[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 37 (Thursday, February 24, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 10436-10501]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03143]



[[Page 10435]]

Vol. 87

Thursday,

No. 37

February 24, 2022

Part II





Securities and Exchange Commission





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17 CFR Parts 232, 240 and 275





Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 87 , No. 37 / Thursday, February 24, 2022 / 
Proposed Rules  

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 232, 240, and 275

[Release Nos. 34-94196, IA-5957; File No. S7-05-22]
RIN 3235-AN02


Shortening the Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') 
proposes rules to shorten the standard settlement cycle for most 
broker-dealer transactions from two business days after the trade date 
(``T+2'') to one business day after the trade date (``T+1''). To 
facilitate a T+1 standard settlement cycle, the Commission also 
proposes new requirements for the processing of institutional trades by 
broker-dealers, investment advisers, and certain clearing agencies. 
These requirements are designed to protect investors, reduce risk, and 
increase operational efficiency. The Commission proposes to require 
compliance with a T+1 standard settlement cycle, if adopted, by March 
31, 2024. The Commission also solicits comment on how best to further 
advance beyond T+1.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before April 11, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number S7-05-22 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments to Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-05-22. This file number 
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help us 
process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one 
method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's 
website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments are also 
available for website viewing and printing in the Commission's Public 
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official 
business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Operating 
conditions may limit access to the Commission's public reference room. 
All comments received will be posted without change. Persons submitting 
comments are cautioned that the Commission does not redact or edit 
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
    Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the 
Commission or staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A 
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any such materials 
will be made available on the Commission's website. To ensure direct 
electronic receipt of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay 
Connected'' option at www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matthew Lee, Assistant Director, Susan 
Petersen, Special Counsel, Andrew Shanbrom, Special Counsel, Jesse 
Capelle, Special Counsel, Tanin Kazemi, Attorney-Adviser, or Mary Ann 
Callahan, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Clearance and Settlement at 
(202) 551-5710, Division of Trading and Markets; Amy Miller, Senior 
Counsel, at (202) 551-4447, Emily Rowland, Senior Counsel, at (202) 
551-6787, and Holly H. Miller, Senior Policy Advisor, at (202) 551-
6706, Division of Investment Management; U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-7010.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission proposes rules to shorten the 
standard settlement cycle to T+1 and improve the processing of 
institutional trades by broker-dealers, investment advisers, and 
certain clearing agencies. First, the Commission proposes to amend 17 
CFR 240.15c6-1 (``Rule 15c6-1'') to shorten the standard settlement 
cycle for most broker-dealer transactions from T+2 to T+1 and to repeal 
the T+4 standard settlement cycle for firm commitment offerings priced 
after 4:30 p.m.,\1\ as discussed in Part III.A. Second, the Commission 
proposes 17 CFR 240.15c6-2 (``Rule 15c6-2'') to prohibit broker-dealers 
from entering into contracts with their institutional customers unless 
those contracts require that the parties complete allocations, 
confirmations, and affirmations by the end of the trade date, a 
practice the securities industry has commonly referred to as ``same-day 
affirmation,'' as discussed in Part III.B. Third, the Commission 
proposes to amend 17 CFR 275.204-2 (``Rule 204-2'') to require 
investment advisers that are parties to contracts under Rule 15c6-2 to 
make and keep records of their allocations, confirmations, and 
affirmations described in Rule 15c6-2, as discussed in Part III.C. 
Fourth, the Commission proposes 17 CFR 240.17Ad-27 (``Rule 17Ad-27'') 
to require a clearing agency that is a central matching service 
provider (``CMSP'') to establish policies and procedures to facilitate 
straight-through processing, as discussed in Part III.D. To assess and 
manage the potential impact of a T+1 settlement cycle, the Commission 
is also soliciting comment on the following Commission rules and 
regulations: Regulation SHO; the financial responsibility rules for 
broker-dealers; requirements in 17 CFR 240.10b-10 (``Rule 10b-10''); 
and requirements related to prospectus delivery. The Commission 
proposes to require compliance with each of the proposed rules and rule 
amendments by March 31, 2024. The Commission solicits comment on this 
proposed compliance date in Part III.F.
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    \1\ See infra Part III.A, notes 83-85, and accompanying text 
(discussing the types of securities to which Rule 15c6-1 applies, 
which includes equities, corporate bonds, unit investment trusts 
(``UITs''), mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (``ETFs''), American 
Depositary Receipts (``ADRs''), security-based swaps, and options).
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    In addition, accelerating beyond a T+1 settlement cycle to a same-
day standard settlement cycle (i.e., settlement no later than the end 
of trade date, or ``T+0'') is an objective that the Commission is 
actively assessing; however, the Commission is not proposing rules to 
require a T+0 standard settlement cycle at this time. In Part IV, the 
Commission discusses and requests comment regarding potential pathways 
to T+0, as well as certain challenges to implementing T+0 that have 
been identified by market participants. The comments received will be 
used to inform any future action to further shorten the settlement 
cycle beyond T+1.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Background
    A. Relevant History
    B. Current State of Post-Trade Processing
    1. Clearing Agencies--CCPs, CSDs, and CMSPs
    2. Broker-Dealers
    3. Retail and Institutional Investors
    C. Recent Initiatives and Market Events
III. Proposals for T+1
    A. Shortening the Length of the Standard Settlement Cycle
    1. Proposed Amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a)
    2. Basis for Shortening the Standard Settlement Cycle to T+1
    3. Proposed Deletion of Rule 15c6-1(c) and Conforming Technical 
Amendments to Rule 15c6-1

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    4. Basis for Eliminating T+4 Standard for Certain Firm 
Commitment Offerings
    5. Request for Comment
    B. New Requirement for ``Same-Day Affirmation''
    1. Proposed Rule 15c6-2 Under the Exchange Act
    2. Basis for Requiring Affirmation No Later Than the End of 
Trade Date
    3. Request for Comment
    C. Proposed Amendment to Recordkeeping Rule for Investment 
Advisers
    1. Request for Comment
    D. New Requirement for CMSPs To Facilitate Straight-Through 
Processing
    1. Policies and Procedures To Facilitate Straight-Through 
Processing
    2. Annual Report on Straight-Through Processing
    3. Request for Comment
    E. Impact on Certain Commission Rules and Guidance and SRO Rules
    1. Regulation SHO Under the Exchange Act
    2. Financial Responsibility Rules Under the Exchange Act
    3. Rule 10b-10 Under the Exchange Act
    4. Prospectus Delivery and ``Access Versus Delivery''
    5. Changes to SRO Rules and Operations
    F. Proposed Compliance Date
IV. Pathways to T+0
    A. Possible Approaches to Achieving T+0
    1. Wide-Scale Implementation
    2. Staggered Implementation Beginning With Key Infrastructure
    3. Tiered Implementation Beginning With Pilot Programs
    B. Issues To Consider for Implementing T+0
    1. Maintaining Multilateral Netting at the End of Trade Date
    2. Achieving Same-Day Settlement Processing
    3. Enhancing Money Settlement
    4. Mutual Fund and ETF Processing
    5. Institutional Trade Processing
    6. Securities Lending
    7. Access to Funds and/or Prefunding of Transactions
    8. Potential Mismatches of Settlement Cycles
    9. Dematerialization
V. Economic Analysis
    A. Background
    B. Economic Baseline and Affected Parties
    1. Central Counterparties
    2. Market Participants--Investors, Broker-Dealers, and 
Custodians
    3. Investment Companies and Investment Advisers
    4. Current Market for Clearance and Settlement Services
    C. Analysis of Benefits, Costs, and Impact on Efficiency, 
Competition, and Capital Formation
    1. Benefits
    2. Costs
    3. Economic Implications Through Other Commission Rules
    4. Effect on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    5. Quantification of Direct and Indirect Effects of a T+1 
Settlement Cycle
    D. Reasonable Alternatives
    1. Amend 15c6-1(c) to T+2
    2. Propose 17Ad-27 To Require Certain Outcomes
    E. Request for Comment
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Proposed Amendment to Rule 204-2
    B. Proposed Rule 17Ad-27
    C. Request for Comment
VII. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    A. Proposed Rules and Amendments for Rules 15c6-1, 15c6-2, and 
204-2
    1. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Actions
    2. Legal Basis
    3. Small Entities Subject to the Proposed Rule and Proposed Rule 
Amendments
    4. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    5. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
    6. Significant Alternatives
    7. Request for Comment
    B. Proposed Rule 17Ad-27

Statutory Authority and Text of the Proposed Rules and Rule Amendments

I. Introduction

    In the 1920s, capital markets maintained a one-day settlement cycle 
for transactions in securities.\2\ Over the course of the twentieth 
century, the length of the settlement cycle grew to five days--a 
response to the ever-growing number of investors, the rising volume of 
transactions, and the increasing complexity of the processing 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate the settlement of those 
transactions.\3\ Since the late 1980s, the Commission, seeking to 
protect investors and reduce risk, has been working with the securities 
industry to minimize the time it takes for securities transactions to 
settle. The first initiative to shorten the standard settlement cycle 
emerged following studies by government and industry groups after the 
October 1987 market break, including the Report of the Bachmann Task 
Force on Clearance and Settlement Reform in U.S. Securities Markets.\4\ 
The Bachmann Report presented multiple recommendations to improve the 
securities market by improving the safety and soundness of the National 
C&S System.\5\ The Bachmann Report, submitted to the Commission in May 
1992, recommended that by 1994 the Commission shorten the standard 
settlement cycle from five days to three days.
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    \2\ See Kenneth S. Levine, Was Trade Settlement Always on T+3? A 
History of Clearing and Settlement Changes, Friends of Financial 
History No. 56, at 20, 22 (Summer 1996), https://archive.org/details/friendsoffinanci00muse_12/page/20/mode/2up?view=theater.
    \3\ See Levine, supra note 2, at 23-25.
    \4\ See Report of the Bachmann Task Force on Clearance and 
Settlement Reform in U.S. Securities Markets, Submitted to The 
Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (May 1992) 
(``Bachmann Report''), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1992-06-22/pdf/FR-1992-06-22.pdf. The task force was headed by John W. 
Bachmann, the Managing Principal of Edward D. Jones & Co. of St. 
Louis, Missouri. The recommendations in the Bachmann Report were 
intended to help inform the Commission's approach to considering 
reforms of the national system for clearance and settlement 
(``National C&S System'').
    \5\ See id.
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    To support its recommendation, the Bachmann Report used the concept 
``time equals risk'' to illustrate that ``less time between a 
transaction and its completion reduces risk.'' \6\ In addition, the 
report stated that a ``shorter settlement cycle will also uncover 
potential problems sooner, before they mushroom or begin to cascade 
throughout the industry.'' \7\ In recommending that the Commission 
shorten the standard settlement cycle, the Bachmann Report also stated, 
``[t]he system and legal initiatives necessary to accomplish the T+3 
settlement for corporate and municipal securities should serve as a 
stepping stone to further reductions in settlement periods over time as 
technology and systems permit.'' \8\
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    \6\ See id. at 4. Specifically, the concept posits that the 
length of time between the execution and settlement of a securities 
transaction correlates to the financial risk exposure inherent in 
the transaction, and that shortening this length of time can reduce 
the overall risk exposure.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Id. at 6.
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    In 1993, the Commission adopted Rule 15c6-1 to shorten this process 
by requiring the settlement of most securities transactions within 
three business days (``T+3''),\9\ and in 2017, the Commission amended 
the rule to require settlement within two business days (``T+2'').\10\ 
The Commission believes that further shortening of the settlement cycle 
would promote investor protection, reduce risk, and increase 
operational efficiency. This view has been informed by two recent 
episodes of increased market volatility--in March 2020 following the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, and in January 2021 following 
heightened interest in certain ``meme'' stocks.
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    \9\ Exchange Act Release No. 33023 (Oct. 6, 1993), 58 FR 52891 
(Oct. 13, 1993) (``T+3 Adopting Release''). In adopting Rule 15c6-1, 
the Commission set a compliance date of June 1, 1995.
    \10\ Exchange Act Release No. 80295 (Mar. 22, 2017), 82 FR 
15564, 15601 (Mar. 29, 2017) (``T+2 Adopting Release'').

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These two episodes have highlighted potential vulnerabilities in the 
U.S. securities market that shortening the standard settlement cycle 
could help mitigate.\11\ Accordingly, the Commission is proposing a 
transition to a T+1 standard settlement cycle. The Commission also 
believes that achieving settlement by the end of trade date (``T+0'') 
could benefit investors as well.\12\ While the Commission is not 
proposing a T+0 standard settlement cycle at this time, the Commission 
would like to better understand the challenges that market participants 
may need to address and resolve to achieve T+0. Accordingly, the 
Commission solicits comments on potential paths to and challenges 
associated with achieving a T+0 standard settlement cycle in Part 
IV.\13\
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    \11\ See, e.g., Staff Report on Equity and Options Market 
Structure Conditions in Early 2021 (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/files/staff-report-equity-options-market-struction-conditions-early-2021.pdf. This report represents the views of 
Commission staff. It is not a rule, regulation, or statement of the 
Commission. The Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its 
content. This report, like all staff reports, has no legal force or 
effect: It does not alter or amend applicable law, and it creates no 
new or additional obligations for any person.
    \12\ In this release, the Commission uses ``T+0'' to refer to a 
settlement cycle that is complete by the end of the day on which the 
trade was executed (``trade date''). This is sometimes referred to 
as ``same-day'' settlement and is distinct from real-time 
settlement, which contemplates settlement in real time or near real 
time (i.e., immediately following trade execution) on a gross basis. 
See infra Part IV (further discussing the concept of ``T+0'' as used 
in this release, as well as the related concepts of real-time 
settlement and rolling settlement, where trades are netted and 
settled intraday on a recurring basis).
    \13\ Part IV discusses potential paths to and challenges 
associated with implementing a T+0 settlement cycle. For example, 
activities that are linked to the length of the settlement cycle 
include securities lending activities. See infra Part IV.B.6.
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    On December 1, 2021, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
(``DTCC''),\14\ the Investment Company Institute (``ICI''),\15\ the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (``SIFMA''),\16\ 
and Deloitte & Touche LLP (``Deloitte'') \17\ published a report that 
presented industry recommendations to implement a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle in the U.S.\18\ The Commission has considered the 
potential requirements, benefits, and costs associated with further 
shortening the standard settlement cycle in the U.S., and proposes to 
require that the standard settlement cycle transition to T+1, if 
adopted, by March 31, 2024.\19\ As the securities industry considers 
how it would implement T+1, the Commission believes that market 
participants also generally should consider investments in new 
technology or operations now that can be effective over the long term 
at maximizing the benefits of risk reduction and improved efficiency in 
post-trade processing that accompany shortening the settlement cycle, 
mindful of efforts to shorten the settlement cycle beyond T+1.
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    \14\ DTCC is the holding company for three registered clearing 
agencies: The Depository Trust Company (``DTC''), the National 
Securities Clearing Corporation (``NSCC''), and the Fixed Income 
Clearing Corporation (``FICC''). It is also the holding company for 
DTCC ITP Matching (US) LLC (``DTCC ITP Matching''), which operates a 
CMSP pursuant to an exemption from registration as a clearing 
agency.
    \15\ ICI is an association representing regulated funds 
globally, including mutual funds, ETFs, closed-end funds, and unit 
investment trusts in the United States, and similar funds offered to 
investors in jurisdictions worldwide.
    \16\ SIFMA is a trade association for broker-dealers, investment 
banks, and asset managers operating in the U.S. and global capital 
markets.
    \17\ See infra note 18.
    \18\ Deloitte, DTCC, ICI, & SIFMA, Accelerating the U.S. 
Securities Settlement Cycle to T+1 (Dec. 1, 2021) (``T+1 Report''), 
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Accelerating-the-U.S.-Securities-Settlement-Cycle-to-T1-December-1-2021.pdf. See 
infra Part II.C (summarizing the recommendations in the T+1 Report).
    \19\ See infra Part III.F (discussing the proposed compliance 
date). The T+1 Report contemplates implementation of T+1 in the 
first half of 2024, and the Commission believes that sufficient time 
is available to achieve T+1 by March 31, 2024, as discussed further 
in Part III.F.
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    In Part II, the Commission provides (i) a history of the key 
Commission and industry efforts to shorten the standard settlement 
cycle, including past concerns related to T+1 and T+0 settlement 
cycles, (ii) an overview of the current state of post-trade processing 
in the market for U.S. equity securities, and (iii) a summary of other 
recent market events related to this rule proposal. In Part III, the 
Commission describes the rule proposals that are necessary to achieve 
T+1. In Part IV, the Commission discusses the potential pathways and 
challenges associated with implementing a standard T+0 settlement cycle 
and requests comment on any and all aspects of achieving T+0.

II. Background

    In developing the rule proposals included in this release, the 
Commission considered the history related to shortening the standard 
settlement cycle, the current state of post-trade processing in the 
U.S. equities market, and recent initiatives and market events that 
have focused attention in the securities industry and the public on the 
appropriate length of the standard settlement cycle. Each of these is 
discussed further below.

A. Relevant History

    The first industry-level engagement on T+1 began in the late 1990s 
and developed a business case for using straight-through processing to 
achieve T+1,\20\ estimating that an industry investment of $8 billion 
in improved settlement technologies and processes could reduce 
settlement exposures by 67% and return $2.7 billion in annual savings. 
Implementation of the building blocks described in the Securities 
Industry Association (``SIA'') Business Case Report was postponed when 
improving operational resilience following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 took priority,\21\ although many of them were 
subsequently achieved.
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    \20\ The term ``straight-through processing'' generally refers 
to processes that allow for the automation of the entire trade 
process from trade execution through settlement without manual 
intervention. See infra Part III.D.1 (further discussing the concept 
of straight-through processing).
    \21\ See SIA, T+1 Business Case Final Report (July 2000) (``SIA 
Business Case Report''), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/t1-business-case-final-report.pdf.
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    In 2012, DTCC commissioned a new study that found moving to a T+2 
settlement cycle would be significantly less costly and take less time 
to implement than either an immediate or gradual transition to T+1, 
while still delivering significant benefits with respect to reducing 
risks and costs.\22\ The BCG Study ruled out as infeasible at the time 
a settlement cycle with settlement on trade date (i.e., T+0) ``given 
the exceptional changes required to achieve it and weak support across 
the industry.'' \23\ It concluded that a T+0 settlement cycle would 
face major challenges with processes such as trade reconciliation and 
exception management, securities lending, and transactions with foreign 
counterparties (especially where time zones are least aligned). It also 
concluded that payment systems used for final settlement would need to 
be significantly altered to enable transactions late in the day. The 
BCG Study noted that market participants were aware that a T+2 
settlement cycle could be accomplished through mere compression of 
timeframes and corresponding rule changes but that implementing T+2 
without certain building blocks would limit the amount of savings that 
would be realized across the industry.
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    \22\ See The Boston Consulting Group (``BCG''), Cost Benefit 
Analysis of Shortening the Settlement Cycle (Oct. 2012) (``BCG 
Study''), https://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/WhitePapers/
CBA_BCG_Shortening_the_Settlement_Cycle_October2012.pdf.
    \23\ Id. at 9.

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The BCG Study further concluded that moving to a T+1 settlement cycle 
would require new infrastructure to enable near real-time trade 
processing and would also require transforming the securities lending 
and foreign buyer processes.\24\
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    \24\ Id.
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    In 2014, DTCC, ICI, SIFMA, and other market participants formed an 
Industry Steering Group (``ISG'') to facilitate a transition to 
T+2.\25\ The ISG and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP published a white paper 
describing certain ``industry-level requirements'' and ``sub-
requirements'' that the ISG believed would be required for a successful 
migration to a T+2 settlement cycle.\26\ In conjunction with the ISG, 
Deloitte published in December 2015 a ``T+2 Playbook'' setting forth 
the requested implementation timeline with milestones and dependencies, 
as well as detailing ``remedial activities'' that impacted market 
participants should consider to prepare for migration to T+2.\27\ The 
ISG White Paper also included an implementation timeline that targeted 
the transition for the end of the third quarter of 2017.
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    \25\ See Press Release, DTCC, Industry Steering Committee and 
Working Group Formed to Drive Implementation of T+2 in the U.S. 
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2014/october/16/ust2.aspx.
    \26\ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP & ISG, Shortening the Settlement 
Cycle: The Move to T+2 (June 2015) (``ISG White Paper''), http://www.ust2.com/pdfs/ssc.pdf. This release uses ``ISG'' rather than 
``ISC'' (``Industry Steering Committee,'' the term used in the ISG 
White Paper) when referring to the T+2 effort so that this release 
clearly distinguishes between the ISC's current work on T+1, as 
reflected in the T+1 Report, supra note 18, from past work on T+2.
    \27\ Deloitte & ISG, T+2 Industry Implementation Playbook (Dec. 
18, 2015) (``T+2 Playbook''), http://www.ust2.com/pdfs/T2-Playbook-12-21-15.pdf.
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    In 2015, the Commission's Investor Advisory Committee recommended 
that the Commission pursue T+1 (rather than T+2), noting that retail 
investors would significantly benefit from a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle.\28\ In the event that the Commission determined to pursue a T+2 
standard settlement cycle, the IAC recommended that the Commission work 
with industry participants to create a clear plan for moving to T+1 
shortly thereafter.\29\
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    \28\ Investor Advisory Committee (``IAC''), U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Recommendation of the Investor Advisory 
Committee: Shortening the Settlement Cycle in U.S. Financial Markets 
(Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/settlement-cycle-recommendation-final.pdf.
    \29\ Id.
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    The Commission amended Rule 15c6-1 in 2017 to shorten the standard 
settlement cycle from T+3 to T+2 and set a compliance date for 
September 2017.\30\ The Commission recognized that the clearance and 
settlement process for securities transactions encompassed by the rule 
involved a number of market participants and entities whose functions 
and capabilities would be impacted significantly by a change in the 
standard settlement cycle, and the Commission considered these in its 
analysis supporting the move to T+2. Among these entities were the NSCC 
and the DTC, which respectively operate the central counterparty 
(``CCP'') and central securities depository (``CSD'') for transactions 
in U.S. equity securities,\31\ three CMSPs,\32\ and the diverse 
population of market participants that depend on the clearance and 
settlement services provided by NSCC, DTC, and the CMSPs. These market 
participants include but are not limited to, retail and institutional 
investors, registered investment advisers, broker-dealers, exchanges, 
alternative trading systems, service providers, and custodian banks.
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    \30\ T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10; see also Exchange Act 
Release No. 78962 (Sept. 28, 2016), 81 FR 69240 (Oct. 5, 2016) 
(``T+2 Proposing Release'').
    \31\ NSCC and DTC are subsidiaries of DTCC and each a clearing 
agency registered with the Commission. See supra note 14.
    \32\ See Order Granting Exemption from Registration as a 
Clearing Agency for Global Joint Venture Matching Services--U.S., 
LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 44188 (Apr. 17, 2001), 66 FR 20494, 
20501 (Apr. 23, 2001); Order Approving Applications for an Exemption 
from Registration as a Clearing Agency for Bloomberg STP LLC and 
SS&C Techs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 76514 (Nov. 24, 2015), 
80 FR 75388, 75413 (Dec. 1, 2015) (``BSTP and SS&C Order''). In the 
T+2 Adopting Release, the Commission also referred to these entities 
as ``matching and electronic trade confirmation service providers.'' 
T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15566.
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    In the T+2 Adopting Release, the Commission explained that a T+1 
standard settlement cycle could produce greater reductions in market, 
credit, and liquidity risk for market participants than a move to T+2, 
but that shortening beyond T+2 would require significantly larger 
investments in new systems and processes.\33\ In an effort to analyze, 
among other things, the impacts of further shortening beyond T+2, the 
Commission directed Commission staff to study the issue.\34\ As a 
result of the staff's study and analysis of the settlement cycle, the 
Commission believes that, among other things, improvements to 
institutional trade processing are critical to promoting the 
operational efficiency necessary to facilitate a standard settlement 
cycle shorter than T+2, as discussed further in Part III.B below.
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    \33\ T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15582.
    \34\ Id. at 15582-83.
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B. Current State of Post-Trade Processing

    In the T+2 Proposing Release, the Commission provided a detailed 
overview of post-trade processing for transactions in equity 
securities, including the roles of the CCP, the CSD, and CMSPs.\35\ The 
Commission also provided a summary of the affected market 
participants--investors, broker-dealers, prime broker-dealers (``prime 
brokers''), and custodian banks--and described at a high level the 
different paths to settlement available depending on whether a 
transaction involves a retail or institutional investor.\36\ While this 
overview remains an accurate summary of the post-trade process, the 
Commission recognizes that shortening the standard settlement cycle 
beyond T+2 will require particular focus on improving institutional 
trade processing.
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    \35\ T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69243-46.
    \36\ As in the T+2 Proposing Release, the distinction between 
``retail investor'' and ``institutional investor'' is made only for 
the purpose of illustrating the manner in which these types of 
entities generally clear and settle their securities transactions.
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    To provide context for understanding the Commission's rule 
proposals and the related economic analysis that follows in this 
release, the Commission provides below an overview of the current state 
of post-trade processing, including a brief summary of trade flows 
relevant to the processing of institutional trades. As a general 
matter, investors often rely on securities intermediaries to facilitate 
the clearance and settlement of their securities transactions. These 
intermediaries include broker-dealers, which maintain a securities 
account on the investor's behalf to facilitate purchases and sales of 
securities, and clearing agencies, which provide a range of services 
designed to facilitate the clearance and settlement of a securities 
transaction. As relevant to this release, a clearing agency may act as 
a CCP, a CSD, or a CMSP. The role of each of these entities is 
explained further below.
1. Clearing Agencies--CCPs, CSDs, and CMSPs
    As explained more fully in the T+2 Proposing Release,\37\ a CCP 
interposes itself between the counterparties to a trade following trade 
execution, becoming the buyer to each seller and seller to each buyer 
to ensure the performance of open contracts. One critical function of a 
CCP is to eliminate bilateral credit risk between individual buyers and 
sellers. NSCC is a registered

[[Page 10440]]

clearing agency that provides CCP services for transactions in U.S. 
equity securities to its members.\38\ NSCC facilitates the management 
of risk among its members using a number of tools, which include: (1) 
Novating and guaranteeing trades to assume the credit risk of the 
original counterparties; (2) collecting clearing fund contributions 
from members to help ensure that NSCC has sufficient financial 
resources in the event that one of the counterparties defaults on its 
obligations; \39\ and (3) netting to reduce NSCC's overall exposure to 
its counterparties.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69243.
    \38\ As discussed further in the T+2 Proposing Release, NSCC 
also provides CCP services for other types of securities, including 
corporate bonds, municipal securities, and UITs. Id.
    \39\ Commission rules require a covered clearing agency that 
provides CCP services to have policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to maintain financial resources that cover a wide range of 
foreseeable stress scenarios that include, but are not limited to, 
the default of the participant family that would potentially cause 
the largest aggregate credit exposure for the covered clearing 
agency in extreme but plausible market conditions. See 17 CFR 
240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii).
    \40\ These functions are discussed in more detail in the T+2 
Proposing Release. See T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 
69243. Since publication of the T+2 Proposing Release, NSCC has 
amended its rules to provide a trade guarantee as soon as NSCC has 
validated the trade upon submission for clearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed further in Part V.B.1, CCP netting reduces risk in the 
settlement process by reducing the overall number of obligations that 
must be settled. NSCC's netting and accounting system is called the 
Continuous Net Settlement System (``CNS''). NSCC accepts trades into 
CNS for clearing from the nation's exchanges and other trading venues, 
and it uses CNS to net each NSCC member's trades in each security 
traded that day to a single position for each security, either long 
(i.e., the right to receive securities) or short (i.e., an obligation 
to deliver securities). Throughout the day, NSCC records cash debit and 
credit data generated by its members' activities, and at the end of the 
processing day, NSCC nets the debits and credits to produce one 
aggregate cash debit or credit for each member.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ The operation of CNS is explained more fully in the T+2 
Proposing Release. See id. at 69244.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While NSCC provides final settlement instructions to its members 
each day, the payment for and transfer of securities ownership occurs 
at DTC, which serves as the CSD and settlement system for U.S. equity 
securities. At the conclusion of each trading day, an NSCC member's 
short and long positions are compared against its corresponding DTC 
account to determine whether securities are available for settlement. 
If securities are available, they will be transferred to cover the NSCC 
member's short positions. Specifically, on settlement date NSCC submits 
instructions to DTC to deliver (i.e., transfer) securities positions 
for each security netted through CNS to each NSCC member holding a long 
position in such securities. Cash obligations are settled through DTC 
by one net payment for each NSCC member at the end of the settlement 
day.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The interaction between NSCC and DTC to achieve settlement 
is explained more fully in the T+2 Proposing Release. See id. at 
69245.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, DTC is a CSD, which is an entity that holds 
securities for its participants either in certificated or 
uncertificated (i.e., immobilized or dematerialized) form so that 
ownership can be easily transferred through a book entry (rather than 
the transfer of physical certificates) and provides central safekeeping 
and other asset services. Additionally, a CSD may operate a securities 
settlement system, which is a set of arrangements that enables 
transfers of securities, either for payment or free of payment, and 
facilitates the payment process associated with such transfers. DTC 
serves as the CSD and settlement system for most U.S. equity 
securities, providing custody and book-entry services.\43\ In 
accordance with its rules, DTC accepts deposits of securities from its 
participants, credits those securities to the depositing participants' 
accounts, and effects book-entry transfer of those securities. DTC 
substantially reduces the number of physical securities certificates 
transferred in the U.S. markets, which significantly improves 
operational efficiencies and reduces risk and costs associated with the 
processing of physical securities certificates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ DTC's role as CSD is discussed more fully in the T+2 
Proposing Release. See id. at 69245-46. As of 2017, DTC retained 
custody of more than 1.3 million active securities issues valued at 
$54.2 trillion, including securities issued in the U.S. and 131 
other countries and territories. See DTCC, Businesses and 
Subsidiaries: The Depository Trust Company (DTC), https://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc. The corporate 
bond market accounted for another $30 billion and the municipal bond 
market saw over $10 billion on average traded every day in 2016. See 
SIFMA, T+2 Fact Sheet, https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Sep-8-T2-Update-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to a securities account at DTC, each DTC participant 
has a settlement account at a clearing bank to record any net funds 
obligation for end-of-day settlement. Debits and credits in the 
participant's settlement account are netted intraday to calculate, at 
any time, a net debit balance or net credit balance, resulting in an 
end-of-day settlement obligation or right to receive payment. DTC nets 
debit and credit balances for participants who are also members of NSCC 
to reduce fund transfers for settlement, and acts as settlement agent 
for NSCC in this process. Settlement payments between DTC and DTC's 
participants' settlement banks are made through the National Settlement 
Service (``NSS'') of the Federal Reserve System.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ The relevance of NSS to achieving money settlement in a T+0 
environment is discussed in Part IV.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CMSPs electronically facilitate communication among a broker-
dealer, an institutional investor or its investment adviser, and the 
institutional investor's custodian to reach agreement on the details of 
a securities trade.\45\ These entities emerged as a result of efforts 
by market participants to develop a more efficient and automated 
matching process that continues to be viewed as a necessary step in 
achieving straight-through processing for the settlement of 
institutional trades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The role of the CMSP in facilitating settlement is 
discussed more fully in the T+2 Proposing Release. See T+2 Proposing 
Release, supra note 30, at 69246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CMSPs provide the communication facilities to enable a broker-
dealer and an institutional investor to send messages back and forth 
that results in the agreement of the trade details, generally referred 
to as an ``affirmation'' or ``affirmed confirmation,'' which is then 
sent to DTC to effect settlement of the trade.\46\ In general, the 
formatting and content of messages used to communicate confirmations 
and affirmations varies and may include use of, for example, SWIFT, 
FIX, ISITC, or other formats. The delivery method of such messages also 
may vary across market participants. The CMSP, by acting as a 
centralized hub, helps promote standardization and facilitate 
communication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Specifically, the CMSP will send the affirmed confirmations 
to DTC where the DTC participants, who will deliver the securities, 
will authorize the trades for automated settlement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, a CMSP may offer a ``matching'' process by which it 
compares and reconciles the broker-dealer's trade details with the 
institutional investor's trade details to determine whether the two 
descriptions of the trade agree, at which point it can generate an 
affirmation to effect settlement of the trade. As part of such process, 
the CMSP may offer services that can assist with the automated 
identification of trades that do not match, allowing market 
participants to identify errors and remediate any trade information 
that does not match.

[[Page 10441]]

2. Broker-Dealers
    Broker-dealers are securities intermediaries that, among other 
things, may hold accounts on behalf of investors to facilitate the 
purchase and sale of securities transactions. Broker-dealers that are 
direct members of clearing agencies are typically referred to as 
``clearing brokers.'' Clearing brokers must comply with the rules of 
the clearing agency, including but not limited to rules for operational 
and financial requirements.\47\ Broker-dealers that submit transactions 
to a clearing agency through a clearing broker are typically referred 
to as ``introducing brokers.'' In general, broker-dealers executing 
trades on a registered securities exchange are required to clear those 
transactions through a registered clearing agency. Broker-dealers 
executing trades outside the auspices of a trading venue (e.g., on an 
internalized basis) may clear through a clearing agency or may choose 
to settle those trades through mechanisms internal to that broker-
dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ The requirements for membership or participation 
established by the clearing agencies are discussed more fully in the 
T+2 Proposing Release. See T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 
69247.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Retail and Institutional Investors
    As discussed in the T+2 Proposing Release, institutional investors 
are entities such as, but not limited to, pension funds, mutual funds, 
hedge funds, bank trust departments, and insurance companies.\48\ 
Transactions involving institutional investors are often more complex 
than those for and with retail investors due to the volume and size of 
the transactions, the entities involved in facilitating the execution 
and settlement of the trade, including CMSPs, bank custodians, or prime 
brokers, and the need to manage certain regulatory or business 
obligations.\49\ By contrast, the settlement of retail investor trades 
generally occurs directly with the investor's broker-dealer,\50\ 
without relying on a separate custodian bank or prime broker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Institutional investors also include employee-benefit 
plans, foundations, endowments, insurance companies and registered 
investment companies (``RICs'') (of which mutual funds are one 
type), among other investor types.
    \49\ See T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69247 
(discussing the same).
    \50\ As previously discussed, if the broker-dealer is an 
introducing broker-dealer, the broker-dealer may use a clearing 
broker-dealer to facilitate clearance and settlement. See id. 
(discussing the same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Institutional investors may choose to trade through an executing 
broker-dealer that clears and settles its securities transactions using 
NSCC and DTC. However, depending on the size and complexity of the 
trade and the number of trading partners involved in the transaction, 
institutional investors may also choose to avail themselves of 
processes specifically designed to address the unique aspects of their 
trades. Specifically, as described below, many institutional trades 
settle on an allocated trade-for-trade basis through a custodian bank. 
Many hedge funds settle their trades using prime brokers.
    Below are diagrams that illustrate at a high level the typical path 
to settlement for retail trades and institutional trades.
(a) Retail Trades
    In general, individual retail investors rely on their broker-
dealers to execute trades on their behalf as customers of their broker-
dealers. As previously discussed, a broker-dealer may choose to 
internalize a customer's order using its own inventory of securities. 
However, the broker-dealer may also take other steps, away from its 
customer, to deliver securities to its customer's account. Depending on 
how the broker-dealer executes such trades away from its customer, 
these other trades may clear through a clearing agency or may settle 
bilaterally.
    Retail investors may engage in ``self-directed'' trading. Figure 1 
illustrates, at a high level, the activities that take place for a 
self-directed retail trade. In this scenario, when a retail investor 
places an order to trade with its counterparty, the counterparty--
typically, the broker-dealer through which the retail investor holds 
its securities account--will execute the trade. The counterparty will 
issue a trade confirmation identifying certain trade details, such as 
the transaction type, the account information, the security and 
quantity of shares traded, the trade and settlement dates, and the net 
amount of money to be received or paid at settlement.\51\ The 
confirmation may also include other financial details, such as 
commissions, taxes, and fees. A retail investor generally would review 
the information provided in the confirmation and contact its broker-
dealer to correct any errors. In the absence of errors, the broker-
dealer can proceed with settlement processing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See infra Part III.B.1 (further discussing trade 
confirmations and distinguishing the requirements with respect to a 
confirmation under existing Rule 10b-10 and a confirmation under 
proposed Rule 15c6-2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

[[Page 10442]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP24FE22.000

    In some instances, self-directed retail trades and trades directed 
by an investment adviser are executed together as part of a block trade 
initiated by an investment adviser, which could also engage the use of 
a CMSP to communicate the allocations of the block trade to 
participating accounts.\52\ Further discussion of institutional trades 
and the use of block trades by institutional investors follows below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the services provided by 
a CMSP); infra Part II.B.3.c) (discussing block trades).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Institutional Trades
    Institutional investors often engage a broker-dealer or another 
counterparty for trade execution, and separately, a bank custodian to 
provide custodial safekeeping and asset servicing for their 
investments.\53\ Because the counterparty and the custodian are 
different entities in this scenario, additional steps are necessary to 
complete the post-trade process, as identified by the black shapes in 
Figure 2. Specifically, the institutional investor or its investment 
adviser will need to instruct the bank custodian on the details of each 
transaction and authorize the bank custodian to settle the trade. The 
black shapes in Figure 2 also illustrate how the investor's 
counterparty generally will provide the institutional investor or 
investment adviser with execution details prior to issuing a trade 
confirmation.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Some institutional investors use broker-dealers to custody 
their securities, and in such cases their transactions will trade 
and settle as described in Figure 1. In this release, we have 
grouped such circumstances under the retail investor scenario 
because of the similar transaction flow.
    \54\ An electronic copy of the execution details is sometimes 
referred to as a ``notice of execution.''

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 10443]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP24FE22.001

    Institutional investors, along with their broker-dealers and bank 
custodians, may rely on the services of a CMSP to transmit 
confirmations and affirmations or match the trade details to prepare a 
trade for settlement. Alternatively, they may use other standardized 
messaging protocols, such as FIX and SWIFT,\55\ to communicate trade 
information. Some market participants, however, still rely on manual 
processes to communicate trade information, such as through the use of 
fax machines or email, and may use Excel data files rather than 
standardized data protocols.\56\ Whichever the mechanism, achieving an 
affirmed confirmation by the end of trade date is considered a 
securities industry best practice.\57\ According to data from DTCC, 
however, only 68% of trades are affirmed on trade date.\58\ Figure 2 
illustrates a scenario where the institutional investor does not rely 
on a CMSP to complete the confirmation/affirmation process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 5.
    \56\ Protocols are the rules that govern the exchange or 
transmission of data and may refer to the specific content and 
formatting of trade information (i.e., ISO15022, FIX, SWIFT or an 
Excel template), the method for delivery trade information (i.e., 
file transfer protocol (FTP), SSH file transfer protocol (SFTP), 
SWIFT, DTC ITP, email, etc.), or both. They may also refer to the 
frequency of transmission, deadlines for data delivery, and whether 
data is sent for individual trades or a group (or ``batch'') of 
trades. Some delivery mechanisms may offer a hub-and-spoke model for 
delivery, in which the sender delivers data to a central hub and the 
hub passes the data on to identified recipients. Other delivery 
mechanisms are bi-lateral, in which the sender and receiver have a 
direct communication with one another without transmission through a 
hub.
    \57\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 8-9.
    \58\ Sean McEntee, Executive Director, ITP Product Management, 
DTCC, Remarks at the DTCC ITP Forum--Americas (June 17, 2021) 
(``DTCC ITP Forum Remarks'') (recording available at https://www.dtcc.com/events/archives).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For some institutional investors, such as hedge funds, a prime 
broker may act as both the counterparty to the trade and the custodian 
of the securities. In this scenario, the institutional investor or its 
investment adviser provides trade details to the prime broker, and the 
prime broker will affirm the transaction to facilitate settlement. As a 
broker-dealer, the prime broker may also use NSCC to clear the 
transaction. Generally, the Commission understands that the prime 
broker will ``disaffirm'' a transaction if the institutional investor 
does not make margin payments required of the investor by the prime 
broker.
(c) Use of Block Trades
    Investment advisers commonly trade in ``blocks'' to manage the 
accounts of their institutional clients. In such a scenario, investment 
advisers aggregate the orders of multiple clients into a block for 
trade execution. After trade execution of the block order by the 
broker-dealer, the investment adviser

[[Page 10444]]

will allocate securities within the block to the accounts of its 
clients participating in the block, as reflected in Figure 3. These 
allocation instructions are communicated to the broker-dealer so that 
the broker-dealer can generate a confirmation of the trade details for 
each account for the investment adviser to affirm.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP24FE22.002

BILLING CODE 8011-01-C

C. Recent Initiatives and Market Events

    Efforts to facilitate a settlement cycle shorter than T+2 began 
soon after the transition to a T+2 standard settlement cycle had been 
completed. For example, DTCC announced two initiatives in January 2018 
to achieve additional operational and capital efficiencies, dubbed 
``Accelerating Time to Settlement'' and ``Settlement Optimization.'' 
\59\ Among other things, the DTCC-owned clearing agencies have been 
exploring steps to modify their settlement process to be more 
efficient, such as by introducing new algorithms to position more 
transactions for settlement during the ``night cycle'' process (which 
currently begins in the evening of T+1) to reduce the need for activity 
on the day of settlement. Portions of these two initiatives have been 
submitted to the Commission and approved as proposed rule changes.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ DTCC, Modernizing the U.S. Equity Markets Post-Trade 
Infrastructure (Jan. 2018) (``DTCC Modernizing Paper''), https://
www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/downloads/Thought-leadership/modernizing-
the-u-s-equity-markets-post-trade-infrastructure.pdf. These 
initiatives are relevant to the discussion of T+0 building blocks 
related to netting and batch processing, as discussed in Part IV.B.1 
and Part IV.B.2.
    \60\ See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 87022 (Sept. 19, 2019), 
84 FR 50541 (Sept. 25, 2019) (order amending NSCC's settlement guide 
to implement a new algorithm for night cycle transactions); Exchange 
Act Release No. 87756 (Dec. 16, 2019), 84 FR 70256 (Dec. 20, 2019) 
(order extending the implementation timeframe for the new algorithm 
for transactions processed in the night cycle); Exchange Act Release 
No. 87023 (Sept. 19, 2019), 84 FR 50532 (Sept. 25, 2019) (order 
amending the CNS Accounting Operation of NSCC's Rules & Procedures 
with respect to receipt of securities from NSCC's CNS System).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More recently, periods of increased market volatility--first in 
March 2020 following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, and again 
in January 2021 following heightened interest in certain ``meme'' 
stocks--highlighted the significance of the settlement cycle to the 
calculation of financial exposures and exposed potential risks to the 
stability of the U.S. securities market.\61\

[[Page 10445]]

Specifically, these two events have expanded a public debate over the 
length of the settlement cycle, and whether a shorter settlement cycle 
could have reduced the impact of the market volatility on investors by, 
among other things, reducing the length of time over which a broker-
dealer member of NSCC is required to provide margin deposits with 
respect to a given transaction, thereby also potentially reducing the 
size of the deposits required per portfolio to manage the increased 
volatility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ According to DTCC, on March 12, 2020, NSCC processed over 
363 million market-side transactions in equity securities, topping 
by 15% its prior peak set in October 2008 during the financial 
crisis. On an average day, NSCC processes approximately 106 million 
market-side transactions. DTCC, Advancing Together: Leading the 
Industry to Accelerated Settlement, at 4 (Feb. 2021) (``DTCC White 
Paper''), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/PDFs/White%20Paper/DTCC-Accelerated-Settle-WP-2021.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In February 2021, DTCC published the DTCC White Paper stating that 
accelerating settlement beyond T+2 may bring significant benefits to 
market participants but requires careful consideration and a balanced 
approach so that settlement can be achieved as close to the trade as 
possible without creating capital inefficiencies or introducing new, 
unintended consequences--such as inadvertently reducing or eliminating 
the benefits and cost savings provided by multilateral netting.\62\ 
DTCC suggested that shortening the settlement cycle to T+1 could occur 
in the second half of 2023, and it estimated that a T+1 settlement 
cycle could reduce the volatility component of NSCC margin requirements 
by up to 41%.\63\ DTCC also contended that achieving T+1 could be 
largely supported by using existing systems and available tools and 
procedures.\64\ With respect to a T+0 settlement cycle, DTCC 
distinguished between netted T+0 settlement and real-time gross 
settlement,\65\ noting that in a netted settlement environment, trades 
would be netted either during the day or prior to settlement at the end 
of the day; with real-time gross settlement, trades would be settled 
instantaneously without netting. Currently, the DTCC clearing agencies 
can facilitate settlement on either T+1 or T+0 pursuant to their rules 
and procedures for accelerated settlement.\66\ The DTCC White Paper 
explained that DTCC's participants believe ``the hurdles to T+0 
settlement,'' especially real-time gross settlement, are ``too great at 
this time.'' \67\ Furthermore, DTCC noted that real-time gross 
settlement could require trades to be funded on a trade-for-trade 
basis, eliminating the liquidity and risk-reduction benefits of 
existing CCP netting processes.\68\ Additionally, DTCC indicated that 
over the past year it has been working collaboratively with a cross-
section of market participants to build support for further shortening 
of the settlement cycle, and has outlined a plan to increase these 
efforts to forge a consensus on setting a firm date and approach to 
achieving a transition to T+1.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Id. at 2. The DTCC White Paper notes that centralized 
multilateral netting reduces the value of payments that need to be 
exchanged each day by an average of 98%, and netting is particularly 
important during times of heightened volatility and volume.
    \63\ Id. at 5, 8.
    \64\ Id. at 5.
    \65\ See supra note 12 and accompanying text (making the same 
distinction); infra Part IV (discussing three potential models for 
T+0 settlement, and soliciting comment on these models).
    \66\ See, e.g., DTCC, Same-Day Settlement (SDS), https://www.dtcc.com/sds.
    \67\ DTCC White Paper, supra note 61, at 7.
    \68\ Id.
    \69\ See Press Release, DTCC, DTCC Proposes Approach to 
Shortening U.S. Settlement Cycle to T+1 Within 2 Years (Feb. 24, 
2021), https://www.dtcc.com/news/2021/february/24/dtcc-proposes-approach-to-shortening-us-settlement-cycle-to-t1-within-two-years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Following publication of the DTCC White Paper, the securities 
industry formed an Industry Steering Committee (``ISC'') and an 
Industry Working Group (``IWG'') \70\ with the intent of developing 
industry consensus for an accelerated settlement cycle transition, 
including to understand the impacts, evaluate the potential risks, and 
develop an implementation approach. To support this effort, the ISC 
engaged Deloitte to facilitate the IWG's analysis of the benefits and 
barriers to moving to T+1, and coordinate with the industry on 
recommending solutions for the transition.\71\ In April 2021, DTCC, 
ICI, and SIFMA issued a joint press release to announce their 
collaboration ``on efforts to accelerate the U.S. securities settlement 
cycle from T+2 to T+1.'' \72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ IWG participation consisted of over 800 subject matter 
advisors representing over 160 firms from buy- and sell-side firms, 
custodians, vendors, and clearinghouses. T+1 Report, supra note 18, 
at 4.
    \71\ Id.
    \72\ See Press Release, DTCC, SIFMA, ICI and DTCC Leading Effort 
to Shorten U.S. Securities Settlement Cycle to T+1, Collaborating 
with the Industry on Next Steps (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.dtcc.com/news/2021/april/28/sifma-ici-and-dtcc-leading-effort-to-shorten-us-securities-settlement-cycle-to-t1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As stated above, on December 1, 2021, DTCC, SIFMA and ICI, together 
with Deloitte, published the T+1 Report, which outlined the ISC's 
recommendations for achieving a T+1 standard settlement cycle, and 
proposed transitioning to T+1 settlement by the second quarter of 
2024.\73\ These recommendations focused on the following topics: 
Allocation and confirmation of institutional trades, trade 
documentation, global settlement and FX markets, corporate actions, 
prime brokerage services, securities lending, settlement errors and 
fails, creation and redemption of exchange traded funds (``ETFs''), 
equity and debt offerings, and regulatory requirements.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18.
    \74\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to presenting the ISC's recommendations regarding the 
requirements for moving to T+1, the T+1 Report stated that the IWG also 
considered the impacts and benefits of moving to T+0 settlement.\75\ 
The ISC and IWG concluded, by consensus, that T+0 is not achievable in 
the short term given the current state of the settlement ecosystem.\76\ 
The T+1 Report stated that a move towards a shortening of the 
settlement cycle to T+0 would require an overall modernization of 
current-day clearance and settlement infrastructure, changes to 
business models, revisions to industry-wide regulatory frameworks, and 
the potential implementation of real-time currency movements to 
facilitate such a change.\77\ Additionally, the IWG indicated that 
``adoption of such technologies would disproportionately fall on small 
and medium-sized firms that rely on manual processing or legacy systems 
and may lack the resources to modernize their infrastructure rapidly.'' 
\78\ The T+1 Report also described several ``key areas'' that the IWG 
concluded would be significantly impacted by a move to T+0 settlement. 
These areas included: Re-engineering of securities processing; 
securities netting; funding requirements for securities transactions; 
securities lending practices; prime brokerage practices; global 
settlement; and primary offerings, derivatives markets and corporate 
actions.\79\ The Commission is assessing these challenges, and in Part 
IV, includes further discussion of them in requesting comment on 
considerations related to T+0 settlement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Id. at 10.
    \76\ Id.
    \77\ Id.
    \78\ Id.
    \79\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Proposals for T+1

    The Commission is proposing the following rules to implement a T+1 
standard settlement cycle. First, the Commission proposes to amend Rule 
15c6-1 to establish a standard settlement cycle of T+1 for most broker-
dealer transactions.\80\ In so doing, the Commission also proposes to 
repeal Rule 15c6-1(c), which currently establishes a T+4 standard 
settlement cycle for certain firm commitment offerings.\81\ Second, the 
Commission proposes three additional rules applicable, respectively, to 
broker-

[[Page 10446]]

dealers, investment advisers, and CMSPs to improve the efficiency of 
managing the processing of institutional trades under the shortened 
timeframes that would be available in a T+1 environment. Specifically, 
the Commission proposes new Rule 15c6-2 to prohibit broker-dealers who 
have agreed with a customer to engage in an allocation, confirmation or 
affirmation process from effecting or entering into a contract for the 
purchase or sale of a security on behalf of that customer unless the 
broker-dealer has also entered into a written agreement that requires 
the allocation, confirmation, affirmation to be completed as soon as 
technologically practicable and no later than the end of the day on 
trade date in order to complete settlement in the timeframes required 
under Rule 15c6-1(a). The Commission also proposes to amend the 
recordkeeping obligations of investment advisers to ensure that they 
are properly documenting their related allocations and affirmations, as 
well as retaining the confirmations they receive from their broker-
dealers. Finally, the Commission proposes a requirement for CMSPs to 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures designed to facilitate straight-through processing. Each 
proposal is discussed further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ See infra Part III.A.1.
    \81\ See infra Part III.A.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission also discusses the anticipated impact 
of T+1 on other Commission rules and existing Commission guidance on 
Regulation SHO, the financial responsibility rules for broker-dealers 
under the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-10, prospectus delivery, and rules and 
operations of self-regulatory organizations (``SROs''). Finally, the 
Commission proposes to require compliance with each of the above rule 
proposals, if adopted, by March 31, 2024. The Commission is soliciting 
comment on all aspects of the proposals, and in each section below also 
solicits comment on specific aspects of the proposed rules and rule 
amendments, the anticipated impact on the other Commission rules noted 
above, and the proposed compliance date.

