[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 10 (Wednesday, January 15, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 2522-2571]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-28407]



[[Page 2521]]

Vol. 85

Wednesday,

No. 10

January 15, 2020

Part III





Securities and Exchange Commission





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b





Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 10 / Wednesday, January 15, 2020 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 2522]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b

[Release No. 34-87783; File No. S7-24-19]
RIN 3235-AM06


Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are proposing Rule 13q-1 and an amendment to Form SD to 
implement Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the ``Dodd-Frank Act'') relating to disclosure 
of payments by resource extraction issuers. Section 1504 of the Dodd-
Frank Act added Section 13(q) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Section 13(q) directs the Commission to issue rules requiring resource 
extraction issuers to include in an annual report information relating 
to payments made to a foreign government or the Federal Government for 
the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals. Section 13(q) requires these issuers to provide information 
about the type and total amount of payments made for each of their 
projects related to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals, and the type and total amount of payments made to each 
government. In addition, Section 13(q) requires a resource extraction 
issuer to provide information about those payments in an interactive 
data format.

DATES: Comments should be received by March 16, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment forms (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number S7-24-19 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-24-19. This file number 
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help us 
process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one 
method. We will post all comments on our internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments also are available for 
website viewing and printing in our Public Reference Room, 100 F Street 
NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours 
of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All comments received will be posted 
without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that we do 
not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment 
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make 
available publicly.
    We or the staff may add studies, memoranda or other substantive 
items to the comment file during this rulemaking. A notification of the 
inclusion in the comment file of any such materials will be made 
available on our website. To ensure direct electronic receipt of such 
notifications, sign up through the ``Stay Connected'' option at 
www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elliot Staffin, Special Counsel, 
Office of Rulemaking, Division of Corporation Finance, at (202) 551-
3430, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission initially adopted Rule 13q-1 
and amendments to Form SD on August 22, 2012. Those rules were vacated 
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on July 2, 
2013. On June 27, 2016, the Commission adopted a revised version of 
Rule 13q-1 and amendments to Form SD. On February 14, 2017, the revised 
rules were disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress pursuant to 
the Congressional Review Act. Although the joint resolution vacated the 
2016 Rules, the statutory mandate under Section 13(q) of the Exchange 
Act remains in effect. As a result, we are proposing 17 CFR 240.13q-1 
(``Rule 13q-1'') and an amendment to Form SD \1\ under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'').\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 17 CFR 249b.400.
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table of Contents

I. Background
    A. Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act
    B. International Transparency Promotion Efforts
    C. The 2016 Rulemaking and Congress's Actions Under the CRA
    1. Key Aspects of the 2016 Rules
    2. Congressional Disapproval Under the CRA
    3. Proposed Rules in Response to the CRA Disapproval
II. Proposed Rules Under Section 13(q)
    A. Definition of ``Resource Extraction Issuer''
    B. Definition of ``Commercial Development of Oil, Natural Gas, 
or Minerals''
    1. ``Extraction'' and ``Processing''
    2. ``Export''
    3. ``Minerals''
    C. Definition of ``Payment''
    1. Taxes
    2. Royalties, Fees, and Bonuses
    3. Dividend Payments
    4. Infrastructure Payments
    5. Community and Social Responsibility Payments
    6. In-Kind Payments
    7. Other Payment Types
    8. Accounting Considerations
    9. The ``Not De Minimis'' Threshold
    D. Anti-Invasion
    E. Definition of ``Subsidiary'' and ``Control''
    F. Definition of ``Project''
    1. Considerations for Modified ``Project'' Definition
    2. Discussion of the Modified ``Project'' Definition
    G. Definition of ``Foreign Government'' and ``Federal 
Government''
    H. Annual Report Requirement
    I. Public Reporting
    1. Public Disclosure of the Issuer's Payment Information, 
Including the Company Name
    2. Public Compilation
    J. Exemptions From Compliance
    1. Exemption for Conflicts of Law
    2. Exemption for Conflicts With Pre-Existing Contracts
    3. Exemption for Smaller Reporting Companies and Emerging Growth 
Companies
    4. Targeted Exemption for Payments Related to Exploratory 
Activities
    5. Transitional Relief for Recently Acquired Companies
    6. Transitional Relief for Initial Public Offerings
    7. Case-by-Case Exemption
    K. Exhibits and Interactive Data Format Requirements
    L. Alternative Reporting
    M. Treatment for Purposes of the Exchange Act and Securities Act
    N. Compliance Date
    O. General Request for Comment
III. Economic Analysis
    A. Introduction and Baseline
    B. Potential Benefits Resulting From the Payment Reporting 
Requirement
    C. Potential Costs Resulting From the Payment Reporting 
Requirement
    D. Discussion of Discretionary Choices
    1. Definition of ``Project''
    2. Exemptions From Disclosure
    3. Annual Report Requirement
    4. Public Availability of Data
    5. Alternative Reporting
    6. Definition of ``Control''
    7. Definition of ``Commercial Development of Oil, Natural Gas, 
or Minerals''
    8. Types of Payments
    9. Definition of ``Not De Minimis''
    10. Exhibit and Interactive Data Requirement
    11. Quantitative Estimates of Costs Resulting From the Proposed 
Rulemaking

[[Page 2523]]

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Background
    B. Estimate of Issuers
    C. Estimate of Issuer Burdens
    D. Request for Comment
V. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
VII. Statutory Authority and Text of Proposed Rule and Form 
Amendments

I. Background

A. Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act

    Section 13(q) was added to the Exchange Act in 2010 by Section 1504 
of the Dodd-Frank Act.\3\ It directs the Commission to issue final 
rules that require each resource extraction issuer to include in an 
annual report information relating to any payment made by the resource 
extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the resource extraction issuer, or 
an entity under the control of the resource extraction issuer to a 
foreign government or the Federal Government for the purpose of the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. The 
information must include: (i) The type and total amount of such 
payments made for each project of the resource extraction issuer 
relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals, and (ii) the type and total amount of such payments made to 
each government.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Public Law 111-203 (July 21, 2010).
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(A). As discussed further below, Section 
13(q) also specifies that the Commission's rules must require 
certain information to be provided in an interactive data format.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 22, 2012, the Commission adopted Rule 13q-1 and 
amendments to Form SD (the ``2012 Rules'') as mandated by Section 13(q) 
of the Exchange Act.\5\ The 2012 Rules were vacated by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia on July 2, 2013.\6\ On June 
27, 2016, the Commission adopted a revised version of Rule 13q-1 and 
amendments to Form SD (the ``2016 Rules'') that addressed the concerns 
raised in the prior litigation.\7\ On February 14, 2017, the 2016 Rules 
were disapproved by a joint resolution \8\ of Congress pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act (the ``CRA'').\9\ We are proposing a new Rule 
13q-1 and amendments to Form SD to implement Section 13(q).\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See Release No. 34-67717 (Aug. 22, 2012) [77 FR 56365 (Sept. 
12, 2012)] (the ``2012 Rules Adopting Release'') available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67717.pdf. See also Release No. 34-
63549 (Dec. 15, 2010) [75 FR 80978 (Dec. 23, 2010)] (the ``2012 
Rules Proposing Release'') available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63549.pdf.
    \6\ See API v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. July 2, 2013). The 
District Court based its decision on two findings: First, that the 
Commission misread Section 13(q) to compel the public disclosure of 
the issuers' reports; and second, the Commission's explanation for 
not granting an exemption for when disclosure is prohibited by 
foreign governments was arbitrary and capricious. See 953 F. Supp. 
2d at 17-19 and 21-23.
    \7\ See Release No. 34-78167 (June 27, 2016) [81 FR 49359 (July 
27, 2016)] available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78167.pdf (the ``2016 Rules Adopting Release''). See also Release 
No. 34-76620 (Dec. 11, 2015) [80 FR 80057 (Dec. 23, 2015)] available 
at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-76620.pdf (the ``2016 
Rules Proposing Release''). Unless otherwise indicated, comment 
letters referenced in this release were submitted in connection with 
the 2016 Rules.
    \8\ See H.R.J. Res. 41, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
    \9\ 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
    \10\ Although the joint resolution vacated the 2016 Rules, the 
statutory mandate under Section 13(q) remains in effect. We discuss 
the CRA's requirements for subsequent rulemaking in connection with 
disapproved rules in Section I.C.2. below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 13(q) defines several key terms:
     ``Resource extraction issuer'' means an issuer that is 
required to file an annual report with the Commission and engages in 
the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals; \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     ``Commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals'' includes exploration, extraction, processing, export, and 
other significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or 
the acquisition of a license for any such activity, as determined by 
the Commission; \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     ``Foreign government'' means a foreign government, a 
department, agency or instrumentality of a foreign government, or a 
company owned by a foreign government, as determined by the Commission; 
\13\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     ``Payment'' means a payment that:
    [cir] Is made to further the commercial development of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals;
    [cir] Is not de minimis; and
    [cir] Includes taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees), 
production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits, that the 
Commission, consistent with the guidelines of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (the ``EITI'') \14\ (to the extent 
practicable), determines are part of the commonly recognized revenue 
stream for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ The EITI is a voluntary coalition of oil, natural gas, and 
mining companies, foreign governments, investor groups, and other 
international organizations committed to establishing a global 
standard (the ``EITI Standard'') for the good governance of oil, 
gas, and mineral resources. The coalition was formed with industry 
participation and describes itself as being dedicated to fostering 
and improving transparency and accountability in resource-rich 
countries through the publication and verification of company 
payments and government revenues from oil, natural gas, and mining. 
See Implementing EITI for Impact--A Handbook for Policymakers and 
Stakeholders (2012) (``EITI Handbook''), at xii. After volunteering 
to become an EITI candidate, a country must implement a series of 
requirements set forth in the EITI Standard and complete an EITI 
validation process to become a compliant member. Although the United 
States became an EITI candidate country in March 2014, it withdrew 
its EITI candidacy in November 2017. See infra Section II.B.
    \15\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 13(q) specifies that ``[t]o the extent practicable, the 
rules . . . . shall support the commitment of the Federal Government to 
international transparency promotion efforts relating to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.'' \16\ Although the 
statutory definition of ``payment'' explicitly refers to the EITI, the 
provision in Section 13(q) about supporting the Federal Government's 
commitment to international transparency promotion efforts does not 
mention the EITI.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(E).
    \17\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to Section 13(q), the rules must require a resource 
extraction issuer to submit the payment information included in an 
annual report in an interactive data format \18\ using an interactive 
data standard established by the Commission.\19\ Section 13(q) defines 
``interactive data format'' to mean an electronic data format in which 
pieces of information are identified using an interactive data 
standard.\20\ It also defines ``interactive data standard'' as a 
standardized list of electronic tags that mark information included in 
the annual report of a resource extraction issuer.\21\ Section 13(q) 
also requires that the rules include electronic tags that identify, for 
any payments made by a resource extraction issuer to a foreign 
government or the Federal Government:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(C).
    \19\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(D).
    \20\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(E).
    \21\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The total amounts of the payments, by category;
     The currency used to make the payments;
     The financial period in which the payments were made;
     The business segment of the resource extraction issuer 
that made the payments;
     The government that received the payments and the country 
in which the government is located; and
     The project of the resource extraction issuer to which the 
payments relate.\22\
    Section 13(q) further authorizes the Commission to require 
additional

[[Page 2524]]

electronic tags that it determines are necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(D)(ii).
    \23\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, Section 13(q) requires, to the extent practicable, 
that the Commission make publicly available online a compilation of the 
information required to be submitted by resource extraction issuers 
under the rules.\24\ The statute does not define the term compilation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, Section 13(q) provides that the final rules ``shall take 
effect on the date on which the resource extraction issuer is required 
to submit an annual report relating to the fiscal year . . . that ends 
not earlier than one year after the date on which the Commission issues 
final rules . . .'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress enacted Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act to increase the 
transparency of payments made by oil, natural gas, and mining companies 
to governments for the purpose of the commercial development of their 
oil, natural gas, and minerals. According to Senator Richard Lugar, who 
co-sponsored the amendment that was the basis for this statutory 
provision, a goal of requiring transparency was to provide more 
information to the global commodity markets and ``help empower citizens 
to hold their governments to account for the decisions made by their 
governments in the management of valuable oil, gas, and mineral 
resources and revenues.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See 156 Cong. Rec. S3816 (daily ed. May 17, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. International Transparency Promotion Efforts

    In 2013, the European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
(``EU'') adopted two directives that include payment disclosure 
rules.\27\ The EU Accounting Directive and the EU Transparency 
Directive (the ``EU Directives'') are very similar in content. Both 
determine the applicability and scope of the disclosure requirements 
and set the baseline in each EU member state and European Economic Area 
(``EEA'') \28\ country for annual disclosure requirements for oil, gas, 
mining, and logging companies concerning the payments made to 
governments on a per country and per project basis.\29\ All EU member 
states have implemented both of the EU Directives.\30\ Norway has also 
adopted regulations similar to the EU Directives.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, 
consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain 
types of undertakings (``EU Accounting Directive''); and Directive 
2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the harmonization of transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 
2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public 
or admitted to trading and Directive 2007/14/EC on the 
implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC (``EU 
Transparency Directive'').
    \28\ See European Commission Memo (June 12, 2013) (``New 
disclosure requirements for the extractive industry and loggers of 
primary forests in the Accounting (and Transparency) Directives 
(Country by Country Reporting)--frequently asked questions''). The 
EEA is composed of the EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
and Norway.
    \29\ The EU Accounting Directive regulates disclosure of 
financial information by all ``large'' companies incorporated under 
the laws of an EU member state or those of an EEA country, even if 
the company is privately held, and requires covered oil, gas, 
mining, and logging companies to disclose specified payments to 
governments. See Article 3(4) of the EU Accounting Directive, which 
defines ``large undertakings'' (i.e., large companies) to mean those 
which on their balance sheet dates exceed at least two of the three 
following criteria: (a) Balance sheet totaling [euro]20 million; (b) 
net turnover of [euro]40 million; and (c) average number of 
employees of 250. The EU Transparency Directive applies these 
disclosure requirements to all companies listed on EU-regulated 
markets even if they are not registered in the EEA or are 
incorporated in other countries. See EU Transparency Directive, Art. 
2(1)(d) and Art. 6.
    \30\ Resource extraction issuers commenced filing reports under 
the EU Directives for 2015 and have since annually filed such 
reports. According to the National Resource Governance Institute 
(``NRGI''), approximately 90 U.K.-reporting companies have entered 
their fourth annual round of public payments to governments 
disclosures in 2019. See NRGI, U.K. Financial Regulator Confirms 
Extractive Companies Must Name Government Entities to Which They 
Make Payments (April 25, 2019), available at https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/uk-financial-regulator-confirms-extractive-companies-must-name-govts-they-pay; see also BHP 
Billiton's Economic Contribution Report 2018, available at https://www.bhp.com/investor-centre/-/media/documents/investors/annual-reports/2018/bhpeconomiccontributionreport2018.pdf; BP p.l.c.'s 
Report on Payments to Governments for the year ended December 31, 
2018, available at https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/sustainability/group-reports/bp-report-on-payments-to-governments-2018.pdf; and Royal Dutch Shell's Payments 
to Governments Report for the Year 2017, available at https://www.shell.com/sustainability/transparency/payments-to-governments/_jcr_content/par/textimage.stream/1554163266774/0354390d1d06f4fe154700810bc50102817feb82/royal-dutch-shell-the-payments-to-governments-report-for-the-year-2018.pdf.
    \31\ See PWYP-Norway, Norwegian Regulations concerning country-
by-country reporting (Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://www.publishwhatyoupay.no/en/node/16414, which provides an English 
translation of the Norwegian source document, Forskrift om land-for-
land rapportering (Dec. 20, 2013), available at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/forskrift-om-land-for-land-rapportering/id748525/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Canada adopted a Federal resource extraction disclosure law, the 
Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act (``ESTMA''), which went 
into effect on June 1, 2015.\32\ In March 2016, Canada finalized its 
ESTMA Guidance \33\ and the ESTMA Technical Reporting Specifications 
(``ESTMA Specifications''), which provide guidelines for complying with 
the ESTMA disclosure regime.\34\ ESTMA covers entities that are engaged 
in the commercial development of oil, gas, or minerals or that control 
another entity that is engaged in those activities, subject to certain 
limitations.\35\ Public reporting under ESTMA was required for fiscal 
years beginning after June 1, 2015.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See ESTMA, 2014 S.C., ch. 39, s. 376 (Can.).
    \33\ ESTMA Guidance available at https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/mining-materials/PDF/ESTMA%E2%80%93Guidance.pdf.
    \34\ ESTMA Specifications available at https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/mining-materials/PDF/ESTMA%E2%80%93TRS.pdf.
    \35\ ESTMA, Section 2. The reporting obligation applies to (a) 
an entity that is listed on a stock exchange in Canada; (b) an 
entity that has a place of business in Canada, does business in 
Canada or has assets in Canada and that, based on its consolidated 
financial statements, meets at least two of the following conditions 
for at least one of its two most recent financial years: (i) It has 
at least[thinsp]$20 million (CAD) in assets, (ii) it has generated 
at least[thinsp]$40 million (CAD) in revenue, (iii) it employs an 
average of at least 250 employees; and (c) any other prescribed 
entity. ESTMA, Section 8.
    \36\ Links to reports made under ESTMA can be found on Natural 
Resources Canada's website at https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/estma/18198.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 19, 2014, the United States became an EITI candidate 
country,\37\ following which the United States Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (the ``USEITI'') submitted reports for 2015 and 
2016. On November 2, 2017, the United States withdrew as an EITI 
implementing country.\38\ It has, however, maintained

[[Page 2525]]

its status as a supporting country of the EITI.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ When becoming an EITI candidate, a country must establish a 
multi-stakeholder group, including representatives of civil society, 
industry, and government, to oversee implementation of the EITI. The 
stakeholder group for a particular country agrees to the terms of 
that country's EITI plan, including the requirements for what 
information will be provided by the governments and by the companies 
operating in that country. Generally, under the EITI, companies and 
the host country's government submit payment information 
confidentially to an independent administrator selected by the 
country's multi-stakeholder group, which is frequently an 
independent auditor. The auditor reconciles the information provided 
to it by the government and by the companies and produces a report. 
While the information provided in the reports varies among 
countries, the reports must adhere to the EITI requirements provided 
in the EITI Standard. See the EITI's website at http://eiti.org.
    \38\ See letter from Gregory Gould, Director of the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue, U.S. Department of the Interior, to 
Fredrik Reinfeldt, Chair of the EITI (Nov. 2, 2017) (noting ``the 
fact that the U.S. laws prevent us from meeting specific provisions 
of the EITI Standard''). This letter is available at https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/eiti_withdraw.pdf.
    \39\ See id. The United States is currently one of 15 supporting 
countries of the EITI. Supporting governments are committed to 
promote good governance in the extractive industries across the 
world. Although the only formal requirement of a supporting country 
is to make a clear public endorsement, a country can also support 
the EITI through financial, technical, and political support at the 
international level and in implementing and other resource-rich 
countries. See https://eiti.org/supporters/countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. The 2016 Rulemaking and Congress's Actions Under the CRA

1. Key Aspects of the 2016 Rules
    The 2016 Rules provided for issuer-specific, public disclosure of 
payment information broadly in line with the standards adopted under 
other international transparency promotion regimes, including the EU 
Directives, ESTMA and the EITI. The 2016 Rules differed from the 2012 
Rules in certain key aspects. These aspects included:
     Defining project to mean ``operational activities governed 
by a single contract, license, lease, concession, or similar legal 
agreement, which forms the basis for payment liabilities with a 
government;'' \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See Item 2.01(d)(9) of the 2016 Form SD; see also the 2016 
Adopting Release, Section II.E.3. This definition also provided that 
``[a]greements that are both operationally and geographically 
interconnected may be treated by the resource extraction issuer as a 
single project.'' The 2012 Rules did not define the term ``project'' 
but provided guidance on the meaning of the term. See the 2012 
Adopting Release, Section II.D.3.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Adopting a targeted exemption to permit issuers to delay 
reporting payment information in connection with certain exploratory 
activities for one year; \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See the 2016 Form SD, Item 2.01(b)(1); see also the 2016 
Rules Adopting Release, Section II.I.3. The 2012 Rules did not 
provide for any exemptions, targeted or otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Revising the definition of ``control'' under the 2012 
Rules, which had relied on the definition of control under Exchange Act 
Rule 12b-2,\42\ by basing the definition instead on applicable 
accounting principles; \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See the 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.D.4.c.
    \43\ See the 2016 Form SD, Item 2.01(d)(3); see also 2016 Rules 
Adopting Release, Section II.D.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Adopting an alternative reporting mechanism whereby 
issuers would be able to meet the requirements of the 2016 Rules by 
providing disclosure that complies with a foreign jurisdiction's or the 
USEITI's resource extraction payment disclosure requirements if they 
are deemed ``substantially similar'' by the Commission; \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See the 2016 Form SD, Item 2.01(c); see also the 2016 Rules 
Adopting Release, Section II.J.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Adopting transitional relief for issuers that had recently 
acquired companies, where such companies had not previously been 
subject to the Section 13(q) rules or another ``substantially similar'' 
jurisdiction's requirements in its last full fiscal year; \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See the 2016 Form SD, Item 2.01(b)(2); see also the 2016 
Rules Adopting Release, Section II.G.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Expressly permitting the submission of requests for 
exemptive relief on a case-by-case basis; \46\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.I.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Including a provision requiring the Commission's staff, to 
the extent practicable, to periodically make available online a public 
compilation of the payment information required to be filed by issuers 
on Form SD.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See the 2016 Release, Section II.H.3. In the 2012 
rulemaking, the Commission did not affirmatively adopt such a 
provision after noting that, by providing an issuer's Form SD 
filings to the public through the searchable, online EDGAR system, 
users of the information would be able to produce their own up-to-
date compilations in real time. In the 2016 rulemaking, however, 
after reasserting this position, the Commission acknowledged that, 
as some commenters maintained, the statute could be read to require 
the Commission to periodically provide a public compilation separate 
from the individual compilations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other respects, the 2016 Rules were the same or similar to the 
2012 Rules. For example, under both sets of rules:
     There was no broad, rule-based exemption for situations 
where a foreign law or contract term prohibited the payment disclosure;
     A resource extraction issuer had to provide the payment 
information, including the issuer's identity, publicly on Form SD; \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.H.3. and 
the 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.F.1.c. Mindful of the 
2013 District Court decision, the Commission acknowledged that 
Section 13(q) provides the Commission with the discretion to require 
public disclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers or to 
permit confidential filings. The Commission, however, explained its 
continued belief that requiring public disclosure of each issuer's 
specific filings (including all the payment information) would best 
accomplish the purpose of the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Form SD was to be filed with, and not furnished to, the 
Commission, thereby making the payment disclosure subject to liability 
under Section 18 of the Exchange Act; \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.L.3. and 
the 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.F.3.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The definitions for ``foreign government'' and ``federal 
government'' were the same under both sets of rules; \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See the 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.F.3. and the 2012 
Adopting Release, Section II.E.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The definitions for ``payment'' \51\ and ``commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals'' \52\ were similar under 
both sets of rules; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ The 2012 Rules' definition of payments added payments for 
infrastructure improvements to the list of statutorily mandated 
payment types required to be disclosed. See the 2012 Rules Adopting 
Release, Section II.D.1.c. The 2016 Rules added to the 2012 Rules' 
list of required payment types community and social responsibility 
payments that are required by law or contract. The 2016 Rules also 
added an instruction clarifying the types of royalty payments 
required to be disclosed. See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, 
Section II.C.3.
    \52\ In the 2012 rulemaking, the Commission defined ``commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals'' to include certain 
statutorily mandated activities. It then provided guidance that the 
term ``commercial development'' applied only to activities directly 
related to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals, and was not intended to capture ancillary or preparatory 
activities. See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.C.3. In the 
2016 rulemaking, the Commission adopted the same definition of 
``commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals'' as in 
the earlier rulemaking while expanding upon and codifying the 
guidance regarding activities pertaining to ``processing'' and 
``export.'' See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Issuers had to electronically tag the payment information 
using the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (``XBRL'') electronic 
format.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.K.3. and 
the 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.F.2.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Congressional Disapproval Under the CRA
    On February 14, 2017, the President signed a joint resolution of 
Congress disapproving the 2016 Rules pursuant to the CRA. Members of 
the House and the Senate who supported the joint resolution expressed a 
number of concerns with the 2016 Rules. The principal concerns focused 
on the potential adverse economic effects of the rules. Specifically, 
members expressed the view that the 2016 Rules would impose undue 
compliance costs on companies,\54\ undermine job growth and burden the 
economy,\55\ and impose competitive harm to U.S. companies relative to 
foreign competition.\56\

