[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 94 (Monday, May 16, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29768-29774]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-10415]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-94884; File No. SR-IEX-2022-04]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Investors Exchange LLC; Notice of 
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Remove 
the Midpoint Price Constraint on Non-Displayed Limit Orders and Make 
Conforming Changes

May 10, 2022.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby 
given that, on April 29, 2022, the Investors Exchange LLC (``IEX'' or 
the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I 
and II below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory 
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
    \3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the 
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

    Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) under the Act,\4\ 
and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\5\ the Exchange is filing with the 
Commission a proposed rule change to remove the midpoint price 
constraint on non-displayed limit orders and make conforming changes to 
several rules. The Exchange has designated this rule change as ``non-
controversial'' under Section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act \6\ and provided 
the Commission with the notice required by Rule 19b-4(f)(6) 
thereunder.\7\
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    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \5\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \6\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \7\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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    The text of the proposed rule change is available at the Exchange's 
website at www.iextrading.com, at the principal office of the Exchange, 
and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization 
included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the 
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the 
proposed rule change. The text of these statement may be examined at 
the places specified in Item IV below. The self-regulatory organization 
has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of the 
most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    Currently, IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2) (Non-Displayed Price Sliding) 
adjusts the price of any non-displayed limit order priced more 
aggressively than the Midpoint Price \8\ to be priced at the Midpoint 
Price (the ``Midpoint Price Constraint''). The Exchange proposes to 
amend its non-displayed price sliding rule to allow non-displayed limit 
orders to be priced more aggressively than the Midpoint Price. 
Specifically, the Exchange proposes to amend IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2) to 
remove the Midpoint Price Constraint on non-displayed limit orders, 
thereby allowing non-displayed limit orders to be priced as 
aggressively as the contra-side Protected Quotation,\9\ provided it 
does not lock IEX's Order Book.\10\ Because this rule change should 
result in there being more aggressively priced non-displayed liquidity 
resting on the Exchange, IEX also proposes to amend its Order Execution 
Recheck \11\ rule to increase the circumstances in which a resting non-
displayed order may be invited by the System \12\ to execute against 
eligible contra-side liquidity. Additionally, the Exchange proposes to 
make related changes to IEX Rules 11.190(b) and 11.230(a)(4)(C) to 
prevent aggressively priced non-displayed limit orders locking or 
crossing IEX's displayed Order Book. Finally, the Exchange proposes to 
make conforming changes to IEX Rules 11.190, 11.220, 11.230, 11.231, 
11.232, and 11.340. This proposal would align IEX's non-displayed price 
sliding rules with those of other national securities exchanges that 
trade equities, as detailed below.\13\
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    \8\ See IEX Rule 1.160(t).
    \9\ See IEX Rule 1.160(bb).
    \10\ See IEX Rule 1.160(p).
    \11\ See IEX Rule 11.230(a)(4)(D).
    \12\ See IEX Rule 1.160(nn).
    \13\ See, e.g., Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (``Cboe BZX'') Rule 
11.9(g)(4); MIAX PEARL LLC (``MIAX PEARL'') Rule 2614(g)(2).
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I. Midpoint Price Constraint Removal
    Currently, IEX restricts non-displayed limit orders such that they 
cannot be booked and ranked at a price any more aggressive than the 
Midpoint Price.\14\

[[Page 29769]]

