the utility of a notice is likely to 
exhibit decay. For example, if a breach is discovered immediately, 
the utility of receiving a notification within 1 day is considerably 
greater than the utility of receiving a notification in 30 days. 
However, if a breach is discovered only after 200 days, the 
difference in expected utility from receiving a notification on day 
201 vs day 231 is smaller: with each passing day some opportunities 
to prevent the compromised information from being exploited are lost 
(e.g., unauthorized wire transfer), with each passing day 
opportunities to discover the compromise grow (e.g., noticing an 
unauthorized transaction), and with each passing day the compromised 
information becomes less valuable (e.g., passwords, account numbers, 
addresses, etc., change over time).
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    Based on data from the Washington Attorney General's Office,\463\ 
in 2021 it took an average of 170 days (standard deviation: 209 days) 
from the time a breach occurred to its discovery. This suggests that 
time to discovery is likely to prevent issuance of timely customer 
notices in most cases.\464\ However, as plotted in Figure 6, while some 
firms take many months--even years--to discover a data breach, others 
do so in a matter of days: 15% of firms were able to detect a breach 
within 2 weeks, and 20% were able to do so within 30 days. Thus, while 
the proposed 30-day notification deadline may not substantially improve 
the timeliness of customer notices in many cases, in some cases it 
could.
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    \463\ Washington State Office of the Attorney General, Data 
Breach Notifications, available at https://data.wa.gov/Consumer-Protection/Data-Breach-Notifications-Affecting-Washington-Res/sb4j-ca4h (last visited Mar. 7, 2023). We rely on data from Washington 
State as it provides the most detail on the life cycle of incidents.
    \464\ With respect to the time to discovery of a data breach, we 
believe that data from Washington State is fairly representative of 
the broader U.S. population. Similarly, data from California 
regarding breach notices sent to more than 500 California residents 
indicates that the average time from discovery to notification in 
2021 was 197 days. State of California Department of Justice, Office 
of the Attorney General, Search Data Security Breaches (2023), 
available at https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/databreach/list (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2023). According to IBM, in 2021 it took an average 
of 212 days to identify a data breach. See IBM Cost of Data Breach 
Report, supra note 350.

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[[Page 20669]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP06AP23.006


    While we do not preliminarily believe that the proposed 30-day 
deadline to customer notifications would impose significant direct 
costs relative to a longer deadline (or relative to having no fixed 
deadline), the shorter deadline could potentially lead to indirect 
costs arising from the reporting deadline potentially interfering with 
incident containment efforts. Based on data from the Washington 
Attorney General's Office for 2021, ``containment'' of data breaches 
generally occurs quickly--4.4 days on average.\465\ However, according 
to IBM's study for 2021, it takes an average of 75 days to ``contain'' 
a data breach.\466\ The discrepancy suggests that there exists some 
ambiguity in the interpretation of ``containment,'' raising the 
possibility that the 30-day notification deadline could require 
customer notification to occur before some aspects of incident 
containment have been completed and potentially interfering with 
efforts to do so.\467\
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    \465\ In the data provided by the Washington Attorney General, 
``containment'' (data field DaysToContainBreach) is defined as ``the 
total number of days it takes a notifying entity to end the exposure 
of consumer data, after discovering the breach.'' See supra note 
463.
    \466\ In the IBM study, ``containment'' refers to ``the time it 
takes for an organization to resolve a situation once it has been 
detected and ultimately restore service.'' See IBM Cost of Data 
Breach Report, supra note 350.
    \467\ For example, the notice may prompt additional attacks 
aimed at taking advantage of vulnerabilities that cannot be 
adequately addressed in a 30 day timeframe.
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    In some circumstances, requiring customers to be notified within 30 
days may hinder law enforcement investigation of an incident by 
potentially making an attacker aware of the attack's detection. While 
the proposal would allow the covered institution to delay notification 
in specific circumstances related to national security, most law 
enforcement investigations would not rise to this level.\468\ Thus, the 
proposed 30-day customer notification requirement could impose costs on 
the public insofar as it interferes with law enforcement investigations 
that do not raise national security concerns and, thus, decreases 
recoveries or impedes deterrence.
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    \468\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iii).
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iv. Broader Scope of Information Triggering Notification
    In the proposal, ``sensitive customer information'' is defined more 
broadly than in most state statutes,\469\ yielding a customer 
notification trigger that is broader in scope than the various state 
law notification triggers included under the baseline.\470\ The broader 
scope of information triggering the notice requirements would cover 
more data breaches impacting customers than the notice requirements 
under the baseline. This increased sensitivity could benefit customers 
who would be made aware of more cases where their information has been 
compromised. At the same time, the increased sensitivity could lead to 
false alarms--cases where the ``sensitive customer information'' 
divulged does not ultimately harm the customer. Such false alarms could 
be problematic if they reduce customers' sensitivity to data breach 
notices. In addition, the proposed scope will also likely imply 
additional costs for covered institutions, which may need to adapt 
their processes for safeguarding information

[[Page 20670]]

to encompass a broader set of customer information, and may need to 
issue additional notices.\471\
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    \469\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(9).
    \470\ See supra section III.C.2.a.
    \471\ Estimates of administrative costs related to notice 
issuance are discussed in section IV.
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    In the proposal, ``sensitive customer information'' is defined as 
``any component of customer information alone or in conjunction with 
any other information, the compromise of which could create a 
reasonably likely risk of substantial harm or inconvenience to an 
individual identified with the information.'' \472\ The proposed 
definition's basis in ``any component of customer information'' creates 
a broader scope than under state notification laws. In addition to 
identification numbers, PINs, and passwords, many other pieces of 
nonpublic information have the potential to satisfy this standard. For 
example, many financial institutions have processes for establishing 
identity that require the user to provide a number of pieces of 
information that--on their own--are not especially sensitive (e.g., 
mother's maiden name, name of a first pet, make and model of first 
car), but which--together--could allow access to a customer's account. 
The compromise of some subset of such information would thus 
potentially require a covered institution to notify customers under the 
proposed amendments.
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    \472\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The definitions of information triggering notice requirements under 
state laws are generally much more circumscribed, and can be said to 
fall into one of two types: basic and enhanced.\473\ Basic definitions 
are used by 12 states, which account for 20% of the U.S. population. In 
these states, only the compromise of a customer's name together with 
one or more enumerated pieces of information triggers the notice 
requirement. Typically, the enumerated information is limited to Social 
Security number, a driver's license number, or a financial account 
number combined with an access code. For the estimated 10 million 
customers residing in these states, a covered institution's compromise 
of the customer's account login and password would not necessarily 
result in a notice, nor would a compromise of his credit card number 
and PIN.\474\ Such compromises could nonetheless lead to substantial 
harm and inconvenience.
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    \473\ See supra section III.C.2.a.
    \474\ See supra text accompanying note 354.
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    Thus, the proposed amendments would significantly enhance the 
notification requirements applicable to these customers.
    States adopting enhanced definitions for information triggering 
notice requirements extend the basic definition to include username/
password and username/security question combinations. They may also 
include additional enumerated items whose compromise (when linked with 
the customer's name) can trigger the notice requirement (e.g., 
biometric data, tax identification number, and passport number). For 
the estimated 40 million customers residing in the states with enhanced 
definitions, the benefits from the proposed amendment will be somewhat 
more limited. However, even for these customers, the proposal would 
tighten the effective notification requirement. There are many pieces 
of information not covered by the enhanced definitions the compromise 
of which could potentially lead to substantial harm or inconvenience. 
For example, under California law, the compromise of information such 
as a customer's email address in combination with a security question 
and answer would only trigger the notice requirement if that 
information would--in itself--permit access to an online account; 
moreover, the compromise of information such as a customer's name, 
combined with her transaction history, account balance, or other 
information not specifically enumerated would not trigger the notice 
requirement under California law.\475\
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    \475\ Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1798.82.
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    The broader scope of information triggering a notice requirement 
under the proposed amendments would benefit customers. As noted 
earlier, many pieces of information not covered under state data breach 
laws could, when compromised, cause substantial harm or inconvenience. 
Under the proposed amendments, data breaches involving such information 
could require customer notification in cases where state law does not, 
and thus potentially increase customers' ability to take actions to 
mitigate the effects of such breaches. At the same time, there is some 
risk that the broader minimum standard will lead to notifications 
resulting from data compromises that--while troubling--are ultimately 
less likely to cause substantial harm or inconvenience.\476\ A large 
number of such notices could undermine the effectiveness of the notice 
regime.
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    \476\ This may be the case even though the proposal includes an 
exception from notification when the covered institution determines, 
after investigation, that the sensitive customer information has not 
been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that 
would result in substantial harm or inconvenience. For example, the 
covered institution could decide to forgo investigations and always 
report, or could investigate but not reach a conclusion that 
satisfied the terms of the exception.
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    The broader minimum standard for notification is likely to result 
in higher compliance costs for covered institutions. In particular, it 
is possible the covered institutions have developed processes and 
systems designed to provide enhanced information safeguards for the 
specific types of information enumerated in the various state laws. For 
example, it is likely that IT systems deployed by financial 
institutions only retain information such as passwords or answers to 
security questions in hashed form, reducing the potential for such 
information to be compromised. Similarly, it is likely that such 
systems limit access to information such as Social Security numbers to 
a limited set of employees.
    It may be costly for covered institutions to upgrade these systems 
to expand the scope of enhanced information safeguards. In some cases, 
it may be impractical to expand the scope of such systems. For example, 
while it may be feasible for covered institutions to strictly limit 
access to Social Security numbers, passwords, or answers to secret 
questions, it may not be feasible to apply such limits to account 
numbers, transaction histories, account balances, related accounts, or 
other potentially sensitive customer information. In these cases, the 
proposed minimum standard may not have a significant prophylactic 
effect, and may lead to an increase in reputation and litigation costs 
for covered institutions resulting from more frequent breach 
notifications as well as increased administrative costs related to 
sending out additional notice.\477\ In addition, because the proposed 
notice trigger is based on a determination that there is a reasonably 
likely risk of substantial harm or inconvenience, it could increase 
costs related to incident evaluation, legal consultation, and 
litigation risk. This subjectivity could reduce consistency in the 
propensity of covered institutions to provide notice to customers, 
reducing the utility of such notices in customer's inferences about 
covered institutions' safeguarding efforts.
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    \477\ See supra note 471.
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v. Notification Trigger
    Under the proposal, the access or use without authorization of an 
individual's sensitive customer information (or the reasonable 
likelihood thereof) triggers the customer notice requirement unless the 
covered institution is able to determine that sensitive customer