A. Shortening the Length of the Standard Settlement Cycle

    Existing Rule 15c6-1(a) under the Exchange Act provides that, 
unless otherwise expressly agreed by the parties at the time of the 
transaction, a broker-dealer is prohibited from entering into a 
contract for the purchase or sale of a security (other than an exempted 
security, government security, municipal security, commercial paper, 
bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) that provides for payment of 
funds and delivery of securities later than the second business day 
after the date of the contract.\82\ Rule 15c6-1(a) covers contracts for 
the purchase or sale of all types of securities except for the excluded 
securities enumerated in paragraph (a)(1) of the rule. The definition 
of the term ``security'' in Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act 
covers, among others, equities, corporate bonds, UITs, mutual funds, 
ETFs, ADRs, security-based swaps, and options.\83\ Application of Rule 
15c6-1(a) extends to the purchase and sale of securities issued by 
investment companies (including mutual funds),\84\ private-label 
mortgage-backed securities, and limited partnership interests that are 
listed on an exchange.\85\
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    \82\ 17 CFR 240.15c6-1(a).
    \83\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10). Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010), amended, among other things, the definition of 
``security'' under the Exchange Act to encompass security-based 
swaps. The Commission in July 2011 granted temporary exemptive 
relief from compliance with certain provisions of the Exchange Act, 
including Rule 15c6-1, in connection with the revision of the 
Exchange Act definition of ``security'' to encompass security-based 
swaps. See Order Granting Temporary Exemptions Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 In Connection With the Pending Revision of the 
Definition of ``Security'' To Encompass Security-Based Swaps, 
Exchange Act Release No. 64795 (July 1, 2011), 76 FR 39927, 39938-39 
(July 7, 2011). This temporary exemptive relief expired on February 
5, 2020. See Order Granting a Limited Exemption from the Exchange 
Act Definition of ``Penny Stock'' for Security-Based Swap 
Transactions between Eligible Contract Participants; Granting a 
Limited Exemption from the Exchange Act Definition of ``Municipal 
Securities'' for Security-Based Swaps; and Extending Certain 
Temporary Exemptions under the Exchange Act in Connection with the 
Revision of the Definition of ``Security'' to Encompass Security-
Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 84991 (Jan. 25, 2019), 84 FR 
863 (Jan. 31, 2019) (extending the expiration date for the relevant 
portion of the temporary exemptive relief to February 5, 2020); 
Order Extending Temporary Exemptions from Exchange Act Section 8 and 
Exchange Act Rules 8c-1, 10b-16, 15a-1, 15c2-1 and 15c2-5 in 
Connection with the Revision of the Definition of ``Security'' to 
Encompass Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 87943 (Jan. 
10, 2020), 85 FR 2763 (Jan. 16, 2020) (allowing the relevant portion 
of the temporary exemptive relief to expire on February 5, 2020).
    \84\ The Commission applied Rule 15c6-1 to broker-dealer 
contracts for the purchase and sale of securities issued by 
investment companies, including mutual funds, because the Commission 
recognized that these securities represented a significant and 
growing percentage of broker-dealer transactions. See T+3 Adopting 
Release, supra note 9, at 52900.
    \85\ With regard to limited partnership interests, the 
Commission excluded non-listed limited partnerships due to 
complexities related to processing the trades in these securities 
and the lack of an active secondary market. In contrast, the 
Commission included listed limited partnerships primarily to ensure 
exclusion of these securities would not unnecessarily contribute to 
the bifurcation of the settlement cycle for listed securities 
generally. See id. at 52899.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 15c6-1(a) allows the parties to the trade to agree that 
settlement will take place later than two business days after the trade 
date, provided that such an agreement is express and reached at the 
time of the transaction.\86\ This provision is sometimes referred to as 
the ``override provision.'' When the Commission first adopted Rule 
15c6-1(a), it stated that use of the override provision ``was intended 
to apply only to unusual transactions, such as seller's option trades 
that typically settle as many as sixty days after execution as 
specified by the parties to the trade at execution.'' \87\ The override 
provision in 15c6-1(a) continues to be intended to apply only to these 
unusual transactions.\88\
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    \86\ 17 CFR 240.15c6-1(a).
    \87\ T+3 Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 52902. In the T+2 
Proposing Release, the Commission stated its preliminary belief that 
the use of this provision should continue to be applied in limited 
cases to ensure that the settlement cycle set by Rule 15c6-1(a) 
remains a standard settlement cycle. T+2 Proposing Release, supra 
note 30, at 69257 n.153.
    \88\ To date, the Commission has not identified instances 
indicating a risk of overuse of this provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 15c6-1(b) provides an exclusion for contracts involving the 
purchase or sale of limited partnership interests that are not listed 
on an exchange or for which quotations are not disseminated through an 
automated quotation system of a registered securities association.\89\ 
Pursuant to Rule 15c6-1(b), the Commission has granted an exemption 
from Rule 15c6-1 for securities that do not have facilities for 
transfer or delivery in the U.S.\90\ However, if the parties execute a 
transaction on a registered securities exchange, the transaction will 
be subject to both the rules of the exchange and Rule 15c6-1.\91\ Under 
the exemption, an ADR is considered a separate security from the 
underlying security.\92\ Thus, if there are no transfer facilities in 
the U.S. for a foreign security but there are transfer facilities for 
an ADR based on such

[[Page 10447]]

foreign security, only the foreign security will be exempt from Rule 
15c6-1.\93\ The Commission has also granted a separate exemption for 
contracts for the purchase or sale of any security issued by an 
insurance company (as defined in Section 2(a)(17) of the Investment 
Company Act \94\) that is funded by or participates in a ``separate 
account'' (as defined in Section 2(a)(37) of the Investment Company Act 
\95\), including a variable annuity contract or a variable life 
insurance contract, or any other insurance contract registered as a 
security under the Securities Act of 1933 (``Securities Act'').\96\
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    \89\ 17 CFR 240.15c6-1(b). In recognition of the fact that the 
Commission may not have identified all situations or types of trades 
where T+2 settlement would be problematic, Rule 15c6-1(b) provides 
that the Commission may exempt by order additional types of trades 
from T+2 settlement, either unconditionally or on specified terms 
and conditions, if the Commission determines that such an exemption 
is consistent with the public interest and the protection of 
investors. Id.
    \90\ See Exchange Act Release No. 35750 (May 22, 1995), 60 FR 
27994, 27995 (May 26, 1995) (granting an exemption from Rule 15c6-1 
for certain transactions in foreign securities). The exemption also 
provides that if less than 10% of the annual trading volume in a 
security that has U.S. transfer or deliver facilities occurs in the 
U.S., the transaction in such security will be exempt from the 
requirements in the rule.
    \91\ Id.
    \92\ Id. at n.7.
    \93\ Id.
    \94\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(17).
    \95\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(37).
    \96\ See Exchange Act Release No. 35815 (June 6, 1995), 60 FR 
30906, 30907 (June 12, 1995) (granting an exemption from Rule 15c6-1 
for transactions involving certain insurance contracts). The 
Commission determined not to rescind or modify the exemptive order 
when it shortened the settlement cycle from T+3 to T+2. See T+2 
Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15581.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 15c6-1(c) establishes a T+4 settlement cycle for firm 
commitment underwritings for securities that are priced after 4:30 p.m. 
Eastern Time (``ET'').\97\ Specifically, the rule states that the 
standard settlement cycle set forth in Rule15c6-1(a) does not apply to 
contracts for the sale of securities that are priced after 4:30 p.m. ET 
on the date that such securities are priced and that are sold by an 
issuer to an underwriter pursuant to a firm commitment offering 
registered under the Securities Act or sold to an initial purchaser by 
a broker-dealer participating in such offering. Under the rule, the 
broker or dealer must effect or enter into a contract for the purchase 
or sale of those securities that provides for payment of funds and 
delivery of securities no later than the fourth business day after the 
date of the contract unless otherwise expressly agreed to by the 
parties at the time of the transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ 17 CFR 240.15c6-1(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 15c6-1(d) provides that, for purposes of paragraphs (a) and 
(c) of the rule, parties to a contract shall be deemed to have 
expressly agreed to an alternate date for payment of funds and delivery 
of securities at the time of the transaction for a contract for the 
sale for cash of securities pursuant to a firm commitment offering if 
the managing underwriter and the issuer have agreed to such date for 
all securities sold pursuant to such offering and the parties to the 
contract have not expressly agreed to another date for payment of funds 
and delivery of securities at the time of the transaction.\98\
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    \98\ 17 CFR 240.15c6-1(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Proposed Amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a)
    The Commission proposes to amend Rule 15c6-1(a) to prohibit a 
broker-dealer from effecting or entering into a contract for the 
purchase or sale of a security (other than an exempted security, a 
government security, a municipal security, commercial paper, bankers' 
acceptances, or commercial bills) that provides for payment of funds 
and delivery of securities later than the first business day after the 
date of the contract unless otherwise expressly agreed to by the 
parties at the time of the transaction.\99\ The Commission's proposal 
to amend Rule 15c6-1(a) would change only the standard settlement date 
for securities transactions covered by the existing rule, and would not 
impact the existing exclusions enumerated in the rule. In addition, the 
Commission's proposal would retain the so-called ``override 
provision,'' and the Commission continues to intend for the ``override 
provision'' to apply only to unusual cases to ensure that the 
settlement cycle set by Rule 15c6-1(a) is in fact the standard 
settlement cycle.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ 17 CFR 240.15c6-1(a).
    \100\ See supra note 88.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Basis for Shortening the Standard Settlement Cycle to T+1
    First, the Commission preliminarily believes that market 
participants have made substantial progress toward identifying the 
technological and operational changes that would be necessary to 
establish a T+1 standard settlement cycle, and significant industry 
support for such a move has emerged. By contrast, at the time the 
Commission proposed to shorten the standard settlement cycle to T+2, 
market participants generally supported moving to T+2 and many believed 
that moving to T+1 would be substantially more costly and take longer 
to achieve than moving to T+2.\101\ At that time, neither the 
Commission nor the industry supported moving to a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle.\102\ Since then, Commission staff has continued to 
study the potential impact of further shortening the settlement cycle, 
and the ISC has recommended that the securities industry implement a 
T+1 standard settlement cycle.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15598-99.
    \102\ See id. at 15572.
    \103\ See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing 
the recommendations in the T+1 Report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission acknowledges that a transition from a T+2 to T+1 
standard settlement cycle, and implementation of the necessary 
operational, technical, and business changes, will likely result in 
varying burdens, costs and benefits for a wide range of market 
participants.\104\ The Commission has remained mindful and observant of 
industry initiatives and progress targeted at facilitating an 
environment where a shortened standard settlement cycle could be 
achieved in a manner that reduces risk for market participants while 
also minimizing the likelihood of disruptive burdens and costs. Having 
taken current industry initiatives and their relative progress into 
consideration, the Commission preliminarily believes there has been 
collective progress by market participants sufficient to facilitate a 
transition to a T+1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See infra Part V (analyzing the economic effects of 
shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, when the Commission adopted a T+2 standard settlement 
cycle, it identified a number of incremental improvements to the 
functioning of the U.S. securities market likely to result relative to 
a T+3 standard settlement cycle.\105\ The Commission preliminarily 
believes that a T+1 settlement cycle would produce similar incremental 
improvements to the functioning of the U.S. securities market relative 
to a T+2 settlement cycle. These benefits, discussed further in Part 
V.C.1, are summarized briefly here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15569-75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, as a general matter, time to settlement determines a 
significant portion of a market participant's risk exposure on a given 
securities transaction. As a result, all else being equal, shortening 
the time to settlement reduces exposure to credit,\106\ market,\107\ 
and liquidity risk.\108\ In addition, assuming that trading volume 
remains constant, shortening the time to settlement also decreases the 
total number of unsettled trades that exists at any point in time, as 
well as the total

[[Page 10448]]

market value of all unsettled trades.\109\ This reduction in the number 
and total value of unsettled trades should correspond to a reduction in 
a market participant's overall exposure to risk arising from unsettled 
transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Credit risk refers to the potential for the market 
participant's counterparty to a given transaction to default on the 
transaction and therefore the market participant will not receive 
either the cash or securities necessary to settle the transaction.
    \107\ Market risk refers to the potential for the value of the 
security that underlies the transaction to change between trade 
execution and settlement.
    \108\ Liquidity risk refers to the risk that the market 
participant will be unable to timely settle a transaction because it 
does not have access to sufficient cash or securities. The market 
participant may not have access to sufficient cash or securities for 
a given transaction if, for example, it has recently been exposed to 
the default of a counterparty on a separate transaction and did not 
receive the anticipated proceeds of that transaction.
    \109\ In other words, a T+2 settlement cycle results in two days 
of unsettled transactions at any given time, whereas a T+1 
settlement cycle would result in one day of unsettled transactions 
at any given time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the above dynamics produce noticeable effects for 
transactions that are centrally cleared because they reduce the CCP's 
exposure to credit, market, and liquidity risk arising from its 
obligations to its participants, promoting the stability of the CCP and 
thereby reducing the potential for systemic risk to transmit through 
the financial system. For example, when the CCP faces a participant 
default, the CCP will liquidate open positions of the defaulting 
participant and use the defaulting participant's financial resources 
held by the CCP to cover the CCP's losses and expenses. The CCP may 
face losses if the market value of the defaulting participant's open 
positions has moved significantly in the time between trade execution 
and default.\110\ While the CCP works to close out the defaulting 
participant's open positions, it also needs to continue to meet its 
end-of-day settlement obligations to non-defaulting participants, and 
so the CCP is exposed to liquidity risk when a member defaults because 
it may need to use its own resources to complete end-of-day 
settlement.\111\ In each instance, the amount of risk to which the CCP 
is exposed is determined in part by the length of the settlement cycle, 
and shortening the settlement cycle would reduce the CCP's overall 
exposure to these risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ For example, if the open position is net long, to close 
the position the CCP would obtain replacement securities in the 
market, possibly at a higher price than the original transaction. 
Conversely, if the open position is net short, to close the position 
the CCP would sell the defaulting participant's securities in the 
market, possibly at a lower price than the original transaction.
    \111\ The costs associated with deploying such resources are 
ultimately borne by the CCP members, both in the ordinary course of 
the CCP's daily risk management process and in the event of an 
extraordinary event where members may be subject to additional 
liquidity assessments. These costs may be passed on through the CCP 
members to broker-dealers and investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, reducing these risks to the CCP would reduce the overall 
size of the financial resources that the CCP requires of its 
participants,\112\ thereby reducing the risks and costs faced by the 
CCP participants (i.e., broker-dealers) and, by extension, their 
customers (i.e., investors).\113\ CCP participants may choose to pass 
these reductions down to their customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69251 n.77 
(discussing mutual fund settlement timeframes and related liquidity 
risk, which may be exacerbated during times of stress). The 
Commission preliminarily believes that shortening settlement 
timeframes for portfolio securities to T+1 will generally assist in 
reducing liquidity and other risks for funds that must satisfy 
investor redemption requests that settle pursuant to shorter 
settlement timeframes (e.g., T+1).
    \113\ See id. at 69251.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, the Commission anticipates that the above effects would 
reduce the potential for systemic risk.\114\ When the Commission 
proposed to shorten the standard settlement cycle from T+3 to T+2 it 
explained that its ``views are even more apt today given the increasing 
interconnectivity and interdependencies among markets and market 
participants.'' \115\ In particular, in periods of market stress, 
liquidity demands imposed by the CCP on its participants, such as in 
the form of intraday margin calls, can have procyclical effects that 
reduce overall market liquidity.\116\ Reducing the CCP's liquidity 
exposure by shortening the settlement cycle can help limit this 
potential for procyclicality,\117\ enhancing the ability of the CCP to 
serve as a source of stability and efficiency in the national clearance 
and settlement system.\118\
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    \114\ As the Commission noted when it adopted Rule 15c6-1, 
reducing the total volume and value of outstanding obligations in 
the settlement pipeline at any point in time will better insulate 
the financial sector from the potential systemic consequences of 
serious market disruptions. See T+3 Adopting Release, supra note 9, 
at 52894.
    \115\ T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69258 n.160 
(citing Exchange Act Release No. 68080 (Oct. 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220, 
66254 (Nov. 2, 2012) (``Clearing Agency Standards Adopting 
Release'') and DTCC, Understanding Interconnectedness Risks--To 
Build a More Resilient Financial System (Oct. 2015), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2015/october/12/understanding-interconnectedness-risks-article).
    \116\ For a discussion regarding procyclicality, see T+2 
Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69250-52.
    \117\ See T+3 Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 52894.
    \118\ See Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act 
Release No. 71699 (Mar. 12, 2014), 79 FR 16865 (Mar. 26, 2014), 
corrected at 79 FR 29507, 29598 (May 22, 2014) (``CCA Standards 
Proposing Release''). Clearing members are often members of larger 
financial networks, and the ability of a covered clearing agency to 
meet payment obligations to its members can directly affect its 
members' ability to meet payment obligations outside of the cleared 
market. Thus, management of liquidity risk may mitigate the risk of 
contagion between asset markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1 would 
enable investors to access the proceeds of their securities 
transactions sooner than they are able to in the current T+2 
environment. In particular, in a T+1 environment, sellers would have 
access to cash proceeds one day sooner and buyers would see purchased 
securities in their accounts one day earlier relative to a T+2 standard 
settlement cycle.
    In addition, as noted above, the Commission has evaluated the 
potential for shortening the settlement cycle to impose costs on market 
participants, which are likely to vary across market participants 
depending on a number of facts. These costs and considerations are 
discussed in Part V.C.2. The costs include those costs associated with 
investments in improved operations and new technologies to manage the 
compression of time resulting from a shorter settlement cycle. 
Shortening the settlement cycle may have other effects as well. For 
example, shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1 for equity 
securities would disconnect settlement with foreign exchange (``FX'') 
transactions, which settle on a T+2 basis. Mismatched settlement 
timeframes between equities and FX transactions may increase the cost 
needed to fund and hedge related securities transactions.\119\ In 
addition, the Commission recognizes that a disorderly transition to a 
shorter settlement cycle could lead to an increase in settlement fails. 
However, as discussed in Part V.B.4, in analyzing the shortening of the 
settlement cycle from T+3 to T+2, the Commission found no marked change 
in the volume of such failures. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that an orderly transition to a T+1 standard settlement cycle can limit 
the negative effects of settlement fails. The Commission also believes 
that facilitating an increase in same-day affirmations helps mitigate 
the effects of settlement fails, as affirmations on trade date can 
limit the potential for processing errors on settlement day that cause 
fails.\120\ More generally, the Commission preliminarily believes that 
the anticipated benefits of a shortened settlement cycle justify the 
anticipated costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ See infra Part V.C.2 (noting that market participants will 
have a choice between bearing an additional day of currency risk or 
incurring the cost related to hedging away this risk in the forward 
or futures market).
    \120\ See infra Part III.B (proposing new Rule 15c6-2 to 
increase same-day affirmations); Part V.C.1 (noting that the 
proposed rule can facilitate an orderly transition to T+1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Proposed Deletion of Rule 15c6-1(c) and Conforming Technical 
Amendments to Rule 15c6-1
    As explained above, Rule 15c6-1(c) establishes a T+4 settlement 
cycle for firm commitment offerings for securities that are priced 
after 4:30 p.m. ET, unless otherwise expressly agreed to by the parties 
at the time of the transaction.

[[Page 10449]]

The Commission proposes to delete this provision. Deleting Rule 15c6-
1(c) would, in conjunction with the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-
1(a), set a T+1 standard settlement cycle for firm commitment offerings 
priced after 4:30 p.m. ET. However, the so-called ``override'' 
provisions in paragraphs (a) and (d) of Rule 15c6-1 would continue to 
allow contracts currently covered by paragraph (c) to provide for 
settlement on a timeframe other than T+1 if the parties expressly agree 
to a different settlement timeframe at the time of the transaction.
    In proposing to delete paragraph (c) of Rule 15c6-1, the Commission 
also proposes conforming amendments to paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of 
the rule. Specifically, the Commission is proposing to delete all 
references to paragraph (c) of Rule 15c6-1 that currently appear in 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of the rule.
4. Basis for Eliminating T+4 Standard for Certain Firm Commitment 
Offerings
    The Commission believes that expanded application of the ``access 
equals delivery'' standard for prospectus delivery supports removing 
paragraph (c) from Rule 15c6-1 because delays in the process that made 
delivery of the prospectus difficult to achieve under the standard 
settlement cycle have been mitigated by the ``access equals delivery'' 
standard. In addition, if paragraph (c) is removed as proposed, 
paragraph (d) would continue to provide underwriters and the parties to 
a transaction the ability to agree, in advance of a particular 
transaction, to a settlement cycle other than the standard set forth in 
Rule 15c6-1(a) when needed to manage obligations associated with the 
firm commitment offering.
    The Commission adopted paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 15c6-1 in 
1995, two years after Rule 15c6-1 was originally adopted.\121\ At the 
time, the rule included a limited exemption from the requirements under 
paragraph (a) of the rule for the sale for cash pursuant to a firm 
commitment offering registered under the Securities Act.\122\ The 
exemption for firm commitment offerings was added in response to public 
comments stating that new issue securities could not settle on T+3 
because prospectuses could not be printed prior to the trade date (the 
date on which the securities are priced).\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ See Prospectus Delivery; Securities Transaction Settlement 
Cycle, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35705 (May 11, 1995), 60 FR 26604 
(May 17, 1995) (``1995 Amendments Adopting Release'').
    \122\ The exemption was limited to sales to an underwriter by an 
issuer and initial sales by the underwriting syndicate and selling 
group. Any secondary resales of such securities were to settle on a 
T+3 settlement cycle. T+3 Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 52898.
    \123\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When the Commission proposed to amend Rule 15c6-1 in 1995, it 
stated that, since the adoption of the rule, members of the brokerage 
community had suggested the Commission eliminate the exemption and ease 
the problems associated with prospectus delivery by other means. The 
primary reasons expressed for requiring T+3 settlement of such 
offerings were: (i) The secondary market for a new issue may be subject 
to greater price fluctuations or instability, which in turn may expose 
underwriters, dealers and investors to disproportionate credit and 
market risk; and (ii) the bifurcated settlement cycle created for 
initial sales and resales of new issues would be disruptive to broker-
dealer operations and to the clearance and settlement system.\124\ In 
particular, it was explained that if a purchaser of a new issue sells 
on the first or second day after pricing, the purchaser's broker will 
not be able to settle with the buyer's broker on a T+3 schedule because 
the securities would not yet be available for settlement purposes.\125\ 
As a result, all such trades by the purchasers would ``fail'' and 
result in expense, inefficiencies, and greater settlement risk for all 
participants. A bifurcated settlement cycle also may require the 
maintenance of separate computer systems and additional internal 
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See Exchange Act Release No. 34-35396 (Feb. 21, 1995), 60 
FR 10724 (Feb. 27, 1995) (``1995 Amendments Proposing Release'').
    \125\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The vast majority of commenters submitting feedback in response to 
the 1995 Amendments Proposing Release supported T+4 as the standard 
settlement cycle for firm commitment offerings price after 4:30 
p.m.\126\ Several of these commenters reasoned that it is difficult to 
print prospectuses within a T+3 timeframe when securities are priced 
late in the day. These commenters also stated that the potential 
systemic and market risks associated with the proposed T+4 provision 
should be limited because most secondary market trading in the subject 
securities would not begin trading until the opening of the market on 
the next business day, and therefore the primary issuance of securities 
would be available to settle secondary trading in the security.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ 1995 Amendments Adopting Release, supra note 121, at 
26608.
    \127\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The T+1 Report stated that paragraph (c) is rarely used in the 
current T+2 settlement environment, but the IWG expects a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle would increase reliance on paragraph (c).\128\ The T+1 
Report further stated that the IWG recommends retaining paragraph (c) 
but amending it to establish a standard settlement cycle of T+2 for 
firm commitment offerings.\129\ The T+1 Report cited issues with 
respect to complex documentation and other operational elements of 
equity offerings that may delay settlement to T+2 in a T+1 environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 33-35.
    \129\ Id. at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to debt offerings, the T+1 Report stated that many 
such offerings frequently rely on the exception provided in Rule 15c6-
1(d).\130\ In describing the reasons debt offerings ``have historically 
needed, and will continue to need, this exemption if the standard 
settlement cycle is moved to T+1,'' the T+1 Report stated that such 
offerings are ``document-intensive and typically have more 
documentation than equity offerings.'' \131\ According to the T+1 
Report, this documentation includes indentures, guarantees, and 
collateral documentation, all of which are individually negotiated and 
unique to the transaction.\132\ Thus, the T+1 Report states, a 
substantial portion of debt offerings settle later than T+3.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ Id.
    \131\ Id.
    \132\ Id.
    \133\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Commission appreciates that documentation relating to 
firm commitment offerings for equities must be completed prior to 
settlement of such transactions, the T+1 Report did not explain why or 
how timely completion of such documentation would not be possible if 
the exception in paragraph (c) of Rule 15c6-1 were eliminated. In 
contrast, the T+1 Report states, as discussed above, that firm 
commitment offerings generally settle in alignment with the standard 
settlement cycle. As the Commission is not currently aware of any data 
or facts indicating that the documentation associated with firm 
commitment offerings cannot be completed by T+1, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that the need to complete transaction 
documentation prior to settlement does not justify proposing a separate 
standard settlement cycle of T+2 for equity offerings. Rather, to the 
extent that documentation may in some cases require more time to 
complete than is available under a T+1 standard settlement cycle, the 
parties to the

[[Page 10450]]

transaction can agree to a longer settlement period pursuant to 
paragraph (d) when they enter the transaction. In this way, deleting 
paragraph (c) does not prevent the parties from using paragraph (d) to 
agree to a longer settlement period; it only removes the presumption 
that such firm commitment offerings should be subject to a different 
settlement cycle than the standard settlement cycle set forth in 
paragraph (a).
    In addition, as discussed further in Part III.E.4, 17 CFR 230.172 
(``Rule 172'') has implemented an ``access equals delivery'' model that 
permits, with certain exceptions, final prospectus delivery obligations 
to be satisfied by the filing of a final prospectus with the 
Commission, rather than delivery of the prospectus to purchasers. As a 
result of these changes, broker-dealers generally would not require 
time to print and deliver prospectuses--a point originally cited by 
many commenters in support of adopting paragraph (c)--and the 
Commission preliminarily believes that broker-dealers are able to 
satisfy their obligations with respect to these firm commitment 
offerings on a timeline much shorter than the current T+4 standard 
settlement cycle for these firm commitment offerings.
    In addition, establishing T+1 as the standard settlement cycle for 
these firm commitment offerings, and thereby aligning the settlement 
cycle with the standard settlement cycle for securities generally, 
would reduce exposures of underwriters, dealers, and investors to 
credit and market risk, and better ensure that the primary issuance of 
securities is available to settle secondary market trading in such 
securities.\134\ The Commission believes that harmonizing the 
settlement cycle for such firm commitment offerings with secondary 
market trading, to the greatest extent possible, limits the potential 
for operational risk.
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    \134\ As noted above, prior to the Commission's 1995 amendments 
to Rule 15c6-1 members of the broker-dealer community expressed the 
view that (i) the secondary market for a new issue may be subject to 
greater price fluctuations or instability, which in turn may expose 
underwriters, dealers and investors to disproportionate credit and 
market risk; and (ii) a bifurcated settlement cycle created for 
initial sales and resales of new issues would be disruptive to 
broker-dealer operations and to the clearance and settlement system. 
See supra notes 124, 125, and accompanying text. While these 
arguments were made by market participants when the standard 
settlement cycle in the U.S. was still T+3, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that they remain relevant to the Commission's 
proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) and proposed deletion of Rule 
15c6-1(c). In particular, if the Commission were to adopt the 
proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) without deleting Rule 15c6-
1(c), a broker-dealer settling on behalf of a customer who sells 
shares of a new issue on the first day after pricing might, in some 
cases, not be able to settle with the purchaser's broker-dealer 
because the securities may not yet be available for settlement. 
Specifically, if the new issue settled on T+2 and the secondary 
market transactions executed on the first day of trading settled on 
T+1, the primary issuance would presumably not be available for 
timely settlement of the secondary market transactions. Conversely, 
if the Commission adopts both the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-
1(a) and the proposed deletion of Rule 15c6-1(c), the settlement 
cycle would not be bi-furcated and the basis for the above-described 
concerns raised previously by the broker-dealer community related to 
bi-furcation of the settlement cycle would not be applicable.
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    Therefore, in the Commission's view, deleting paragraph (c) while 
retaining paragraph (d) provides sufficient flexibility for market 
participants to manage the potential need for longer than T+1 
settlement on certain firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m. 
that may include ``complex'' documentation because paragraph (d) would 
continue to permit the underwriters and the parties to a transaction to 
agree, in advance of entering the transaction, whether T+1 settlement 
or some other settlement timeframe is appropriate for the transaction. 
In addition, the Commission believes that having the underwriters and 
the parties to the transaction agree in advance of entering the 
transaction whether to deviate from the standard settlement cycle 
established in paragraph (a) would promote transparency among the 
parties, in advance of entering the transaction, as to the length of 
the time that it takes to complete documentation with respect to the 
transaction. The Commission requests comment on these views. To the 
extent that commenters agree with the T+1 Report, the Commission 
requests that such commenters provide data or other detailed 
information explaining why a T+1 settlement cycle is an inappropriate 
standard for all firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m., such 
as an explanation or description for what specific documentation cannot 
be completed consistent with a T+1 settlement cycle.
5. Request for Comment
    The Commission is requesting comment on all aspects of the proposed 
amendments to Rule 15c6-1 to shorten the current T+2 and T+4 standard 
settlement cycles to T+1. The Commission also solicits comment on the 
particular questions set forth below, and encourages commenters to 
submit any relevant data or analysis in connection with their answers.
    1. Should the Commission amend Rule 15c6-1 to shorten the standard 
settlement cycle to T+1 as proposed? Why or why not?
    2. Are efforts to shorten the standard settlement cycle to T+1 a 
logical step on the path to T+0 settlement, or would shortening to T+1 
require investments or processes that would be outdated or unnecessary 
in a T+0 environment? \135\ Please explain why or why not.
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    \135\ See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining that 
T+0 in this release is intended to refer to netted settlement by the 
end of trade date); see also infra Part IV (discussing the same).
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    3. Is the current scope of securities covered by Rule 15c6-1, 
including the exclusions provided in the text of Rule 15c6-1(a), still 
appropriate in light of the Commission's proposal to shorten the 
standard settlement cycle to T+1? Are there any asset classes, 
securities as defined in Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, or types 
of securities transactions for which the proposed amendment to Rule 
15c6-1(a) would present compliance problems for broker-dealers? What 
would be the quantitative and qualitative impacts of maintaining those 
exclusions?
    4. The Commission requests that commenters provide information 
regarding securities transactions that, in today's T+2 settlement 
environment, generally settle later than T+2. To what extent does this 
occur, and what are the circumstances that motivate market participants 
to settle later than T+2? If Rule 15c6-1(a) is amended to shorten the 
standard settlement cycle from T+2 to T+1, would market participants 
continue to settle such securities transactions on a longer settlement 
cycle? Would market participants who frequently settle certain 
securities transactions later than T+2 settle such transactions later 
than T+1 if the Commission adopts the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-
1(a)? Conversely, under what circumstances are securities transactions 
settled on an expedited basis (i.e., on timeframes less than T+2), and 
how often how common is such settlement? What are the circumstances 
that motivate earlier settlements? If Rule 15c6-1(a) is amended to 
shorten the standard settlement cycle from T+2 to T+1, how will the 
proposed amendment affect these expedited settlement decisions?
    5. To what extent do market participants currently rely on the 
override provision in Rule 15c6-1(a)? Would market participants expect 
use of the provision to increase or decrease in a T+1 environment? Why 
or why not?
    6. As noted above, the Commission previously issued an order that 
exempted security-based swaps from the requirements under Rule 15c6-1, 
and

[[Page 10451]]

subsequently extended that exemptive relief on several occasions, but 
the exemptive relief that previously covered compliance with Rule 15c6-
1 expired in 2020.\136\ Should the Commission issue a new order 
providing exemptive relief from compliance with Rule 15c6-1 for 
transactions in security-based swaps? If so, why or why not?
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    \136\ See supra note 83.
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    7. Should the Commission amend any other provisions of Rule 15c6-1 
(other than the proposed amendments to the rule) for the purposes of 
shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1? If so, which 
provisions and why?
    8. Are the conditions set forth in the Commission's exemptive order 
for securities traded outside the U.S. still appropriate? \137\ If not, 
why not? If the exemption should be modified, how should it be modified 
and why?
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    \137\ See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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    9. Are the conditions set forth in the Commission's exemptive order 
for insurance contracts still appropriate? \138\ If not, why not? If 
the exemption should be modified, how should it be modified and why?
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    \138\ See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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    10. Should the Commission provide exemptive relief under Rule 15c6-
1(b) for any other securities or types of transactions?
    11. Would shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1 as 
proposed make it difficult for broker-dealers to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 15c6-1? Please provide examples.
    12. How would retail investors be impacted by new processes that 
broker-dealers may implement in support of a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle? For example, do commenters believe that broker-dealers would 
require changes to the way that retail investors fund their accounts in 
a T+1 environment? If so, how? Would shortening the standard settlement 
cycle to T+1 result in retail investors encountering ongoing costs due 
to a delay in their ability to make investments? Would shortening the 
standard settlement cycle to T+1 result in any benefits to retail 
investors?
    13. How would institutional investors be impacted by new processes 
that broker-dealers may implement in support of a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle? For example, do market participants anticipate an 
increase in prefunding requirements for institutional investors in a 
T+1 environment?
    14. What impact, if any, would the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-
1(a) have on market participants who engage in cross-border 
transactions? To what extent would shortening the standard settlement 
cycle in the U.S. to T+1 result in increased or decreased operational 
costs to market participants? To what extent would shortening the 
standard settlement cycle for securities transactions in the U.S. 
increase or decrease risks associated with cross-border transactions or 
related transactions, such as financing transactions?
    15. What impact, if any, would the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-
1(a) have on market participants who engage in trading activity across 
various financial product classes, each potentially involving a 
different settlement cycle? For example, what would be the impact on 
market participants conducting transactions in U.S. equities and U.S. 
commercial paper on the same day? Alternatively, are there benefits to 
alignment of the settlement timeframes across most U.S. security types 
to one day? For example, options and government securities currently 
settle on T+1 while equities, corporate bonds, and municipal debt 
settle on T+2.
    16. What impact, if any, would the proposal have on trading 
involving derivatives and exchange-traded products (``ETPs'')? \139\ 
Would shortening the settlement cycle for ETPs affect the costs of 
creating or redeeming shares in ETPs that hold portfolio securities 
that are on a different settlement cycle, such as net capital charges 
related to collateral requirements? \140\ If so, would such a change in 
costs affect the efficiency or effectiveness of the arbitrage between 
an ETP's secondary market price and the value of its underlying assets? 
Would such a change lead to other downstream effects, such as an 
increase in the use of cash or custom baskets? \141\ Similarly, would 
the proposed amendments affect transactions in derivatives instruments 
if a derivative were to settle on a different timeframe than its 
underlying reference assets?
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    \139\ ETPs constitute a diverse class of financial products that 
seek to provide investors with exposure to financial instruments, 
financial benchmarks, or investment strategies across a wide range 
of asset classes. ETP trading occurs on national securities 
exchanges and other secondary markets that are regulated by the 
Commission under the Exchange Act, making ETPs widely available to 
market participants, from individual investors to institutional 
investors, including hedge funds and pension funds. The largest 
category of ETPs are ETFs, which are open-end fund vehicles or UITs 
that are registered investment companies under the Investment 
Company Act. See Request for Comment on Exchange-Traded Products, 
Exchange Act Release No. 75165 (June 12, 2015), 80 FR 34729 (June 
17, 2015).
    \140\ For example, the way a market participant executes a 
creation or redemption of an ETF share resembles a stock trade in 
the secondary market. A market participant typically referred to as 
an ``Authorized Participant'' or ``AP'' submits an order to create 
or redeem (``CR'') ETF shares much like an investor submits an order 
to his broker to buy or sell a stock. Also, similar to a stock 
trade, the CR order settles on a T+2 settlement cycle through NSCC. 
See ICI, 20 ICI Research Perspective, no. 5, Sept. 2014, at 14, 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per20-05.pdf; see also DTCC, Exchange Traded 
Fund (ETF) Processing, http://www.dtcc.com/clearing-services/equities-trade-capture/etf; DTCC, ETF and CNS Processing Facts, 
https://dtcclearning.com/content/220-equities-clearing/exchange-traded-fund-etf/about-etf/3613-etf-cns-processing-facts.html.
    \141\ Rule 6c-11 under the Investment Company Act permits ETFs 
to use ``custom baskets'' if their basket policies and procedures: 
(i) Set forth detailed parameters for the construction and 
acceptance of custom baskets that are in the best interest of the 
ETF and its shareholders, including the process for any revisions 
to, or deviations from, those parameters; and (ii) specify the 
titles or roles of the employees of the ETF's investment adviser who 
are required to review each custom basket for compliance with those 
parameters. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (further 
discussing the creation unit purchase and redemption process for 
ETFs).
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    17. What impact, if any, would shortening the standard settlement 
cycle to T+1 have on the levels of liquidity risk that may currently 
exist as a result of mismatches between the settlement cycles for 
different markets? For example, would shortening the standard 
settlement cycle to T+1 eliminate or reduce any liquidity risk that 
mutual funds may face as a result of the mismatch between the current 
T+1 settlement cycle for transactions in open-end mutual fund shares 
that are settled through NSCC and the T+2 settlement cycle that is 
applicable to many portfolio securities held by mutual funds?
    18. The Commission solicits comment on the status and readiness of 
the technology and processes currently used by market participants to 
support a T+1 settlement cycle.
    19. What impact would the Commission's proposed deletion of 
paragraph (c) of Rule 15c6-1 have on underwriters, broker-dealers, and 
other market participants?
    20. Have the technological and operational capabilities of broker-
dealers and their service providers improved sufficiently to allow 
prospectuses to be printed and delivered on time if the standard 
settlement cycle for firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m. 
is shortened to T+1? Please describe such improvements and why they 
would or would not be sufficient to support shortening the standard 
settlement cycle for such transactions.
    21. Should the Commission shorten the standard settlement cycle for 
firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m. to a time frame other 
than T+1 (e.g., T+2, or T+3)? If so, why?

[[Page 10452]]

    22. Would any additional technological and operational changes, if 
any, be necessary for broker-dealers to print and deliver prospectuses 
on time for firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m. if a T+1 
standard settlement cycle is adopted for such transactions? What costs 
would be associated with such improvements?
    23. Would the Commission's proposed deletion of paragraph (c) of 
Rule 15c6-1 decrease exposures of underwriters, dealers and investors 
to market and credit risks related to the bifurcated settlement periods 
for new issues and secondary market transactions? Please explain why or 
why not.
    24. With respect to corporate actions, in most cases the ex-date 
will be the record date (``RD''), meaning that RD-1 will be the last 
day that a purchaser will gain the dividend or entitlement.\142\ Given 
the shorter timeframes, the Commission requests comments on this 
dynamic and statements in the T+1 Report urging a concerted effort 
among exchanges, other authorities, and issuers to standardize some 
currently fragmented procedures to set up and announce corporate 
actions.\143\
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    \142\ See, e.g., ISITC Virtual Winter Forum, DTCC presentation 
to Corporate Actions Working Group (Dec. 13, 2021).
    \143\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 20.
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    25. Regarding corporate actions that concern voluntary 
reorganizations, the Commission solicits comments on the impact of a 
T+1 settlement cycle on DTC's ``cover/protect'' process for certain 
tenders, exchanges, or rights offerings.\144\ This procedure enables 
DTC participants to allow their investors to make or change their final 
elections until the end of an offer's expiration date; where an offer 
allows, participants provide DTC with a notice of guaranteed delivery, 
allowing later delivery of the shares or rights. How would this process 
affect operations under a T+1 settlement cycle? Would any changes to 
this process be needed?
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    \144\ Id. at 19-20; see also ISITC Virtual Winter Forum, DTCC 
presentation to Corporate Actions Working Group (Dec. 13, 2021).
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    26. The Commission generally requests comment on the deadlines and 
timeframes set forth in the T+1 Report. For example, the Commission 
requests comment on their impact on DTC's IVORS function, used for 
retiring a UIT by withdrawing assets and transferring them to a new 
UIT.\145\
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    \145\ See DTC, IVORS Service Guide, https://www.dtcc.com/~/
media/Files/Downloads/Settlement-Asset-Services/EDL/IVORS.pdf.
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    27. If the Commission adopts the proposed deletion of paragraph (c) 
of Rule 15c6-1 and the proposed conforming technical amendments to 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of the rule, should the Commission adopt 
any additional amendments to Rule 15c6-1 in connection with such 
changes?

B. New Requirement for ``Same-Day Affirmation''

    As discussed in Part II.B.1, integral to completing the 
institutional trade process is achieving an affirmed confirmation, 
which can require a series of communications between a broker-dealer 
and its institutional customer. Since 2000, market participants have 
identified accelerating this process, which requires agreement among 
the parties regarding the trade details that facilitate trade 
allocation when needed, as well as trade confirmation and affirmation, 
as one of the core building blocks to improve the speed, safety, and 
efficiency of the trade settlement process, and ultimately to achieve 
shorter settlement cycles.\146\ In particular, in the SIA Business Case 
Report, the securities industry noted the need to prioritize ensuring 
that a higher number and proportion of trades were confirmed and 
affirmed on trade date.\147\ These improvements were considered 
essential to compressing the settlement cycle and facilitating an 
environment less prone to operational risk.\148\ This objective, where 
broker-dealers and their institutional customers allocate, confirm, and 
affirm the trade details necessary to achieve settlement by the end of 
trade date has sometimes been referred to as ``same-day affirmation.''
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    \146\ See SIA Business Case Report, supra note 21; BCG Study, 
supra note 22; see also T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 
69252, 69254 (describing in detail the SIA Business Case Report and 
the BCG Study). The building blocks are described generally as the 
core initiatives that need to be implemented prior to shortening the 
settlement cycle. See SIA Business Case Report, supra note 21, at 
18.
    \147\ See, e.g., Press Release, SIA, SIA Board Endorses Program 
to Modernize Clearing, Settlement Process for Securities (July 18, 
2002) (statement from the SIA Board of Directors endorsing straight-
through processing); letter from Jeffrey C. Bernstein, Chairman, SIA 
STP Steering Committee, Securities Industry Association (June 16, 
2004) (``SIA Letter''). The comment letter is available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71304.shtml.
    \148\ T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69252.
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    In its 2004 concept release seeking comment on methods to improve 
the safety and operational efficiency of the National C&S System to 
achieve straight-through processing,\149\ the Commission explored 
whether to adopt its own rule or whether the SROs should amend their 
existing rules to require the completion of the confirmation and 
affirmation process on trade date.\150\ Many market participants 
supported a Commission rule to mandate it, but believed that such 
requirements should be implemented in phases to allow for the 
development of certain processing improvements.\151\ Recommendations 
for such improvements included: (i) Achieving 100% of trades as matched 
or affirmed as soon as possible after execution on trade date; (ii) 
achieving asynchronous (non-sequential) and electronic communication 
between all trade parties, including notices of execution, allocations, 
match status, confirmation status, and settlement instructions; (iii) 
adoption of an industry standard electronic format for message 
communication; and (iv) adoption of standards that allow manual 
processing on an exception-only basis.\152\
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    \149\ Exchange Act Release No. 49405 (Mar. 11, 2004), 69 FR 
12922 (Mar. 18, 2004) (``Concept Release'').
    \150\ Id.
    \151\ See SIA Letter, supra note 147 (commenting on the Concept 
Release); letter from Margaret R. Blake, Counsel to the Association, 
Dan W. Schneider, Counsel to the Association, The Association of 
Global Custodians (June 28, 2004) (commenting on the Concept 
Release). Copies of the comment letters are available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71304.shtml.
    \152\ See supra note 151.
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    Since 2004, the industry has made significant progress in 
developing new centralized systems and processes designed to automate 
and streamline the institutional trade processing environment, both 
from an operational and technological perspective.\153\ Market 
participants also rely on a variety of ``local'' matching tools that 
allow them to compare trade information received from another party 
against their own trade information. Further, industry coordination has 
facilitated improved communication between the parties to a trade using 
standardized messaging protocols, such as FIX, and the SWIFT network. 
When the Commission proposed to shorten the settlement cycle to T+2, 
the Commission observed that the market has improved these 
confirmation, affirmation, and matching processes through the use of 
CMSPs.\154\
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    \153\ For example, DTCC ITP Matching has introduced centralized 
matching with its CTM platform that continues to automate the trade 
confirmation process and includes connectivity via FIX and the SWIFT 
network to custodian banks for the purposes of settlement 
notification. See DTCC, Why Is DTCC Migrating US Trade Flows to CTM 
and Terminating OASYS?, https://dtcclearning.com/content/1439-cat-institutional-trade-processing/cat-ctm/us-trade-flows/us-trades-on-ctm-faqs/us-trades-on-ctm-general-faqs/7353-why-is-dtcc-migrating-us-trade-flows-to-ctm-and-terminating-oasys.html.
    \154\ T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69258.