Additionally, IEX offers several order types that constrain an order's 
price to a price no more aggressive than the Midpoint Price.\15\ Based 
on informal feedback, IEX understands that a number of Members \16\ 
would like to be able to post non-displayed orders at prices more 
aggressive than the Midpoint Price. The Members also express a 
preference to have IEX's non-displayed price-sliding function like that 
of other equities exchanges, which only reprice non-displayed limit 
orders to be equal to the contra-side Protected Quotation when they 
would otherwise be priced more aggressively than the contra-side 
Protected Quotation. In response to this feedback, and with the 
understanding that Members will continue to have the option of using 
one of several order types that constrain orders to prices no more 
aggressive than the Midpoint Price, IEX proposes to remove its Midpoint 
Price Constraint on non-displayed limit orders.
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    \14\ Currently, a non-displayed limit order can check past the 
Midpoint Price on entry, but cannot rest at a price more aggressive 
than the Midpoint Price.
    \15\ For example, Midpoint Peg and Retail Liquidity Provider 
orders rest at the less aggressive of the order's limit price or the 
Midpoint Price, and Discretionary Peg and Corporate Discretionary 
Peg orders rest one minimum price variant less aggressive than the 
National Best Bid (for bids) or National Best Offer (for offers) and 
exercise discretion to the less aggressive of the order's limit 
price or the Midpoint Price.
    \16\ See IEX Rule 1.160(s).
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    Specifically, IEX proposes to modify IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2) to 
remove all references to the Midpoint Price Constraint, and to 
introduce text specifying that non-displayed limit orders can be priced 
more aggressively than the Midpoint Price (i.e., between the Midpoint 
Price and the NBO \17\ for bids (buy orders) or between the Midpoint 
Price and the NBB \18\ for offers (sell orders). If a non-displayed 
limit order to buy (sell) is priced more aggressively than the NBO 
(NBB), IEX will adjust the order's price to the NBO (for bids) or the 
NBB (for offers).\19\
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    \17\ The term ``NBO'' means the national best offer. See IEX 
Rule 1.160(u).
    \18\ The term ``NBB'' means the national best bid. See IEX Rule 
1.160(u).
    \19\ This repricing could occur upon order entry, or after the 
NBBO changes such that the order is now priced more aggressively 
than the contra-side Protected Quotation.
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    For example, if the NBBO \20\ is $10.00 x $10.10, and IEX receives 
a non-displayed buy order \21\ with a limit price of $10.20, the 
incoming bid will be repriced to the NBO, $10.10, and execute against 
any eligible contra-side liquidity on IEX \22\ or book at $10.10 if IEX 
has no eligible contra-side liquidity (i.e., IEX has no offers resting 
on its Order Book).\23\ However, if the incoming non-displayed buy 
order has a minimum quantity instruction \24\ (``MQTY'') or other 
specific condition \25\ that prevents it from matching with an order on 
the IEX Order Book, the System will reprice the incoming non-displayed 
buy order to a price one minimum price variant (``MPV'') \26\ less 
aggressive than the NBO price if the IEX sell order is displayed at the 
NBO, or at the NBO if the IEX sell order is non-displayed.\27\
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    \20\ The term ``NBBO'' means the national best bid or offer, as 
set forth in Rule 600(b) of Regulation NMS under the Act. See IEX 
Rule 1.160(u).
    \21\ The example focuses on price sliding of non-displayed limit 
orders to buy, but the same rules would apply to non-displayed 
orders to sell.
    \22\ For purposes of this example, we are treating the orders as 
``IEX Only'' (non-routable) orders. See IEX Rule 11.190(a)(1)(B). If 
the incoming order was designated as routable, it would first seek 
to execute against the IEX Order Book and any away markets before 
booking.
    \23\ Because the incoming order is non-displayed, it can be 
priced at the contra-side NBO without locking the away market NBO. 
See Reg NMS Rule 610(d), 17 CFR 242.610(d).
    \24\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(11). Significantly, only non-
displayed orders can have specific conditions such as a Minimum 
Quantity that could prevent a match. Id.
    \25\ Any order that cannot be executed due to its specific 
conditions (but would otherwise be executable against a contra-side 
order) surrenders its precedence in the Order Book. See IEX Rule 
11.220(a)(5). Usually, this issue arises when one or both orders 
have a MQTY instruction preventing an execution, but there are a few 
other specific conditions that prevent executions and cause an order 
to surrender precedence, such as an Offset Peg order being 
ineligible to trade during a locked market, see IEX Rule 
11.190(h)(3)(C)(iii).
    \26\ See IEX Rule 11.210.
    \27\ See IEX Rule 11.220(a)(5).
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    IEX believes it is appropriate to adjust the price of the non-
displayed limit order whose specific conditions prevent an execution 
with IEX's Protected Bid or Offer (as applicable) prior to posting, 
because the Member who submitted the order with specific conditions 
chose to reduce the number of situations in which the order could 
potentially execute. Thus, in the example above, if another non-
displayed buy order arrives that is able to execute against the 
displayed sell order resting at the NBO, an execution will occur 
consistent with IEX's execution priority rules,\28\ including the rule 
that orders that cannot execute due to their specific conditions 
surrender their precedence.\29\
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    \28\ Orders execute in price, display, time priority, so the 
incoming bid, which would be priced at $10.10 has priority over the 
bid with specific conditions resting at $10.09. See IEX Rule 
11.220(a)(2).
    \29\ See IEX Rule 11.220(a)(5).
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    However, when the resting sell order is non-displayed, and the two 
orders cannot execute because of a specific condition of one or both 
orders, IEX believes it is appropriate to allow the two non-displayed 
orders to book at the same price (the NBO), thereby ``locking'' the 
non-displayed Order Book.\30\ If a later arriving buy order can execute 
with the resting non-displayed sell order at the NBO price, it will 
appropriately execute before the first buy order with specific 
conditions that prevented an execution, because the order with specific 
conditions surrenders its precedence.\31\
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    \30\ IEX has always permitted non-displayed orders to lock on 
its non-displayed Order Book when a specific condition of one or 
both orders prevents an execution. See IEX 11.230(a)(4)(C).
    \31\ See IEX Rule 11.220(a)(5).
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    Therefore, IEX proposes to add text to IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2) 
specifying that if a repriced non-displayed limit order would lock or 
cross IEX's Protected Quotation, the order will be adjusted to a price 
one MPV less aggressive than the NBO (for bids) or the NBB (for 
offers). IEX notes this functionality is identical to that of The 
Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq''), which also reprices non-displayed 
minimum quantity orders that would otherwise ``lock'' a contra-side 
displayed order that does not meet its specific conditions to a price 
one MPV less aggressive than the price of the contra-side order.\32\ 
Similarly, pursuant to Nasdaq rules, a non-displayed minimum quantity 
order can lock a contra-side non-displayed order priced at the 
Protected Quotation, because the order with specific conditions will 
surrender precedence to incoming orders that can execute against the 
contra-side order resting at the ``locking'' price.\33\ Additionally, 
other exchanges, such as MIAX PEARL, will not allow minimum quantity 
orders to trade at a price above (below) any sell (buy) displayed 
orders that are priced below (above) the price of the minimum quantity 
order.\34\ MIAX PEARL will only execute a non-displayed minimum 
quantity order that would otherwise ``lock'' a contra-side displayed 
order that does not meet its specific conditions at a price \1/2\ MPV 
less aggressive than the contra-side displayed order.\35\
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    \32\ See Nasdaq Rule 4703(e).
    \33\ See Nasdaq Rule 4703(e); see also Nasdaq Rule 4702(b)(3)(A) 
(allowing non-displayed orders to book at the price of an away 
market Protected Quotation).
    \34\ See MIAX PEARL Rule 2614(c)(7)(B)(iii).
    \35\ See MIAX PEARL Rules 2617(a)(4)(C) and (D). In the same 
situation, IEX is proposing to re-price the non-displayed order to a 
price one (1) MPV less aggressive than the contra-side displayed 
order, which IEX believes is a minor distinction from MIAX PEARL's 
\1/2\ MPV approach.
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    Example 1 demonstrates how, as proposed, IEX's non-displayed price 
sliding rules will work:

[[Page 29770]]

Example 1

     NBBO for a stock is $10.10 x $10.20. IEX has no 
displayed quote.
     Order A, a displayed order to buy 100 shares with a 
limit price of $10.09 arrives and is booked at $10.09, thereby 
becoming IEX's Protected Best Bid.
     Order B, a displayed order to sell 100 shares with a 
limit price of $10.21 arrives and is booked at $10.21, thereby 
becoming IEX's Protected Best Offer.
     IEX's PBBO for the stock is now $10.09 x $10.21.
     Order C, a non-displayed order to buy 300 shares with a 
limit price of $10.30 and a minimum quantity \36\ of 300 shares 
arrives.\37\
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    \36\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(11).
    \37\ The example focuses on price sliding of non-displayed limit 
orders to buy, but the same rules would apply to non-displayed 
orders to sell.
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     Order C is repriced by the System to $10.20, which is 
the NBO.
     The NBBO changes to $10.10 x $10.21. Order B, which is 
IEX's Best Offer, is now equal to the NBO.
     Order C remains priced at $10.20, a price one MPV less 
aggressive than IEX's contra-side Protected Quotation of $10.21.
     Order D, a displayed order to sell 100 shares with a 
limit price of $10.20 arrives. Order C and Order D do not match 
because Order D does not satisfy Order C's minimum quantity 
requirements.
     Order D becomes the NBO, and the NBBO moves to $10.10 x 
$10.20.
     Order C is repriced to $10.19, a price one MPV less 
aggressive than IEX's contra-side Protected Quotation of $10.20.

    As noted above and discussed in the Statutory Basis section below, 
these proposed changes would align IEX's non-displayed price sliding 
rules with those of the other equities exchanges.
II. Impact of Midpoint Price Constraint Removal on Specific Order Types
    As discussed above, this rule proposal impacts the price sliding 
behavior of non-displayed limit orders, including (i) non-displayed 
Discretionary Limit (``D-Limit'') \38\ orders; (ii) non-displayed 
portions of Reserve \39\ orders, and (iii) non-displayed portions of D-
Limit Reserve \40\ orders, which will be able to rest and trade at 
prices up to the contra-side away market Protected Quotation. 
Additionally, as set forth below, this proposed rule change impacts the 
pricing and functionality of Offset Peg \41\ and Primary Peg \42\ 
orders, respectively.
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    \38\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7).
    \39\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(2)(B).
    \40\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(2)(B).
    \41\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(13).
    \42\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(8).
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    Specifically, IEX proposes to amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(13), 
describing Offset Peg orders, to allow them to be priced as 
aggressively as the contra-side Protected Quotation, dependent upon the 
limit price plus the offset amount. Currently, Offset Peg orders cannot 
be priced more aggressively than the Midpoint Price.\43\ IEX is 
proposing to allow Offset Peg orders to rest at prices as aggressive as 
the contra-side Protected Quotation, irrespective of the Midpoint 
Price. Therefore, IEX proposes to amend IEX Rules 11.190(b)(13) to 
reflect the new offset functionality. Additionally, because Offset Peg 
orders will no longer rest or execute at the Midpoint Price if it is a 
sub-penny Midpoint Price,\44\ IEX proposes to amend IEX Rule 
11.190(a)(3) (Pegged Order) to reflect that Offset Peg orders cannot 
execute in sub-penny increments.
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    \43\ Currently, if the offset amount plus the limit price would 
result in a price more aggressive than the Midpoint Price, the 
Offset Peg would be priced at the Midpoint Price.
    \44\ Depending upon the difference between the NBB and NBO, the 
Midpoint Price for any execution over $1.00 per share can be a whole 
penny or a sub-penny price (i.e., if the NBB is $10.01 and NBO is 
$10.05, the Midpoint Price is a sub-penny price, $10.025. But if the 
NBB is $10.01 and the NBO is $10.06, the Midpoint Price is a whole 
penny price, $10.03).
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    This rule filing also impacts Primary Peg orders, which currently 
book at a price one MPV less aggressive than the NBB (for bids) or NBO 
(for offers) and during periods of quote stability \45\ can exercise 
discretion up to the NBB/NBO for bids/offers. Primary Peg orders are 
not currently eligible for Book Recheck because the Midpoint Price 
Constraint means there will not be any eligible non-displayed contra-
side liquidity on the Order Book resting at a price aggressive enough 
to match the Primary Peg. And currently, Primary Peg orders cannot have 
a TIF of IOC or FOK, because the only types of orders Primary Pegs 
could match with upon entry are non-displayed odd lots priced at the 
contra-side Protected Quotation. Because, as proposed, non-displayed 
orders will be able to rest at the contra-side Protected Quotation, 
there is a greater chance a Primary Peg order could execute upon entry. 
Therefore, IEX proposes to amend IEX Rules 11.190(a)(3) and 
11.190(b)(8) to allow Primary Pegs to be submitted with any TIF.
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    \45\ See IEX Rules 11.190(b)(8)(K) and 11.190(g).
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    Notwithstanding that IEX is proposing to remove the Midpoint Price 
Constraint, there are still several order types that Members seeking a 
Midpoint Price execution can use. Specifically, Midpoint Peg \46\ 
orders (including Retail Liquidity Provider \47\ orders) and 
Discretionary Peg \48\ orders (including Corporate Discretionary Peg 
\49\ orders), will continue to allow Members to submit orders that will 
execute at prices no more aggressive than the Midpoint Price.
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    \46\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(9).
    \47\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(14).
    \48\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(10).
    \49\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(16).
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III. Expansion of Book Recheck Opportunities
    Currently, all non-displayed orders, other than Primary Peg \50\ 
orders, are eligible to be invited by the System to become active and 
check the Order Book for contra-side liquidity upon a change to the 
Order Book or NBBO, or as part of the processing of inbound messages 
(``Book Recheck'' or ``Recheck'').\51\ Book Recheck allows resting 
orders to trade against other orders on the Order Book that were 
ineligible for execution, or did not satisfy the order's conditions 
(i.e., minimum quantity) when they were originally booked.\52\ 
Currently, to be eligible for Book Recheck, orders must be able to 
execute at a price equal to or more aggressive than the Midpoint 
Price.\53\ IEX's Book Recheck functionality is consistent with the 
manner in which other exchanges allow a resting order to become active 
if price changes or other circumstances allow two orders to execute 
with one another when they previously could not.\54\
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    \50\ As discussed above, Primary Peg orders are not currently 
eligible for Book Recheck because the Midpoint Price Constraint 
means there will not be any eligible non-displayed contra-side 
liquidity on the Order Book resting at a price aggressive enough to 
match the Primary Peg.
    \51\ See IEX Rule 11.230(a)(4)(D).
    \52\ See IEX Rule 11.230(a)(4)(D).
    \53\ See IEX Rule 11.230(a)(4)(D)(ii).
    \54\ See New York Stock Exchange (``NYSE'') Rules 7.37(b)(8) and 
(9) (Resting orders that are repriced and become marketable against 
contra-side orders on the order book will trade consistent with 
their ranking, and resting orders on both sides of market that 
reprice and become marketable against one another will trade 
consistent with their ranking); see also MIAX PEARL Rule 1901(a) 
(resting orders may become ``Aggressing'' orders if the PBBO or NBBO 
is updated, in which case the Aggressing order will check the order 
book for marketable contra-side liquidity); Nasdaq Rule 4702(a) 
(whenever an order receives a new timestamp, including if it was 
repriced, it is treated by Nasdaq as a new, active order).
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    As described above, with the proposed removal of the Midpoint Price 
Constraint, IEX expects to have non-displayed orders resting on the 
Order Book that are priced more aggressively than the Midpoint Price. 
Therefore, IEX proposes to amend IEX Rule 11.230(a)(4)(D) to clarify 
that for an order to be eligible for Book Recheck, it must be able to 
execute against resting contra-side liquidity, irrespective of if the 
contra-side order is resting at the Midpoint Price. IEX also proposes 
to amend the Book Recheck references in