[[Page 20671]]

information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a 
manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience.\478\ 
Moreover, if the covered institution is unable to determine which 
customers are affected by a data breach, a notice to all potentially 
affected customers would be required.\479\ The resulting presumptions 
for notification are important because although it is usually possible 
to determine what information could have been compromised in a data 
breach, it is often not possible to determine what information was 
compromised \480\ or to estimate the potential for such information to 
be used in a way that is likely to cause harm. Because of this, it may 
not be feasible to establish the likelihood of sensitive customer 
information being accessed or used in a way that creates a risk of 
substantial harm or inconvenience. Consequently, in the absence of the 
presumption for notification, it may be possible for covered 
institutions to avoid notifying customers in cases where it is unclear 
whether customer information was accessed or used in this way. 
Currently, 21 states' notification laws do not include a presumption 
for notification.
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    \478\ Proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(i).
    \479\ Proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(ii).
    \480\ Many covered institutions, especially smaller investment 
advisers and broker-dealers, are unlikely to have elaborate software 
for logging and auditing data access. For such entities, it may be 
impossible to determine what specific information was exfiltrated 
during a data breach.
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    We do not have data with which to estimate reliably the effect of 
this presumption on the propensity of covered institutions to issue 
customer notifications. However, we expect that for the estimated 15 
million customers residing in states without the presumption of 
notification, some notifications that would be required under the 
proposed amendments are not currently occurring. Thus, we anticipate 
that the proposed amendments will improve these customers ability to 
take actions to mitigate the effects of data breaches.
    The increased sensitivity of the notification trigger resulting 
from the presumption for notification would result in additional costs 
for covered institutions, who would bear higher reputational costs as 
well as some additional direct compliance costs (e.g., mailing notices, 
responding to customer questions, etc.) due to more breaches requiring 
customer notification. We are unable to quantify these additional 
costs.
2. Extend Scope of Customer Safeguards To Transfer Agents
    The proposed amendments would bring transfer agents within the 
scope of the safeguards rule.\481\ In addition to the costs and 
benefits arising from the proposed response program discussed 
separately in section III.D.1 this would create an additional 
obligation on transfer agents to develop, implement, and maintain 
written policies and procedures that address administrative, technical, 
and physical safeguards for the protection of customer information more 
generally.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \481\ See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
    \482\ Proposed rule 248.30(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in sections II.C.3 and III.C.3.d, in the U.S., 
transfer agents provide the infrastructure for tracking ownership of 
securities. Maintaining such ownership records necessarily entails 
holding or accessing non-public information about a large swath of the 
U.S. investing public. Given the highly-concentrated nature of the 
transfer agent market,\483\ a general failure of customer information 
safeguards at a transfer agent could negatively impact large numbers of 
customers.\484\ In general, transfer agents with written policies and 
procedures to safeguard this information would be at reduced risk of 
experiencing such safeguard failures.\485\ Further, because the core of 
the transfer agent business is maintaining customer records, and 
transfer agents are likely to handle large numbers of customers, 
transfer agents are likely to have written policies and procedures in 
place to address safeguarding of customer information.\486\ In 
addition, transfer agents are currently subject to the notification 
requirements in state law, which would require customer notification in 
many of the same cases as under the proposed amendments.\487\ Thus, we 
do not expect substantial costs or benefits to arise from extending the 
scope of the safeguards rule to transfer agents in the aggregate. We 
anticipate that most transfer agents have policies and procedures in 
place already, and that the compliance costs of the proposal would thus 
be limited to the review of those existing policies and procedures for 
consistency with the safeguards rule. We discuss these costs in section 
IV.\488\
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    \483\ See supra section III.C.3.
    \484\ Half of the registered transfer agents maintain records 
for more than 10,000 individual accounts. See supra Figure 5.
    \485\ See supra section III.D.1.a for a discussion of the 
benefits of written policies and procedures generally.
    \486\ See supra text accompanying notes 420-424.
    \487\ See supra section III.D.1.c.
    \488\ See supra note 435.
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3. Recordkeeping
    Under the new recordkeeping requirements, covered institutions 
would be required to make and maintain written records documenting 
compliance with the requirements of the safeguards rule and of the 
disposal rule.\489\ A covered institution would be required to make and 
maintain written records documenting its compliance with, among other 
things: its written policies and procedures required under the proposed 
rules, including those relating to its service providers and its 
consumer information and customer information disposal practices; its 
assessments of the nature and scope of any incidents involving 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information; any 
notifications of such incidents received from service providers; steps 
taken to contain and control such incidents; and, where applicable, any 
investigations into the facts and circumstances of an incident 
involving sensitive customer information, and the basis for determining 
that sensitive customer information has not been, and is not reasonably 
likely to be, used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience.\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \489\ See proposed rule 248.30(d).
    \490\ See the various provisions of proposed rule 248.30(b) and 
248.30(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These proposed recordkeeping requirements would help facilitate the 
Commission's inspection and enforcement capabilities. As a result, the 
Commission would be better able to detect deficiencies in a covered 
institution's response program so that such deficiencies could be 
remedied. Insofar as correcting deficiencies results in material 
improvement in the response capabilities of covered institutions and 
mitigates potential harm resulting from the lack of an adequate 
response program, the proposed amendments would benefit customers 
through channels described in section III.D.1.
    We do not expect the proposed recordkeeping requirements to impose 
substantial compliance costs. As covered institutions are currently 
subject to similar recordkeeping requirements applicable to other 
required policies and procedures, we do not anticipate covered 
institutions will need to invest in new recordkeeping staff, systems, 
or procedures to satisfy the new recordkeeping requirements.\491\

[[Page 20672]]

The incremental administrative costs arising from maintaining 
additional records related to these provisions using existing systems 
are covered in the Paperwork Reduction Act analysis in section IV and 
estimated to be $381/year.
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    \491\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.17a-3; 17 CFR 275.204-2; 17 CFR 
270.31a-1; and 17 CFR 240.17Ad-7. Where permitted, entities may 
choose to use third-party providers in meeting their recordkeeping 
obligations under the proposed rule, see supra note 217.
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4. Exception From Annual Notice Delivery Requirement
    The proposed amendments would incorporate into the regulation an 
existing statutory exception to the requirement that a broker-dealer, 
investment company, or registered investment adviser deliver an annual 
privacy notice to its customers.\492\ An institution may only rely on 
the exception if it has not changed its policies and practices with 
regard to disclosing nonpublic personal information from those it most 
recently provided to the customer via privacy notice.\493\ Reliance on 
the exception is further limited to cases where the institution 
provides information to a third party to perform services for, or 
functions on behalf of, the institution \494\ in accordance with one of 
a number of existing exemptions that contain notice provisions.\495\
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    \492\ See supra note 220.
    \493\ See proposed rule 248.5(e)(1)(ii).
    \494\ See id; see also 15 U.S.C. 6802(b)(2) (providing the 
statutory basis to this exception).
    \495\ See proposed rule 248.5(e)(1)(i). These existing 
exemptions address a number of cases, such as information sharing 
necessary to perform transactions on behalf of the customer, 
information sharing directed by the customer, reporting to credit 
reporting agencies, information sharing resulting from business 
combination transactions (mergers, sales, etc.). See 15 U.S.C. 
6802(e) (providing the statutory basis to these additional 
criteria).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The effect of the exception would be to eliminate the requirement 
to send the same privacy policy notice to customers on multiple 
occasions. As such notices would provide no new information, we do not 
believe that receiving multiple copies of such notices provides any 
significant benefit to customers. Moreover, we expect that widespread 
reliance on the proposed exception is more likely to benefit customers, 
by providing clearer signals of when privacy policies have 
changed.\496\ At the same time, reliance on the exception would reduce 
costs for covered entities. However, we expect these cost savings to be 
limited to the administrative burdens discussed in section IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \496\ In other words, reducing the number of privacy notices 
with no new content allows customers to devote more attention to 
parsing notices that do contain new content.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the exception became effective when the statute was 
enacted, we believe that the aforementioned benefits have already been 
realized. Consequently, we do not believe that its inclusion would have 
any economic effects relative to the current status quo.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \497\ We distinguish here between the theoretical ``baseline'' 
in which the self-effectuating provisions of the statute have not 
come into effect and the current ``status quo'' (in which they 
have). See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation

    As discussed in the foregoing sections, market imperfections could 
lead to underinvestment in customer information safeguards, and to 
information asymmetry about cybersecurity incidents.\498\ Various 
elements of the proposed amendments aim to mitigate the inefficiency 
resulting from these imperfections by imposing mandates for policies 
and procedures. Specifically, the proposal would require covered 
entities to include a response program for incidents involving 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, which would 
address assessment and containment of such incidents, and could thereby 
reduce potential underinvestment in these areas, and thereby improve 
customer information safeguards.\499\ In addition, by requiring 
notification to customers about certain safeguard failures, the 
proposal could reduce the aforementioned information asymmetry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \498\ See supra section III.B.
    \499\ See supra section III.D (discussing benefits and costs of 
response program requirement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the proposed amendments have the potential to mitigate these 
inefficiencies, the scale of the overall effect is likely to be limited 
due to the presence of state notification laws, and existing security 
practices, as well as existing regulations.\500\ Moreover, insofar as 
the proposed amendments alter covered institutions' practices, the 
improvement--in terms of the effectiveness of covered institutions' 
response to incidents, customers' ability to respond to breaches of 
their sensitive customer information, and in reduced information 
asymmetry about covered institutions' efforts to safeguard this 
information--is generally impracticable to quantify due to data 
limitations discussed previously.\501\ The proposed provisions would 
not have first order effects on channels typically associated with 
capital formation (e.g., taxation policy, financial innovation, capital 
controls, investor disclosure, market integrity, intellectual property, 
rule-of-law, and diversification). Thus, the proposed amendments are 
unlikely to lead to significant effects on capital formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \500\ See supra sections III.C.1 and III.C.2.
    \501\ See, e.g., supra sections III.A., III.D.1.a. and 
III.D.1.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the proposed amendments are likely to impose 
proportionately larger costs on smaller and more geographically-limited 
covered institutions, this may affect their competitiveness vis-
[agrave]-vis their larger peers. Such covered institutions--which may 
be less likely to have written policies and procedures for incident 
response programs already in place--would face disproportionately 
higher costs resulting from the proposed amendments.\502\ Thus, the 
proposed amendments could tilt the competitive playing field in favor 
of larger covered institutions. On the other hand, if clients and 
investors believe that the proposed amendments effectively induce the 
appropriate level of effort, smaller covered institutions would likely 
reap disproportionately large benefits from these improved 
perceptions.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \502\ The development of policies and procedures entails a fixed 
cost component that imposes a proportionately larger burden on 
smaller firms. We expect smaller investment advisers and broker 
dealers would be most affected. See supra sections III.C.3.a and 
III.C.3.b.
    \503\ Given the aforementioned disproportionately large costs 
faced by smaller institutions, it is reasonable for potential 
customers to suspect that smaller entities would be more inclined to 
avoid such costs than their larger peers; such suspicions would be 
mitigated by a regulatory requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to competition among covered institutions' service 
providers, the overall effect of the proposed amendments is similarly 
ambiguous. The standardized terms of service used by some service 
providers may already contain appropriate measures designed to protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of customer information. If they 
do not, however, it is likely that some service providers would decline 
to negotiate contractual terms with respect to customer information 
safeguards, effectively causing these service providers to cease 
offering services to affected covered institutions.\504\ This would 
reduce competition. On the other hand, service providers with fewer 
customer information safeguards (i.e., those unwilling to provide said 
assurances) would be unable to undercut service providers with greater 
information safeguards. This would improve the competitive position of 
this latter group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \504\ See supra section III.C.3.e.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, we anticipate that neither the proposed recordkeeping 
provisions,\505\ nor the proposed exception from annual privacy notice 
delivery requirements \506\

[[Page 20673]]

will have a notable impact on efficiency, competition, or capital 
formation due to their limited economic effects.\507\ As discussed 
elsewhere in this proposal, we do not expect the proposed recordkeeping 
requirements to impose material compliance costs, and we expect the 
economic effects of the proposed exception to be limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \505\ Proposed rule 248.30(d).
    \506\ Proposed rule 248.5.
    \507\ See supra sections III.D.3 and III.D.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Reasonable Alternatives Considered