[[Page 2526]]

Members also expressed concern that the rule extended beyond the SEC's 
core mission.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See, e.g., 163 Cong. Rec. H.848 (February 1, 2017) 
(Statement of Rep. Hensarling) (``The SEC has estimated that ongoing 
compliance costs for his rule could reach as high as $591 million 
annually . . . Furthermore, this rule still goes far beyond the 
statute passed by Congress and mandates public specialized 
disclosures that cost more and more, and is more burdensome than the 
law requires.'').
    \55\ See id. (Statement of Rep. Hensarling) (``That is $591 
million every year that could better be used to hire thousands more 
Americans in an industry where the average pay is 50 percent higher 
than the U.S. average. Literally we could be talking about 10,000 
jobs on the line for this ill-advised rule.'').
    \56\ See id. (Statement of Rep. Hensarling) (``The economic 
opportunities of . . . millions of Americans . . . are not helped by 
top-down, politically driven regulations that give many foreign 
companies an advantage over American public companies. That is 
exactly what this Securities and Exchange Commission regulation that 
we are talking about today does. It forces American public companies 
to disclose [expensive] proprietary information that can actually be 
obtained by their foreign competitors, including state-owned 
companies in China and Russia. This is just one regulation out of 
thousands and thousands that are burdening our companies, our job 
creators, and are costing our households by one estimate, over 
$14,000 a year . . .''); see also 163 Cong. Rec. H.851 (February 1, 
2017) (Statement of Rep. Wagner) (``This particular SEC regulation . 
. . regarding resource extraction disclosures will make it more 
expensive for our public companies that are involved with energy 
production to be competitive overseas with foreign state-owned 
companies.'').
    \57\ See, e.g., 163 Cong. Rec. H.850 (February 1, 2017) 
(Statement of Rep. Huizenga) (observing that the Congressional goals 
underlying Section 13(q) are outside of the SEC's ``core mission'' 
of ``protect[ing] investors,'' ``maintain[ing] fair, orderly and 
efficient markets,'' and ``facilitat[ing] capital formation'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some members who voted in favor of the disapproval nonetheless 
reiterated the rule's transparency and anti-corruption objectives. For 
instance, a group of senators who voted for the joint resolution 
expressed their ``strong support'' for anticorruption policies and 
stated that they were ``committed to efforts to encourage corporate 
transparency on these matters consistent with the international 
standards already adopted by European and other governments.'' \58\ 
They also indicated, however, that they voted in favor of disapproving 
the 2016 Rules in part due to their concern that those rules would 
place U.S. and other SEC-registered companies at a significant 
competitive disadvantage.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See Letter from Senator Bob Corker, Senator Susan Collins, 
Senator Marco Rubio, Senator Johnny Isakson, Senator Lindsey Graham, 
Senator Todd Young (Feb. 2, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/resource-extraction-issuers/resource-extraction-issuers.shtml.
    \59\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the joint resolution vacated the 2016 Rules, the statutory 
mandate under Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act remains in effect. As a 
result, the Commission is statutorily obligated to issue a new 
rule.\60\ Under the CRA, however, the Commission may not reissue the 
same rule in ``substantially the same form'' or issue a new rule that 
is ``substantially the same'' as the disapproved rule.\61\ The CRA does 
not define the phrase ``substantially the same,'' but the legislative 
history \62\ urges Congress to provide direction to agencies regarding 
the possibility of issuing a new rule when debating the resolution of 
disapproval.\63\ Given this legislative history, and the absence of 
further general guidance from the CRA or any specific legislative 
guidance from Congress addressing the form of a new rulemaking, we 
looked to the concerns raised by members of Congress during the floor 
debates on the joint resolution to assist us in developing a rule that 
is not ``substantially the same'' \64\ as the 2016 Rules.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ A number of members who supported the joint resolution 
noted that the Commission would be obligated to issue a new rule 
fulfilling the statutory mandate. See, e.g., 163 Cong. Rec. H.848, 
849 (February 1, 2017) (Statement of Rep. Hensarling) (``Let's also 
remember that this joint resolution does not repeal section 1504 of 
Dodd-Frank. I wish it did, but it doesn't . . . It simply tells the 
SEC to go back to the drawing board, comply with the Dodd-Frank Act, 
and come up with a better rule . . .''); 163 Cong. Rec. S.635 (Feb. 
2, 2017) (Statement of Sen. Crapo) (``What this resolution does is 
to cause the current SEC rule to not take effect. As it was 
characterized yesterday on the House floor and will be characterized 
further today on the Senate floor, what the SEC will need to do is 
to go back to the drawing board and come up with a better rule that 
complies with the law of the land.'').
    \61\ See 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2).
    \62\ The principal sponsors of the CRA submitted identical joint 
explanatory statements that were ``intended to provide guidance to 
the agencies, the courts, and other interested parties when 
interpreting the act's terms.'' See Joint Explanatory Statement of 
House and Senate Sponsors (Senators Nickles, Reid, and Stevens), 142 
Cong. Rec. S.3683 (April 18, 1996).
    \63\ 142 Cong. Rec. S.3686 (``The authors intend the debate on 
any resolution of disapproval to focus on the law that authorized 
the rule and make the congressional intent clear regarding the 
agency's options or lack thereof after enactment of a joint 
resolution of disapproval. It will be the agency's responsibility in 
the first instance when promulgating the rule to determine the range 
of discretion afforded under the original law and whether the law 
authorizes the agency to issue a substantially different rule. Then, 
the agency must give effect to the resolution of disapproval.'').
    \64\ See 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2).
    \65\ See supra n. 54-57. In this regard, we note that many of 
the concerns raised by members of Congress were raised by commenters 
in the previous rulemakings. See, e.g., Letters from the American 
Petroleum Institute (``API'') (Feb. 16, 2016); ExxonMobil 
Corporation (``ExxonMobil'') (Feb. 16, 2016); and Chevron 
Corporation (``Chevron'') (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    We welcome feedback and encourage interested parties to submit 
comments on any or all aspects of the proposed amendments. When 
commenting, it would be most helpful if you include the reasoning 
behind your position or recommendation.
    1. Are there any data since the 2016 Rules concerning actual costs 
of compliance with mandatory disclosure regimes that relate to or 
otherwise address the Congressional concerns about the potential 
adverse economic effects of the rules, and specifically, that the 2016 
Rules would impose undue compliance costs on companies? Should we 
consider, and if so how, the compliance cost data in the UK 
Government's Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
post-implementation review of the UK regulations,\66\ in determining 
how to address the stated Congressional concerns?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS), Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations: Final 
Report, BEIS Research Paper, Jan. 2018, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/3209/pdfs/uksiod_20143209_en_001.pdf. See infra Section III.D.11. for a 
related discussion of the UK report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Have there been any developments or changes in industry 
practices since the 2016 Rules related to how companies track and 
record payment information or how they capture the cost of compliance 
with mandatory disclosure regimes that could impact or otherwise 
address the stated Congressional concerns?

[[Page 2527]]

3. Proposed Rules in Response to the CRA Disapproval
    Similar to the prior rules, the proposed rules, which are described 
in more detail in Part II below, would require resource extraction 
issuers to submit on an annual basis a Form SD that includes 
information about payments related to the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals that are made to governments. Given the 
requirements of Section 13(q), certain elements of the proposed rules 
are also in the 2016 Rules.\67\ Nevertheless, we believe that the 
proposed rules, considered as a whole, are not in substantially the 
same form as the 2016 Rules and therefore in compliance with the CRA's 
restriction on subsequent rulemaking.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ For example, we are proposing the same targeted exemption 
for exploratory activities, the same transitional relief for 
recently acquired companies, and a similar alternative reporting 
mechanism, all of which were adopted in 2016 primarily to limit 
compliance costs. See supra Section I.C.1. We also are proposing the 
same definitions as adopted in 2016 for ``resource extraction 
issuer,'' ``commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals,'' ``payment,'' and ``foreign government.'' As further 
discussed below, most commenters who addressed those definitions in 
the 2016 rulemaking generally supported them.
    \68\ The CRA instructs that the ``new rule'' cannot be 
``substantially the same'' or in ``substantially the same form'' as 
the disapproved rule. See 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(1). We believe that this 
language clearly reflects Congress' intent that, in issuing a new 
rule, an agency must do more than substantially revise the 
rationales supporting the prior rule or the economic analysis 
underlying the prior rule. Rather, the CRA instructs that the ``new 
rule'' itself must be substantially different. As such, we do not 
believe that readopting the 2016 Rules with modifications only to 
the rationales or economic analysis in the release would satisfy the 
substantially different requirement mandated by the plain language 
of the CRA. Instead, we concur with the views of two scholars that 
the CRA requires changes to the rule itself. See Adam M. Finkel and 
Jason W. Sullivan, 63 Administrative Law Review 707, 757-58 (2011) 
(asserting that the view that ``anything goes so long as the agency 
merely asserts that external conditions have changed . . . would 
contravene all the plain language and explanatory material in the 
CRA. Even if the agency believes it now has better explanations for 
an identical reissued rule, the appearance of asking the same 
question until you get a different answer is offensive enough to 
bedrock good government principles that the regulation should be 
required to have different costs and benefits after a veto, not just 
new rhetoric about them.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this regard, the proposed new rules include several significant 
changes to the core provisions of the 2016 Rules. Specifically, the 
proposed rules would: (1) Revise the definition of the term ``project'' 
to require disclosure at the national and major subnational political 
jurisdiction, as opposed to the contract, level; \69\ (2) revise the 
definition of ``not de minimis'' to include both a project threshold 
and an individual payment threshold; \70\ (3) add two new conditional 
exemptions for situations in which a foreign law or a pre-existing 
contract prohibits the required disclosure; \71\ (4) add an exemption 
for smaller reporting companies and emerging growth companies; \72\ (5) 
revise the definition of ``control'' to exclude entities or operations 
in which an issuer has a proportionate interest; \73\ (6) limit the 
liability for the required disclosure by deeming the payment 
information to be furnished to, but not filed with, the Commission; 
\74\ (7) add an instruction in Form SD that would permit an issuer to 
aggregate payments by payment type made at a level below the major 
subnational government level; \75\ (8) add relief for issuers that have 
recently completed their U.S. initial public offerings; \76\ and (9) 
extend the deadline for furnishing the payment disclosures.\77\ These 
changes, which directly impact the amount, granularity, timing, scope 
of, and liability for, the required disclosures, form the basis for our 
belief that, when considered as a whole, the proposed rules are not in 
substantially the same form as the 2016 Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See infra Section II.F.
    \70\ See infra Section II.C.9.
    \71\ See infra Sections II.J.1. and II.J.2.
    \72\ See infra Sections II.J.3.
    \73\ See infra Section II.E.
    \74\ See infra Section II.M.
    \75\ See infra Section II.G.
    \76\ See infra Section II.J.5.
    \77\ See infra Section II.H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following chart summarizes the primary changes in the proposed 
rules compared to the 2016 Rules:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Issue                           2016 Rules (disapproved)                   Proposed rules
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Definition of ``project''............   Defined as operational activities   Defined using three
                                        governed by a single contract, license,     factors:
                                        lease, concession, or similar legal        (1) Type of resource;
                                        agreement, which forms the basis for       (2) type of operation; and
                                        payment liabilities with a government.     (3) major subnational
                                                                                    jurisdiction.
Aggregation of payments..............   No aggregation of payments beyond   Aggregation of
                                        contract level, except that payments        payments permitted at major
                                        related to operational activities           subnational jurisdiction
                                        governed by multiple legal agreements       level, which must be
                                        could be aggregated together as long as     identified;
                                        the multiple agreements were                Aggregation of
                                        operationally and geographically related.   payments permitted at levels
                                                                                    below major subnational
                                                                                    level, which may be
                                                                                    described generically (e.g.,
                                                                                    as county or municipality).
Definition of ``not de minimis''        Defined as a payment that equals    Defined as any
 payment.                               or exceeds $100,000.                        payment that equals or
                                                                                    exceeds $150,000 made in
                                                                                    connection with a project
                                                                                    that equals or exceeds
                                                                                    $750,000 in total payments.
Exemptions from compliance based on     No exemptions for conflicts with    Conditional
 conflicts with foreign laws or         foreign laws or contract terms.             exemptions for foreign law
 contract terms.                        Case-by-case exemptive process      conflicts and pre-existing
                                        established.                                (pre-adoption) contract
                                                                                    terms that prohibit
                                                                                    disclosure.
Exemption for smaller reporting         No exemption for smaller            Exemption for
 companies or emerging growth           reporting companies or emerging growth      smaller reporting companies
 companies.                             companies.                                  and emerging growth
                                                                                    companies.
Definition of ``control''............   Based on established financial      Similar to approach
                                        reporting principles: Issuer has control    under 2016 Rules, except
                                        over an entity when it is required under    that an issuer is not
                                        GAAP or IFRS to consolidate or              required to disclose
                                        proportionately consolidate the financial   payments made by entities
                                        results of that entity.                     that it only proportionately
                                                                                    consolidates.
Filed vs. Furnished--Application of     Reports required to be filed;       Reports are
 Exchange Act Section 18 liability.     Potential Section 18 liability.     furnished;
                                                                                    No Section 18
                                                                                    liability.

[[Page 2528]]

 
Relief for Initial Public Offerings     No relief for IPOs.                 Transitional relief
 (IPOs).                                                                            for IPOs;
                                                                                    Issuer would not
                                                                                    have to comply with the
                                                                                    Section 13(q) rules until
                                                                                    the first fiscal year
                                                                                    following the fiscal year in
                                                                                    which it completed its
                                                                                    initial public offering.
Deadline for Furnishing Payment         For all issuers, no later than      For issuers with
 Disclosures.                           150 days after the end of the issuer's      fiscal years ending on or
                                        most recent fiscal year.                    before June 30, no later
                                                                                    than March 31 in the
                                                                                    following calendar year;
                                                                                    For issuers with
                                                                                    fiscal years ending after
                                                                                    June 30, no later than March
                                                                                    31 in the second calendar
                                                                                    year following their most
                                                                                    recent fiscal year.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In proposing these provisions and other aspects of this rulemaking, 
we have striven to achieve an appropriate balance between implementing 
the statute as required by Congress and addressing the concerns 
expressed by commenters and members of Congress.\78\ Specifically, we 
expect that the proposal would meaningfully reduce the compliance 
burden for issuers compared to the compliance burden estimated for the 
2016 Rules, for example, by permitting greater aggregation of payments 
at the major subnational level and at lower government levels. We also 
believe that, for the same reason, the proposal would address the 
concerns about potential competitive harm that the 2016 Rules would 
have caused as a result of the public disclosure of contract level 
payment information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ As noted above, the estimated cost of compliance of the 
2016 Rules and the potential for competitive harm were specifically 
noted by the members of Congress who voted to disapprove the rules. 
See, e.g., 163 Cong. Rec. H.848 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement 
of Rep. Hensarling); 163 Cong. Rec. at H.852 (statement of Rep. 
Barr).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, we have not provided for the confidential 
submission of payment information, as suggested by some commenters.\79\ 
In addition, we have not provided for the release of information only 
through an anonymized, aggregated compilation produced by the 
Commission, as suggested by some commenters.\80\ As explained below, we 
believe that public disclosure of company-specific, project-level 
payment information provides an appropriate balance between the stated 
concerns with the 2016 Rules and the mandate of Section 13(q) to 
increase transparency of payments to governments in resource-rich 
nations.\81\ However, we are requesting comment on an alternative 
approach that would allow for confidential filing and would release 
information only through an anonymized, aggregated compilation.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See, e.g., Letters from API (Nov. 7, 2013) (submitted prior 
to the 2016 Proposing Release) and (Feb. 16, 2016); Letter from 
Chevron (Feb. 16, 2016); and Letter from Royal Dutch Shell plc 
(``RDS'') (Feb. 5, 2016).
    \80\ See id.
    \81\ See infra Sections II.F. and II.I.
    \82\ See infra Section II.I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Proposed Rules Under Section 13(q)

A. Definition of ``Resource Extraction Issuer''

    Section 13(q) defines a resource extraction issuer in part as an 
issuer that is ``required to file an annual report with the 
Commission.'' We believe this language could reasonably be read to 
include or to exclude issuers that file annual reports on forms other 
than Forms 10-K, 20-F, or 40-F. We are therefore using our discretion 
and proposing to cover only issuers filing annual reports on Forms 10-
K, 20-F, or 40-F. Specifically, the proposed rules would define the 
term ``resource extraction issuer'' to mean an issuer that is required 
to file with the Commission an annual report on one of those forms 
pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and that engages in 
the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.\83\ As 
with the 2016 Rules, we believe that covering issuers that provide 
disclosure outside of the Exchange Act reporting framework would do 
little to further the transparency objectives of Section 13(q) but 
would add costs and burdens to the existing disclosure regime governing 
those categories of issuers. The proposed definition would therefore 
exclude issuers subject to Tier 2 reporting obligations under 
Regulation A and issuers filing annual reports pursuant to Regulation 
Crowdfunding.\84\ In addition, investment companies registered under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (``Investment Company Act'') would 
not be subject to the proposed rules.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(a) and proposed Item 2.01(d)(11) of 
Form SD. We interpret ``engages'' as used in Section 13(q) and 
proposed Rule 13q-1 to include indirectly engaging in the specified 
commercial development activities through an entity under a 
company's control. See infra Section II.E. for our discussion of 
``control.''
    \84\ In prior releases, the Commission noted that, in the 
staff's experience, resource extraction issuers rarely use 
Regulation A. This continues to be the case. Between June 2015 
through September 2017, only one of the Regulation A issuers with a 
qualified offering statement appears to have been a resource 
extraction issuer at the time of filing based on a review of 
assigned Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Similarly, 
between May 2016 and December 2016, only one of the Regulation 
Crowdfunding issuers appears to have been a resource extraction 
issuer.
    \85\ It seems unlikely that an entity that fits within the 
definition of ``investment company'' would be one that is 
``engag[ing] in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals.'' See Section 3(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act (15 
U.S.C. 80a-3(a)(1)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Almost all of the commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release 
supported a definition similar to the one we are proposing today \86\ 
Consistent with the 2016 Rules, we are not proposing exemptions to our 
definition of ``resource extraction issuer'' based on foreign private 
issuer status \87\ or the extent of business operations constituting 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.A.2.
    \87\ See the definition of ``foreign private issuer'' in 
Securities Act Rule 405 [17 CFR 230.405] and Exchange Act Rule 3b-4 
[17 CFR 240.3b-4]. We are, however, proposing to exclude from the 
proposed rules foreign private issuers that are exempt from Exchange 
Act registration and reporting obligations pursuant to Exchange Act 
Rule 12g3-2(b) (17 CFR 240.12g3-2(b). As discussed in prior 
releases, we believe that expanding the statutory definition of 
``resource extraction issuer'' to include foreign private issuers 
that are relying on Rule 12g3-2(b) would discourage reliance on the 
exemption and would be inconsistent with the effect and purpose of 
that rule. See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.A.3; and 
the 2016 Rules Proposing Release, Section II.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are, however, proposing to exempt smaller reporting companies 
\88\ and emerging growth companies \89\ from the

[[Page 2529]]

scope of Rule 13q-1. As explained below,\90\ we believe that this 
proposed change from the 2016 Rules would reduce the overall cost of 
the proposed rules \91\ and address the related Congressional 
concerns.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See the definition of smaller reporting company in 
Securities Act Rule 405 (17 CFR 230.405) and Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 
(17 CFR 240.12b-2).
    \89\ See the definition of emerging growth company in Securities 
Act Rule 405 and Exchange Act Rule 12b-2; see also Securities Act 
Section 2(a)(19) (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(19)) and Exchange Act Section 
3(a)(80) (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(80)).
    \90\ See infra Section II.J.3.
    \91\ We solicit comment on our proposed exemption for smaller 
reporting companies and emerging growth companies in Section II.J.3. 
below.
    \92\ See supra n. 54 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    3. Should we define ``resource extraction issuer'' to mean an 
issuer that is required to file with the Commission an annual report on 
Form 10-K, Form 20-F, or Form 40-F pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of 
the Exchange Act and that engages in the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals, as proposed? Should we alter our approach to 
the definition of ``resource extraction issuer'' based on any 
developments since the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our 
other proposals in this release?
    4. Should we exclude other categories of issuers, such as foreign 
private issuers, from the definition of ``resource extraction issuer''?