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[[Page 10453]]

    A 2010 white paper issued by Omgeo (now DTCC ITP) also described 
same-day affirmation as ``a prerequisite'' of shortening the settlement 
cycle because of its impact on the rate of settlement fails and on 
operational risk.\155\ According to data published in 2011 regarding 
affirmation rates achieved through the use of one CMSP, on average, 45% 
of trades were affirmed on trade date, 90% were affirmed by the end of 
T+1, and 92% were affirmed by noon on T+2.\156\ Existing processes for 
matching institutional trades rely on a number of manual elements, and 
currently only about 68% of trades achieve affirmation by 12:00 
midnight at the end of trade date.\157\ While these rates have improved 
over time, the improvements have been incremental and, in the 
Commission's view, insufficient. Failing to affirm by the end of trade 
date increases the likelihood that errors or exceptions will not be 
resolved in time for settlement. The sooner the parties have affirmed 
the trade information for their transaction, the lower the likelihood 
of a settlement fail because the parties will have more time to 
identify and resolve any potential errors. The T+1 Report highlights 
the need for achieving affirmation on trade date and encourages that on 
trade date allocations be completed by 7:00 p.m. ET and affirmations by 
9:00 p.m. ET to facilitate shortening of the standard settlement cycle 
to T+1.\158\ As discussed below, the Commission proposes Rule 15c6-2 to 
require completion of institutional trade allocations, confirmations, 
and affirmations by the end of trade date.
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    \155\ Omgeo, Mitigating Operational Risk and Increasing 
Settlement Efficiency through Same Day Affirmation (SDA), at 2, 7 
(Oct. 2010) (``Omgeo Study'').
    \156\ DTCC, Proposal to Launch a New Cost-Benefit Analysis on 
Shortening the Settlement Cycle, at 7 (Dec. 2011), https://www.dtcc.com/en/news/2011/december/01/proposal-to-launch-a-new-cost-benefit-analysis-on-shortening-the-settlement-cycle.aspx.
    \157\ DTCC ITP Forum Remarks, supra note 58.
    \158\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 13.
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1. Proposed Rule 15c6-2 Under the Exchange Act
    The Commission proposes Rule 15c6-2 to require that, where parties 
have agreed to engage in an allocation, confirmation, or affirmation 
process, a broker or dealer would be prohibited from effecting or 
entering into a contract for the purchase or sale of a security (other 
than an exempted security, a government security, a municipal security, 
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) on behalf 
of a customer unless such broker or dealer has entered into a written 
agreement with the customer that requires the allocation, confirmation, 
affirmation, or any combination thereof, be completed as soon as 
technologically practicable and no later than the end of the day on 
trade date in such form as may be necessary to achieve settlement in 
compliance with Rule 15c6-1(a). As explained in further detail below, 
the Commission believes that implementing a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle, as well as any potential further shortening beyond T+1, would 
require a significant improvement in the current rates of same-day 
affirmations to ensure timely settlement in a T+1 environment. In this 
way, the Commission also believes that proposed Rule 15c6-2 should 
facilitate timely settlement as a general matter, regardless of 
shortening the settlement cycle, because it will accelerate the 
completion of affirmations on trade date. Because broker-dealers and 
their institutional customers will review and reconcile trade data 
earlier in the settlement process, the Commission believes that same-
day affirmation can improve the accuracy and efficiency of 
institutional trade processing. In particular, conducting these 
activities earlier in the process, and as soon as technologically 
practicable, will allow more time to resolve errors, an important 
consideration as shorter settlement cycles compress the available time 
to resolve errors.
    Proposed Rule 15c6-2 applies requirements to a broker-dealer's 
contractual arrangements with its institutional customers because the 
Commission preliminarily believes that broker-dealers are best 
positioned to ensure (through their contractual arrangements) that 
their customers, including those acting on behalf of their customers, 
will perform the required allocation, confirmation, and affirmation 
functions on the appropriate timeframe and as soon as technologically 
practicable. Because broker-dealers are the party to a transaction most 
likely to have access to a clearing agency, the broker-dealer is also 
the party best positioned to ensure the timely settlement of 
institutional trades, and as such, should be able to ensure via its 
customer agreements that institutional customers or their agents also 
comport their operations to facilitate same-day affirmation.\159\ In 
addition, requiring broker-dealers to enter into written agreements 
that require the allocation, confirmation, and affirmation processes be 
completed as soon as technologically practicable and no later than the 
end of trade date may help increase the use of standardized terms and 
trade details across market participants, which may enable the parties 
to reduce their reliance on manual processes in favor of more automated 
methods.
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    \159\ In an effort to also encourage investment advisers to 
ensure that their own operations and procedures for institutional 
trade processing can accommodate T+1 or shorter settlement 
timeframes, in Part III.C the Commission proposes an amendment to an 
existing recordkeeping rule for registered investment advisers.
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    As proposed, Rule 15c6-2 does not define the terms ``allocation,'' 
``confirmation,'' or ``affirmation.'' As discussed in Part II.B.3.c), 
trade allocation refers to the process by which an institutional 
investor (often an investment adviser) allocates a large trade among 
various client accounts or determines how to apportion securities 
trades ordered contemporaneously on behalf of multiple funds or non-
fund clients.\160\ The terms ``confirmation'' and ``affirmation'' refer 
to the transmission of messages among broker-dealers, institutional 
investors, and custodian banks to confirm the terms of a trade executed 
for an institutional investor, a process necessary to ensure the 
accuracy of the trade being settled. Broker-dealers transmit trade 
confirmations to their customers to verify trade information, and 
customers provide an affirmation in response to affirm the confirmation 
so that the transaction can be prepared for settlement. The Commission 
believes that these terms are widely used and generally understood by 
market participants who engage in institutional trade processing.
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    \160\ For example, DTCC ITP's OASYS platform is a trade 
allocation and acceptance service that communicates trade and 
allocation details between investment managers and broker-dealers. 
DTCC ITP is in the process of decommissioning OASYS and replacing it 
with CTM, an enriched automated system that offers central matching 
workflow (including allocation) settlement notification and ALERT 
services. ALERT provides a database for the maintenance and 
communication of account and SSI information so that investment 
managers, broker-dealers, custodian banks and prime brokers can 
share account information electronically. See DTCC, ALERT, https://www.dtcc.com/institutional-trade-processing/itp/alert.
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    Proposed Rule 15c6-2 uses the term ``confirmation'' to refer to the 
operational message that includes trade details provided by the broker-
dealer to the customer to verify trade information so that a trade can 
be prepared for settlement on the timeline established in Rule 15c6-
1(a).\161\ In contrast,

[[Page 10454]]

confirmations required by Exchange Act Rule 10b-10 concern a series of 
disclosures that broker-dealers are required to provide in writing to 
customers at or before completion of a transaction.\162\ While some 
matching or electronic trade confirmation services may use the 
operational confirmation process described in proposed Rule 15c6-2 to 
produce a confirmation for purposes of compliance with Rule 10b-10, 
others may not. Accordingly, the term ``confirmation'' as used in 
proposed Rule 15c6-2 should be understood to refer to the institutional 
trade processing message or verification and not the disclosure 
required under Rule 10b-10. Below the Commission solicits comment as to 
whether these terms are sufficiently understood to facilitate 
compliance with the proposed rule.
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    \161\ Confirmations will include the following trade 
information: transaction type, security (including an identifier and 
description), account ID and title, trade date, settlement date, 
quantity, price, commission (if any), taxes and fees (if any), 
accrued interest (if appropriate) and the net amount of money to be 
paid or received at settlement. A confirmation will also include the 
broker name and whether the broker-dealer was acting as principal or 
agent on the trade.
    \162\ 17 CFR 240.10b-10. For more information on confirmations 
required under Rule 10b-10, see Part III.E.3.
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    Proposed Rule 15c6-2 would also require broker-dealers to enter 
into a written agreement with a ``customer'' that has agreed to engage 
in the allocation, confirmation, or affirmation process. For purposes 
of the rule, the term ``customer'' includes any person or agent of such 
person who opens a brokerage account at a broker-dealer to effect an 
institutional trade or purchases or sells a security for which the 
broker-dealer receives or will receive compensation. In the 
institutional trade processing environment, the Commission understands 
that at times, a broker-dealer may accept instructions or trades from 
entities acting on behalf of the institutional investor. The term, as 
used in proposed Rule 15c6-2, is intended to cover both the 
institutional investor and any and all agents acting on its behalf. As 
stated below, the Commission is seeking further comment on whether the 
obligations imposed by proposed Rule 15c6-2 should explicitly state 
that contracts of such agents acting on behalf of the broker-dealer's 
customer are subject to the proposed rule or whether the proposed rule 
text as written is sufficiently clear.
    Finally, the written agreement executed pursuant to proposed Rule 
15c6-1 requires that the allocation, confirmation, and affirmation 
processes, or any combination thereof, related to these trades be 
completed as soon as technologically practicable and no later than the 
end of the day on trade date in such form as may be necessary to 
achieve settlement in compliance with Rule 15c6-1(a).\163\ The 
Commission is proposing ``end of the day on trade date'' rather than 
requiring a specific time earlier than end of day to allow firms to 
maximize their internal processes to meet the appropriate cutoff times 
and other deadlines, as soon as technologically practicable. The 
Commission expects that different sectors of the market, different 
types of asset classes or market participants, and different 
operational processes (e.g., cross-border transactions) may have 
varying processing deadlines, some of which may need to be earlier than 
end of the day to facilitate trade processing. For example, as noted 
above, the T+1 Report contemplates moving the ``ITP Affirmation 
Cutoff'' from 11:30 a.m. on the day after trade date to 9:00 p.m. on 
trade date to facilitate a T+1 settlement cycle.\164\ Accordingly, the 
parties would be able under the rule to require earlier timeframes when 
appropriate. Moreover, the SROs could consider whether and how to use 
earlier than end of day deadlines, such as those recommended by the T+1 
Report.
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    \163\ For purposes of this rule, ``end of the day'' has the same 
meaning as it is generally understood: no later than 11:59:59 p.m., 
Eastern Standard Time or Eastern Daylight Saving Time, whichever is 
currently in effect on trade date.
    \164\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 39.
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2. Basis for Requiring Affirmation No Later Than the End of Trade Date
    As discussed in Part II.B, aspects of post-trade processing for 
institutional transactions remain inefficient and costly for several 
reasons. Although same-day affirmation is considered a best practice 
for institutional trade processing, adoption is not universal across 
market participants or even across all trades entered by a given 
participant.\165\ Market participants continue to use hundreds of 
``local'' matching platforms,\166\ and rely on inconsistent SSI data 
independently maintained by broker-dealers, investment managers, 
custodians, sub-custodians, and agents on separate databases.\167\ As 
discussed in Part II.B, processing institutional trades requires 
managing the back and forth involved with transmitting and reconciling 
trade information among the parties, functionally matching and re-
matching with the counterparties to the trade, as well as custodians 
and agents, to facilitate settlement. It also requires market 
participants to engage in allocation processes, such as allocation-
level cancellations and corrections, some of which are still processed 
manually.\168\ This collection of redundant, often manual steps and the 
use of uncoordinated (i.e., not standardized) databases can lead to 
delays, exceptions processing, settlement fails, wasted resources, and 
economic losses. While the proposed rule does not require any changes 
to manual processes or existing uses of databases and exceptions 
processing, the Commission preliminarily believes that market 
participants may pursue improvements to these existing processes to 
manage their obligations under Rule 15c6-2, if adopted.
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    \165\ While the concept of completing these functions on trade 
date has often been referred to a ``same-day'' affirmation, the 
Commission is proposing instead to use the term ``trade date'' in 
the rule to be clear that the allocation, confirmation, and 
affirmation process should be completed on the trade date.
    \166\ Local matching platforms include, for example, the trade 
reconciliation and inventory management tools that market 
participants use to reconcile trade information. See DTCC, Embracing 
Post-Trade Automation: Seven Ways the Sell-Side Will Benefit from 
No-Touch Future (Nov. 2020) (``DTCC Embracing Post-Trade 
Automation''), https://www.dtcc.com/itp-hub/dist/downloads/broker_supplement_11.11.20z.pdf. Examples of such service providers 
include Bloomberg, Corfinancial, Lightspeed, and SS&C Technologies.
    \167\ For more information about the use and impact of ``local'' 
matching platforms, see supra note 166. A 2020 DTCC survey of global 
broker-dealers found that certain institutional post-trade 
processing costs could be reduced by 20-25% through leveraging post-
trade automation, which would in turn eliminate redundancies and 
manual processing and mitigate operational risks. See DTCC, DTCC 
Identifies Seven Areas of Broker Cost Savings as a Result of Greater 
Post-Trade Automation (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.dtcc.com/news/2020/november/18/dtcc-identifies-seven-areas-of-broker-cost-savings-as-a-result-of-greater-post-trade-automation; see also DTCC 
Embracing Post-Trade Automation, supra note 166.
    \168\ See DTCC, Re-Imagining Post-Trade: No-Touch Processing 
Within Reach, at 4 (Sept. 2019), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/Downloads/Institutional-Trade-Processing/ITP-Story/DTCC-Re-Imagining-Post-Trade.pdf.
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    Although proposed Rule 15c6-2 does not require settlement of the 
transaction on trade date, the Commission preliminarily believes the 
proposed rule helps ensure that institutional trades will timely settle 
on T+1 because, by promoting the completion of these processes as soon 
as technologically practicable and no later than the end of trade date, 
it reduces the likelihood of exceptions or other errors with respect to 
trade information that can prevent a transaction from settling. In the 
Commission's view, because the rule requires that allocation, 
confirmation, and affirmation be completed as soon as technologically 
practicable and no later than the end of trade date, it can also 
facilitate shortening the settlement cycle, both with respect to T+1 
and potentially for shortening beyond T+1 in the future. By elevating 
an industry best practice to a Commission

[[Page 10455]]

requirement, the Commission believes that proposed Rule 15c6-2 can 
significantly improve the current 68% rate of affirmations on trade 
date by standardizing the obligations of broker-dealers and their 
institutional customers with respect to the timing of achieving 
affirmations. This, in turn, could facilitate increases in operational 
efficiency necessary to support an orderly transition to shorter 
settlement cycles. The Commission also anticipates that SROs will 
consider whether to propose rule changes to incorporate the 
requirements in new Rule 15c6-2 if adopted,\169\ and proposed Rule 
15c6-2 would likely encourage further development of automated and 
standardized practices among market participants to facilitate 
settlement of institutional trades.
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    \169\ For example, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(``FINRA'') Rule 11860 does not require that a broker-dealer send a 
confirmation of trade details until the day after trade date, which 
can delay the affirmation process until T+1 (in a T+2 environment) 
and reduce the time available to manage trade exceptions. FINRA, as 
well as DTC and DTCC ITP Matching may propose new rules, procedures 
or services to further enhance the ability of market participants to 
settle in shorter timeframes.
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3. Request for Comment
    The Commission solicits comment on the particular questions set 
forth below, and encourages commenters to submit any relevant data or 
analysis in connection with their answers.
    28. Would proposed Rule 15c6-2 accomplish the stated objectives? 
Would the proposed rule encourage further standardization and 
automation in the processing of institutional trades? What effect will 
the proposed rule have on improving efficiencies and reducing errors 
and fails? Please provide a basis or explanation for your position.
    29. Proposed Rule 15c6-2 uses such terms as ``allocation,'' 
``confirmation,'' and ``affirmation.'' As discussed above, the 
Commission believes that these are well understood concepts. Should 
these terms be defined for purposes of the proposed rule? If so, please 
explain which terms need further definition and why? Please include the 
recommended elements of such definitions.
    30. Similarly, does the term ``end of the day on trade date'' need 
to be defined? If so, please provide information as to why and include 
recommended elements of such a definition.
    31. Proposed Rule 15c6-2 uses the term ``customer.'' Given that 
often agents of the customer are providing allocation, confirmation or 
affirmation instructions or communications to the broker-dealer on 
behalf of the broker-dealer's customer, does the rule as written 
address this scenario? Does the use of the term ``customer'' 
sufficiently incorporate any and all agents of the customer? Is the 
Commission's understanding of these terms consistent with the 
industry's use of these terms? Why or why not? Should the term 
``customer'' be defined for purposes of Rule 15c6-2? If so, please 
include the recommended elements of such a definition.
    32. What effect would proposed Rule 15c6-2 have on the relationship 
between a broker-dealer and its customer?
    33. Do the perceived benefits of proposed Rule 15c6-2 or the 
benefits of trade date confirmation and affirmation accrue to all 
participants--brokers-dealers (including prime brokers), institutional 
customers, custodians, or matching utilities? If not, why? Do they 
accrue differently based on size of the entity? Please explain.
    34. Does proposed Rule 15c6-2 introduce any new risks? If so, 
please describe such risks and whether they can be quantified. Can 
these risks be mitigated? If so, how?
    35. If proposed Rule 15c6-2 is adopted by the Commission, what 
should be the necessary time frame for implementing such a rule? What 
factors should the Commission consider in determining the 
implementation date?
    36. Would proposed Rule 15c6-2 affect cross-border trading or 
cross-border trade processing? If so, how would it do so?
    37. As proposed, Rule 15c6-2 excludes exempted securities, 
government securities, municipal securities, commercial paper, bankers' 
acceptances, and commercial bills. For those asset classes that do not 
already settle on T+1, should the proposed rule apply to any or all of 
these excluded securities? Please discuss the reasons why any or all of 
these securities should or should not be excluded from Rule 15c6-2.
    38. What if anything should the Commission do to further facilitate 
the use of standardized industry protocols and standardization of 
reference data by broker-dealers and institutional customers, including 
investment advisers and custodians? What if anything should the 
Commission do to further facilitate efficiency in processing 
institutional trades and reducing errors and fails?
    39. Would the adoption of further Commission rules be necessary to 
require or further facilitate the objective of ensuring that 
institutional trades are operationally capable of settling on a T+1 or 
shorter timeframe?
    40. The T+1 Report indicates that market participants may cancel 
and rebill an affirmed trade because of a monetary change to the trade 
and states that these instances occur frequently in a T+2 settlement 
cycle.\170\ Why are trades affirmed when monetary amounts may not 
agree? Should it be permissible to cancel an affirmed trade? Why or why 
not?
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    \170\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 26.
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    41. Are investment advisers matching their records about a trade 
against the received confirmation prior to affirming? If not, why not? 
If so, what criteria are used to determine that a `match' has occurred? 
Which fields must match? Should financial values, such as unit price, 
total commission, accrued interest for fixed-income trades and net 
amount to be paid or received be matched? What steps does or should the 
adviser take to ensure the affirming party, if not the adviser, is 
matching adviser-provided trade information against the broker or 
dealer confirmation before affirming trades?
    42. When matching trade information on a given transaction between 
the investment adviser and the broker-dealer, the parties to the 
transaction may view differences, such as differences in amounts, as 
minor and therefore within a satisfactory ``tolerance'' range to match, 
whereas in other cases a party may be unwilling to match if any 
discrepancy in trade information exists. These differences in trade 
information may be perceived to be small in absolute terms or relative 
to the size of the trade. Parties also may set ``tolerance'' thresholds 
in their systems to ignore some differences, such as trade information 
where an element differs by ``one penny'' or less than 0.01% of the 
value being compared. To what extent do advisers apply such tolerances 
when matching trades? What fields are subject to such tolerance 
thresholds and what size tolerances are generally used? For example, if 
the net money for settlement as calculated by the adviser differs from 
the net money for settlement as calculated by the broker or dealer as 
part of the confirmation by a dollar, is that trade a ``match''? And if 
so, which value is used for settlement, the amount on the confirmation 
or the adviser's records? Does the other party then adjust its records 
to the amount used for settlement? Are investors ever harmed by this 
approach? Is there general consensus on tolerances? Are there industry 
groups that define guidelines or best practices on the use of 
tolerances and, if so, do they all agree?
    43. Should advisers be expected to affirm trades or should this 
always be a

[[Page 10456]]

function of the broker-dealer or bank custodian holding the account 
where securities will be delivered? How should the adviser proceed if 
the deadline to notify a broker-dealer or bank custodian is approaching 
yet a confirmation has not been received? If advisers delay 
notification of the custodian until after affirming the trade in such a 
scenario, will this create delays in recalling loaned securities or 
securities that may have been pledged as collateral?
    44. In some cases, bank custodians may receive a copy of a 
confirmation (a ``duplicate confirmation'') as an early alert of 
potential trade activity. Are these duplicate confirmations relied upon 
to affirm the trade information? Do custodians ever settle trades based 
solely on information received in a duplicate confirmation? Should this 
practice be permitted? Please explain why or why not. Do custodians use 
these duplicate confirmations as an early alert to call a security back 
from being on loan or to identify a security that may be pledged as 
collateral?
    45. Elements of FINRA Rule 11860 could be used to help facilitate 
compliance with proposed Rule 15c6-2, if adopted. Is proposed Rule 
15c6-2 consistent with the approach to RVP/DVP settlement set forth in 
FINRA Rule 11860 and, more generally, the Uniform Practice Code 
(``UPC'') set forth in the FINRA Rule 11000 series? \171\ If not, 
please explain.
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    \171\ The UPC is a series of FINRA rules, interpretations and 
explanations designed to make uniform, where practicable, custom, 
practice, usage, and trading technique in the investment banking and 
securities business, particularly with regard to operational and 
settlement issues. These can include such matters as trade terms, 
deliveries, payments, dividends, rights, interest, reclamations, 
exchange of confirmations, stamp taxes, claims, assignments, powers 
of substitution, computation of interest and basis prices, due-
bills, transfer fees, ``when, as and if issued'' trading, ``when, as 
and if distributed'' trading, marking to the market, and close-out 
procedures. The UPC was created so that the transaction of day-to-
day business by members may be simplified and facilitated; that 
business disputes and misunderstandings, which arise from 
uncertainty and lack of uniformity in such matters, may be 
eliminated; and that the mechanisms of a free and open market may be 
improved and impediments thereto removed. See, e.g., Exchange Act 
Release No. 91789 (May 7, 2021), 86 FR 26084, 26088 (May 12, 2021).
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    46. Should proposed Rule 15c6-2 have separate requirements and 
deadlines for each step in the allocation, affirmation, and 
confirmation processes? And if so, should deadlines be relative to a 
prior dependent activity? For example, should allocations be 
communicated within an hour of, or no later than three hours after, 
receipt of the notice of execution and affirmations be communicated 
within an hour of, or no later than three hours after, receipt of the 
confirmation? Or is it acceptable to require end of day for all 
activity? What changes would be recommended for a T+0 environment?

C. Proposed Amendment to Recordkeeping Rule for Investment Advisers

    Under proposed Rule 15c6-2, a broker-dealer would be prohibited 
from entering into a contract on behalf of a customer for the purchase 
or sale of certain securities \172\ unless it has entered into a 
written agreement with the customer that requires the allocation, 
confirmation, affirmation, or any combination thereof to be completed 
no later than the end of the day on trade date in such form as may be 
necessary to achieve settlement in compliance with proposed Rule 15c6-
1(a).\173\ Investment advisers, as customers of a broker or dealer, may 
become a party to such an agreement. Proposed Rule 15c6-2 does not 
specify which party would be obligated to provide the necessary 
allocation, confirmation, and affirmation, although the Commission 
understands that, generally, the customer (here, the investment 
adviser) customarily provides the broker or dealer with instructions 
directing how to allocate the securities to be purchased or sold, and 
the broker or dealer confirms the trade details, which the adviser, in 
turn, affirms.
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    \172\ As discussed in Part III.B.1, proposed Rule 15c6-2 would 
not apply to an exempted security, government security, municipal 
security, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial 
bills.
    \173\ See supra Part III.B (discussing the proposed new 
requirement for ``same-day affirmation'').
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    Based on staff experience, the Commission believes that advisers 
generally have recordkeeping processes that include keeping originals 
and/or electronic copies of such allocations, confirmations, and 
affirmations. However, in some instances this may not be the case. Some 
activities, such as affirmation, may be performed on the adviser's 
behalf by a third party, such as middle-office outsourcing provider, a 
custodian or a prime broker, and advisers may not maintain these 
records.\174\ In addition, based on staff experience, the Commission 
also believes that some advisers do not maintain these records or 
maintain them only in paper. Accordingly, the Commission is proposing 
an amendment to the investment adviser recordkeeping rule designed to 
ensure that registered investment advisers that are parties to 
contracts under proposed Rule 15c6-2 retain records of confirmations 
received, and keep records of the allocations and affirmations sent to 
a broker or dealer.\175\ Specifically, the Commission proposes to amend 
Rule 204-2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the ``Advisers 
Act'') by adding a requirement in paragraph (a)(7)(iii) that advisers 
maintain records of each confirmation received, and any allocation and 
each affirmation sent, with a date and time stamp for each allocation 
(if applicable) and affirmation that indicates when the allocation or 
affirmation was sent to the broker or dealer if the adviser is a party 
to a contract under proposed Rule 15c6-2. As with other records 
required under Rule 204-2(a)(7), advisers would be required to keep 
originals of confirmations, and copies of allocations and affirmations, 
described in the proposed rule, but may maintain records electronically 
if they satisfy certain conditions.\176\
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    \174\ See DTCC ITP Forum Remarks, supra note 58 (stating that up 
to 70% of institutional trades are affirmed by custodians).
    \175\ See proposed Rule 204-2(a)(7)(iii), infra Part 0.
    \176\ See Rule 204-2(a)(7) (requiring making and keeping 
originals of all written communications received and copies of all 
written communications sent by an investment adviser relating to the 
records listed thereunder). But see Rule 204-2(g) (permitting 
advisers to maintain records electronically if they establish and 
maintain required procedures).
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    While the Commission believes that retaining records of all of 
these documents is important, we understand that the timing of 
communicating allocations to the broker or dealer is a critical pre-
requisite to ensure that confirmations can be issued in a timely 
manner, and affirmation is the final step necessary for an adviser to 
acknowledge agreement on the terms of the trade or alert the broker or 
dealer of a discrepancy. The proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 therefore 
would require advisers to time and date stamp records of any allocation 
and each affirmation. The proposed time and date stamp for these 
communications would occur when they were ``sent to the broker or 
dealer.'' To meet this proposed requirement, an adviser generally 
should time and date stamp records of each allocation (if applicable) 
and affirmation to the nearest minute.
    Based on staff experience, the Commission believes many advisers 
send allocations and affirmations electronically to brokers or dealers, 
and many records are already consistently date and time stamped to the 
nearest minute using either a local time zone or a centralized time 
zone, such as

[[Page 10457]]

coordinated universal time, or ``UTC.'' \177\ The Commission believes 
that date and time stamping these records to the nearest minute would 
evidence that the advisers have met their obligations to timely achieve 
a matched trade.
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    \177\ See U.S. Naval Observatory, Systems of Time, https://www.cnmoc.usff.navy.mil/Organization/United-States-Naval-Observatory/Precise-Time-Department/The-USNO-Master-Clock/Definitions-of-Systems-of-Time/. The Commission understands that 
some firms have systems that date and time stamp records with 
greater precision. Certainly as volumes increase and the timeframes 
to complete operational activities, such as settlement, shorten, the 
Commission believes from a practical perspective that many firms 
will find value in having increased precision in the time stamps on 
trade-related activities.
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    The Commission recognizes that requiring these records and adding 
time and date stamps to records would, however, add additional costs 
and burdens for those advisers that do not currently maintain these 
records or do not use electronic systems to send allocations and 
affirmations to brokers or dealers or maintain confirmations. For 
example, some advisers may incur costs to update their processes to 
accommodate these records. For advisers that use third parties to 
perform or communicate allocations or affirmations, they also could 
incur costs associated with directing the third parties to 
electronically copy the adviser on any allocations or 
affirmations.\178\
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    \178\ For additional discussion on this and other initial costs 
and burdens of the proposed amendment to Rule 204-2, see infra Part 
V.C.5.b).
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    We believe that requiring these records and requiring a time and 
date stamp of all affirmations and any applicable allocations (but not 
confirmations) would help advisers establish that they have timely met 
contractual obligations under proposed Rule 15c6-2 and ultimately help 
ensure that trades involving such advisers would timely settle on T+1. 
In addition, we believe the proposed requirement would aid the 
Commission staff in preparing for examinations of investment advisers 
and assessing adviser compliance.
1. Request for Comment
    We request comment on the proposed amendment to the investment 
adviser recordkeeping rule:
    47. Should the Commission amend Rule 204-2 to specifically 
correspond to the proposed Rule 15c6-2 and require advisers that are 
parties to contracts under proposed Rule 15c6-2 to retain records of 
the documents described in that rule?
    48. Should the Commission require that these records be retained 
under a different provision of the recordkeeping rule? For example, 
should the Commission instead amend Rule 204-2(a)(3) (requiring 
advisers to retain ``memorandums'' of orders) to explicitly include 
these records? If so, the determination of whether to maintain the 
relevant allocations, confirmation, and affirmations would depend on if 
they were part of an ``order.'' Given that certain orders may never be 
executed, and that certain executed trades potentially might not have 
orders associated with them, would including the requirement in the 
recordkeeping requirement related to ``orders'' result in advisers not 
retaining some allocations, confirmations, and affirmations? 
Separately, would maintaining the proposed records under Rule 204-
2(a)(3) create confusion about whether advisers need to maintain 
originals and/or duplicate copies of relevant allocations, 
confirmations, and affirmations, when the specified record is the 
memorandum? Or, do advisers currently maintain records of allocations, 
confirmations, and affirmations under this provision to document the 
orders they describe in the memoranda?
    49. Should the Commission require time and date stamping of the 
allocations and affirmations to the nearest minute, as proposed? Would 
advisers need to make system changes to accomplish such time and date 
stamping of allocations and affirmations? Is there an approach other 
than time and date stamping that would allow Commission staff to verify 
that an adviser has completed the steps necessary to facilitate 
settlement in a timely manner? Should the Commission require time and 
date stamping of just the affirmation or just the allocation? Is the 
requirement to time and date stamp the allocation or affirmation when 
it is ``sent to the broker or dealer'' clear? Should we require the 
time and date stamp at a different point in time? If so, when?
    50. Should we require time and date stamping of receipt of the 
confirmation as well? What additional costs or burdens would such time 
stamping incur?
    51. Under what circumstances do third parties, such as prime 
brokers or custodians, affirm trades instead of advisers, and in those 
instances do the third parties send copies of the affirmations to the 
advisers? Does this happen for all accounts an adviser manages or only 
some accounts and why?
    52. If advisers are matching adviser records to confirmations, some 
trades will not match. In other instances, an adviser may receive a 
confirmation for a trade that the adviser does not ``know,'' such as 
when an adviser did not execute a trade or when the adviser's trading 
desk has not notified the adviser's middle or back office. In such 
cases, do advisers proactively notify the broker-dealer that the trade 
does not match (often referred to as ``don't know'' or sending a 
``DK'')? Should the proposed rule be more specific about recordkeeping 
when an adviser does not agree with or does not ``know'' a trade for 
which a confirmation was received? How often do trades not match? How 
frequently do advisers receive confirmations they do not ``know?''

D. New Requirement for CMSPs To Facilitate Straight-Through Processing

    Because of the rising volume of transactions for which CMSPs 
provide matching and other services,\179\ CMSPs have become 
increasingly critical to the functioning of the securities market.\180\ 
As described in Part II.B.1, CMSPs facilitate communications among a 
broker-dealer, an institutional investor or its investment adviser, and 
the institutional investor's custodian to reach agreement on the 
details of a securities transaction, enabling the trade allocation, 
confirmation, affirmation, and/or the matching of institutional trades. 
Once the trade details have been agreed among the parties or matched by 
the CMSP, the CMSP can then facilitate settlement of the transaction.
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    \179\ See, e.g., Press Release, DTCC, Over 1,800 Firms Agree to 
Leverage U.S. Institutional Trade Matching Capabilities in DTCC's 
CTM (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.dtcc.com/news/2021/october/12/over-1800-firms-agree-to-leverage-dtccs-ctm; DTCC's Trade Processing 
Suite Traffics One Billion Trades, Traders Magazine (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.tradersmagazine.com/departments/clearing/dtccs-trade-processing-suite-traffics-one-billion-trades/.
    \180\ CMSPs are clearing agencies as defined in Section 3(a)(23) 
of the Exchange Act, and as such, are required to register as a 
clearing agency or obtain an exemption from registration. The 
Commission has currently exempted three CMSPs from the registration 
requirement. The Commission also has adopted rules that apply to 
both registered and exempt clearing agencies, including CMSPs 
operating pursuant to an exemption from registration. See, e.g., 
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act Release 
No. 73639 (Nov. 19, 2014), 79 FR 72252 (Dec. 5, 2014) (``Regulation 
SCI Adopting Release'').
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    While the introduction of new technologies and streamlined 
operations such as those offered by CMSPs have improved the efficiency 
of post-trade processing over time, the Commission believes more should 
be done to facilitate further improvements, particularly with respect 
to the processing of institutional trades. Currently, some SRO rules 
require the use of CMSP services for institutional

[[Page 10458]]

trade processing.\181\ The Commission has previously explained that a 
shortened settlement cycle may lead to expanded use of CMSPs, as well 
as increased focus on enhancing the services and operations of the 
CMSPs themselves.\182\ In particular, the Commission believes that 
eliminating the use of tools that encourage or require manual 
processing, alongside the continued development and implementation of 
more efficient automated systems in the institutional trade processing 
environment, is essential to reducing risk and costs to ensure the 
prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions.\183\ Below is a discussion of the elements of the 
proposed rule.
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    \181\ See e.g., FINRA Rule 11860 (requiring a broker-dealer to 
use a registered clearing agency, a CMSP, or a qualified vendor to 
complete delivery-versus-payment transactions with their customers).
    \182\ T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69258.
    \183\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 9.
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1. Policies and Procedures To Facilitate Straight-Through Processing
    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would require a CMSP to establish, implement, 
maintain and enforce policies and procedures to facilitate straight-
through processing for transactions involving broker-dealers and their 
customers.
    The term ``straight-through processing'' generally refers to 
processes that allow for the automation of the entire trade process 
from trade execution through settlement without manual 
intervention.\184\ In the context of institutional trade processing 
under this rule, straight-through processing occurs when a market 
participant or its agent uses the facilities of a CMSP to enter trade 
details and completes the trade allocation, confirmation, affirmation, 
and/or matching processes without manual intervention. Under the rule, 
a CMSP facilitates straight-through processing when its policies and 
procedures enable its users to minimize or eliminate, to the greatest 
extent that is technologically practicable, the need for manual input 
of trade details or manual intervention to resolve errors and 
exceptions that can prevent settlement of the trade. A CMSP also 
facilitates straight-through processing when it enables, to the 
greatest extent that is technologically practicable, the transmission 
of messages regarding errors, exceptions, and settlement status 
information among the parties to a trade and their settlement agents. 
Under the rule, policies and procedures generally should establish a 
holistic framework for facilitating straight-through processing, as 
just described, on a CMSP-wide basis. CMSPs should also generally 
consider and address how the services, systems, and any operational 
requirements a CMSP applies to its users ensure that the CMSP's 
policies and procedures advance the goal of achieving straight-through 
processing for trades processed through it. For example, a CMSP's 
policies and procedures generally should explain the criteria that the 
CMSP applies to determine when a ``match'' has been achieved, including 
any relevant tolerances that it or its users might apply to achieve a 
match, and the extent to which such criteria should be standardized or 
customized. With respect to the use of electronic trade confirmation 
services, which often rely on legacy technologies, a CMSP's policies 
and procedures generally should establish a timeline for transitioning 
users away from manual processes to matching services that reduce a 
party's reliance on the manual, often sequential, entry and 
reconciliation of trade information.
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    \184\ See SIA Business Case Report, supra note 21, at app. E 
(defining ``straight-through processing'').
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    The Commission believes that increasing the efficiency of using a 
CMSP can reduce the risk that a trade will fail to settle, as well as 
the costs associated with correcting errors that result from the use of 
manual processes and data entry, thereby improving the overall 
efficiency of the National C&S System. CMSPs have become increasingly 
connected to a wide variety of market participants in the U.S.,\185\ 
increasing the need to reduce risks and inefficiencies that may result 
from use of a CMSP's services. Because the proposed rule would preclude 
reliance on service offerings at CMSPs that rely on manual processing, 
the Commission preliminarily believes the proposed rule will better 
position CMSPs to provide services that not only reduce risk generally 
but also help facilitate an orderly transition to a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle,\186\ as well as potential further shortening of the 
settlement cycle in the future.
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    \185\ See, e.g., DTCC, About DTCC Institutional Trade 
Processing, https://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtccitp (noting that DTCC ITP, parent to DTCC ITP Matching, serves 
6,000 financial services firms in 52 countries).
    \186\ As discussed in Part III.B.2, the T+1 Report contemplates 
moving the ``ITP Affirmation Cutoff'' from 11:30 a.m. on the day 
after trade date to 9:00 p.m. on trade date. See supra note 164. 
Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 is consistent with, and should help promote, 
efforts to shorten the processing time for institutional trades in a 
T+1 environment.
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    The Commission has taken a ``policies and procedures'' approach in 
developing the proposed rule because it preliminarily believes such an 
approach will remain effective over time as CMSPs consider and offer 
new technologies and operations to improve the settlement of 
institutional trades. The Commission also believes that improving the 
CMSP's systems to facilitate straight-through processing can help 
market participants consider additional ways to make their own systems 
more efficient. In addition, a ``policies and procedures'' approach can 
help ensure that a CMSP considers in a holistic fashion how the 
obligations it applies to its users will advance the implementation of 
methodologies, operational capabilities, systems, or services that 
support straight-through processing.
    In considering how to develop policies and procedures that 
facilitate straight-through processing, a CMSP generally should 
consider the full range of operations and services related to the 
processing of institutional trades for settlement. For example, as 
noted above, the CMSP often acts as a communication platform for 
different market participants to transmit messages regarding errors, 
exceptions, and settlement status information among the parties to a 
trade and their settlement agents. Under proposed Rule 17Ad-27, a CMSP 
also generally should consider the extent to which its policies, 
procedures, and processes restrict, inhibit, or delay the ability of 
users to transmit such messages to any agent that assists said users in 
preparing or submitting the trade for settlement. In the Commission's 
view, the CMSP generally should consider having policies and procedures 
that promote the onward transmission of messages among the relevant 
parties to a transaction to ensure timely settlement and reduce the 
potential for errors. Similarly, in structuring its process for 
submitting transactions for settlement, the CMSP generally should 
consider ensuring that its systems, operational requirements, and the 
other choices it makes in designing its services enable and incentivize 
prompt and accurate settlement without manual intervention.
    As explained above, the Commission recognizes it may not be 
technologically or operationally practicable to eliminate all manual 
processes immediately. Indeed, the Commission believes that in certain 
circumstances, the parties to a trade may need to engage in manual 
interventions to ensure the accuracy of trade information and minimize 
operational or other risks that may prevent settlement, and proposed 
Rule 17Ad-27 does not require CMSPs to remove a manual processes if 
doing so would clearly undermine the prompt and accurate clearance and 
settlement of

[[Page 10459]]

securities transactions. However, pursuant to the policies and 
procedures approach described above, where a CMSP continues to permit 
manual reconciliation or other types of human intervention, it 
generally should explain in its policies and procedures why those 
manual processes remain necessary as part of its systems and processes. 
In addition, the CMSP should consider developing processes that 
ultimately would eliminate the underlying issues that drive the use of 
manual processes in order to facilitate a more automated approach.
2. Annual Report on Straight-Through Processing
    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 also would require a CMSP to submit every 
twelve months to the Commission a report that describes the following: 
(a) The CMSP's current policies and procedures for facilitating 
straight-through processing; (b) its progress in facilitating straight-
through processing during the twelve month period covered by the 
report; and (c) the steps the CMSP intends to take to facilitate and 
promote straight-through processing during the twelve month period that 
follows the period covered by the report. The Commission preliminarily 
intends to make this annual report publicly available on its website to 
enable the public to review and analyze progress on achieving straight-
through processing. A CMSP would submit this report to the Commission 
using the Commission's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval system (``EDGAR''), and would tag the information in the 
report using the structured (i.e., machine-readable) Inline eXtensible 
Business Reporting Language (``XBRL'').\187\
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    \187\ This requirement would be implemented by including a 
cross-reference to Regulation S-T in proposed Rule 17Ad-27, and by 
revising Regulation S-T to include the proposed straight-through 
processing reports. Pursuant to Rule 301 of Regulation S-T, the 
EDGAR Filer Manual is incorporated by reference into the 
Commission's rules. In conjunction with the EDGAR Filer Manual, 
Regulation S-T governs the electronic submission of documents filed 
with the Commission.
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    The Commission believes that the proposed reporting requirement 
would enable the Commission to evaluate actions taken by the CMSP to 
ensure compliance with the rule and to help fulfill the Commission's 
responsibility for oversight of the National C&S System, both as it 
relates to the CMSP specifically and the National C&S System more 
generally. The proposed requirement would also inform the Commission 
and the public, particularly the direct and indirect users of the CMSP, 
as to the progress being made each year to advance implementation of 
straight-through processing with respect to the allocation, 
confirmation, affirmation, and matching of institutional trades, the 
communication of messages among the parties to the transactions, and 
the availability of service offerings that reduce or eliminate the need 
for manual processing. In particular, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that a CMSP generally should include in its report a summary 
of key settlement data relevant to its straight-through processing 
objective. Such data could include the rates of allocation, 
confirmation, affirmation, and/or matching achieved via straight-
through processing. In describing its progress in facilitating 
straight-through processing, the CMSP could also identify common or 
best practices that facilitate straight-through processing. In 
addition, after the CMSP has submitted its initial report, in 
subsequent years a CMSP generally should include in its report an 
assessment of how its progress in facilitating straight-through 
processing during the twelve month period covered by the report under 
paragraph (b) compares to the steps it intended to take to facilitate 
straight-through processing under paragraph (c) from the prior year's 
report.
    Because this information would be useful to the industry and the 
general public in considering potential ways to increase the 
availability of straight-through processing, the Commission believes 
that the report should be made public. The Commission preliminarily 
believes that the proposed requirement generally would not require the 
disclosure of proprietary information, trade secrets, or personally 
identifiable information. To the extent that an annual report includes 
confidential commercial or financial information, a CMSP could request 
confidential treatment of those specific portions of the report.\188\
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    \188\ See 17 CFR 240.24b-2.
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    As the National C&S System continues to evolve, the Commission 
believes that CMSPs will continue to play an increasingly critical role 
in efforts to facilitate the prompt and accurate clearance and 
settlement of securities transactions and to eliminate inefficient and 
costly procedures that effect the settlement of securities 
transactions, particularly institutional transactions. Furthermore, 
because of the CMSP's role in submitting matched or confirmed and 
affirmed trades for overnight positioning of settling transactions, the 
Commission believes that a CMSP generally should evaluate how it 
participates in that process and consider how it can support 
improvements to the timing and manner of settlement obligations (e.g., 
intraday) to increase efficiency in the National C&S System.
    Requiring CMSPs to file the reports on EDGAR would provide the 
Commission and the public with a centralized, publicly accessible 
electronic database for the reports, facilitating the use of the 
reported data on straight-through processing. Moreover, requiring 
Inline XBRL tagging of the reported disclosures, which would 
specifically comprise an Inline XBRL block text tag for each of the 
three required narrative disclosures as well as detail tags for 
individual data points, would make the disclosures more easily 
available and accessible to and reusable by market participants and the 
Commission for retrieval, aggregation, and comparison across different 
CMSPs and time periods, as compared to an unstructured PDF, HTML, or 
ASCII format requirement for the reports.\189\ Detail tags could be 
helpful to the extent the reports disclose individual data points, 
including the rates of allocation, confirmation, affirmation, and/or 
matching achieved via straight-through processing.
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    \189\ See Release No. 33-10514 (June 28, 2018), 83 FR 40846, 
40847 (Aug. 16, 2018). Inline XBRL allows filers to embed XBRL data 
directly into an HTML document, eliminating the need to tag a copy 
of the information in a separate XBRL exhibit. Id. at 40851.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing a 12-month requirement in the rule 
because the Commission preliminarily believes that a yearly review and 
report on progress with respect to straight-through processing is the 
appropriate timescale on which the CMSP should consider, develop, and 
implement iterative improvements over time, while also ensuring that 
progress towards straight-through processing is expeditious. 
Specifically, a 12-month period would provide the CMSP with a 
sufficient look-back period to complete a meaningful review on an 
organization-wide basis and time to test and implement material changes 
to technologies and procedures. An annual reporting requirement, as 
opposed to a monthly or semi-annual requirement, should help ensure 
that the information provided to the Commission reflects meaningful and 
substantive progress by the CMSP, as opposed to focusing the 
Commission's attention on smaller, technical changes in services and 
policies that would be less relevant to improving the Commission's 
understanding of the overall progress towards achieving straight-
through processing by the CMSP. The

[[Page 10460]]

Commission believes that the reporting requirement should continue 
indefinitely because changes in technology will require ongoing review 
and consideration of how such changes might impact policies and 
procedures to facilitate straight-through processing.
3. Request for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of proposed Rule 
17Ad-27, as well as the following specific topics:
    53. Is the proposed policies and procedures approach appropriate 
and sufficient to achieve the proposed rule's stated objectives? Why or 
why not? Would more specific or directive requirements, such as those 
discussed above be more effective at facilitating straight-through 
processing than the proposed policies and procedures approach? Please 
explain why or why not.
    54. Is proposed Rule 17Ad-27 consistent with the approach to RVP/
DVP settlement set forth in FINRA Rule 11860 and, more generally, the 
UPC set forth in the FINRA Rule 11000 series? \190\ If not, please 
explain.
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    \190\ See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing the 
UPC).
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    55. Is the proposed use of the term ``straight-through processing'' 
clear and understandable? Why or why not? Should the Commission define 
the term for purposes of the proposed rule? If so, please describe the 
elements that the Commission should consider including in the 
definition to make it clear and understandable.
    56. Should the Commission require a CMSP to enable the users of its 
service to complete the matching, confirmation, or affirmation of 
securities transactions as soon as technologically practicable? 
Alternatively, should the Commission impose a specific deadline on such 
a requirement, such as requiring that these processes be completed 
within a certain number of minutes or hours? Should the Commission 
require specific deadlines, when using a CMSP, for completing each of 
the allocation, confirmation, affirmation, or matching processes? Why 
or why not? If the Commission were to impose a specific deadline, what 
would be the appropriate deadline for each process--allocation, 
confirmation, affirmation, and matching?
    57. Should the Commission require a CMSP to forward or otherwise 
submit a transaction for settlement as soon as technologically and 
operationally practicable, as if using fully automated systems? Should 
the Commission specify to whom a CMSP should forward such information 
to facilitate straight-through processing? To what extent do CMSPs not 
forward such trade information as soon as technologically practicable? 
Are certain parties excluded? What are the reasons preventing such 
forwarding of trade information?
    58. Is it appropriate for proposed Rule 17Ad-27 to require a CMSP 
to retire any electronic trade confirmation services, where the users 
of a CMSP may transmit sequential messages back and forth to achieve 
allocation, confirmation, and affirmation of a transaction? If so, 
should the rule be modified to accommodate electronic trade 
confirmation services offered by CMSPs? Why or why not?
    59. More generally, are electronic trade confirmation services 
consistent with the concept of ``straight-through processing?'' Why or 
why not? Please explain.
    60. With regard to the proposed requirement for a CMSP to provide 
an annual report, does the proposed rule include the appropriate 
aspects or level of detail that should be included in such a report? 
Why or why not? Should the Commission require that the public report be 
issued in a machine-readable data language? Why or why not?
    61. Are the time periods (i.e., every 12 months) described in the 
rule concerning the submission and content of the annual report 
sufficiently clear? If not, please explain.
    62. Should a CMSP be required to tag its annual report using Inline 
XBRL? Why or why not? Rather than requiring block text tags for the 
narrative disclosures as well as detail tags of individual data points 
(including those nested within the narrative disclosures), should we 
only require block text tags for the narrative disclosures? Should the 
annual report be tagged in an open structured data language other than 
Inline XBRL? If so, what open structured data language should be used 
and why?
    63. Is EDGAR an appropriate submission mechanism for the annual 
report? Why or why not? Should the Commission use an alternative 
submission mechanism, such as the Electronic Form Filing System 
(``EFFS'')? An EFFS submission requirement would not be compatible with 
a requirement to use Inline XBRL or other open structured data language 
for the annual report.
    64. Should the Commission make public the annual report required to 
be submitted to the Commission under the proposed rule? Why or why not? 
Would making the report public alter the type or detail of information 
included by the CMSP in the report or in its policies and procedures? 
If so, why? If the public availability of any information required 
under the proposed rule would raise issues related to confidentiality 
or the proprietary nature of the CMSP's operations, please explain.
    65. CMSPs generally allow their users to define the criteria that 
will constitute a ``match,'' and the users may set different tolerances 
under those criteria depending on their business strategy. Should a 
CMSPs be required to disclose in the annual report its matching 
criteria? Should a CMSP be required to disclose data regarding 
confirmations, affirmations, and/or matches in its annual report, such 
as the percentage of successful confirmations, affirmations, and/or 
matches achieved on trade date, or the average time users take to 
achieve confirmation, affirmation, and/or a match from trade 
submission? Should a CMSP be required to disclose any other data to 
help facilitate straight-through processing, such as average time to 
submit a trade to a registered clearing agency for settlement, or the 
average number of messages that a CMSP transmits among the parties to a 
trade before the trade is submitted to a registered clearing agency for 
settlement? Please explain.
    66. More generally, should CMSPs be required to make their policies 
and procedures for straight-through processing public? Please explain 
why or why not?
    67. The Commission has issued exemptive orders for three CMSPs, 
pursuant to which each CMSP is subject to a series of operational and 
interoperability conditions.\191\ Should the Commission amend the 
respective exemptive orders to add conditions similar to the proposed 
requirements in Rule 17Ad-27 instead of adopting this proposal? Why or 
why not?
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    \191\ See supra note 32 (providing citations to the exemptive 
orders for DTCC ITP Matching, BSTP, and SS&C).
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    68. In the Matching Release, the Commission stated that, even 
though matching services fall within the Exchange Act definition of 
``clearing agency,'' it was of the view that an entity that limits its 
clearing agency functions to providing matching services need not be 
subject to the full panoply of clearing agency regulation.\192\ The 
Commission offered two alternative approaches for regulation: Limited 
registration or conditional exemptions. Since the Matching Release, the 
Commission has approved three conditional exemptions

[[Page 10461]]

for CMSPs, as noted in the above question, with the goal of 
facilitating competition in the provision of matching services.\193\ 
Has the Commission's approach to the regulation of CMSPs facilitated 
competition in the provision of matching services? If so, why or why 
not? To what extent does competition among CMSPs help promote either a 
shortened settlement cycle or straight-through processing? Please 
explain.
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    \192\ Exchange Act Release No. 39829 (Apr. 6, 1998), 63 FR 
17943, 17947 (Apr. 13, 1998) (``Matching Release'').
    \193\ See, e.g., BSTP and SS&C Order, supra note 32, at 75397-
400 (noting the Commission's interest in facilitating competition 
among CMSPs).
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    69. Are there any other steps that the Commission should take to 
enhance the ability of the CMSPs to promote straight-through processing 
or increase efficiency in the settlement of securities transactions?