    In formulating our proposal, we have considered various reasonable 
alternatives. These alternatives are discussed below.
1. Reasonable Assurances From Service Providers
    Rather than requiring policies and procedures that require covered 
institutions to enter into a written contract with each service 
provider requiring that it take appropriate measures designed to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information,\508\ the Commission considered requiring covered 
institutions to obtain ``reasonable assurances'' from service providers 
instead. This would be a lower threshold than the proposed provision 
requiring a written contract, and as such would be less costly to reach 
but also less protective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \508\ See supra section III.D.1.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under this alternative we would use the proposal's definition of 
``service provider,'' which is ``any person or entity that is a third 
party and receives, maintains, processes, or otherwise is permitted 
access to customer information through its provision of services 
directly to a covered institution.'' \509\ Thus, similar to the 
proposal, this alternative could affect a broad range of service 
providers including, potentially: email providers, customer 
relationship management systems, cloud applications, and other 
technology vendors. Depending on the states where they operate, these 
service providers may already be subject to state laws applicable to 
businesses that ``maintain'' computerized data containing private 
information.\510\ Additionally, it is likely that any service provider 
that offers a service involving the maintenance of customer information 
to U.S. financial firms generally, or to any specific financial firm 
with a national presence, has processes in place to ensure compliance 
with these state laws; we request public comment on this assumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \509\ Proposed rule 248.30(e)(10).
    \510\ See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code sec. 1798.82(b), N.Y. Gen. Bus. 
Law sec. 899-AA(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For service providers that provide specialized services aimed at 
covered institutions, this alternative would, like the proposal, create 
market pressure to enhance service offerings so as to provide the 
requisite assurances and facilitate covered institutions' compliance 
with the proposed requirements.\511\ These service providers would have 
little choice other than to adapt their services to provide the 
required assurances, which would result in additional costs for the 
service providers related to adapting business processes to accommodate 
the requirements. In general, we expect these costs would be limited in 
scale in the same ways the costs of the proposal are limited in scale: 
specialized service providers are adapted to operating in a highly-
regulated industry, and are likely to have policies and procedures in 
place to facilitate compliance with state data breach laws. And, as 
with the proposal, we generally anticipate that such costs would 
largely be passed on to covered institutions and ultimately their 
customers. As compared to the proposal's requirement for written 
contracts, we expect that ``reasonable assurances'' would require fewer 
changes to business processes and, accordingly, lower costs. Assuming 
the covered institution did not use written contracts to document the 
``reasonable assurances,'' however, this alternative would also be less 
protective than the proposed requirement for contractual language. As 
compared to ``reasonable assurances,'' a written contract is clearer, 
more easily enforced as between the covered institution and the service 
provider, and more likely to ensure customer notification in the event 
of a data breach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \511\ A service provider involved in any business-critical 
function likely ``receives, maintains, processes, or otherwise is 
permitted access to customer information''. See proposed rule 
248.30(e)(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to more generic service providers (e.g., email, or 
customer-relationship management), the situation could be quite 
different. For these providers, covered institutions are likely to 
represent a small fraction of their customer base. As under the 
proposed service provider provisions, generic service providers may 
again be unwilling to adapt their business processes to the regulatory 
requirements of a small subset of their customers under this 
alternative.\512\ Some generic service providers may be unwilling to 
make the assurances needed, although we anticipate that they would be 
generally more willing to make assurances than to provide contractual 
guarantees.\513\ If the covered institution could not obtain the 
reasonable assurances required under this alternative, the covered 
institution would need to switch service providers and bear the 
associated switching costs, while the service providers would suffer 
loss of customers. Although the costs of obtaining reasonable 
assurances would likely be lower than under the proposed service 
provider provisions, and the need to switch providers less frequent, 
these costs could nonetheless be particularly acute for smaller covered 
institutions who lack bargaining power with generic service providers. 
And, as outlined above, this alternative would be less protective than 
contractual language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \512\ See supra section III.D.1.b (discussing the proposed 
requirement for covered institutions to enter into written contracts 
with their service providers).
    \513\ See id. Additionally, the service provider's standard 
terms and conditions might in some situations provide reasonable 
assurances adequate to meet the requirement.
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2. Lower Threshold for Customer Notice
    The Commission considered lowering the threshold for customer 
notice, such as one based on the ``possible misuse'' of sensitive 
customer information (rather than the proposed threshold requiring 
notice when sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely 
to have been, accessed or used without authorization), or even 
requiring notification of any breach without exception. A lower 
threshold would increase the number of notices customers receive. 
Although more frequent notices could potentially reveal incidents that 
warrant customers' attention and thereby potentially increase the 
benefits accruing to customers from the notice requirement discussed in 
section III.D.1.c, they would also increase the number of false alarms. 
As discussed in section III.D.1.c.iv, such false alarms could be 
problematic if they reduce customers' ability to discern which notices 
require action.
    Although a lower threshold could impose some additional compliance 
costs on covered institutions (due to additional notices being sent), 
we would not anticipate the additional direct compliance costs to be 
significant.\514\ Of more economic significance to covered institutions 
would be the resulting reputational effects.\515\ However, the 
direction of these effects is ambiguous. On the one hand, increased 
notices resulting from a lower threshold can be expected to lead to 
additional

[[Page 20674]]

reputation costs for firms required to issue more of such notices. On 
the other hand, lower thresholds could inundate customers with notices, 
such that notices are no longer notable, likely leading the negative 
reputation effects associated with such notices to be reduced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \514\ The direct compliance costs of notices are discussed in 
section IV.
    \515\ See supra section III.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Encryption Safe Harbor
    The Commission considered including a safe harbor to the 
notification requirement for breaches in which only cipher text was 
compromised. Assuming that such an alternative safe harbor would be 
sufficiently circumscribed to prevent its application to insecure 
encryption algorithms, or to secure algorithms used in a manner as to 
render them insecure, we believe that the economic effects of its 
inclusion would be largely indistinguishable from the proposal. This is 
because, as proposed, notification is triggered by the ``reasonable 
likelihood'' that sensitive customer information was accessed or used 
without authorization.\516\ Given the computational complexity involved 
in cracking the cipher texts of modern encryption algorithms generally 
viewed as secure, the compromise of cipher text produced by such 
algorithms in accordance with secure procedures \517\ would generally 
not give rise to ``a reasonably likely risk of substantial harm or 
inconvenience to an individual identified with the information.'' \518\ 
It would thus not constitute ``sensitive customer information,'' 
meaning that the threshold for providing notice would not be met and 
thereby rendering an explicit encryption safe harbor superfluous in 
such cases. In certain other cases, however, an express safe harbor may 
not be as protective as the proposal's minimum nationwide standard for 
determining whether the compromise of customer information could create 
``a reasonably likely risk of substantial harm or inconvenience to an 
individual identified with the information.'' \519\ It may also become 
outdated as technologies and security practices evolve. Thus, while an 
explicit (and appropriately circumscribed) safe harbor could provide 
some procedural efficiencies from streamlined application, it could 
also be misapplied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \516\ Proposed rule 248.30(b)(3)(iii).
    \517\ Here, ``secure procedures'' refers to the secure 
implementation of encryption algorithms and encompasses proper key 
generation and management, timely patching, user access controls, 
etc.
    \518\ Proposed rule 248.30(e)(9); see also supra note 112 and 
accompanying text.
    \519\ See proposed rule 248.30(e)(9). The August 2022 breach of 
the LastPass cloud-based password manager provides an illustrative 
example. In this data breach a large database of website credentials 
belonging to LastPass' customers was exfiltrated. The customer 
credentials in this database were encrypted using a secure algorithm 
and the encryption keys could not have been exfiltrated in the 
breach, so an encryption safe harbor could be expected to apply in 
such a case. Nonetheless, customers whose encrypted passwords were 
divulged in the breach became potential targets for brute force 
attacks (i.e., attempts to decrypt the passwords by guessing a 
customer's master password) and to phishing attacks (i.e., attempts 
to induce an affected customer to divulge the master password). See 
Karim Toubba, Notice of Recent Security Incident, LastPass (Dec. 22, 
2022), available at https://blog.lastpass.com/2022/12/notice-of-recent-security-incident/; see also Craig Clough, LastPass Security 
Breach Drained Bitcoin Wallet, User Says, Portfolio Media (Jan. 4, 
2023), available at https://www.law360.com/articles/1562534/lastpass-security-breach-drained-bitcoin-wallet-user-says.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Longer Customer Notification Deadlines
    The Commission considered incorporating longer customer 
notification deadlines, such as 60 or 90 days, as well as providing no 
fixed customer notification deadline. Although longer notification 
deadlines would provide more time for covered institutions to rebut the 
presumption in favor of notification discussed in section II.A.4.a, we 
expect that longer investigations would, in general, correlate with 
more serious or complicated incidents and would therefore be unlikely 
to end in a determination that sensitive customer information has not 
been and is not reasonably likely to be used in a manner that would 
result in substantial harm or inconvenience. We therefore do not 
believe that longer notification deadlines would ultimately lead to 
significantly fewer required notifications. Compliance costs 
conditional on notices being required (i.e., the actual furnishing of 
notices to customers) would be largely unchanged under alternative 
notice deadlines. That said, costs related to incident assessment would 
likely be somewhat lower due to the reduced urgency of determining the 
scope of an incident and a reduced likelihood that notifications would 
need to be made before an incident has been contained.\520\ Arguably, 
longer notification deadlines may increase reputation costs borne by 
covered institutions that choose to take advantage of the longer 
deadlines. Overall, however, we do not expect that longer notification 
deadlines would lead to costs for covered institutions that differ 
significantly from the costs of the proposed 30-day deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \520\ See supra section III.D.1.c.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Providing for longer notifications deadlines would likely reduce 
the promptness with which some covered institutions issue notifications 
to customers, potentially reducing their customers' ability to take 
effective mitigating actions. In particular, as discussed in section 
III.D.1.c.iii, some breaches are discovered very quickly. For customers 
whose sensitive customer information is compromised in such breaches, a 
longer notification deadline could significantly reduce the 
timeliness--and value--of the notice.\521\ On the other hand, where a 
public announcement could hinder containment efforts, a longer 
notification timeframe could yield benefits to the broader public (and/
or to the affected investors).\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \521\ See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
    \522\ See supra section II.A.4.e
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Broader Law Enforcement Exception From Notification Requirements
    The Commission considered providing for a broader exception to the 
30-day notification deadline, for example by extending its 
applicability to cases where any appropriate law enforcement agency 
requests the delay, and not limiting the length of the delay. This 
alternative law enforcement exception would more closely align with the 
law enforcement exceptions adopted by the Banking Agencies \523\ and 
many states.\524\
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    \523\ See Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance, supra 
note 47.
    \524\ See, e.g., RCW 19.255.010(8); Fla. Stat. sec. 
501.171(4)(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The principal function of a law enforcement exception would be to 
allow a law enforcement or national security agency to keep 
cybercriminals unaware of their detection. Observing a cyberattack that 
is in progress can allow investigators to take actions that can assist 
in revealing the attacker's location, identity, or methods.\525\ 
Notifying affected customers has the potential to alert attackers that 
their intrusion has been detected, hindering these efforts.\526\ Thus, 
a broader law enforcement exception could generally be expected to 
enhance law enforcement's efficacy in cybercrime investigations, which 
would potentially benefit affected customers through damage mitigation 
and benefit the general public through improved deterrence and 
increased recoveries,

[[Page 20675]]

and by enhancing law enforcement's knowledge of attackers' methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \525\ Cybersecurity Advisory: Technical Approaches to Uncovering 
and Remediating Malicious Activity, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure 
Sec. Agency (Sept. 24, 2020), available at https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-245a (explaining how and 
why investigators may ``avoid tipping off the adversary that their 
presence in the network has been discovered'').
    \526\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    That said, use of the exception would necessarily delay notice to 
customers affected by a cyber-attack, reducing the value to customers 
of such notices.\527\ Incidents where law enforcement would like to 
delay customer notifications are likely to involve numerous customers, 
who--without timely notice--may be unable to take timely mitigating 
actions that could prevent additional harm.\528\ Law enforcement 
investigations can also take time to resolve and, even when successful, 
their benefits to affected customers (e.g., recovery of criminals' ill-
gotten gains) may be limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \527\ See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
    \528\ See supra section III.D.1.c.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Information about cybercrime investigations is often confidential. 
The Commission does not have data on the prevalence of covert 
cybercrime investigations, their success or lack of success, their 
deterrent effect if any, or the impact of customer notification on 
investigations. Thus, we are unable to quantify the costs and benefits 
of this alternative. We invite public comment on these topics.