[[Page 29771]]

IEX Rule 11.190(b) to align the language (and functionality) with IEX 
Rule 11.230(a)(4)(D). By way of example, with this proposed change, a 
resting non-displayed bid priced at $10.03 with a NBBO of $10.00 x 
$10.10 would be eligible to Recheck against a resting sell order 
(either a displayed odd lot or a non-displayed order) with a limit 
price equal to or more aggressive than $10.03.
    As a result of this rule change, non-displayed limit orders will be 
allowed to rest at the contra-side Protected Quotation, which means 
there can now be circumstances when a resting Primary Peg order could 
execute against resting contra-side liquidity. Therefore, IEX also 
proposes to amend the Book Recheck rule to remove the language 
excluding Primary Peg orders from Book Recheck eligibility and amend 
the Primary Peg order definition to state they are eligible for Book 
Recheck.
IV. Minimum Quantity Order Changes
    As described above, orders with specific conditions, such as MQTY 
orders, might not always be able to execute against contra-side 
liquidity with which they would otherwise match because of the Minimum 
Quantity order's specific conditions.\55\ Therefore, as discussed 
above, IEX proposes to amend IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2) to adjust the price 
of a minimum quantity order in such a circumstance to a price one MPV 
less aggressive than the contra-side Protected Quotation when the 
Exchange's Protected Quotation is equal to the NBBO. IEX also proposes 
a conforming change to amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(11), governing MQTY 
orders, by adding a paragraph reflecting that the new repricing 
functionality in IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2) applies when an order's minimum 
quantity prevents it from executing with an order resting at the 
contra-side Protected Quotation. Specifically, IEX proposes to add 
subparagraph (G)(iii)(c) to IEX Rule 11.190(b)(11) specify that an 
incoming MQTY order that would otherwise be executable against a 
resting non-displayed order but for the MQTY order's specific 
conditions will be booked and ranked by the System at the less 
aggressive of the incoming MQTY order's limit price, if any, or the 
contra-side protected quotation (i.e., the NBO for buy orders and NBB 
for sell orders) unless the Exchange's Protected Bid (for offers) or 
Protected Offer (for bids) is equal to the current NBB (for offers) or 
current NBO (for bids), in which case the incoming MQTY order is booked 
and ranked on the Order Book non-displayed one (1) MPV below the 
current NBO (for bids) or one (1) MPV above the current NBB (for 
offers).
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    \55\ This scenario would not arise if the contra-side order were 
a displayed order because displayed orders cannot include a minimum 
quantity and would execute against any eligible contra-side order.
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    Additionally, IEX proposes to add subparagraph (G)(iv)(b) to IEX 
Rule 11.190(b)(11) to specify what happens when two MQTY orders cannot 
match because of at least one of the order's specific conditions. The 
proposed new subparagraph specifies that in this situation, the 
incoming MQTY order would be booked and ranked by the System at the 
less aggressive of its limit price, if any, or the contra-side 
Protected Quotation (i.e., the NBO for buy orders and NBB for sell 
orders). However, if the Exchange's Protected Bid (for offers) or 
Protected Offer (for bids) is equal to the current NBB (for offers) or 
current NBO (for bids), the incoming MQTY order would be booked and 
ranked on the Order Book non-displayed one (1) MPV below the current 
NBO (for bids) or one (1) MPV above the current NBB (for offers), as 
set forth in IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2). As proposed, this functionality 
could result in a ``crossed'' non-displayed Order Book, as reflected in 
Example 2, below. Therefore, the Exchange proposes to amend IEX Rule 
11.230(a)(4)(C) to remove the last sentence, which reads ``Lastly, 
orders are never permitted to post non-displayed nor rest non-displayed 
on the Order Book at prices that cross contra-side liquidity.''