B. Definition of ``Commercial Development of Oil, Natural Gas, or 
Minerals''

    Consistent with the statutory definition, the proposed rules would 
define ``commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals'' as 
exploration, extraction, processing, and export of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity.\93\ 
Although we have discretionary authority to include other significant 
activities relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals,\94\ we are not 
proposing to expand the list of covered activities beyond the explicit 
terms of Section 13(q). We adopted the same approach when defining 
``commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals'' in the 2016 
rulemaking, and most commenters that addressed this aspect of the prior 
rules supported this approach.\95\ As was the case with the 2016 Rules, 
we have not sought to impose disclosure obligations that extend beyond 
Congress' required disclosures in Section 13(q) and the disclosure 
standards developed in connection with international transparency 
promotion efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals. This approach should limit the compliance 
costs of the Section 13(q) rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ See 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(A).
    \94\ See id.
    \95\ See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.B.2.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed definition of ``commercial development'' would capture 
only those activities that are directly related to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, and not activities 
ancillary or preparatory to such commercial development. Accordingly, a 
company that is only providing products or services that support the 
exploration, extraction, processing, or export of such resources would 
not be a ``resource extraction issuer'' under the proposed rules.\96\ 
For example, a company that manufactures drill bits or provides 
hardware to help companies explore and extract would not be considered 
a resource extraction issuer. Similarly, a company engaged by an 
operator to provide hydraulic fracturing or drilling services, to 
enable the operator to extract resources, would not be a resource 
extraction issuer.\97\ We believe this approach is consistent with 
Section 13(q) and the approach adopted in the 2016 rulemaking, which 
most commenters who addressed the issue supported.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ Marketing activities would also not be included. Section 
13(q) does not include marketing in the list of activities covered 
by the definition of ``commercial development.'' In addition, 
including marketing activities within the final rules under Section 
13(q) would go beyond what is covered by the EITI and other 
international regimes. See, e.g., the EITI Handbook, at 35. For 
similar reasons, the definition of ``commercial development'' does 
not include activities relating to security support. See 2012 Rules 
Adopting Release at n.146 and Section II.D. for a related discussion 
of payments for security support.
    \97\ A resource extraction issuer would be required, under the 
proposed rules, to disclose payments when such a service provider 
makes a payment to a government on its behalf that meets the 
definition of ``payment.'' See proposed Instruction 7 to Item 2.01 
of Form SD. We discuss the definition of ``payment'' in Section II.C 
below.
    \98\ See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.B.2.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the past, commenters have requested clarification of the 
activities covered by the definition of ``commercial development.'' 
\99\ We discuss our proposals to define or provide guidance on several 
terms contained within the definition in the subsections that follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.B.2; 2012 Rules 
Adopting Release, Section II.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    5. Should we define ``commercial development of oil, natural gas, 
or minerals'' using the list of activities described in the statute, as 
proposed? Should we alter our approach based on any developments since 
the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in 
this release?
1. ``Extraction'' and ``Processing''
    As proposed, and consistent with the definitions adopted in the 
2016 rulemaking,\100\ ``extraction'' would be defined as the production 
of oil and natural gas as well as the extraction of minerals.\101\ 
``Processing'' would include, but would not be limited to, midstream 
activities such as removing liquid hydrocarbons from gas, removing 
impurities from natural gas prior to its transport through a pipeline 
and the upgrading of bitumen and heavy oil, through the earlier of the 
point at which oil, gas, or gas liquids (natural or synthetic) are 
either sold to an unrelated third party or delivered to a main 
pipeline, a common carrier, or a marine terminal. ``Processing'' would 
also include the crushing or preparing of raw ore prior to the smelting 
or refining phase.\102\ ``Processing'' would not include downstream 
activities, such as refining or smelting. As noted above,\103\ the 
focus of Section 13(q) is on transparency in connection with the 
payments that resource extraction issuers make to governments. Those 
payments are primarily generated by ``upstream'' activities like 
exploration and extraction and not in connection with refining or 
smelting.\104\ Accordingly, we do not believe that, for purposes of the 
proposed rules, the term ``processing'' should cover downstream 
activities. We also note that including refining or smelting within the 
rules

[[Page 2530]]

under Section 13(q) would go beyond what is contemplated by the 
statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ Several commenters specifically supported the definitions 
of ``extraction'' and ``processing'' proposed in the 2016 rulemaking 
while other commenters sought additional guidance regarding the 
types of activities covered by the term ``processing.'' See 2016 
Rules Adopting Release, Section II.B.3.
    \101\ See proposed Item 2.01(d)(5) of Form SD.
    \102\ See proposed Instruction 8 to Item 2.01 of Form SD. 
Although substantively the same as the instruction found in the 2016 
Rules, we are proposing revisions for additional clarity.
    \103\ See supra Section I.A.
    \104\ We also note that, in other contexts, Congress has treated 
midstream activities like ``processing'' and downstream activities 
like ``refining'' as separate activities, which further supports our 
view that Congress did not intend to include ``refining'' and 
``smelting'' as ``processing'' activities. For example, the Sudan 
Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 (``SADA''), which also 
relates to resource extraction activities, specifically includes 
``processing'' and ``refining'' as two distinct activities in its 
list of ``mineral extraction activities'' and ``oil-related 
activities . . .'' See 110 Public Law 174 (2007). Similarly, the 
Commission's oil and gas disclosure rules exclude refining and 
processing from the definition of ``oil and gas producing 
activities'' (other than field processing of gas to extract liquid 
hydrocarbons by the company and the upgrading of natural resources 
extracted by the company other than oil or gas into synthetic oil or 
gas). See Rule 4-10(a)(16)(ii) of Regulation S-X [17 CFR 210.4-
10(a)(16)(ii)] and the 2012 Rules Adopting Release, n.108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    6. Should we define ``extraction'' as the production of oil and 
natural gas as well as the extraction of minerals, as proposed?
    7. Are the types of activities covered by the term ``processing'' 
appropriate?
    8. Should we alter our approach to the definition of ``extraction'' 
or the instruction on ``processing'' based on any developments since 
the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in 
this release?
2. ``Export''
    The proposed definition of ``commercial development of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals'' would not cover transportation made for a purpose 
other than export. Instead, ``export'' would be defined as the 
transportation of a resource from its country of origin to another 
country by an issuer with an ownership interest in the resource, with 
certain exceptions described below.\105\ This definition would reflect 
the significance of the relationship between upstream activities, such 
as exploration and extraction, and the categories of payments to 
governments identified in the statute. In contrast, we do not believe 
that Section 13(q) was intended to capture payments related to 
transportation on a fee-for-service basis across an international 
border by a service provider with no ownership interest in the 
resource.\106\ Nor do we believe that ``export'' was intended to 
capture activities with little relationship to upstream or midstream 
activities, such as commodity trading-related activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See proposed Item 2.01(d)(4) of Form SD.
    \106\ It is noteworthy that Section 13(q) includes export, but 
not transportation, in the list of covered activities. In contrast, 
SADA specifically includes ``transporting'' in the definition of 
``oil and gas activities'' and ``mineral extraction activities.'' 
The inclusion of ``transporting'' in SADA, in contrast to the 
language of Section 13(q), suggests that the term export means 
something different than transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the proposed definition of ``export'' would not cover 
the movement of a resource across an international border by a company 
that (a) is not engaged in the exploration, extraction, or processing 
of oil, natural gas, or minerals and (b) acquired its ownership 
interest in the resource directly or indirectly from a foreign 
government or the Federal Government.\107\ The definition would cover, 
however, the purchase of such government-owned resources by a company 
otherwise engaged in resource extraction due to the stronger nexus 
between the movement of the resource across an international border and 
the upstream development activities. This nexus would be particularly 
strong in instances where the company is repurchasing government 
production entitlements that were originally extracted by that 
issuer.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ See proposed Item 2.01(d)(4) of Form SD.
    \108\ See infra Section II.C.6 (discussing when and how payments 
must be reported in instances where an issuer is repurchasing 
government production entitlements that were originally extracted by 
that issuer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed definition of export is consistent with the approach 
regarding ``export'' adopted by the Commission in the 2016 rulemaking. 
The Commission articulated this approach in specific response to one 
commenter who sought additional guidance on the scope of the term 
``export'' under the Section 13(q) rules.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See Letter from Pietro Poretti (Feb. 15, 2016). Except for 
this commenter, the Commission's proposed definition of ``export'' 
was largely unaddressed by commenters in the 2016 rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    9. Should we adopt the definition of ``export,'' as proposed? If we 
should provide a different definition, what should it be? Should we 
alter our approach based on any developments since the adoption of the 
2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in this release?
3. ``Minerals''
    The proposed rules would include an instruction on the meaning of 
the term ``minerals'' but would not provide a defined term. We believe 
that the term is commonly understood and includes, at a minimum, any 
material for which an issuer with mining operations would provide 
disclosure under the Commission's existing disclosure requirements for 
mining properties.\110\ In support of this approach, which is 
consistent with the Commission's approach in the 2016 rulemaking, we 
note that no industry commenter suggested that we define the term in 
connection with the 2016 Rules.\111\ We also believe that a flexible 
approach to this term would preserve consistency between the term's use 
under Rule 13q-1 and its use in our other disclosure requirements and 
policies.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ The Commission recently revised its disclosure 
requirements for mining properties to provide investors with a more 
comprehensive understanding of a registrant's mining properties and 
to align those disclosure requirements and policies more closely 
with current industry and global regulatory practices and standards. 
See Release No. 33-10570 (October 31, 2018) [83 FR 66344 (December 
26, 2018)]. The new mining property disclosure rules, which are 
codified in subpart 1300 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.1300), will 
replace the mining property disclosure guidance in Industry Guide 7 
[17 CFR 229.801(g) and 802(g)] and requirements in Item 102 of 
Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.102). Registrants engaged in mining 
operations must comply with the new rules for the first fiscal year 
beginning on or after January 1, 2021. Industry Guide 7 will remain 
effective until all registrants are required to comply with the 
final rules, at which time Industry Guide 7 will be rescinded. See 
Release No. 33-10570, Section I.
    \111\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, n.149 and accompanying 
text.
    \112\ For example, new subpart 1300 of Regulation S-K defines 
``mineral resource'' to mean a concentration or occurrence of 
material of economic interest in or on the Earth's crust in such 
form, grade or quality, and quantity that there are reasonable 
prospects for economic extraction. ``Material of economic interest'' 
is then defined to include ``mineralization, including dumps and 
tailings, mineral brines, and other resources extracted on or within 
the earth's crust'' while excluding oil and gas resources resulting 
from oil and gas producing activities, gases (e.g., helium and 
carbon dioxide), geothermal fields, and water. See 17 CFR 229.1300. 
Industry Guide 7 similarly does not explicitly define the term 
``minerals,'' but does provide a definition of, and guidance 
regarding the disclosure of, ``reserves,'' which includes references 
to ``minerals'' and ``mineralization.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed instruction to Form SD would refer issuers to the use 
of the term ``minerals'' in our other disclosure rules.\113\ As such, 
the guidance would encompass any changes to that term that may be 
reflected in our disclosure requirements for mining registrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See proposed Instruction 13 to Item 2.01 of Form SD. The 
Commission's staff has previously provided similar guidance. See 
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers FAQ 3 (May 30, 
2013) available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/resourceextraction-faq.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    10. Should we adopt the instruction on the meaning of the term 
``mineral,'' as proposed? Is the proposed instruction sufficiently 
clear for issuers to identify when they are engaged in the commercial 
development of a mineral?
    11. Have there been developments since the 2016 Rules that should 
lead us to provide a defined term for ``mineral'' or different 
guidance? If so, what should be the definition or guidance?

C. Definition of ``Payment''

    Section 13(q) defines ``payment'' to mean a payment that:
     Is made to further the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals;
     Is not de minimis; and
     Includes taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees), 
production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits, that the 
Commission, consistent with the EITI's guidelines (to the extent 
practicable), determines are part of the commonly recognized revenue 
stream for the commercial

[[Page 2531]]

development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules would define payments to 
include the specific types of payments identified in the statute, as 
well as community and social responsibility (``CSR'') payments that are 
required by law or contract, payments of certain dividends, and 
payments for infrastructure. The proposed rules would also provide 
additional guidance on the statutory payment categories of royalties, 
fees, and bonuses. Finally, the proposed rules would address in-kind 
payments.
    In addition to the types of payments expressly included in the 
definition of ``payment'' in the statute, Section 13(q) provides that 
the Commission include within the definition ``other material 
benefits'' that it determines are ``part of the commonly recognized 
revenue stream for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals.'' \115\ According to Section 13(q), these ``other material 
benefits'' must be consistent with the EITI's guidelines ``to the 
extent practicable.'' \116\ Some commenters on the 2012 Rules Proposing 
Release suggested that we include a broad, non-exhaustive list of 
payment types or category of ``other material benefits.'' \117\ 
Commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release, however, did not make a 
similar suggestion. We continue to believe that Section 13(q) directs 
us to make an affirmative determination that the other ``material 
benefits'' are part of the commonly recognized revenue stream. 
Accordingly, the other material benefits specified in the proposed 
rules would be limited to CSR payments required by law or contract, 
dividends, and infrastructure payments. As was the case with the 2016 
Rules, and as discussed in more detail below, we have determined that 
these payment types represent material benefits that are part of the 
commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, and minerals and that otherwise meet the definition 
of payment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(C)(ii).
    \116\ Id.
    \117\ See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, n.175 and accompanying 
text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Taxes
    Consistent with Section 13(q), the proposed rules would require a 
resource extraction issuer to disclose tax payments. The proposed rules 
also include an instruction to clarify that a resource extraction 
issuer would be required to disclose payments for taxes levied on 
corporate profits, corporate income, and production, but would not be 
required to disclose payments for taxes levied on consumption, such as 
value added taxes, personal income taxes, or sales taxes.\118\ In 
response to earlier concerns expressed by commenters about the 
difficulty of allocating payments that are made for obligations levied 
at the entity level, such as corporate taxes, to the project 
level,\119\ the proposed rules would provide that issuers may disclose 
those payments at the entity level rather than the project level.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ See proposed Instruction 9 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
    \119\ See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, n.155 and accompanying 
text.
    \120\ See proposed Instruction 4 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    12. Is the proposed approach to disclosure of tax payments 
appropriate? Should we alter our approach based on any developments 
since the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals 
in this release? Would allowing disclosure of tax payments at the 
entity level improperly inflate reported payments?
    13. Should we provide additional guidance on how to isolate the 
corporate income tax payments made on income generated from the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals given that 
income may be earned from other business activities in the same 
jurisdiction as well? If so, what guidance should we provide?
2. Royalties, Fees, and Bonuses
    The definition of ``payment'' in Section 13(q) includes royalties, 
fees, and bonuses. The statute provides ``license fees'' as an example 
of the types of fees covered by that term but does not provide examples 
of royalties and bonuses.\121\ As under the 2016 Rules, the proposed 
rules would provide further clarification of these terms by including 
an instruction setting forth a non-exclusive list of fees (rental fees, 
entry fees, and concession fees), bonuses (signature, discovery, and 
production bonuses), and royalties (unit-based, value-based, and 
profit-based royalties) that would be considered payments under the 
proposed rules. The types of fees and bonuses we are proposing to 
include are specifically mentioned in the EITI's guidance as payments 
that should be disclosed by EITI participants,\122\ which supports our 
view that they are part of the commonly recognized revenue stream. The 
types of royalties we are proposing to include are not mentioned in the 
EITI's guidance but, based on the experience of the Commission staff's 
mining engineers, we believe they are also part of the commonly 
recognized revenue stream and that including them would provide 
additional clarity for issuers.\123\ These examples would be provided 
as guidance, and resource extraction issuers could be required to 
disclose other types of fees, bonuses, and royalties depending on the 
facts and circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(C)(ii).
    \122\ See EITI Standard, at 23.
    \123\ See proposed Instruction 10 to Item 2.01 of Form SD. For a 
discussion of these types of royalties, see World Bank, Mining 
Royalties: Their Impact on Investors, Government and Civil Society 
(2006), pp. 50-54 available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/09/11/000090341_20060911105823/Rendered/PDF/372580Mining0r101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    14. Should we adopt an instruction providing examples of fees, 
bonuses, and royalties that would be considered ``payments,'' as 
proposed? Is our interpretation of royalties overly broad? Should we 
alter our approach based on any developments since the adoption of the 
2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in this release?
3. Dividend Payments
    As under the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules would include dividends 
in the list of payment types required to be disclosed. None of the 
commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release objected to the 
inclusion of dividend payments.
    The proposed rules would clarify in an instruction that a resource 
extraction issuer generally would not need to disclose dividends paid 
to a government as a common or ordinary shareholder of the issuer as 
long as the dividend is paid to the government under the same terms as 
other shareholders.\124\ The issuer would, however, be required to 
disclose any dividends paid to a government in lieu of production 
entitlements or royalties. Under this approach, ordinary dividend 
payments would not be part of the commonly recognized revenue stream 
because they are not made to further the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals. This approach is consistent with the approach 
taken towards dividend payments in both the 2012 Rules and 2016 Rules. 
Most of the commenters who discussed the definition of payments in the 
earlier rulemakings either supported or did not

[[Page 2532]]

object to this approach towards dividends.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See proposed Instruction 11 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
    \125\ See 2012 Adopting Release, Section II.D.1.b. and 2016 
Adopting Release, Section II.C.2.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    15. Should we require disclosure of dividend payments, as proposed? 
Should we alter our approach based on any developments since the 
adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in this 
release?
4. Infrastructure Payments
    The proposed rules would require the disclosure of payments for 
infrastructure, such as building a road or railway to further the 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.\126\ We believe such 
payments are ``other material benefits'' that are part of the commonly 
recognized revenue stream for the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals.\127\ Like dividend payments, none of the 
commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release objected to the 
inclusion of infrastructure payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ We note that payments for infrastructure often are in-kind 
payments rather than direct monetary payments. For additional 
discussion of our proposed approach to in-kind payments, see infra 
Section II.C.6.
    \127\ See Letters from AngloGold Ashanti (Jan. 31, 2011) 
(``AngloGold''); Barrick Gold Corporation (Feb. 28, 2011) (``Barrick 
Gold''); EarthRights International (Jan. 26, 2011) (``ERI 1''); 
Earthworks (Mar. 2, 2011) (``Earthworks''); Global Witness (Feb. 25, 
2011); ONE (Mar. 2, 2011) (``ONE''); and Publish What You Pay U.S. 
(Feb. 25, 2011). Disclosure of payments for infrastructure 
improvements is also required under the EITI. See, e.g., EITI 
Standard at 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    16. Should we require the disclosure of infrastructure payments, as 
proposed? Should we alter our approach based on any developments since 
the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in 
this release?
5. Community and Social Responsibility Payments
    The proposed rules would require disclosure of CSR payments that 
are required by law or contract.\128\ For the reasons discussed below, 
we believe that such CSR payments are part of the commonly recognized 
revenue stream for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ CSR payments could include, for example, funds to build or 
operate a training facility for oil and gas workers, funds to build 
housing, payments for tuition or other educational purposes, and in 
general payments to support the social or economic well-being of 
communities within the country where the expenditures are made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Most commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release that addressed 
the issue supported the inclusion of CSR payments.\129\ We find the 
evidence cited by those commenters to be persuasive. For example, one 
commenter noted prevalent discussion of CSR payments in industry 
conferences, studies, guidance, and compliance manuals.\130\ This view 
was supported by a broad range of commenters and not limited to 
academia or civil society organizations. One industry commenter also 
stated that CSR payments are part of the commonly recognized revenue 
stream for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, 
at least when required by law or contract.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.C.2.a. The one 
commenter that opposed including CSR payments stated that those 
payments were not part of the commonly recognized revenue stream due 
to their philanthropic or voluntary nature. See Letter from Encana 
Corporation (Jan. 25, 2016) (``Encana'').
    \130\ See Letter from Prof. Harry G. Broadman and Bruce H. 
Searby (Jan. 25, 2016).
    \131\ See Letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the views of commenters, there is other evidence 
supporting the significant role that CSR payments have in the 
extractive industries. For example, several issuers already report 
their required or voluntary CSR payments.\132\ Furthermore, disclosure 
of CSR payments that are required by law or contract has been required 
under the EITI since 2013.\133\ Accordingly, we find that the evidence 
on balance supports the conclusion that such payments are part of the 
commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See, e.g., Statoil ASA, 2017 Sustainability Report, p. 36 
(disclosing that in 2017 Statoil made $4.6 million in social 
investments); Newmont Goldcorp, Beyond the Mine: 2017 Sustainability 
Report, p. 87 (reporting a total of over $13.9 million in community 
investments); and BHP Billiton Ltd., 2018 Sustainability Report, pp. 
7 and 37 (reporting that BHP's voluntary community investment 
totaled $77.1 million in 2018).
    \133\ As is currently the case under the 2016 EITI Standard, the 
2013 version of the EITI Standard required social contribution 
payments to be disclosed if the company was legally or contractually 
required to make those payments. See EITI Standard, at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    17. Should we require disclosure of CSR payments, as proposed? 
Should we alter our approach based on any developments since the 
adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in this 
release? For example, is there evidence to suggest that CSR payments 
are not part of the commonly recognized revenue stream for the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals?
    18. If we exclude CSR payments from the list of covered payment 
types, should we provide additional guidance concerning how an issuer 
would distinguish CSR payments from infrastructure payments?
6. In-Kind Payments
    The proposed rules would require disclosure of payments that fall 
within the specified payment types that are made in-kind rather than 
through a monetary payment to the host country government.\134\ 
Examples include production entitlement payments and infrastructure 
payments. None of the commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release 
objected to the inclusion of in-kind payments in the 2016 Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ See proposed Instruction 12 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 13(q) specifies that the rules require the disclosure of 
the type and total amount of payments made for each project and to each 
government. Accordingly, issuers would need to determine the monetary 
value of in-kind payments.\135\ Similar to the 2016 Rules, the proposed 
rules specify that issuers must report in-kind payments at historical 
cost, or if historical costs are not reasonably determinable, fair 
market value, and provide a brief description of how the monetary value 
was calculated.\136\ We continue to believe that the required 
disclosure would be more consistent and comparable if issuers are 
required to report in-kind payments at cost and only permitted to 
report using fair market value if historical costs are not reasonably 
available or determinable.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ In addition, in light of the requirement in Section 13(q) 
to tag the information to identify the currency in which the 
payments were made, the proposed rules would instruct issuers 
providing a monetary value for in-kind payments to tag the 
information as ``in-kind'' for purposes of the currency tag. See 
proposed Instruction 12 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
    \136\ See id.
    \137\ This approach is consistent with the recommendation of 
some commenters in the 2012 rulemaking. See 2012 Adopting Release, 
Section II.D.1.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As under the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules would also include an 
instruction clarifying how to report payments made to a foreign 
government or the Federal Government to purchase the resources 
associated with production entitlements that are reported in-kind.\138\ 
An issuer's purchase of production entitlements affects the ultimate 
cost of such entitlements. Accordingly, if the issuer would be required 
to report an in-kind production entitlement payment under the rules and 
then repurchases the resources associated with the

[[Page 2533]]

production entitlement within the same fiscal year, the issuer would be 
required to use the purchase price (rather than using the valuation 
methods described above) when reporting the in-kind value of the 
production entitlement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ See proposed Instruction 12 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the in-kind production entitlement payment and the subsequent 
purchase are made in different fiscal years and the purchase price is 
greater than the previously reported value of the in-kind payment, the 
issuer would be required to report the difference in values in the 
latter fiscal year if that amount exceeds the de minimis threshold. In 
other situations, such as when the purchase price in a subsequent 
fiscal year is less than the in-kind value already reported, no 
disclosure relating to the purchase price would be required.
    We also considered whether to require issuers to report the volume 
of in-kind payments. Commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release 
were divided on whether to require the reporting of volume.\139\ We 
generally agree with the commenter that stated such information was 
unnecessary.\140\ In this regard, we note that issuers would be 
required to provide a brief description of how the monetary value was 
calculated, which will provide additional context for assessing the 
reasonableness of the disclosure. Based on these considerations, we are 
not proposing disclosure related to volume.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.C.2.a.
    \140\ See Letter from ExxonMobil (Mar. 8, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    19. Should we require an issuer to report in-kind payments at cost, 
or if cost is not reasonably available or determinable, at fair market 
value, and provide a brief description of how the monetary value was 
calculated, as proposed? Should we alter our approach based on any 
developments since the adoption of the 2016 Rules, in light of our 
other proposals in this release or for any other reason? Specifically, 
should we require an issuer to report in-kind payments at fair market 
value, or at cost only if fair market value is not reasonably available 
or determinable? Should we instead permit resource extraction issuers 
to choose whether to report in-kind payments at cost or fair market 
value?
    20. Should we include an instruction regarding how to calculate the 
in-kind value of a production entitlement, as proposed? Is the proposed 
instruction sufficiently clear for resource extraction issuers to 
determine how to calculate the in-kind value?
7. Other Payment Types
    Some commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release suggested that 
we add other payment types such as commodity trading related payments, 
payments for government expenses, providing jobs or tuition to persons 
related to government officials, investing in companies created by 
officials or related persons, or other similar payments.\141\ We are 
not proposing to require disclosure for such payment types because we 
do not believe that they represent material benefits that are part of 
the commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas, or minerals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.C.2.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to commodity trading-related payments, we believe that 
the proposed definition of ``export'' and the categories of payments in 
the proposed rules, particularly in-kind payments, accurately reflect 
the commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas, or minerals. We acknowledge that significant 
payments may be made by buying/trading companies or similar companies 
to purchase natural resources. Nevertheless, we do not believe that 
purchasing or trading oil, natural gas, or minerals, even at a level 
above the de minimis threshold, is on its own sufficiently related to 
the ``commercial development'' of those resources to warrant being 
covered by the proposed rules, particularly when the proposed rules 
already would require disclosure of in-kind payments of production 
entitlements. As discussed above, the proposed rules would, however, 
address how such production entitlement payments must be valued when 
initially made by an issuer in-kind but the associated resources are 
subsequently purchased by the same issuer from the recipient 
government.
    We are also not specifically proposing requirements to disclose 
payments for government expenses, providing jobs or tuition to persons 
related to government officials, investing in companies created by 
officials or related persons, or other similar payments that could 
reasonably raise corruption concerns. We find it unnecessary to do so 
because, when these payments are made to further the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas or minerals (in connection with or in 
lieu of the identified payments), they would be covered by the proposed 
anti-evasion provision discussed below.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See infra Section II.D. See also generally U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government 
Affairs, Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and 
Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Case Study Involving Riggs Bank 
Report, at 98-111 (July 14, 2004) (providing examples of the roles 
that resource extraction companies can play in facilitating the 
suspect or corrupt practices of foreign officials seeking to divert 
resource extraction payments that belong to the government).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposed rules would not require issuers to 
disclose payments for fines and penalties. We do not believe that such 
payments relate sufficiently to the commercial development of natural 
resources to warrant inclusion.
Request for Comment
    21. In light of developments since the 2016 Rules or other aspects 
of the proposed rules, should we add other payment types or eliminate 
certain payment types from the proposed list of covered payment types? 
If so, please explain which payment types should or should not be 
considered part of the commonly recognized revenue stream for the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. If you 
recommend adding other payment types, please also explain how they are 
consistent with the EITI's guidelines and how their inclusion would 
support the commitment of the Federal Government to international 
transparency promotion efforts relating to the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas or minerals.
8. Accounting Considerations
    Under the proposed rules, Form SD would expressly state that the 
payment disclosure must be made on a cash basis instead of an accrual 
basis and need not be audited.\143\ We believe that requiring reporting 
to be made on a cash basis is the best approach because: (1) These 
payment disclosures are largely cash-based, so reporting them on a cash 
basis would limit the associated compliance burden, and (2) requiring a 
consistent approach to reporting would improve comparability and 
therefore result in greater transparency. This is consistent with the 
approach that the Commission proposed and adopted in the 2016 
rulemaking.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See proposed Item 2.01(a)(2) of Form SD.
    \144\ See the 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to whether to require the payment information to be 
audited, we note that the EITI approach is different from Section 
13(q). Under the EITI, companies and the host country's government 
generally each submit payment information confidentially to an 
independent administrator selected by the country's multi-stakeholder 
group, frequently an independent auditor, who reconciles the 
information