E. Impact on Certain Commission Rules and Guidance and SRO Rules

    The proposed rules and rule amendments may affect compliance with 
other existing Commission rules and guidance that reference the 
settlement cycle or settlement processes in establishing requirements 
for market participants. Below is a preliminary list of rules 
identified by the Commission. The Commission preliminarily believes 
that no changes to these rules are necessary to adopt the proposed 
rules. The Commission solicits comment on the potential impacts of 
shortening the settlement cycle to T+1 on each of the below rules.
1. Regulation SHO Under the Exchange Act
    As with the adoption of a T+2 standard settlement cycle, several 
provisions of Regulation SHO may be impacted by shortening the 
settlement cycle to T+1 because certain provisions use ``trade date'' 
and ``settlement date'' to determine the timeframes for compliance 
relating to sales of equity securities and fails to deliver on 
settlement date. Since these references are not to a particular 
settlement cycle (e.g., ``T+2''), the timeframes for these provisions 
change in tandem with changes in the standard settlement cycle.
(a) Rule 204
    Shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1 would reduce the 
timeframes to effect the closeout of a fail-to-deliver position under 
17 CFR 242.204 (``Rule 204'').\194\ Under Rule 204,\195\ a participant 
of a registered clearing agency must deliver securities to a registered 
clearing agency for clearance and settlement on a long or short sale in 
any equity security by settlement date, or if a participant has a fail-
to-deliver position, the participant shall, by no later than the 
beginning of regular trading hours on the applicable closeout date, 
immediately close out the fail-to-deliver position by borrowing or 
purchasing securities of like kind and quantity.\196\
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    \194\ 17 CFR 242.204.
    \195\ For purposes of Regulation SHO, the term ``participant'' 
has the same meaning as in Section 3(a)(24) of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. 78c(a)(24). See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act 
Release No. 60388 (July 27, 2009), 74 FR 38266, 38268 n.34 (July 31, 
2009) (``Rule 204 Adopting Release''). Section 3(a)(24) of the 
Exchange Act defines ``participant'' to mean, when used with respect 
to a clearing agency, any person who uses a clearing agency to clear 
or settle securities transactions or to transfer, pledge, lend, or 
hypothecate securities. Such term does not include a person whose 
only use of a clearing agency is (A) through another person who is a 
participant or (B) as a pledgee of securities.
    \196\ 17 CFR 242.204(a).
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    The applicable closeout date for a fail-to-deliver position differs 
depending on whether the position results from a short sale, a long 
sale, or bona fide market making activity. If a fail-to-deliver 
position results from a short sale, the participant must close out the 
fail-to-deliver position by no later than the beginning of regular 
trading hours on the settlement day following the settlement date.\197\ 
Under the current T+2 standard settlement cycle, the applicable 
closeout date for short sales is required by the beginning of regular 
trading hours on T+3. In a T+1 settlement cycle, the existing closeout 
requirement for fail-to-deliver positions resulting from short sales 
would be reduced from T+3 to T+2.\198\
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    \197\ Id.
    \198\ See 17 CFR 242.204(g)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If a fail-to-deliver position results from a long sale or bona fide 
market making activity, the participant must close out the fail-to-
deliver position by no later than the beginning of regular trading 
hours on the third consecutive settlement day following the settlement 
date.\199\ Under the current T+2 standard settlement cycle, the 
closeout for long sales or bona fide market making activity is required 
by the beginning of regular trading hours on T+5. If the Commission 
adopts a T+1 standard settlement cycle, this closeout requirement would 
be shortened from T+5 to T+4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ See 17 CFR 242.204(a)(1), (a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Rule 200(g)
    Shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1 may also impact the 
application of 17 CFR 242.200(g) (``Rule 200(g)''). Specifically, a T+1 
settlement cycle may change when a broker-dealer would need to initiate 
a bona fide recall of a loaned security to be able to mark the sale of 
such loaned but recalled security ``long'' for purposes of Rule 
200(g)(1). Under Rule 200(g), a broker-dealer must mark all sell orders 
of any equity security as ``long,'' ``short,'' or ``short exempt.'' 
\200\ Rule 200(g)(1) stipulates that a broker-dealer may only mark a 
sale as ``long'' if the seller is ``deemed to own'' the security being 
sold under 17 CFR 242.200 (a) through (f) and either (i) the security 
is in the broker-dealer's physical possession or control; or (ii) it is 
reasonably expected that the security will be in the broker-dealer's 
possession or control by settlement of the transaction.\201\
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    \200\ See 17 CFR 242.200(g).
    \201\ See 17 CFR 242.200(g)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has provided guidance on when a person that sells a 
loaned but recalled security would be ``deemed to own'' the security 
and be able to mark the sale ``long.'' \202\ The guidance was given 
when the standard settlement cycle was T+3. Under those circumstances, 
the Commission indicated that, if a person that has loaned a security 
to another person sells the security and a bona fide recall of the 
security is initiated within two business days after trade date, the 
person that has loaned the security will be ``deemed to own'' the 
security for purposes of Rule 200(g)(1), and such sale will not be 
treated as a short sale for purposes of Rule 204. The Commission also 
stated that a broker-dealer may mark such orders as ``long'' sales 
provided such marking is also in compliance with Rule 200(c) of 
Regulation SHO, and thus the closeout requirement of Rule 204.\203\
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    \202\ See Rule 204 Adopting Release, supra note 195, at n.55.
    \203\ See id.; see also 17 CFR 242.200(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This guidance was predicated on the Commission's belief that, under 
then current industry standards, recalls for loaned securities would 
likely be delivered within three business days after the initiation of 
a recall. In that case, a broker-dealer that initiated a bona fide 
recall by T+2 would receive delivery of loaned securities by T+5 and 
then be able to close out any failure to deliver on a ``long'' sale of 
the loaned but recalled securities by the beginning of regular trading 
hours on T+6, as then required by Rule 204 in a T+3 environment.
    Under a T+2 standard settlement cycle, the closeout period for 
sales marked ``long'' is T+5, and so recalls of loaned securities need 
to be delivered by T+4 to be available to close out any fails on sales 
marked ``long'' by the beginning of regular trading hours on

[[Page 10462]]

T+5. To meet this timeframe, a number of broker-dealers have securities 
lending agreements that set the period of delivery for delivering 
loaned but recalled securities to two settlement days after initiation 
of a recall. Under such an agreement, a bona fide recall by no later 
than T+2 would result in the delivery of such loaned securities by T+4 
and in time to close out any fails on sales marked long by the 
beginning of regular trading hours on T+5. For those broker-dealers 
that lend securities pursuant to securities lending agreements that 
have a recall period of three business days after recall, a broker-
dealer would need to initiate a bona fide recall by T+1 to receive 
delivery of the loaned security by T+4 and in time to close out any 
fails on sales marked long by the beginning of regular trading hours on 
T+5.
    If a T+1 settlement cycle is implemented, closeout of a failure of 
a sale marked ``long'' would be required by the beginning of regular 
trading hours on T+4. With this further shortened timeframe, recalls of 
loaned securities would need to be delivered by T+3 to be available to 
close out any fails on sales marked ``long'' by the beginning of 
regular trading hours on T+4. Accordingly, under a T+1 settlement 
cycle, broker-dealers that lend securities pursuant to a recall period 
of three business days would need to initiate a bona fide recall on 
trade date (i.e., T+0), and those brokers that lend securities pursuant 
to a recall period of two business days would need to initiate a bona 
fide recall by T+1, in order to close out any failure to deliver on 
sales marked ``long'' by the beginning of regular trading hours in T+4. 
The Commission understands, however, that under a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle, at least some broker-dealers would be likely to 
modify their securities lending agreements to shorten the recall period 
to one settlement day after the initiation of the recall.\204\ Under 
such agreements, a bona fide recall would need to be initiated by T+2 
in order to meet the applicable closeout period for long sales. Figure 
4 provides a diagram of close-out scenarios in a T+1 environment.
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    \204\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 24-25.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP24FE22.003
    
2. Financial Responsibility Rules Under the Exchange Act
    Certain provisions of the Commission's broker-dealer financial 
responsibility rules \205\ reference explicitly or implicitly the 
settlement date of a securities transaction. For example, paragraph (m) 
of Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3 references the settlement date to prescribe 
the timeframe in which a broker-dealer must complete certain sell 
orders on behalf of customers.\206\ Specifically, Rule 15c3-3(m) 
provides that if a broker-dealer executes a sell order of a customer 
(other than an order to execute a sale of securities which the seller 
does not own) and if for any reason whatever the broker-dealer has not 
obtained possession of the securities from the customer within ten 
business days after the settlement date, the broker-dealer must 
immediately close the transaction with the customer by purchasing 
securities of like kind and quantity.\207\ In addition, settlement date 
is incorporated into paragraph (c)(9) of Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1,\208\ 
which

[[Page 10463]]

defines what it means to ``promptly transmit'' funds and ``promptly 
deliver'' securities within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and 
(a)(2)(v) of Rule 15c3-1.\209\ The concepts of promptly transmitting 
funds and promptly delivering securities are incorporated in other 
provisions of the financial responsibility rules as well, including 
paragraphs (k)(1)(iii), (k)(2)(i), and (k)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3-3,\210\ 
paragraph (e)(1)(A) of Rule 17a-5,\211\ and paragraph (a)(3) of Rule 
17a-13.\212\
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    \205\ For purposes of this release, the term ``financial 
responsibility rules'' includes any rule adopted by the Commission 
pursuant to Sections 8, 15(c)(3), 17(a) or 17(e)(1)(A) of the 
Exchange Act, any rule adopted by the Commission relating to 
hypothecation or lending of customer securities, or any rule adopted 
by the Commission relating to the protection of funds or securities. 
The Commission's broker-dealer financial responsibility rules 
include 17 CFR 240.15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-3, 17a-4, 17a-5, 17a-11, and 
17a-13.
    \206\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(m).
    \207\ However, paragraph (m) of Rule 15c3-3 provides that the 
term ``customer'' for the purpose of paragraph (m) does not include 
a broker or dealer who maintains an omnibus credit account with 
another broker or dealer in compliance with Rule 7(f) of Regulation 
T (12 CFR 220.7(f)).
    \208\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(9).
    \209\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(v).
    \210\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(k)(1)(iii), (k)(2)(i)-(ii).
    \211\ 17 CFR 240.17a-5(e)(1)(A).
    \212\ 17 CFR 240.17a-13(a)(3).
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    The Commission acknowledges that shortening the standard settlement 
cycle to T+1 will effectively reduce the number of days (from 12 
business days to 11 business days) that a broker-dealer will have to 
obtain possession of customer securities before being required to close 
out a customer transaction under Rule 15c3-3(m). The operations 
supporting the processing of customer orders by broker-dealers and the 
technology supporting those operations have developed substantially 
since 1972, when the Commission adopted paragraph (m) of Rule 15c3-
3.\213\ Based on staff experience, the Commission believes that these 
developments have resulted in a lower frequency of broker-dealers 
failing to obtain possession of the securities from their customers 
within 10 business days after the settlement date. Therefore, the 
Commission believes that these developments in technology and broker-
dealer operations diminish the potential for customers to be adversely 
affected by the change from 12 business days to 11 business days. 
Accordingly, the Commission believes that the change from 12 business 
days to 11 business days would not materially burden broker-dealers or 
their customers,\214\ and the Commission believes that it is 
unnecessary to amend Rule 15c3-3(m), or any of the broker-dealer 
financial responsibility rules, at this time.
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    \213\ See Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 
Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10, 1972), 37 FR 25224 (Nov. 29, 
1972) (``Rule 15c3-3 Adopting Release'').
    \214\ See infra Part V.C.3 (discussing the economic implications 
of shortening the settlement cycle on Rule 15c3-3).
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    The Commission solicits comment regarding the effect that 
shortening the standard settlement cycle from T+2 to T+1 could have on 
the ability of broker-dealers to comply with the Commission's financial 
responsibility rules.
3. Rule 10b-10 Under the Exchange Act
    Providing customers with confirmations pursuant to Rule 10b-10 
serves a significant investor protection function.\215\ Confirmations 
provide customers with a means of verifying the terms of their 
transactions, alerting investors to potential conflicts of interest 
with their broker-dealers, acting as a safeguard against fraud, and 
providing investors a means to evaluate the costs of their transactions 
and the quality of their broker-dealers' execution.\216\
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    \215\ 17 CFR 240.10b-10.
    \216\ See Confirmation Requirements for Transactions of Security 
Futures Products Effected in Futures Accounts, Exchange Act Release 
No. 46471 (Sept. 6, 2002), 67 FR 58302, 58303 (Sept. 13, 2002).
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    Although Rule 10b-10 does not directly refer to the settlement 
cycle, it requires that a broker-dealer send a customer a written 
confirmation disclosing specified information ``at or before 
completion'' of the transaction, which Rule 10b-10 defines to have the 
meaning provided in the definition of the term in Rule 15c1-1 under the 
Exchange Act.\217\ Generally, Rule 15c1-1 defines ``completion of the 
transaction'' to mean the time when: (i) A customer purchasing a 
security pays for any part of the purchase price after payment is 
requested or notification is given that payment is due; (ii) a security 
is delivered or transferred to a customer who purchases and makes 
payment for it before payment is requested or notification is given 
that payment is due; (iii) a security is delivered or transferred to a 
broker-dealer from a customer who sells the security and delivers it to 
the broker-dealer after delivery is requested or notification is given 
that delivery is due; or (iv) a broker-dealer makes payment to a 
customer who sells a security and delivers it to the broker-dealer 
before delivery is requested or notification is given that delivery is 
due.\218\
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    \217\ See 17 CFR 240.10b-10(d)(2).
    \218\ See 17 CFR 240.15c1-1(b).
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    When first adopting Rule 15c6-1 in 1993 to establish a T+3 
settlement cycle, the Commission noted that broker-dealers typically 
send customer confirmations on the day after the trade date.\219\ When 
adopting a T+2 settlement cycle in 2017, the Commission stated that, 
while broker-dealers may continue to send physical customer 
confirmations on the day after the trade date, broker-dealers may also 
send electronic confirmations to customers on the trade date. 
Accordingly, the Commission noted its belief that implementation of a 
T+2 settlement cycle would not create problems with regard to a broker-
dealer's ability to comply with the requirement under Rule 10b-10 to 
send a confirmation ``at or before completion'' of the transaction, but 
acknowledged that broker-dealers would have a shorter timeframe to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 10b-10 in a T+2 settlement 
cycle.\220\ With respect to a T+1 standard settlement cycle, the 
Commission similarly believes that T+1 would not create a compliance 
issue for broker-dealers under Rule 10b-10, although broker-dealers 
would have a further shortened timeframe to do so in a T+1 settlement 
cycle. In addition, as explained in Part III.D, proposed Rule 15c6-2 
also would not alter the requirements of Rule 10b-10.\221\
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    \219\ T+3 Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 52908.
    \220\ T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15579.
    \221\ See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the relationship 
between a ``confirmation'' under proposed Rule 15c6-2 and existing 
Rule 10b-10).
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    The Commission solicits comment on the extent to which the T+1 rule 
proposals may impact compliance with Rule 10b-10. In the T+1 Report, 
the ISC recommends clarifying what constitutes ``delivery'' for 
electronic confirmations under Rule 10b-10. The Commission has 
previously provided such guidance.\222\ The Commission therefore 
solicits comment on whether this guidance needs to be updated in a T+1 
environment.
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    \222\ See generally Use of Electronic Media for Delivery 
Purposes, Exchange Act Release No. 36345 (Oct. 6, 1995) (``1995 
Release'') (providing Commission views on the use of electronic 
media to deliver information to investors, with a focus on 
electronic delivery of prospectuses, annual reports to security 
holders and proxy solicitation materials under the federal 
securities laws); Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, 
Transfer Agents, and Investment Advisers for Delivery of 
Information, Exchange Act Release No. 37182 (May 9, 1996) (``1996 
Release'') (providing Commission views on electronic delivery of 
required information by broker-dealers, transfer agents and 
investment advisers); Use of Electronic Media, Exchange Act Release 
No. 42728 (Apr. 28, 2000) (``2000 Release'') (providing updated 
interpretive guidance on the use of electronic media to deliver 
documents on matters such as telephonic and global consent; issuer 
liability for website content; and legal principles that should be 
considered in conducting online offerings). Under the guidance, the 
Commission's framework for electronic delivery consists of the 
following elements: (1) Notice to the investor that information is 
available electronically; (2) access to information comparable to 
that which would have been provided in paper form and that is not so 
burdensome that the intended recipients cannot effectively access 
it; and (3) evidence to show delivery (i.e., reason to believe that 
electronically delivered information will result in the satisfaction 
of the delivery requirements under the federal securities laws). See 
1996 Release at 24646-47.

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[[Page 10464]]

4. Prospectus Delivery and ``Access Versus Delivery''
    Broker-dealers have to comply with prospectus delivery obligations 
under the Securities Act.\223\ As discussed in Part III.A.4, Securities 
Act Rule 172 implements an ``access equals delivery'' model that 
permits, with certain exceptions, final prospectus delivery obligations 
to be satisfied by the filing of a final prospectus with the 
Commission, rather than delivery of the prospectus to purchasers.\224\
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    \223\ 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq. Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities 
Act makes it unlawful to deliver (i.e., as part of settlement) a 
security ``unless accompanied or preceded'' by a prospectus that 
meets the requirements of Section 10(a) of the Act (known as a 
``final prospectus''). 15 U.S.C. 77e(b)(2).
    \224\ 15 U.S.C. 77e(b)(2); 17 CFR 230.172. Under Securities Act 
Rule 172(b), an obligation under Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities 
Act to have a prospectus that satisfies the requirements of Section 
10(a) of the Act precede or accompany the delivery of a security in 
a registered offering is satisfied only if the conditions specified 
in paragraph (c) of Rule 172 are met. 17 CFR 230.172(b). Pursuant to 
Rule 172(d), ``access equals delivery'' generally is not available 
to the offerings of most registered investment companies (e.g., 
mutual funds), business combination transactions, or offerings 
registered on Form S-8. 17 CFR 230.172(d). The Commission recently 
amended Rule 172 to allow registered closed-end funds and business 
development companies to rely on the rule. See Securities Offering 
Reform for Closed-End Investment Companies, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 33836 (Apr. 8, 2020), 85 FR 33353 (June 1, 2020).
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that, if a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle is implemented, such a standard settlement cycle would 
not raise any significant legal or operational concerns for issuers or 
broker-dealers to comply with the prospectus delivery obligations under 
the Securities Act.
    The Commission requests comment on whether commenters believe any 
specific legal or operational concerns would arise for issuers or 
broker-dealers to comply with the prospectus delivery obligations under 
the Securities Act if the settlement cycle is shortened to T+1. The 
Commission asks that commenters identify specific examples of the 
circumstances in which such legal or operational difficulties could 
occur.
    The Commission also requests comment on the extent to which the T+1 
rule proposals may impact compliance with the prospectus delivery 
requirements under the Securities Act.
5. Changes to SRO Rules and Operations
    As with the T+2 transition, the Commission anticipates that the 
proposed transition to T+1 would again require changes to SRO rules and 
operations to achieve consistency with a T+1 standard settlement cycle. 
Certain SRO rules reference existing Rule 15c6-1 or currently define 
``regular way'' settlement as occurring on T+2 and, as such, may need 
to be amended in connection with shortening the standard settlement 
cycle to T+1. Certain timeframes or deadlines in SRO rules also may 
refer to the settlement date, either expressly or indirectly. In such 
cases, the SROs may need to amend these rules in connection with 
shortening the settlement cycle to T+1.\225\
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    \225\ The T+1 Report similarly indicates that SROs will likely 
need to update their rules to facilitate a transition to a T+1 
standard settlement cycle. T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 35-36.
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    Because the Commission is also proposing two other rule changes to 
facilitate a T+1 standard settlement cycle, SRO rules and operations 
may be affected to a greater extent than occurred during the T+2 
transition. For example, while elements of FINRA Rule 11860 could be 
used to facilitate compliance with proposed Rule 15c6-2, FINRA Rule 
11860 currently requires that affirmations be completed no later than 
the day after trade date and may need to be amended to align with the 
requirements in proposed Rule 15c6-2.
    The Commission solicits comment on the extent to which the T+1 rule 
proposals may impact existing SRO rules and operations.

F. Proposed Compliance Date

    Industry planning and testing was critical to ensuring an orderly 
transition from a T+3 standard settlement cycle to T+2, and the 
Commission anticipates that planning and testing would again be 
critical to ensuring an orderly transition to a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle, if adopted. Accordingly, the Commission recognizes that the 
compliance date for the above rule proposals, if adopted, must allow 
sufficient time for broker-dealers, investment advisers, clearing 
agencies, and other market participants to plan for, implement, and 
test changes to their systems, operations, policies, and procedures in 
a manner that allows for an orderly transition. The Commission also 
recognizes that the compliance date must provide sufficient time for 
broker-dealers and other market participants to engage in outreach and 
education regarding the transition to ensure that, among other things, 
their customers, including individual retail investors, have time to 
prepare for operational or other changes related to a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle.
    The Commission is mindful that failure to appropriately implement 
an orderly transition to T+1, if a T+1 standard settlement cycle is 
adopted, may heighten certain operational risks for the U.S. securities 
markets. However, the Commission is also mindful that delaying the 
transition to a T+1 standard settlement cycle further than is necessary 
would delay the realization of the risk reducing and other benefits 
expected under a T+1 standard settlement cycle.\226\ The DTCC White 
Paper contemplated that a transition to T+1 is achievable in the second 
half of 2023,\227\ and the T+1 Report states that a T+1 transition is 
achievable in the first half of 2024. The T+1 Report estimates that 
planning for testing will begin in Q4 2022, that industry-wide testing 
will begin in Q2 2023, and that industry-wide testing will need to 
occur for one full year before implementation of a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle.\228\ The T+1 Report also states that, once 
``regulatory certainty and guidance is achieved, the industry 
anticipates a lengthy and necessary amount of time will be required for 
T+1 implementation.'' \229\
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    \226\ See infra Part V.C (discussing the anticipated benefits of 
a T+1 standard settlement cycle).
    \227\ DTCC White Paper, supra note 61, at 8.
    \228\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at Fig. 1.
    \229\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 6-7.
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    With these dates and considerations in mind, the Commission 
believes that market participants should prepare expeditiously for a 
T+1 transition and proposes a compliance date of March 31, 2024.\230\ 
If the proposed rules and rule amendments presented in this release are 
adopted as proposed, the Commission believes that the systems and 
operational changes necessary at the industry level can be planned, 
tested, and implemented in advance of March 31, 2024. Although the T+1 
Report estimates that planning for testing will not begin until Q4 
2022, and that industry-wide testing will not begin until Q2 2023,\231\ 
the Commission believes that market participants can implement a T+1 
standard settlement cycle by the earlier end of the T+1 Report's 
overall time table. Specifically, planning for testing could begin 
sooner than Q4 2022, so that industry-wide testing can begin in early 
2023 and conclude in early 2024, in advance of the proposed compliance 
date.
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    \230\ Notwithstanding the proposed compliance date, market 
participants could still coordinate to establish an earlier T+1 
transition date as needed to ensure effective planning, testing, and 
implementation.
    \231\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at Fig. 1.
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    70. The Commission solicits comment on whether the proposed March 
31, 2024 compliance date is appropriate for each of the four proposed 
rules (Rule 15c6-1, Rule 15c6-2, Rule 17Ad-27,

[[Page 10465]]

and the amendment to Rule 204-2(a)). How many months would market 
participants need to plan, test, and implement a transition to T+1? 
What data points would market participants use to assess the timing for 
planning, testing, and implementation? Are any specific operational or 
technological issues raised by the proposed compliance date? To what 
extent does the proposed compliance date align or not align with 
typical practices related to the planning and testing of systems or 
other technology changes among affected parties, such as market 
participants, broker-dealers, investment advisers, or clearing 
agencies? For example, to achieve a compliance date of March 31, 2024, 
to what extent, if any, would these parties (and market participants 
more generally) have to consider an implementation date that is earlier 
than March 31, 2024? Why? Please explain.
    71. What is the extent of planning and testing necessary to achieve 
an orderly transition to a T+1 standard settlement cycle, if adopted? 
In responding to this request for comment, commenters should provide 
specific data and any other relevant information necessary to explain 
the extent of industry-wide planning and testing that would be required 
to ensure an orderly transition to the proposed T+1 settlement cycle by 
March 31, 2024.
    72. The Commission has proposed a single compliance date applicable 
to each of the four proposed rules. Would staggering the compliance 
dates for these rules help facilitate an orderly transition to a T+1 
settlement cycle, if adopted? For example, should the compliance date 
for Rule 15c6-2, if adopted, fall before the compliance date for Rule 
15c6-1, to ensure an orderly transition to a T+1 settlement cycle, if 
adopted? If staggering would be appropriate, what would be an 
appropriate schedule of compliance dates? Would staggering the 
compliance dates introduce impediments to an orderly T+1 settlement 
cycle transition? If so, please describe.

IV. Pathways to T+0

    The Commission uses T+0 in this release to refer to settlement that 
is complete by the end of trade date.\232\ This has sometimes been 
referred to as same-day settlement. In the Commission's preliminary 
view, same-day settlement could occur pursuant to at least three 
different models: (i) Netted settlement at the end of the day on T+0; 
(ii) real-time settlement, where transactions are settled in real time 
or near real time and presumably on a gross basis (i.e., without any 
netting applied to reduce the overall number of open positions); and 
(iii) ``rolling'' settlement, where trades are netted and settled 
intraday on a recurring basis. In this release, the Commission uses T+0 
to refer specifically to netted settlement at the end of the day on 
T+0. The Commission believes that this model of same-day settlement is 
currently the most appropriate to consider applying to the standard 
settlement cycle after implementation of T+1, if adopted, because it 
retains a core element of the existing settlement infrastructure--
namely, the application of multilateral netting at the end of trade 
date to reduce the overall number of open positions before completing 
settlement.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
    \233\ In Part IV.B, the Commission solicits comment on the 
merits of this model versus the others described, as well as any 
other potential settlement models.
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that implementing a T+0 
standard settlement cycle would have similar benefits of market, 
credit, and liquidity risk reduction that were realized in the 
shortening of the settlement cycle from T+3 to T+2 and are expected in 
moving from a T+2 to a T+1 standard settlement cycle. In particular, 
shortening from a T+2 standard settlement cycle to a T+0 standard might 
result in a larger reduction in certain settlement risks than would 
result from shortening to a T+1 standard because the risks associated 
with counterparty default tend to increase with time.\234\ Similarly, 
because price volatility is a concave function of time,\235\ the 
shorter settlement cycle in a T+0 environment will reduce expected 
price volatility to a greater extent than in a T+1 environment.\236\ In 
addition, assuming constant trading volume, the volume of unsettled 
trades for a T+0 settlement cycle could be roughly half that from a T+1 
settlement cycle, and, as a result, for any given adverse movement in 
prices, the financial losses resulting from counterparty default could 
be half that expected in a T+1 settlement cycle.\237\
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    \234\ See T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15598.
    \235\ If price changes are uncorrelated across time periods then 
the variance of price change over T periods is T times the variance 
over a single period. Therefore, the standard deviation of price 
changes over T periods is T1/2 times the standard 
deviation over a single period.
    \236\ See id.
    \237\ See id.
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    The Commission believes that now is the time to begin identifying 
potential paths to achieving T+0. Thus, the Commission is actively 
assessing the benefits and costs associated with accelerating the 
standard settlement cycle to T+0. As the securities industry plans how 
to implement a T+1 standard settlement cycle, this process should 
include consideration of the potential paths to achieving T+0 to help 
ensure that investments in new technology and operations undertaken to 
achieve T+1 can maximize the value of such investments over the long 
term. In this way, the transition to a T+1 settlement cycle can be a 
useful step in identifying potential paths to T+0.
    The Commission is also mindful of some perceived challenges to 
implementing a T+0 standard settlement cycle in the immediate future 
identified by market participants. As discussed above,\238\ the T+1 
Report states that T+0 is ``not achievable in the short term given the 
current state of the settlement ecosystem'' and would require an 
``overall modernization'' of modern-day clearance and settlement 
infrastructure, changes to business models, revisions to industry-wide 
regulatory frameworks, and the potential implementation of real-time 
currency movements to facilitate such a change.\239\ The T+1 Report 
identified ``key areas'' that industry groups determined would be 
impacted by a move to T+0 settlement, including re-engineering of 
securities processing; securities netting; funding requirements for 
securities transactions; securities lending practices; prime brokerage 
practices; global settlement; and primary offerings, derivatives 
markets and corporate actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
    \239\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 10; see also supra notes 76-
77 and accompanying text (discussing the same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To advance the discussion of developing and achieving a T+0 
standard settlement cycle, the Commission solicits comment on potential 
approaches to overcoming the operational and other barriers identified 
by market participants for shortening the standard settlement cycle 
beyond T+1. Specifically, the Commission in Part IV.A discusses three 
potential approaches that could be used to implement a T+0 settlement 
cycle, and solicits comment on all aspects of the approaches described. 
The Commission also discusses in Part IV.B the operational and other 
challenges that market participants have identified for implementing 
T+0, and solicits comment on the building blocks necessary to address 
or resolve those challenges to enable a T+0 settlement cycle.

[[Page 10466]]

A. Possible Approaches to Achieving T+0

    To facilitate discussion of T+0 settlement, the Commission has 
identified three possible approaches or frameworks for considering how 
to implement T+0 settlement. These are presented not as an exhaustive, 
complete, or discrete list of pathways but rather as example cases that 
help illustrate the range of potential approaches, or combination of 
approaches, that might be useful in facilitating investments that 
improve the efficiency of the National C&S System, including the 
ability to implement a T+0 standard settlement cycle. The Commission 
provides these examples to help facilitate comment on the implications 
of a T+0 standard settlement cycle and the mechanics of implementation, 
as well as their potential impact on the challenges identified in Part 
IV.B. Comments received will help inform any future proposals.
1. Wide-Scale Implementation
    One possible path to shortening the settlement cycle from T+1 to 
T+0 involves a wide effort, led by the Commission or an industry 
working group, to develop and publish documents like the ISG White 
Paper, the T+2 Playbook, and now the T+1 Report, in which industry 
experts identify the full set of potential impediments to T+0, propose 
solutions, and develop a timeline for education, testing, and 
implementation.
    While this approach would mirror past efforts to shorten the 
settlement cycle, it necessarily requires industry-wide solutions to 
the impediments identified with respect to T+0, such as those that may 
be related to the considerations in Part IV.B. For this reason, the 
Commission believes that it may be helpful to consider two alternative 
paths to T+0: (i) An approach where implementation begins first with 
technology and operational changes by key infrastructure providers; and 
(ii) an approach where exchanges and clearing agencies offer pilots or 
similar small-scale programs to establish T+0 as an optional settlement 
cycle in certain circumstances.
2. Staggered Implementation Beginning With Key Infrastructure
    An alternative approach to shortening the settlement cycle from T+1 
to T+0 could begin by focusing efforts on improving key settlement 
infrastructure to support wide-scale implementation of T+0 settlement 
cycle. Such an approach could involve the development of industry-led 
or academic research designed to identify the key improvements and to 
promote engagement with respect to development and implementation.
    Under this approach, a key assumption is that achieving a T+0 
standard settlement cycle, or the benefits anticipated from it, may not 
be possible until existing market infrastructure has sufficient 
capacity to support the full range of market participants who would 
settle their transactions on T+0, and that the challenges to achieving 
T+0 derive, in part, from insufficient capacity or capability to serve 
those market participants. Infrastructure providers have used this 
approach in the past to develop, test, and implement new technologies 
and services before wide-scale release. For example, as discussed in 
Part II.C, following implementation of a T+2 standard settlement cycle, 
DTCC began to pursue two sets of initiatives, accelerated settlement 
and settlement optimization, designed to improve its own infrastructure 
to support more efficient settlement processes. A similar effort 
following implementation of T+1 could identify improvements to existing 
infrastructure that could address the challenges identified in Part 
IV.B. For example, infrastructure providers like DTCC could explore 
mechanisms that expand the availability of money settlement, as 
discussed further in Part IV.B.3, or reduce the timing challenges 
associated with T+0 settlement, as discussed in Part IV.B.8.
3. Tiered Implementation Beginning With Pilot Programs
    Exchanges and clearing agencies have often deployed new 
technologies in targeted environments to test new functionality and 
service offerings on a small scale. This approach could allow market 
participants to test T+0 settlement in a targeted environment, such as 
using a specific exchange or exchanges, specific securities, and/or 
specific settlement services at a registered clearing agency. SROs 
could consider pilot proposals that could help advance development of 
the operational and technological resources necessary to enable T+0 
settlement.
    For example, DTCC began exploring the use of distributed ledger in 
2015, completed its Project ION case study in 2020,\240\ and recently 
announced plans to deploy its ION platform through its ``minimal viable 
product'' pilot program.\241\ According to DTCC, the ION MVP program is 
a mechanism for NSCC and DTC participants to test the use of 
distributed ledger technology alongside ``classic'' settlement 
infrastructure at NSCC and DTC.\242\ Similarly, BOX Exchange LLC 
recently implemented its Boston Security Token Exchange (``BSTX'') 
platform to enable access to accelerated settlement for certain 
securities.\243\ In India, where the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India recently announced plans to implement a T+1 settlement cycle, the 
securities regulator plans to allow local stock exchanges to offer T+1 
settlement on certain securities, while retaining a T+2 settlement 
cycle for others. Each case presents examples where new technologies 
are offered on a select basis, such as on certain exchanges or for 
certain securities, in ways that could allow market participants to 
begin to adapt to T+0 settlement on an incremental basis in a 
controlled environment.
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    \240\ See DTCC, Project ION Case Study (May 2020), https://
www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/settlement-asset-services/user-
documentation/Project-ION-Paper-2020.pdf.
    \241\ See Press Release, DTCC, DTCC's Project ION Platform Moves 
to Development Phase Following Successful Pilot with Industry (Sept. 
15, 2021), https://www.dtcc.com/news/2021/september/15/dtccs-project-ion-platform-moves-to-development-phase-following-successful-pilot-with-industry.
    \242\ See id. To the extent that elements of the ION MVP program 
constitute rules, policies, or procedures of NSCC or DTC, it may be 
subject to the requirements for submitting proposed rule changes 
under Section 19 of the Exchange Act and Rule 19b-4. See 15 U.S.C. 
78s(b); 17 CFR 240.19b-4. To the extent that this proposal would 
involve changes to rules, procedures, and operations that could 
materially affect the nature or level of risk presented by NSCC or 
DTC, they may also be required to submit an Advance Notice under the 
Dodd-Frank Act. See 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1)(A); 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n).
    \243\ See Exchange Act Release No. 94092 (Jan. 27, 2022), 87 FR 
5881 (Feb. 2, 2022) (order approving a proposed rule change to adopt 
rules governing the listing and trading of equity securities on BOX 
Exchange LLC through a facility of BOX Exchange LLC to be known as 
BSTX LLC).
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    Such an approach potentially allows market participants to achieve 
T+0 without having to first address all of the challenges described in 
Part IV.B for all market participants, instead enabling experimentation 
and innovation to find solutions for certain segments over time. This 
could help minimize one challenge noted in the T+1 Report: That T+0 
would likely require the adoption of new technologies, implementation 
costs that would disproportionately fall on small and medium-sized 
firms that rely on manual processing or legacy systems and may lack the 
resources to modernize their infrastructure rapidly.\244\
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    \244\ See T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 10; see also supra notes 
77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the same); infra note 385 
and accompanying text (noting that some benefits may accrue to those 
market participants with high market power).

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[[Page 10467]]

B. Issues To Consider for Implementing T+0

    Below the Commission describes several challenges identified as 
impediments to implementing a T+0 standard settlement cycle, 
particularly in the short term. The Commission requests comment on 
these challenges, as well as any comments identifying other challenges 
or necessary building blocks associated with implementing T+0. More 
generally, with respect to each of these topics, the Commission 
solicits comment on ways to improve the efficiency of and reduce the 
risks that can result from the post-trade processes implicated by each 
of these challenges. The Commission is particularly interested in 
commenters that identify potential methods or building blocks that can 
enable T+0. In considering the below topics, the Commission also 
requests that commenters assess whether the three approaches identified 
in Part IV.A might affect the analysis of the below or otherwise reveal 
potential methods for addressing and implementing them.
1. Maintaining Multilateral Netting at the End of Trade Date
    As discussed in Part II.B.1, multilateral netting by the CCP is an 
essential feature of the National C&S System. By substantially reducing 
the volume and value of transactions in equity securities that need to 
be settled each day, CCP netting unlocks substantial capital 
efficiencies for market participants while, at the same time, reducing 
credit, market, and liquidity risk in the National C&S System. While 
the Commission continues to consider how new technologies and business 
practices in the industry might further reduce risk and promote capital 
efficiency, the Commission preliminarily believes that the capital 
efficiencies and risk reduction benefits that result from the use of 
multilateral netting make it unlikely that market participants could 
cost-effectively implement a T+0 standard settlement cycle without the 
continued use of multilateral netting in some form.\245\
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    \245\ See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the capital efficiencies 
and risk reducing effects that result from the use of multilateral 
netting).
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    In particular, at this time the Commission believes that a 
transition from T+1 settlement to real-time settlement could not be 
achieved without substantial and significant changes to fundamental 
elements of market structure and infrastructure because real-time 
settlement, to the extent it requires gross settlement would prevent 
the use of, or significantly reduce the utility of, multilateral 
netting before settlement. If market participants develop technologies 
and business practices that can support the use of a real-time 
settlement system in the U.S. at some point in the future, the 
Commission is interested in understanding how such technologies might 
interact with existing infrastructure that provides multilateral 
netting. Indeed, retaining multilateral netting in a T+0 environment 
poses challenges that include accommodating the submission of trades 
for clearing during and after the close of regular trading hours while 
still producing netting results with sufficient time to enable market 
participants to position their cash and securities to achieve final 
settlement before money settlement systems close for the day.\246\ The 
Commission observes that existing processes and computational tools 
used to complete the processing and settlement of trades currently rely 
on significantly more time than the few hours between the close of 
regular trading hours and the close of money settlement systems on a 
given day.
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    \246\ Part IV.B.3 discusses existing limitations in money 
settlement infrastructure that may contribute to this challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is interested in receiving public comments on both 
the utility of centralized multilateral netting as a feature of the 
National C&S System and any potential impediments or challenges 
associated with retaining such netting functionality while shortening 
the settlement cycle to T+0. The Commission is also interested in 
receiving public comments on potential benefits or costs associated 
with real-time settlement. In particular the Commission requests 
comment on the following:
    73. Is it possible to shorten the settlement cycle in the U.S. 
markets to T+0 and retain multilateral netting? If so, what is the 
earliest time on T+0 that market participants could be prepared to 
settle their trades without eliminating multilateral netting, and what 
changes, if any, to existing netting processes would be necessary to 
move to a T+0 settlement cycle?
    74. Could a real-time settlement model be successfully deployed in 
the National C&S System in a way that compliments the use of 
multilateral netting? If yes, please explain. For example, most 
institutional trades that use bank custodians generally are not 
submitted to CNS for netting. Would it be possible to settle those 
trades in a real-time settlement model while other trading activity 
would continue to rely on multilateral netting? Alternatively, would it 
be beneficial to find ways to move more institutional trades into 
multilateral netting processes, such as by expanding access to 
multilateral netting systems to custodians? Why or why not? What are 
the impediments to expanding access to custodians?
    75. If real-time settlement is not possible without eliminating or 
substantially curtailing multilateral netting activity, please explain.
    76. If real-time settlement is not compatible with multilateral 
netting, would the potential benefits of real-time gross settlement 
still justify the elimination of multilateral netting in the National 
C&S System? Please explain why or why not.
    77. What impact would the elimination of multilateral netting have 
on capital demands (e.g., margin requirements) imposed on market 
participants in connection with their settlement obligations? To the 
extent possible, please include any quantitative estimates or data that 
may be relevant to the request for comment.
    78. How would the elimination of multilateral netting impact 
overall levels of market, liquidity and credit risk in the clearance 
and settlement system and how might such risks be distributed among 
market participants?
    79. Are there disadvantages to multilateral netting and, if so, 
what are they? Does multilateral netting mandate the use of agreed 
timeframes to determine which trades will be included in netting (for 
example, trades settling on or executed on a given day or within a 
given hour)? Why or why not? Are there netting activities that 
currently only happen once a day that might need to occur more often 
for trades to settle at the end of trade date? If so, what are they and 
are there benefits, costs or risks to performing these activities more 
than once a day?
    80. Does multilateral netting foster or require the use of batch 
processing? Does multilateral netting necessitate sequential processing 
activities that impede the adoption of same-day settlement? Why or why 
not? For example, do introducing broker-dealers that maintain omnibus 
accounts at clearing broker-dealers need to net their activity prior to 
submitting net trades to their clearing broker-dealers who, in turn, 
have a dependency before being able to calculate their own net figures? 
Are there computational or other technology upgrades that could be 
employed to accelerate these processes so that they could continue to 
function effectively under the shortened timeframes available in a T+0 
environment? Are there other settlement

[[Page 10468]]

models, such as those deploying intraday or rolling settlement, that 
could improve the settlement process in such a way that facilitates an 
effective multilateral netting process at the end of the day in a T+0 
environment?
2. Achieving Same-Day Settlement Processing
    Moving settlement to the end of trade date would significantly 
compress the array of operational activities and processes required to 
achieve settlement, raising questions about whether the current 
arrangement of settlement processes can support T+0 settlement.
    For example, in the current T+2 settlement environment, DTC 
processes certain transactions for settlement during the day on 
settlement date and other transactions the night before settlement date 
(``S-1'') during the so-called ``night cycle,'' which begins at 8:30 
p.m. on S-1. Processing transactions during the night cycle allows for 
earlier settlement of certain transactions that are included in the 
night cycle, thereby reducing counterparty risk and, with respect to 
transactions that are cleared through NSCC, enables such transactions 
to be removed from members' marginable portfolios, which in turn 
reduces such members' NSCC margin requirements.
    DTC uses a process called the ``Night Batch Process'' to control 
the order of processing of transactions in the night cycle.\247\ During 
the Night Batch Process, DTC evaluates each participant's available 
positions, transaction priority and risk management controls, and 
identifies the transaction processing order that optimizes the number 
of transactions processed for settlement. The Night Batch Process 
allows DTC to run multiple processing scenarios until it identifies an 
optimal processing scenario. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on S-1, DTC 
subjects all transactions eligible for processing to the Night Batch 
Process, which is run in an ``off-line'' batch that is not visible to 
participants, allowing DTC to run multiple processing scenarios until 
the optimal processing scenario is identified. The results of the Night 
Batch Process are incorporated back into DTC's core processing 
environment on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
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    \247\ See DTC, Settlement Service Guide, at 68 (June 24, 2021), 
https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/Downloads/legal/service-guides/Settlement.pdf.
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    Because trade date and settlement date would be the same day in a 
T+0 environment, shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+0 would 
require DTC and its participants to initiate and complete their 
settlement processes much sooner relative to the time a trade is 
executed and without the benefit of any overnight processes. 
Compressing timeframes to achieve T+0 settlement necessarily removes 
the ability to perform any settlement activities on S-1. This has 
implications for how DTC conducts its existing ``night cycle'' process 
but, more broadly, for all the market participants who collect trading 
information that feeds into the night cycle process and any systems 
that they run overnight to prepare for settlement. Moving to a T+0 
settlement cycle would also impact the processing timeframes for 
corporate actions.
    The Commission requests public comment regarding the prospective 
impact that shortening the settlement cycle to T+0 would have on 
settlement processes such as those described above. In particular, the 
Commission requests comment on the following:
    81. Would shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+0 allow 
sufficient time for settlement processes that are currently conducted 
by DTC and its participants to be completed on a timeframe that is 
compatible with timely settlement? If not, why not?
    82. When would be the optimal time to complete existing processes 
that occur on S-1 in a T+0 environment? More generally, how would 
existing settlement processes that occur on S-1 need to change to 
accommodate a T+0 standard settlement cycle?
    83. What would be the impact on market participants (clearing 
agencies, broker-dealers, buy side participants, retail investors, 
etc.) of any changes in processes necessary to accommodate T+0?
    84. What risks, if any, arise by the compression of the settlement 
cycle to accommodate T+0, particularly as it relates to market, credit, 
liquidity, and systemic risk? What are the associated costs of these 
risks? How might these risks affect the market, trading behaviors, 
investors (both retail and institutional), and innovation? Is 
mitigation of these risks feasible, and if so, how?
3. Enhancing Money Settlement
    To achieve final settlement on settlement date, DTCC and its 
clearing agency participants rely on access to two systems operated by 
the Federal Reserve Board, the National Settlement Service and 
Fedwire.\248\ These systems settle the cash portions of securities 
transactions. Final settlement at NSS and Fedwire currently must occur 
by 6:30 p.m., leaving little time in a T+0 environment for market 
participants to settle their positions in an end-of-day process after 
most major U.S. stock exchanges typically close at 4:00 p.m. Although 
Fedwire (but not NSS) reopens at 9:00 p.m., payments posted are 
processed overnight and, like NSCC/DTC securities movements processed 
during the night cycle, do not settle until the following day. NSS is 
available throughout the trading day, although currently DTCC only 
makes use of it at defined points during the day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ See id. at 18-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    85. To achieve T+0, would NSS and FedWire services need to have 
their availability expanded? If so, how? What timeframes (both minimum 
and desired standards) would be necessary to accommodate T+0?
    86. What other changes to NSS or FedWire, if any, would be 
necessary to accommodate a T+0 settlement environment? If the available 
windows for NSS or FedWire were to change, what changes would market 
participants need to make to their own systems and processes to 
accommodate such changes?
    87. Are there ways to manage the money settlement process in a T+0 
environment that do not require changes to NSS or FedWire? Please 
explain.
4. Mutual Fund and ETF Processing
    Purchases and redemptions of shares of open-end mutual funds 
generally settle today on a T+1 basis, except for certain retail funds 
and ETFs sold through intermediaries,\249\ which typically settle on 
T+2. For open-end funds, several mutual fund families offer investors 
the ability to open an account directly with the fund's transfer agent 
and trade through that account. In other cases, orders are placed with 
intermediaries, such as broker-dealers, banks and retirement plan 
recordkeepers. Much of this intermediary activity is processed through 
DTCC's Fund/SERV system, in which intermediaries submit orders through 
Fund/SERV that are then routed to mutual fund transfer agents to be 
executed at the current net asset value (``NAV'') \250\ next calculated 
by the fund's administrator after receipt of the order, pursuant to 
Rule 22c-1 of the Investment Company Act.\251\ These