Example 2

     NBBO for a stock is $10.00 x $10.10. IEX has no 
displayed orders resting on the Order Book.
     Order A, a non-displayed order to sell 10,000 shares 
with a limit price of $10.08 and a MQTY of 3,000 shares arrives and 
is booked at $10.08.
     Order B, a non-displayed order to buy 2,000 shares with 
a limit price of $10.11 and a MQTY of 500 shares arrives.
     Order B does not satisfy Order A's MQTY, so the two 
orders do not match.
     Order B books at $10.10, the contra-side Protected 
Quotation, because it is able to rest at the contra-side Protected 
Quotation so long as IEX does not have a Protected Quotation priced 
at the NBO.
     IEX's non-displayed Order Book is crossed at $10.10 x 
$10.08.

    IEX notes that the manner in which it proposes to allow two MQTY 
orders to cross IEX's non-displayed Order Book is the same approach 
taken by other exchanges. For example, MEMX LLC (``MEMX'') allows 
orders with minimum execution quantities to create a dark order book 
cross,\56\ and MIAX PEARL allows its non-displayed order book to be 
internally locked or crossed, in the same manner IEX is proposing.\57\
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    \56\ See MEMX Rule 11.6(f).
    \57\ See MIAX PEARL Rule 2614(c)(7)(B)(iv).
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V. Related Changes to the Retail Price Improvement Program
    IEX's Retail Price Improvement Program \58\ currently allows a 
Retail \59\ order to trade with a contra-side order resting at the 
Midpoint Price, or with an aggressively priced displayed odd lot order 
priced between the Midpoint Price and the contra-side Protected 
Quotation.\60\ Because this proposed rule change will allow non-
displayed orders to also be priced between the Midpoint Price and the 
contra-side Protected Quotation, IEX proposes to amend IEX Rule 11.232 
to allow Retail orders to interact with any order priced between the 
Midpoint Price and the contra-side Protected Quotation. Specifically, 
IEX proposes to amend IEX Rules 11.232(a)(2) and 11.232(e)(2) to 
reflect this change.
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    \58\ See IEX Rule 11.232.
    \59\ See IEX Rules 11.190(b)(15) and 11.232(a)(2).
    \60\ See IEX Rule 11.232(a)(2).
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    Additionally, IEX proposes to amend Rule 11.232(e)(3) regarding 
Retail order priority, by adding subparagraph (iii), which states that 
non-displayed orders priced more aggressively than the Midpoint Price 
will have price priority over orders resting at the Midpoint Price 
because of their more aggressive price.\61\ IEX also proposes to 
renumber subparagraph (iii) to (iv) to reflect the insertion of the new 
subparagraph (iii).
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    \61\ An aggressively priced displayed odd lot order resting at 
the same price as the aggressively priced non-displayed limit order 
will have execution priority over the non-displayed limit order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, IEX proposes to add a new Example 6, to demonstrate how an 
aggressively priced non-displayed limit order will have execution 
priority over orders priced to execute at the Midpoint Price.
VI. Conforming Changes Caused by Midpoint Price Constraint Removal
    IEX also proposes several conforming changes to other IEX rules. 
Specifically, IEX proposes to make the following conforming changes:

     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(a)(3) (Pegged Order) to remove 
the text stating that an Offset Peg order may be executed in sub-
pennies if necessary to obtain a Midpoint Price. As noted below, 
Offset Peg orders would no longer be constrained by the Midpoint 
Price, and therefore will no longer execute in sub-pennies.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ As set forth in IEX Rule 11.210, for securities that 
execute at sub-dollar prices (i.e., the order is priced less than 
$1.00 per share), the minimum price variation is $0.0001. Therefore, 
sub-penny executions can still occur for any sub-dollar executions.

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[[Page 29772]]