[[Page 2534]]

provided by the companies and the government and then produces a 
report.\145\ In contrast, Section 13(q) does not contemplate that an 
administrator would audit and reconcile the information or produce a 
report as a result of the audit and reconciliation. Moreover, while 
Section 13(q) refers to ``payments,'' it does not require the 
information to be included in the financial statements. In addition, we 
recognize the concerns raised by some previous commenters that an 
auditing requirement for the payment information would significantly 
increase implementation and ongoing reporting costs.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ See EITI Standard, at 15, 25-26.
    \146\ See, e.g., Letters from Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 
(Mar. 2, 2011), AngloGold, API (Jan. 28, 2011), British Petroleum 
p.l.c. (Feb. 11, 2011), Chevron Corporation (Jan. 28, 2011), Ernst & 
Young (Jan. 31, 2011), New York State Bar Association, Securities 
Regulation Committee (Mar. 1, 2011), Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Feb. 
21, 2011), and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (Mar. 2, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    22. Should we require issuers to disclose payment information on a 
cash basis rather than an accrual basis, as proposed? Should we alter 
our approach based on any developments since the adoption of the 2016 
Rules or in light of our other proposals in this release?
9. The ``Not De Minimis'' Threshold
    The 2016 Rules defined a ``not de minimis'' payment as one that 
equals or exceeds $100,000, or its equivalent in the issuer's reporting 
currency, whether made as a single payment or series of related 
payments.\147\ In light of the previously expressed concerns that the 
threshold was unreasonably low and costly to calculate \148\ and the 
likely impact of the revised definition of project that we are 
proposing,\149\ we no longer believe that the $100,000 threshold is the 
best method for determining whether a payment is ``not de minimis'' 
under Section 13(q).\150\ Rather, we believe that an appropriate 
threshold for determining what is a ``not de minimis payment'' must 
consider the value of individual payments as well as the value of the 
total company payments per project.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.C.3.c. The 2012 
Rules also defined a ``not de minimis'' payment using the $100,000 
threshold. See 2012 Adopting Release, Section II.D.2.c.
    \148\ See, e.g., letter from Nouveau Inc. (Feb. 16, 2016) 
(stating that the $100,000 reporting threshold would be unreasonably 
low for companies working on massive scale projects and would 
require parties to engage in the costly collection, compilation, and 
standardization of potentially thousands of different data points); 
see also 2012 Adopting Release, Section II.D.2.b (discussing a 
variety of approaches suggested by commenters to the ``not de 
minimis'' payment requirement).
    \149\ See infra Section II.F.2.
    \150\ Section 13(q) does not define ``not de minimis.'' 
Consistent with the 2012 and 2016 rules, and for the reasons stated 
therein, we continue to believe that it is appropriate to adopt a 
definition of ``not de minimis'' to provide clear guidance regarding 
when a resource extraction issuer must disclose a payment.
    \151\ See proposed Item 2.01(d)(8) of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rules, an issuer would not be required to 
provide disclosure if the aggregate project payments for all types of 
payments for an individual project are below $750,000. Where the 
aggregate payments for an individual project equal or exceed $750,000, 
only payments made to each foreign government in a host country or the 
Federal Government that equal or exceed $150,000, or its equivalent in 
the issuer's reporting currency, whether made as a single payment or a 
series of related payments, will need to be reported.\152\ Thus, if no 
single payment or series of related payments of the same type equals or 
exceeds $150,000 for an individual project, even if the aggregate 
payments for that project are equal to or greater than $750,000, no 
payments disclosure would be required for that project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that this change is necessary to take into account the 
proposed definition of project, which aggregates payments at a higher 
level, which would likely increase the value of the individual types of 
payments. As such, we believe that using the 2016 threshold of $100,000 
would likely require more payment disclosure, thus increasing rather 
than decreasing the cost and disclosure burden on issuers, contrary to 
the guidance provided by Congress in its disapproval of the 2016 Rules. 
We further believe that, in light of the larger aggregations permitted 
under the revised definition of project, a quantitative standard based 
upon project level and individual payment information establishes a 
more appropriate threshold for determining ``not de minimis.'' In 
addition, we believe that $750,000 in total payments is the appropriate 
project threshold and $150,000 is the appropriate threshold for 
individual payments because we are proposing to exempt smaller 
reporting companies and emerging growth companies from the Section 
13(q) disclosure requirements,\153\ thereby resulting in larger 
companies, with larger projects and larger individual payments, being 
primarily affected by the proposed rules. We also believe that this 
``not de minimis'' threshold would further the statutory objectives of 
Section 13(q) by requiring disclosure of those payments that are of a 
significant enough size such that they would likely benefit the host 
country and its local communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ See supra Section II.J.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When adopting the 2016 Rules, we observed that Section 13(q) uses a 
``not de minimis'' standard instead of a materiality standard, which is 
used elsewhere in the Federal securities laws and in the EITI. This 
suggests that Congress did not intend ``not de minimis'' to equate to a 
materiality standard.\154\ We continue to believe that this is the 
better approach to take when defining ``not de minimis.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.D.2.c. Some 
commenters suggested that we adopt a materiality-based definition of 
``not de minimis'' in the 2012 rulemaking. See id., n. 224 and 
accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An instruction to the 2016 Rules allowed an issuer to choose 
several methods to calculate currency conversions for payments not made 
in U.S. dollars or the issuer's reporting currency. That instruction 
also provided that the same methods are available to issuers when 
calculating whether a payment not made in U.S. dollars exceeds the de 
minimis threshold.\155\ We are proposing the same instruction \156\ as 
we continue to believe that providing alternative methods for 
calculating currency conversions would help limit compliance costs 
under Section 13(q). Like the 2016 Rules, an issuer would be required 
to use a consistent method for its payment currency conversions, 
including when determining if a payment is not de minimis, and would be 
required to disclose which method it used.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ See Instruction 2 to Item 2.01 of Form SD under the 2016 
Rules.
    \156\ See proposed Instruction 2 to Item 2.01 of Form SD, which 
states: ``A resource extraction issuer must report the amount of 
payments made for each payment type, and the total amount of 
payments made for each project and to each government, during the 
reporting period in either U.S. dollars or the resource extraction 
issuer's reporting currency. If a resource extraction issuer has 
made payments in currencies other than U.S. dollars or its reporting 
currency, it may choose to calculate the currency conversion between 
the currency in which the payment was made and U.S. dollars or the 
resource extraction issuer's reporting currency, as applicable, in 
one of three ways: (a) By translating the expenses at the exchange 
rate existing at the time the payment is made; (b) using a weighted 
average of the exchange rates during the period; or (c) based on the 
exchange rate as of the resource extraction issuer's fiscal year 
end. When calculating whether the de minimis threshold has been 
exceeded, a resource extraction issuer may be required to convert 
the payment to U.S. dollars, even though it is not required to 
disclose those payments in U.S. dollars. For example, this may occur 
when the resource extraction issuer is using a non-U.S. dollar 
reporting currency. In these instances, the resource extraction 
issuer may use any of the three methods described above for 
calculating the currency conversion.''
    \157\ See id. (stating that ``[i]n all cases, a resource 
extraction issuer must disclose the method used to calculate the 
currency conversion and must choose a consistent method for all such 
currency conversions within a particular Form SD submission'').

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 2535]]

Request for Comment
    23. The definition of ``not de minimis'' requires issuers to 
disclose payments for an individual project if the payments in the 
aggregate equal or exceed $750,000, unless no individual payments per 
that project equal or exceed $150,000. Is this approach appropriate in 
light of our proposed definition of ``project,'' which would allow for 
greater aggregation of payments? Should we instead continue to use the 
same quantitative threshold of $100,000 that we used in the 2016 and 
2012 Rules without regard to the proposed definition of project? If it 
is appropriate to take into account the proposed definition of project, 
are there any data or have there been any developments since the 2016 
Rules that suggest a quantitative threshold lower or higher than 
$750,000 is the more appropriate project threshold, or that an 
individual payment threshold lower or higher than $150,000 is the more 
appropriate threshold?
    24. The statute does not define ``not de minimis'' or explain how 
that term should be applied. Should we base the ``not de minimis'' 
threshold on an amount that is not de minimis relative to (i) a 
particular resource extraction issuer, (ii) a particular country, or 
(iii) a particular project?
    25. Should the focal point for determining whether a payment is 
``not de minimis'' be the relationship between individual and total 
company payments per payment type? If not, what should the focal point 
be? Should we consider the relation of the payment to the government 
recipient and/or the local community when adopting the ``not de 
minimis'' payment threshold?
    26. As an alternative to setting a bright line threshold based on 
dollar amount of payment, should we not define ``not de minimis'' and 
allow resource extraction issuers to make the determination of what 
qualifies as a payment that is not de minimis, based on the particular 
facts and circumstances?
    27. If we should adopt an absolute quantitative threshold, should 
we include a mechanism to adjust periodically the de minimis threshold 
to reflect the effects of inflation? If so, what is an appropriate 
interval for such adjustments? What should the basis be for making any 
such adjustments if the appropriate focal point for determining whether 
a payment is ``not de minimis'' is in relation to the host country 
recipient?
    28. Should we adopt a definition of ``not de minimis'' using a 
standard based on the materiality of the payment to the issuer? If so, 
would this be consistent with the language of the statute, which uses 
the term ``not de minimis'' rather than ``material''?

D. Anti-Evasion

    As under the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules would require 
disclosure with respect to an activity or payment that, although not 
within the categories included in the proposed rules, is part of a plan 
or scheme to evade the disclosure required under Section 13(q).\158\ 
This provision is designed to emphasize substance over the form or 
characterization of payments. We believe that it covers most of the 
situations that have concerned commenters in past releases. For 
example, the provision would cover payments that were substituted for 
otherwise reportable payments in an attempt to evade the disclosure 
rules,\159\ as well as activities and payments that were structured, 
split, or aggregated in an attempt to avoid application of the 
rules.\160\ Similarly, a resource extraction issuer could not avoid 
disclosure by re-characterizing an activity as transportation that 
would otherwise be covered under the rules, or by making a payment to 
the government via a third party in order to avoid disclosure under the 
proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(b). Several commenters supported 
this provision in the 2016 rulemaking although a few commenters 
recommended revising the provision to address specific concerns. See 
2016 Adopting Release, Section II.C.2.c.
    \159\ See, e.g., Letter from Elise J. Bean (Feb. 16, 2016). See 
also Section II.F below (discussing application of the anti-evasion 
provision in the context of the definition of ``project'' under the 
proposed rules).
    \160\ See, e.g., Letter from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    29. Should we adopt an anti-evasion provision, as proposed? Should 
we provide additional guidance about when the anti-evasion provision 
would apply?
    30. Have there been any developments since the 2016 Rules that 
suggest that a different approach to the anti-evasion provision would 
be appropriate?

E. Definition of ``Subsidiary'' and ``Control''

    Section 13(q) requires a resource extraction issuer to disclose 
payments by a subsidiary or an entity under the control of the issuer. 
Similar to the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules would define the terms 
``subsidiary'' and ``control'' based on accounting principles rather 
than using the definitions of those terms provided in Rule 12b-2,\161\ 
which was the case under the 2012 Rules.\162\ All of the commenters on 
the 2016 Rules Proposing Release that addressed this aspect of the 
proposed rules generally supported using accounting principles to 
define ``control.'' \163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ Under Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 [17 CFR 240.12b-2], 
``control'' (including the terms ``controlling,'' ``controlled by'' 
and ``under common control with'') is defined to mean the 
possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the 
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether 
through the ownership of voting shares, by contract, or otherwise. 
Rule 12b-2 also defines ``subsidiary'' of a specified person to mean 
an affiliate controlled by such person directly, or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries. See also the definitions of 
``majority-owned subsidiary,'' ``significant subsidiary,'' and 
``totally held subsidiary'' in Rule 12b-2.
    \162\ See 2012 Adopting Release, Section II.D.4.c.
    \163\ See, e.g., Letters from the API (Feb. 16, 2016); British 
Petroleum p.l.c. (Feb. 16, 2016); Chevron Corporation (Feb. 16, 
2016); Encana; ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016); Global Witness (Mar. 8, 
2016); and PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed approach, a resource extraction issuer would 
have ``control'' of another entity when the issuer consolidates that 
entity under the accounting principles applicable to its financial 
statements included in the periodic reports filed pursuant to Section 
13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Thus, for purposes of determining 
control, the resource extraction issuer would follow the consolidation 
requirements under generally accepted accounting principles in the 
United States (``U.S. GAAP'') or under the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (``IFRS'') as issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board, as applicable.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ See Accounting Standards Codification (``ASC'') 810, 
Consolidation; and IFRS 10, Consolidated Financial Statements. A 
foreign private issuer that prepares financial statements according 
to a comprehensive set of accounting principles, other than U.S. 
GAAP or IFRS, and files with the Commission a reconciliation to U.S. 
GAAP would be required to determine whether or not an entity is 
under its control using U.S. GAAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the proposed definition, compared to the use of the 
definition of ``control'' in Rule 12b-2, would better balance 
transparency for users of the payment disclosure and the burden on 
issuers. Issuers already apply the concept of control for financial 
reporting purposes, which should facilitate compliance. Assuming a 
reporting issuer consolidates the entity making the eligible payment, 
this approach also should have the benefit of limiting the potential 
overlap of the disclosed payments because generally, under applicable 
financial reporting principles, only one party can control, and 
therefore consolidate, that entity.

[[Page 2536]]

Further, this approach could enhance the quality of the reported data 
since each resource extraction issuer is required to provide audited 
financial statement disclosure of its significant consolidation 
accounting policies in the notes to the audited financial statements 
included in its existing Exchange Act annual reports.\165\ The 
disclosure of these accounting policies should provide greater 
transparency about how the issuer determined which entities and 
payments should be included within the scope of the required 
disclosures. Finally, a resource extraction issuer's determination of 
control under the proposed rules would be subject to the audit process 
as well as to the internal accounting controls that issuers are 
required to have in place with respect to reporting audited financial 
statements filed with the Commission.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ See ASC 235-10-50; IFRS 8. See also Rules 1-01, 3-01, and 
4-01 of Regulation S-X [17 CFR 210.1-01, 2-01 and 4-01].
    \166\ See Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B) [15 U.S.C. 
78m(b)(2)(B)]. See also Rules 13a-15 [17 CFR 240.13a-15] and 15d-15 
[17 CFR 240.15d-15]. We note, however, that the proposed rules would 
not create a new auditing requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rules would not require disclosure of the 
proportionate amount of the payments made by a resource extraction 
issuer's proportionately consolidated entities or operations.\167\ 
After reconsidering the comments raising concern about the definition 
of control and the potential compliance costs associated with using a 
broader definition of control, the definition we are proposing would 
exclude entities or operations in which an issuer has only a 
proportionate interest.\168\ Compared to an issuer that consolidates an 
entity, an issuer with a proportionate interest in an entity or 
operations may not have the same level of ability to direct the entity 
or operations making the payments. For example, as commenters have 
noted, an issuer that holds a proportionate interest in a joint venture 
typically does not have ready access to detailed payment information 
when it is not the operator of that venture.\169\ Requiring such a non-
operator issuer to provide the payment disclosure based on its 
proportionate interest in the venture could compel that issuer to 
renegotiate its joint venture agreement or make other arrangements to 
obtain sufficiently detailed payment information to comply with the 
Section 13(q) rules, which could significantly increase its compliance 
burden. Excluding proportionate interest entities or operations from 
the proposed definition of control would result in less payment 
information about joint ventures becoming public,\170\ as compared to 
the 2016 Rules; however, we believe that this potential reduction in 
transparency is an appropriate tradeoff to help reduce the compliance 
burden of the proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ Proportionately consolidated entities or operations 
include those entities or operations that are proportionately 
consolidated in accordance with ASC 810-10-45-14 and ``joint 
operations'' as defined in IFRS 11, Joint Arrangements.
    \168\ See, e.g., Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016); BP (Feb. 16, 
2016); Chevron (Feb. 16, 2016); ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016); Petro1eo 
Brasileiro S.A-Petrobras (``Petrobras'') (Feb. 16, 2016); and RDS 
(Feb. 5, 2016).
    \169\ See, e.g., Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016); and 
ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \170\ See, e.g., Letters from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016); and 
Global Witness (Mar. 8, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also reconsidered the recommendation of commenters on the 2016 
Rules Proposing Release to include a ``significant influence'' test for 
determining control in addition to the accounting consolidation 
principles we are proposing.\171\ We do not believe, however, that we 
should define control such that significant influence by itself would 
constitute control.\172\ The concept of significant influence does not 
reflect the same level of ability to direct or control the actions of 
an entity that is generally reflected in the concept of consolidation. 
As such, we believe that the consolidation principles are better 
aligned with the purposes underlying Section 13(q) than a significant 
influence test. Moreover, unlike a potential significant influence 
test, the consolidation principles used to define control for the 
purposes of Section 13(q) more closely capture the situations where the 
resource extraction issuer has access to the information that is 
required to be reported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ See, e.g., Letter from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \172\ In this regard, we note that under U.S. GAAP and IFRS, 
significant influence alone does not represent a level of control 
that would result in consolidation. See ASC 323-10-15, paragraphs 6 
through 11 and IAS 28, paragraph 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    31. Should we define the term ``control'' based on applicable 
accounting principles, as proposed? Should we alter our approach based 
on any developments since the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of 
our other proposals in this release?
    32. Should we exclude from the definition of control entities or 
operations in which an issuer has only a proportionate interest, as 
proposed? Should we instead require an issuer to disclose its 
proportionate share of the payments made by a joint venture based on 
its proportionate interest in the venture even when it is not the 
operator of the venture? Should we require such a non-operator joint 
venture participant to disclose its proportionate share of the joint 
venture payments if it knows or is able to obtain the information 
necessary to comply with the proposed rules without undue difficulty or 
expense?
    33. Are there alternatives to the proposed definition of control 
that would better balance transparency for users of the payment 
information and the compliance burden on issuers? For example, should 
we require only the operator of a joint venture to disclose all of the 
payments it makes to governments, including those made on behalf of 
non-operator joint venture participants? Should we require the operator 
of a joint venture to disclose its proportionate share of the payments 
made? When the operator is not an Exchange Act reporting company, and 
therefore not subject to the Section 13(q) rules, should each non-
operator participant that is subject to the Section 13(q) rules be 
required to disclose the payments made by itself and entities or 
operations that it fully or proportionately consolidates or accounts 
for as a joint operation? In the event that none of the joint venture 
participants is a consolidated entity, should we require a registrant 
that owns a proportionate interest in the operator of the venture to 
disclose the payments made either on behalf of all the participants or 
based on the registrant's proportionate share of the venture? In these 
circumstances, should we require a registrant that owns a proportionate 
interest in a non-operator venture participant to disclose its 
proportionate share of the payments if it is able to obtain the 
necessary payment information without undue burden or expense?
    34. Alternatively, should we adopt a definition of control that 
includes more than just consolidated entities (e.g., entities over 
which an issuer has significant influence)?