[[Page 10469]]

orders may be submitted on an omnibus basis and in one of three ways: 
As a request to purchase or redeem a given number of shares or units, 
as a request to purchase or redeem a given U.S. dollar value, or as a 
request to exchange a given number of shares/units or U.S. dollar value 
for another fund. Because the NAV becomes the `price' for each order, 
the net money to be paid or received at settlement cannot be calculated 
until after the NAV has been calculated and published. Once the NAV is 
available, the transfer agent is able to issue confirmations to the 
intermediaries acknowledging receipt and execution of the orders 
submitted. For orders submitted as share quantities, the net 
confirmation includes not only the quantity executed, but the net 
amount of money to be exchanged at settlement. For orders submitted as 
U.S. dollar amounts, the transfer agent can calculate the quantity 
purchased or redeemed and include it in the confirm. For exchanges of 
shares in one fund for shares in another, the NAV of both funds is 
required to determine both the quantity and the net settlement amount 
for each fund.
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    \249\ ETFs are investment companies registered under the 
Investment Company Act. See 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(a)(1). Historically, 
ETFs have been organized as open-end funds or UITs.
    \250\ See 17 CFR 270.2a-4 (defining ``current net asset 
value'').
    \251\ Open-end funds are required by law to redeem their 
securities on demand from shareholders at a price approximating 
their proportionate share of the fund's NAV at the time of 
redemption. See 15 U.S.C. 80a-22(d).
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    In general, mutual fund families will utilize prices as of 4:00 
p.m. ET to value the underlying holdings in each fund for the current 
day.\252\ This is a critical input to the calculation of the NAV and, 
as such, 4:00 p.m. ET is a dependency in the NAV calculation process. 
Prior to 4:00 p.m. ET, fund administrators are able to reconcile 
holdings to custodians, calculate and apply any income and expense 
accruals, update the shares outstanding based on the prior day's 
purchase and redemption activity and in general prepare for the receipt 
of current-day prices. Once those prices are available, fund 
administrators are able to apply prices to holdings, perform a variety 
of validation checks on the prices and fund and ultimately calculate or 
``strike'' the NAV, then submitting or publishing the NAV to pricing 
vendors, newspapers and intermediaries. This tends to occur between 
6:00 p.m. ET and 8:00 p.m. ET.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ As noted in Part IV.B.3, most major U.S. stock exchanges 
typically close at 4:00 p.m. ET during standard (i.e., non-holiday) 
trading hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Once the day's NAV of a fund is available and each intermediary 
calculates the settlement quantity or monetary amount for each 
order,\253\ the intermediary aggregates and nets the amount of money to 
be paid to or received from each fund's agent bank. These values are 
aggregated and netted to determine a single payment or receipt per bank 
and instructions are sent to the intermediary's bank to arrange for 
payments.
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    \253\ For example, if an order were placed as shares, the 
intermediary would multiply the share quantity and the NAV to 
determine the amount of money to be paid or received. If an order 
were placed as a dollar amount, the intermediary would divide this 
amount by the NAV to calculate the share quantity traded. (These 
calculations may be further adjusted for commissions or other fees.) 
Exchange transactions would require two calculations: One for the 
redemption side of any exchange, and then a second calculation for 
the subscription side of the exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the event an intermediary is an introducing broker, these 
introducing broker calculations are then forwarded to the clearing 
broker, which, in turn, aggregates values received from other 
introducing brokers as well as any of its own order activity. 
Ultimately the clearing broker determines a single net payment or 
receipt for each agent bank representing all of the funds traded. The 
clearing broker must receive calculations for all its introducing 
brokers before it can finalize its own calculations.
    Given the current timing of NAV calculation and publication, we 
understand that many market participants are not able to calculate net 
settlement amount or quantity traded until after 8:00 p.m. ET. This is 
90 minutes later--to the extent this activity occurs on 8:00 p.m. ET--
than the time the Federal Reserve's NSS system, which moves the cash 
necessary to effect settlement of securities transactions, closes at 
6:30 p.m.\254\ Even when a NAV is available at 6:00 p.m. ET, there is 
only a 30-minute window for intermediaries to obtain the NAV, calculate 
settlement quantity or net amount, determine the net cash to be paid or 
received for each fund, further determine the net payment or receipt 
for each agent bank across all funds traded and to submit these values 
to NSS prior to its close at 6:30 p.m. ET. In addition, if the 
intermediary services other intermediaries at another omnibus ``tier,'' 
such as a clearing broker servicing one or more introducing brokers, 
the intermediary must wait on calculations from others before 
finalizing its own numbers and submitting instructions. This sequential 
processing introduces a greater number of activities that must occur in 
the approximately 30-minute window that would typically be available 
for same-day settlement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, to receive a given day's NAV, intermediaries must 
receive orders prior to the time at which the fund's NAV is calculated, 
but intermediaries may not submit these orders to Fund/SERV or the 
transfer agent until after the NAV calculation time, in some cases as 
late as around 7:30 a.m. ET on T+1.\255\ The Commission understands 
this is often the case with retirement plan recordkeepers who perform 
compliance and other checks on orders before they are finalized for 
submission to Fund/SERV. Such timing would require modification to 
support end of day settlement on T+0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ Per a 2017 ICI survey based on 3Q 2016 data, only 70% of 
trade flow, including estimated trade flow, is known by funds or 
their transfer agents around 5:00 p.m. ET and that number remains 
rather constant until approximately 7:00 a.m. ET on T+1. See ICI, 
Evaluating Swing Pricing: Operational Considerations, at 4 (June 
2017), https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/pdf/ppr_17_swing_pricing_summary.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unlike mutual funds, ETFs do not sell or redeem individual shares. 
Instead, APs that have contractual arrangements with the ETF purchase 
and redeem ETF shares directly from the ETF in blocks called ``creation 
units.'' An AP that purchases a creation unit of ETF shares directly 
from the ETF deposits with the ETF a ``basket'' of securities and other 
assets identified by the ETF that day, and then receives the creation 
unit of ETF shares in return for those assets. After purchasing a 
creation unit, the AP may hold the individual ETF shares, or sell some 
or all of them in secondary market transactions. The redemption process 
is the reverse of the purchase process: The AP redeems a creation unit 
of ETF shares for a basket of securities and other assets. Secondary 
market trading of ETF shares occurs at market-determined prices (i.e., 
at prices other than those described in the prospectus or based on 
NAV), and the settlement values will be known at the time of execution, 
similar to an exchange-traded equity security.\256\ Secondary market 
ETF share transactions settle today on a T+2 basis. Currently, most 
securities in a ``creation basket'' settle in a similar timeframe (T+2) 
as the settlement time for a ``creation unit,'' which is also the same 
as the settlement time for the ETF shares sold to APs, as well as ETF 
shares traded in the secondary market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ Purchases and sales of ETFs in the secondary market may 
offset one another and do not always result in a primary market 
transaction between the AP and the ETF to create or redeem units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NAVs are calculated for ETF shares in a manner similar to the 
process for open-end mutual funds, with comparable times for capturing 
prices of underlying holdings and for publishing the NAVs. Secondary 
market purchases and sales of ETF shares occur throughout the business 
day and often occur at prices that differ from the ETF's

[[Page 10470]]

NAV.\257\ Those trading ETF shares in the secondary market during the 
day will know their settlement amount almost immediately, because the 
transaction price is the market price of the shares. Therefore, 
secondary market ETF share transactions generally do not present the 
same challenges presented by open-end mutual funds when considering 
same-day settlement.\258\
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    \257\ The combination of the creation and redemption process 
with secondary market trading in ETF shares and underlying 
securities provides arbitrage opportunities that are designed to 
help keep the market price of ETF shares at or close to the NAV per 
share of the ETF. See Exchange-Traded Funds, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 33646 (Sept. 25, 2019), 84 FR 57162, 57165 n.31 (Oct. 
24, 2019).
    \258\ We understand that some institutional investors may opt to 
place orders to trade ETFs at the end-of-day NAV. These are 
generally placed with a market maker who may or may not be an AP. 
The market maker will guarantee the end-of-day NAV price plus (or 
less) a fee (depending on the direction of the trade) to cover 
transaction costs and profit. The market makers can either trade 
with the institutional investor as a proprietary or principal trade 
or they can submit a creation/redemption as agent on behalf of the 
institutional investor and deliver/receive cash or the basket in 
exchange for the ETF shares. Under these circumstances, secondary 
market investors in ETF shares would incur the same time compression 
described above for open-end mutual funds to settle on a T+0 basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requests comment on the challenges open-end mutual 
funds and ETFs might experience if U.S. markets were to adopt T+0 
settlement.
    88. Are there additional factors that may negatively affect same-
day settlement of open-end mutual funds and ETFs that we have not 
described, and if so, what are they? Please provide as much detail as 
possible.
    89. Are fund administrators able to calculate and release NAVs any 
earlier while still relying on 4:00 p.m. ET prices? What can they do to 
optimize their processes, including the publication of the NAV?
    90. Is our description of the netting across multiple omnibus 
``tiers''--and the subsequent sequential processing that results--an 
accurate portrayal? If so, how many tiers might exist that would 
necessitate sequential processes and how long might each tier be 
expected to need to perform its calculations to pass on to the next 
tier? What factors influence this processing? Are there potential 
solutions to this sequential processing challenge and, if so, what are 
they? Are there ways in which intermediaries might process information 
concurrently? If this description of netting across multiple omnibus 
tiers does not capture current processes, please provide an explanation 
of the way(s) it does occur today.
    91. Could open-end mutual funds and ETFs settle on a T+1 basis even 
if other security types, such as equities and corporate bonds, move to 
T+0 settlement? If so, what risks would be introduced to open-end 
mutual funds and ETFs from holding positions in securities that settle 
on a T+0 basis when trades of the fund's shares occur on a T+1 basis? 
Should these funds receive large amounts of purchases from investors, 
would they wait a day for those purchase transactions to settle before 
investing cash in securities? Would they rely on borrowing facilities 
and, if so, does that introduce new issues or risks? For large 
redemption requests by investors, would these funds have additional 
time to liquidate underlying holdings or would they increase their cash 
position in the interim?
    92. Are there additional considerations for APs if securities in a 
creation basket settle on a different basis than the shares of the ETF? 
What are the current risks and considerations in this process where the 
securities in a creation basket settle on a different basis than the 
shares of the ETF itself, such as is the case with U.S. Treasury 
securities, which commonly settle on a T+1 basis today while the ETF 
shares settle on a T+2 basis?
    93. What time do market intermediaries believe would be necessary 
for open-end mutual funds and ETFs to publish NAVs in order to achieve 
same-day settlement and why?
    94. What are the reasons intermediaries do not submit orders to 
purchase or sell mutual fund shares to Fund/SERV or the transfer agent 
earlier on trade date? What are the reasons some intermediaries may be 
delayed in the submission of those orders until T+1 in the current 
environment? Please be as specific as possible and include data if 
available on submission times. What would be needed to accelerate these 
timeframes?
    95. Would open-end mutual funds potentially establish an earlier 
cut-off time for placing orders to purchase or sell fund shares than is 
currently used (i.e., earlier than 4:00 p.m. ET) to capture prices for 
NAV calculations, in order to speed the time at which a NAV can be 
published? If so, what time might be most likely and why? If different 
funds opted to use different times, would this create new market 
opportunities for funds? What challenges would this introduce?
    96. The Commission understands that some ETFs calculate NAVs more 
than once per day. Are there unique challenges and opportunities these 
funds may have with same-day settlement?
    97. Currently, Rule 22c-1(a) of the Investment Company Act limits 
the ability to transact in fund shares at a price other than ``a price 
based on the current net asset value . . . which is next computed after 
receipt of a tender of such security for redemption or of an order to 
purchase or sell such security.'' In the event a fund elects to 
calculate its NAV using intra-day prices for the underlying securities 
held in the fund, such as utilizing 2:00 p.m. ET prices to value its 
portfolio in order to produce a NAV earlier in the day to support same-
day settlement, how would this limitation impact the acceptance of 
orders to purchase or redeem shares of the fund? Would a fund establish 
a cut-off time for acceptance of orders that is based on the time when 
a snapshot of prices is captured to value the fund's securities 
positions? Would it be possible in different scenarios for investors to 
have an information advantage and, if so, how? For funds that may 
currently utilize prices for U.S. securities prior to the U.S. market 
close, how has such an approach modified timelines and processes for 
acceptance of orders and publication of the NAV?
    98. If different funds adopt differing policies for the time to 
capture prices or to publish NAVs, and subsequently impose different 
cut-off times for receipt of orders pursuant to Rule 22c-1, would 
intermediaries be able to accommodate such differences on a fund-
specific basis?
    99. Might funds consider requiring orders to be received by the 
fund's transfer agent, rather than an intermediary, by the cut-off 
time? Are there other ways in which a movement to T+0 settlement would 
affect transfer agents' processes, and if so, how should those 
processes be changed?
    100. If receipt by an intermediary is sufficient (as opposed to 
requiring orders be received by the fund's transfer agent by the cut-
off time), as is the case today, how do intermediaries or others 
monitor intermediary compliance?
    101. Does monitoring of order receipt relative to cut-off times 
differ by types of intermediaries? For example, are there different 
processes to monitor ``authorized agents'' as opposed to other types of 
intermediaries? What are the differences between ``authorized agents'' 
and other intermediaries?
    102. If ETFs were to utilize an earlier time in the day to capture 
prices of their portfolio investments for purpose of calculating the 
ETF's shares' NAV (that is, the price that would form the basis for 
APs' purchases and redemptions of creation units), how would this 
affect

[[Page 10471]]

primary market transactions in ETF shares? Would this affect secondary 
market ETF share transactions in any way, for example, transactions by 
institutional investors who may opt to place orders to trade ETFs at 
the end-of-day NAV?
    103. Should the Commission consider elimination of omnibus 
processing to facilitate the adoption of T+0 settlement for open-end 
mutual funds? Since any investor account must be maintained by at least 
one party, how does omnibus accounting by intermediaries rather than 
maintaining investor-specific accounts at each fund's transfer agent 
reduce costs to investors?
    104. Are there any additional unique considerations for open-end 
mutual funds or ETFs that hold non-U.S. securities if the Commission 
were to adopt a same-day settlement standard while non-U.S. markets may 
continue with longer settlement timeframes, including T+1 and T+2? What 
potential liquidity impacts might such funds experience?
5. Institutional Trade Processing
    As discussed throughout this release, while significant 
improvements to the infrastructure for institutional trade processing 
have decreased reliance on manual activities and enabled more 
transparency into and standardization of trade information, several 
operational and technology challenges continue to limit the speed, 
accuracy, and efficiency of institutional trade processing, all of 
which would be more acute in a T+0 environment.
    As discussed previously, the T+1 Report recommends that allocations 
for all institutional trades be made and communicated by 7:00 p.m. on 
trade date and these trades be confirmed and affirmed by 9:00 p.m. ET 
on trade date.\259\ The industry has identified a number of issues 
related to the institutional trade process that would need to be 
addressed in a T+1 settlement cycle, including, but not limited to, 
trade systems and reference data, the trade allocations, confirmation 
and affirmation cut-off times, batch cycle timing, migration to trade 
date matching, and identification of automated vendor solutions to 
alleviate manual processing.\260\ In addition, improvements in the 
quality and standardization of settlement instructions, the quality of 
static settlement data maintenance, the use of automation and the 
expansion of straight-through processing capabilities would all help 
facilitate higher affirmation rates and faster processing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 13; see also supra note 164 
and accompanying text (discussing the same). Additionally, the 
industry has recommended the adoption of Commission or SRO rules 
requiring: (i) Broker-dealers to obtain an agreement from their 
customers at the outset of the relationship or at the time of the 
trade to participate in and to comply with the operational 
requirements of interoperable trade-match systems as a condition to 
settling trades on an RVP/DVP basis; and (ii) investment managers to 
participate in a trade-match system, similar to the way broker-
dealers and institutions are required by the SRO confirmation/
affirmation rules to participate in a confirmation/affirmation 
system.
    \260\ See supra note 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in Part III.D, the Commission has previously explained 
that a shortened settlement cycle may lead to increased reliance on the 
use of CMSPs, with a focus on improving and accelerating the 
allocation, confirmation, and affirmation processes and enhancing 
efficiencies in the services and operations of the CMSPs.\261\ Improved 
automation in the settlement process has enabled better straight-
through processing and contributed to increases in affirmation rates on 
trade date and increases in settlement rates, with an attendant 
decrease in exceptions and fails. Moving to T+1 may promote continued 
improvements in technology and operations, encourage incremental 
increases in the utilization by certain market participants of CMSPs, 
and focus the industry on improving and accelerating the allocation, 
confirmation and affirmation processes by completing those processes 
earlier and more efficiently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \261\ See T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69258.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, it is unclear whether addressing these issues would (i) 
facilitate further shortening of the settlement cycle beyond T+1; (ii) 
whether these issues would continue to be relevant in a T+0 
environment; or (iii) whether new technologies or operational processes 
would need to be designed and implemented to accommodate T+0 for 
institutional trade processing. Accordingly, the Commission is 
requesting comment on all issues pertaining to improving the 
institutional trade processing in order to achieve a T+0 standard 
settlement cycle. In addition, the Commission is seeking comment on the 
following:
    105. What operational, technological and regulatory issues related 
to institutional trade processing should be considered in further 
shortening of the settlement cycle to T+0, particularly any impediments 
to investors and other market participants?
    106. What, if anything, should the Commission do to facilitate T+0, 
particularly as it relates to the standardization of reference data, 
the use of standardized industry protocols by broker-dealers, asset 
managers, and custodians, and the use of matching services?
    107. Does moving to T+0 introduce any new risks in the processing 
of institutional trades? If so, please describe such risks and whether 
mitigation is possible. Can such risks be quantified?
    108. What are the benefits and costs of settling institutional 
trades in a T+0 environment? What are the relative challenges for the 
different market participants involved? Do the benefits of T+0 accrue 
to all participants--brokers, institutional customers, custodians, or 
matching utilities? Do they accrue to large, medium, and small 
entities?
    109. How would the current systems and processes used in the 
institutional post-trade process need to change to accommodate a T+0 
settlement requirement?
    110. Would any or all of the changes contemplated by the Industry 
Working Group to address the building blocks considered essential for 
institutional trade settlement in T+1 be useful should the settlement 
cycle move to T+0?
    111. How would the allocation, confirmation and affirmation process 
be accomplished in a T+0 environment? In particular, what timeframes 
would be necessary to ensure settlement on T+0? To what extent would 
the roles of CMSPs, broker-dealers, or bank custodians need to change 
to accommodate T+0 settlement? To what extent does the use of a 
custodian foster or impair a transition to a T+0 settlement cycle? 
Please explain.
    112. What effect would T+0 have on the relationship between a 
broker-dealer and its customer? What effect would T+0 have on the 
relationship between an investor and its custodian?
6. Securities Lending
    Both the ISG White Paper and the T+2 Playbook highlighted the 
potential impact shortening the settlement to T+2 may have on 
securities lending practices in the U.S. For example, the ISG White 
Paper noted that securities lenders may have less time to recall loaned 
securities, and securities borrowers should be cognizant of the reduced 
timeframe between execution and settlement when loaning securities, 
particularly when transacting in hard to borrow securities.\262\ The 
ISC White Paper further stated that service providers may need to 
update their

[[Page 10472]]

products and services to accurately process such transactions.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ ISG White Paper, supra note 26, at 26.
    \263\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The T+2 Playbook included several recommendations regarding actions 
firms should take to address the potential impact that shortening the 
standard settlement cycle may have on securities lending practices in 
the industry. For example, the T+2 Playbook recommended that market 
participants' decisions to loan securities should take into account the 
shortened settlement cycle, and stock borrow positions should be 
evaluated to reduce exposure to counterparty risk based on the 
shortened settlement cycle.\264\ More recently industry working groups 
tasked with understanding industry requirements for shortening the 
standard settlement cycle to T+1 have begun to analyze how shortening 
the settlement cycle may require additional changes to securities 
lending practices.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ T+2 Playbook, supra note 27, at 86.
    \265\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 24-25.
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    While market participants have yet to explore in significant detail 
how shortening the settlement cycle to T+0 might impact securities 
lending practices in the U.S. markets, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that such a move would likely impact these practices further, 
and may necessitate further changes to procedures, operations and 
technologies that facilitate securities lending and borrowing. 
Additionally, the Commission is interested in learning whether 
shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+0 could impact overall 
liquidity in the U.S. markets to the extent that market participants 
may curtail their participation in the securities lending markets in 
response to such a move.
    The Commission is requesting public comment regarding all aspects 
of the potential impact that shortening the settlement cycle to T+0 
could have on securities lending in the U.S. In particular, the 
Commission requests comment on the following:
    113. To what extent would shortening the standard settlement cycle 
to T+0 make it difficult for securities lenders to timely recall 
securities on loan?
    114. To what extent would the Commission need to amend Regulation 
SHO to accommodate securities lending in a T+0 environment? Are there 
changes to Regulation SHO that can be made to help facilitate lending 
in a T+0 environment?
    115. Please describe any technology changes that might be necessary 
to support securities lending operations of market participants if the 
settlement cycle were shortened to T+0. Please include in any comments 
descriptions of existing technologies that may help the Commission 
identify and understand the limitations, if any, of such technologies 
with respect to a T+0 settlement cycle.
    116. With respect to stock loan recalls, are there ways to improve 
the level of coordination between investment managers and third-party 
lending agents for underlying funds, and to facilitate partial stock 
loan recalls from bulk lending positions aggregated from multiple 
institutional investors? \266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ See, e.g., ISITC Virtual Winter Forum, Securities Lending 
Working Group discussion (Dec. 13, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    117. To what extent might securities lenders need to rely on 
predictive analytics to make decisions regarding which securities to 
recall before lenders can be sure such recalls will be necessary? What 
additional costs, if any, might be associated with the increased use of 
predictive analytics?
    118. How might shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+0 
impact market participants seeking to borrow securities in the U.S. 
markets? Please include discussion regarding the possible impact on 
market participants' ability to borrow securities that might be 
difficult to borrow.
    119. How might shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+0 
impact the decisions of securities lenders and borrows to lend and 
borrow securities, respectively?
    120. What impact, if any, would shortening the standard settlement 
cycle to T+0 have on the cost of borrowing securities in the U.S.?
    121. What impact would shortening the settlement cycle to T+0 have 
on costs related to loaning securities (e.g., investments in technology 
improvements, analytics, etc.)?
    122. To what extent might shortening the standard settlement cycle 
to T+0 reduce revenue securities lenders generate from loaning 
securities compared with a T+2 or T+1 settlement cycle?
    123. What impact, if any, might a T+0 settlement cycle have on 
overall liquidity in the U.S. markets if such a move were to reduce 
securities lending activity?
    124. Please describe any indirect impact that shortening the 
standard settlement cycle to T+0 might have on market structure or 
trading activity as a result of changes to securities lending in the 
U.S. markets. For example, if shortening the settlement cycle to T+0 
would reduce the availability of difficult to borrow securities, how 
would such a reduction impact short selling practices in the U.S. 
markets?
    125. Please describe any other impacts that shortening the 
settlement cycle to T+0 might have on securities lending markets in the 
U.S.
7. Access to Funds and/or Prefunding of Transactions
    A T+0 settlement cycle may increase prefunding requirements for 
investors, shifting some costs from broker-dealers and banks to retail 
and institutional investors.\267\ When purchasing securities in the 
U.S. market, retail and institutional investors must be ready to 
provide cash to settle their securities transaction. Cash is typically 
held in a short-term sweep account, such as a money market fund (MMF) 
or commingled vehicle, and therefore requires that the investor redeem 
cash from the sweep vehicle to finance the securities transaction. 
Alternatively, it may simply be held in a cash account. In some cases, 
funds will be converted to USD from another currency through an FX 
transaction. The specific needs, timing and arrangements vary for 
retail versus institutional investors. Retail investors may fund their 
securities transactions using cash accounts, and in such cases FINRA 
rules permit the brokers to require the payment of purchase money to be 
paid ``upon delivery,'' \268\ which functionally means no later than 
settlement. Some brokers require their retail clients to prefund their 
transactions--in other words, deposit sufficient cash for settlement in 
their brokerage account before the broker acts on their orders and 
executes a purchase trade. Alternatively, retail clients may be 
permitted to fund transactions through use of a margin account. An 
institutional investor is required, pursuant to its contractual 
relationships with its brokers and custodians, to provide cash (or have 
credit available) on the day that the custodian or broker receives the 
purchased securities and credits them to the investor's account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ This discussion concerns the settlement arrangements 
between investors and their brokers or custodians. These 
arrangements are separate from obligations of brokers and custodians 
to NSCC and DTC.
    \268\ See FINRA Rule 11330.
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    In a T+0 environment, investors will not have time after markets 
close to identify and obtain the cash necessary for settlement of a 
securities transaction, as settlement of the securities transaction 
will occur on the same day. This could have a number of potential 
effects, and the Commission is requesting comment on the following:

[[Page 10473]]

    126. Will there be a significant increase in prefunding 
requirements for securities transactions across market participants? 
Would some investors have to start planning in advance before the trade 
date to accurately position necessary funds for redemption and 
securities and cash for settlement? To what extent might retail 
investors alter their funding behaviors or their use of margin accounts 
in response to added prefunding requirements?
    127. Would a prefunding requirement shift risk from the broker-
dealer and bank community to the investor, both retail and 
institutional?
    128. To the extent that an investor would need to redeem shares of 
a money market fund to receive cash to settle a separate securities 
transaction, how would such redemptions be effected? Would redemptions 
of money market fund shares need to be effected in the morning of T+0 
to receive cash to settle a separate securities transaction on the same 
day?
    129. How would this affect the borrowing of cash from clearing 
members, prime brokers, custodians, and other liquidity providers when 
an institutional investor cannot successfully redeem funds or otherwise 
convert assets to cash in time to settle?
    130. How would T+0 affect FX transactions used to finance the 
settlement of transactions?
    131. Could T+0 affect the volume of securities trading at various 
points throughout the trading day?
8. Potential Mismatches of Settlement Cycles
    The Commission preliminarily believes that shortening the standard 
settlement cycle to T+0 could create mismatches between settlement 
timeframes in different markets, or could increase the degree to which 
certain settlement timeframes may already be mismatched at the time a 
T+0 settlement cycle might be implemented. For example, most major 
securities markets in non-U.S. jurisdictions currently settle 
transactions on a T+2 basis, as do FX markets generally. When the 
Commission amended Exchange Act Rule 15c6-1(a) in 2017 to shorten the 
standard settlement cycle to T+2, several major securities markets had 
already adopted a T+2 settlement cycle, and the move to T+2 in the U.S. 
harmonized large portions of the U.S. settlement cycle with prevailing 
settlement cycles in those markets.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ See T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69241-42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the T+2 Adopting Release the Commission stated that the 
prospective harmonization of the standard settlement cycle in the U.S. 
with settlement cycles in foreign markets that settle transactions on a 
T+2 settlement cycle may reduce the need for some market participants 
engaging in cross-border and cross-asset transactions to hedge risks 
stemming from mismatched settlement cycles and reduce related financing 
and borrowing costs, resulting in additional benefits.\270\ The T+2 
Adopting Release also noted that shortening the settlement cycle 
further than T+2 at that time could increase funding costs for market 
participants who rely on the settlement of FX transactions to fund 
securities transactions that settle regular way.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ T+2 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 15574.
    \271\ Id. at 15599. Both the T+2 Proposing Release and the T+2 
Adopting Release stated that, because the settlement of FX 
transactions occurs on T+2, market participants who seek to fund a 
cross-border securities transaction with the proceeds of an FX 
transaction would, in a T+1 or T+0 environment, be required to 
settle the securities transaction before the proceeds of the FX 
transaction become available and would be required to pre-fund 
securities transactions in foreign currencies. Under these 
circumstances, a market participant would either incur opportunity 
costs and currency risk associated with holding FX reserves or be 
exposed to price volatility by delaying securities transactions by 
one business day to coordinate settlement of the securities and FX 
legs. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Whether shortening the standard settlement cycle for securities 
transactions in the U.S. to T+0 would in fact result in mismatched 
settlement cycles vis-[agrave]-vis major foreign securities markets, or 
the settlement cycle for FX transactions, may depend on future 
developments that are unknown at this time, including the extent to 
which settlement cycles in those markets might be shortening in 
response to the implementation of a shorter settlement cycle for 
securities in the U.S., or in response to other future developments in 
global markets.
    The Commission notes that mutual funds and investment advisers have 
invested in markets with mismatched settlement cycles for many 
years.\272\ Many investors evaluate an investment portfolio based on 
traded positions without reference to pending or actual settlement 
because entitlement to trade, receive income or corporate actions and 
performance calculations generally are based on trade-date information. 
Nonetheless, institutional and retail investors alike often consider 
anticipated settlement dates when managing cash balances to ensure that 
settlements do not conflict or create an unexpected shortfall of cash, 
or an unplanned event that results in an uninvested cash balance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ As noted earlier, U.S. equities securities have moved from 
settling T+5 to T+3 and more recently to T+2, while U.S. Treasury 
securities have settled on a T+1 basis throughout. Portfolios that 
invest globally have encountered mismatched settlement cycles, 
especially prior to October 6, 2014 when twenty-nine European 
markets moved to T+2 settlement in an effort to harmonize settlement 
times in Europe. See European Central Securities Depositories 
Association, A Very Smooth Transition to T+2, https://ecsda.eu/archives/3793.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is interested in receiving public comment regarding 
the impact a T+0 standard settlement cycle in the U.S. securities 
markets might have on global harmonization of settlement cycles, 
including any indirect impact on market participants. Specifically the 
Commission requests comment on the following:
    132. Would shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+0 in the 
U.S. securities markets result in decreased harmonization of settlement 
cycles generally? Which markets would be impacted by such decreased 
harmonization? Could solutions be applied to mitigate the effects of 
de-harmonization? For example, to what extent could other asset 
classes, such as FX, transition to a shorter settlement cycle? What are 
the impediments to shortening settlement cycles for these other asset 
classes? Could FX transactions transition to a T+0 settlement cycle? 
Please explain.
    133. Would certain non-U.S. markets move to a T+0 settlement cycle 
in response to a prospective move to T+0 in the U.S.?
    134. How might shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+0 in 
the U.S. impact market participants who seek to fund cross-border 
transactions with the proceeds of an FX transaction?
    135. To what extent might any adverse impact from increased 
settlement cycle mismatches be mitigated if the standard settlement 
cycle in the U.S. is shortened to T+1 prior to a move to a T+0 standard 
settlement cycle at a later time?
    136. To what extent might monitoring of anticipated settlement-date 
balances change if the U.S. moved to a T+1 settlement cycle? How would 
such monitoring be impacted if the U.S. moved to a T+0 standard 
settlement cycle?
9. Dematerialization
    Currently the vast majority of securities asset classes trading in 
the U.S. markets, including government securities, options, most mutual 
fund securities, and some municipal bonds, are issued in book-entry 
form only (i.e., dematerialized).\273\ In contrast, other

[[Page 10474]]

asset classes, such as listed equities, unlisted equities that have 
been admitted as DTC-eligible, and some debt securities, can be 
immobilized \274\ using DTC and dematerialized using the Direct 
Registration System (``DRS'') services enabled by DTC's facilities, but 
many issuers of these equity and debt securities continue to allow 
their investors to obtain paper certificates.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ Dematerialization of securities occurs where securities 
owned by an investor are not represented by paper certificates, and 
transfers of ownership of those securities are made through book-
entry movements. For more information on issues related to the use 
of certificates in the U.S. Markets, see Concept Release, supra note 
149, at 12932-34.
    \274\ Immobilization of securities occurs where the underlying 
certificate is kept in a securities depository (or held in custody 
for the depository by the issuer's transfer agent) or at a custodian 
and transfers of ownership are recorded through electronic book-
entry movements between the depository or custodian's internal 
accounts. These types of securities are often referred to as being 
held in ``street name.'' An issue is partially immobilized (as is 
the case with most equity securities traded on an exchange), when 
the street name positions beneficially owned by investors are linked 
through chains of beneficial ownership through intermediaries (such 
as brokers) to the certificate immobilized at the securities 
depository, but certificates are still available to investors 
directly registered on the issuer's books. Id. at 12931 n.107; see 
also Exchange Act Release No. 76743 (Dec. 22, 2015), 80 FR 81948, 
81952 n.39 (Dec. 31, 2015).
    \275\ DRS facilitates and automates the process whereby an 
investor, generally in equities, can establish a direct book-entry 
position registered in the investor's own name on the issuer's 
master securityholder file; such DRS issues are maintained by 61 
transfer agents (as of December 31, 2021) that have been admitted to 
DRS by DTC (out of a total, as of September 30, 2021, of 403 
registered transfer agents). Where an issuer has authorized 
ownership in book-entry form and is serviced by a transfer agent 
that has been admitted by DTC as DRS-eligible and an investor 
currently holds the securities in street name form in the investor's 
broker-dealer account, the investor can arrange, assuming the 
broker-dealer supports DRS servicing at DTC, to have its securities 
electronically withdrawn from the account and forwarded to the 
transfer agent. The procedure avoids the risks and custodial costs 
of moving certificates; in response to the investor's instruction to 
the broker-dealer, the investor's shares are changed into DRS form 
when the transfer agent receives an electronic file from DTC 
specifying the investor's details supplied by the broker-dealer, 
cancels the prior registration in the name of DTC's Cede & Co. 
nominee, and re-registers the securities directly in the investor's 
name, with the investor receiving a statement. Conversely, if the 
investor later elects to transfer the securities back to the 
investor's broker-dealer account (i.e., change the form of ownership 
of the securities from DRS back into street-name form held through 
the broker-dealer account), the investor most commonly would request 
the broker-dealer to withdraw the securities from DRS, with the 
transfer agent re-registering the securities in the name of DTC's 
nominee, and the broker-dealer crediting the securities to the 
investor's account. Some frictions remain: DRS is not authorized by 
all issuers and not available for all registered securities types; a 
number of the transfer agents for DTC-eligible issues do not meet 
DTC's qualifications to participate in DRS; some brokers may not 
support DRS transfers or promptly process investors' instructions to 
facilitate the transfer of securities into DRS form. See Concept 
Release, supra note 139, at 12932.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the U.S. markets have made significant strides over the past 
twenty years in achieving immobilization and dematerialization, many 
industry representatives believe that the small percentage of 
securities held in certificated form impose unnecessary risk and 
expense to the industry and to investors.\276\ Moreover, the ISG 
previously identified the dematerialization of securities certificates 
as a necessary building block to achieve shorter settlement 
timeframes.\277\ The industry has long asserted that, despite the 
reduction in the use of paper certificates in the U.S. markets, 
certificates continue to pose risks, create inefficiencies and increase 
costs,\278\ many of which will be exacerbated as the settlement cycle 
shortens. Fully transitioning from paper certificates to book-entry 
(i.e., electronic records) would not only contribute to a more cost-
effective, efficient, secure, and resilient marketplace by addressing 
operational issues related to record-keeping, inventory management, 
resilience and controls, but would facilitate a more efficient 
transition to shorter settlement cycles.\279\
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    \276\ The processing of paper securities certificates has long 
been identified as an inefficient and risk-laden mechanism by which 
to hold and transfer ownership. Because paper certificates require 
manual processing and multiple touchpoints between investors and 
financial intermediaries, their use can result in significant delays 
and expenses in processing securities transactions and can raise 
risk concerns associated with lost, stolen, and forged certificates. 
See id. at 12930-31; Transfer Agents Operating Direct Registration 
System, Exchange Act Release No. 35038 (Dec. 1, 1994), 59 FR 63652, 
63653 (Dec. 8, 1994) (``1994 Concept Release''); see also SIA 
Business Case Report, supra note 21, at 10; BCG Study, supra note 
22, at 59, 62; DTCC, From Physical to Digital: Advancing the 
Dematerialization of U.S. Securities, at 4, 6 (Sept. 2020) (``DTCC 
2020 Dematerialization White Paper''), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/PDFs/DTCC-Dematerialization-Whitepaper-092020.pdf.
    \277\ See, e.g., William M. Martin, Jr., The Securities Markets: 
A Report with Recommendations, Submitted to The Board of Governors 
of the New York Stock Exchange (Aug. 5, 1971) (``Martin Report''), 
https://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1971_0806_MartinReport.pdf.
    \278\ Id. DTCC estimates that only a small portion of securities 
positions remains certificated and states that requests for 
certificates are declining, but also explains that the risks and 
costs associated with processing the remaining certificates in the 
marketplace are substantial and avoidable. See DTCC 2020 
Dematerialization White Paper, supra note 276, at 4.
    \279\ See DTCC 2020 Dematerialization White Paper, supra note 
276, at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has long advocated a reduction in the use of 
certificates in the trading environment by immobilizing or 
dematerializing securities and has acknowledged that the use of 
certificates increases the costs and risks of clearing and settling 
securities for all parties processing the securities, including those 
involved in the National C&S System.\280\ Most of these costs and risks 
are ultimately borne by investors.\281\ For example, in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, DTC suspended all physical securities processing 
services for approximately six weeks to minimize the risk of 
transmission of COVID-19 among its employees, who would otherwise be on 
site at DTC's vault that holds physical securities on deposit.\282\ 
While this service disruption did not affect the electronic book-entry 
settlement of securities transactions, DTC instituted alternative 
methods of handling certain transactions, such as the use of letters of 
possession and an emergency rider in connection with underwriting new 
securities issues.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \280\ Concept Release, supra note 149, at 12934. The Commission 
also stated in the Concept Release that, while investors should have 
the ability to register securities in their own names, it was time 
to explore ways to further reduce certificates in the trading 
environment due to the significant risk, inefficiency, and cost 
related to the use of securities certificates. Id. The possibility 
exists that investors' attachment to the certificate may be based 
more on sentiment than need, particularly in light of the fact that 
today non-negotiable records of ownership (e.g., account statements) 
evidence ownership of not only most securities issued in the U.S. 
but also other financial assets, such as money in bank accounts. See 
id. at 12934-35. DRS allows an investor to have securities 
registered in the investor's name without having a certificate 
issued to the investor and the ability to electronically transfer 
securities between the investor's broker-dealer and the issuer's 
transfer agent without the risk and delays associated with the use 
of certificates. Id. at 12932.
    \281\ Id. at 12934.
    \282\ See, e.g., DTCC, Important Notice (May 14, 2020), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/pdf/2020/5/14/13402-20.pdf; DTCC, 
Important Notice (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/pdf/2020/4/8/13276-20.pdf.
    \283\ See, e.g., DTCC, Important Notice (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/Files/pdf/2020/3/13/13099-20.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of continuing 
to immobilize or dematerialize the U.S. market to decrease risks and 
costs associated with physical certificates, but the Commission 
preliminarily believes that dematerialization is not a prerequisite to 
shortening the settlement cycle. Mechanisms in place today to 
facilitate immobilizing paper certificates can adequately address the 
risk and efficiency issues associated with such certificates (as 
evidenced by the COVID-19 example above), and can accommodate shorter 
settlement cycles, up to and including T+0. In particular, DRS provides 
a viable alternative to street-name holding for those investors who do 
not want to hold securities at a broker-dealer or who want their 
securities registered in their own

[[Page 10475]]

name.\284\ Investors can use the linkages enabled by DTC to transfer 
their securities back and forth between DRS at the transfer agent and 
book-entry form on the books of a broker-dealer as it suits their 
needs.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ Due to the expanded use in today's market, DRS is 
considered a viable alternative to holding physical certificates, 
allowing transfers to be made relatively quickly and without the 
risk and delays associated with the use of certificates. See DTCC 
2020 Dematerialization White Paper, supra note 276, at 4 n.2.
    \285\ Specifically, DTC participants can use the linkages 
enabled by DTC and qualified FAST transfer agents to withdraw 
securities electronically. Upon the investor's request, a broker can 
use DRS, if available for the particular securities issue, to 
transfer securities from the broker's account (where it is in DTC's 
nominee registration) to be held in an investor's own name on the 
transfer agent's book. DTC's balance in that security drops and the 
investor receives a statement of its holdings, rather than a 
certificate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The key issues appear to be processing time and access to transfers 
between DRS at the transfer agent and book-entry form at the broker-
dealer. With regard to processing time, the Commission is concerned 
that broker-dealer processes, whereby an investor requests that its 
broker-dealer change the investor's form of ownership from certificate 
form into street name form at the broker-dealer, can take days or 
weeks. Those processing timeframes will need to be significantly 
compressed or completed in real time to accommodate T+0. Broker-dealers 
might require investors to complete the process of transferring paper 
certificates into book-entry either through the transfer agent or the 
broker-dealer prior to trade execution, thereby allowing the broker-
dealer assurances the securities can be delivered in time for 
settlement. With regard to access, only investors who have an issuer 
and transfer agent that offer DRS services can move their securities 
between DRS at the transfer agent and book-entry form at the broker-
dealer.
    The Commission is seeking comment on these issues, as well as a 
number of other issues related to the consideration of 
dematerialization as a building block to achieving T+0.
    137. Is the elimination of the paper certificate necessary to 
achieve T+0? If so, why? If not, why?
    138. Would further dematerialization, immobilization, or some 
combination thereof, without the elimination of the paper certificate, 
be sufficient to facilitate a T+0 settlement cycle? Please describe how 
and why this would or would not be the case.
    139. If further dematerialization or immobilization is necessary to 
achieve T+0 settlement, what needs to be done on either an operational 
or regulatory basis to achieve such an objective? Please be as specific 
as possible, particularly where your answer relates to regulatory 
initiatives. For example, should the Commission consider mandating the 
dematerialization of certain types of securities? If so, which 
securities? Should such a mandate be limited to securities traded on an 
exchange, or focused on particular asset classes?
    140. Should any potential requirements regarding dematerialization 
be imposed in stages or, instead, be comprehensive from the outset? For 
example, should such requirements be phased by addressing: (i) First, 
newly listed companies, (ii) then, new issues of securities by all 
listed companies, and (iii) all outstanding securities?
    141. In order to better accommodate a T+0 environment, what 
changes, if any, would need to be made to broker-dealer processes for 
responding to investor requests to transfer investors' paper 
certificates into holdings in street-name book-entry form at the 
broker-dealer?
    142. Do laws in other jurisdictions present any barriers to 
achieving complete dematerialization, such as laws that require an 
issuer to issue certificates or prohibit book-entry ownership? If so, 
please describe the jurisdictions and the specific laws that raise 
potential issues.
    143. What are the costs and benefits with requiring investors who 
hold paper certificates to complete the transfer of such securities 
into book-entry prior to the execution of a trade?

V. Economic Analysis

    The Commission is mindful of the economic effects that may result 
from the proposed amendments, including the benefits, costs, and the 
effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.\286\ This 
section analyzes the expected economic effects of the proposed rules 
relative to the current baseline, which consists of the current market 
and regulatory framework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ Exchange Act Section 3(f) requires the Commission, when it 
is engaged in rulemaking pursuant to the Exchange Act and is 
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, to consider, in addition to the 
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). In 
addition, Exchange Act Section 23(a)(2) requires the Commission, 
when making rules pursuant to the Exchange Act, to consider among 
other matters the impact that any such rule would have on 
competition and not to adopt any rule that would impose a burden on 
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of 
the purposes of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This economic analysis begins with a discussion of the risks 
inherent in the settlement cycle and how a reduction in the cycle's 
length may affect the management and mitigation of these risks. Next, 
it discusses market frictions that potentially impair the ability of 
market participants to shorten the settlement cycle in the absence of a 
Commission rule. These settlement cycle risks and market frictions 
frame our subsequent analysis of the rule's benefits and costs. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendment to 
Exchange Act Rule 15c6-1(a) and the proposed deletion of Exchange Act 
Rule 15c6-1(c) ameliorate some or all of these market frictions and 
thus reduce the risks inherent in the settlement process.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that, to successfully shorten 
the settlement timeframes to T+1 while minimizing settlement fails in 
the institutional trade processing environment, will require further 
enhancing automation, standardization, and the percentage of trades 
that are allocated, confirmed, and affirmed by the end of the trade 
date.\287\ To this end the Commission is also proposing (i) new Rule 
15c6-2 to require that, where parties have agreed to engage in an 
allocation, confirmation, or affirmation process, a broker or dealer 
would be prohibited from effecting or entering into a contract for the 
purchase or sale of a security (other than an exempted security, a 
government security, a municipal security, commercial paper, bankers' 
acceptances, or commercial bills) on behalf of a customer unless such 
broker or dealer has entered into a written agreement with the customer 
that requires the allocation, confirmation, affirmation, or any 
combination thereof, be completed no later than the end of the day on 
trade date in such form as may be necessary to achieve settlement in 
compliance with Rule 15c6-1(a),\288\ (ii) an amendment to Rule 204-2 
under the Advisers Act to require investment advisers that are parties 
to agreements under Exchange Act Rule 15c6-2 to maintain a time stamped 
record of confirmations received, and when allocations and affirmations 
were sent to a broker or dealer,\289\ and (iii) new Rule 17Ad-27 under 
the Exchange Act to require policies and procedures that require CMSPs 
facilitate the ongoing development of operational and technological 
improvements associated with institutional trade processing,

[[Page 10476]]

which may in turn also facilitate further shortening of the settlement 
cycle in the future.\290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ See supra Part III.B.2; infra Part V.C.
    \288\ See supra Part III.B.
    \289\ See supra Part III.C.
    \290\ See supra Part III.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The discussion of the economic effects of the proposed amendment to 
Rule 15c6-1(a), the proposed deletion of Rule 15c6-1(c), the proposed 
Rule 15c6-2, the proposed amendment to Rule 204-2, and the proposed 
Rule 17Ad-27 begins with a baseline of current practices. The economic 
analysis then discusses the likely economic effects of the proposal as 
well as its effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
The Commission has, where practicable, attempted to quantify the 
economic effects expected to result from this proposal. In some cases, 
however, data needed to quantify these economic effects is not 
currently available or otherwise publicly available. As noted below, 
the Commission is unable to quantify certain economic effects and 
solicits comment, including estimates and data from interested parties, 
that could help inform the estimates of the economic effects of the 
proposal.