G. Request for Comment on Economic Analysis

    To assist the Commission in better assessing the economic effects 
of the proposal, we request comment on the following questions:
    107. What additional qualitative or quantitative information should 
be considered as part of the baseline for the economic analysis of the 
proposals?
    108. Are the effects on competition, efficiency, and capital 
formation arising from the proposed amendments accurately 
characterized? If not, why not?
    109. Are the economic effects of the alternatives accurately 
characterized? If not, why not?
    110. Are the costs and benefits of the proposals accurately 
characterized? If not, why not? What, if any, other costs or benefits 
should be taken into account? Please provide data that could help us 
quantify any of the aforementioned costs and benefits that we have been 
unable to quantify.
    111. Do institutions that would be covered by this proposal already 
comply with one or more state data breach notification requirements? If 
so, how similar or different are the compliance obligations under the 
state data breach notification laws and our proposal?
    112. Do existing contracts between covered institutions and service 
providers address notification in the event of a data breach? If so, in 
what circumstances does the service provider notify either the covered 
institution or the customer whose data was compromised?
    113. Do you believe the Commission has accurately characterized the 
cost of service providers adapting business practices to accommodate 
the proposed requirements? Please state why or why not, in as much 
detail as possible.
    114. Do policies and procedures implemented to comply with 
Regulation S-ID incorporate red flags related to potential compromise 
of customer information?
    115. Have potentially covered institutions developed and 
implemented written policies and procedures for response to data breach 
incidents?
    a. If so, please indicate whether these policies and procedures are 
written to comply with state data breach notification laws, 
international law, contracts, and/or other law or guidance.
    b. If so, please indicate which elements (e.g., detection, 
assessment, containment, lessons learned, notification) such policies 
contain.
    c. Please indicate what kind of institution (e.g., broker, transfer 
agent, etc.) your experience reflects.
    116. Have service providers to potentially covered institutions 
developed and implemented written policies and procedures for response 
to data breach incidents?
    a. If so, please indicate whether these policies and procedures are 
written to comply with state data breach notification laws, 
international law, contracts, and/or other law or guidance.
    b. If so, please indicate which elements (e.g., detection, 
assessment, containment, lessons learned, notification) such policies 
contain.
    c. Please indicate what kind of service provider your experience 
reflects.
    117. Do you believe that written policies and procedures to 
safeguard information lead to reduced risk of safeguard failures? 
Please share your experience or the basis for your belief.
    118. Do you believe that safeguarding the customer information of 
customers of other financial institutions, or notifying these 
individuals in the event their sensitive customer information is 
compromised would entail additional costs?
    a. If so, please indicate the nature and scale of the costs.
    b. If so, please characterize the population of individuals whose 
sensitive customer information would entail these significant 
additional costs.
    119. Do you believe a broader law enforcement exception would 
provide benefits?
    a. If so, please indicate the nature and scale of these benefits.
    b. If so, to the extent possible, please provide data or case 
studies that could help establish the scale of these benefits.
    120. Do you believe that use of a broader law enforcement exception 
would entail significant costs to individuals whose sensitive customer 
information is compromised?
    a. If so, please indicate the nature and scale of these costs.
    b. If so, to the extent possible, please provide data or case 
studies that could help establish the scale of these costs.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Introduction

    Certain provisions of the proposed amendments contain ``collection 
of information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\529\ We are submitting the proposed 
collection of information to the Office of Management and Budget 
(``OMB'') for review in accordance with the PRA.\530\ The safeguards 
rule and the disposal rule we propose to amend would have an effect on 
the currently approved existing collection of information under OMB 
Control No. 3235-0610, the title of which is, ``Rule 248.30, Procedures 
to safeguard customer records and information; disposal of consumer 
report information.'' \531\
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    \529\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 through 3521.
    \530\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d); 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \531\ The paperwork burden imposed by Regulation S-P's notice 
and opt-out requirements, 17 CFR 248.1 to 248.18, is currently 
approved under a separate OMB control number, OMB Control No. 3235-
0537. The proposed amendments would implement a statutory exception 
that has been in effect since late 2015. We do not believe that the 
proposed amendment to implement the statutory exception makes any 
substantive modifications to this existing collection of information 
requirement or imposes any new substantive recordkeeping or 
information collection requirements within the meaning of the PRA. 
Similarly, we do not believe that the proposed amendments to: (i) 
Investment Company Act rules 31a-1(b) (OMB control number 3235-0178) 
and 31a-2(a) (OMB control number 3235-0179) for investment companies 
that are registered under the Investment Company Act, (ii) 
Investment Advisers Act rule 204-2 (OMB control number 3235-0278) 
for investment advisers, (iii) Exchange Act rule 17a-4 (OMB control 
number 3235-0279) for broker-dealers, and (iv) Exchange Act rule 
17Ad-7 (OMB control number 3235-0291) for transfer agents, makes any 
modifications to this existing collection of information requirement 
or imposes any new recordkeeping or information collection 
requirements. Accordingly, we believe that the current burden and 
cost estimates for the existing collection of information 
requirements remain appropriate, and we believe that the proposed 
amendments should not impose substantive new burdens on the overall 
population of respondents or affect the current overall burden 
estimates for this collection of information. We are, therefore, not 
revising any burden and cost estimates in connection with these 
amendments.

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[[Page 20676]]

    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required 
to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a 
currently valid OMB control number. The proposed requirement to adopt 
policies and procedures constitutes a collection of information 
requirement under the PRA. The collection of information associated 
with the proposed amendments would be mandatory, and responses provided 
to the Commission in the context of its examination and oversight 
program concerning the proposed amendments would be kept confidential 
subject to the provisions of applicable law. A description of the 
proposed amendments, including the need for the information and its 
use, as well as a description of the types of respondents, can be found 
in section II above, and a discussion of the expected economic effects 
of the proposed amendments can be found in section III above.

B. Amendments to the Safeguards Rule and Disposal Rule

    As discussed above, the proposed amendments to the safeguards rule 
would require covered institutions to develop, implement, and maintain 
written policies and procedures that include incident response programs 
reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover from 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, including 
customer notification procedures. The response program must include 
procedures to assess the nature and scope of any incident involving 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information; take appropriate 
steps to contain and control the incident; and provide notice to each 
affected individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is 
reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization 
(unless the covered institution makes certain determinations as 
specified in the proposed rule).
    The proposed amendments to the disposal rule would require covered 
institutions that maintain or otherwise possess customer information or 
consumer information for a business purpose to adopt and implement 
written policies and procedures that address proper disposal of such 
information, which would include taking reasonable measures to protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of the information in connection 
with its disposal.
    Finally, the proposed amendments would require covered institutions 
to make and maintain written records documenting compliance with the 
requirements of the safeguards rule and the disposal rule. Under the 
proposed rules, the time periods for preserving records would vary by 
covered institution to be consistent with existing recordkeeping 
rules.\532\
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    \532\ The proposed amendments would also broaden the scope of 
information covered by the safeguards rule and the disposal rule (to 
include all customer information in the possession of a covered 
institution, and all consumer information that a covered institution 
maintains or otherwise possesses for a business purpose) and extend 
the application of the safeguards provisions to transfer agents 
registered with the Commission or another appropriate regulatory 
agency. These amendments do not contain collections of information 
beyond those related to the incident response program analyzed 
above.
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    Based on FOCUS Filing and Form BD-N data, as of December 2021, 
there were 3,401 brokers or dealers other than notice-registered 
brokers or dealers. Based on Investment Adviser Registration Depository 
data, as of June 2022, there were 15,129 investment advisers registered 
with the Commission. As of December 2021, there were 13,965 investment 
companies.\533\ Based on Form TA-1, as of December, 2021, there were 
335 transfer agents registered with the Commission and 67 transfer 
agents registered with the Banking Agencies.
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    \533\ Data on investment companies registered with the 
Commission comes from Form N-CEN filings; data on BDCs comes from 
Forms 10-K and 10-Q; and data on employees' securities companies 
comes from Form 40-APP. See supra Table 1.
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    Table 2 below summarizes our PRA initial and ongoing annual burden 
estimates associated with the proposed amendments to the safeguards 
rule and the disposal rule.

                     Table 2--Proposed Amendments to Safeguards Rule and Disposal Rule--PRA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Internal     Internal annual
                              initial burden    burden hours    Wage rate \2\    Internal time   Annual external
                                   hours            \1\                               cost         cost burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               PROPOSED ESTIMATES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adopting and implementing                 60  25 hours \3\...  $455 (blended    $11,375 (equal   $2,655 \4\
 policies and procedures.                                       rate for         to the
                                                                compliance       internal
                                                                attorney and     annual burden
                                                                assistant        x the wage
                                                                general          rate).
                                                                counsel).
Preparation and distribution               9  8 hours \5\....  $300 (blended    $2,400 (equal    $2,018 \6\
 of notices.                                                    rate for         to the
                                                                senior           internal
                                                                compliance       annual burden
                                                                examiner and     x the wage
                                                                compliance       rate).
                                                                manager).
Recordkeeping...............               1  1 hour.........  $381 (blended    $381...........  $0
                                                                rate for
                                                                compliance
                                                                attorney and
                                                                senior
                                                                programmer).
Total new annual burden per   ..............  34 hours (equal  ...............  $14,156 (equal   $4,673 (equal
 covered institution.                          to the sum of                     to the sum of    to the sum of
                                               the above                         the above        the above two
                                               three boxes).                     three boxes).    boxes)
Number of covered             ..............  x 32,897         ...............  x 32,897         16,449 \8\
 institutions.                                 covered                           covered
                                               institutions                      institutions.
                                               \7\.
Total new annual aggregate    ..............  1,118,498 hours  ...............  $465,689,932...  $76,866,177
 burden.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  TOTAL ESTIMATED BURDENS INCLUDING AMENDMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current aggregate annual      ..............  + 47,565 hours.  ...............  ...............  + $0
 burden estimates.
Revised aggregate annual      ..............  1,166,063 hours  ...............  ...............  $76,866,177
 burden estimates.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Includes initial burden estimates annualized over a 3-year period.
\2\ The Commission's estimates of the relevant wage rates are based on the SIFMA Wage Report. The estimated
  figures are modified by firm size, employee benefits, overhead, and adjusted to account for the effects of
  inflation.