F. Definition of ``Project''

    Consistent with Section 13(q), the proposed rules would require a 
resource extraction issuer to disclose payments made to governments 
relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals 
by type and total amount per project. The proposed rules would define 
``project'' using the following three criteria: (1) The type of 
resource being commercially developed; (2) the method of extraction; 
and (3) the major subnational political jurisdiction where the 
commercial development of

[[Page 2537]]

the resource is taking place.\173\ The proposed definition (``Modified 
Project Definition'') differs from the definition included in the 2016 
Rules, which defined ``project'' as the operational activities governed 
by a single contract, license, lease, concession, or similar agreement, 
which form the basis for payment liabilities with a government 
(``Contract-Level Project Definition'').\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ This proposed definition is similar to the definition of 
``project'' suggested by one industry commenter. See Letters from 
the API (Nov. 7, 2013) and (Feb. 16, 2016). The term ``project'' as 
used in this release would only apply to disclosure provided 
pursuant to Rule 13q-1 and not, for example, the disclosure required 
by Article 4-10 of Regulation S-X (17 CFR 210.4-10) or subpart 1200 
of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.1200).
    \174\ 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.E.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Considerations for Modified ``Project'' Definition
    In adopting the 2016 Rules, the Commission expressly considered the 
Modified Project Definition as an alternative to the Contract-Level 
Project Definition that it ultimately adopted. In considering the 
Modified Project Definition, the Commission acknowledged that such a 
definition ``could lower the potential for competitive harm when 
compared to [the Contract-Level Project Definition].'' \175\ However, 
the Commission stated that, in its view, the Contract-Level Project 
Definition was ``on balance, necessary and appropriate notwithstanding 
the potential competitive concerns that may result in some instances.'' 
\176\ In doing so, the Commission acknowledged that both approaches 
would provide the public with information concerning ``the overall 
revenue that national governments receive from natural resources, so 
that the public can seek to hold the government accountable for how 
much it is receiving and how it spends that money.'' \177\ 
Nevertheless, the Commission determined that the more granular 
transparency provided by the Contract-Level Project Definition could 
potentially go further in combating corruption. Specifically, the 
Commission found that the Contract-Level Project Definition, by 
providing transparency about the revenues generated from each contract, 
license, and concession, could serve to reduce the potential for 
corruption in connection with the negotiation and implementation of a 
resource-extraction contract.\178\ In this way, the Contract-Level 
Project Definition could minimize instances of corruption that may 
occur before resource-extraction revenue is paid to the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ Id.
    \176\ Id.
    \177\ Id.
    \178\ Among other things, the Commission found that the 
Contract-Level Project Definition had the advantage that, in some 
instances, it could combat corruption by: (1) ``help[ing] assist 
citizens, civil society groups, and others to monitor individual 
companies' contributions to the public finances and ensur[ing] firms 
are meeting their payment obligations,'' at least ``[t]o the extent 
that a company's contractual or legal obligations are known''; (2) 
deterring ``companies from either entering into agreements that 
contain suspect payment provisions or following government 
officials' suspect payment instructions''; (3) ``help[ing] local 
communities and civil society groups to weigh the costs and benefits 
of an individual project''; and (4) ``allow[ing] for comparisons of 
revenue flow among different projects . . . to identify payment 
discrepancies[.]'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In advancing a contract-level definition of ``project,'' the 
Commission acknowledged that such an approach increases the potential 
that resource-extraction issuers might be required to disclose 
sensitive competitive information about the underlying contracts, 
licenses, or concessions.\179\ The Commission nevertheless concluded 
that the additional benefits of this more granular disclosure justified 
any attendant competitive effects.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.E.3.
    \180\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of the concerns expressed by prior commenters and members 
of Congress that the 2016 Rules imposed undue competitive harm, we have 
reconsidered the balance that the Commission previously struck. In 
proposing the Modified Project Definition, we acknowledge that we may 
be narrowing the scope of the transparency benefits that the 
disclosures under Section 13(q) were intended to produce. Although we 
believe that the proposed definition would continue to provide 
substantial transparency about the overall revenue flows to foreign 
governments and the U.S. Federal Government, under the Modified Project 
Definition, these disclosures would no longer provide the additional 
transparency benefits associated with contract-level information. For 
the reasons discussed below, we believe that forgoing these additional 
transparency benefits is an appropriate trade-off to address 
commenters' and Congress's concerns about the potentially adverse 
impacts on resource extraction issuers arising from the 2016 Rules.
    The proposed change to the definition of ``project'' directly 
addresses the primary concerns expressed about the 2016 Rules. Those 
concerns included the costs, burdens, and risks of competitive harm 
related to tracking, recording, and disclosing the payment information 
on a per contract basis using the contract-based definition of 
``project'' in the 2016 Rules.\181\ The Modified Project Definition 
should alleviate those concerns by reducing the likelihood of 
competitively harmful information being released. As one industry 
commenter noted in connection with the 2016 Rules Proposing Release, 
disclosure that is less detailed and not as closely linked to 
individual contracts would assuage concerns that competitors could 
reverse-engineer proprietary commercial information.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ See supra n. 54 through 56. In addition, one congressman 
noted that extractive companies ``are already publicly disclosing 
the work they do in foreign countries and will continue to do so'' 
but ``at a level that does not cause competitive harms.'' 163 Cong. 
Rec. at H854 (statement of Rep. Williams). See also Letters from API 
(Nov. 7, 2013) and (Feb. 16, 2016); Letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 
2016); and Letter from Chevron (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \182\ See letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A broader project definition should also reduce the compliance 
burden of the proposed rules compared to the 2016 Rules. Because the 
Modified Project Definition would allow an issuer to make the payment 
disclosure at a greater level of aggregation than under the Contract-
Level Project Definition, there would be fewer individual data points 
that have to be electronically tagged and reported, which should make 
it easier to disclose the payment information on an ongoing basis. An 
issuer's costs could be further reduced to the extent that it has 
already aggregated the payment information for its own internal 
accounting or financial reporting purposes. In that event, it may be 
less costly for an issuer to modify its internal accounting/financial 
reporting system to collect the required payment information than it 
would be to build from scratch a system to collect the payment 
information on a contract-by-contract basis.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ See infra Section III.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, we believe that this change is consistent with the CRA's 
instruction that an agency may not reissue ``a new rule that is 
substantially the same as'' the rule that Congress disapproved.\184\ As 
is evident from the discussions in

[[Page 2538]]

the Commission's previous releases and the comments received in 
response, the definition of ``project'' is a critical element of the 
disclosure regime contemplated by Section 13(q).\185\ We therefore 
believe that the Modified Project Definition would help to satisfy the 
CRA's requirement that the new rule that we are proposing not be 
substantially the same as the 2016 Rules.\186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(1). The CRA instructs that the ``new 
rule'' cannot be ``substantially the same'' or in ``substantially 
the same form'' as the disapproved rule. Id. (emphasis added). We 
believe that this language clearly reflects Congress' intent that, 
in issuing a new rule, an agency must do more than substantially 
revise the rationales supporting the prior rule or the economic 
analysis underlying the prior rule. Rather, the CRA instructs that 
the ``new rule'' itself must be substantially different. As such, we 
do not believe that readopting the 2016 rule with modifications only 
to the rationales or economic analysis in the release will satisfy 
the substantially different requirement mandated by the plain 
language of the CRA.
    \185\ See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section III.D.3; 2016 
Rules Adopting Release, Section III.E.3.
    \186\ In the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, the Commission 
expressed the view that the Contract-Level Project Definition 
embodied a more natural understanding of what constitutes a 
``project.'' See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section III.E.3. 
However, the Commission did not foreclose the Modified Project 
Definition as a plausible alternative. In light of Congress's 
disapproval of the 2016 Rules, we believe that it is appropriate to 
utilize the Modified Project Definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, we note that some prior commenters maintained that a 
Contract-Level Project Definition would provide material benefits to 
investors by, for example, assisting in the assessment of financial, 
political, social, and market risks regarding a particular issuer's 
projects,\187\ or helping to mitigate systemic financial market risk 
generally in the extractive industries sector.\188\ However, we believe 
that Commission rules requiring disclosure of the most significant 
risks affecting a company or the securities being offered \189\ and 
disclosure of known trends or uncertainties that have had or are 
reasonably likely to have a material impact on the registrant's 
liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations,\190\ should 
elicit all appropriate risk-related disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \187\ See, e.g., Letter from Calvert Investments and Social 
Investment Forum (Nov. 15, 2010); Letter from Calvert Investments 
(Feb. 16, 2016); and Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (Oct. 
30, 2015).
    \188\ See, e.g., Letter from ACTIAM NV et al. (Mar. 8, 2016); 
Allianz Global Investors et al. (April 28, 2014); and the First 
Swedish National Pension Fund et al. (May 9, 2014).
    \189\ See Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.503(c)).
    \190\ See Item 303 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.303).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Discussion of the Modified ``Project'' Definition
    In the following three subsections, we discuss the disclosure 
required by each of the three prongs of the proposed Modified Project 
Definition in greater detail. In each instance, we have striven to 
achieve an appropriate balance between the policy goal of promoting 
transparency about a resource extraction issuer's payments to 
governments and the concerns expressed by commenters and members of 
Congress about the compliance costs and burdens of the proposed rules, 
including the risk of competitive harm by requiring the disclosure of 
proprietary commercial information.
a. Type of Resource
    Under the Modified Project Definition, the first prong for 
determining the parameters of a project is the type of resource that is 
being commercially developed. As proposed, a resource extraction issuer 
would have to disclose whether the project relates to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or a specified type of mineral. Thus, 
an issuer would not be required to describe the specific type or 
quality of oil or natural gas or distinguish between subcategories of 
the same mineral type. For example, an issuer disclosing payments 
relating to an oil project would not be required to describe whether it 
is extracting light or heavy crude oil. Similarly, an issuer disclosing 
payments relating to a mining project would be required to disclose 
whether the mineral is gold, copper, coal, sand, gravel, or some other 
generic mineral class, but not whether it is, for example, bituminous 
coal or anthracite coal. For clarity and consistency, a proposed 
instruction to Form SD would require synthetic oil or gas obtained 
through processing of coal to be classified as ``coal.'' \191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ See proposed Instruction 5 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that a requirement to provide greater detail regarding 
the type of resource that is the subject of extractive activities, 
although perhaps useful in some instances for tracking specific 
payments, is not necessary for citizens of resource rich countries to 
determine whether those activities have given rise to government 
revenues in which they may have an interest. On the other hand, such a 
requirement could unnecessarily increase an issuer's compliance costs 
and burdens, including the risk that such additional detail may reveal 
proprietary information that could cause competitive harm.
b. Method of Extraction
    The second prong for determining the parameters of a project is the 
method of extraction. This prong would require a resource extraction 
issuer to identify whether the resource is being extracted through the 
use of a well, an open pit, or underground mining. Additional detail 
about the method of extraction would not be required. For example, a 
resource extraction issuer would not be required to disclose whether it 
is using horizontal or vertical drilling, hydraulic fracturing, or 
strip, sublevel stope, or block cave mining. Similar to the type of 
resource prong, we preliminarily believe that such a level of 
specificity regarding the particular method of extraction is not 
necessary for citizens of resource rich countries to determine 
generally if extractive activities in their region have given rise to 
government revenues in which they may have an interest. Thus, a 
requirement to provide more specificity regarding the particular method 
of extraction could unnecessarily increase an issuer's regulatory costs 
and burdens, including the risk of having to disclose proprietary 
information that could potentially result in competitive harm.
c. Major Subnational Political Jurisdiction
    The third prong for determining the parameters of a project is the 
major subnational political jurisdiction where the commercial 
development of the resource is taking place. This prong would require 
an issuer to disclose only two levels of jurisdiction: (1) The country; 
and (2) the state, province, territory or other major subnational 
jurisdiction in which the resource extraction activities are 
occurring.\192\ For example, extractive activities in the city of 
Timika in the province of Papua, Indonesia could be disclosed as 
occurring in Papua, Indonesia without identifying Timika. In addition, 
an issuer could treat its activities in the counties of Elko, Nevada 
and White Pine, Nevada, as part one project because Nevada would be the 
major subnational political jurisdiction. If the extractive activity is 
offshore, the proposed rules would require an issuer to disclose that 
it is offshore and the nearest major subnational political 
jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ As proposed, an issuer would have to provide an electronic 
tag for both the country and the major subnational political 
jurisdiction in which the extractive activities are occurring that 
is consistent with the International Organization for 
Standardization (``ISO'') code pertaining to countries and their 
major subdivisions. See infra Section II.K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that defining project with regard to the major 
subnational jurisdiction in which a project is located would alleviate 
one of the most significant concerns (and related harms) expressed by 
commenters in the 2016 rulemaking about the Contract-Level Project 
Definition, including that contract-level disclosure would:
     Allow competitors to derive important information about 
new areas under exploration for potential resource development, the 
value the company

[[Page 2539]]

places on such resources, and the costs associated with acquiring the 
right to develop these new resources;
     Enable competitors to evaluate the new resources more 
precisely, and as a result, structure their bids for additional 
opportunities in the areas with new resources more effectively; and
     Allow competitors to reverse-engineer proprietary 
commercial information: For example, to determine the commercial and 
fiscal terms of the agreements, get a better understanding of an 
issuer's strategic approach to bidding and contracting, and identify 
rate of return criteria.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ See, e.g., Letters from the API (Feb. 16, 2016) and 
ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016). In particular, we understand that 
exploratory activities, particularly in a subnational jurisdiction 
that is small, may pose a significant risk of competitive harm to a 
resource extraction issuer. We discuss that risk and our proposed 
targeted exemption to mitigate that risk in Section II.J.4 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also note that the proposed use of ISO codes \194\ to identify 
subnational jurisdictions would provide a standardized data format that 
may be more easily analyzed than the data produced under the Contract-
Level Project Definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
created and maintains codes for the representation of names of 
countries and their subdivisions. See infra Section II.L (discussing 
the proposed requirement to use ISO codes to describe the country in 
which the project is located and the subnational geographic location 
of a project).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Special Situations
    The proposed definition of project would include commercial 
development activities using multiple resource types or extraction 
methods if such activities are located in the same major subnational 
political jurisdiction. The issuer would be required to describe each 
type of resource that is being commercially developed and each method 
of extraction used for that project. For example, an open pit and 
underground zinc mining project in Erongo, Namibia would be described 
as ``NA-ER/Zinc/Open Pit/Underground'' and a drilling project off the 
shore of Nigeria that produced oil and natural gas would be described 
as ``NG-BY/Offshore/Oil/Natural Gas/Well.''
    We recognize that such an approach could result in broad 
aggregation of projects within a major subnational political 
jurisdiction, which could make it more difficult for end-users of the 
disclosure to identify the specific commercial development activities 
associated with the disclosed payments. Nevertheless, we believe this 
approach to be appropriate because issuers often develop more than one 
type of resource at a particular location and use more than one method 
of extraction. Limiting the definition of project to only commercial 
development activities comprising the same type of resource, method of 
extraction, and major subnational political jurisdiction may result in 
artificial distinctions. For example, an issuer would be required to 
treat oil and natural gas extraction from the same well as separate 
projects, and similarly, open pit and underground mining in the same 
location as separate projects. Requiring that these types of related 
activities be treated as separate projects could also lead to confusion 
about how reportable payments should be allocated between such 
projects. In addition, we note that greater aggregation could result in 
additional payments being disclosed on a per project basis because it 
would be less likely that such a payment would be de minimis than if 
project was defined more granularly.
    In some situations the site where a resource is being commercially 
developed could cross the borders between multiple major subnational 
political jurisdictions. In such a case, the proposed rules would 
require the issuer to treat the activities in each major subnational 
political jurisdiction as separate projects. This approach reflects the 
fact that, although the cross-border extractive activities are related, 
they likely would give rise to a separate set of payments to different 
subnational payees in each jurisdiction.
Request for Comment
    35. Should we define ``project'' by the type of resource being 
commercially developed, the method of extraction, and the major 
subnational political jurisdiction where the commercial development of 
the resource is taking place, as proposed?
    36. Would the Modified Project Definition achieve an appropriate 
balance between promoting transparency regarding a resource extraction 
issuer's payments to governments and reducing regulatory costs and 
burdens, including the risk of harming the issuer's competitive 
position by requiring disclosure of proprietary commercial information? 
Are there any specific changes that we could make to the Modified 
Project Definition that would improve transparency and/or help limit 
compliance costs and burdens consistent with the Section 13(q) mandate 
and the CRA's restrictions on subsequent rulemaking?
    37. Have companies experienced compliance problems or burdens with 
reporting contract-based payments under the EU Directives and Canada's 
ESTMA? Does that experience confirm that our proposed approach to the 
definition of ``project'' is appropriate, or does it suggest that we 
should adopt a different approach? If the latter, describe that 
approach and whether it would also help limit compliance costs and 
burdens for resource extraction issuers.
    38. Is there an alternative to using either the Modified Project 
Definition or the Contract-level Project Definition that would support 
the commitment of the Federal Government to promote international 
transparency promotion efforts relating to the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas or minerals while limiting compliance costs and 
mitigating competitive concerns for resource extraction issuers? To 
what extent is comparability among Section 13(q) disclosures important 
for transparency purposes? To the extent it is important, would 
requiring more or less granular project information impact 
comparability?
    39. Are the proposed requirements for describing the type of 
resource appropriate? If not, please explain how the type of resource 
should be described and why.
    40. Should we require issuers to provide greater detail on the type 
of resource than proposed? If so, what level of detail should we 
require? What benefits would such additional detail provide to end-
users? What costs would an issuer incur to provide such additional 
detail?
    41. Are the proposed requirements for describing the method of 
extraction appropriate? If not, please explain how the method of 
extraction should be described and why.
    42. Should we require issuers to provide greater detail on the 
method of extraction being used? If so, what level of detail should we 
require? What benefits would such additional detail provide to end-
users? What costs would an issuer incur to provide such additional 
detail?
    43. Does the proposed requirement to describe the major subnational 
political jurisdiction where the commercial development of the resource 
is taking place provide the appropriate balance between promoting 
payment transparency and limiting an issuer's compliance costs and 
burdens? If not, how should we alter the requirement and why? Does the 
reference to ``the state, province, territory or other major 
subnational jurisdiction'' provide adequate guidance concerning how to 
identify the political jurisdiction where the commercial development of 
the resource is taking place?
    44. The proposed rules would permit an issuer to combine separate 
resources

[[Page 2540]]

and different extraction methods into one project if they occur in the 
same major subnational political jurisdiction. Would this result in too 
much aggregation even if, as proposed, issuers would be required to 
describe each resource and each method of extraction?
    45. If we do not allow for multiple resource types or methods of 
extraction to be aggregated, would it result in confusion for issuers 
or end-users? Would requiring issuers to treat each resource type or 
method of extraction as a separate project result in more payments 
being considered de minimis and thus reduce the overall amount of 
disclosure?
    46. Is our proposed approach to disclosing activities that cross 
the borders of major subnational political jurisdictions appropriate? 
Are there specific cross-border situations that we should address? 
Should we instead allow issuers to include all the major subnational 
political jurisdictions in the description of the project in such a 
cross-border situation? Would such an approach make it more difficult 
to identify the location of the project?

G. Definition of ``Foreign Government'' and ``Federal Government''

    As with the 2016 Rules, we are proposing definitions of ``foreign 
government'' and ``Federal Government'' that are consistent with 
Section 13(q).\195\ Under the proposed rules, a ``foreign government'' 
would be defined as a foreign government, a department, agency, or 
instrumentality of a foreign government, or a company at least majority 
owned by a foreign government. The term ``foreign government'' would 
include a foreign national government as well as a foreign subnational 
government, such as the government of a state, province, county, 
district, municipality, or territory under a foreign national 
government.\196\ ``Federal Government'' would be defined as the Federal 
Government of the United States and would not include subnational 
governments within the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.F.3. We also adopted 
the same definitions in the 2012 rulemaking. See 2012 Adopting 
Release, Section II.E.3.
    \196\ To the extent that aboriginal, indigenous, or tribal 
governments are subnational governments in foreign countries, 
payments to those government entities would be covered by the 
proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of identifying the foreign governments that received 
payments at a level below the major subnational government level, the 
proposed rules would permit an issuer to aggregate all of its payments 
of a particular payment type without having to identify the particular 
subnational government payee. The issuer would only be required to 
identify the type of administrative or political level of subnational 
government that received the payments. For example, an issuer could 
aggregate payments by payment type made to multiple counties and 
municipalities (the level below major subnational government level) and 
disclose the aggregate amount without having to identify the particular 
subnational government payee. The issuer would instead generically 
identify the subnational government payee (e.g., as ``county,'' 
``municipality'' or some combination of subnational governments).\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See proposed Instruction (14) to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast, for payments made at the major subnational government 
level, the issuer would have to disclose the particular major 
subnational payee. Under the proposed Modified Project Definition, 
however, the issuer could aggregate payments of a particular payment 
type made to that particular payee.\198\ For example, an issuer with 
extractive operations in the three oil sands regions of Alberta, Canada 
\199\ would be able to aggregate all of its fees paid for environmental 
and other permits to the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, 
Northern Sunrise County and the Municipality of Cold Lake, but would 
not have to identify any of those subnational governments. Instead, 
when disclosing the aggregate amount, the issuer would identify the 
payment type as ``fees'' and the government as ``county and 
municipality.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ See supra Section II.F.
    \199\ The three major oil sands regions in Alberta are the 
Athabasca, Peace River, and Cold Lake regions. See, e.g., Regional 
Aquatics Monitoring Program, ``The Oil Sands Described,'' available 
at http://www.ramp-alberta.org/resources/development/distribution.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For royalties paid to the Alberta Department of Energy, at the 
major subnational government level, however, the issuer would have to 
identify the payee as ``Alberta Department of Energy.'' It could 
aggregate all of the royalties arising from its operations in the three 
oil sands areas, when disclosing the aggregate amount and identifying 
the payment type as ``royalties.''
    We are proposing this option for aggregated disclosure of 
subnational government payments to reduce the potential for competitive 
harm that could result from implementation of the Section 13(q) rules. 
Some prior commenters stated that overly granular disclosure 
requirements could permit the reverse-engineering of an issuer's 
proprietary commercial information or otherwise cause the issuer 
competitive harm.\200\ Moreover, in disapproving the 2016 Rules, 
members of Congress were particularly concerned about the rules' 
potential for causing competitive harm.\201\ In light of these 
concerns, we are proposing to permit an issuer to aggregate payments 
made to entities below the major subnational level without having to 
identify the particular subnational government payee to mitigate the 
risk that an issuer could be exposed to potential competitive harm from 
the disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ See, e.g., Letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016); and 
Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \201\ See supra Section I.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Separately, under the proposed rules, a company owned by a foreign 
government would be defined as a company that is at least majority-
owned by a foreign government.\202\ Although we acknowledge the 
concerns of the commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release that 
argued for a more expansive definition,\203\ we believe it would be 
difficult for issuers to determine when the government has control over 
a particular entity outside of a majority-ownership context. In this 
regard, we note that the statute refers to a company ``owned'' by a 
foreign government, not ``controlled'' by a foreign government. 
Moreover, the ``control'' concept is explicitly included in Section 
13(q) in other contexts.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ See proposed Item 2.01(d)(7) of Form SD.
    \203\ See, e.g., Letters from Global Witness (Mar. 8, 2016) and 
PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \204\ Compare Section 13(q)(1)(B) with Section 13(q)(2(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the definition of ``Federal Government,'' we 
believe that Section 13(q) is clear in only requiring disclosure of 
payments made to the Federal Government in the United States and not to 
state and local governments. In this regard, we believe that typically 
the term ``Federal Government'' refers only to the U.S. national 
government and not the states or other subnational governments in the 
United States.
Request for Comment
    47. Should the definition of ``foreign government'' include a 
foreign government, a department, agency, or instrumentality of a 
foreign government, or a company owned by a foreign government, as 
proposed?
    48. Should we permit an issuer to aggregate payments made to 
subnational governments below the major subnational level without 
having to identify any particular subnational government payee, as 
proposed? If we should instead require the disclosure of

[[Page 2541]]

each subnational government payee, please explain why that approach 
would be more appropriate and address whether such a requirement could 
increase the potential for competitive harm.
    49. Should we include an instruction in the rules clarifying that a 
company owned by a foreign government is a company that is at least 
majority-owned by a foreign government, as proposed? Should we instead 
provide that a company owned by a foreign government is a company in 
which the foreign government is the controlling shareholder?
    50. Should the definition of ``foreign government'' include 
federally recognized American Indian or Alaska Native tribal entities?
    51. Should we alter our approach to the terms ``foreign 
government'' or ``Federal Government'' based on any developments since 
the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in 
this release?