A. Background

    As previously discussed, the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) 
would prohibit, unless otherwise expressly agreed to by both parties at 
the time of the transaction, a broker-dealer from effecting or entering 
into a contract for the purchase or sale of certain securities that 
provides for payment of funds and delivery of securities later than the 
first business day after the date of the contract subject to certain 
exceptions provided in the rule. In its analysis of the economic 
effects of the proposal, the Commission has considered the risks that 
market participants, including broker-dealers, clearing agencies, and 
institutional and retail investors are exposed to during the settlement 
cycle and how those risks change with the length of the cycle.
    The settlement cycle spans the time between when a trade is 
executed and when cash and securities are delivered to the seller and 
buyer, respectively. During this time, each party to a trade faces the 
risk that its counterparty may fail to meet its obligations to deliver 
cash or securities. When a counterparty fails to meet its obligations 
to deliver cash or securities, the non-defaulting party may bear costs 
as a result. For example, if the non-defaulting party chooses to enter 
into a new transaction, it will be with a new counterparty and will 
occur at a potentially different price.\291\ The length of the 
settlement cycle influences this risk in two ways: (i) Through its 
effect on counterparty exposures to price volatility, and (ii) through 
its effect on the value of outstanding obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \291\ This applies to the general case of a transaction that is 
not novated to a CCP. As described above, in its role as a CCP, NSCC 
becomes counterparty to both initial parties to a centrally cleared 
transaction. In the case of such transactions, while each initial 
party is not exposed to the risk that its original counterparty 
defaults, both are exposed to the risk of CCP default. Similarly, 
the CCP is exposed to the risk that either initial party defaults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, additional time allows asset prices to move further away 
from the price of the original trade. For example, in a simplified 
model where daily asset returns are statistically independent, the 
variance of an asset's return over t days is equal to t multiplied by 
the daily variance of the asset's return. Thus when the daily variance 
of returns is constant, the variance of returns increases linearly in 
the number of days.\292\ In other words, the more days that elapse 
between when a trade is executed and when a counterparty defaults, the 
larger the variance of price change will be, and the more likely that 
the asset's price will deviate from the execution price. The price 
change could be positive or negative, but in the event of a price 
increase, the buyer must pay more than the original execution price, 
and in the event of a price decrease, the buyer may buy the security 
for less than the original execution price.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ More generally, because total variance over multiple days 
is equal to the sum of daily variances and variables related to the 
correlation between daily returns, total variance increases with 
time so long as daily returns are not highly negatively correlated. 
See, e.g., Morris H. DeGroot, Probability and Statistics 216 
(Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1986).
    \293\ Similarly, a seller whose counterparty fails faces similar 
risks with respect to the security price but in the opposite 
direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the length of the settlement cycle directly influences the 
quantity of transactions awaiting settlement. For example, assuming no 
change in transaction volumes, the volume of unsettled trades under a 
T+1 settlement cycle is approximately half the volume of unsettled 
trades under a T+2 settlement cycle.\294\ Thus, in the event of a 
default, counterparties would have to enter into a new transaction, or 
otherwise close out approximately half as many trades under a T+1 
standard settlement cycle than under a T+2 standard. This means that 
for a given adverse move in prices, the financial losses resulting from 
a counterparty default will be approximately half as large under a T+1 
standard settlement cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ The relationship is approximate because some trades may 
settle early or, if both counterparties agree at the time of the 
transaction, settle after the time limit in Rule 15c6-1(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Market participants manage and mitigate settlement risk in a number 
of specific ways.\295\ Generally, these methods entail costs to market 
participants. In some cases, these costs may be explicit. For instance, 
clearing brokers typically explicitly charge introducing brokers to 
clear trades. Other costs are implicit, such as the opportunity cost of 
assets posted as collateral or limits placed on the trading activities 
of a broker's customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ See T+2 Proposing Release, supra note 30, at 69251 
(discussing the entities that compose the clearance and settlement 
infrastructure for U.S. securities markets).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission acknowledges that, given current trading volumes and 
complexity, certain market frictions may prevent securities markets 
from shortening the settlement cycle in the absence of regulatory 
intervention. The Commission has considered two key market frictions 
related to investments required to implement a shorter settlement 
cycle. The first is a coordination problem that arises when some of the 
benefits of actions taken by one or more market participants are only 
realized when other market participants take a similar action. For 
example, under the current regulatory structure, if a particular 
institutional investor were to make a technological investment to 
reduce the time it requires to match and allocate trades without a 
corresponding action by its clearing broker-dealers, the institutional 
investor cannot fully realize the benefits of its investment, as the 
settlement process is limited by the capabilities of the clearing 
agency for trade matching and allocation. More generally, when every 
market participant must bear the costs of an upgrade for the entire 
market to enjoy a benefit, the result is a coordination problem, where 
each market participant may be reluctant to make the necessary 
investments until it can be reasonably certain that others will also do 
so. In general, these coordination problems may be resolved if all 
parties can credibly commit to the necessary infrastructure 
investments. Regulatory intervention is one possible way of 
coordinating market participants to undertake the investments necessary 
to support a shorter settlement cycle. Such intervention could come 
through Commission rulemaking or through a coordinated set of SRO rule 
changes.
    In addition to coordination problems, a second market friction 
related to the settlement cycle involves situations where one market 
participant's

[[Page 10477]]

investments result in benefits for other market participants. For 
example, if a market participant invests in a technology that reduces 
the error rate in its trade matching, not only does it benefit from 
fewer errors, but its counterparties and other market participants may 
also benefit from more robust trade matching. However, because market 
participants do not necessarily take into account the benefits that may 
accrue to other market participants (also known as ``externalities'') 
when market participants choose the level of investment in their 
systems, the level of investment in technologies that reduce errors 
might be less than efficient for the entire market. More generally, 
underinvestment may result because each participant only takes into 
account its own costs and benefits when choosing which infrastructure 
improvements or investments to make, and does not take into account the 
costs and benefits that may accrue to its counterparties, other market 
participants, or financial markets generally.
    Moreover, because market participants that incur similar costs to 
move to a shorter settlement cycle may nevertheless experience 
different levels of economic benefits, there is likely heterogeneity 
across market participants in the demand for a shorter settlement 
cycle. This heterogeneity may exacerbate coordination problems and 
underinvestment. Market participants that do not expect to receive 
direct benefits from settling transactions earlier may lack incentives 
to invest in infrastructure to support a shorter settlement cycle and 
thus could make it difficult for the market as a whole to realize the 
overall risk reduction that the Commission believes a shorter 
settlement cycle may bring.
    For example, the level and nature of settlement risk exposures vary 
across different types of market participants. A market participant's 
characteristics and trading strategies can influence the level of 
settlement risk it faces. For example, large market participants will 
generally be exposed to more settlement risk than small market 
participants because they trade in larger volume. However, large market 
participants also trade across a larger variety of assets and may face 
less idiosyncratic risk in the event of counterparty default if the 
portfolio of trades that may have to be replaced is diversified.\296\ 
As a corollary, a market participant who trades a single security in a 
single direction against a given counterparty may face more 
idiosyncratic risk in the event of counterparty failure than a market 
participant who trades in both directions with that counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \296\ See Ananth Madhavan et al., Risky Business: The Clearance 
and Settlement of Financial Transactions 4-5 (U. Pa. Wharton Sch. 
Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Res. Working Paper No. 40-88, 1988), 
https://rodneywhitecenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/8840.pdf; see also John H. Cochrane, Asset Pricing 15 (Princeton 
Univ. Press rev. ed. 2009) (defining the idiosyncratic component of 
any payoff as the part that is uncorrelated with the discount 
factor).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the extent to which a market participant experiences 
any economic benefits that may stem from a shortened standard 
settlement cycle likely depends on the market participant's relative 
bargaining power. While larger intermediaries may experience direct 
benefits from a shorter settlement cycle as a result of being required 
to post less collateral with a CCP, if they do not effectively compete 
for customers through fees and services as a result of market power, 
they may pass only a portion of these cost savings through to their 
customers.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ See infra Parts V.C.1 (Benefits) and V.C.2 (Costs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendment 
to Rule 15c6-1(a), which would shorten the standard settlement cycle 
from T+2 to T+1 may mitigate the market frictions of coordination and 
underinvestment described above. The Commission believes that by 
mitigating these market frictions and for the reasons discussed below, 
the transition to a shorter standard settlement cycle will reduce the 
risks inherent in the clearance and settlement process.
    The shorter standard settlement cycle might also affect the level 
of operational risk in the National C&S System. Shortening the 
settlement cycle by one day would reduce the time that market 
participants have to resolve any errors that might occur in the 
clearance and settlement process. Tighter operational timeframes and 
linkages required under a shorter standard settlement cycle might 
introduce new fragility that could affect market participants, 
specifically an increased risk that operational issues could affect 
transaction processing and related securities settlement.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \298\ For example, the ability to compute an accurate net asset 
value (``NAV'') within the settlement timeframe is a key component 
for settlement of ETF transactions. See, e.g., Barrington Partners 
White Paper, An Extraordinary Week: Shared Experiences from Inside 
the Fund Accounting Systems Failure of 2015 (Nov. 2015), https://www.mfdf.org/docs/default-source/fromjoomla/uploads/blog_files/sharedexperiencefromfasystemfailure2015.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In part to lessen the likelihood that shortening the settlement 
cycle might negatively affect operational risk, the Commission and 
market participants have emphasized on multiple occasions the 
importance of accelerating the institutional trade clearance and 
settlement process by improving, among other things, the allocation, 
confirmation and affirmation processes for the clearance and settlement 
of institutional trades, as well as improvements to the provision of 
central matching and electronic trade confirmation.\299\ A 2010 DTCC 
paper published when the standard settlement cycle in the U.S. was 
still T+3, described same-day affirmation as ``a prerequisite'' of 
shortening the settlement cycle because of its impact on settlement 
failure rates and operational risk.\300\ According to previously cited 
statistics published by DTCC in 2011 regarding affirmation rates 
achieved through industry utilization of a certain matching/ETC 
provider, on average, 45% of trades were affirmed on trade date, 90% 
were affirmed by T+1, and 92% were affirmed by noon on T+2.\301\ 
Currently, only about 68% of trades achieve affirmation by 12:00 
midnight at the end of trade date.\302\ While these numbers have 
improved over time, the improvements have been incremental and fallen 
short of achieving an affirmed confirmation by the end of trade date as 
is considered a securities industry best practice.\303\ Accordingly, 
and as described more fully below, to achieve the maximum efficiency 
and risk reduction that may result from completing the allocation, 
confirmation and affirmation process on trade date, and to facilitate 
shortening the settlement cycle to T+1 or shorter, the Commission is 
proposing new Rule 15c6-2 under the Exchange Act to facilitate trade 
date completion of institutional trade allocations, confirmations and 
affirmations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \299\ See supra Part III.B; see also supra notes 146-148 and 
accompanying text.
    \300\ See supra note 155.
    \301\ See supra note 156.
    \302\ See supra note 157.
    \303\ See supra note 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Economic Baseline and Affected Parties

    The Commission uses as its economic baseline the clearance and 
settlement process as it exists at the time of this proposal. In 
addition to the current process that is described in Part II.B above, 
the baseline includes rules adopted by the Commission, including 
Commission rules governing the clearance and settlement system, SRO

[[Page 10478]]

rules,\304\ as well as rules adopted by regulators in other 
jurisdictions to regulate securities settlement in those jurisdictions. 
The following section discusses several additional elements of the 
baseline that are relevant for the economic analysis of the proposed 
amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) because they are related to the financial 
risks faced by market participants that clear and settle transactions 
and the specific means by which market participants manage these risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \304\ Certain SRO rules currently define ``regular way'' 
settlement as occurring on T+2 and, as such, would need to be 
amended in connection with shortening the standard settlement cycle 
to T+1. See, e.g., MSRB Rule G-12(b)(ii)(B); FINRA Rule 11320(b). 
Further, certain timeframes or deadlines in SRO rules key off the 
current settlement date, either expressly or indirectly. In such 
cases, the SROs may also need to amend these rules. See supra Part 
III.E.5 (further discussing the impact of the proposal on SRO rules 
and operations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Central Counterparties
    NSCC, a subsidiary of DTCC, is a clearing agency registered with 
the Commission that operates the CCP for U.S. equity securities 
transactions.\305\ One way that NSCC mitigates the credit, market, and 
liquidity risk that it assumes through its novation and guarantee of 
trades as a CCP is by multilateral netting of securities trades' 
delivery and payment obligations across its members. By offsetting its 
members' obligations, NSCC reduces the aggregate market value of 
securities and cash it must deliver to clearing members. While netting 
reduces NSCC's settlement payment obligations by a daily average of 
98%,\306\ it does not fully eliminate the risk posed by unsettled 
trades because NSCC is responsible for payments or deliveries on any 
trades that it cannot fully net. NSCC reported clearing an average of 
approximately $2.251 trillion each day during the first quarter of 
2021,\307\ suggesting an average net settlement obligation of 
approximately $45 billion each day.\308\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \305\ A second DTCC subsidiary, DTC, also a clearing agency 
registered with the Commission, operates a CSD with respect to 
securities transactions in the U.S. in several types of eligible 
securities including, among others, equities, warrants, rights, 
corporate debt and notes, municipal bonds, government securities, 
asset-backed securities, depositary receipts and money market 
instruments.
    \306\ See supra note 62.
    \307\ See NSCC, Q1 2021 Fixed Income Clearing Corporation and 
NSCC Quantitative Disclosure for Central Counterparties, at 20 (June 
2021), http://www.dtcc.com/legal/policy-and-compliance.
    \308\ Calculated as $2.251 trillion x 2% = $45.02 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The aggregate settlement risk faced by NSCC is also a function of 
the probability of clearing member default. NSCC manages the risk of 
clearing member default by imposing certain financial responsibility 
requirements on its members. For example, as of 2021, broker-dealer 
members of NSCC that are not municipal securities brokers and do not 
intend to clear and settle transactions for other broker-dealers must 
have excess net capital of $500,000 over the minimum net capital 
requirement imposed by the Commission and $1,000,000 over the minimum 
net capital requirement if the broker-dealer member clears for other 
broker-dealers.\309\ Furthermore, each NSCC member is subject to other 
ongoing membership requirements, including a requirement to furnish 
NSCC with assurances of the member's financial responsibility and 
operational capability, including, but not limited to, periodic reports 
of its financial and operational condition.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \309\ For a description of NSCC's financial responsibility 
requirements for registered broker-dealers, see NSCC Rules and 
Procedures, at 336 (effective Jan. 24, 2022) (``NSCC Rules and 
Procedures''), https://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/
rules/nscc_rules.pdf. Pursuant to Rule 11 and Addendum K to NSCC's 
Rules and Procedures, NSCC guarantees the completion of CNS settling 
trades (``NSCC trade guaranty'') that have been validated. Id. at 
74-79, 363.
    \310\ See, e.g., id. at 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to managing the member default risk, NSCC also takes 
steps to mitigate the impacts of a member default. For example, in the 
normal course of business, CCPs are generally not exposed to market or 
liquidity risk because they expect to receive every security from a 
seller they are obligated to deliver to a buyer and they expect to 
receive every payment from a buyer that they are obligated to deliver 
to a seller. However, when a clearing member defaults, the CCP can no 
longer expect the defaulting member to deliver securities or make 
payments. CCPs mitigate this risk by requiring clearing members to make 
contributions of financial resources to the CCP so that it may make 
payments or deliver securities in the event of a member default. The 
level of financial resources CCPs require clearing members to commit 
may be based on, among other things, the market and liquidity risk of a 
member's portfolio, the correlation between the assets in the member's 
portfolio and the member's own default probability, and the liquidity 
of the assets posted as collateral.
2. Market Participants--Investors, Broker-Dealers, and Custodians
    As discussed in Part II.B, broker-dealers serve both retail and 
institutional customers. Aggregate statistics from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System suggest that at the end of the 
second quarter 2021, U.S. households held approximately 40% of the 
value of corporate equity outstanding, and 57% of the value of mutual 
fund shares outstanding, which provide a general picture of the share 
of holdings by retail investors.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \311\ See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Statistical Release Z.1, Financial Accounts of the United States: 
Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic 
Accounts, at 130 (Sept. 23, 2021), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20210923/z1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the third quarter of 2021, approximately 3,500 broker-dealers 
filed FOCUS Reports \312\ with FINRA. These firms varied in size, with 
median assets of approximately $1.3 million and average assets of 
approximately $1.5 billion. The top 1% of broker-dealers held 81% of 
the assets of broker-dealers overall, indicating a high degree of 
concentration in the industry. Of the approximately 3,500 filers, as of 
the end of 2020, 156 reported self-clearing public customer accounts, 
while 1,126 reported acting as an introducing broker and sending orders 
to another broker-dealer for clearing and not self-clearing. Broker-
dealers that identified themselves as self-clearing broker-dealers, on 
average, had higher total assets than broker-dealers that identified 
themselves as introducing broker-dealers. While the decision to self-
clear may be based on many factors, this evidence is consistent with 
the argument that there may currently be high barriers to entry for 
providing clearing services as a broker-dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \312\ FOCUS Reports, or ``Financial and Operational Combined 
Uniform Single'' Reports, are monthly, quarterly, and annual reports 
that broker-dealers generally are required to file with the 
Commission and/or SROs pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 17a-5, 17 CFR 
240.17a-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Clearing broker-dealers face liquidity risks as they are obligated 
to make payments to clearing agencies on behalf of customers who 
purchase securities. As discussed in more detail below, because 
customers of a clearing broker may default on their payment obligations 
to the broker, particularly when the price of a purchased security 
declines before settlement, clearing broker-dealers routinely seek to 
reduce the risks posed by their customers. For example, clearing 
broker-dealers may require customers to contribute financial resources 
in the form of margin to margin accounts, to pre-fund purchases in cash 
accounts, or may restrict the use of customers' unsettled funds. These 
measures are in many ways analogous to measures taken by clearing 
agencies to reduce and mitigate the risks posed by their clearing 
members. In addition, clearing broker-dealers may also mitigate the 
risks

[[Page 10479]]

posed by customers by charging higher transaction fees that reflect the 
value of the customer's option to default, thereby causing customers to 
internalize the cost of default that is inherent in the settlement 
process.\313\ While not directly reducing the risk posed by customers 
to clearing members, these higher transaction fees at least allocate to 
customers a portion of the expected direct costs of customer default.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \313\ See infra Parts V.C.2 and V.C.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another way the settlement cycle may affect transaction prices 
involves the potential use of funds during the settlement cycle. To the 
extent that buyers may use the cash to purchase securities during the 
settlement cycle for other purposes, they may derive value from the 
length of time it takes to settle a transaction. Testing this 
hypothesis, studies have found that sellers demand compensation for the 
benefit that buyers receive from deferring payment during the 
settlement cycle and that this compensation is incorporated in equity 
returns.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \314\ See Victoria Lynn Messman, Securities Processing: The 
Effects of a T+3 System on Security Prices (May 2011) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Tennessee--Knoxville), http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1002/; Josef Lakonishok & Maurice 
Levi, Weekend Effects on Stock Returns: A Note, 37 J. Fin. 883 
(1982), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2327716.pdf; Ramon P. 
DeGennaro, The Effect of Payment Delays on Stock Prices, 13 J. Fin. 
Res. 133 (1990), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1990.tb00543.x/abstract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The settlement process also exposes investors to certain risks. The 
length of the settlement cycle sets the minimum amount of time between 
when an investor places an order to sell securities and when the 
customer can expect to have access to the proceeds of that sale. 
Investors take this into account when they plan transactions to meet 
liquidity needs. For example, under T+2 settlement, investors who 
experience liquidity shocks, such as unexpected expenses that must be 
met within one day, could not rely on obtaining funding solely through 
a sale of securities because the proceeds of the sale would not 
typically be available until the end of the second day after the sale. 
One possible strategy to deal with such a shock under T+2 settlement 
would be to borrow to meet payment obligations on day T+1 and repay the 
loan on the following day with the proceeds from a sale of securities, 
incurring the cost of one day of interest. Another strategy that 
investors may use is to hold financial resources to insure themselves 
from liquidity shocks.
3. Investment Companies and Investment Advisers
    Shares issued by investment companies may settle on different 
timeframes. ETFs, certain closed-end funds, and mutual funds that are 
sold by brokers generally settle on T+2.\315\ By contrast, mutual fund 
shares that are directly purchased from the fund generally settle on 
T+1. Mutual funds that settle on a different basis than the underlying 
investments currently face liquidity risk as a result of a mismatch 
between the timing of mutual fund share transaction settlement and the 
timing of fund portfolio security transaction order settlements. Mutual 
funds may manage these particular liquidity needs by, among other 
methods, using cash reserves, back-up lines of credit, or interfund 
lending facilities to provide cash to cover the settlement 
mismatch.\316\ As of the end of 2020, there were 11,323 open-end funds 
(including money market funds and ETFs).\317\ The assets of these funds 
were approximately $29.3 trillion.\318\ Of the 11,323 funds noted, 
2,296 were ETFs with combined assets of $5.5 trillion.\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \315\ See supra note 84.
    \316\ See Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; 
Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company 
Reporting Modernization Release, Investment Company Act Release No. 
31835 (Sept. 22, 2015), 80 FR 62274, 62285 n.100 (Oct. 15, 2015).
    \317\ See ICI, 2021 Investment Company Fact Book, at 40 (May 
2021) (``2021 ICI Fact Book''), available at https://www.ici.org/. 
This comprises 9,027 open-end mutual funds, including mutual funds 
that invest primarily in other mutual funds, and 2,296 ETFs, 
including ETFs that invest primarily in other ETFs.
    \318\ See id. at 41.
    \319\ See id. at 40-41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act, an open-end fund 
generally is required to pay shareholders who tender shares for 
redemption within seven days of their tender.\320\ Open-end fund shares 
that are sold through broker-dealers must be redeemed within two days 
of a redemption request because broker-dealers are subject to Rule 
15c6-1(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \320\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-22(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, Rule 22c-1 under the Investment Company Act,\321\ the 
``forward pricing'' rule, requires funds, their principal underwriters, 
and dealers to sell and redeem fund shares at a price based on the 
current NAV next computed after receipt of an order to purchase or 
redeem fund shares, even though cash proceeds from purchases may be 
invested or fund assets may be sold in subsequent days in order to 
satisfy purchase requests or meet redemption obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \321\ 17 CFR 270.22c-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on Investment Adviser Registration Depository data as of 
December 2020, approximately 13,804 advisers registered with the 
Commission are required to maintain copies of certain books and records 
relating to their advisory business. The Commission further estimates 
that 2,521 registered advisers required to maintain copies of certain 
books and records relating to their advisory business would not be 
required to make and keep the proposed required records because they do 
not have any institutional advisory clients.\322\ Therefore, the 
remaining 11,283 of these advisers, or 81.74% of the total registered 
advisers required to maintain copies of certain books and records 
relating to their advisory business, would enter a contract with a 
broker or dealer under proposed Rule 15c6-2 and therefore be subject to 
the related proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act 
(i.e., to retain copies of confirmations received, and any allocation 
and each affirmation sent, with a date and time stamp for each 
allocation (if applicable) and affirmation that indicates when the 
allocation or affirmation was sent to the broker or dealer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ See infra note 425.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Current Market for Clearance and Settlement Services
    As described in Part II.B, two affiliated entities, NSCC and DTC, 
facilitate clearance and settlement activities in U.S. securities 
markets in most instances. There is limited competition in the 
provision of the services that these entities provide. NSCC is the CCP 
for trades between broker-dealers involving equity securities, 
corporate and municipal debt, and UITs for the U.S. market. DTC is the 
CSD that provides custody and book-entry transfer services for the vast 
majority of securities transactions in the U.S. market involving 
equities, corporate and municipal debt, money market instruments, ADRs, 
and ETFs. CMSPs electronically facilitate communication among a broker-
dealer, an institutional investor or its investment adviser, and the 
institutional investor's custodian to reach agreement on the details of 
a securities trade, thereby creating binding terms.\323\ As discussed 
further in Part III.D, FINRA currently requires broker-dealers to use a 
clearing agency, such as DTC or a CMSP, or a qualified vendor under the

[[Page 10480]]

rule to complete delivery-versus-payment transactions with their 
customers.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \323\ See supra Part II.B.1; see also T+2 Proposing Release, 
supra note 30, at 69246.
    \324\ See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Broker-dealers compete to provide services to retail and 
institutional customers. Based on the large number of broker-dealers, 
there is likely a high degree of competition among broker-dealers. 
However, the markets that broker-dealers serve may be segmented along 
lines relevant for the analysis of competitive effects of the proposed 
amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a). As noted above, the number of broker-
dealers that self-clear public customer accounts is smaller than the 
set of broker-dealers that introduce and do not self-clear. This could 
mean that introducing broker-dealers compete more intensively for 
customers than clearing broker-dealers. Further, clearing broker-
dealers must meet requirements set by NSCC and DTC, such as financial 
responsibility requirements and clearing fund requirements. These 
requirements represent barriers to entry for brokers that may wish to 
become clearing broker-dealers, limiting competition among such 
entities.
    Competition for customers affects how the costs associated with the 
clearance and settlement process are allocated among market 
participants. In managing the expected costs of risks from their 
customers and the costs of compliance with SRO and Commission rules, 
clearing broker-dealers decide what fraction of these costs to pass 
through to their customers in the form of fees and margin requirements, 
and what fraction of these costs to bear themselves. The level of 
competition that a clearing broker-dealer faces for customers will 
dictate the extent to which it is able to pass these costs through to 
its customers.
    In addition, several factors affect the current levels of 
efficiency and capital formation in the various functions that make up 
the market for clearance and settlement services. First, at a general 
level, market participants occupying various positions in the clearance 
and settlement system must post or hold liquid financial resources, and 
the level of these resources is a function of the length of the 
settlement cycle. For example, NSCC collects clearing fund 
contributions from members to help ensure that it has sufficient 
financial resources in the event that one of its members defaults on 
its obligations to NSCC. As discussed above, the length of the 
settlement cycle is one determinant of the size of NSCC's exposure to 
clearing members. As another example, mutual funds may manage liquidity 
needs by, among other methods, using cash reserves, back-up lines of 
credit, or interfund lending facilities to provide cash. These 
liquidity needs, in turn, are related to the mismatch between the 
timing of mutual fund transaction order settlements and the timing of 
fund portfolio security transaction order settlements.
    Holding liquid assets solely for the purpose of mitigating 
counterparty risk or liquidity needs that arise as part of the 
settlement process could represent an allocative inefficiency. That is, 
because firms that are required to hold these assets might prefer to 
put them to alternative uses and because these assets may be more 
efficiently allocated to other market participants who value them for 
their fundamental risk and return characteristics rather than for their 
value as collateral. To the extent that any intermediaries between 
buyer and seller who facilitate clearance and settlement of the trade 
bear costs as a result of inefficient allocation of collateral assets, 
these inefficiencies may be reflected in higher transaction costs.
    The settlement cycle may also have more direct impacts on 
transaction costs. As noted above, clearing broker-dealers may charge 
higher transaction fees to reflect the value of the customer's option 
to default and these fees may cause customers to internalize the cost 
of the default options inherent in the settlement process. However, 
these fees also make transactions more costly and may influence the 
willingness of market participants to efficiently share risks or to 
supply liquidity to securities markets. Taken together, inefficiencies 
in the allocation of resources and risks across market participants may 
serve to impair capital formation.
    Finally, market participants may make processing errors in the 
clearance and settlement process.\325\ Market participants have stated 
that manual processing and a lack of automation result in processing 
errors.\326\ Although some of these errors may be resolved within the 
settlement cycle and not result in a failed trade, those that are not 
may result in failed trades, which appear in the failure to deliver 
data.\327\ Further, market participants may incorporate the likelihood 
that processing errors result in delays in payments or deliveries into 
securities prices.\328\
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    \325\ See, e.g., Omgeo Study, supra note 155, at 12; see also 
T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 26.
    \326\ Matthew Stauffer, Managing Director, Head of Institutional 
Trade Processing at DTCC, stated, ``The findings of our survey 
highlight the benefits of leveraging automated post-trade solutions 
to reduce the costs of operational functions and the risk inherent 
in manual processes.'' See DTCC, DTCC Identifies Seven Areas of 
Broker Cost Savings as a Result of Greater Post-Trade Automation 
(Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.dtcc.com/news/2020/november/18/dtcc-identifies-seven-areas-of-broker-cost-savings-as-a-result-of-greater-post-trade-automation;
    \327\ See Statement by The Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Securities 
Lending and Short Sales Roundtable, at 3 (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-590/4590-32.pdf; see also T+1 Report, supra 
note 18, at 26.
    \328\ See Messman, supra note 314.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Figure 5 shows total fails to deliver in shares by month from 
January 2016 through November 2021. The change in the U.S. settlement 
cycle from T+3 to T+2 became effective in September 2017. Although 
processing errors are only one reason a trade may result in a fail to 
deliver, there is no marked change in the fails data around the 
previous shortening of the settlement cycle.

[[Page 10481]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP24FE22.004

C. Analysis of Benefits, Costs, and Impact on Efficiency, Competition, 
and Capital Formation

1. Benefits
    The proposed amendment and new rules would likely yield benefits 
associated with the reduction of risk in the settlement cycle. By 
shortening the settlement cycle, the proposed amendment would reduce 
both the aggregate market value of all unsettled trades and the amount 
of time that CCPs or the counterparties to a trade may be subject to 
market and credit risk from an unsettled trade.\329\ First, holding 
transaction volumes constant, the market value of transactions awaiting 
settlement at any given point in time under a T+1 settlement cycle will 
be approximately one half lower than under the current T+2 settlement 
cycle. Using the risk mitigation framework described in Part V.B.1, 
based on published statistics from the first quarter of 2021 \330\ and 
holding average dollar volumes constant, the aggregate notional value 
of unsettled transactions at NSCC would fall from nearly $90 billion to 
approximately $45 billion.\331\
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    \329\ See supra Part III.A.2.
    \330\ See supra note 307, at 14.
    \331\ See id. at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, a market participant that experiences counterparty default 
and enters into a new transaction under a T+2 settlement cycle is 
exposed to more market risk than would be the case under a T+1 
settlement cycle. As a result, market participants that are exposed to 
market, credit, and liquidity risks would be exposed to less risk under 
a T+1 settlement cycle. This reduction in risk may also extend to 
mutual fund transactions conducted with broker-dealers that currently 
settle on a T+2 basis.\332\ To the extent that these transactions 
currently give rise to counterparty risk exposures between mutual funds 
and broker-dealers, these exposures may decrease as a consequence of a 
shorter settlement cycle. In addition, a shorter standard settlement 
cycle would reduce liquidity risks that could arise by allowing 
investors to obtain the proceeds of securities transactions sooner. 
These risks affect all market participants, are difficult to diversify 
away, and require resources to manage and mitigate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ In today's environment, ETFs and certain closed-end funds 
clear and settle on a T+2 basis. Open-end funds (i.e., mutual funds) 
generally settle on a T+1 basis, except for certain retail funds 
which typically settle on T+2. Thus, the proposed amendment to Rule 
15c6-1(a) would require ETFs, closed-end funds, and mutual funds 
settling on a T+2 basis to revise their settlement timeframes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CCPs require clearing members to post financial resources in order 
to secure members' obligations to deliver cash and securities to the 
CCP. Clearing members in turn impose fees on their customers, e.g., 
introducing broker-dealers, institutional investors, and retail 
investors. The margin requirements required by the CCP are a function 
of the risk posed to the CCP by the potential default of the clearing 
member. That risk is a function of several factors including the value 
of trades submitted for clearing but not yet settled and the volatility 
of the securities prices that make up those unsettled trades. As these 
factors are an increasing function of the time to settlement, by 
reducing settlement from T+2 to T+1, a CCP may require less collateral 
from its members, and the CCP's members may, in turn, reduce fees that 
they may pass down to other market participants, including introducing 
broker-dealers, institutional investors, and retail investors.
    Any reduction in clearing broker-dealers' required margin would 
provide multiple benefits. First, financial resources that are used to 
mitigate the risks of the clearance and settlement process can be put 
to alternative uses. Reducing the financial risks associated with the 
overall clearance and settlement process would reduce the amount of 
collateral required to mitigate these risks, which would reduce the 
costs that market participants bear to manage and mitigate these risks 
and the allocative inefficiencies that may stem

[[Page 10482]]

from risk management practices.\333\ Second, assets that are valuable 
because they are particularly suited to meeting financial resource 
obligations may be better allocated to market participants that hold 
these assets for their fundamental risk and return characteristics. 
This improvement in allocative efficiency may improve capital 
formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \333\ See supra Part V.B (further discussing financial resources 
collected to mitigate and manage financial risks).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A portion of the savings from less costly risk management under a 
T+1 standard settlement cycle relative to a T+2 standard settlement 
cycle may flow through to investors. Investors may be able to 
profitably redeploy financial resources that were once needed to fund 
higher clearing fees, for example.
    Market participants might also individually benefit through reduced 
clearing fund deposit requirements. In 2012, the BCG Study estimated 
that cost reductions related to reduced clearing fund contributions 
resulting from moving from a T+3 to a T+2 settlement cycle would amount 
to $25 million per year.\334\ In addition, a shorter settlement cycle 
might reduce liquidity risk by allowing investors to obtain the 
proceeds of their securities transactions sooner. Reduced liquidity 
risk may be a benefit to individual investors, but it may also reduce 
the volatility of securities markets by reducing liquidity demands in 
times of adverse market conditions, potentially reducing the 
correlation between market prices and the risk management practices of 
market participants.\335\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \334\ See BCG Study, supra note 22, at 10. According to SIFMA, 
average daily trading volume in U.S. equities grew from $253.1B in 
2011 to $564.7B in 2021, an increase of 123%. See CBOE Exchange, 
Inc., and SIFMA, US Equities and Related Statistics (Jan. 3, 2022), 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-equity-and-related-securities-statistics/us-equities-and-related-statistics-sifma/. 
Price volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of the 
price, is concave in time, which means that as a period of time 
increases, volatility will increase, but at a decreasing rate. This 
suggests that the reduction in price volatility from moving from T+2 
settlement to T+1 settlement is larger than the reduction in price 
volatility from moving from T+3 settlement to T+2 settlement. These 
two facts suggest that the estimated reduction in clearing fund 
contributions would be more than $25 million per year.
    \335\ See Peter F. Christoffersen & Francis X. Diebold, How 
Relevant is Volatility Forecasting for Financial Risk Management?, 
82 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 12 (2000), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003465300558597#.V6xeL_nR-JA. The paper shows that 
volatility can be predicted in the short run, and concludes that 
short run forecastable volatility would be useful for risk 
management practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Shortening the settlement cycle may reduce incentives for investors 
to trade excessively in times of high volatility.\336\ Such incentives 
exist because investors do not always bear the full cost of settlement 
risk for their trades. Broker-dealers incur costs in managing 
settlement risk with CCPs. Broker-dealers can recover the average cost 
of risk management from their customers. However, if a particular trade 
has above-average settlement risk, such as when market prices are 
unusually volatile, it is difficult for broker-dealers to pass along 
these higher costs to their customers because fees typically depend on 
factors other than those such as market volatility that impact 
settlement risk. In extreme cases broker-dealers may prevent a customer 
from trading.\337\ Shortening the settlement cycle reduces the cost of 
risk management and should reduce any such incentives to trade more 
than they otherwise would if they bore the full cost of settlement risk 
for their trades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \336\ See Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Externalities in securities 
clearing and settlement: Should securities CCPs clear trades for 
everyone? (Fed. Res. Bank Chi. Working Paper No. 2021-02, 2021).
    \337\ This occurred in January 2021 following heightened 
interest in certain ``meme'' stocks. See supra Part II.A; see also 
Staff Report on Equity and Options Market Structure Conditions in 
Early 2021, at 31-35 (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/files/staff-report-equity-options-market-struction-conditions-early-2021.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The benefits of harmonized settlement cycles may also accrue to 
mutual funds. As described above,\338\ transactions in mutual fund 
shares typically settle on a T+1 basis even when transactions in their 
portfolio securities settle on a T+2 basis. As a result, there is a 
one-day mismatch between when these funds make payments to shareholders 
that redeem shares and when they receive cash proceeds for portfolio 
securities they sell. This mismatch represents a source of liquidity 
risk for mutual funds. Shortening the settlement cycle by one day will 
mitigate the liquidity risk due to this mismatch. As a result, mutual 
funds that settle on a T+1 basis may be able to reduce the size of cash 
reserves or the size of back up credit facilities that some currently 
use to manage liquidity risk from the mismatch in settlement cycles. 
Further, mutual funds may be able to invest incoming cash more quickly 
when funds have net subscriptions, because the settlement time for the 
purchase of fund shares will be aligned with the settlement time for 
portfolio investments, thus allowing funds to maximize their exposure 
to their defined investment strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ See supra note 332; see also supra Part V.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that these benefits are 
unlikely to be substantially mitigated by the exceptions to Rule 15c6-
1(a) discussed in Part III.A. Market participants that rely on Rule 
15c6-1(b) in order to transact in limited partnership interests that 
are not listed on an exchange or for which quotations are not 
disseminated through an automated quotation system of a registered 
securities association would likely continue to rely on the exception 
if the Commission adopts the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a). 
There may be transactions covered by Rule 15c6-1(b) that in the past 
did not make use of this exception because they settled within two 
business days, but that may require use of this exception under the 
proposed amendment to paragraph (a) of the rule because they require 
more than one business day to settle. However, these markets are opaque 
and the Commission does not have data on transactions in these 
categories that currently settle within two days but that might make 
use of this exception under the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a). 
In addition, pursuant to Rule 15c6-1(b), the Commission has granted an 
exemption from Rule 15c6-1 for securities that do not have facilities 
for transfer or delivery in the U.S.\339\ Market participants relying 
on this exemption are unlikely to be impacted by a shortening of the 
standard settlement cycle to T+1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the extent to which different types of market participants 
would experience any benefits that stem from the proposed amendment to 
Rule 15c6-1(a) may depend on their market power. As discussed 
above,\340\ the clearance and settlement system involves a number of 
intermediaries that provide a range of services between the ultimate 
buyer and seller of a security. Those market participants that have a 
greater ability to negotiate with customers or service providers may be 
able to retain a larger portion of the operational cost savings from a 
shorter settlement cycle than others, as they may be able to use their 
market power to avoid passing along the cost savings to their clients.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \340\ See supra Part II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposes to delete Rule15c6-1(c) that 
establishes a T+4 settlement cycle for firm commitment offerings for 
securities that are priced after 4:30 p.m. ET, unless otherwise 
expressly agreed to by the parties at the time of the transaction.\341\ 
As discussed above, paragraph (c) is rarely used in the current T+2 
settlement environment, but the IWG expects a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle would increase reliance on paragraph

[[Page 10483]]

(c).\342\ The Commission preliminarily believes that establishing T+1 
as the standard settlement cycle for these firm commitment offerings, 
and thereby aligning the settlement cycle with the standard settlement 
cycle for securities generally, would reduce exposures of underwriters, 
dealers, and investors to credit and market risk, and better ensure 
that the primary issuance of securities is available to settle 
secondary market trading in such securities. The Commission believes 
that harmonizing the settlement cycle for such firm commitment 
offerings with secondary market trading, to the greatest extent 
possible, limits the potential for operational risk. Further, should 
there be a need to settle beyond T+1, perhaps because of complex 
documentation requirements of certain types of offerings, the parties 
to the transaction can agree to a longer settlement period pursuant to 
paragraph (d) when they enter the transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \341\ See supra Part III.A.3.
    \342\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 33-35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) and proposed 
deletion of Rule 15c6-1(c), the Commission proposes three additional 
rules applicable, respectively, to broker-dealers, investment advisers, 
and CMSPs to improve the efficiency of managing the processing of 
institutional trades under the shortened timeframes that would be 
available in a T+1 environment. First, the Commission proposes new Rule 
15c6-2 to require that a broker-dealer enter into contracts with 
institutional customers that can achieve the allocation, confirmation, 
and affirmation of a securities transaction no later than the end of 
trade date.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \343\ See supra Part III.B.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily believes that implementing a T+1 
standard settlement cycle, as well as any potential further shortening 
beyond T+1, will necessitate significant increases in same-day 
affirmation rates because timely affirmations will be critical to 
achieving timely settlement. In this way, the Commission also 
preliminarily believes that proposed Rule 15c6-2 should facilitate 
timely settlement as a general matter because it will accelerate the 
transmission and affirmation of trade data to trade date, improving the 
accuracy and efficiency of institutional trade processing and reducing 
the potential for settlement failures. The Commission further 
anticipates that proposed Rule 15c6-2 would likely encourage further 
development of automated and standardized practices among market 
participants more generally, particularly those that continue to rely 
on manual processes to achieve settlement.
    Although same-day affirmation is considered a best practice for 
institutional trade processing, adoption is not universal across market 
participants or even across all trades entered by a given participant. 
Market participants continue to use hundreds of ``local'' matching 
platforms, and rely on inconsistent SSI data independently maintained 
by broker-dealers, investment managers, custodians, sub-custodians, and 
agents on separate databases. As discussed in Part II.B, processing 
institutional trades requires managing the back and forth involved with 
transmitting and reconciling trade information among the parties, 
functionally matching and re-matching with the counterparties to the 
trade, as well as custodians and agents, to facilitate settlement. It 
also requires market participants to engage in allocation processes, 
such as allocation-level cancellations and corrections, some of which 
are still processed manually.\344\ This collection of redundant, often 
manual steps and the use of uncoordinated (i.e., not standardized) 
databases can lead to delays, exceptions processing, settlement fails, 
wasted resources, and economic losses. The total industry headcount 
employed in managing today's pre-settlement and settlement fails 
management process is in the thousands, and additional costs and risks 
resulting from the inability to settle efficiently are 
significant.\345\ The Commission believes that proposed Rule 15c6-2 
should increase the percentage of trades that achieve an affirmed 
confirmation on trade date and should help facilitate an orderly 
transition to T+1. Proposed Rule 15c6-2 would also improve the 
efficiency of the settlement cycle by incentivizing market participants 
to commit to operational and technological upgrades that facilitate 
same-day affirmation to eliminate, among other things, manual 
operations, while also reducing operational risk and promoting 
readiness for shortening the settlement cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See supra note 168.
    \345\ See DTCC Modernizing Paper, supra note 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the Commission proposes to amend the recordkeeping 
obligations of investment advisers to ensure that they are properly 
documenting their related allocations and affirmations, as well as the 
confirmations they receive from their broker-dealers.\346\ The proposed 
amendment to Rule 204-2 would require advisers to time and date stamp 
records of any allocation and each affirmation. The Commission believes 
that the timing of communicating allocations to the broker or dealer is 
a critical pre-requisite to ensure that confirmations can be issued in 
a timely manner, and affirmation is the final step necessary for an 
adviser to acknowledge agreement on the terms of the trade or alert the 
broker or dealer of a discrepancy. The Commission believes the proposed 
recordkeeping requirements would help advisers to establish that they 
have met their obligations to achieve a matched trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \346\ See supra Part III.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission proposes a requirement for CMSPs to 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures designed to facilitate straight-through processing.\347\ 
Under the rule, a CMSP facilitates straight-through processing when its 
policies and procedures enable its users to minimize, to the greatest 
extent that is technologically practicable, the need for manual input 
of trade details or manual intervention to resolve errors and 
exceptions that can prevent settlement of the trade.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ See supra Part III.D; see also supra Part III.D.1 (further 
discussing the term ``straight-through processing'').
    \348\ See supra note 347.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that increasing the efficiency of using a 
CMSP can reduce costs and risks associated with processing 
institutional trades and improve the efficiency of the National C&S 
System. CMSPs have become increasingly connected to a wide variety of 
market participants in the U.S.,\349\ increasing the need to reduce 
risks and inefficiencies that may result from use of a CMSPs' systems. 
Because the proposed rule would preclude reliance on service offerings 
at CMSPs that rely on manual processing, the Commission preliminarily 
believes the proposed rule will better position CMSPs to provide 
services that not only reduce risk generally but also help facilitate 
an orderly transition to a T+1 standard settlement cycle, as well as 
potential further shortening of the settlement cycle in the future. The 
proposed requirement would support the benefits derived from a 
shortening of the settlement cycle and would mitigate any subsequent 
potential increase in fails due to the reduced time to remediate any 
errors in trades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \349\ See supra note 185.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 also would require a CMSP to submit every 
twelve months to the Commission a report that describes the following: 
(i) The CMSP's current policies and procedures for facilitating 
straight-through processing;

[[Page 10484]]

(ii) its progress in facilitating straight-through processing during 
the twelve month period covered by the report; and (iii) the steps the 
CMSP intends to take to facilitate and promote straight-through 
processing during the twelve month period that follows the period 
covered by the report.\350\ The proposed requirement would also inform 
the Commission and the public, particularly the direct and indirect 
users of the CMSP, as to the progress being made each year to advance 
implementation of straight-through processing with respect to the 
allocation, confirmation, affirmation, and matching of institutional 
trades, the communication of messages among the parties to the 
transactions, and the availability of service offerings that reduce or 
eliminate the need for manual processing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \350\ See supra Part III.D.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would require the CMSP to file the report on 
EDGAR using Inline XBRL, a structured (machine-readable) data language. 
Requiring a centralized filing location and a machine-readable data 
language for the reports would facilitate access, retrieval, analysis, 
and comparison of the disclosed straight-through processing information 
across different CMSPs and time periods by the Commission and the 
public, thus potentially augmenting the informational benefits of the 
report requirement.
2. Costs
    The Commission preliminarily believes that compliance with a T+1 
standard settlement cycle would involve initial fixed costs to update 
systems and processes.\351\ The Commission does not have all of the 
data necessary to form its own firm-level estimates of the costs of 
updates to systems and processes, as the types of data needed to form 
these estimates are difficult or impossible for the Commission to 
collect. However, the Commission has used inputs provided by industry 
studies discussed in this release to quantify these costs to the extent 
possible in Part V.C.5. In addition, the Commission encourages 
commenters to provide any information or data on the costs to market 
participants of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ Industry sources have suggested some updates to systems 
and processes might yield operational cost savings after the initial 
update. E.g., ``While there may be . . . up-front implementation 
costs to transition the industry to T+1, the industry foresees long-
term cost reduction for market participants, and by extension, costs 
borne by end investors, given the benefits of moving to T+1 
settlement.'' T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 9; see infra Part 
V.C.5.a) for industry estimates of the costs and benefits of the 
proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The operational cost burdens associated with the proposed amendment 
to Rule 15c6-1(a) for different market participants might vary 
depending on each market participant's degree of direct or indirect 
inter-connectivity to the clearance and settlement process, regardless 
of size. For example, market participants that internally manage more 
of their own post-trade processes would directly incur more of the 
upfront operational costs associated with the proposed amendment to 
Rule 15c6-1(a), because they would be required to directly undertake 
more of the upgrades and testing necessary for a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle. As mentioned in Part II.B, other market participants 
might outsource the clearance and settlement of their transactions to 
third-party providers of back-office services. The exposures to the 
operational costs associated with shortening the standard settlement 
cycle would be indirect to the extent that third-party service 
providers pass through the costs of infrastructure upgrades to their 
customers. The degree to which customers bear operational costs depends 
on their bargaining position relative to third-party providers. Large 
customers with market power may be able to avoid internalizing these 
costs, while small customers in a weaker negotiation position relative 
to service providers may bear the bulk of these costs.
    Further, changes to initial and ongoing operational costs may make 
some self-clearing market participants alter their decision to continue 
internally managing the clearance and settlement of their transactions. 
Entities that currently internally manage their clearance and 
settlement activity may prefer to restructure their businesses to rely 
instead on third-party providers of clearance and settlement services 
that may be able to amortize the initial fixed cost of upgrade across a 
much larger volume of transaction activity.
    In addition, the shortening of the settlement cycle may increase 
the need for some market participants engaging in cross-border and 
cross-asset transactions to hedge risks stemming from mismatched 
settlement cycles, resulting in additional costs. For example, under 
the proposed T+1 settlement cycle, a market participant selling a 
security in European equity markets to fund a purchase of securities in 
U.S. markets would face a one day lag between settlement in Europe and 
settlement in the U.S. The market participant could choose between 
bearing an additional day of market risk in the U.S. trading markets by 
delaying the purchase by a day, or funding the purchase of U.S. shares 
with short-term borrowing. Additionally, because the FX market has a 
T+2 settlement cycle,\352\ the market participant would also be faced 
with a choice between bearing an additional day of currency risk due to 
the need to sell Euros as part of the transaction, or to incur the cost 
related to hedging away this risk in the forward or futures market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \352\ See, e.g., CME Rulebook, Ch. 13, Sec.  1302 (```Spot FX 
Transaction''' means a currency purchase and sale that is 
bilaterally settled by the counterparties via an actual delivery of 
the relevant currencies within two Business Days.''), https://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/. U.S. and Canadian dollar spot FX 
transactions settle on the next business day. Id. Ch. 13, Appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The way that different market participants would likely bear costs 
as a result of the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) may also vary 
based on their business structure. For example, a shorter standard 
settlement cycle will require payment for securities that settle 
regular-way by T+1 rather than T+2. Generally, regardless of current 
funding arrangements between investors and broker-dealers, removing one 
business day between execution and settlement would mean that broker-
dealers could choose between requiring investors to fund the purchase 
of securities one business day earlier while extending the same level 
of credit they do under T+2 settlement, or providing an additional 
business day of funding to investors. In other words, broker-dealers 
could pass through some of the costs of a shorter standard settlement 
cycle by imposing the same shorter cycle on investors, or they could 
pass these costs on to investors by raising transactions fees to 
compensate for the additional business day of funding the broker-dealer 
may choose to provide. The extent to which these costs get passed 
through to customers may depend on, among other things, the market 
power of the broker-dealer. If a broker-dealer does not face 
significant competition, its market power may enable it to recover the 
entire initial investment cost from its customers. On the other hand, a 
broker-dealer that faces perfect competition for its customers may be 
unable to pass along any of these costs to its customers.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \353\ See supra Part V.C.1 for additional discussion regarding 
the impact of broker-dealer market power. See infra Part V.C.5.b)(3) 
for quantitative estimates of the costs to broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, broker-dealers that predominantly serve retail investors 
may experience the burden of an earlier payment requirement differently 
from broker-dealers with more institutional