[[Page 20677]]

 
\3\ Includes initial burden estimates annualized over a three-year period, plus 5 hours of ongoing annual burden
  hours. The estimate of 2560 hours is based on the following calculation: ((60 initial hours/3) + 5 hours of
  additional ongoing burden hours) = 25 hours.
\4\ This estimated burden is based on the estimated wage rate of $531/hour, for 5 hours, for outside legal
  services. The Commission's estimates of the relevant wage rates for external time costs, such as outside legal
  services, takes into account staff experience, a variety of sources including general information websites,
  and adjustments for inflation.
\5\ Includes initial burden estimate annualized over a three-year period, plus 5 hours of ongoing annual burden
  hours. The estimate of 8 hours in based on the following calculation: ((9 initial hours/3 years) + 5 hours of
  additional ongoing burden hours) = 8 hours.
\6\ This estimated burden is based on the estimated wage rate of $531/hour, for 3 hours, for outside legal
  services and $85/hour, for 5 hours, for a senior general clerk.
\7\ Total number of covered institutions is calculated as follows: 3,401 broker-dealers other than notice-
  registered broker-dealers + 15,129 investment advisers registered with the Commission + 13,965 investment
  companies + 335 transfer agents registered with the Commission + 67 transfer agents registered with the
  Banking Agencies = 32,897 covered institutions.
\8\ We estimate that 50% of covered institutions will use outside legal services for these collections of
  information. This estimate takes into account that covered institutions may elect to use outside legal
  services (along with in-house counsel), based on factors such as budget and the covered institution's standard
  practices for using outside legal services, as well as personnel availability and expertise.

C. Request for Comment

    We request comment on whether these estimates are reasonable. 
Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits comments 
in order to: (1) evaluate whether the proposed collection of 
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of 
the Commission, including whether the information will have practical 
utility; (2) evaluate the accuracy of the Commission's estimate of the 
burden of the proposed collection of information; (3) determine whether 
there are ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected; and (4) determine whether there are ways 
to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who 
are to respond, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology.
    Persons wishing to submit comments on the collection of information 
requirements of the proposed amendments should direct them to the OMB 
Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
[email protected], and should send a copy to 
Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090, with reference to File No. 
S7-05-23. OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collections 
of information between 30 and 60 days after publication of this 
release; therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full 
effect if OMB receives it within 30 days after publication of this 
release. Requests for materials submitted to OMB by the Commission with 
regard to these collections of information should be in writing, refer 
to File No. S7-05-23, and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Office of FOIA Services, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549-2736.

V. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act \534\ (``RFA'') requires an agency, 
when issuing a rulemaking proposal, to prepare and make available for 
public comment an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'') 
that describes the impact of the proposed rule on small entities, 
unless the Commission certifies that the rule, if adopted, would not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.\535\ This IRFA has been prepared in accordance with the RFA. 
It relates to the proposed new rules and amendments described in 
sections II through IV above.
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    \534\ See 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \535\ See 5 U.S.C. 603(a); 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Reason for and Objectives of the Proposed Action

    The objectives of the proposed amendments are to: (i) establish a 
Federal minimum standard for providing notification to all customers of 
a covered institution affected by a data breach (regardless of state 
residency) and providing consistent disclosure of important information 
to help affected customers respond to a data breach; (ii) require 
covered institutions to develop, implement, and maintain written 
policies and procedures for an incident response program that is 
reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover from 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information; (iii) enhance 
the protection of customers' nonpublic personal information by aligning 
the information protected under the safeguards rule and the disposal 
rule by applying the protections of both rules to ``customer 
information,'' while also broadening the group of customers whose 
information is protected under both rules; and (iv) bring all transfer 
agents within the scope of the safeguards rule and the disposal rule. 
The proposed amendments also would update applicable recordkeeping 
requirements and conform Regulation S-P's annual privacy notice 
delivery provisions to the terms of a statutory exception. The proposed 
amendments are intended to:
    A. Prevent and mitigate the unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information;
    B. Improve covered institutions' preparedness to respond to data 
breaches involving customer information, and the effectiveness of their 
response programs to such data breaches when they do occur;
    C. Ensure that firms consistently monitor their systems to 
identify, contain, and control data breach incidents involving customer 
information quickly;
    D. Help affected individuals through the adoption of a minimum 
standard for notification in response to unauthorized access or use of 
sensitive customer information that leverages some of the more 
protective state law practices already in existence;
    E. Expand the coverage of the safeguards rule to provide for 
greater protection of customer information that is maintained by 
transfer agents;
    F. Extend the protections of Regulation S-P to cover customer 
information that covered institutions receive from another financial 
institution in the process of conducting business;
    G. Create more consistent standards across the safeguards rule and 
the disposal rule for the handling of the same types of nonpublic 
personal information; and
    H. Require that a covered institution's response program include 
policies and procedures that require a covered institution, by 
contract, to require that its service providers take appropriate 
measures that are designed to protect against unauthorized access to or 
use of customer information.

B. Legal Basis

    We are proposing the new rules and rule amendments described above 
under the authority set forth in sections 17, 17A, 23, and 36 of the 
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78q, 78q-1, 78w, and 78mm], sections 31 and 38 
of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-30 and

[[Page 20678]]

80a-37], sections 204, 204A and 211 of the Investment Advisers Act [15 
U.S.C. 80b-4, 80b-4a and 80b-11], section 628(a) of the FCRA [15 U.S.C. 
1681w(a)], and sections 501, 504, 505, and 525 of the GLBA [15 U.S.C. 
6801, 6804, 6805 and 6825].

C. Small Entities Subject to Proposed Rule Amendments

    The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P would affect brokers, 
dealers, registered investment advisers, investment companies, and 
transfer agents, including entities that are considered to be a small 
business or small organization (collectively, ``small entity'') for 
purposes of the RFA. For purposes of the RFA, under the Exchange Act a 
broker or dealer is a small entity if it: (i) had total capital of less 
than $500,000 on the date in its prior fiscal year as of which its 
audited financial statements were prepared or, if not required to file 
audited financial statements, on the last business day of its prior 
fiscal year; and (ii) is not affiliated with any person that is not a 
small entity.\536\ A transfer agent is a small entity if it: (i) 
received less than 500 items for transfer and less than 500 items for 
processing during the preceding six months; (ii) transferred items only 
of issuers that are small entities; (iii) maintained master shareholder 
files that in the aggregate contained less than 1,000 shareholder 
accounts or was the named transfer agent for less than 1,000 
shareholder accounts at all times during the preceding fiscal year; and 
(iv) is not affiliated with any person that is not a small entity.\537\ 
Under the Investment Company Act, investment companies are considered 
small entities if they, together with other funds in the same group of 
related funds, have net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of 
its most recent fiscal year.\538\ Under the Investment Advisers Act, a 
small entity is an investment adviser that: (i) manages less than $25 
million in assets; (ii) has total assets of less than $5 million on the 
last day of its most recent fiscal year; and (iii) does not control, is 
not controlled by, and is not under common control with another 
investment adviser that manages $25 million or more in assets, or any 
person that has had total assets of $5 million or more on the last day 
of the most recent fiscal year.\539\
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    \536\ 17 CFR 240.0-10.
    \537\ Id.
    \538\ 17 CFR 270.0-10.
    \539\ 17 CFR 275.0-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on Commission filings, we estimate that approximately 764 
broker-dealers,\540\ 158 transfer agents,\541\ 85 investment 
companies,\542\ and 522 registered investment advisers \543\ may be 
considered small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \540\ Estimate based on FOCUS Report data collected by the 
Commission as of September 30, 2022.
    \541\ Estimate based on the number of transfer agents that 
reported a value of fewer than 1,000 for items 4(a) and 5(a) on Form 
TA-2 for the 2021 annual reporting period (which, was required to be 
filed by March 31, 2022).
    \542\ Based on Commission staff approximation that as of June 
2022, approximately 43 open-end funds (including 11 exchange-traded 
funds), 31 closed-end funds, and 11 business development companies 
are small entities. See Tailored Shareholder Reports for Mutual 
Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds; Fee Information in Investment 
Company Advertisements, Securities Act Release No. 11125 (Oct. 26, 
2022) [87 FR 72758-01 (Nov. 25, 2022)].
    \543\ Estimate based on IARD data as of June 30, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements

    The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P would require covered 
institutions to develop incident response programs for unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information, as well as imposing a 
customer notification obligation in instances where sensitive customer 
information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used 
without authorization. The proposed amendments also would include new 
mandatory recordkeeping requirements and language conforming Regulation 
S-P's annual privacy notice delivery provisions to the terms of a 
statutory exception.
    Under the proposed amendments, covered institutions would have to 
develop, implement, and maintain, within their written policies and 
procedures designed to comply with Regulation S-P, a program that is 
reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover from 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, including 
customer notification procedures. Such policies and procedures would 
also need to require that covered institutions, pursuant to a written 
contract between the covered institution and its service providers, 
require the service providers to take appropriate measures designed to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer information, 
including by notifying the covered institution as soon as possible, but 
no later than 48 hours after becoming aware of a breach, in the event 
of any breach in security that results in unauthorized access to a 
customer information system maintained by the service provider, in 
order to enable the covered institution to implement its response 
program. If an incident were to occur, unless a covered institution has 
determined, after a reasonable investigation of the facts and 
circumstances of the incident of unauthorized access to or use of 
sensitive customer information, that sensitive customer information has 
not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that 
would result in substantial harm or inconvenience, the covered 
institution must provide a clear and conspicuous notice to each 
affected individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is 
reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization. 
As part of its incident response program, a covered institution may 
also enter into a written agreement with its service provider to have 
the service provider notify affected individuals on its behalf.
    In addition, covered institutions would be required to make and 
maintain specified written records designed to evidence compliance with 
these requirements. Such records would be required to be maintained 
starting from when the record was made, or from when the covered 
institution terminated the use of the written policy or procedure, for 
the time periods stated in the amended recordkeeping regulations for 
each type of covered institution.\544\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \544\ Specifically, the proposal would amend (i) Investment 
Company Act rules 31a-1(b) and 31a-2(a) for investment companies 
that are registered under the Investment Company Act, (ii) proposed 
rule 248.30(d) under Regulation S-P for unregistered investment 
companies, (iii) Investment Advisers Act rule 204-2 for investment 
advisers, (iv) Exchange Act rule 17a-4 for broker-dealers, and (v) 
Exchange Act rule 17Ad-7 for transfer agents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some covered institutions, including covered institutions that are 
small entities, would incur increased costs involved in reviewing and 
revising their current safeguarding policies and procedures to comply 
with these obligations, including their cybersecurity policies and 
procedures. Initially, this would require covered institutions to 
develop as part of their written policies and procedures under the 
safeguards rule, a program reasonably designed to detect, respond to, 
and recover from any unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information, including customer notification procedures, in a manner 
that provides clarity for firm personnel. Further, in developing these 
policies and procedures, covered institutions would need to include 
policies and procedures requiring the covered institution, pursuant to 
a written contract, to require its service providers to take 
appropriate measures that are