H. Annual Report Requirement

    Section 13(q) mandates that a resource extraction issuer provide 
the payment disclosure required by that section in an annual report but 
otherwise does not specify the location of the disclosure, either in 
terms of a specific form or in terms of location within a form. We 
believe that resource extraction issuers should provide the required 
disclosure about payments on Form SD.
    Form SD is already used for specialized disclosure not included 
within an issuer's periodic or current reports, specifically, the 
disclosure required by the rule implementing Section 1502 of the 
Act.\205\ As such, we believe that using Form SD would facilitate 
interested parties' ability to locate the disclosure. We also believe 
that using Form SD would address issuers' concerns about providing the 
disclosure in their Exchange Act annual reports on Forms 10-K, 20-F or 
40-F.\206\ For example, it should alleviate the concern that the 
disclosure will be subject to the officer certifications required by 
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14. It would also allow the 
Commission, as discussed below, to adjust the timing of the submission 
without directly affecting the broader Exchange Act disclosure 
framework.\207\ As proposed, Form SD would require an issuer to include 
a brief statement in the body of the form in an item entitled, 
``Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers,'' directing 
readers to the detailed payment information provided in the exhibits to 
the form.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ Rule 13p-1 [17 CFR 240.13p-1]. See also Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-67716 (Aug. 22, 2012) [77 FR 56273 (Sept. 12, 2012)] 
(``Conflict Minerals Release'').
    \206\ See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, n.366-370 and 
accompanying text. Under the rules proposed in the 2012 Rules 
Proposing Release, a resource extraction issuer would have been 
required to furnish the payment information in its annual report on 
Form 10-K, Form 20-F, or Form 40-F. One commenter continued to 
support this approach after the 2012 Rules Adopting Release. See 
Letter from Susan Rose-Ackerman (Mar. 28, 2014) (``[t]here is no 
need for the cost of a separate report.'').
    \207\ In this regard, we considered permitting the resource 
extraction payment disclosure to be submitted as an amendment to 
Form 10-K, 20-F, or 40-F, as applicable, but we are concerned that 
this might give the false impression that a correction had been made 
to a previous filing. See also 2012 Rules Adopting Release, n.379 
and accompanying text.
    \208\ See proposed Item 2.01(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While Section 13(q) mandates that a resource extraction issuer 
include the relevant payment disclosure in an ``annual report,'' it 
does not specifically mandate the time period in which a resource 
extraction issuer must provide the disclosure. We believe fiscal year 
reporting would limit resource extraction issuers' compliance costs by 
allowing them to use their existing tracking and reporting systems for 
their public reports to also track and report payments under Section 
13(q).
    The 2016 Rules required resource extraction issuers to submit Form 
SD on EDGAR no later than 150 days after the end of the issuer's most 
recent fiscal year. We based this deadline in part on the need to avoid 
a conflict with the deadline for an issuer's annual report on Form 10-
K, 20-F, or 40-F under the Exchange Act.\209\ While we continue to 
believe that it is reasonable to provide a deadline that would be later 
than an issuer's Exchange Act annual report deadline, in light of the 
concerns about excessive compliance costs and burdens and potential 
competitive harm under the 2016 Rules,\210\ we are proposing a 
submission deadline for Form SD that is longer than the 150 day 
deadline. The proposed rules would require an issuer with a fiscal year 
ending on or before June 30 to submit Form SD no later than March 31 in 
the calendar year following its most recent fiscal year. For an issuer 
with a fiscal year ending after June 30, the Form SD submission 
deadline would be no later than March 31 in the second calendar year 
following its most recent fiscal year.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.G.3.
    \210\ See, e.g., supra note 54 and accompanying text.
    \211\ See proposed General Instruction B.2. of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the proposed submission deadlines would be 
sufficient to enable all resource extraction issuers to prepare timely 
disclosure regarding payments to governments made in their most recent 
fiscal year, no matter when their fiscal year-end may be, and therefore 
mitigate the compliance burdens under Section 13(q). We also believe 
that the lengthened submission deadlines would also address the 
concerns that the public disclosure of the payment information could 
cause competitive harm.
    We also considered the possibility that certain resource extraction 
issuers may be required to submit two reports on Form SD every year if 
we use a reporting period based on the fiscal year and they are subject 
to the May 31st conflict minerals disclosure deadline.\212\ 
Nevertheless, we continue to believe that the fiscal year is the more 
appropriate reporting period for the payment disclosure. We believe it 
would reduce resource extraction issuers' compliance costs when 
compared to a fixed, annual reporting requirement by allowing them to 
use their existing tracking and reporting systems for their public 
reports to also track and report payments under Section 13(q). In 
addition, although minimizing the number of Forms SD an issuer would 
need to submit if it was also subject to the conflict minerals 
disclosure rules could have benefits, we do not believe that those 
benefits outweigh those arising from a reporting regime tailored to a 
resource extraction issuer's fiscal year.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ General Instruction B.1 of Form SD. See also Exchange Act 
Rule 13p-1.
    \213\ Of the 236 companies that we estimate would be subject to 
the proposed rules, only 39 filed a Form SD pursuant to Rule 13p-1 
in 2018. In addition, we note that the conflict minerals reporting 
regime adopted a uniform reporting period, in part, because such a 
period allows component suppliers that are part of a manufacturer's 
supply chain to provide reports to their upstream purchasers only 
once a year. See Conflict Minerals Release, n.352 and accompanying 
text. The same reasoning does not apply to the issuer-driven 
disclosure under the proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    52. Should we require resource extraction issuers to provide the 
payment disclosure mandated under Section 13(q) on Form SD, as 
proposed? Should we alter our approach based on any developments since 
the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in 
this release? Would extending the submission deadline in this way help 
to mitigate potential competitive harm from the payment disclosures?
    53. What would be a suitable submission deadline? Should we base 
the furnishing deadline on an issuer's

[[Page 2542]]

calendar year-end rather than fiscal year-end?

I. Public Reporting

1. Public Disclosure of the Issuer's Payment Information, Including the 
Company Name
    Section 13(q) provides the Commission with the discretion to 
require public disclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers, 
including their names, or to permit nonpublic filings.\214\ For the 
reasons set forth below, we preliminarily believe that exercising our 
discretion to require public disclosure, including the issuer's name, 
might better accomplish the objectives of Section 13(q). We are 
therefore proposing that resource extraction issuers provide the 
required payment disclosure publicly through the searchable, online 
EDGAR system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ See API v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (finding that the 
Commission ``misread the statute to mandate public disclosure of the 
reports'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 13(q) requires us to adopt rules that, to the extent 
practicable, support the commitment of the Federal Government to 
international transparency promotion efforts relating to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas or minerals.\215\ We understand that 
existing transparency regimes require public disclosure of each 
reporting company's annual report, including the identity of the 
company.\216\ A public disclosure requirement of the payment 
information under Section 13(q), including the resource extraction 
issuer's name, would further the statutory directive to support the 
commitment of the Federal Government to international transparency 
promotion efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas or minerals by increasing the total number of companies 
that provide public, project-level disclosure. In addition, companies 
that could be subject to the proposed rules may already be publicly 
reporting under the Canadian or EU regimes, using a more granular 
contract-level definition of project. For these companies, there would 
likely be only minimal burden or harm due to public reporting under the 
proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ Section 13(q)(2)(E).
    \216\ See, e.g., ESTMA Specifications, Section 2.4 (``Reporting 
Entities are required to publish their reports on the internet so 
they are available to the public''); EITI Standard (2013) at 6 
(requiring all EITI reports to show payments by individual company 
rather than aggregated data) and EITI Standard (2016) at Section 
2.5(c) (in addition to individual company disclosure, requiring 
disclosure of the company's beneficial owners in EITI reports by 
2020); and EU Accounting Directive Arts. 42(1) and 45(1) (requiring 
disclosure of payments to governments in a report made public on an 
annual basis and published pursuant to the laws of each member 
state). We are not aware of any existing transparency regimes that 
do not require public disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We recognize that some previous commenters suggested that we permit 
issuers to submit their annual reports to the Commission non-publicly 
and have the Commission use those nonpublic submissions to produce an 
aggregated, anonymized compilation that would be made available to the 
public.\217\ Rather than follow this approach, the proposed rules seek 
to preserve the public disclosure of payment information while 
incorporating other changes that we believe would significantly 
alleviate, and in some cases eliminate, the concerns of commenters and 
certain members of Congress about the rules' potential adverse 
competitive effects. These changes from the 2016 Rules include (1) the 
Modified Project Definition--which would permit aggregation of project 
data at the major subnational level,\218\ (2) the proposal to permit 
aggregation of subnational government payments,\219\ (3) the proposed 
exemptions for conflicts with foreign law and pre-existing 
contracts,\220\ (4) the proposed targeted exemption allowing delayed 
reporting for exploratory activities,\221\ and (5) the extended filing 
deadline.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ See, e.g., Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016) and (Jan. 28, 
2011); BP (Feb. 16, 2016); Chevron (Feb. 16, 2016); and Royal Dutch 
Shell (Feb. 5, 2016); see also 2016 Rules Proposing Release, Section 
II.G.2 and 2016 Adopting Release, n.345.
    \218\ See supra Section II.F. Disclosure that is less granular 
and not as closely linked to individual contracts should also 
assuage concerns that competitors could reverse-engineer proprietary 
commercial information.
    \219\ See supra Section II.G. In this regard, one industry 
commenter on the 2016 Rules Proposing Release stated that its 
concerns about company-specific public disclosure causing 
competitive harm would be ``substantially mitigated'' if the 
Commission adopted a definition of ``project'' similar to the one we 
have proposed. See Letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \220\ See infra Sections II.J.1. and 2.
    \221\ See infra Section II.J.4.
    \222\ See infra Section II.H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While we preliminarily believe that the proposed rules strike an 
appropriate balance, we are also considering the alternative approach 
of permitting resource extraction issuers to submit their annual 
reports on Form SD to the Commission non-publicly and the Commission 
using those nonpublic submissions to produce an aggregated, anonymized 
public compilation. In this regard, we note that some commenters have 
indicated that public disclosure of each issuer's specific payments 
would increase the risk of competitive harm and that such public 
disclosure would force issuers to reveal highly confidential, 
commercially-sensitive information, which could also endanger the 
safety of an issuer's employees.\223\ Similarly, as discussed above, 
several members of Congress who voted to disapprove the 2016 Rules 
expressed anti-competitive concerns.\224\ We also note the view 
expressed by commenters that the disclosure of issuer-specific 
information is not necessary to achieve the statutory goal of 
transparency.\225\ These commenters have expressed the view that the 
information that is necessary to achieve the statute's purposes is the 
type and amount of payments to governments, which would be provided in 
an anonymized compilation. We acknowledge our statutory duty in a 
public rulemaking to consider whether a proposed action would promote 
competition in addition to protect investors.\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ One of these commenters also stated that these harms would 
not be mitigated by the European Union or Canadian disclosure 
regimes because 46 of the top 100 oil and gas companies are listed 
only in the United States, with many having no reportable operations 
in Europe or Canada, or only limited operations in those 
jurisdictions conducted through subsidiaries. See Letter from API 
(Feb. 16, 2016).
    \224\ See supra n.56.
    \225\ See, e.g., Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \226\ See Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78c(f)], 
which requires that, whenever the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking under the Exchange Act and is required to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to 
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote 
efficiency, competition and capital formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are interested in commenters' views on whether the rules, as 
proposed, would sufficiently alleviate concerns about adverse 
competitive effects or whether we should go further and permit 
nonpublic submission of the required payment information. If commenters 
feel that nonpublic submission is necessary or appropriate, it would be 
helpful if commenters could provide specific explanations for why 
nonpublic submission is warranted (i.e., what incremental benefits 
would it provide as compared to the proposed rules) and how aggregated, 
anonymized payment information would impact the statute's transparency 
goals. We welcome feedback from all interested parties on these points.
2. Public Compilation
    Consistent with Section 13(q), the proposed rules would provide 
that the Commission's staff will periodically make a separate public 
compilation of the payment information submitted on Forms SD available 
online, to the extent practicable.\227\ The staff may determine the 
form, manner, and timing of each

[[Page 2543]]

compilation.\228\ As proposed, the staff would not anonymize or change 
the information included in the compilation.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(e).
    \228\ See id. We do not anticipate that the staff would produce 
such a compilation more frequently than once a year.
    \229\ As noted above, we also are considering an alternative 
approach whereby resource extraction issuers would submit their 
annual reports on Form SD to the Commission non-publicly. Under this 
alternative approach, the Commission would use those nonpublic 
submissions to produce an aggregated, anonymized public compilation 
of the required payment information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, as discussed above, the Commission is also considering the 
alternative of making available a public aggregated, anonymized 
compilation instead of making public individual Forms SD. If we choose 
this alternative, we are considering including information relating to 
the aggregate payments that flowed to a particular jurisdiction by 
resource and extraction method.
Request for Comment
    54. Should the rules require public disclosure of payment 
information, as proposed? Would the proposed definition of ``project'' 
together with the proposed exemptions (discussed in Section II.J. 
below) and other provisions of the proposed rules sufficiently mitigate 
the risk of competitive harm that may arise from public disclosure?
    55. Should we instead permit issuers to submit the required payment 
information non-publicly and then provide an anonymized compilation? 
What are the incremental benefits and costs of permitting non-public 
submission and providing an anonymized compilation as compared to the 
proposed rules? Please be as specific as possible in your response.
    56. If we permit non-public submission of Form SD information and 
provide an anonymized compilation, what information should we include 
in the compilation? Should it include all information other than the 
identity of the issuer and identify payments by specific project, or 
should other information be omitted? Would the disclosure of the 
project raise similar competitive concerns as providing the issuer's 
identity? When and how often should the compilation be provided? Please 
be as specific as possible in your response.

J. Exemptions From Compliance

    The proposed rules include two new exemptions from reporting under 
Section 13(q) where disclosure is prohibited by foreign law or pre-
existing contracts. As the 2013 District Court opinion found, the 
Commission has the authority to grant exemptions with respect to 
Section 13(q).\230\ Several industry commenters specifically 
recommended these two exemptions in connection with prior rulemakings 
in order to reduce the risk of competitive harm that could result from 
the required Section 13(q) payment disclosure.\231\ According to these 
commenters, without these exemptions, a resource extraction issuer that 
faced a legal or contractual conflict would have to choose between 
complying with Section 13(q) or the host country law or contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ See API v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 21-23.
    \231\ See, e.g., Letters from the API (Feb. 16, 2016) and (Nov. 
7, 2013); Letter from Chevron (Feb. 16, 2016); and Letter from 
ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016); see also Letter from Nouveau (Feb. 16, 
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, if an issuer chose to provide the payment disclosure 
in violation of the host country law, the issuer could face the shut 
down and, in the extreme case, expropriation of its facilities in the 
host country, the imposition of fines or the withholding of 
permits.\232\ Similarly, an issuer whose contract prohibits the 
disclosure of payment information without the host government's 
permission, and who fails to obtain such permission, could also face 
adverse financial consequences. For example, the issuer would have to 
incur costs associated with having to renegotiate its contract with the 
host government in order to provide the payment disclosure required 
under Section 13(q).\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ See, e.g., Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \233\ See id. (stating that ``many companies' contracts with 
host governments contain clauses requiring the government's 
permission before a company publicly reveals payment information'' 
and noting that ``[a]lthough some of these contracts allow an issuer 
to disclose payment information to comply with securities laws, many 
do not, particularly older contracts.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These two new exemptions would be in addition to the targeted 
exemption for exploratory activities and transitional relief for 
recently acquired companies that were included in the 2016 Rules \234\ 
and that are being retained in the proposed rules.\235\ We are also 
proposing similar transitional relief for a resource extraction issuer 
that has recently conducted its initial public offering.\236\ Together, 
we believe that these provisions, as well as our continued willingness 
to consider additional exemptive relief on a case-by-case basis, would 
significantly mitigate the concerns of commenters and members of 
Congress about the burdens of Section 13(q) disclosure and the 
potential for competitive harm. As a result, we believe these 
provisions, when considered together with the other proposed changes to 
the 2016 Rules discussed in this release, should serve to satisfy the 
CRA's restriction on adopting rules that are in substantially the same 
form as the disapproved rules. We discuss each of these provisions in 
more detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.G.3. Some commenters 
on the 2016 rulemaking also sought an exemption for disclosure that 
could jeopardize the safety of an issuer's personnel. See the 2016 
Adopting Release, Section II.I.3. The Commission decided not to 
adopt such an exemption primarily because of its belief that issues 
involving safety concerns are inherently fact specific and require 
an analysis of the underlying facts and circumstances. Accordingly, 
the Commission reasoned that, rather than adopting an exemption 
regarding safety concerns that issuers might apply in an overly 
broad way, the better approach would be to permit issuers to raise 
such concerns by applying for exemptive relief on a case-by-case 
basis. See id. We continue to believe that a case-by-case exemptive 
process, which would be available under the proposed rules, is the 
more appropriate approach for addressing issuers' safety concerns. 
See proposed Rule 13q-1(d)(4). We also believe that other proposed 
provisions, such as the proposed exemptions for conflicts with 
foreign law or pre-existing contracts as well as the proposed 
definition of project, should help to alleviate concerns about 
employee safety that could potentially result from the proposed 
payment disclosure.
    \235\ See infra Sections II.J.3. and II.J.4.
    \236\ See infra Section II.J.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Exemption for Conflicts of Law
    We are proposing an exemption for when an issuer is unable to 
provide the required disclosure without violating the laws of the 
jurisdiction where the project is located.\237\ Unlike the exemption 
provided in the 2016 Rules, the proposed exemption would not require 
issuers to apply to the Commission for exemptive relief. Although the 
Commission stated in the 2016 rulemaking that a case-by-case exemptive 
approach for handling situations involving conflicts of law or contract 
prohibitions was preferable, after reconsidering the comments and with 
a view to limiting compliance costs and burdens, we are proposing to 
permit issuers to avail themselves of the exemptions without seeking 
individual relief on a case-by-case basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that the proposed approach would facilitate an issuer's 
timely submission of Form SD and the timely resolution of any conflict 
of laws situations with the host government. It also would alleviate 
some of the uncertainties of handling conflict of laws situations and 
the potential competitive harm that could result. In this respect, we 
note that one commenter in the 2016 rulemaking stated that, with a 
case-by-case approach, ``there would be substantial practical and 
administrative difficulties associated with obtaining timely exemptive 
relief'' from the Section 13(q)

[[Page 2544]]

rules.\238\ Another commenter expressed concern about a case-by-case 
approach for handling conflicts of law situations for a company 
threatened with the potential total loss of its operations in the host 
country.\239\ We anticipate that the proposed rule-based exemption for 
foreign law conflicts would substantially address these administrative 
difficulties and concerns about potential losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ See Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \239\ See Letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016).(stating that 
``we do not believe the mere possibility of an exemption--which may 
or may not be granted and even if granted could be revoked or 
challenged at any time--provides adequate comfort to companies and 
investors against the potential for being forced to halt operations 
in a country because of a conflict of laws situation, especially 
given that any such action by a company would likely represent a 
breach of the company's contractual obligation to the country and 
force the company potentially to suffer a total loss of its local 
operations--operations which could be worth tens of billions of 
dollars as previously indicated . . .'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, to the extent that the requirement to obtain a case-by-
case exemption (and the attendant uncertainties surrounding whether 
such relief might be granted) could inhibit companies from bidding on 
or initiating resource extraction projects in particular countries or 
otherwise impair the ability of companies to compete effectively for 
such projects, we anticipate that our revised approach would 
substantially eliminate these potential barriers.
    Although issuers could avail themselves of the exemption without 
further Commission action, an issuer seeking to rely on the exemption 
would be required to take certain steps to qualify for the exemption, 
including providing specified disclosures about its eligibility for 
relief. We believe that these proposed conditions would help ensure 
that issuers forgo disclosure only when there is a legitimate conflict 
of law, so that the exemption does not unreasonably frustrate the 
statutory goal of increasing transparency regarding resource extraction 
payments. Moreover, as is the case with all filings, the issuer's 
disclosure and reliance on this exemption would be subject to 
Commission staff review, which should discourage potentially 
inappropriate uses of the exemption.
    As proposed, the issuer would first have to take reasonable steps 
to seek and use exemptions or other relief under the applicable law of 
the foreign jurisdiction. After taking such steps and failing to obtain 
an exemption or other relief, the issuer would have to disclose the 
foreign jurisdiction for which it has excluded disclosure, the law 
preventing disclosure, its efforts to seek and use exemptions or other 
relief under such law, and the results of those efforts. This 
disclosure would be required in the body of Form SD. The issuer would 
also be required to furnish as an exhibit to Form SD a legal opinion 
from counsel that opines on the inability of the issuer to provide the 
required disclosure without violating the foreign jurisdiction's law.
    The proposed exemption would not be limited to pre-existing foreign 
laws. We acknowledge that this may provide an incentive for foreign 
jurisdictions to enact such laws. Although not eliminating this 
incentive, the absence of a similar exemption under the EU Directives 
or ESTMA, which generally require disclosure at a more granular level, 
should serve to limit the likelihood that jurisdictions will pass such 
laws. In this regard, one previous commenter observed that no country 
has adopted a rule or law prohibiting payment disclosures since the 
initial adoption of Section 13(q) in July 2010.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ Letter from API (Nov. 7, 2013) (``Despite their broad 
potential application, these exemptions are only invoked in limited 
cases and have not led to a notable spread of non-disclosure laws'' 
[referring to other Commission provisions that similarly permit a 
registrant to limit its disclosure, and in particular, mentioning 
Rule 1202 of Regulation S-K, which allows registrants to omit 
disclosure of proved reserves if that country's government prohibits 
such disclosure, and General Instruction E to Form 10-K, which 
allows registrants to omit any item or other requirement of Form 10-
K with respect to any foreign subsidiary to the extent that the 
required disclosure would be detrimental to the registrant.] See 
also Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016) (noting that currently ``two 
countries--Qatar and China--continue to prohibit the required 
disclosures.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    57. Should we provide an exemption from disclosing payments when an 
issuer is unable to provide such disclosure without violating the laws 
of the jurisdiction where the project is located, as proposed? If we 
should adopt such an exemption, should issuers be permitted to rely on 
it without first seeking relief from the Commission, as proposed?
    58. Should we include qualifying conditions to the exemption, as 
proposed? Would these proposed conditions provide adequate protection 
against potentially inappropriate uses of the exemption? Are the 
proposed required disclosures appropriate? For example, should we 
require an issuer to disclose the steps taken to seek and use 
exemptions or other relief under foreign law as a condition to claiming 
the conflicts of law exemption? Would requiring such disclosure 
exacerbate any conflict the issuer may have with foreign law? Should we 
include additional or different disclosures?
    59. Should we require a legal opinion to be furnished in support of 
the exemption, as proposed? If so, are the requirements for the legal 
opinion appropriate?
    60. An issuer would be required to take reasonable steps to seek 
and use exemptions or other relief under the applicable law of the 
foreign jurisdiction in which there is a conflict in order to qualify 
for the proposed exemption. Should we provide guidance about what would 
constitute reasonable steps to satisfy this condition of the exemption? 
If so, what should we include in the guidance?
    61. Are there other conditions to the proposed exemption that we 
should adopt instead of, or in addition to, the proposed conditions? 
For example, should we limit the exemption to foreign laws that pre-
date the effective date of the new rules or some earlier date, such as 
the date of this release? Should we limit the exemption to situations 
involving a conflict with a foreign national law and preclude its 
availability when the conflict arises with the law of a foreign 
subnational jurisdiction, such as a province? If so, please explain why 
any additional limitation would be appropriate.
2. Exemption for Conflicts With Pre-Existing Contracts
    We are proposing an exemption from disclosing payments when the 
terms of an existing contract prohibit disclosure.\241\ The exemption 
would only apply to contracts in which such terms are expressly 
included in writing prior to the effective date of the Section 13(q) 
rules. Similar to the exemption for conflicts of law, and for the same 
reasons, issuers would not need to seek the exemption on an individual, 
case-by-case basis. The issuer would, however, have to meet certain 
conditions to qualify for relief, and its disclosure and reliance on 
the exemption would be subject to staff review, which should help to 
discourage potentially inappropriate uses of the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As proposed, an issuer would first have to take reasonable steps to 
seek and use any contractual exceptions or other contractual relief 
(e.g., attempting to obtain the consent of the relevant contractual 
parties) to disclose the payment information. This obligation to take 
reasonable steps would not include an obligation to renegotiate an 
existing contract or to compensate the other contractual parties in 
exchange for their