[[Page 10485]]

clients or large custodian banks because of the way retail investors 
fund their accounts. Retail investors may find it difficult to 
accelerate payments associated with their transactions, which may cause 
broker-dealers who are unwilling to extend additional credit to retail 
investors to instead require that these investors pre-fund their 
transactions.\354\ These broker-dealers may also experience costs 
unrelated to funding choices. For instance, retail investors may 
require additional or different services such as education regarding 
the impact of the shorter standard settlement cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \354\ See infra Part V.C.5.b)(3) for additional discussion 
regarding retail investors and their broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, a shorter settlement cycle may result in higher costs 
associated with liquidating a defaulting member's position, as a 
shorter horizon may result in larger price impacts, particularly for 
less liquid assets. For example, when a clearing member defaults, NSCC 
is obligated to fulfill its trade guarantee with the defaulting 
member's counterparty. One way it accomplishes this is by liquidating 
assets from clearing fund contributions from clearing members. However, 
liquidating assets in shorter periods of time can have larger adverse 
impacts on the prices of the assets. Shortening the standard settlement 
cycle from two business days to one business day could reduce the 
amount of time that NSCC would have to liquidate its assets, which may 
exacerbate the price impact of liquidation.
3. Economic Implications Through Other Commission Rules
    As noted in Part III.E, the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a), 
by shortening the standard settlement cycle, could have an ancillary 
impact on the means by which market participants comply with existing 
regulatory obligations that relate to the settlement timeframe. The 
Commission also provided illustrative examples of specific Commission 
rules that include such requirements or are otherwise are keyed-off 
settlement date, including Regulation SHO,\355\ and certain provisions 
included in the Commission's financial responsibility 
rules.356 357
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    \355\ 17 CFR 242.200 et seq.
    \356\ See supra Part III.E.2.
    \357\ The Commission is also soliciting comment on the impact of 
shortening the settlement cycle on compliance with Rule 10b-10 under 
the Exchange Act and broker-dealer obligations with regard to 
prospectus delivery. See supra Parts III.E.3 and III.E.4. However, 
based on current practices and comments received by the Commission 
to the T+2 proposing release, the Commission preliminarily believes 
shortening the settlement cycle to T+1 will not impact compliance 
with these rules. Id.
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    Financial markets and regulatory requirements have evolved 
significantly since the Commission adopted Rule 15c6-1 in 1993. Market 
participants have responded to these developments in diverse ways, 
including implementing a variety of systems and processes, some of 
which may be unique to specific market participants and their 
businesses, and some of which may be integrated throughout business 
operations of certain market participants. Because of the broad variety 
of ways in which market participants currently satisfy regulatory 
obligations pursuant to Commission rules, in most circumstances it is 
difficult to identify those practices that market participants would 
need to change in order to meet these other obligations. Under these 
circumstances, and without additional information, the Commission is 
unable to provide an estimate of the ancillary economic impact that the 
proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) would have on how market 
participants comply with other Commission rules. The Commission invites 
commenters to provide quantitative and qualitative information about 
these potential economic effects.
    In certain cases, based on information about current market 
practices, the Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) would be unlikely to change the means by 
which market participants comply with existing regulatory requirements. 
In these cases, the Commission believes that market participants would 
not incur significant increased costs of compliance from such 
regulatory requirements from shortening the settlement cycle to T+1.
    In other cases, however, the proposed amendment may incrementally 
increase the costs associated with complying with other Commission 
rules where such rules potentially require broker-dealers to engage in 
purchases of securities. Two examples of these types of rules are 
Regulation SHO and the Commission's financial responsibility rules. In 
most instances, Regulation SHO governs the timeframe in which a 
``participant'' of a registered clearing agency must close out a fail 
to deliver position by purchasing or borrowing securities.\358\ 
Similarly, some of the Commission's financial responsibility rules 
relate to actions or notifications that reference the settlement date 
of a transaction. For example, Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3(m) \359\ uses 
the settlement date to prescribe the timeframe in which a broker-dealer 
must complete certain sell orders on behalf of customers. As noted 
above, the term ``settlement date'' is also incorporated into paragraph 
(c)(9) of Rule 15c3-1,\360\ which explains what it means to ``promptly 
transmit'' funds and ``promptly deliver'' securities within the meaning 
of paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(v) of Rule 15c3-1. As explained 
above, the concepts of promptly transmitting funds and promptly 
delivering securities are incorporated in other provisions of the 
financial responsibility rules.\361\ Under the proposed amendment to 
Rule 15c6-1(a), the timeframes included in these rules will be one 
business day closer to the trade date.
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    \358\ See supra Part III.E.1.
    \359\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(m).
    \360\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(9).
    \361\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(v); 17 CFR 
240.15c3-3(k)(1)(iii), (k)(2)(i), (k)(2)(ii); 17 CFR 240.17a-
5(e)(1)(A); 17 CFR 240.17a-13(a)(3).
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    The Commission preliminarily believes that shortening these 
timeframes would not materially affect the costs that broker-dealers 
would likely incur to meet their Regulation SHO obligations and 
obligations under the Commission's financial responsibility rules. 
Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges that a shorter settlement 
cycle could affect the processes by which broker-dealers manage the 
likelihood of incurring these obligations. For example, broker-dealers 
may currently have in place inventory management systems that help them 
avoid failing to deliver securities by T+2. Broker-dealers would likely 
incur costs in order to update these systems to support a shorter 
settlement cycle.
    In cases where market participants will need to adjust the way in 
which they comply with other Commission rules, the magnitude of the 
costs associated with these adjustments is difficult to quantify. As 
noted above, market participants employ a wide variety of strategies to 
meet regulatory obligations. For example, broker-dealers may ensure 
that they have securities available to meet their obligations by using 
inventory management systems or they may choose instead to borrow 
securities. An estimate of costs is further complicated by the 
possibility that market participants could change their compliance 
strategies in response to a shorter standard settlement cycle.
    As with the T+2 transition, the Commission anticipates that the 
proposed transition to T+1 would again require changes to SRO rules and 
changes to the operations or market participants subject to those rules 
to achieve consistency with a T+1 standard settlement cycle. Certain 
SRO

[[Page 10486]]

rules reference existing Rule 15c6-1 or currently define ``regular 
way'' settlement as occurring on T+2 and, as such, may need to be 
amended in connection with shortening the standard settlement cycle to 
T+1. Certain timeframes or deadlines in SRO rules also may refer to the 
settlement date, either expressly or indirectly. In such cases, the 
SROs may need to amend these rules in connection with shortening the 
settlement cycle to T+1.\362\
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    \362\ The T+1 Report similarly indicates that SROs will likely 
need to update their rules to facilitate a transition to a T+1 
standard settlement cycle. T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission invites commenters to provide quantitative and 
qualitative information about the impact of the proposed amendment to 
Rule 15c6-1(a) on the costs associated with compliance with other 
Commission rules.
4. Effect on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    Market participants may incur initial costs for the investments 
necessary to comply with a shorter standard settlement cycle.\363\ 
However, these costs would likely differ across market participants and 
these differences may exacerbate coordination problems. First, per-
transaction operational costs clearing members incur in connection with 
the clearing services they provide may be higher for members that clear 
fewer transactions than such costs are for members that clear a higher 
volume of transactions. Thus, the extent to which many of the upgrades 
necessary for a T+1 standard settlement cycle are optimal for a member 
to adopt unilaterally may depend, in part, on the transaction volume 
cleared by such member. For example, certain upgrades necessary for a 
T+1 standard settlement cycle may result in economies of scale, where 
large clearing members are able to comply with the proposed amendment 
to Rule 15c6-1(a) at a lower per-transaction cost than smaller members. 
As a result, larger members might take a short time to recover their 
initial costs for upgrades; smaller members with lower transaction 
volumes might take longer to recover their initial cost outlays and 
might be more reluctant to make the upgrades in the absence of the 
proposed amendment. These differences in cost per transaction may be 
mitigated through the use of third-party service providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \363\ See supra Part V.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission acknowledges that the upgrades 
necessary to implement a shorter standard settlement cycle may produce 
indirect economic effects. We analyze some of these indirect effects, 
such as the impact on competition and third-party service providers, in 
the following section.
    A shorter settlement cycle might improve the efficiency of the 
clearance and settlement process through several channels. First, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that the primary effect that a 
shorter settlement cycle would have on the efficiency of the settlement 
process would be a reduction in the credit, market, and liquidity risks 
that broker-dealers, CCPs, and other market participants are subject to 
during the standard settlement cycle.\364\ A shorter standard 
settlement cycle will generally reduce the volume of unsettled 
transactions that could potentially pose settlement risk to 
counterparties. Shortening the period between trade execution and 
settlement would enable trades to be settled with less aggregate risk 
to counterparties or the CCP. A shorter standard settlement cycle may 
also decrease liquidity risk by enabling market participants to access 
the proceeds of their transactions sooner, which may reduce the cost 
market participants incur to handle idiosyncratic liquidity shocks 
(i.e., liquidity shocks that are uncorrelated with the market). That 
is, because the time interval between a purchase/sale of securities and 
payment is reduced by one business day, market participants with 
immediate payment obligations that they could cover by selling 
securities would be required to obtain short-term funding for one less 
day.\365\ As a result of reduced cost associated with covering their 
liquidity needs, market participants may, under particular 
circumstances, be able to shift assets that would otherwise be held as 
liquid collateral towards more productive uses, improving allocative 
efficiency.\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \364\ Reduction of these risks should result in the reduction of 
margin requirements and other risk management activity that requires 
resources that could be put to another use.
    \365\ See supra Part V.B.2.
    \366\ See supra Part V.A.
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    Second, a shorter standard settlement cycle may increase price 
efficiency through its effect on credit risk exposures between 
financial intermediaries and their customers. In particular, a prior 
study noted that certain intermediaries that transact on behalf of 
investors, such as broker-dealers, may be exposed to the risk that 
their customers default on payment obligations when the price of 
purchased securities declines during the settlement cycle.\367\ As a 
result of the option to default on payment obligations, customers' 
payoffs from securities purchases resemble European call options and, 
from a theoretical standpoint, can be valued as such. Notably, the 
value of European call options increases in the time to expiration 
\368\ suggesting that the value of call options held by customers who 
purchase securities is increasing in the length of the settlement 
cycle. In order to compensate itself for the call option that it 
writes, an intermediary may include the cost of these call options as 
part of its transaction fee and this cost may become a component of 
bid-ask spreads for securities transactions. By reducing the value of 
customers' option to default by reducing the option's time to maturity, 
a shorter standard settlement cycle may reduce transaction costs in 
U.S. securities markets. In addition, to the extent that any benefit 
buyers receive from deferring payment during the settlement cycle is 
incorporated in securities returns,\369\ the proposed amendment to Rule 
15c6-1(a) may reduce the extent to which such returns deviate from 
returns consistent with changes in fundamentals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ See Madhavan et al., supra note 296.
    \368\ All other things equal, an option with a longer time to 
maturity is more likely to be in the money given that the variance 
of the underlying security's price at the exercise date is higher.
    \369\ See supra Part V.B.2.
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    As discussed in more detail above, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) would likely 
require market participants to incur costs related to infrastructure 
upgrades and would likely yield benefits to market participants, 
largely in the form of reduced financial risks related to settlement. 
As a result, the Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed 
amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) could affect competition in a number of 
different, and potentially offsetting, ways.
    The prospective reduction in financial risks related to shortening 
the standard settlement cycle may represent a reduction in barriers to 
entry for certain market participants.\370\ Reductions in the financial 
resources required to cover an NSCC member's clearing fund requirements 
that result from a shorter standard settlement cycle could encourage 
financial firms that currently clear transactions through NSCC clearing 
members to become clearing members themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \370\ See supra Part V.C.1 for a discussion of the reduction in 
credit, market, and liquidity risks to which NSCC would be subject 
as a result of a shortening of the settlement cycle and the 
subsequent reduction financial resources dedicated to mitigating 
those risks.

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[[Page 10487]]

    Their entry into the market could promote competition among NSCC 
clearing members. Furthermore, if a reduction in settlement risks 
results in lower transaction costs for the reasons discussed above, 
market participants that were, on the margin, discouraged from 
supplying liquidity to securities markets due to these costs could 
choose to enter the market for liquidity suppliers, increasing 
competition.
    At the same time, the Commission acknowledges that the process 
improvements required to enable a shorter standard settlement cycle 
could adversely affect competition. Among clearing members, where such 
process improvements might be necessary to comply with the shorter 
standard settlement cycle required under the proposed amendment to Rule 
15c6-1(a), the cost associated with compliance might increase barriers 
to entry, because new firms would incur higher fixed costs associated 
with a shorter standard settlement cycle if they wish to enter the 
market. Clearing members might choose to comply by upgrading their 
systems and processes or may choose instead to exit the market for 
clearing services. The exit of clearing members could have negative 
consequences for competition among clearing members. Clearing activity 
tends to be concentrated among larger broker-dealers.\371\ Clearing 
member exit could result in further concentration and additional market 
power for those clearing members that remain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \371\ See supra Part V.B.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Alternatively, some current clearing members may choose to comply 
in part by outsourcing their operational needs to third-party service 
providers. Use of third-party service providers may represent a 
reasonable response to the operational costs associated with the 
proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a). To the extent that third-party 
service providers are able to spread the fixed costs of compliance 
across a larger volume of transactions than their clients, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that the use of third-party service 
providers might impose a smaller compliance cost on clearing members 
than if these firms directly bore the costs of compliance. The 
Commission preliminarily believes that this impact may stretch beyond 
just clearing members. The use of third-party service providers may 
mitigate the extent to which the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) 
raises barriers to entry for broker-dealers. Because these barriers to 
entry may have adverse effects on competition between clearing members, 
we preliminarily believe that the use of third-party service providers 
may mitigate the adverse effects of the proposed amendment to Rule 
15c6-1(a) on competition between broker-dealers.
    Existing market power may also affect the distribution of 
competitive impacts stemming from the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-
1(a) across different types of market participants. While, as noted 
above, reductions in the credit, market, and liquidity risks that 
broker-dealers, CCPs, and other market participants are subject to 
during the standard settlement cycle could promote competition among 
clearing members and liquidity suppliers, these groups may benefit to 
differing degrees, depending on the extent to which they are able to 
capture the benefits of a shortened standard settlement cycle.
    Finally, a shorter standard settlement cycle might also improve the 
capital efficiency of the clearance and settlement process, which would 
promote capital formation in U.S. securities markets and in the 
financial system generally.\372\ A shorter standard settlement cycle 
would reduce the amount of time that collateral must be held for a 
given trade, thus freeing the collateral to be used elsewhere earlier. 
For a given quantity of trading activity, collateral would also be 
committed to clearing fund deposits for a shorter period of time. The 
greater collateral efficiency promoted by a shorter settlement cycle 
might also indirectly promote capital formation for market participants 
in the financial system in general. Specifically, the improved capital 
efficiency that would result from a shorter standard settlement cycle 
would enable a given amount of collateral to support a larger amount of 
financial activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \372\ See supra Part V.A for more discussion regarding capital 
formation and efficiency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Quantification of Direct and Indirect Effects of a T+1 Settlement 
Cycle
    In previous years, several industry groups have released estimates 
for compliance costs associated with a shorter standard settlement 
cycle, including the SIA, the ISC, and BCG.\373\ Although all of these 
studies examined prior shortenings of the settlement cycle including 
from T+5 to T+3 and from T+3 to T+2, in the absence of a current study 
examining shortening from the current T+2 to T+1 they serve as a useful 
rough initial estimate of the costs involved in a settlement cycle 
shortening. The most recent of these, the BCG Study performed a cost-
benefit analysis of a T+2 standard settlement cycle. Below is a summary 
of the cost estimates in the BCG Study and in the following 
subsections, an evaluation of these estimates as part of the discussion 
of the potential direct and indirect compliance costs related to the 
proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a). In addition, the Commission 
encourages commenters to provide additional information to help 
quantify the economic effects that we are currently unable to quantify 
due to data limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \373\ See SIA Business Case Report, supra note 21; see also ISG 
White Paper, supra note 26; BCG Study, supra note 22. The SIA has 
since merged with other groups to form SIFMA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(a) Industry Estimates of Costs and Benefits
    The BCG Study concluded that the transition to a T+2 settlement 
cycle would cost approximately $550 million in incremental initial 
investments across industry constituent groups,\374\ which would result 
in annual operating savings of $170 million and $25 million in annual 
return on reinvested capital from clearing fund reductions.\375\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \374\ The BCG Study generally refers to ``institutional broker-
dealers,'' ``retail broker-dealers,'' ``buy side'' firms, and 
``custodian banks,'' without defining these particular groups. The 
Commission uses these terms when referring to estimates provided by 
the BCG Study but notes that its own definitions of various affected 
parties may differ from those in the BCG Study.
    \375\ See BCG Study, supra note 22, at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The BCG Study also estimated that the average level of required 
investments per firm could range from $1 to 5 million, with large 
institutional broker-dealers incurring the largest amount of 
investments on a per-firm basis, and buy side firms at the lower end of 
the spectrum.\376\ The investment costs for ``other'' entities, 
including DTCC, DTCC ITP Matching (US) LLC (f/k/a Omgeo Matching (US) 
LLC), service bureaus, RICs and non-self-clearing broker-dealers 
totaled $70 million for the entire group. Within this $70 million, DTCC 
and Omgeo were estimated to have a compliance investment cost of $10 
million each. The study's authors estimated that institutional broker-
dealers would have operational cost savings of approximately 5%, retail 
broker-dealers of 2% to 4%, buy-side firms of 2% and custodial banks of 
10% to 15% for an industry total operational cost savings of 
approximately $170MM per year.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \376\ Id. at 30-31.
    \377\ See id. at 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The BCG Study also estimated the annual clearing fund reductions 
resulting from reductions in clearing firms' clearing funds 
requirements to be

[[Page 10488]]

$25 million per year.\378\ The study estimated this by considering the 
reduction in clearing fund requirements and multiplied it by the 
average Federal Funds target rate for the 10-year period up until 2008 
(3.5%). The BCG Study also estimated the value of the risk reduction in 
buy side exposure to the sell side. The implied savings were estimated 
to be $200 million per year, but these values were not included in the 
overall cost-benefit calculations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \378\ See supra note 334 for a discussion of the impact of 
increases in daily trading volume since the time of the BCG study on 
this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several factors limit the usefulness of the BCG Study's estimates 
of potential costs and benefits of the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-
1(a). First, a further shortening of the settlement cycle to T+1 may 
require investments in new technology and processes that were not 
necessary under the previous shortening to T+2. Second, technological 
improvements, such as the increased use of computers and automation in 
post-trade processes, that have been made since 2012, when the report 
was first published, may have reduced the cost of the upgrades 
necessary to comply with a shorter settlement cycle. This may, in turn, 
reduce the costs associated with the proposed amendment,\379\ as a 
larger portion of market participants may have already adopted many 
processes that would reduce the cost of a transition to a shorter 
settlement cycle. In addition, the BCG Study considered as a part of 
its cost estimates operational cost savings as a result of improvements 
to operational efficiency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \379\ See supra Part V.A. While market participants may have 
already made investments consistent with implementing a shorter 
settlement cycle, the fact that these investments have not resulted 
in a shorter settlement cycle is consistent with the existence of 
coordination problems among market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, the BCG Study was premised on survey responses by a subset 
of market participants that may be affected by the rule. Surveys were 
sent to 270 market participants and 70 responses were received, 
including 20 institutional broker-dealers, prime brokers and 
correspondent clearers; 12 retail broker-dealers; 17 buy side firms; 14 
RIAs; and seven custodian banks. Given the low response rate, as well 
as the uncertainty regarding the sample of market participants that was 
asked to complete the survey, the Commission cannot conclude that the 
cost estimates in the BCG Study are representative of the costs of all 
market participants.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \380\ See BCG Study, supra note 22, at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Estimates of Costs
    The proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) would generate direct and 
indirect costs for market participants, who may need to modify and/or 
replace multiple systems and processes to comply with a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle. As noted above, the T+2 Playbook included a timeline 
with milestones and dependencies necessary for a transition to a T+2 
settlement cycle, as well as activities that market participants should 
consider in preparation for the transition and the Commission 
preliminarily believes that this provides an initial guide to those 
that would be necessary for a transition to T+1. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the majority of activities for migration to 
a T+1 settlement cycle would stem from behavior modification of market 
participants and systems testing, and thus the majority of the costs of 
migration would be from labor.\381\ These modifications would include a 
compression of the settlement timeline, as well as an increase in the 
fees that brokers may impose on their customers for trade failures. 
Although the T+2 Playbook did not include any direct estimates of the 
compliance costs for a T+2 settlement cycle, the Commission utilizes 
the timeline in the T+2 Playbook for specific actions necessary to 
migrate to a T+2 settlement cycle to directly estimate the inputs 
needed for migration, and form preliminary compliance cost estimates 
for the shortening to T+2 and uses these as an estimate for the 
shortening to T+1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \381\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the T+2 Playbook, the ISC White Paper, and the BCG 
Study identified several categories of actions that market participants 
might need to take to comply with a T+2 settlement cycle and likely 
also with a T+1 settlement cycle--processing, asset servicing, and 
documentation.\382\ While the following cost estimates for these 
remedial activities span industry-wide requirements for a migration to 
a T+1 settlement cycle, the Commission does not anticipate each market 
participant directly undertaking all of these activities for several 
reasons. First, some market participants work with third-party service 
providers to facilitate certain functions that may be impacted by a 
shorter standard settlement cycle, such as trade processing and asset 
servicing, and thus may only bear the costs of the requirements through 
fees paid to those service providers. Second, certain costs might only 
fall on specific categories of entities. For example, the costs of 
updating the CNS and ID Net system would only directly fall on NSCC, 
DTC, and members/participants of those clearing agencies. Finally, some 
market participants may already have the processes and systems in place 
to accommodate a T+1 standard settlement cycle or would be able to 
adjust to a T+1 settlement cycle without incurring significant costs. 
For example, some market participants may already have the systems and 
processes in place to meet the requirements for same-day trade 
affirmation and matching consistent with the requirements in proposed 
Rule 15c6-2.\383\ These market participants may thus bear a 
significantly lower cost to update their trade affirmation systems/
processes to settle on a T+1 standard settlement cycle.\384\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \382\ See T+2 Playbook, supra note 27, at 11.
    \383\ See BCG Study, supra note 22, at 23.
    \384\ The BCG Study, as it is based on survey responses from 
market participants, does reflect the heterogeneity of compliance 
costs for market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following section examines several categories of market 
participants and estimate the compliance costs for each category. The 
Commission's estimate of the number and type of personnel that may be 
required is based on the scope of activities for a given category of 
market participant necessary for the market participant to migrate to a 
T+1 settlement cycle, the market participant's role within the 
clearance and settlement process, and the amount of testing required to 
minimize undue disruptions.\385\ Hourly salaries for personnel are from 
SIFMA's Management and Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 
2013.\386\ These estimates use the timeline from the T+2 Playbook to 
determine the length of time personnel would work on the activities 
necessary to support a T+1 settlement cycle. The timeline provides an 
indirect method to estimate the inputs necessary to migrate to a T+1 
settlement cycle, rather than relying directly on survey response 
estimates. The Commission acknowledges many entities are already 
undertaking activities to support a migration to a T+1 settlement cycle 
in anticipation of

[[Page 10489]]

the proposed amendment. However, to the extent that the costs of these 
activities have already been incurred, the Commission considers these 
costs sunk, and they are not included in the analysis below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \385\ For example, FMUs that play a critical role in the 
clearance and settlement infrastructure would require more testing 
associated with a T+1 standard settlement cycle than institutional 
investors.
    \386\ To monetize the internal costs, the Commission staff used 
data from SIFMA publications, modified by Commission staff to 
account for an 1800 hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 
(professionals) or 2.93 (office) to account for bonuses, firm size, 
employee benefits and overhead. See SIFMA, Management and 
Professional Earnings in the Security Industry--2013 (Oct. 7, 2013), 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/management-and-professional-earnings-in-the-securities-industry-2013/; SIFMA, 
Office Salaries in the Securities Industry--2013 (Oct. 7, 2013), 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/office-salaries-in-the-securities-industry/. These figures have been adjusted for inflation 
using data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) FMUs--CCPs and CSDs
    CNS, NSCC/DTC's ID Net service, and other systems would require 
adjustment to support a T+1 standard settlement cycle. According to the 
T+2 Playbook and the ISC White Paper, regulation-dependent planning, 
implementation, testing, and migration activities associated with the 
transition to a T+2 settlement cycle could last up to five 
quarters.\387\ The Commission preliminarily believes that these 
activities would impose a one-time compliance cost of $12.6 million 
\388\ for DTC and NSCC each. After this initial compliance cost, the 
Commission preliminarily expects that both DTCC and NSCC would incur 
minimal ongoing costs from the transition to a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle, because the Commission believes that the majority of costs would 
stem from pre-migration activities, such as implementation, updates to 
systems and processes, and testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \387\ See T+2 Playbook, supra note 27, at 11.
    \388\ The estimate is based on the T+2 Playbook timeline, which 
estimates regulation-dependent implementation activity, industry 
testing, and migration lasting five quarters. The Commission assumes 
10 operations specialists (at $149 per hour), 10 programmers (at 
$295 per hour), and 1 senior operations manager (at $397/hour), 
working 40 hours per week. (10 x $149 + 10 x $295 + 1 x $397) x 5 x 
13 x 40 = $12,575,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Matching/ETC Providers--Exempt Clearing Agencies
    Matching/ETC Providers may need to adapt their trade processing 
systems to comply with a T+1 settlement cycle. This may include actions 
such as updating reference data, configuring trade match systems, and 
configuring trade affirmation systems to affirm trades on T+0. 
Matching/ETC Providers would also need to conduct testing and assess 
post-migration activities. The Commission preliminarily estimates that 
these activities would impose a one-time compliance cost of up to $12.6 
million \389\ for each Matching/ETC Provider. However, the Commission 
acknowledges that some ETC providers may have a higher cost burden than 
others based on the volume of transactions that they process. The 
Commission expects that ETC providers would incur minimal ongoing costs 
after the initial transition to a T+1 settlement cycle because the 
Commission preliminarily believes that the majority of the costs of 
migration to a T+1 settlement cycle entail behavioral changes of market 
participants and pre-migration testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \389\ The estimate is based on the T+2 Playbook timeline, which 
estimates regulation-dependent implementation activity for trade 
systems, matching, affirmation, testing, and post-migration testing 
lasting five quarters. The Commission assumes 10 operations 
specialists (at $149 per hour), 10 programmers (at $295 per hour), 
and 1 senior operations manager (at $397/hour), working 40 hours per 
week. (10 x $149 + 10 x $295 + 1 x $397) x 5 x 13 x 40 = 
$12,575,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(3) Market Participants--Investors, Broker-Dealers, Investment 
Advisers, and Bank Custodians
    The overall compliance costs that a market participant incurs would 
depend on the extent to which it is directly involved in functions 
related to clearance and settlement including trade confirmation/
affirmation, asset servicing, and other activities. For example, retail 
investors may bear few (if any) direct costs in a transition to a T+1 
standard settlement cycle, because their respective broker-dealer 
handles the back-office functions of each transaction. However, as is 
discussed below, this does not imply that retail investors would not 
face indirect costs from the transition, such as those passed through 
from broker-dealers or banks.
    Institutional investors may need to configure systems and update 
reference data, which may also include updates to trade funding and 
processing mechanisms, to operate in a T+1 environment. The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that this would require an initial expenditure 
of $2.67 million per entity.\390\ However, these costs may vary 
depending on the extent to which a particular institutional investor 
has already automated its processes. The Commission preliminarily 
expects institutional investors would incur minimal ongoing direct 
compliance costs after the initial transition to a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \390\ The estimate is based on the T+2 Playbook timeline, which 
estimates regulation-dependent implementation activity for trade 
systems, reference data, and testing activity to last four quarters. 
We assume 2 operations specialists (at $149 per hour), 2 programmers 
(at $295 per hour), and 1 senior operations manager (at $397 per 
hour), working 40 hours per week. (2 x $149 + 2 x $195 + 1 x $397) x 
4 x 13 x 40 = $2,673,400.
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    Broker-dealers that serve institutional investors would not only 
need to configure their trading systems and update reference data, but 
may also need to update trade confirmation/affirmation systems, 
documentation, cashiering and asset servicing functions, depending on 
the roles they assume with respect to their clients. The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that, on average, each of these broker-dealers 
would incur an initial compliance cost of $5.44 million.\391\ The 
Commission preliminarily expects that these broker-dealers would incur 
minimal ongoing direct compliance costs after the initial transition to 
a T+1 standard settlement cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \391\ The estimate is based on the T+2 Playbook timeline, which 
estimates regulation-dependent implementation activity for trade 
systems, reference data, documentation, asset servicing, and testing 
to last four quarters. We assume 5 operations specialists (at $149 
per hour), 5 programmers (at $295 per hour), and 1 senior operations 
manager (at $397 per hour), working 40 hours per week. (5 x $149 + 5 
x $256 + 1 x $345) x 4 x 13 x 40 = $4,721,600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Broker-dealers that serve retail customers may also need to spend 
significant resources to educate their clients about the shorter 
settlement cycle. The Commission preliminarily estimates that these 
broker-dealers would incur an initial compliance cost of $9.91 million 
each.\392\ However, unlike previously mentioned market participants, 
the Commission expects that broker-dealers that serve retail investors 
may face significant one-time compliance costs after the initial 
transition to T+1. Retail investors may require additional education 
and customer service, which may impose costs on their broker-dealers. 
The Commission preliminarily believes that a reasonable upper bound for 
the costs associated with this requirement is $30,000 per broker-
dealer.\393\ Assuming all clearing and introducing broker-dealers must 
educate retail customers, the upper bound for the costs of retail 
investor education would be approximately $40.6 million.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \392\ The estimate is based on the T+2 Playbook timeline, which 
estimates regulation-dependent implementation activity for trade 
systems, reference data, documentation, asset servicing, customer 
education and testing to last five quarters. We assume 5 operations 
specialists (at $149 per hour), 5 programmers (at $295 per hour), 5 
trainers (at $239 per hour) and 1 senior operations manager (at $397 
per hour), working 40 hours per week. (5 x $149 + 5 x $295 + 5 x 
$239 + 1 x $397) x 5 x 13 x 40 = $9,914,000.
    \393\ This estimate is based on the assumption that a broker-
dealer chooses to educate customers using a 10-minute video that 
takes at most $3,000 per minute to produce. See Crowdfunding, 
Exchange Act Release No. 76324 (Oct. 30, 2015), 80 FR 71388, 71529 & 
n.1683 (Nov. 16, 2015).
    \394\ Calculated as $30,000 per broker-dealer x (156 broker-
dealers reporting as self-clearing + 1,126 broker-dealers reporting 
as introducing but not self-clearing + 71 broker-dealers reporting 
as introducing and self-clearing) = $40,590,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Custodian banks would need to update their asset servicing 
functions to comply with a shorter settlement cycle. The Commission 
preliminarily estimates that custodian banks would incur an initial 
compliance cost of $1.34

[[Page 10490]]

million,\395\ and expects custodian banks to incur minimal ongoing 
compliance costs after the initial transition because the Commission 
preliminarily believes that most of the costs would stem from pre-
migration updates and testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \395\ The estimate is based on the T+2 Playbook timeline, which 
estimates regulation-dependent implementation activity for asset 
servicing and testing to last two quarters. We assume 2 operations 
specialists (at $149 per hour), 2 programmers (at $295 per hour), 
and 1 senior operations manager (at $397 per hour), working 40 hours 
per week. (2 x $149 + 2 x $295 + 1 x $397) x 2 x 13 x 40 = 
$1,336,700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 would require investment 
advisers to maintain records of allocations (if any), confirmations or 
affirmations if the adviser is a party to a contract under that rule. 
Based on Form ADV filings as of December 2020, approximately 13,804 
advisers registered with the Commission are required to maintain copies 
of certain books and records relating to their advisory business.\396\ 
The Commission further estimates that 2,521 registered advisers 
required to maintain copies of certain books and records relating to 
their advisory business would not be required to make and keep the 
proposed required records because they do not have any institutional 
advisory clients.\397\ Therefore, the remaining 11,283 of these 
advisers would be subject to the related proposed amendment to Rule 
204-2 under the Advisers Act, would enter a contract with a broker or 
dealer under proposed Rule 15c6-2 and therefore be subject to the 
related proposed recordkeeping amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \396\ See infra note 424.
    \397\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, based on staff experience, the Commission 
believes that many advisers already have recordkeeping processes in 
place to retain records of confirmations received, and allocations and 
affirmations sent to brokers or dealers. The Commission believes these 
are customary and usual business practices for many advisers, but that 
some small and mid-size advisers do not currently retain these records. 
Further, the Commission believes that the vast majority of these books 
and records are kept in electronic fashion with an ability to capture a 
date and time stamp, such as in a trade order management or other 
recordkeeping system, through system logs of file transfers, email 
archiving or as part of DTC's Institutional Trade Processing services, 
but that some advisers maintain paper records (e.g., confirmations) 
and/or communicate allocations by telephone. In addition, as noted in 
Section III.C, above, we believe that up to 70% of institutional trades 
are affirmed by custodians, and therefore advisers may not retain or 
have access to the affirmations these custodians sent to brokers or 
dealers.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \398\ See DTCC ITP Forum Remarks, supra note 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For those advisers maintaining date and time stamped electronic 
records already, we estimate no incremental compliance costs. We 
estimate that the proposed amendments to rule 204-2 would result in an 
initial one-time compliance cost of approximately $30,500 for the small 
and mid-size advisers \399\ that we estimate do not currently maintain 
these records, which we amortize over three years for an estimated 
annual cost of approximately $10,167.\400\ In addition, we believe that 
only a small number of advisers, or 1% of advisers that have 
institutional clients, do not send allocations or affirmations 
electronically to brokers or dealers (e.g., they communicate them by 
telephone).\401\ We estimate that these advisers will incur initial 
one-time costs of approximately $16,000 updating their policies and 
procedures and training their personnel to send these communications 
through their existing electronic systems, which we amortize over three 
years for an estimated annual cost of approximately $5,333.\402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \399\ For purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act, infra section 
VI, we estimated the number of small and mid-sized advisers based on 
Form ADV Items 2.A.(2) (for mid-sized advisers) and 12 (for small 
advisers).
    \400\ The estimate assumes that the proposed amendments to Rule 
204-2 would result in an initial increase in the collection of 
information burden estimate by 2 hours for the small and medium size 
advisers that have institutional clients that we estimate do not 
currently maintain these records. We estimate this number of 
advisers to be approximately 50% of small and medium sized 
registered investment advisers that have institutional clients, or 
approximately 220 small and medium size advisers. See infra Table 1 
(Summary of burden estimates for the proposed amendment to Rule 204-
2) note 4. The estimated 2 hours per adviser would be an initial 
burden to update procedures and instruct personnel to retain these 
records in the advisers' electronic recordkeeping systems, including 
any confirmations that they may receive in paper format and do not 
currently retain. We believe that these advisers already have 
recordkeeping systems to accommodate these records, which would 
include, at a minimum, spreadsheet formats and email retention 
systems. As with our estimates relating to the previous amendments 
to Advisers Act Rule 204-2, the Commission expects that performance 
of these functions would most likely be allocated between compliance 
clerks and general clerks, with compliance clerks performing 17% of 
the function and general clerks performing 83% of the function. We 
assume 20 minutes of a compliance clerk (at $76 per hour) and 100 
minutes of a general clerk (at $68 per hour). (1/3 x 76 + 5/3 x 68) 
x 220 = $30,507.
    \401\ We estimate that currently registered large advisers that 
do not currently maintain electronic records, would be part of the 
estimated 1% of advisers that would incur 2 hours each to comply 
with the proposed amendment as described above. For new large 
advisers, we estimate that there would be no incremental cost 
associated with this proposed amendment, as we believe these 
advisers would implement electronic systems as part of their initial 
compliance with Rule 204-2, and that these electronic systems would 
have an ability to capture a date and time stamp.
    \402\ We estimate 1% of 11,283 or 113 advisers do not sent 
allocations or affirmations electronically. We assume, for each 
adviser, 20 minutes for a compliance clerk (at $76 per hour) and 100 
minutes of a general clerk (at $68 per hour). (1/3 x 76 + 5/3 x 68) 
x 113 = $15,669.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we estimate that 70% of institutional trades are 
affirmed by custodians, and therefore advisers may not retain or have 
access to the affirmations these custodians sent to brokers or dealers. 
Because we do not know the number of advisers that correlate to these 
trades, we estimate for purposes of this collection of information that 
70% of advisers with institutional clients make institutional trades 
that are affirmed by custodians. Therefore, we estimate that these 
advisers would incur initial one-time costs of approximately $1,095,000 
to direct their institutional clients' custodians to copy the adviser 
on any affirmations sent through email, or for the adviser to use its 
systems to issue affirmations, which we amortize over three years for 
an estimated annual cost of approximately $365,500.\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \403\ We estimate 70% of 11,283 or 7,898 advisers affirm trades 
through custodians. We assume, for each advisor, 20 minutes for a 
compliance clerk (at $76 per hour) and 100 minutes of a general 
clerk (at $68 per hour). (1/3 x 76 + 5/3 x 68) x 7,898 = $1,095,189.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would require a CMSP to establish, implement, 
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures. Based on the 
similar policies and procedures requirements and the corresponding 
burden estimates previously made by the Commission for Rules 17Ad-
22(d)(8) and 17Ad-22(e)(2),\404\ the Commission preliminarily estimates 
that respondent CMSPs would incur an aggregate one-time cost of 
approximately $27,000.\405\
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    \404\ See Clearing Agency Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 
68080 (Oct. 22, 2012), 77 FR 66219, 66260 (Nov. 2, 2012) (``Clearing 
Agency Standards Adopting Release''); Standards for Covered Clearing 
Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (Sept. 28, 2016), 81 FR 
70786, 70891-92 (Oct. 13, 2016) (``CCA Standards Adopting 
Release'').
    \405\ There are currently three CMSPs and the Commission 
anticipates that one additional entity may seek to become a CMSP in 
the next three years. The aggregate cost was estimated as follows: 
(Assistant General Counsel at $602/hour x 8 hours = $4,816) + 
(Compliance Attorney at $334/hour x 6 hours = $2,004) = $6,820 x 4 
CMSPs equals $27,280.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would also require ongoing documentation 
activities with respect to the annual report required to be submitted 
to the Commission. Based on the similar reporting requirements and the 
corresponding burden estimates

[[Page 10491]]

previously made by the Commission for Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23),\406\ the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that the ongoing activities required 
by proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would impose an aggregate annual cost of this 
ongoing burden of approximately $44,000.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \406\ See CCA Standards Adopting Release, supra note 404, at 
70899.
    \407\ This figure was calculated as follows: [(Compliance 
Attorney at $397/hour x 24 hours = $9,528) + (Computer Operations 
Manager at $480/hour x 10 hours = $4,800) = $14,328 x 4 CMSPs = 
$57,312]. In addition, we estimate that the Inline XBRL requirement 
would require respondent CMSPs to spend $900 each year to license 
and renew Inline XBRL compliance software and/or services, and incur 
1 internal burden hour to apply and review Inline XBRL tags for the 
three disclosure requirements on the report, resulting in a total 
annual aggregate cost of $5,188 [(Compliance Attorney at $397/hour x 
1 hour = $397) + $900 in external costs = $1,297 x 4 CMSPs = 
$5,188]. In addition, respondent CMSPs that do not already have 
access to EDGAR would be required to file a Form ID so as to obtain 
the access codes that are required to file or submit a document on 
EDGAR. We anticipate that each respondent would require 0.15 hours 
to complete the Form ID, and for purposes of the PRA, that 100% of 
the burden of preparation for Form ID will be carried by each 
respondent internally. Because two respondent CMSPs already have 
access to EDGAR, we anticipate that proposed amendments would result 
in a one-time nominal increase of 0.30 burden hours for Form ID, 
which would not meaningfully add to, and would effectively be 
encompassed by, the existing burden estimates associated with these 
reports.
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(4) Indirect Costs
    In estimating these implementation costs, the Commission notes that 
market participants who bear the direct costs of the actions they 
undertake to comply with the amendment to Rule 15c6-1 may pass these 
costs on to their customers. For example, retail and institutional 
investors might not directly bear the cost of all of the necessary 
upgrades for a T+1 settlement cycle, but might indirectly bear these 
costs as their broker-dealers might increase their fees to amortize the 
costs of updates among their customers. The Commission is unable to 
quantify the overall magnitude of the indirect costs that retail and 
institutional investors may bear, because such costs would depend on 
the market power of each broker-dealer, and each broker-dealer's 
willingness to pass on the costs of migration to a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle to its customers. However, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that in situations where broker-dealers have 
little or no competition, broker-dealers may pass on as much as 100% of 
their initial costs to their customers. As discussed above, this could 
be as high as the full amount of the estimated $5.44 million for 
broker-dealers that serve institutional investors, and $9.91 million 
for broker-dealers that serve retail investors. However, in situations 
where broker-dealers face heavy competition for customers, they may 
bear the full costs of the initial investment, and avoid passing on any 
portion of these costs to their customers.
    As noted in Part V.B.4, the ability of market participants to pass 
implementation costs on to customers likely depends on their relative 
bargaining power. For example, CCPs, like many other utilities, exhibit 
many of the characteristics of natural monopolies and, as a result, may 
have market power, particularly relative to broker-dealers who submit 
trades for clearing. This means that CCPs may be able to share 
implementation costs they directly face related to shortening the 
settlement cycle with broker-dealers through higher clearing fees. 
Conversely, to the extent that institutional investors have market 
power relative to broker-dealers, broker-dealers may not be in a 
position to impose indirect costs on them.
(5) Industry-Wide Costs
    To estimate the aggregate, industry-wide cost of a transition to a 
T+1 standard settlement cycle, the Commission takes its own per-entity 
estimates and multiplies them by our estimate of the respective number 
of entities. The Commission preliminarily estimates that there are 
1,229 buy-side firms, 156 self-clearing broker-dealers, and 49 
custodian banks.\408\ Additionally, while there are three Matching/ETC 
Providers, the Commission believes that only one of these is currently 
providing services in the U.S. We estimate there are 1,282 broker-
dealers that would incur investor education costs. One way to establish 
a total industry initial compliance cost estimate would be to multiply 
each estimated per-entity cost by the respective number of entities and 
sum these values, which would result in an estimate of $4.97 
billion.\409\ The Commission, however, preliminarily believes that this 
estimate is likely to overstate the true initial cost of transition to 
a T+1 settlement cycle for a number of reasons. First, our per-entity 
estimates do not account for the heterogeneity in market participant 
size, which may have a significant impact on the costs that market 
participants face. While the BCG Study included both estimates of the 
number of entities in different size categories as well as estimates of 
costs that an entity in each size category is likely to incur, it did 
not provide sufficient underlying information to allow the Commission 
to estimate the relationship between participant size and compliance 
cost and thus we cannot produce comparable estimates. The Commission 
solicits comment on the extent to which market participants believe 
that the compliance costs for proposed Rule 15c6-1(a) would scale with 
market participant size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \408\ The estimate for the number of buy-side firms is based on 
the Commission's 13(f) holdings information filers with over $1 
billion in assets under management, as of December 31, 2020. The 
estimate for the number of broker-dealers is based on FINRA FOCUS 
Reports of firms reporting as self-clearing. See supra note 312 and 
accompanying text. The estimate for the number of custodian banks is 
based on the number of ``settling banks'' listed in DTC's Member 
Directories, available at http://www.dtcc.com/client-center/dtc-directories.
    \409\ Calculated as 156 broker-dealers (self-clearing) x 
$9,914,000 + 1,282 broker-dealers (self-clearing and introducing) x 
$30,000 + 49 custodian banks x $1,337,000 + 1,229 buy-side firms x 
$2,673,000 + 1 Matching/ETC Providers x $12,575,000 + 2 FMUs x 
$12,575,000 + (IA costs of 30,500 + 16,000 + 1,095,000) + (CMSP 
initial costs of $26,000) = $ 4,974,556,500.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, investments by third-party service providers may mean that 
many of the estimated compliance costs for market participants are 
duplicated. The BCG Study suggests that ``leverage'' from service 
providers may yield a savings of $194 million, reducing aggregate costs 
by approximately 29%.\410\ The Commission seeks further comment on the 
extent to which the efficiencies generated by the investments of 
service providers might reduce the compliance costs of market 
participants. Taking into account potential cost reductions due to 
repurposing existing systems and using service providers as described 
above, the Commission preliminarily believes that $3.5 billion 
represents a reasonable range for the total industry initial compliance 
costs.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \410\ See BCG Study, supra note 22, at 79.
    \411\ The lower bound of this range is calculated as ($4.97 
billion x (1-0.29)) = $3.5 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these initial costs, a transition to a shorter 
settlement cycle may also result in certain ongoing industry-wide 
costs. Though the Commission preliminarily believes that a move to a 
shorter settlement cycle would generally bring with it a reduced 
reliance on manual processing, a shorter settlement cycle may also 
exacerbate remaining operational risk. This is because a shorter 
settlement cycle would provide market participants with less time to 
resolve errors. For example, if there is an entry error in the trade 
match details sent by either counterparty for a trade, both 
counterparties would have one extra day to resolve the error under the 
baseline than in a T+1 environment. For these errors, a shorter 
settlement cycle

[[Page 10492]]

may increase the probability that the error ultimately results in a 
settlement fail. However, the Commission preliminarily believes that a 
large variety of operational errors are possible in the clearance and 
settlement process and some of these errors are likely to be 
infrequent, the Commission is unable to quantify the impact that a 
shorter settlement cycle may have on the ongoing industry-wide costs 
stemming from a potential increase in operational risk.

D. Reasonable Alternatives

1. Amend 15c6-1(c) to T+2
    The Commission is proposing to delete Rule 15c6-1(c) that 
establishes a T+4 settlement cycle for firm commitment offerings for 
securities that are priced after 4:30 p.m. ET, unless otherwise 
expressly agreed to by the parties at the time of the transaction.\412\ 
The Commission has considered amending Rule 15c6-1(c) to shorten the 
settlement cycle for firm commitment offerings to T+2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \412\ See supra Part III.A.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The T+1 Report stated that paragraph (c) is rarely used in the 
current T+2 settlement environment.\413\ The Commission adopted 
paragraph (c) of Rule 15c6-1 in 1995, two years after Rule 15c6-1 was 
originally adopted.\414\ At the time, the rule included a limited 
exemption from the requirements under paragraph (a) of the rule for the 
sale for cash pursuant to a firm commitment offering registered under 
the Securities Act.\415\ The exemption for firm commitment offerings 
was added in response to public comments stating that new issue 
securities could not settle on T+3 because prospectuses could not be 
printed prior to the trade date (the date on which the securities are 
priced).\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \413\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 33-35.
    \414\ See Prospectus Delivery; Securities Transaction Settlement 
Cycle, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35705 (May 11, 1995), 60 FR 26604 
(May 17, 1995) (``1995 Amendments Adopting Release'').
    \415\ The exemption was limited to sales to an underwriter by an 
issuer and initial sales by the underwriting syndicate and selling 
group. Any secondary resales of such securities were to settle on a 
T+3 settlement cycle. T+3 Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 52898.
    \416\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed further in Part III.E.4, Rule 172 has implemented an 
``access equals delivery'' model that permits, with certain exceptions, 
final prospectus delivery obligations to be satisfied by the filing of 
a final prospectus with the Commission, rather than delivery of the 
prospectus to purchasers. As a result of these changes, broker-dealers 
generally do not require time to print and deliver prospectus--a point 
originally cited by many commenters in support of adopting paragraph 
(c).\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \417\ Id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although rarely used in the current T+2 settlement environment, the 
IWG expects a T+1 standard settlement cycle would increase reliance on 
paragraph (c).\418\ The T+1 Report further stated that the IWG 
recommends retaining paragraph (c) but amending it to establish a 
standard settlement cycle of T+2 for firm commitment offerings.\419\ 
The T+1 Report cites issues with respect to documentation and other 
operational elements of equity offerings that may delay settlement to 
T+2 in a T+1 environment. As the Commission is not currently aware of 
any specific documentation associated with firm commitment offerings 
that cannot be completed by T+1, the Commission preliminarily believes 
that the need to complete possibly complex transaction documentation 
prior to settlement does not justify proposing a T+2 standard 
settlement cycle for equity offerings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \418\ T+1 Report, supra note 18, at 33-35.
    \419\ Id. at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, establishing T+1 as the standard settlement cycle for 
these firm commitment offerings, and thereby aligning the settlement 
cycle with the standard settlement cycle for securities generally, 
would reduce exposures of underwriters, dealers, and investors to 
credit and market risk, and better ensure that the primary issuance of 
securities is available to settle secondary market trading in such 
securities. The Commission believes that harmonizing the settlement 
cycle for such firm commitment offerings with secondary market trading, 
to the greatest extent possible, limits the potential for operational 
risk. In addition, if paragraph (c) is removed as proposed, paragraph 
(d) would continue to provide underwriters and the parties to a 
transaction the ability to agree, in advance of a particular 
transaction, to a settlement cycle other than the standard set forth in 
Rule 15c6-1(a).
    Therefore, in the Commission's view, deleting paragraph (c) while 
retaining paragraph (d) provides sufficient flexibility for market 
participants to manage the potential need for longer than T+1 
settlement on certain firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m. 
that may include ``complex'' documentation because paragraph (d) would 
continue to permit the underwriters and the parties to a transaction to 
agree, in advance of entering the transaction, whether T+1 settlement 
or some other settlement timeframe is appropriate for the transaction. 
In addition, the Commission preliminarily believes that having the 
underwriters and the parties to the transaction agree in advance of 
entering the transaction whether to deviate from the standard 
settlement cycle established in paragraph (a) would promote 
transparency among the parties, in advance of entering the transaction, 
as to the length of the time that it takes to complete complex 
documentation with respect to the transaction.
2. Propose 17Ad-27 To Require Certain Outcomes
    The Commission is proposing Rule 17Ad-27 to require a CMSP 
establish, implement, maintain and enforce policies and procedures to 
facilitate straight-through processing for transactions involving 
broker-dealers and their customers.\420\ Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 also 
would require a CMSP to submit every twelve months to the Commission a 
report that describes the following: (i) The CMSP's current policies 
and procedures for facilitating straight-through processing; (ii) its 
progress in facilitating straight-through processing during the twelve 
month period covered by the report; and (iii) the steps the CMSP 
intends to take to facilitate and promote straight-through processing 
during the twelve month period that follows the period covered by the 
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \420\ See supra Part III.D (discussing the proposed rule); see 
also supra Part III.D.1 (discussing straight-through processing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has taken a ``policies and procedures'' approach in 
developing the proposed rule because it preliminarily believes such an 
approach will remain effective over time as CMSPs consider and offer 
new technologies and operations to improve the settlement of 
institutional trades. The Commission also believes that improving the 
CMSPs' systems to facilitate straight-through processing can help 
market participants consider additional ways to make their own systems 
more efficient. In addition, a ``policies and procedures'' approach can 
help ensure that a CMSP considers in a holistic fashion how the 
obligations it applies to its users will advance the implementation of 
methodologies, operational capabilities, systems, or services that 
support straight-through processing.
    The Commission has considered as an alternative to the policies and 
procedures approach in proposed Rule 17Ad-27, proposing a rule to 
require CMSPs to achieve certain outcomes that

[[Page 10493]]

would facilitate straight-through processing. For example, the 
Commission could propose to require that a CMSP do the following: (i) 
Enable the users of its service to complete the matching, confirmation, 
or affirmation of the securities transaction as soon as technologically 
and operationally practicable and no later than the end of the day on 
which the transaction was effected by the parties to the transaction; 
or (ii) forward or otherwise submit the transaction for settlement as 
soon as technologically and operationally practicable, as if using 
fully automated systems.
    The Commission believes that these requirements would achieve 
certain discrete objectives with respect to straight-through processing 
and would promote prompt and accurate clearance and settlement. The 
Commission believes, however, that the proposed approach requires 
policies and procedures that include a holistic review and framework 
for considering how systems and processes facilitate straight-through 
processing and that can adapt over time to changes in technology and 
operations, both among and beyond the CMSP's systems.