[[Page 20679]]

designed to protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information, including notifying the covered institution as soon as 
possible, but no later than 48 hours after becoming aware of a breach, 
in the event of any breach in security resulting in unauthorized access 
to a customer information system maintained by the service provider, in 
order to enable the covered institution to implement its response 
program. However, as the Commission recognizes the number and varying 
characteristics (e.g., size, business, and sophistication) of covered 
institutions, these proposed amendments would help covered institutions 
to tailor these policies and procedures and related incident response 
program based on the individual facts and circumstances of the firm, 
and provide flexibility in addressing the general elements of the 
response program requirements based on the size and complexity of the 
covered institution and the nature and scope of its activities.
    In addition, the Commission acknowledges that the proposed rule 
would impose greater costs on those transfer agents that are registered 
with another appropriate regulatory agency, if they are not currently 
subject to Regulation S-P, as well as those transfer agents registered 
with the Commission who are not currently subject to the safeguards 
rule. As discussed above, such costs would include the development and 
implementation of necessary policies and procedures, the ongoing costs 
of required recordkeeping and maintenance requirements, and, where 
necessary, the costs to comply with the customer notification 
requirements of the proposed rule. Such costs would also include the 
same minimal costs for employee training or establishing clear 
procedures for consumer report information disposal that are imposed on 
all covered institutions. To the extent that such costs are being 
applied to a transfer agent for the first time as a result of new 
obligations being imposed, the proposed rule would incur higher present 
costs on those transfer agents than those covered institutions that are 
already subject to the safeguards rule and the disposal rule.
    To comply with these amendments on an ongoing basis, covered 
institutions would need to respond appropriately to incidents that 
entail the unauthorized access to or use of customer information. This 
would entail carrying out the established response program procedures 
to (i) assess the nature and scope of any incident involving 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information and identify the 
customer information systems and types of customer information that may 
have been accessed or used without authorization; (ii) take appropriate 
steps to contain and control the incident to prevent further 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information; and (iii) notify 
each affected individual whose sensitive customer information was, or 
is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization, unless the covered institution determines, after a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the incident 
of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information, 
that the sensitive customer information has not been, and is not 
reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience.
    Where the covered institution determines notice is required, the 
covered institution would need to provide a clear and conspicuous 
notice to each affected individual whose sensitive customer information 
was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization. This notice would need to be transmitted by a means 
designed to ensure that each affected individual can reasonably be 
expected to receive actual notice in writing. Further, the covered 
institution would need to satisfy the specified content requirements of 
that notice,\545\ the preparation of which would incur some incremental 
additional costs on covered institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \545\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(4)(iv). In particular, the 
covered institution would need to: (i) describe in general terms the 
incident and the type of sensitive customer information that was or 
is reasonably believed to have been accessed or used without 
authorization; (ii) describe what has been done to protect the 
sensitive customer information from further unauthorized access or 
use; (iii) include, if the information is reasonably possible to 
determine at the time the notice is provided, any of the following: 
the date of the incident, the estimated date of the incident, or the 
date range within which the incident occurred; (iv) include contact 
information sufficient to permit an affected individual to contact 
the covered institution to inquire about the incident, including the 
following: a telephone number (which should be a toll-free number if 
available), an email address or equivalent method or means, a postal 
address, and the name of a specific office to contact for further 
information and assistance; (v) if the individual has an account 
with the covered institution, recommend that the customer review 
account statements and immediately report any suspicious activity to 
the covered institution; (vi) explain what a fraud alert is and how 
an individual may place a fraud alert in the individual's credit 
reports to put the individual's creditors on notice that the 
individual may be a victim of fraud, including identity theft; (vii) 
recommend that the individual periodically obtain credit reports 
from each nationwide credit reporting company and have information 
relating to fraudulent transactions deleted; (viii) explain how the 
individual may obtain a credit report free of charge; and (ix) 
include information about the availability of online guidance from 
the Federal Trade Commission and usa.gov regarding steps an 
individual can take to protect against identity theft, a statement 
encouraging the individual to report any incidents of identity theft 
to the Federal Trade Commission, and include the Federal Trade 
Commission's website address where individuals may obtain government 
information about identity theft and report suspected incidents of 
identity theft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, covered institutions would also face costs in complying 
with the new recordkeeping requirements imposed by these amendments 
that are incrementally more than those costs covered institutions 
already incur from their existing regulatory recordkeeping obligations, 
in light of their already existing record retention systems. However, 
the Commission has proposed such record maintenance provisions to align 
with those most frequently employed as to each covered institution 
subject to this rulemaking, partially in an effort to minimize these 
costs to firms.
    Overall, incremental costs would be associated with the proposed 
amendments to Regulation S-P.\546\ Some proportion of large or small 
institutions would be likely to experience some increase in costs to 
comply with the proposed amendments if they are adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \546\ Covered institutions are currently subject to similar 
recordkeeping requirements applicable to other required policies and 
procedures. Therefore, covered institutions will generally not need 
to invest in new recordkeeping staff, systems, or procedures to 
satisfy the new recordkeeping requirements; see supra note 491 and 
accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More specifically, we estimate that many covered institutions would 
incur one-time costs related to reviewing and revising their current 
safeguarding policies and procedures to comply with these obligations, 
including their cybersecurity policies and procedures. Additionally, 
some covered institutions, including transfer agents, may incur costs 
associated with establishing such policies and procedures as these 
amendments require if those covered institutions do not already have 
such policies and procedures. We also estimate that the ongoing, long-
term costs associated with the proposed amendments could include costs 
of responding appropriately to incidents that entail the unauthorized 
access to or use of customer information.
    We encourage written comments regarding this analysis. We solicit 
comments as to whether the proposed amendments could have an effect 
that we have not considered. We also request that commenters describe 
the nature of any impact on small entities and provide empirical data 
to support the extent of the impact. In addition, we

[[Page 20680]]

solicit comments regarding our proposal to amend Regulation S-P's 
annual privacy notice delivery provisions to conform to the terms of a 
statutory exception.

E. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules

    As discussed above, the proposed amendments would impose 
requirements that covered institutions develop response programs for 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information in the form of 
written policies and procedures designed to detect, respond to, and 
recover from unauthorized access to or use of customer information, 
including customer notification procedures. Covered institutions are 
subject to requirements elsewhere under the Federal securities laws and 
rules of the self-regulatory organizations that require them to adopt 
written policies and procedures that may relate to some similar 
issues.\547\ The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P, however, would 
not require covered institutions to maintain duplicate copies of 
records covered by the rule, and an institution's incident response 
program for unauthorized access to or use of customer information would 
not have to be maintained in a single location. We preliminarily 
believe, therefore, that any duplication of regulatory requirements 
would be limited and would not impose significant additional costs on 
covered institutions including small entities.\548\ With the exception 
of the Banking Agencies' Incident Response Guidance and their 
requirements for safeguarding customer information and disposing of 
consumer financial report information as they apply to transfer agents 
that are registered with another appropriate regulatory agency, we 
believe there are no other Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or 
conflict with the proposed reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \547\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 80b-4a (requiring each adviser 
registered with the Commission to have written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to prevent misuse of material non-
public information by the adviser or persons associated with the 
adviser); 17 CFR 270.38a-1(a)(1) (requiring investment companies to 
adopt compliance policies and procedures); 275.206(4)-7(a) 
(requiring investment advisers to adopt compliance policies and 
procedures); Regulation S-ID, 17 CFR part 248, subpart C, (requiring 
financial institutions subject to the Commission's jurisdiction with 
covered accounts to develop and implement a written identity theft 
prevention program that is designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate 
identity theft in connection with covered accounts, which must 
include, among other things, policies and procedures to respond 
appropriately to any red flags that are detected pursuant to the 
program); and FINRA Rule 3110 (requiring each broker-dealer to 
establish and maintain written procedures to supervise the types of 
business it is engaged in and to supervise the activities of 
registered representatives and associated persons, which could 
include registered investment advisers).
    \548\ See supra section II.G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the case of transfer agents that are registered with another 
appropriate regulatory agency, the proposed rule might be considered 
duplicative of or overlapping with the Banking Agencies' Incident 
Response Guidance. Specifically, the proposed rule might be considered 
to overlap or conflict with the Banking Agencies' Incident Response 
Guidance regarding the safeguarding of customer information, disposal 
of consumer financial report information, and as to procedures for 
customer notification in connection with an incident response program.
    In general, however, the similarities between the proposed 
reporting requirements and existing reporting requirements under rules 
of the Banking Agencies and the FTC are the result of our statutory 
mandate to set standards for safeguarding customer records and 
information that are consistent and comparable with the corresponding 
standards set by the other agencies.

F. Significant Alternatives

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs us to consider significant 
alternatives that would accomplish the stated objectives, while 
minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entities. In 
connection with the proposed amendments, we considered the following 
alternatives:
    1. establishing different compliance or reporting standards that 
take into account the resources available to small entities;
    2. the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of the 
reporting and compliance requirements under the rule for small 
entities;
    3. use of performance rather than design standards; and
    4. exempting small entities from coverage of the rule, or any part 
of the rule.
    With regard to the first alternative, we have proposed amendments 
to Regulation S-P that would continue to permit institutions 
substantial flexibility to design safeguarding policies and procedures 
appropriate for their size and complexity, the nature and scope of 
their activities, and the sensitivity of the personal information at 
issue. We nevertheless believe it necessary to propose to require that 
covered institutions, regardless of their size, adopt a response 
program for incidents of unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information, which would include customer notification procedures.\549\ 
The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P arise from our concern with 
the increasing number of information security breaches that have come 
to light in recent years, particularly those involving institutions 
regulated by the Commission. Establishing different compliance or 
reporting requirements for small entities could lead to less favorable 
protections for these entities' customers and compromise the 
effectiveness of the proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \549\ See proposed rule 248.30(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to the second alternative, the proposed amendments 
should, by their operation, simplify reporting and compliance 
requirements for small entities. Small covered institutions are likely 
to maintain personal information on fewer individuals than large 
covered institutions, and they are likely to have relatively simple 
personal information systems. The proposed amendments would not 
prescribe specific steps a covered institution must take in response to 
a data breach, but instead would give the institution flexibility to 
tailor its policies and procedures to its individual facts and 
circumstances. The proposed amendments therefore are intended to give 
covered institutions the flexibility to address the general elements in 
the response program based on the size and complexity of the 
institution and the nature and scope of its activities. Accordingly, 
the requirements of the proposed amendment already would be simplified 
for small entities. In addition, the requirements of the proposed 
amendments could not be further simplified, or clarified or 
consolidated, without compromising the investor protection objectives 
the proposed amendments are designed to achieve.
    With regard to the third alternative, the proposed amendments are 
design based. Rather than specifying the types of policies and 
procedures that an institution would be required to include in its 
response program, the proposed amendments would require a response 
program that is reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover 
from both unauthorized access to and unauthorized use of customer 
information. With respect to the specific requirements regarding 
notifications in the event of a data breach, we have proposed that 
institutions provide only the information that seems most relevant for 
an affected customer to know in order to assess adequately the 
potential damage that could result from the breach and to develop an 
appropriate response.

[[Page 20681]]

    Finally, with regard to alternative four, we preliminarily believe 
that an exemption for small entities would not be appropriate. Small 
entities are as vulnerable as large ones to the types of data security 
breach incidents we are trying to address. In this regard, the specific 
elements we have proposed must be considered and incorporated into the 
policies and procedures of all covered institutions, regardless of 
their size, to mitigate the potential for fraud or other substantial 
harm or inconvenience to investors. Exempting small entities from 
coverage of the proposed amendments or any part of the proposed 
amendments could compromise the effectiveness of the proposed 
amendments and harm investors by lowering standards for safeguarding 
investor information maintained by small covered institutions. 
Excluding small entities from requirements that would be applicable to 
larger covered institutions also could create competitive disparities 
between large and small entities, for example by undermining investor 
confidence in the security of information maintained by small covered 
institutions.
    We request comment on whether it is feasible or necessary for small 
entities to have special requirements or timetables for, or exemptions 
from, compliance with the proposed amendments. In particular, could any 
of the proposed amendments be altered in order to ease the regulatory 
burden on small entities, without sacrificing the effectiveness of the 
proposed amendments?