[[Page 2545]]

consent to disclose the payments. If the issuer fails to obtain 
consent, the issuer would have to disclose the jurisdiction where it 
has excluded such disclosure, the particular contract terms preventing 
the issuer from providing disclosure, its efforts to seek consent or 
other contractual relief, and the results of those efforts. This 
disclosure would be required in the body of Form SD. The issuer would 
also be required to furnish as an exhibit to Form SD a legal opinion 
from counsel that opines on the inability of the issuer to provide the 
required disclosure without violating the applicable contractual terms.
    This exemption would differ from the conflicts of law exemption in 
that it would only apply to written terms of contracts that were 
entered into prior to the date the Section 13(q) rules take effect. We 
believe that this limitation is justified because issuers have control 
over the terms of their contracts and would be in a position to modify 
future contract terms accordingly. By contrast, issuers would not have 
similar control over the laws of the jurisdiction where they are 
engaged in the commercial development of natural resources.
Request for Comment
    62. Should we provide an exemption from disclosing payments when 
the written terms of a pre-existing contract restrict such disclosure, 
as proposed?
    63. Should we include qualifying conditions to the exemption, as 
proposed? Would these proposed conditions provide adequate protection 
against potentially inappropriate uses of the exemption? In particular, 
should we require an issuer to disclose the reasonable steps taken to 
seek and use any contractual exceptions or other contractual relief to 
disclose the payment information? Would requiring such disclosure 
exacerbate any conflict the issuer may have with a pre-existing 
contract term?
    64. Should we require a legal opinion to be furnished in support of 
the exemption, as proposed? If so, are the proposed requirements for 
the legal opinion appropriate?
    65. As proposed, the exemption would apply only to contracts that 
were entered into prior to the effective date of the Section 13(q) 
rules. Should it instead apply to contracts entered into by an earlier 
or later date? If so, please identify the different date and explain 
why it would be more appropriate.
    66. Should we provide further guidance on the scope of the proposed 
exemption for pre-existing contracts? For example, how should we treat 
amendments or extensions of pre-existing contracts that occur after the 
effective date of the Section 13(q) rules? Should the proposed 
exemption apply to such amendments or extensions?
3. Exemption for Smaller Reporting Companies and Emerging Growth 
Companies
    We propose to exempt smaller reporting companies \242\ and emerging 
growth companies \243\ from the scope of Rule 13q-1.\244\ As proposed, 
neither a smaller reporting company nor an emerging growth company 
would be required to provide any of the payment disclosure mandated by 
Section 13(q) and proposed Rule 13q-1. Given the potentially 
significant fixed cost component of the proposed rules,\245\ we believe 
that this proposed change from the 2016 Rules, eliminating the 
compliance burden for those companies that are less able to afford it, 
would reduce the overall cost of the proposed rules and address the 
related Congressional concerns.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ The Commission recently amended the definition of 
``smaller reporting company'' to expand the number of registrants 
that qualify as smaller reporting companies, and to reduce 
compliance costs for these registrants and promote capital 
formation, while maintaining appropriate investor protections. The 
amended definition of ``smaller reporting company'' includes 
registrants with a public float of less than $250 million (compared 
to $75 million in the earlier rule), as well as registrants with 
annual revenues of less than $100 million for the previous year and 
either no public float or a public float of less than $700 million. 
See Release No. 33-10513 (Jun. 28, 2018) [83 FR 31992 (Jul. 10, 
2018)].
    \243\ The term ``emerging growth company'' means an issuer that 
had total annual gross revenues of less than $1,070,000,000 during 
its most recently completed fiscal year. See the definition of 
emerging growth company in Securities Act Rule 405 and Exchange Act 
Rule 12b-2.
    \244\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(d)(3).
    \245\ See infra Section III.C.
    \246\ See supra n. 54 and accompanying text. This change would 
also help to fulfill Congress' mandate that the proposed rules are 
not substantially the same as the 2016 Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed exemption is consistent with our statutory duty in a 
public rulemaking to consider, in addition to investor protection 
concerns, whether an action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.\247\ It also is consistent with our treatment of 
smaller reporting companies and emerging growth companies in other 
rulemakings \248\ undertaken since the enactment of the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act (``JOBS Act'').\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ See supra n. 226.
    \248\ See, e.g., Pay Ratio Disclosure, Release No. 33-9877 (Aug. 
5, 2015) [80 FR 50103 (Aug. 18, 2015)] (exempting smaller reporting 
companies and emerging growth companies, among others, from the 
scope of the required pay ratio disclosure).
    \249\ Public Law 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    67. Should we exempt smaller reporting companies or emerging growth 
companies from the scope of Rule 13q-1, as proposed?
    68. Should we instead provide a longer transition period for 
smaller reporting companies or emerging growth companies to comply with 
Rule 13q-1? If so, what should be the compliance date for those 
companies?
    69. Should we instead adopt scaled disclosure requirements for 
smaller reporting companies or emerging growth companies under Rule 
13q-1? If so, what should those scaled disclosure requirements entail?
4. Targeted Exemption for Payments Related to Exploratory Activities
    We are proposing a targeted exemption for payments related to 
exploratory activities. We adopted such an exemption in the 2016 Rules 
after considering the concerns raised by industry commenters that the 
disclosure of payment information regarding exploratory activities 
could result in competitive harm to a resource extraction issuer.\250\ 
We have considered whether such an exemption would continue to be 
necessary in light of the proposed Modified Project Definition, which 
would provide the geographic location of a project at the national and 
major subnational political jurisdiction--rather than contract--level. 
We believe the exemption is necessary, given the inherently 
commercially sensitive nature of exploratory activities. We also have 
considered whether this targeted exemption is necessary in light of the 
proposed extended deadline for furnishing the payment information. 
Again, we believe it is, because of the difficulty of determining the 
precise point at which exploratory activities cease being commercially 
sensitive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.I.3. (citing Letter 
from API (Feb. 16, 2016), which explained the competitive harm that 
could result from the disclosure of bonus and other payments to the 
host government regarding high-potential exploratory territory and 
stating that a case-by-case exemptive approach would be insufficient 
to protect against competitive harm in those situations). See also 
Letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016) (discussing the competitive 
harm from the forced disclosure of payments that may allow 
competitors to identify new areas of potential resource development 
an issuer has identified, and to determine the value the issuer 
places on such resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the Modified Project Definition should help alleviate 
competitive harm, we remain concerned that such harm could still occur. 
For example, harm could occur if the major subnational political 
jurisdiction is

[[Page 2546]]

small or if other indicators, such as disclosure of a particular 
payment type that is associated with the commencement of exploratory 
activities, would provide enough information to reveal an issuer's 
exploratory activities. Thus, we continue to believe that a targeted 
exemption for disclosure of payments related to exploratory activities 
would mitigate the potential competitive harm that issuers might 
experience in these circumstances. Importantly, we do not believe it 
would substantially reduce the overall benefits of the disclosure to 
its users.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.I.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under this proposed targeted exemption, issuers would not be 
required to report payments related to exploratory activities in the 
Form SD for the fiscal year in which payments are made. Instead, an 
issuer could delay reporting such payments until it submits a Form SD 
for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the payments 
were made.\252\ We are proposing a limited, delayed approach because we 
believe that the likelihood of competitive harm from the disclosure of 
payment information related to exploratory activities diminishes over 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ In the Form SD for the fiscal year following the fiscal 
year in which the exploratory payments were made, the issuer would 
be required to report those exploratory payments as well as all 
applicable non-exploratory payments, if any, made during the fiscal 
year following the fiscal year in which the issuer made the 
exploratory payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of this proposed exemption, we would consider payments 
to be related to exploratory activities if they are made as part of the 
process of identifying areas that may warrant examination or examining 
specific areas that are considered to have prospects of containing oil 
and gas reserves, or as part of a mineral exploration program. In all 
cases, exploratory activities would be limited to activities conducted 
prior to the commercial development (other than exploration) of the 
oil, natural gas, or minerals that are the subject of the exploratory 
activities.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ See proposed Item 2.01(b)(1) of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In proposing this exemption, we considered the fact that the total 
payment streams from the first year of exploration that would be 
covered by the exemption should often be relatively small compared to, 
for example, the annual payment streams that would likely occur once an 
issuer commences development and production. Given this likelihood, we 
believe that any diminished transparency as a result of the one-year 
delay in reporting of such payments is justified by the potential 
competitive harms that we anticipate may be avoided as a result of this 
exemptive relief. Nevertheless, we are proposing to limit the exemption 
to one year because we believe that the likelihood of competitive harm 
from disclosing the payment information diminishes over time once 
exploratory activities have begun.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ We appreciate that the exploratory phase may vary from 
project to project, and that this variance can depend on such 
considerations as the geographic area in which the exploration is 
being undertaken and the type of resource being sought. In proposing 
to provide a one-year reporting delay, we looked to considerations 
in the oil and gas industry in particular as oil and gas industry 
commenters asserted a specific need for the exemptive relief. We 
understand that the exploratory period for oil and gas generally 
involves a seismic survey/analysis phase followed by an exploratory 
drilling phase. We further understand that, while the time periods 
for those activities can vary considerably, conducting seismic 
surveys and analyzing the data can take six months or more, while 
(at least for conventional onshore hydrocarbons) exploratory 
drilling and site clearance can potentially take a similar length of 
time. These considerations lead us to believe that one year is an 
appropriate period for the proposed delay in reporting exploratory 
payments, although we solicit comment below on other potential 
timeframes for relief. We further note that an issuer would be able 
to apply for an exemption on a case-by-case basis, as discussed 
below in Section II.J.6., if it believes that its individual 
circumstances warranted a longer exemptive period than the proposed 
one-year exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    70. Should we provide a targeted exemption for payments related to 
exploratory activities, as proposed? If so, should it be for longer or 
shorter than the proposed one-year delay in reporting? For example, 
should an issuer be permitted to wait until the second fiscal year 
following the fiscal year in which the exploratory activities occurred 
before having to provide the Section 13(q) disclosure?
    71. Should we alter our approach based on any developments since 
the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals in 
this release? For example, does the proposed definition of project, 
which is non-contract based, mitigate the need for, or support a 
modification to, the targeted exemption regarding exploratory 
activities?
5. Transitional Relief for Recently Acquired Companies
    We are proposing transitional relief with respect to recently 
acquired companies where such companies were not previously subject to 
Section 13(q) or an alternative reporting regime deemed by the 
Commission to satisfy the transparency objectives of Section 
13(q).\255\ The Commission provided this relief under the 2016 Rules 
based on the recommendations of commenters who asserted that such 
relief was necessary to reduce the compliance costs associated with 
recently acquired companies that may experience difficulty timely 
complying with the payment disclosure requirements.\256\ As noted by 
those commenters, the Commission adopted a similar provision under Rule 
13p-1,\257\ which also requires disclosure on Form SD.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ See proposed Item 2.01(b)(2) of Form SD. For purposes of 
this provision, an issuer that has recently acquired a company that 
has not been subject to an alternative reporting regime pursuant to 
proposed Item 2.01(c) of Form SD would be eligible for the 
transitional relief. Under that provision, a resource extraction 
issuer that is subject to the resource extraction payment disclosure 
requirements of an alternative reporting regime that has been deemed 
by the Commission to require disclosure that satisfies the 
transparency objectives of Section 13(q) may satisfy its Section 
13(q) disclosure obligations by including, as an exhibit to the Form 
SD, a report complying with the reporting requirements of the 
alternative jurisdiction. See infra Section K.
    \256\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.G.3. (citing Letter 
from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton (``Cleary'') (Feb. 17, 
2016) and Letter from Ropes & Gray (Feb. 16, 2016)).
    \257\ 17 CFR 240.13p-1.
    \258\ See Instruction (3) to Item 1.01 of Form SD. The proposed 
rules differ, however, from what is provided for under Rule 13p-1 
because disclosure under Rule 13p-1 occurs on a calendar year basis 
rather than a fiscal year basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under proposed Rule 13q-1 and Form SD, an issuer would be required 
to disclose resource extraction payment information for every entity it 
controls. Therefore, absent an exemption, an issuer would be required 
to include the acquired company's resource extraction payment 
information in its first annual submission after obtaining control. We 
are concerned that implementing the appropriate reporting mechanisms in 
a timely manner for a company that was not previously subject to 
reporting under Section 13(q) or an alternative reporting regime might 
remain a significant undertaking, notwithstanding our belief that the 
Modified Project Definition would reduce compliance costs and burdens 
compared to the 2016 Rules. As such, we are providing transitional 
relief with respect to such companies.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ As explained in the 2016 rulemaking, the proposed 
transitional relief would not apply to companies that have been 
subject to Section 13(q)'s disclosure requirements or to those of an 
alternative reporting regime prior to their acquisition because such 
companies should already be generally familiar with the Section 
13(q) requirements or have sufficient notice of them to establish 
reporting systems and prepare the appropriate disclosure during the 
fiscal year of their acquisition. See 2016 Adopting Release, Section 
II.G.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rules, issuers would not need to report payment 
information for a company that it

[[Page 2547]]

acquired or over which it otherwise obtained control, if the acquired 
company, in its last full fiscal year, was not obligated to disclose 
resource extraction payment information pursuant to Rule 13q-1 or an 
alternative reporting regime's requirements deemed by the Commission to 
satisfy Section 13(q)'s transparency objectives. In these 
circumstances, the resource extraction issuer would begin reporting 
payment information for the acquired company starting with the Form SD 
submission for the first full fiscal year immediately following the 
effective date of the acquisition. As under the 2016 Rules, and in 
contrast to the targeted exemption for exploratory activities, an 
issuer would not be required to provide the (excluded) payment 
disclosure for the year in which it acquired the company in a future 
Form SD.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    72. Should we provide transitional relief for an issuer that has 
acquired or obtained control over a company whose resource extraction 
payments are required to be disclosed and was not previously obligated 
to provide such disclosure, as proposed? Should we alter our approach 
based on any developments since the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in 
light of our other proposals in this release?
    73. Should the transitional relief be for a longer or shorter 
period than as proposed? For example, should an issuer that has 
acquired a recently acquired company, which is eligible for the 
proposed transitional relief, be permitted to wait until its second 
fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the acquisition occurred 
before having to comply with the Section 13(q) rules?
6. Transitional Relief for Initial Public Offerings
    We are proposing similar transitional relief for a resource 
extraction issuer that has completed its initial public offering in the 
United States in its last full fiscal year. Such an issuer would not 
have to comply with the Section 13(q) rules until the first fiscal year 
following the fiscal year in which it completed its initial public 
offering.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \261\ See proposed Item 2.01(b)(3) of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed transitional relief for companies that have recently 
completed their U.S. initial public offerings is a change from the 2016 
Rules. At that time, the Commission stated its belief that such 
companies would have sufficient notice of the payment reporting 
requirements to establish reporting systems and prepare the appropriate 
disclosure prior to undertaking the initial public offering.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An issuer that is preparing to conduct its U.S. initial public 
offering would have notice of the Section 13(q) rules. Thus, such an 
issuer would likely need to incur costs to establish a payment 
reporting system to comply with the Section 13(q) rules in advance of 
the public offering despite not knowing whether it will successfully 
conduct that initial public offering. The company would then incur 
these costs unnecessarily if it chose not to move forward with a 
planned initial public offering. We believe that the proposed 
transitional relief would prevent the situation where an issuer 
contemplating a U.S. initial public offering would need to postpone or, 
in the extreme case, refrain from conducting its U.S. initial public 
offering to avoid the Section 13(q) compliance costs. These outcomes 
would be contrary to the stated goals of Section 13(q) as they would 
delay or reduce the disclosure provided under that section.
Request for Comment
    74. Should we provide transitional relief for an issuer that has 
completed its U.S. initial public offering in its last full fiscal 
year, as proposed?
    75. Should we limit the transitional relief only to those issuers 
that, prior to completion of their initial public offering, have not 
been subject to an alternative reporting regime deemed by the 
Commission to require disclosure that satisfies the transparency 
objectives of Section 13(q)?
    76. Should the transitional relief be for a longer or shorter 
period than as proposed? For example, should an issuer that has 
recently completed its U.S. initial public offering be permitted to 
wait until its second fiscal year following the fiscal year in which 
the initial public offering occurred before having to comply with the 
Section 13(q) rules?
7. Case-by-Case Exemption
    To address any other potential bases for exemptive relief, beyond 
the rule-based exemptions and transitional relief described above, the 
proposed rules would provide that issuers may apply for exemptions on a 
case-by-case basis using the procedures set forth in 17 CFR 240.0-12 
(Rule 0-12 of the Exchange Act).\263\ Issuers seeking an exemption 
would be required to submit a written request for exemptive relief to 
the Commission. The request should describe the particular payment 
disclosures it seeks to omit (e.g., signature bonuses in Country X or 
production entitlement payments in Country Y) and the specific facts 
and circumstances that warrant an exemption, including the particular 
costs and burdens it faces if it discloses the information. The 
Commission would be able to consider all appropriate factors in making 
a determination whether to grant requests, including whether the 
disclosure is already publicly available and whether (and how 
frequently) similar information has been disclosed by other companies, 
under the same or similar circumstances. If the proposed rules are 
adopted, we would anticipate relying on Section 36(a) of the Exchange 
Act to provide exemptive relief under this framework. In situations 
where exigent circumstances exist, the Commission staff, acting 
pursuant to delegated authority from the Commission, could rely on 
Exchange Act Section 12(h) \264\ for the limited purpose of providing 
interim relief while the Commission considered the Section 36(a) 
exemptive application.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \263\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(d)(4).
    \264\ 15 U.S.C. 78l(h).
    \265\ See Section 36(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)] 
(providing the Commission with broad authority to provide exemptions 
when it is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and it 
is consistent with the protection of investors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This approach would allow the Commission to determine if and when 
exemptive relief may be warranted and how broadly it should apply, 
based on the specific facts and circumstances presented in the 
application. For example, an issuer could apply for an exemption in 
situations where disclosure would have a substantial likelihood of 
jeopardizing the safety of an issuer's personnel, or in other 
situations posing a significant threat of commercial harm that fall 
outside the scope of the proposed rule-based exemptions and 
transitional relief described above. The Commission could then 
determine the best approach to take based on the facts and 
circumstances, including denying an exemption, providing an individual 
exemption, providing a broader exemption for all issuers operating in a 
particular country, or providing some other appropriately tailored 
exemption.
Request for Comment
    77. In light of the other proposed exemptions and transitional 
relief, should the Section 13(q) rules provide that issuers may apply 
for exemptions on a case-by-case basis using the procedures set forth 
in Rule 0-12 of the Exchange Act, as proposed?

[[Page 2548]]

K. Exhibits and Interactive Data Format Requirements

    As required by Section 13(q), the proposed rules would require a 
resource extraction issuer to submit the required disclosure on EDGAR 
in an XBRL exhibit to Form SD.\266\ Providing the required disclosure 
elements in a machine readable (electronically tagged) format would 
enable users easily to extract, aggregate, and analyze the information 
in a manner that is most useful to them. For example, it would allow 
the information received from the issuers to be converted by EDGAR and 
other commonly used software and services into an easily readable 
tabular format.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(C) and 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(D)(ii). The 
Commission has defined an ``interactive data file'' to be the 
interactive data submitted in a machine-readable format. See 17 CFR 
232.11; Release No. 33-9002 (Jan. 14, 2009) [74 FR 6776 (Feb. 10, 
2009)], 6778, n.50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In proposing to require the use of XBRL as the interactive data 
format, we note that most commenters on the 2016 Rules Proposing 
Release who addressed the issue supported the use of XBRL.\267\ 
Commenters, however, did not similarly support the use of Inline XBRL, 
which is a particular form of XBRL that allows filers to embed XBRL 
data directly into an HTML document, eliminating the need to tag a copy 
of the information in a separate XBRL exhibit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.K.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recently proposed to require the use of the Inline 
XBRL format for the submission of operating company financial statement 
information and mutual fund risk/return summaries.\268\ We are not 
proposing to require a resource extraction issuer to use Inline XBRL 
when submitting the Section 13(q) payment information. Given the nature 
of the disclosure required by the proposed rules, which is primarily an 
exhibit with tabular data, we do not believe that Inline XBRL would 
improve the usefulness or presentation of the required disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \268\ See Release No. 33-10323 (Mar. 1, 2017) [82 FR 13928 (Mar. 
15, 2017)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rules, and consistent with the statute, a 
resource extraction issuer would be required to submit the payment 
information in XBRL using electronic tags--a taxonomy of defined 
reporting elements--that identify, for any payment required to be 
disclosed:
     The total amounts of the payments, by category; \269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ For example, categories of payments could be royalties, 
bonuses, taxes, fees, or production entitlements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The currency used to make the payments;
     The financial period in which the payments were made;
     The business segment of the resource extraction issuer 
that made the payments;
     The government that received the payments, and the country 
in which the government is located; and
     The project of the resource extraction issuer to which the 
payments relate.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ See proposed Item 2.01(a)(5) of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the electronic tags specifically required by the 
statute, a resource extraction issuer would also be required to provide 
and tag the type and total amount of payments, by payment type, made 
for each project and the type and total amount of payments, by payment 
type, for all projects made to each government.\271\ These additional 
tags relate to information that is specifically required to be included 
in the resource extraction issuer's annual report by Section 
13(q).\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ See proposed Item 2.01(a)(5)(i) through (ii).
    \272\ See Section 13(q)(2)(A)(i) through (ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rules would also require resource extraction issuers 
to tag the particular resource that is the subject of commercial 
development, the method of extraction, and the country and major 
subnational political jurisdiction of the project. While these three 
items of information also would be included in the project description, 
we believe that having separate tags for these items would further 
enhance the usefulness of the data with an insignificant corresponding 
increase in compliance costs.
    For the country in which the government and project is located and 
the major subnational geographic location of a project, we are 
proposing that the issuer use a tag that is consistent with the 
appropriate ISO code.\273\ As some previous commenters pointed out, 
such use would standardize references to those geographic locations and 
thereby help to reduce confusion caused by a particular project 
description.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ ISO 3166-1 pertains to countries whereas ISO 3166-2 
pertains to major subdivisions in the listed countries.
    \274\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.K.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the statute, the proposed rules would require a 
resource extraction issuer to include an electronic tag that identifies 
the currency used to make the payments. The statute also requires a 
resource extraction issuer to present the type and total amount of 
payments made for each project and to each government, but does not 
specify how the issuer should report the total amounts. We believe that 
the statutory requirement to provide a tag identifying the currency 
used to make the payment, coupled with the requirement to disclose the 
total amount of payments by payment type for each project and to each 
government, requires issuers to perform currency conversions when 
payments are made in multiple currencies.
    We are proposing an instruction to Form SD clarifying that issuers 
would have to report the amount of payments made for each payment type, 
and the total amount of payments made for each project and to each 
government, in U.S. dollars or in the issuer's reporting currency if 
not U.S. dollars.\275\ We understand that issuers may have concerns 
regarding the compliance costs related to making payments in multiple 
currencies and being required to report the information in another 
currency.\276\ As we did in the 2016 Rules,\277\ in order to address 
those concerns, we are proposing that a resource extraction issuer 
would be able to choose to calculate the currency conversion between 
the currency in which the payment was made and U.S. dollars or the 
issuer's reporting currency, as applicable, in one of three ways:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ See proposed Instruction 2 to Item 2.01 of Form SD. 
Foreign private issuers may currently present their financial 
statements in a currency other than U.S. dollars for purposes of 
Securities Act registration and Exchange Act registration and 
reporting. See Rule 3-20 of Regulation S-X [17 CFR 210.3-20].
    \276\ See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, n.485 and accompanying 
text.
    \277\ See 2016 Adopting Release, Section II.K.1. Only one 
commenter addressed the Commission's currency conversion approach in 
the 2016 rulemaking. That commenter stated that ``the three proposed 
methods for calculating the currency conversion when payments are 
made in multiple currencies provide issuers with sufficient options 
to address any possible concerns about compliance costs and 
comparability of the disclosure among issuers.'' Letter from 
Petrobras (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     By translating the expenses at the exchange rate existing 
at the time the payment is made;
     By using a weighted average of the exchange rates during 
the period; or
     Based on the exchange rate as of the issuer's fiscal year 
end.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \278\ See proposed Instruction 2 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rules, a resource extraction issuer would have 
to disclose the method used to calculate the currency conversion. In 
addition, in order to avoid confusion, we are proposing to require that 
an issuer choose a consistent method for all such currency conversions 
within a particular Form SD.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \279\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the statute, the proposed rules would require a 
resource extraction issuer to include an

[[Page 2549]]

electronic tag that identifies the business segment of the resource 
extraction issuer that made the payments. We are proposing to define 
``business segment'' as a business segment consistent with the 
reportable segments used by the resource extraction issuer for purposes 
of financial reporting.\280\ Defining ``business segment'' in this way 
would enable issuers to report the information according to how they 
currently report their business operations, which should help to limit 
compliance costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \280\ See proposed Item 2.01(d)(1) of Form SD. The term 
``reportable segment'' is defined in FASB ASC Topic 280, Segment 
Reporting, and IFRS 8, Operating Segments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, to the extent that payments, such as corporate income 
taxes and dividends, are made for obligations levied at the entity 
level, issuers could omit certain tags that may be inapplicable (e.g., 
project tag, business segment tag) for those payment types. Issuers 
would, however, have to provide all other electronic tags, including 
the tag identifying the recipient government.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ See proposed Instruction 4 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    78. Should we require the resource extraction payment disclosure to 
be electronically formatted in XBRL and provided in a new exhibit, as 
proposed? We are mindful of concerns about mandating technology that 
may one day become outdated. Is there anything we can do to address 
this problem in these rules?
    79. Should we alter our approach to the exhibit and interactive 
data format requirements described above based on any developments 
since the adoption of the 2016 Rules or in light of our other proposals 
in this release?
    80. In addition to the statutorily required tags, should we require 
electronic tagging to identify the type of resource, the method of 
extraction and the country and major subnational jurisdiction in which 
the project is located, as proposed? Would separate tags for these 
items be useful even if the information is required to be disclosed in 
the project description tag?