E. Request for Comment

    The Commission solicits comment on the potential economic impact of 
the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a), the proposed deletion of Rule 
15c6-1(c), proposed new Rule 15c6-2, the proposed amendment to Rule 
204-2, and proposed new Rule 17Ad-27. In addition, the Commission 
solicits comment on related issues that may inform the Commission's 
views regarding the economic impact of the proposed amendment to Rule 
15c6-1(a), the proposed deletion of Rule 15c6-1(c), proposed new Rule 
15c6-2, the proposed amendment to Rule 204-2, and proposed new Rule 
17Ad-27 as well as alternatives to the proposed amendments, deletion, 
and new rules. The Commission in particular seeks comment on the 
following:
    144. The Commission invites commenters to provide additional data 
on the time it takes to complete each step within the current clearance 
and settlement process. What are current constraints or impediments for 
each step within the clearance and settlement process that would limit 
the ability to shorten the settlement cycle from T+2 to T+1? Do these 
constraints or impediments vary by market participant type?
    145. The Commission invites commenters to provide additional data 
on the expected collateral efficiency gains from a T+1 standard 
settlement cycle. How would clearing fund deposits change as a result 
of the proposed amendment? To what extent does this change fully 
represent the change to the level of risk associated with the 
settlement cycle for securities transactions?
    146. The Commission invites commenters to discuss the impact of a 
T+1 settlement cycle on broker-dealers and their customers, including 
custodians who may hold securities on behalf of said customers. What 
types of adaptations would be necessary to comply with a T+1 settlement 
cycle, and what are their relative costs and benefits?
    147. The Commission invites commenters to provide data regarding 
the extent to which a broker-dealer engages in ``internalization'' of a 
transaction on behalf of a customer. How prevalent are internalization 
practices? How does the volume of internalization compare to the volume 
of transactions that are submitted for clearing? \421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \421\ See Part II.B.2 (further discussing internalization by 
broker-dealers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    148. The Commission invites commenters to discuss the potential 
impact of a T+1 standard settlement cycle with respect to cross-border 
and cross-asset class transactions. Would a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle make any cross-border or cross-asset transactions more or less 
costly?
    149. The Commission invites commenters to discuss the anticipated 
market changes, if any, if the proposed amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) 
were not adopted. Which activities necessary for compliance with a T+1 
standard settlement cycle would occur in the absence of the proposed 
rule amendment and how quickly would they occur?
    150. In addition to the prospective impact on costs/burdens, the 
Commission solicits comments related to the credit, market, liquidity, 
legal, and operational risks (increase or decrease) associated with 
shortening the standard settlement cycle to T+1, and in particular, 
quantification of such risks.
    151. Are there types of customers other than institutional 
customers that would be affected by proposed Rule 15c6-2? If so, please 
describe what types of customers. Would the rules impose an 
unanticipated burden on these customers? Please explain.
    152. What are the benefits and costs of requiring broker dealers to 
enter into written agreements with customers engaging in the trade date 
allocation, confirmation and affirmation process where such agreements 
require the process to be completed by the end of the day on trade 
date?
    153. What are the relative burdens of proposed Rule 15c6-2 on the 
different market participants involved in the allocation, confirmation, 
and affirmation process, particularly smaller market participants?

VI. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Two of the rule proposals, proposed Rule 17Ad-27 and the proposed 
amendment to Rule 204-2(a), contain ``collection of information'' 
requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(``PRA'').\422\ The Commission is submitting the proposed collections 
of information to the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for 
review in accordance with the PRA. For the proposed amendment to Rule 
204-2(a), the title of the information collection is ``Rule 204-2 under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940'' (OMB control number 3235-0278). 
For proposed Rule 17Ad-27, the title of the information collection is 
``Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance'' (OMB Control 
No. 3235-0695). An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is 
not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it 
displays a currently valid OMB control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \422\ See 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Proposed Amendment to Rule 204-2

    Under Section 204 of the Advisers Act, investment advisers 
registered or required to register with the Commission under Section 
203 of the Advisers Act must make and keep for prescribed periods such 
records (as defined in Section 3(a)(37) of the Exchange Act), furnish 
copies thereof, and make and disseminate such reports as the 
Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors. Rule 204-2 sets 
forth the requirements for maintaining and preserving specified books 
and records. This collection of information is found at 17 CFR 275. 
204-2 and is mandatory. The Commission staff uses the collection of 
information in its regulatory and examination program. Responses to the 
requirements of the proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 that are provided 
to the Commission in the context of its regulatory and examination 
program would be kept confidential subject to the provisions of 
applicable law.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \423\ See Section 210(b) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-
10(b).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 10494]]

    The proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 would require advisers to 
maintain records of certain documents described in proposed Rule 15c6-2 
if the adviser is a party to a contract under that rule. Rule 15c6-2 
specifically identifies ``allocations, confirmations or affirmations'' 
as documents that must be completed no later than the end of the day on 
trade date. The respondents to this collection of information are 
approximately 13,804 advisers registered with the Commission.\424\ The 
Commission further estimates that 2,521 of these registered advisers 
would not be required to make and keep the proposed required records 
because they do not have any institutional advisory clients.\425\ 
Therefore, the remaining 11,283 of these advisers, or 81.74% of the 
total registered advisers that are subject to Rule 204-2, would enter a 
contract with a broker or dealer under proposed Rule 15c6-2 and 
therefore be subject to the related proposed recordkeeping amendment.
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    \424\ Based on data from Form ADV as of December, 2020.
    \425\ Based on data from Form ADV as of December, 2020, this 
figure represents registered investment advisers that: (i) Report no 
clients that are registered investment companies in response to Item 
5.D, (ii) do not report any institutional separately managed 
accounts in Item 5.D., or separately managed account exposures in 
Section 5.K.(1) of Schedule D, and (iii) do not advise any reported 
hedge funds as per Section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, based on staff experience, the Commission 
believes that many advisers already have recordkeeping processes in 
place to retain records of confirmations received, and allocations and 
affirmations sent to brokers or dealers.\426\ The Commission believes 
that while these are customary and usual business practices for many 
advisers, some small and mid-size advisers do not currently retain 
these records. Further, the Commission believes that the vast majority 
of these books and records are kept in electronic fashion in a trade 
order management or other recordkeeping system, through system logs of 
file transfers, email archiving or as part of DTC's Institutional Trade 
Processing services, but that some advisers maintain paper records 
(e.g., confirmations) and/or communicate allocations by telephone. In 
addition, as noted in Section III.C, above, we believe that up to 70% 
of institutional trades are affirmed by custodians, and therefore 
advisers may not retain or have access to the affirmations these 
custodians sent to brokers or dealers.\427\ Also as noted above, based 
on staff experience, the Commission believes that many advisers send 
allocations and affirmations electronically to brokers or dealers, and 
therefore these records are already date and time stamped in many 
instances. Nevertheless, the proposed amendments would explicitly add a 
new requirement to date and time stamp allocations and affirmations 
(but not confirmations), and thus increase this collection of 
information burden. The Commission estimates that the associated 
increase in burden would be included in our estimate described in the 
chart below for advisers that we believe do not electronically send 
allocations and affirmations to their brokers or dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \426\ See supra Section III.C.
    \427\ See DTCC ITP Forum Remarks, supra note 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We describe the estimated burdens associated with the proposed 
recordkeeping amendment below. These estimated changes from the 
currently approved burden are due to the estimated increase in the 
internal hour and internal time cost burden that would be due to the 
proposed amendment, and the increase in the number of registered 
investment advisers (an increase of 80 advisers).

                                      Table 1--Summary of Burden Estimates for the Proposed Amendment to Rule 204-2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                              Annual
             Advisers                 Initial internal  hour     Annual internal hour         Wage rate \2\          Internal time cost    external cost
                                              burden                  burden \1\                                          per year          burden \3\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
220 small and mid-size advisers     2 hours per adviser \5\...  2 hours, amortized     $69.36 per hour...........  0.667 hour x $69.36                $0
 that have institutional clients,                                over a 3 year                                      per hour = $43.60
 that we believe do not currently                                period, for an                                     per adviser per
 maintain the proposed records \4\.                              annual ongoing                                     year. $69.36 x
                                                                 internal burden of                                 146.74 aggregate
                                                                 0.667 hours per year                               hours = $10,159.16
                                                                 (220 advisers x                                    aggregate cost per
                                                                 0.667 hours each =                                 year.
                                                                 146.74 aggregate
                                                                 annual hours).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
113 advisers that have              2 hours per adviser \7\...  2 hours, amortized     $69.36 per hour...........  0.667 hour x $69.36                 0
 institutional clients that staff                                over a 3 year                                      per hour = $43.60
 estimates do not send allocations                               period, for an                                     per adviser per
 or affirmations electronically to                               annual ongoing                                     year. $69.36 per
 brokers or dealers (e.g., they                                  internal burden of                                 hour x 75.37
 communicate them by telephone)                                  0.667 hours per year                               aggregate hours =
 \6\.                                                            (113 advisers x                                    $5,227.67 aggregate
                                                                 0.667 hours each =                                 cost per year.
                                                                 75.37 aggregate
                                                                 annual hours).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7,898 advisers with institutional   2 hours per adviser \9\...  2 hours, amortized     $69.36 per hour...........  0.667 hour x $69.36                 0
 clients that the staff estimates                                over a 3 year                                      per hour = $43.60
 make institutional trades that                                  period, for an                                     per adviser per
 are affirmed by custodians, and                                 annual ongoing                                     year. $69.36 per
 therefore do not maintain the                                   internal burden of                                 hour x 5,267.97
 proposed affirmations \8\.                                      0.667 hours per year                               aggregate hours =
                                                                 (7,898 advisers x                                  $365,386.40
                                                                 0.667 hours each =                                 Aggregate cost per
                                                                 5,267.97 aggregate                                 year.
                                                                 hours).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total estimated burden per adviser per year resulting from the  5,490.08 aggregate     $380,791.95 per year (5,490.08 aggregate hours                  0
 proposed amendment.                                             hours per year,\10\    per year x $69.36 per hour)
                                                                 or 0.4 blended hours
                                                                 per year per adviser
                                                                 \11\.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently approved aggregate burden...........................  2,764,563 aggregate                       $175,980,426                                 0
                                                                 hours per year.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated revised aggregate burden............................  2,786,199 hours \12\.                 $193,250,787.60 \13\                             0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ We believe that the estimated internal hour burdens associated with the proposed amendment would be one-time initial burdens, and we amortize these
  burdens over three years.

[[Page 10495]]

 
\2\ As with our estimates relating to the previous amendments to Advisers Act Rule 204-2, the Commission expects that performance of these functions
  would most likely be allocated between compliance clerks and general clerks, with compliance clerks performing 17% of the function and general clerks
  performing 83% of the function. Data from SIFMA's Office Salaries in the Securities Industry 2013, modified by Commission staff to account for an 1800-
  hour work-year and inflation, and multiplied by 2.93 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead, suggest that costs for these
  position are $76 and $68, respectively. A blended hourly rate is therefore: (.17 x $76) + (.83 x $68) = $69.36 per hour.
\3\ Under the currently approved PRA for Rule 204-2, there is no cost burden other than the cost of the hour burden described herein, and we believe
  that the proposed amendment would not result in any cost burden other than the cost of the hour burden.
\4\ Based on staff experience, we estimate that approximately 50% of small and mid-sized registered investment advisers that have institutional clients,
  do not currently maintain the proposed records. Based on Form ADV data as of December 2020, we estimate that there are 199 and 241 mid-sized and small
  entity RIAs, respectively, that would be required to retain the proposed new records, for a total of 440 advisers (these are advisers that report the
  following on Form ADV Part 1A as of December 2020: (i) Having any clients that are registered investment companies in response to Item 5.D, (ii)
  having any institutional separately managed accounts in Item 5.D., or separately managed account exposures in Section 5.K.(1) of Schedule D, or (iii)
  advising any reported hedge funds as per Section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D). The categories of mid-size and small entity advisers are based on responses
  to the following Items of Form ADV Part 1A: Item 2.a.(2) (mid-size RIA) and Items 5.F. and 12 (small entity). 50% of 440 advisers = 220 advisers.
\5\ We estimate an initial burden of 2 hours per adviser, to update procedures and instruct personnel to retain the proposed required records in the
  advisers' electronic recordkeeping systems, including any confirmations that they may receive in paper format and do not currently retain. We believe
  that these advisers already have recordkeeping systems to accommodate these records, which would include, at a minimum, spreadsheet formats and email
  retention systems which have an ability to capture a date and time stamp. For those advisers maintaining date and time stamped electronic records
  already, we estimate no incremental compliance costs.
\6\ We believe that only a small number of advisers, or 1% of advisers that have institutional clients, do not send allocations or affirmations
  electronically to brokers or dealers (e.g., they communicate them by telephone). 1% of 11,283 RIAs with institutional clients = 112.83 advisers
  (rounded to 113). For new large advisers, we estimate that there would be no incremental cost associated with this proposed amendment, as we believe
  these advisers would implement electronic systems as part of their initial compliance with Rule 204-2, and that these electronic systems would have an
  ability to capture a date and time stamp.
\7\ We estimate that these advisers would incur an initial burden of 2 hours of updating their procedures and training their personnel to send these
  communications through their existing electronic systems (such as, at a minimum, their current spreadsheet formats and current email and electronic
  retention system to maintain electronic records with date and time stamps). Because these email and electronic retention systems would provide date
  and time stamps, we estimate there would be no incremental compliance costs in connection with the proposed date and time stamp requirement.
\8\ As noted above, we estimate that 70% of institutional trades are affirmed by custodians, and therefore advisers may not retain or have access to the
  affirmations these custodians sent to brokers or dealers. We believe that some of these advisers themselves, however, sometimes send affirmations to
  brokers or dealers. Because we do not know the number of advisers that correlate to these trades, we estimate for purposes of this collection of
  information that 70% of advisers with institutional clients make institutional trades that are affirmed by custodians. This estimate equals 7,898.1
  advisers, rounded to 7,898 advisers (70% of 11,283 RIAs with institutional clients = approximately 7,898 advisers).
\9\ We estimate that the proposed amendments to rule 204-2 would result in an initial increase in the collection of information burden estimate by 2
  hours for these advisers, to direct their institutional clients' custodians to electronically copy the adviser on any affirmations sent through email
  or for the adviser to use its systems to issue affirmations.
\10\ 146.74 hours + 75.37 hours + 5,267.97 hours = 5,490.08 hours.
\11\ 5,490.08 aggregate hours per year/13,804 total RIAs that are subject to Rule 204-2 = a blended average of 0.4 hours per adviser per year.
\12\ The currently approved collection of information burden is 2,764,563 aggregate hours for 13,724 advisers, or 201.44 hours per adviser. The proposed
  new collection of information burden would add approximately 0.4 blended hours per adviser per year, for a total estimate of 201.84 blended hours per
  adviser per year, or 2,786,199 aggregate hours under amended Rule 204-2 for all registered advisers subject to the rule (201.84 blended hours per
  adviser x 13,804 RIAs subject to Rule 204-2 = 2,786,199 aggregate burden hours for RIAs).
\13\ (201.84 estimated revised burden hours per adviser x $69.36 per hour) x 13,804 RIAs = $193,250,787.60 revised aggregate annual cost of the hour
  burden for Rule 204-2.

B. Proposed Rule 17Ad-27

    The purpose of the collections under proposed Rule 17Ad-27 is to 
ensure that CMSPs facilitate the ongoing development of operational and 
technological improvements associated with the straight-through 
processing of institutional trades, which may in turn facilitate 
further shortening of the settlement cycle in the future. The 
collections are mandatory. To the extent that the Commission receives 
confidential information pursuant to this collection of information, 
such information would be kept confidential subject to the provisions 
of applicable law.\428\
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    \428\ See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq. Exemption 4 of the Freedom 
of Information Act provides an exemption for trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential. See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). Exemption 8 of 
the Freedom of Information Act provides an exemption for matters 
that are contained in or related to examination, operating, or 
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an 
agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial 
institutions. See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Respondents under this rule are the three CMSPs to which the 
Commission has granted an exemption from registration as a clearing 
agency. The Commission anticipates that one additional entity may seek 
to become a CMSP in the next three years, and so for purposes of this 
proposal the Commission has assumed four respondents.
    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would require a CMSP to establish, implement, 
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures. Based on the 
similar policies and procedures requirements and the corresponding 
burden estimates previously made by the Commission for Rules 17Ad-
22(d)(8) and 17Ad-22(e)(2),\429\ the Commission estimates that 
respondent CMSPs would incur an aggregate one-time burden of 
approximately 56 hours to create new policies and procedures,\430\ and 
that the aggregate cost of this one time burden would be $27,280.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \429\ See Clearing Agency Standards Adopting Release, supra note 
404; CCA Standards Adopting Release, supra note 404.
    \430\ This figure was calculated as follows: (Assistant General 
Counsel for 8 hours + Compliance Attorney for 6 hours) = 14 hours x 
4 respondent CMSPs = 56 hours.
    \431\ This figure was calculated as follows: (Assistant General 
Counsel at $602/hour x 8 hours = $4,816) + (Compliance Attorney at 
$334/hour x 6 hours = $2,004) = $6,820 x 4 CMSPs equals $27,280.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would impose ongoing burdens on a respondent 
CMSP as follows: (i) Ongoing monitoring and compliance activities with 
respect to the written policies and procedures required by the proposed 
rule; and (ii) ongoing documentation activities with respect to the 
required annual report. Based on the similar reporting requirements and 
the corresponding burden estimates previously made by the Commission 
for Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23),\432\ the Commission estimates that the ongoing 
activities required by proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would impose an aggregate 
annual burden on respondent CMSPs of 140 hours,\433\ and an aggregate 
cost of $58,900.\434\ The total industry cost is estimated to be 
$84,592.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \432\ See CCA Standards Adopting Release, supra note 404, at 
70899.
    \433\ This figure was calculated as follows: (Compliance 
Attorney for 25 hours + Computer Operations Manager for 10 hours) = 
34 hours x 4 respondent CMSPs = 136 hours. As discussed previously, 
supra note 407, the Commission estimates that the Inline XBRL 
requirement would require respondent CMSPs to incur one additional 
ongoing burden hour to apply and review Inline XBRL tags, as 
follows: (Compliance Attorney for 1 hour) x 4 CMSPs = 4 hours. Taken 
together, the total ongoing burden is 140 hours (136 hours + 4 hours 
= 140 hours).
    \434\ This figure was calculated as follows: [(Compliance 
Attorney at $397/hour x 24 hours = $9,528) + (Computer Operations 
Manager at $480/hour x 10 hours = $4,800)] = $14,328 x 4 CMSPs = 
$57,312. The Commission also estimates the costs associated with the 
one burden hour associated with applying and review Inline XBRL tags 
as follows: (Compliance Attorney at $397/hour x 1 hour = $397) x 4 
CMSPs = $1,588. Taken together, the total amount is $58,900 ($57,312 
+ $1,588 = $58,900).
    \435\ This figure was calculated as follows: $27,280 (industry 
one-time burden) + $58,900 (industry ongoing burden) = $84,592.

[[Page 10496]]



                                             Table 2--Summary of Burden Estimates for Proposed Rule 17Ad-27
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Initial
                                                              Type of        Number of      burden per    Ongoing burden   Total annual   Total industry
             Name of information collection                   burden        respondents       entity        per entity      burden  per   burden (hours)
                                                                                              (hours)         (hours)     entity (hours)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17Ad-27.................................................   Recordkeeping               4              56              35              91             364
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Request for Comment

    Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits 
comments to:
    154. Evaluate whether the proposed collections of information are 
necessary for the proper performance of the Commission's functions, 
including whether the information shall have practical utility;
    155. Evaluate the accuracy of the Commission's estimates of the 
burdens of the proposed collections of information;
    156. Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality, 
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected;
    157. Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of 
collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology; and
    158. Evaluate whether the proposed rules and rule amendments would 
have any effects on any other collection of information not previously 
identified in this section.
    Persons submitting comments on the collection of information 
requirements should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Attention: Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and 
should also send a copy of their comments to Secretary, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090, with 
reference to File Number S7-[ ]-22. Requests for materials submitted to 
OMB by the Commission with regard to this collection of information 
should be in writing, with reference to File Number S7-[ ]-22 and be 
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of FOIA/PA 
Services, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-2736. As OMB is 
required to make a decision concerning the collection of information 
between 30 and 60 days after publication, a comment to OMB is best 
assured of having its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of 
publication.

VII. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    Under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996,\436\ a rule is ``major'' if it has resulted, or is likely to 
result in: An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; a 
major increase in costs or prices for consumers or individual 
industries; or significant adverse effects on competition, investment, 
or innovation. The Commission requests comment on whether the proposed 
rules and rule amendments would be a ``major'' rule for purposes of the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act. In addition, the 
Commission solicits comment and empirical data on: The potential effect 
on the U.S. economy on annual basis; any potential increase in costs or 
prices for consumers or individual industries; and any potential effect 
on competition, investment, or innovation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \436\ Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') requires the Commission, 
in promulgating rules, to consider the impact of those rules on small 
entities.\437\ Section 603(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act,\438\ 
as amended by the RFA, generally requires the Commission to undertake a 
regulatory flexibility analysis of all proposed rules to determine the 
impact of such rulemaking on ``small entities.'' \439\ Section 605(b) 
of the RFA states that this requirement shall not apply to any proposed 
rule which, if adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities.\440\ The Commission has 
prepared the following initial regulatory flexibility analysis in 
accordance with Section 603(a) of the RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \437\ See 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \438\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \439\ Section 601(b) of the RFA permits agencies to formulate 
their own definitions of ``small entities.'' See 5 U.S.C. 601(b). 
The Commission has adopted definitions for the term ``small entity'' 
for the purposes of rulemaking in accordance with the RFA. These 
definitions, as relevant to this rulemaking, are set forth in 17 CFR 
240.0-10.
    \440\ See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Proposed Rules and Amendments for Rules 15c6-1, 15c6-2, and 204-2

1. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Actions
    The Commission is proposing to amend Exchange Act Rule 15c6-1 to 
shorten the standard settlement cycle for securities transactions 
(other than those excluded by the rule) from T+2 to T+1. The Commission 
believes that the proposed amendments to Rule 15c6-1 to shorten the 
standard settlement cycle from two days to one day would offer market 
participants benefits by reducing exposure to credit, market, and 
liquidity risk, as well as related reductions to overall systemic risk.
    The Commission is also proposing new Exchange Act Rule 15c6-2 to 
prohibit broker-dealers from entering into contracts with their 
institutional customers unless those contracts require that the parties 
complete allocations, confirmations, and affirmations by the end of the 
trade date. The Commission believes that new Rule 15c6-2 would help 
facilitate settlement of these institutional trades in a T+1 or shorter 
standard settlement cycle by promoting the timely transmission of trade 
data necessary to achieve settlement. Furthermore, the Commission 
believes that proposed Rule 15c6-2 would foster continued improvements 
in institutional trade processing, which should in turn also further 
improve accuracy and efficiency, reduce fails, and in turn, 
collectively reduce operational risk.
    The Commission is proposing a related amendment to investment 
adviser recordkeeping rule under the Advisers Act designed to ensure 
that advisers that are parties to contracts under proposed Rule 15c6-2 
retain records of confirmations received, and of the allocations and 
affirmations sent to a broker or dealer, with a date and time stamp 
that indicates when the allocation or affirmation was sent to the 
broker or dealer.
2. Legal Basis
    The Commission proposes amendments to Rule 15c6-1 and new Rule 
15c6-2 pursuant to authority set forth in the Exchange Act, 
particularly

[[Page 10497]]

Sections 15(c)(6),\441\ 17A,\442\ and 23(a).\443\ The Commission 
proposes an amendment to Rule 204-2 pursuant to authority set forth in 
Sections 204 and 211 of the Advisers Act.\444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \441\ 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(6).
    \442\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
    \443\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a).
    \444\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-4 and 80b-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Small Entities Subject to the Proposed Rule and Proposed Rule 
Amendments
    Paragraph (c) of Exchange Act Rule 0-10 provides that, for purposes 
of Commission rulemaking in accordance with the provisions of the RFA, 
when used with reference to a broker or dealer, the Commission has 
defined the term ``small entity'' to mean a broker or dealer: (1) With 
total capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than 
$500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year as of which its audited 
financial statements were prepared pursuant to Rule 17a-5(d) under the 
Exchange Act,\445\ or if not required to file such statements, a 
broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus subordinated 
liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the last business day of the 
preceding fiscal year (or in the time that it has been in business, if 
shorter); and (2) is not affiliated with any person (other than a 
natural person) that is not a small business or small 
organization.\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \445\ 17 CFR 240.17a-5(c).
    \446\ 17 CFR 240.0-10(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Commission rules, for the purposes of the Advisers Act and 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, an investment adviser generally is a 
small entity if it: (i) Has assets under management having a total 
value of less than $25 million; (ii) did not have total assets of $5 
million or more on the last day of the most recent fiscal year; and 
(iii) does not control, is not controlled by, and is not under common 
control with another investment adviser that has assets under 
management of $25 million or more, or any person (other than a natural 
person) that had total assets of $5 million or more on the last day of 
its most recent fiscal year.\447\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \447\ See 17 CFR 275.0-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to Rule 15c6-1 would prohibit broker-
dealers, including those that are small entities, from effecting or 
entering into a contract for the purchase or sale of a security (other 
than an exempted security, government security, municipal security, 
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) that 
provides for payment of funds and delivery of securities no later than 
the first business day after the date of the contract unless otherwise 
expressly agreed to by the parties at the time of the transaction. 
Proposed Rule 15c6-2 would prohibit broker-dealers, where the broker-
dealer has agreed with its customer to engage in an allocation, 
confirmation, or affirmation process, from effecting or entering into a 
contract for the purchase or sale of a security (other than an exempted 
security, a government security, a municipal security, commercial 
paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) on behalf of a 
customer unless such broker or dealer has entered into a written 
agreement with the customer that requires the allocation, confirmation, 
affirmation, or any combination thereof, be completed no later than the 
end of the day on trade date in such form as may be necessary to 
achieve settlement in compliance with Rule 15c6-1(a). Based on FOCUS 
Report data, the Commission estimates that, as of June 30, 2021, 
approximately 1,439 of broker-dealers might be deemed small entities 
for purposes of this analysis.
    The proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 would require that advisers 
that are parties to contracts under proposed Rule 15c6-2 retain records 
of confirmations received, and of the allocations and affirmations sent 
to a broker or dealer, with a date and time stamp for each allocation 
(as applicable) and each affirmation that indicates when the allocation 
or affirmation was sent to the broker or dealer. As discussed in Part 
VI above, the Commission estimates that based on IARD data as of 
December 30, 2020, approximately 11,283 investment advisers would be 
subject to the proposed amendment to rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act. 
Our proposed amendment would not affect most investment advisers that 
are small entities (``small advisers'') because they are generally 
registered with one or more state securities authorities and not with 
the Commission. Under Section 203A of the Advisers Act, most small 
advisers are prohibited from registering with the Commission and are 
regulated by state regulators.\448\ Based on IARD data, the Commission 
estimates that as of December 2020, approximately 431 advisers 
registered with the Commission are small entities under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act.\449\ Of these, the Commission anticipates that 199, or 
46% of small advisers registered with the Commission, would be subject 
to the proposed amendment under the Advisers Act.\450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \448\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-3a.
    \449\ Based on responses from registered investment adviser to 
Items 5.F. and 12 of Form ADV.
    \450\ Based on data from Form ADV as of December 2020, this 
figure represents registered investment advisers that: (i) Report 
clients that are registered investment companies in response to Item 
5.D, (ii) report any institutional separately managed accounts in 
Item 5.D., or have particular separately managed account exposures 
in Section 5.K.(1) of Schedule D, or (iii) advise reported hedge 
funds as per Section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    The proposed amendments to Rule 15c6-1 would not impose any new 
reporting or recordkeeping requirements on broker-dealers that are 
small entities. However, the proposed amendments to Rule 15c6-1 may 
impact certain broker-dealers, including those that are small entities, 
to the extent that broker-dealers may need to make changes to their 
business operations and incur certain costs in order to operate in a 
T+1 environment.
    For example, conversion to a T+1 standard settlement cycle may 
require broker-dealers, including those that are small entities, to 
make changes to their business practices, as well as to their computer 
systems, and/or to deploy new technology solutions. Implementation of 
these changes may require broker-dealers to incur new or increased 
costs, which may vary based on the business model of individual broker-
dealers as well as other factors.
    Additionally, conversion to a T+1 standard settlement cycle may 
also result in an increase in costs to certain broker-dealers who 
finance the purchase of customer securities until the broker-dealer 
receives payment from its customers. To pay for securities purchases, 
many customers liquidate other securities or money fund balances held 
for them by their broker-dealers in consolidated accounts such as cash 
management accounts. However, some broker-dealers may elect to finance 
the purchase of customer securities until the broker-dealer receives 
payment from its customers for those customers that do not choose to 
liquidate other securities or have a sufficient money fund balance 
prior to trade execution to pay for securities purchases. Broker-
dealers that elect to finance the purchase of customer securities may 
incur an increase in costs in a T+1 environment resulting from 
settlement occurring one day earlier unless the broker-dealer can 
expedite customer payments.
    Proposed Rule 15c6-2 would not impose any new reporting or 
recordkeeping requirements on broker-dealers that are small entities. 
However,

[[Page 10498]]

the proposed rule may impact certain broker-dealers, including those 
that are small entities, to the extent that broker-dealers may need to 
make changes to their business operations and incur certain costs in 
order to achieve trade date completion of institutional trade 
allocations, confirmations, and affirmations. For example, completion 
of allocations, confirmations, and affirmations on trade date may 
require broker-dealers, including those that are small entities, to 
make changes to their business practices, as well as to their computer 
systems, and/or to deploy new technology solutions. Implementation of 
these changes may require broker-dealers to incur new or increased 
costs, which may vary based on the business model of individual broker-
dealers as well as other factors.
    The proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 imposes certain reporting and 
compliance requirements on certain investment advisers, including those 
that are small entities. It would require them to retain records of 
each confirmation received, and any allocation and each affirmation 
sent given to a broker or dealer, with a date and time stamp for each 
allocation (if applicable) and affirmation that indicates when the 
allocation or affirmation was sent to the broker or dealer. The reasons 
for and objectives of, the proposed amendment to the books and records 
rule are discussed in more detail in Part III.C. These requirements as 
well as the costs and burdens on investment advisers, including those 
that are small entities, are discussed in Parts V and VI and below. As 
discussed above, there are approximately 431 small advisers, and 
approximately 199 small advisers would be subject to amendments to the 
books and records rule. As discussed in Part VI.A, the proposed 
amendments to Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act would increase the 
annual burden by approximately 0.4 blended hours per adviser per year, 
or an increased burden of 172.4 blended hours in the aggregate for 
small advisers.\451\ The Commission therefore believes the annual 
monetized aggregate cost to small advisers associated with our proposed 
amendments would be approximately $11,957.66.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ 0.4 hour x 431 small advisers = 172.4 blended hours in the 
aggregate for small advisers.
    \452\ 172.4 blended hours x $69.36 per hour = $11,957.66. See 
Part VI.A for a discussion of the monetized cost of the hour burden 
per adviser.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
    The Commission believes that no federal rules duplicate, overlap or 
conflict with the proposed amendments to Rule 15c6-1, proposed Rule 
15c6-2, or the proposed amendment to Rule 204-2.
6. Significant Alternatives
    The RFA requires that the Commission include in its regulatory 
flexibility analysis a description of any significant alternatives to 
the proposed rule which would accomplish the stated objectives of 
applicable statutes and which would minimize any significant economic 
impact of the proposed rule on small entities.\453\ Pursuant to Section 
3(a) of the RFA, the Commission's initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis must consider certain types of alternatives, including: (a) 
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (b) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
the compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for small 
entities; (c) the use of performance rather than design standards; and 
(d) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part of thereof, for 
such small entities.\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \453\ 5 U.S.C. 603(c).
    \454\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission considered alternatives to the proposed amendments 
to Rule 15c6-1 that would accomplish the stated objectives of the 
amendment without disproportionately burdening broker-dealers that are 
small entities, including: Differing compliance requirements or 
timetables; clarifying, consolidating or simplifying the compliance 
requirements; using performance rather than design standards; or 
providing an exemption for certain or all broker-dealers that are small 
entities. The purpose of Rule 15c6-1 is to establish a standard 
settlement cycle for broker-dealer transactions. Alternatives, such as 
different compliance requirements or timetables, or exemptions, for 
Rule 15c6-1, or any part thereof, for small entities would prevent the 
establishment of a standard settlement cycle and create substantial 
confusion over when transactions will settle. Allowing small entities 
to settle at a time later than T+1 could create a two-tiered market in 
which order flow for small entities would not coincide with that of 
other firms operating on a T+1 settlement cycle. Additionally, the 
Commission believes that establishing a single timetable (i.e., 
compliance date) for all broker-dealers, including small entities, to 
comply with the amendment is necessary to ensure that the transition to 
a T+1 standard settlement cycle takes place in an orderly manner that 
minimizes undue disruptions in the securities markets. In particular, 
because broker-dealers do not always know the identity of their 
counterparty when they enter a transaction, providing broker-dealers 
that are small entities with an exemption from the standard settlement 
cycle would likely create substantial confusion over when a transaction 
will settle. With respect to using performance rather than design 
standards, the Commission used performance standards to the extent 
appropriate under the statute. For example, broker-dealers have the 
flexibility to settle transactions under a standard settlement cycle 
shorter than T+1. For firm commitment offerings, small entities do 
retain the option under paragraph (d) to agree with their counterparty 
in advance of the transaction to use a settlement cycle other than T+1. 
In addition, under the proposed rule amendment, broker-dealers retain 
flexibility to tailor their contracts, systems and processes to choose 
how to comply with the rule most effectively. In Part V.C.5.b)(3), the 
Commission preliminarily estimates the costs likely to be incurred by 
broker-dealers to implement a T+1 standard settlement cycle.
    The Commission also considered alternatives to proposed Rule 15c6-2 
that would accomplish the stated objectives of the new rule without 
disproportionately burdening broker-dealers that are small entities, 
including: Differing compliance requirements or timetables; clarifying, 
consolidating or simplifying the compliance requirements; using 
performance rather than design standards; or providing an exemption for 
certain or all broker-dealers that are small entities. The purpose of 
proposed Rule 15c6-2 is to achieve trade date completion of 
institutional trade allocations, confirmations, and affirmations to 
facilitate a T+1 standard settlement cycle. Alternatives, such as 
different compliance requirements or timetables, or exemptions, for 
Rule 15c6-2, or any part thereof, for small entities would undermine 
the purpose of establishing a standard settlement cycle. For example, 
allowing small entities to complete the allocation, confirmation, and 
affirmation processes at a time later than trade date could create a 
two-tiered market that could work to the detriment of small entities 
whose post-trade processing would not coincide with that of other firms 
operating on a T+1 settlement cycle. Additionally, the Commission 
believes

[[Page 10499]]

that establishing a single timetable (i.e., compliance date) for all 
broker-dealers, including small entities, to comply with the new rule 
is necessary to ensure that the transition to a T+1 standard settlement 
cycle takes place in an orderly manner that minimizes undue disruptions 
in the securities markets. With respect to using performance rather 
than design standards, the Commission used performance standards to the 
extent appropriate under the statute. Under the proposed rule, broker-
dealers have the flexibility to tailor their systems and processes, and 
generally to choose how, to comply with the new rule.
    The Commission considered alternatives to the proposed amendment to 
Rule 204-2 that would accomplish the stated objectives of the amendment 
without disproportionately burdening investment advisers that are small 
entities, including: Differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; clarifying, consolidating or simplifying the compliance and 
reporting requirements; using performance rather than design standards; 
or providing an exemption from coverage of all or part of the proposed 
rule for investment advisers that are small entities. Regarding the 
first and fourth alternatives, the Commission believes that 
establishing different compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables for small advisers, or exempting small advisers from the 
proposed rule, or any part thereof, would be inappropriate under these 
circumstances. Because the protections of the Advisers Act are intended 
to apply equally to clients of both large and small firms, it would be 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Advisers Act to specify 
differences for small entities under the proposed amendment to Rule 
204-2. While it is the staff's experience that some small and mid-size 
advisers do not currently retain these records--whereas most larger 
advisers already retain them--the Commission believes that the initial 
burden on small advisers of retaining the proposed records would not be 
large.\455\ As discussed above, the Commission believes these advisers 
would need to update their policies and procedures and instruct 
personnel to retain these records in their electronic recordkeeping 
systems, including any confirmations that they may have retained in 
paper format. However, because the Commission believes these advisers 
already have recordkeeping systems to accommodate these records (which 
would include, at a minimum, existing spreadsheet formats and email 
retention systems), the Commission does not believe the two hour 
additional burden of complying with this proposed amendment would 
warrant establishing a different timetable for compliance for small 
advisers. In addition, as discussed above, our staff would use the 
information that advisers would maintain to help prepare for 
examinations of investment advisers and verify that an adviser has 
completed the steps necessary to complete settlement in a timely manner 
in accordance with proposed rule 15c6-1(a). Establishing different 
conditions for large and small advisers would negate these benefits. 
Regarding the second alternative, we believe the current proposal is 
clear and that further clarification, consolidation, or simplification 
of the compliance requirements is not necessary. Our proposal states 
the types of communications--confirmations, any allocations, and 
affirmations--that advisers must retain in their records, and that 
allocations (if applicable) and affirmations must be date and time 
stamped. We believe that by proposing to clearly list these types of 
communications as required records, advisers will not need to parse 
whether, and if so which, current requirement under Rule 204-2 captures 
these post-trade communications. Further, the proposed requirement to 
date and time stamp the allocations (if applicable) and affirmations 
sent to a broker or dealer is clear and consistent with many advisers' 
current practices of date and time stamping these records, as discussed 
in Part VI.A, above.\456\ Regarding the third alternative, the proposed 
amendment to Rule 204-2 is narrowly tailored to correspond to the 
proposed rules and rule amendments under the Exchange Act, and using 
performance rather than design standards would be inconsistent with our 
statutory mandate to protect investors, as advisers must maintain books 
and records in a uniform and quantifiable manner that it is useful to 
our regulatory and examination program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \455\ See supra Part III.C.
    \456\ As noted above, however, we estimate that 50% of small and 
mid-sized advisers that have institutional clients do not currently 
maintain these records, and 1% of advisers that have institutional 
clients, do not send allocations or affirmations electronically to 
brokers or dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Request for Comment
    The Commission encourages written comments on matters discussed in 
the initial RFA. In particular, the Commission seeks comment on the 
number of small entities that would be affected by the proposed 
amendments to Rule 15c6-1, proposed Rule 15c6-2, and the proposed 
amendment to Rule 204-2, and whether the effect(s) on small entities 
would be economically significant. Commenters are asked to describe the 
nature of any effect(s) the proposed amendments to Rule 15c6-1, 
proposed Rule 15c6-2, and the proposed amendment to Rule 204-2 may have 
on small entities, and to provide empirical data to support their 
views.

B. Proposed Rule 17Ad-27

    Proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would apply to clearing agencies that are 
CMSPs. For the purposes of Commission rulemaking, a small entity 
includes, when used with reference to a clearing agency, a clearing 
agency that (i) compared, cleared, and settled less than $500 million 
in securities transactions during the preceding fiscal year, (ii) had 
less than $200 million of funds and securities in its custody or 
control at all times during the preceding fiscal year (or at any time 
that it has been in business, if shorter), and (iii) is not affiliated 
with any person (other than a natural person) that is not a small 
business or small organization.\457\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \457\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the Commission's existing information about the CMSPs that 
would be subject to Rule 17Ad-27, the Commission believes that all such 
CMSPs would not fall within the definition of a small entity described 
above.\458\ While other CMSPs may emerge and seek to register as 
clearing agencies or obtain exemptions from registration as a clearing 
agency with the Commission, the Commission does not believe that any 
such entities would be ``small entities'' as defined in 17 CFR 240.0-
10(d). Accordingly, the Commission believes that any such CMSP would 
exceed the thresholds for ``small entities'' set forth in in 17 CFR 
240.0-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \458\ DTCC ITP Matching is a subsidiary of DTCC, and in 2020, 
DTCC processed $2.329 quadrillion in financial transactions. DTCC, 
2020 Annual Report. As of December 1, 2021, SS&C Technologies 
Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: SSNC) had a market capitalization of $19.35 
billion. Bloomberg STP LLC is a wholly-owned by Bloomberg L.P., a 
global business and financial information and news company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the reasons described above, the Commission preliminarily 
believes that proposed Rule 17Ad-27 would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and requests 
comment on this analysis.

[[Page 10500]]

Statutory Authority and Text of the Proposed Rules and Rule Amendments

    The Commission is proposing amendments to Rule 15c6-1, new Rule 
15c6-2, and new Rule 17Ad-27 under the Commission's rulemaking 
authority set forth in Sections 15(c)(6), 17A and 23(a) of the Exchange 
Act [15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(6), 78q-1, and 78w(a) respectively]. The 
Commission is proposing amendments to Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act 
under the authority set forth in Sections 204 and 211 of the Advisers 
Act [15 U.S.C. 80b-4 and 80b-11].

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 232, 240, and 275

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

Text of Amendment

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission proposes to amend 17 CFR parts 232, 240, and 275 as set 
forth below:

PART 232-- REGULATION S-T--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR 
ELECTRONIC FILINGS

0
1. The authority citation for part 232 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s(a), 77z-3, 
77sss(a), 78c(b), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78w(a), 78ll, 80a-6(c), 
80a-8, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-37, 7201 et seq.; and 18 U.S.C. 1350, 
unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
2. Amend Sec.  232.101 by adding paragraph (xxii) to read as follows:


Sec.  232.101  Mandated electronic submissions and exceptions.

    (a) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (xxii) Reports filed pursuant to Rule 17Ad-27 (Sec.  240.17Ad-27) 
under the Exchange Act.
0
3. Add Sec.  232.409 to read as follows:


Sec.  232.409  Straight-through processing report interactive data.

    The straight-through processing report required by Rule 17Ad-27 
(Sec.  240.17Ad-27) under the Exchange Act must be submitted in Inline 
XBRL in accordance with the EDGAR Filer Manual.

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

0
4. The authority citation for part 240 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78o-4, 
78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78ll, 78mm, 80a-20, 
80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, and 7201 et. seq., and 
8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; 
Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 112-106, 
sec. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
5. Amend Sec.  240.15c6-1 by reserving paragraph (c) and revising 
paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  240.15c6-1   Settlement cycle.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section, a 
broker or dealer shall not effect or enter into a contract for the 
purchase or sale of a security (other than an exempted security, a 
government security, a municipal security, commercial paper, bankers' 
acceptances, or commercial bills) that provides for payment of funds 
and delivery of securities later than the first business day after the 
date of the contract unless otherwise expressly agreed to by the 
parties at the time of the transaction.
    (b) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to contracts:
    (1) For the purchase or sale of limited partnership interests that 
are not listed on an exchange or for which quotations are not 
disseminated through an automated quotation system of a registered 
securities association;
    (2) For the purchase or sale of securities that the Commission may 
from time to time, taking into account then existing market practices, 
exempt by order from the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, 
either unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions, if the 
Commission determines that such exemption is consistent with the public 
interest and the protection of investors.
    (c) Reserved.
    (d) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the parties to a 
contract shall be deemed to have expressly agreed to an alternate date 
for payment of funds and delivery of securities at the time of the 
transaction for a contract for the sale for cash of securities pursuant 
to a firm commitment offering if the managing underwriter and the 
issuer have agreed to such date for all securities sold pursuant to 
such offering and the parties to the contract have not expressly agreed 
to another date for payment of funds and delivery of securities at the 
time of the transaction.
0
6. Add Sec.  240.15c6-2 to read as follows:


Sec.  240.15c6-2  Same-day allocation, confirmation, and affirmation.

    For contracts where parties have agreed to engage in an allocation, 
confirmation, or affirmation process, no broker or dealer shall effect 
or enter into a contract for the purchase or sale of a security (other 
than an exempted security, a government security, a municipal security, 
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) on behalf 
of a customer unless such broker or dealer has entered into a written 
agreement with the customer that requires the allocation, confirmation, 
affirmation, or any combination thereof, be completed as soon as 
technologically practicable and no later than the end of the day on 
trade date in such form as may be necessary to achieve settlement in 
compliance with paragraph (a) of Sec.  240.15c6-1.
0
7. Add Sec.  240.17Ad-27 to read as follows:


Sec.  240.17Ad-27   Straight-through processing by central matching 
service providers.

    A clearing agency that provides a central matching service for 
transactions involving broker-dealers and their customers must 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures 
that facilitate straight-through processing. Such clearing agency also 
must submit to the Commission every twelve months a report that 
describes the following:
    (a) Its current policies and procedures for facilitating straight-
through processing;
    (b) Its progress in facilitating straight-through processing during 
the twelve-month period covered by the report; and
    (c) The steps it intends to take to facilitate straight-through 
processing during the twelve-month period that follows the period 
covered by the report.
    The report must be filed electronically on EDGAR and must be 
provided as interactive data as required by Sec.  232.409 of this 
chapter (Rule 409 of Regulation S-T) in accordance with the EDGAR Filer 
Manual.

PART 275--RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940

0
8. The authority citation for part 275 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)(G), 80b-2(a)(11)(H), 80b-
2(a)(17), 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-4a, 80b-6(4), 80b-6a, and 80b-11, unless 
otherwise noted.
* * * * *
    Section 275.204-2 is also issued under 15 U.S.C 80b-6.
* * * * *

[[Page 10501]]

0
9. Amend Sec.  275.204-2 by revising paragraph (a)(7)(iii) to read as 
follows:


 Sec.  275.204-2  Books and records to be maintained by investment 
advisers.

    (a) * * *
    (7) * * *
    (iii) The placing or execution of any order to purchase or sell any 
security; and if the adviser is a party to a contract under rule Sec.  
240.15c6-2, each confirmation received, and any allocation and each 
affirmation sent, with a date and time stamp for each allocation (if 
applicable) and affirmation that indicates when the allocation or 
affirmation was sent to the broker or dealer.
* * * * *

    By the Commission.

    Dated: February 9, 2022.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-03143 Filed 2-23-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