     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(a)(3)(A) to remove the text 
stating that Primary Peg orders may not have a TIF of IOC or FOK. As 
discussed above, because the removal of the Midpoint Price 
Constraint means the IEX Order Book could have resting orders priced 
at the contra-side Protected Quotation, it is now possible for a 
Primary Peg order to execute upon entry, and therefore IEX proposes 
to allow Primary Peg orders to be submitted with a TIF of IOC or 
FOK. Relatedly, IEX proposes to amend subparagraph (E) of the same 
rule to remove the text saying that Primary Peg orders submitted 
with a TIF of IOC or FOK will be rejected on entry.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(2) (Reserve Order) and the 
accompanying Supplementary Material to remove references to the 
Midpoint Price Constraint and replace them with references to the 
non-displayed price sliding rule. IEX also proposes to correct a 
typographical error by inserting a ``B'' into the last word of the 
sentence that reads: ``[f]or example, NBBO is $10.01 x $10.02, and 
IEX does not have any orders resting at the NBO,'' which will now 
end by saying ``at the NBBO.'' Further, IEX proposes to modify the 
example in Supplementary Material .01 (Reserve Orders) to describe a 
displayed odd lot reserve order with 50 shares displayed and 950 
shares in reserve, to demonstrate how the displayed and non-
displayed portions of a reserve order can be booked at different 
prices. Therefore, IEX proposes to end the example by changing the 
non-displayed portion's resting price from $10.015 (the Midpoint 
Price) to $10.02, the NBO. Additionally, IEX proposes to reorder the 
paragraphs in the Supplementary Material about reserve orders such 
that the paragraph about D-Limit reserve orders is the last 
paragraph.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(3) (Non-Displayed Order) to 
remove the text stating that Primary Peg orders are not eligible for 
Book Recheck. As discussed above, these changes are proposed because 
Primary Peg orders have a higher likelihood of executing on entry 
now that non-displayed orders can rest at the contra-side Protected 
Quote.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(8) (Primary Peg Order) to: 
Amend subparagraph (B) to state that a Primary Peg order may have 
any TIF described in IEX Rule 11.190(a)(3); and remove the text in 
subparagraph (J) that says Primary Peg orders are not eligible for 
Book Recheck and add text saying that they are eligible to be 
invited to Recheck to trade against eligible resting contra-side 
interest. As discussed above, the TIF changes are proposed because 
Primary Peg orders have a better likelihood of executing on entry 
now that non-displayed orders can rest at the contra-side Protected 
Quote. Additionally, as discussed above, the proposed change to 
allow Primary Peg orders to Recheck the Order Book conforms to 
proposed changes to the Book Recheck rule to reflect that orders 
will no longer only be invited to recheck the Order Book if there is 
a contra-side order resting at the Midpoint Price.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(9) (Midpoint Peg Order) to 
remove the text in subparagraph (J) that states that Midpoint Peg 
orders are eligible to be invited to Recheck to trade against 
interest resting at the Midpoint Price and replace it with text 
saying they are eligible to be invited to Recheck to trade against 
eligible resting contra-side interest. As discussed above, this 
conforms to proposed changes to the Book Recheck rule to reflect 
that orders will no longer only be invited to recheck the Order Book 
if there is a contra-side order resting at the Midpoint Price.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(10) (Discretionary Peg Order) 
to remove the text in subparagraph (J) that says Discretionary Peg 
orders are eligible to be invited to Recheck to trade against 
interest resting at the Midpoint Price and replace it with text 
saying they are eligible to be invited to Recheck to trade against 
eligible resting contra-side interest. As discussed above, this 
conforms to proposed changes to the Book Recheck rule to reflect 
that orders will no longer only be invited to recheck the Order Book 
if there is a contra-side order resting at the Midpoint Price.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(13) (Offset Peg Order) to 
remove the text in subparagraph (L) that provides that an Offset Peg 
order with an offset amount that results in a price more aggressive 
than the Midpoint Price will have the offset amount reduced so that 
the order is priced at the Midpoint Price until such time as the 
full offset amount will not result in the price of the order being 
more aggressive than the Midpoint Price. IEX further proposes to add 
text stating that if the offset amount results in a price more 
aggressive than the contra-side Protected Quotation, the offset 
amount will be reduced so that the order is booked and ranked on the 
Order Book non-displayed at the contra-side protected quotation 
(i.e., the NBO for buy orders and NBB for sell orders), unless the 
Exchange's Best Bid (for offers) or Best Offer (for bids) is equal 
to the current NBB (for offers) or current NBO (for bids), in which 
case the order is booked and ranked on the Order Book non-displayed 
one (1) MPV below the current NBO (for bids) or one (1) MPV above 
the current NBB (for offers), as set forth in IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2), 
until such time as the full offset amount will not result in the 
price being more aggressive than the contra-side Protected 
Quotation. Additionally, as discussed above, because Offset Peg 
orders will no longer be eligible to be priced in sub-pennies, IEX 
proposes to remove the sentence describing how a sub-penny priced 
order is rounded up or down.
     Amend Supplementary Material .03 (Minimum Quantity 
Orders) to specify that the IEX PBBO for the example is $10.01 x 
$10.03 and modify the example to specify that Order #4 in the 
example would book at its limit price of $10.02 (removing the text 
saying it would book at the Midpoint Price). Additionally, IEX 
proposes to reorder the paragraphs in the Supplementary Material 
about reserve orders such that the paragraph about D-Limit reserve 
orders is the last paragraph.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(b)(16) (Corporate Discretionary 
Peg Order) to remove the text in subparagraph (J) that says 
Corporate Discretionary Peg orders are eligible to be invited to 
Recheck to trade against interest resting at the Midpoint Price and 
replace it with text saying they are eligible to be invited to 
Recheck to trade against eligible resting contra-side interest. As 
discussed above, this conforms to proposed changes to the Book 
Recheck rule to reflect that orders will no longer only be invited 
to recheck the Order Book if there is a contra-side order resting at 
the Midpoint Price.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(h)(3) (Locked and Crossed 
Markets) to remove all references to the Midpoint Price Constraint 
and replace them with references to non-displayed price sliding. 
Additionally, amend IEX Rule 11.190(h)(3)(D)(i) to remove the 
reference to Offset Peg orders and add Corporate Discretionary Peg 
orders to the list of order types for which reference to the 
Midpoint Price is relevant.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.190(h)(4) (Short Sale Price Sliding) 
to remove subparagraph (E) and amend subparagraph (C) to remove 
references to displayed or displayable orders and the Permitted 
Display Price, and add a sentence saying that ``[i]n the event the 
NBB changes such that the price of a non-displayed Order subject to 
Rule 201 of Regulation SHO would lock or cross the NBB, the order 
will receive a new timestamp, and will be re-priced by the System at 
the Permitted Price.'' These changes reflect the fact that without 
the Midpoint Price Constraint, IEX's short sale price sliding rules 
no longer need to distinguish between a ``Permitted Display Price'' 
and a ``Permitted Price.''
     Amend IEX Rule 11.220 (Priority of Orders) 
Supplementary Material .01 (Surrendering Precedence) to change the 
order #4 in the example to a midpoint peg order, so that the example 
will continue to demonstrate how MQTY orders booked at the Midpoint 
Price surrender precedence if their specific conditions prevent an 
execution.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.230(a)(4)(C) (Order Execution) to 
replace references to the Midpoint Price with references to contra-
side Protected Quotation (i.e., the NBB or NBO), modify the first 
sentence of the subparagraph to specify that orders are permitted to 
post and rest non-displayed on the Order Book at prices that lock 
the protected quotation of an away market, so long as IEX does not 
have a protected quotation at the same price, and, as discussed 
above, delete the last sentence of the subparagraph that states that 
orders are never permitted to post non-displayed nor rest non-
displayed on the Order Book at prices that cross contra-side 
liquidity.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.230(a)(4)(D) (Book Recheck) to 
include Corporate Discretionary Pegs in the list of orders eligible 
for Book Recheck and update the rule citations accordingly. Renumber 
subparagraphs (v) and (vi) to (iv) and (v) to reflect the deletion 
of subparagraph (iv), which said Primary Peg orders are not eligible 
for Book Recheck) as described above. And amend IEX Rule 
11.230(a)(4)(D) Supplementary Material .01 to modify the example to 
reflect that a non-displayed limit order would be booked at its 
limit price of $10.02, not the Midpoint Price of $10.015.
     Amend IEX Rule 11.231 (Regular Market Session Opening 
Process for Non-IEX-Listed Securities) by removing the reference to 
the