G. Request for Comment

    We encourage the submission of comments with respect to any aspect 
of this IRFA. In particular, we request comments regarding:
    121. The number of small entities that may be affected by the 
proposed rules and amendments;
    122. The existence or nature of the potential impact of the 
proposed rules and amendments on small entities discussed in the 
analysis;
    123. How the proposed amendments could further lower the burden on 
small entities; and
    124. How to quantify the impact of the proposed rules and 
amendments.
    Commenters are asked to describe the nature of any impact and 
provide empirical data supporting the extent of the impact. Comments 
will be considered in the preparation of the Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, if the proposed rules and amendments are adopted, 
and will be placed in the same public file as comments on the proposed 
rules and amendments themselves.

VI. Consideration of Impact on the Economy

    For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996 (``SBREFA''), the Commission must advise OMB whether a 
proposed regulation constitutes a ``major'' rule. Under SBREFA, a rule 
is considered ``major'' where, if adopted, it results in or is likely 
to result in:
    A. An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
    B. A major increase in costs or prices for consumers or individual 
industries; or
    C. Significant adverse effects on competition, investment, or 
innovation.
    We request comment on whether our proposal would be a ``major 
rule'' for purposes of SBREFA. We solicit comment and empirical data 
on:
     The potential effect on the U.S. economy on an annual 
basis;
     Any potential increase in costs or prices for consumers or 
individual industries; and
     Any potential effect on competition, investment, or 
innovation.
    Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and other 
factual support for their views to the extent possible.

Statutory Authority

    The Commission is proposing to amend Regulation S-P pursuant to 
authority set forth in sections 17, 17A, 23, and 36 of the Exchange Act 
[15 U.S.C. 78q, 78q-1, 78w, and 78mm], sections 31 and 38 of the 
Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-30 and 80a-37], sections 204, 
204A and 211 of the Investment Advisers Act [15 U.S.C. 80b-4, 80b-4a 
and 80b-11], section 628(a) of the FCRA [15 U.S.C. 1681w(a)], and 
sections 501, 504, 505, and 525 of the GLBA [15 U.S.C. 6801, 6804, 6805 
and 6825].

List of Subjects

17 CFR Parts 240, 270, and 275

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements; Securities.

17 CFR Part 248

    Brokers, Consumer protection, Dealers, Investment advisers, 
Investment companies, Privacy, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Securities, Transfer agents.

Text of Proposed Amendments

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission proposes to amend 17 CFR chapter II as follows:

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

0
1. The authority citation for part 240 continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78j-4, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 
78o-4, 78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll, 
78mm, 80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, and 7201 
et seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 
U.S.C. 1350; Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. 
L. 112-106, sec. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise 
noted.
* * * * *
    Section 240.17a-14 is also issued under Public Law 111-203, sec. 
913, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010);
* * * * *
    Section 240.17Ad-7 is also issued under 15 U.S.C. 78b, 78q, and 
78q-1.;
* * * * *
0
2. Amend Sec.  240.17a-4 by adding paragraphs (e)(13) and (e)(14) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  240.17a-4  Records to be preserved by certain exchange members, 
brokers and dealers.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (13) Reserved.
    (14)(i) The written policies and procedures required to be adopted 
and implemented pursuant to Sec.  248.30(b)(1) until three years after 
the termination of the use of the policies and procedures;
    (ii) The written documentation of any detected unauthorized access 
to or use of customer information, as well as any response to, and 
recovery from such unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information required by Sec.  248.30(b)(3) for three years from the 
date when the records were made;
    (iii) The written documentation of any investigation and 
determination made regarding whether notification is required pursuant 
to Sec.  248.30(b)(4), including the basis for any determination made, 
as well as a copy of any notice transmitted following such 
determination, for three years from the date when the records were 
made;
    (iv) The written policies and procedures required to be adopted and 
implemented pursuant to Sec.  248.30(b)(5)(i) until three years after 
the termination of the use of the policies and procedures;
    (v) The written documentation of any contract or agreement entered 
into pursuant to Sec.  248.30(b)(5) until three years after the 
termination of such contract or agreement; and

[[Page 20682]]

    (vi) The written policies and procedures required to be adopted and 
implemented pursuant to Sec.  248.30(c)(2) until three years after the 
termination of the use of the policies and procedures;
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec.  240.17Ad-7 by revising the section heading and adding 
paragraphs (j) and (k) to read as follows:


Sec.  240.17ad-7  (Rule 17Ad-7) Record retention.

* * * * *
    (j) [Reserved].
    (k) Every registered transfer agent shall maintain in an easily 
accessible place:
    (1) The written policies and procedures required to be adopted and 
implemented pursuant to Sec.  248.30(b)(1) for no less than three years 
after the termination of the use of the policies and procedures;
    (2) The written documentation of any detected unauthorized access 
to or use of customer information, as well as any response to, and 
recovery from such unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information required by Sec.  248.30(b)(3) for no less than three years 
from the date when the records were made;
    (3) The written documentation of any investigation and 
determination made regarding whether notification is required pursuant 
to Sec.  248.30(b)(4), including the basis for any determination made, 
as well as a copy of any notice transmitted following such 
determination, for no less than three years from the date when the 
records were made;
    (4) The written policies and procedures required to be adopted and 
implemented pursuant to Sec.  248.30(b)(5)(i) until three years after 
the termination of the use of the policies and procedures;
    (5) The written documentation of any contract or agreement entered 
into pursuant to Sec.  248.30(b)(5) until three years after the 
termination of such contract or agreement; and
    (6) The written policies and procedures required to be adopted and 
implemented pursuant to Sec.  248.30(c)(2) for no less than three years 
after the termination of the use of the policies and procedures.

PART 248--REGULATIONS S-P, S-AM, AND S-ID

0
4. The authority citation for part 248 continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 78q, 78q-1, 78o-4, 78o-5, 78w, 78mm, 80a-
30, 80a-37, 80b-4, 80b-11, 1681m(e), 1681s(b), 1681s-3 and note, 
1681w(a)(1), 6801-6809, and 6825; Pub. L. 111-203, secs. 1088(a)(8), 
(a)(10), and sec. 1088(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
* * * * *
0
5. Amend Sec.  248.2 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  248.2  Model privacy form: rule of construction.

* * * * *
    (c) Substituted compliance with CFTC financial privacy rules by 
futures commission merchants and introducing brokers. Except with 
respect to Sec.  248.30(c), any futures commission merchant or 
introducing broker (as those terms are defined in the Commodity 
Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1, et seq.)) registered by notice with the 
Commission for the purpose of conducting business in security futures 
products pursuant to section 15(b)(11)(A) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(11)(A)) that is subject to and in 
compliance with the financial privacy rules of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (17 CFR part 160) will be deemed to be in compliance 
with this part.
0
6. Amend Sec.  248.5 by revising the first sentence of paragraph 
(a)(1), and adding paragraph (e).

    The revision and addition read as follows:


Sec.  248.5  Annual privacy notice to customers required.

    (a)(1) General rule. Except as provided by paragraph (e) of this 
section, you must provide a clear and conspicuous notice to customers 
that accurately reflects your privacy policies and practices not less 
than annually during the continuation of the customer relationship. 
Annually means at least once in any period of 12 consecutive months 
during which that relationship exists. You may define the 12-
consecutive-month period, but you must apply it to the customer on a 
consistent basis.
* * * * *
    (e) Exception to annual privacy notice requirement. (1) When 
exception available. You are not required to deliver an annual privacy 
notice if you:
    (i) Provide nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third 
parties only in accordance with Sec. Sec.  248.13, 248.14, or 248.15; 
and
    (ii) Have not changed your policies and practices with regard to 
disclosing nonpublic personal information from the policies and 
practices that were disclosed to the customer under Sec.  248.6(a)(2) 
through (5) and (9) in the most recent privacy notice provided pursuant 
to this part.
    (2) Delivery of annual privacy notice after financial institution 
no longer meets the requirements for exception. If you have been 
excepted from delivering an annual privacy notice pursuant to paragraph 
(e)(1) of this section and change your policies or practices in such a 
way that you no longer meet the requirements for that exception, you 
must comply with paragraph (e)(2)(i) or (e)(2)(ii) of this section, as 
applicable.
    (i) Changes preceded by a revised privacy notice. If you no longer 
meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(1) of this section because you 
change your policies or practices in such a way that Sec.  248.8 
requires you to provide a revised privacy notice, you must provide an 
annual privacy notice in accordance with the timing requirement in 
paragraph (a) of this section, treating the revised privacy notice as 
an initial privacy notice.
    (ii) Changes not preceded by a revised privacy notice. If you no 
longer meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(1) of this section 
because you change your policies or practices in such a way that Sec.  
248.8 does not require you to provide a revised privacy notice, you 
must provide an annual privacy notice within 100 days of the change in 
your policies or practices that causes you to no longer meet the 
requirement of paragraph (e)(1) of this section.
    (iii) Examples.
    (A) You change your policies and practices in such a way that you 
no longer meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(1) of this section 
effective April 1 of year 1. Assuming you define the 12-consecutive-
month period pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section as a calendar 
year, if you were required to provide a revised privacy notice under 
Sec.  248.8 and you provided that notice on March 1 of year 1, you must 
provide an annual privacy notice by December 31 of year 2. If you were 
not required to provide a revised privacy notice under Sec.  248.8, you 
must provide an annual privacy notice by July 9 of year 1.
    (B) You change your policies and practices in such a way that you 
no longer meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(1) of this section, 
and so provide an annual notice to your customers. After providing the 
annual notice to your customers, you once again meet the requirements 
of paragraph (e)(1) of this section for an exception to the annual 
notice requirement. You do not need to provide additional annual notice 
to your customers until such time as you no longer meet the 
requirements of paragraph (e)(1) of this section.

[[Page 20683]]

0
7. Amend Sec.  248.17 by, in paragraph (b), replacing the words 
``Federal Trade Commission'' with ``Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau''; and replacing the words ``Federal Trade Commission's'' with 
``Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's.''
0
8. Revise Sec.  248.30 to read as follows:


Sec.  248.30  Procedures to safeguard customer information, including 
response programs for unauthorized access to customer information and 
customer notice; disposal of customer information and consumer 
information.