[[Page 29773]]

Midpoint Price from subparagraph (a)(v) and replacing it with a 
reference to the contra-side protected quotation (i.e., the NBO for 
buy orders and NBB for sell orders).
     Amend IEX Rule 11.340 (Compliance with Regulation NMS 
Plan to Implement a Tick Size Pilot) to remove the reference to the 
Midpoint Price Constraint in subparagraph (d)(4)(D)(ii) and replace 
it with a reference to the non-displayed price sliding rules set 
forth in IEX Rule 11.190(h)(2).
Implementation
    This proposed rule change will be immediately effective upon 
filing, but subject to the thirty (30) day operative delay. The 
Exchange anticipates implementing the rule change within ninety (90) 
days of the effective date and will provide at least ten (10) days' 
notice to Members and market participants of the implementation 
timeline.
2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that this proposed rule change is consistent 
with Section 6(b) of the Act,\63\ in general, and furthers the 
objectives of Section 6(b)(5),\64\ in particular, in that it is 
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to 
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation 
and coordination with persons engaged in facilitating transactions in 
securities, and to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a 
free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to 
protect investors and the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \64\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the Exchange believes that removing the Midpoint 
Price Constraint for non-displayed limit orders is consistent with the 
protection of investors and the public interest because it is designed 
to incentivize the entry of more aggressively priced non-displayed 
limit orders, because it will allow Members to submit orders that are 
more likely to post at their instructed limit price, as opposed to 
being limited to posting no higher than the Midpoint Price. And these 
orders resting between the Midpoint Price and the contra-side Protected 
Quotation will trade before any orders resting at the Midpoint Price, 
which would enhance the aggressively priced orders' execution 
opportunities. Conversely, any contra-side orders that match with these 
aggressively priced non-displayed limit orders will benefit by the 
ability to obtain more price improvement than if they had executed at 
the Midpoint Price. Thus, IEX believes that allowing Members more 
control over the pricing of their non-displayed orders should both 
incentivize the submission of more orders to IEX (improving the overall 
liquidity profile of IEX) and offer more potential price improvement 
opportunities, to the benefit of all market participants.
    The Exchange further believes that removing the Midpoint Price 
Constraint and modeling its non-displayed price sliding rule on those 
of other equity exchanges is consistent with the Act because such 
treatment is designed to remove impediments to and perfect the 
mechanism of a free and open market and national market system by 
conforming IEX's treatment of non-displayed limit orders with the other 
equities exchanges.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See supra note 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, since this proposed rule change would make IEX's non-
displayed price sliding rule consistent with that of the other equities 
exchanges, IEX believes that it will promote just and equitable 
principles of trade and foster cooperation and coordination with 
persons engaged in facilitating securities transactions because market 
participants will no longer have to potentially adjust their order 
routing strategies or trading algorithms to reflect that non-displayed 
limit orders are never allowed to be priced more aggressively than the 
Midpoint Price.
    The Exchange further believes that modifying its Book Recheck 
functionality and Retail Price Improvement program are consistent with 
the protection of investors and the public interest because the rule 
change is designed to increase the opportunities for eligible orders to 
execute on the Exchange, which inures to the benefit of all market 
participants who send orders to the Exchange.
    As discussed in the Purpose Section, each of these proposed changes 
is consistent with rules of other equities exchanges. Specifically:

     As proposed, IEX will slide the price of a non-
displayed limit order priced more aggressively than the contra-side 
Protected Quotation to the price of the contra-side Protected 
Question. Cboe BZX Rule 11.9(g)(4), Nasdaq Rule 4702(b)(3)(A), and 
MIAX PEARL Rule 2614(g)(2) provide for the same functionality.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See supra note 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     As proposed, IEX will slide the price of a non-
displayed order that fails to match with a contra-side order because 
of the order's special conditions to a price one MPV less aggressive 
than the contra-side order. Nasdaq Rule 4703(e) provides for the 
same functionality.\67\ And MIAX PEARL Rules 2617(a)(4)(C) and (D) 
provide for very similar functionality, with the only distinction 
being that MIAX PEARL allows the minimum quantity order that to 
trade at a price \1/2\ MPV less aggressive than the price of the 
contra-side order against which it would match but for the minimum 
quantity instruction.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See supra note 32.
    \68\ See supra note 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     As proposed, IEX will allow resting orders to become 
active and check the Order Book if they become marketable against 
contra-side liquidity resting on the Order Book. NYSE Rules 
7.37(b)(8) and (9), Nasdaq Rule 4702(a), and MIAX PEARL Rule 1901(a) 
provide for the same functionality.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See supra note 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     As proposed, IEX will allow non-displayed order with 
specific conditions that prevent an execution against a contra-side 
order that also has specific conditions to cross on the non-
displayed Order Book. MEMX Rule 11.6(f) and MIAX PEARL Rule 
2614(c)(7)(B)(iv) provide for the same functionality.\70\
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    \70\ See supra notes 56 and 57.

    Overall, while the proposed rule change mirrors the functionality 
of several exchanges, IEX notes that the MIAX PEARL and Nasdaq rules 
are the most substantially similar to IEX's proposal. Specifically, 
IEX's non-displayed price sliding rule proposal mirrors that of MIAX 
PEARL with the sole exception that MIAX PEARL will reprice a non-
displayed order that cannot match with a contra-side order because of 
the non-displayed order's minimum quantity at a price \1/2\ of an MPV 
less aggressive than the contra-side order, while IEX proposes to rank 
the order at a price one MPV away from the price of the contra-side 
order. Further, Nasdaq's non-displayed price sliding rules mirror this 
proposal with the exception that Nasdaq does not explicitly state that 
it will allow two non-displayed minimum quantity orders to cross each 
other on the non-displayed order book, while IEX's rules explicitly 
permit such a cross.\71\ Also, neither MIAX PEARL nor Nasdaq use 
identical terminology (e.g., descriptions of how resting orders can 
become active and check the order book for contra-side liquidity rather 
than use of the term ``recheck'' used in IEX rules).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ IEX notes that Nasdaq's rules, while not explicit, appear 
to allow a crossed non-displayed order book in this particular 
situation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IEX does not believe that these differences raise any new or novel 
issues, but merely reflect minor implementation differences. Both MIAX 
PEARL and IEX (as proposed) reprice a non-displayed order that cannot 
match with a contra-side order because of a minimum quantity, and it 
appears that both Nasdaq and IEX will allow two minimum quantity orders 
to cross each other on the non-displayed order book. Therefore, IEX 
does not believe that this

[[Page 29774]]

proposal raises any new or novel issues that have not already been 
considered by the Commission.
    Finally, IEX believes that the proposed conforming changes and 
typographical corrections further the purposes of the Act because they 
provide greater clarity and consistency to the IEX Rule Book thereby 
reducing the potential for confusion by market participants.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on intermarket competition that is not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. To the contrary, 
the proposal is designed to enhance IEX's competitiveness with other 
markets by adopting rules providing for more prices at which non-
displayed limit orders can execute or rest on the exchange and allowing 
for more circumstances in which orders eligible for Recheck or Retail 
orders will be able to interact with these aggressively priced non-
displayed limit orders to the benefit of all market participants.
    The Exchange also does not believe that the proposed rule change 
will impose any burden on intramarket competition because it will apply 
to all Members in the same manner. All Members are eligible to enter 
non-displayed limit orders and, as discussed in the Purpose section, 
all Members seeking a Midpoint Price may continue to use Discretionary 
Peg and Midpoint Peg orders which will not execute at a price more 
aggressive than the Midpoint Price. Moreover, the proposal would 
provide potential benefits to all Members to the extent that there is 
more liquidity available on IEX as a result of the ability to book non-
displayed limit orders at more aggressive prices. The proposal is 
intended to incentivize the entry of more orders on the Exchange and 
thereby increase the likelihood of executions on the Exchange, which 
would benefit all market participants.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Because the foregoing proposed rule change does not: (i) 
Significantly affect the protection of investors or the public 
interest; (ii) impose any significant burden on competition; and (iii) 
become operative for 30 days from the date on which it was filed, or 
such shorter time as the Commission may designate, it has become 
effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A) \72\ of the Act and Rule 19b-
4(f)(6) thereunder.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \73\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6). In addition, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii) 
requires a self-regulatory organization to give the Commission 
written notice of its intent to file the proposed rule change, along 
with a brief description and text of the proposed rule change, at 
least five business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed 
rule change, or such shorter time as designated by the Commission. 
The Exchange has satisfied this requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule 
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule 
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission 
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to 
determine whether the proposed rule change should be approved or 
disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-IEX-2022-04 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-IEX-2022-04. This file 
number should be included in the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing will also be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments 
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are 
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying 
information from comment submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions 
should refer to File Number SR-IEX-2022-04 and should be submitted on 
or before June 6, 2022.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-10415 Filed 5-13-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