    (a) Scope of information covered by this section. The provisions of 
this section apply to all customer information in the possession of a 
covered institution, and all consumer information that a covered 
institution maintains or otherwise possesses for a business purpose, as 
applicable, regardless of whether such information pertains to 
individuals with whom the covered institution has a customer 
relationship, or pertains to the customers of other financial 
institutions and has been provided to the covered institution.
    (b) Policies and procedures to safeguard customer information.
    (1) General requirements. Every covered institution must develop, 
implement, and maintain written policies and procedures that address 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection 
of customer information.
    (2) Objectives. These written policies and procedures must be 
reasonably designed to:
    (i) Ensure the security and confidentiality of customer 
information;
    (ii) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the 
security or integrity of customer information; and
    (iii) Protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to 
any customer.
    (3) Response programs for unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information. Written policies and procedures in paragraph (b)(1) of 
this section must include a program reasonably designed to detect, 
respond to, and recover from unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information, including customer notification procedures. This response 
program must include procedures for the covered institution to:
    (i) Assess the nature and scope of any incident involving 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information and identify the 
customer information systems and types of customer information that may 
have been accessed or used without authorization;
    (ii) Take appropriate steps to contain and control the incident to 
prevent further unauthorized access to or use of customer information; 
and
    (iii) Notify each affected individual whose sensitive customer 
information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used 
without authorization in accordance with paragraph (b)(4) of this 
section unless the covered institution determines, after a reasonable 
investigation of the facts and circumstances of the incident of 
unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer information, that 
the sensitive customer information has not been, and is not reasonably 
likely to be, used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience.
    (4) Notifying affected individuals of unauthorized access or use. 
(i) Notification obligation. Unless a covered institution has 
determined, after a reasonable investigation of the facts and 
circumstances of the incident of unauthorized access to or use of 
sensitive customer information, that sensitive customer information has 
not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that 
would result in substantial harm or inconvenience, the covered 
institution must provide a clear and conspicuous notice to each 
affected individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is 
reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization. 
The notice must be transmitted by a means designed to ensure that each 
affected individual can reasonably be expected to receive actual notice 
in writing.
    (ii) Affected individuals. If an incident of unauthorized access to 
or use of customer information has occurred or is reasonably likely to 
have occurred, but the covered institution is unable to identify which 
specific individuals' sensitive customer information has been accessed 
or used without authorization, the covered institution must provide 
notice to all individuals whose sensitive customer information resides 
in the customer information system that was, or was reasonably likely 
to have been, accessed or used without authorization.
    (iii) Timing. A covered institution must provide the notice as soon 
as practicable, but not later than 30 days, after becoming aware that 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information has occurred or 
is reasonably likely to have occurred unless the Attorney General of 
the United States informs the covered institution, in writing, that the 
notice required under this rule poses a substantial risk to national 
security, in which case the covered institution may delay such a notice 
for a time period specified by the Attorney General of the United 
States, but not for longer than 15 days. The notice may be delayed for 
an additional period of up to 15 days if the Attorney General of the 
United States determines that the notice continues to pose a 
substantial risk to national security.
    (iv) Notice contents. The notice must:
    (A) Describe in general terms the incident and the type of 
sensitive customer information that was or is reasonably believed to 
have been accessed or used without authorization;
    (B) Describe what has been done to protect the sensitive customer 
information from further unauthorized access or use;
    (C) Include, if the information is reasonably possible to determine 
at the time the notice is provided, any of the following: the date of 
the incident, the estimated date of the incident, or the date range 
within which the incident occurred;
    (D) Include contact information sufficient to permit an affected 
individual to contact the covered institution to inquire about the 
incident, including the following: a telephone number (which should be 
a toll-free number if available), an email address or equivalent method 
or means, a postal address, and the name of a specific office to 
contact for further information and assistance;
    (E) If the individual has an account with the covered institution, 
recommend that the customer review account statements and immediately 
report any suspicious activity to the covered institution;
    (F) Explain what a fraud alert is and how an individual may place a 
fraud alert in the individual's credit reports to put the individual's 
creditors on notice that the individual may be a victim of fraud, 
including identity theft;
    (G) Recommend that the individual periodically obtain credit 
reports from each nationwide credit reporting company and have 
information relating to fraudulent transactions deleted;
    (H) Explain how the individual may obtain a credit report free of 
charge; and
    (I) Include information about the availability of online guidance 
from the Federal Trade Commission and usa.gov regarding steps an 
individual can take to protect against identity theft, a statement 
encouraging the individual to report any incidents of identity theft to 
the Federal Trade Commission, and include the Federal Trade 
Commission's website address where individuals may obtain government 
information about identity theft and report suspected incidents of 
identity theft.

[[Page 20684]]

    (5) Service providers. (i) A covered institution's response program 
prepared in accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of this section must 
include written policies and procedures requiring the institution, 
pursuant to a written contract between the covered institution and its 
service providers, to require the service providers to take appropriate 
measures that are designed to protect against unauthorized access to or 
use of customer information, including notification to the covered 
institution as soon as possible, but no later than 48 hours after 
becoming aware of a breach, in the event of any breach in security 
resulting in unauthorized access to a customer information system 
maintained by the service provider to enable the covered institution to 
implement its response program.
    (ii) As part of its incident response program, a covered 
institution may enter into a written agreement with its service 
provider to notify affected individuals on its behalf in accordance 
with paragraph (b)(4) of this section.
    (c) Disposal of consumer information and customer information. (1) 
Standard. Every covered institution, other than notice-registered 
broker-dealers, that maintains or otherwise possesses customer 
information or consumer information for a business purpose must 
properly dispose of the information by taking reasonable measures to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of the information in 
connection with its disposal.
    (2) Written policies, procedures, and records. Every covered 
institution, other than notice-registered broker-dealers, must adopt 
and implement written policies and procedures that address the proper 
disposal of consumer information and customer information according to 
the standard identified in paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
    (3) Relation to other laws. Nothing in this paragraph (c) shall be 
construed:
    (i) To require any covered institution to maintain or destroy any 
record pertaining to an individual that is not imposed under other law; 
or
    (ii) To alter or affect any requirement imposed under any other 
provision of law to maintain or destroy records.
    (d) Recordkeeping. (1) Every covered institution that is an 
investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 
80a), but is not registered under section 8 thereof (15 U.S.C. 80a-8), 
must make and maintain written records documenting its compliance with 
the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(2) of this section.
    (2) In the case of covered institutions described in paragraph 
(d)(1) of this section, the records required under paragraphs (b) and 
(c)(2) of this section, apart from any policies and procedures 
thereunder, must be preserved for a time period not less than six 
years, the first two years in an easily accessible place. In the case 
of policies and procedures required under paragraphs (b) and (c)(2) of 
this section, covered institutions described in paragraph (d)(1) of 
this section must maintain a copy of such policies and procedures in 
effect, or that at any time within the past six years were in effect, 
in an easily accessible place.
    (e) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context 
otherwise requires:
    (1) Consumer information means any record about an individual, 
whether in paper, electronic or other form, that is a consumer report 
or is derived from a consumer report. Consumer information also means a 
compilation of such records. Consumer information does not include 
information that does not identify individuals, such as aggregate 
information or blind data.
    (2) Consumer report has the same meaning as in section 603(d) of 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)).
    (3) Covered institution means any broker or dealer, any investment 
company, and any investment adviser or transfer agent registered with 
the Commission or another appropriate regulatory agency (``ARA'') as 
defined in section 3(a)(34)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
    (4)(i) Customer has the same meaning as in Sec.  248.3(j) unless 
the covered institution is a transfer agent registered with the 
Commission or another ARA.
    (ii) With respect to a transfer agent registered with the 
Commission or another ARA, customer means any natural person who is a 
securityholder of an issuer for which the transfer agent acts or has 
acted as a transfer agent.
    (5)(i) Customer information for any covered institution other than 
a transfer agent registered with the Commission or another ARA means 
any record containing nonpublic personal information as defined in 
Sec.  248.3(t) about a customer of a financial institution, whether in 
paper, electronic or other form, that is handled or maintained by the 
covered institution or on its behalf.
    (ii) With respect to a transfer agent registered with the 
Commission or another ARA, customer information means any record 
containing nonpublic personal information as defined in Sec.  248.3(t) 
identified with any natural person, who is a securityholder of an 
issuer for which the transfer agent acts or has acted as transfer 
agent, that is handled or maintained by the transfer agent or on its 
behalf.
    (6) Customer information systems means the information resources 
owned or used by a covered institution, including physical or virtual 
infrastructure controlled by such information resources, or components 
thereof, organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, 
sharing, dissemination, or disposition of customer information to 
maintain or support the covered institution's operations.
    (7) Disposal means:
    (i) The discarding or abandonment of consumer information or 
customer information; or
    (ii) The sale, donation, or transfer of any medium, including 
computer equipment, on which consumer information or customer 
information is stored.
    (8) Notice-registered broker-dealer means a broker or dealer 
registered by notice with the Commission under section 15(b)(11) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(11)).
    (9)(i) Sensitive customer information means any component of 
customer information alone or in conjunction with any other 
information, the compromise of which could create a reasonably likely 
risk of substantial harm or inconvenience to an individual identified 
with the information.
    (ii) Examples of sensitive customer information include:
    (A) Customer information uniquely identified with an individual 
that has a reasonably likely use as a means of authenticating the 
individual's identity, including
    (1) A Social Security number, official State or government issued 
driver's license or identification number, alien registration number, 
government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number;
    (2) A biometric record;
    (3) A unique electronic identification number, address, or routing 
code;
    (4) Telecommunication identifying information or access device (as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. 1029(e)); or
    (B) Customer information identifying an individual or the 
individual's account, including the individual's account number, name 
or online user name, in combination with authenticating information 
such as information described in paragraph (e)(9)(ii)(A) of this 
section, or in combination with similar information that could be used 
to gain access to the customer's account such as an access code, a 
credit card expiration date, a

[[Page 20685]]

partial Social Security number, a security code, a security question 
and answer identified with the individual or the individual's account, 
or the individual's date of birth, place of birth, or mother's maiden 
name.
    (10) Service provider means any person or entity that is a third 
party and receives, maintains, processes, or otherwise is permitted 
access to customer information through its provision of services 
directly to a covered institution.
    (11) Substantial harm or inconvenience means personal injury, or 
financial loss, expenditure of effort or loss of time that is more than 
trivial, including theft, fraud, harassment, physical harm, 
impersonation, intimidation, damaged reputation, impaired eligibility 
for credit, or the misuse of information identified with an individual 
to obtain a financial product or service, or to access, log into, 
effect a transaction in, or otherwise misuse the individual's account.
    (12) Transfer agent has the same meaning as in section 3(a)(25) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(25)).

PART 270--RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

0
9. The authority citation for part 270 continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq., 80a-34(d), 80a-37, 80a-39, 
and Pub. L. 111-203, sec. 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), unless 
otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
10. Amend Sec.  270.31a-1 by adding paragraph (b)(13) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  270.31a-1  Records to be maintained by registered investment 
companies, certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other 
persons having transactions with registered investment companies.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (13) Any written records documenting compliance with the 
requirements set forth in 248.30(b) and (c)(2).
* * * * *
0
11. Amend Sec.  270.31a-2 by:
0
a. In paragraph (a)(7), removing the period at the end of paragraph and 
adding ``; and'' in its place; and
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(8) to read as follows:


Sec.  270.31a-2  Records to be preserved by registered investment 
companies, certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other 
persons having transactions with registered investment companies.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (8) Preserve for a period not less than six years, the first two 
years in an easily accessible place, the records required by 270.31a-
1(b)(13) apart from any policies and procedures thereunder and, in the 
case of policies and procedures required under 270.31a-1(b)(13), 
preserve a copy of such policies and procedures in effect, or that at 
any time within the past six years were in effect, in an easily 
accessible place.
* * * * *

PART 275--RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940

0
12. The authority citation for part 275 continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)(G), 80b-2(a)(11)(H), 80b-
2(a)(17), 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-4a, 80b-6(4), 80b-6a, and 80b-11, unless 
otherwise noted.
* * * * *
    Section 275.204-2 is also issued under 15 U.S.C. 80b-6.
* * * * *
0
13. Amend Sec.  275.204-2 by adding paragraph (a)(20) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  275.204-2  Books and records to be maintained by investment 
advisers.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (20) A copy of the written records documenting compliance with the 
requirements set forth in Sec.  248.30(b) and (c)(2).
* * * * *

    By the Commission.

    Dated: March 15, 2023.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-05774 Filed 4-5-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P