L. Alternative Reporting

    As noted above, several countries have implemented resource 
extraction payment disclosure laws.\282\ In light of these 
developments, and with a view towards limiting compliance costs, we are 
proposing a provision that would allow issuers to meet the requirements 
of the proposed rules, in certain circumstances, by providing 
disclosures that comply with a foreign jurisdiction's reporting regime. 
Specifically, this provision would apply if the Commission has 
determined that the alternate reporting regime requires disclosure that 
satisfies the transparency objectives of Section 13(q).\283\ The 
Commission proposed a similar approach to alternative reporting in 
connection with the 2016 Rules and all of the commenters who addressed 
the issue supported this approach.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \282\ See supra Section I.B.
    \283\ See Proposed Item 2.01(c) of Form SD.
    \284\ See, e.g., Letter from Africa Centre for Energy Policy 
(Feb. 16, 2016); Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016); Letter from BHP 
Billiton (Jan. 25, 2016); Letter from BP (Feb. 16, 2016); Letter 
from Calvert Investments (Feb. 16, 2016); Letter from Cleary (Feb. 
17, 2016); Letter from Encana Corporation (Jan. 25, 2016); Letter 
from Global Witness (Feb. 16, 2016); Letter from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 
2016); Letter from RDS (Feb. 5, 2016); Letter from Ropes & Gray 
(Feb. 16, 2017); and Letter from Total (Jan. 13, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed provision would allow an issuer subject to resource 
extraction payment disclosure requirements in a foreign jurisdiction to 
submit the report it prepared under those foreign requirements in lieu 
of the report that would otherwise be required by our disclosure rules, 
subject to certain conditions. The proposed rules would permit 
compliance under this framework only after the Commission has 
determined that the foreign reporting regime requires disclosure that 
satisfies the transparency objectives of Section 13(q). This framework 
for alternative reporting would, at least in part, allow a resource 
extraction issuer to avoid the costs of having to prepare a separate 
report meeting the requirements of our proposed disclosure rules when 
it already submits a report pursuant to another jurisdiction's 
requirements deemed by the Commission to satisfy Section 13(q)'s 
transparency objectives.
    An issuer would only be permitted to use an alternative report for 
an approved foreign jurisdiction or regime if the issuer was subject to 
the resource extraction payment disclosure requirements of that 
jurisdiction or regime and had made the report prepared in accordance 
with that jurisdiction's requirements publicly available prior to 
submitting it to the Commission.\285\ An issuer choosing to avail 
itself of this accommodation must submit as an exhibit to Form SD the 
same report that it previously made publicly available in accordance 
with the approved alternative jurisdiction's requirements.\286\ The 
issuer also would be required to state in the body of its Form SD that 
it is relying on this accommodation and identify the alternative 
reporting regime for which the report was prepared.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ See proposed Item 2.01(c)(1) through (2) of Form SD.
    \286\ See proposed Item 2.01(c)(2) of Form SD. The format of the 
report could differ to the extent necessary to comply with the 
conditions placed by the Commission on the alternative reporting 
accommodation. See id. For example, the report may not have been 
originally submitted in the home jurisdiction in XBRL or may not 
have been in English.
    \287\ See proposed Item 2.01(c)(3) of Form SD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, under the proposed rules, the alternative reports must 
be tagged using XBRL.\288\ We believe that requiring a consistent data 
format for all reports submitted to the Commission would enhance the 
ability of users to access the data and create their own compilations 
in a manner most useful to them. We also believe that requiring a 
consistent data format would better enable the Commission's staff to 
provide any additional compilations of Section 13(q) information.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \288\ See proposed Item 2.01(c)(4) of Form SD.
    \289\ We believe that these considerations justify not following 
the recommendation of a commenter on the 2016 Rules Proposing 
Release that we not require issuers to convert data into a different 
interactive data format to qualify for alternative reporting. See 
letter from BHP Billiton (Jan. 25, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An issuer relying on the proposed alternative reporting 
accommodation must also provide a fair and accurate English translation 
of the entire report if prepared in a foreign language.\290\ Given the 
specificity of the disclosure and the electronic tagging required under 
Rule 13q-1 and Form SD, we do not believe it would be appropriate to 
permit an English summary of a foreign language document that is being 
provided as an alternative report.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ See proposed Item 2.01(c)(5) of Form SD.
    \291\ Rule 306 of Regulation S-T (17 CFR 232.306) requires that 
all electronic filings and submissions be in the English language. 
If a filing or submission requires the inclusion of a foreign 
language document, Rule 306 requires that the document be translated 
into English in accordance with Securities Act Rule 403(c) (17 CFR 
230.403(c)) or Exchange Act Rule 12b-12(d) (17 CFR 240.12b-12(d)). 
Both of these rules require the submission of a fair and accurate 
English translation of an entire foreign language document that is 
being submitted as an exhibit or attachment if the document consists 
of certain specified material. If the foreign language document does 
not consist of such material, and the form permits it, a fair and 
accurate English language summary could be provided in lieu of an 
English translation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other than the XBRL and English translation requirements, an issuer 
that elects to use the alternative reporting option would not be 
required to meet a requirement under the proposed rules to the extent 
that the alternative reporting regime imposes a different requirement.
    Similar to the 2016 Rules, a resource extraction issuer would be 
able to follow the submission deadline of an approved alternative 
jurisdiction if it

[[Page 2550]]

submits a notice on or before the due date of its Form SD indicating 
its intent to submit the alternative report using the alternative 
jurisdiction's deadline.\292\ If a resource extraction issuer fails to 
submit such notice on a timely basis, or submits such a notice but 
fails to submit the alternative report within four business days of the 
alternative jurisdiction's deadline, as proposed, it would not be able 
to rely on the alternative reporting accommodation for the following 
fiscal year.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ See proposed Item 2.01(c)(6) of Form SD.
    \293\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We anticipate making determinations about whether a foreign 
jurisdiction's disclosure requirements satisfy Section 13(q)'s 
transparency objectives either on our own initiative or pursuant to an 
application submitted by an issuer or a jurisdiction. We would then 
publish the determinations in the form of a Commission order.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ Concurrently with the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, the 
Commission issued an order stating that a resource extraction issuer 
that files a report complying with the reporting requirements of the 
EU Directives, ESTMA, and the USEITI would satisfy its disclosure 
obligations under Rule 13q-1. See Release No. 34-78169 (Jun. 16, 
2016) [81 FR 49163] (July 27, 2016) (placing certain additional 
conditions on the use of USEITI reports because they are limited to 
disclosure of payments to the Federal Government and follow a 
different reporting schedule). See also 2016 Rules Adopting Release, 
Section II.J.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We anticipate considering, among others, the following criteria in 
determining whether a foreign jurisdiction's reporting regime requires 
disclosure that satisfies Section 13(q)'s transparency objectives: (1) 
The types of activities that trigger disclosure; (2) the types of 
payments that are required to be disclosed; and (3) whether project-
level disclosure is required and how ``project'' is defined. We also 
anticipate considering other factors as appropriate or necessary under 
the circumstances.
    Applications could be submitted by issuers, governments, industry 
groups, and trade associations.\295\ Applicants would follow the 
procedures set forth in Rule 0-13 of the Exchange Act to request 
recognition of other jurisdictions' reporting regimes as satisfying 
Section 13(q)'s transparency objectives.\296\ Under the proposed rules, 
the application would have to include supporting documents, and it 
would be referred to the Commission's staff for review.\297\ The 
Commission would publish a notice in the Federal Register that a 
complete application has been submitted and allow for public comment. 
The Commission could also, in its sole discretion, schedule a hearing 
before the Commission on the matter addressed by the application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ See proposed Rule 13q-1(c).
    \296\ Rule 0-13 (17 CFR 240.0-13) permits an application to be 
filed with the Commission to request a ``substituted compliance 
order'' under the Exchange Act.
    \297\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    81. Should we include a provision in the rules that would allow for 
issuers subject to reporting requirements in certain foreign 
jurisdictions to submit those reports in satisfaction of our 
requirements, as proposed? Are the conditions we have proposed for the 
use of the alternative reports, such as providing a fair and accurate 
English translation and requiring the information to be tagged using 
XBRL, appropriate? For example, should a resource extraction issuer be 
precluded from relying on the alternative reporting accommodation for 
the following fiscal year if it fails to submit notice on a timely 
basis that it intends to submit an alternative report using the 
alternative jurisdiction's deadline, as proposed? Should it be 
precluded from relying on the alternative reporting accommodation for 
the following fiscal year if it submits such notice but fails to submit 
the alternative report within four business days of the alternative 
jurisdiction's deadline, as proposed? Should we provide more than four 
days after the submission deadline of the approved alternative 
jurisdiction for a resource extraction issuer to submit the alternative 
report? If so, what should that time period be? Should we alter our 
approach based on any developments since the adoption of the 2016 Rules 
or in light of our other proposals in this release?
    82. Are the criteria that we have proposed to determine whether 
another foreign jurisdiction's reporting regime requires disclosure 
that satisfies the transparency objectives of Section 13(q) 
appropriate? Are there certain criteria that we should eliminate or 
substitute for any of the criteria discussed in this proposing release? 
If so, which criteria and why?
    83. Given the development of resource extraction payment disclosure 
rules in various jurisdictions, is there any reason why, when a final 
rule is adopted, we should not make a determination regarding whether 
certain foreign reporting regimes satisfy Section 13(q)'s transparency 
objectives? If we should decide to make such a determination, which 
jurisdictions should we consider? Would the proposed, broader 
definition of ``project'' allow for jurisdictions other than the 
European Union and Canada to be deemed alternative reporting regimes 
that satisfy the transparency objectives of Section 13(q)?

M. Treatment for Purposes of the Exchange Act and Securities Act

    The proposed rules would consider the disclosure provided pursuant 
to Section 13q-1 on Form SD as furnished to, but not filed with, with 
the Commission.\298\ The Commission originally proposed a similar 
approach in the 2012 Rules Proposing Release, but chose to require the 
disclosure to be filed in both of the subsequent adopting 
releases.\299\ In previously determining that the information should be 
``filed,'' the Commission noted that the statute defines ``resource 
extraction issuer'' in part to mean an issuer that is required to file 
an annual report with the Commission.\300\ This could suggest that the 
annual report that includes the required payment information should be 
filed.\301\ On the other hand, and as the Commission noted in the 2012 
Rules Proposing Release, Section 13(q) does not specifically state how 
the information should be submitted, nor does it state that the 
disclosure be included in the annual reports that are customarily filed 
with the Commission, such as Form 10-K, Form 20-F, or Form 40-F.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \298\ The proposed rules would use the term ``furnished'' when 
referring to the requirement to submit Form SD to provide Section 
13(q) payment information to the Commission. See also proposed 
General Instruction B.3 to Form SD (stating that, for purposes of 
Rule 13q-1, the information and documents furnished on Form SD shall 
not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under 
the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, unless a registrant 
specifically incorporates it by reference into such filing).
    \299\ See 2012 Rules Proposing Release, Section II.F.3; 2012 
Rules Adopting Release, Section II.F.3; and 2016 Rules Adopting 
Release, Section II.L.3.
    \300\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(D)(i).
    \301\ See Letters from Global Witness (Feb. 25, 2011); Publish 
What You Pay U.S. (Feb. 25, 2011); and Senator Benjamin Cardin, 
Senator John Kerry, Senator Patrick Leahy, Senator Charles Schumer, 
and Representative Barney Frank (Mar. 1, 2011).
    \302\ See 2012 Proposing Release, Section II.F.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In previous releases the Commission also looked at the nature of 
the disclosure and its likely materiality to investors to determine 
whether it should be filed. In the 2012 Rules Proposing Release, the 
Commission explained its proposal that the information be deemed 
furnished by noting that the nature and purpose of the disclosure 
required by Section 13(q) is qualitatively different from the nature 
and purpose of existing disclosure that has historically been required 
under Section 13 of the Exchange Act. In subsequent releases, however, 
the Commission stated that because materiality is a fact specific 
inquiry, it

[[Page 2551]]

was not persuaded that the nature of this disclosure should be 
determinative that the information should not be deemed filed.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \303\ See, e.g., 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.L.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We recognize that compelling arguments can be made on both sides of 
this policy choice.\304\ Given the concerns expressed by commenters and 
members of Congress regarding the burdens and costs of the required 
disclosure, and the CRA's restriction on issuing rules in substantially 
the same form as the 2016 Rules, we are proposing to treat the 
disclosure provided on Form SD pursuant to Rule 13q-1 as furnished to, 
but not filed with, the Commission. This approach would eliminate the 
possibility of Section 18 liability for the disclosure. It would also 
eliminate the possibility that the disclosure would be incorporated by 
reference into a filing under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
``Securities Act'') and be potentially subject to strict liability 
under Section 11 of the Securities Act, unless the issuer expressly 
incorporated such information.\305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \304\ For example, commenters who believed that the Section 
13(q) information should be deemed ``filed'' maintained that 
investors would benefit from the payment information being subject 
to Exchange Act Section 18 liability. Other commenters asserted that 
allowing the information to be furnished would diminish the 
importance of the information while requiring it to be filed would 
enhance the quality of the disclosure and ensure that it could be 
used reliably for investment analysis and other purposes. Commenters 
who favored treating the Section 13(q) disclosure as ``furnished'' 
emphasized that, in contrast to disclosure that is typically 
required to be filed under Section 13, the nature and purpose of the 
Section 13(q) disclosure requirements are not primarily for the 
protection of investors but, rather, to increase the accountability 
of governments for the proceeds they receive from their natural 
resources and to support international transparency promotion 
efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, 
or minerals, and that users of the payment information did not need 
the level of protection associated with Section 18 liability. See 
2012 Adopting Release, Section II.F.3.b.; and 2016 Adopting Release, 
Section II.L.2.
    \305\ For example, Form S-3 requires reports ``filed'' pursuant 
to Sections 13(a), 13(c), 14 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act prior to 
the termination of the offering to be incorporated by reference into 
the prospectus. Although Form SD would be the form used for 
disclosures under Section 13(q), Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act 
refers generally to periodic information, documents, and reports 
required by Section 13 reports with respect to securities registered 
under Section 12, not simply Section 13(a) reports. Thus, if Form SD 
were deemed ``filed,'' it could raise concerns that the payment 
disclosure would be incorporated by reference into a Securities Act 
filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, we believe that deeming payment information provided 
on Form SD as not ``filed,'' along with the other proposed changes to 
the 2016 Rules, would serve to address the concerns expressed by 
commenters and members of Congress about the costs and burdens of 
disclosure under the disapproved rules. At the same time, we believe 
that this change would not significantly undermine the transparency 
objectives of Section 13(q), as it would limit the liability associated 
with the required disclosures but not the content of those disclosures. 
Moreover, we note that, under the proposed rules, Section 13(q) 
disclosures would continue to be subject to the Exchange Act's general 
antifraud provisions.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \306\ See, e.g., Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-
5 thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    84. Should we deem the resource extraction payment disclosure as 
furnished to, but not filed with, the Commission, as proposed?

N. Compliance Date

    Section 13(q) provides that, with respect to each resource 
extraction issuer, the final rules issued under that section shall take 
effect on the date on which the resource extraction issuer is required 
to submit an annual report relating to the issuer's fiscal year that 
ends not earlier than one year after the date on which the Commission 
issues the final rules under Section 13(q).\307\ The proposed rules 
would require a resource extraction issuer to comply with Rule 13q-1 
and Form SD for fiscal years ending no earlier than two years after the 
effective date of the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \307\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(2)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed two-year transition period is the same as the 
transition period in the 2016 Rules. While we believe that the proposed 
rules would meaningfully reduce the compliance costs and burdens for 
issuers compared to the 2016 Rules, issuers that have not previously 
been subject to an alternative reporting regime would likely have to 
modify their internal systems to track, record and report the required 
payment information. The proposed two-year transition period should 
provide all issuers with sufficient time to establish the necessary 
systems and procedures to capture and track all the required payment 
information before the fiscal year covered by their first Form SD. It 
also should afford issuers an opportunity to make any other necessary 
arrangements to comply with Section 13(q) and the proposed rules, such 
as consulting with counsel on conflicts with foreign law or contractual 
terms, or seeking exemptive relief in other situations.
    We are also proposing to select a specific compliance date that 
corresponds to the end of the nearest calendar quarter following the 
effective date. For example, if the rules were adopted on December 18, 
2019, the compliance date for an issuer with a December 31, 2019, 
fiscal year end would be Tuesday, May 31, 2022 (i.e., 150 days after 
its fiscal year end of December 31, 2021, which falls on Monday, May 
30, 2022, and taking account of the Memorial Day holiday).
Request for Comment
    85. Is the proposed transition period and compliance date 
appropriate? Should we instead adopt a shorter or longer transition 
period? If so, what should that transition period be and why?
    86. Should the rules provide for a longer transition period for 
certain categories of resource extraction issuers, such as foreign 
private issuers, so as to provide them additional time to prepare for 
the disclosure requirements and the benefit of observing how other 
companies comply?

O. General Request for Comment

    We request and encourage any interested person to submit comments 
regarding:
     The proposed rules and amendments that are the subject of 
this release;
     Potential additions or changes to these proposals; or
     Other matters that may have an effect on the proposals, 
particularly any developments since Congress disapproved the 2016 Rules 
pursuant to the CRA.
    We request comment from the points of view of all interested 
parties. With regard to any comments, we note that such comments are of 
great assistance to our rulemaking initiative if accompanied by 
supporting data and analysis of the issues addressed in those comments.

III. Economic Analysis

A. Introduction and Baseline

    As discussed above, Section 13(q) mandates a new disclosure 
provision under the Exchange Act that requires resource extraction 
issuers to identify and report payments they make to foreign 
governments or the U.S. Federal Government relating to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. It does so to help 
promote accountability and combat corruption within resource-rich 
countries.
    We are sensitive to the costs and benefits of the rules we are 
proposing, and Exchange Act Section 23(a)(2) requires us to consider 
the impact that any new rule would have on

[[Page 2552]]

competition. In addition, Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act directs us, 
when engaging in rulemaking that requires us to consider or determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
    We have considered the costs and benefits that would result from 
the proposed rules, as well as the potential effects on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation. Many of the potential economic 
effects of the proposed rules would stem from the statutory mandate, 
while others would stem from the discretion we are exercising in 
implementing the statutory mandate. As noted above, our discretionary 
choices have been informed, in part, by the disapproval of the 2016 
Rules under the CRA, and in particular, the concerns expressed by 
members of Congress about the compliance costs and burdens of the 2016 
Rules and the CRA's restriction on promulgating a substantially similar 
rule.\308\ The discussion below addresses the costs and benefits that 
might result from both the statute and our discretionary choices, as 
well as the comments the Commission received about these matters in the 
2016 rulemaking.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \308\ Members of Congress who supported the resolution of 
disapproval expressed the view that the 2016 Rules would impose 
undue compliance costs on companies, undermine job growth and burden 
the economy, and impose competitive harm to U.S. companies relative 
to foreign competition. See supra Section I.C.
    \309\ Because our discretionary choices are informed by the 
statutory mandate, our discussion of the benefits and costs of those 
choices necessarily involves the benefits and costs of the 
underlying statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The baseline the Commission uses to analyze the potential effects 
of the proposed rules is the current set of legal requirements and 
market practices.\310\ To the extent not already encompassed by 
existing regulations and current market practices, the proposed rules 
likely would have a significant impact on the disclosure practices of, 
and compliance costs faced by, resource extraction issuers. The overall 
magnitude of the potential costs of the proposed disclosure 
requirements will depend on the number of affected issuers and 
individual issuers' costs of compliance. In addition, the proposed 
rules could impose burdens on competition, although as discussed 
elsewhere in this release, the changes we are making from the 2016 
Rules are intended to mitigate those burdens. We expect that the 
proposed rules would affect both U.S. issuers and foreign issuers that 
meet the definition of ``resource extraction issuer'' in much the same 
way, except for those issuers already subject to requirements adopted 
in the EEA member countries or Canada, as discussed above in Section 
I.B. The discussion below describes the Commission's understanding of 
the markets and issuers that would be affected by the proposed 
rules.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \310\ See supra Sections I.A. through C. for a discussion of the 
current legal requirements and significant international 
transparency promotion regimes that affect market practices.
    \311\ In addition to our analysis against the baseline, we have 
noted where the proposed rules differ in their economic effects from 
the 2016 Rules to illustrate why we think those choices address the 
concerns expressed by members of Congress about the 2016 Rules' 
costs and potential competitive harm. To be clear, however, our 
assessment of the proposed rules' economic effects is measured 
against the current state of the world in which issuers are not 
required by U.S. law to disclose resource extraction payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To estimate the number of potentially affected issuers, we use data 
from Exchange Act annual reports for the period January 1, 2018, 
through September 30, 2019. We consider all Forms 10-K, 20-F, and 40-F 
filed during this period by issuers with oil, natural gas, and mining 
Standard Industrial Classification (``SIC'') codes \312\ and thus are 
most likely to be resource extraction issuers. We also consider filings 
by issuers that do not have the above-mentioned oil, natural gas, and 
mining SIC codes and add them to the list of potentially affected 
issuers if we determine that they might be affected by the proposed 
rules.\313\ In addition, we attempt to remove issuers that use oil, 
natural gas, and mining SIC codes but appear to be more accurately 
classified under other SIC codes based on the disclosed nature of their 
business. Finally, we exclude royalty trusts from our analysis because 
we believe it is uncommon for such companies to make the types of 
payments that would be covered by the proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \312\ Specifically, the oil, natural gas, and mining SIC codes 
considered are 1000, 1011, 1021, 1031, 1040, 1041, 1044, 1061, 1081, 
1090, 1094, 1099, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1231, 1311, 1321, 1381, 1382, 
1389, 1400, 2911, 3330, 3331, 3334, and 3339.
    \313\ These are issuers whose primary business is not 
necessarily resource extraction but which have some resource 
extraction operations, such as ownership of mines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From these filings, we estimate that the number of potentially 
affected issuers is 677. We note that this number does not reflect the 
number of issuers that actually made resource extraction payments to 
governments in the period under consideration but rather represents the 
estimated number of issuers that might make such payments. It is 
possible that some potentially affected issuers, as a response to the 
Section 13(q) rules, may decide it is necessary to delist from an 
exchange in the United States, deregister, and cease reporting with the 
Commission to avoid the potential compliance costs. We believe, 
however, that such a scenario is unlikely given the higher cost of 
capital and potentially limited access to capital in the future that 
issuers who deregister would incur.
    In determining which issuers are likely to bear the full costs of 
compliance with the proposed rules, we make three adjustments to the 
list of affected issuers. First, we exclude issuers that are smaller 
reporting companies and emerging growth companies since the proposed 
rules provide an exemption for those issuers. Second, we exclude 
issuers that are subject to disclosure requirements in foreign 
jurisdictions that generally require more granular disclosure than the 
proposed rules and therefore likely already are bearing compliance 
costs for such disclosure. Third, we exclude small issuers that likely 
could not have made any payment above the de minimis amount of $750,000 
to any government entity in the period January 1, 2018 through 
September 30, 2019.
    First, among the 677 issuers that we estimate would be affected by 
the proposed rules, 211 reported being smaller reporting companies 
(SRCs) and 191 reported being emerging growth companies (EGCs) in the 
period January 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019. There are 84 
issuers that reported both SRC and EGC status during this period. 
Subtracting the SRCs and EGCs (total of 318) from the sample of 677 
potentially affected issuers results in 359 issuers that would be 
subject to the requirements of the proposed rules.
    To address the second consideration, we searched the filed annual 
forms for issuers that have a business address, are incorporated, or 
are listed on markets in the EEA or Canada.\314\ For purposes of our 
analysis, we assume that issuers in these jurisdictions already are 
providing more granular resource extraction payment disclosure than the 
disclosure that would be required by the proposed rules and thus that 
the additional costs to comply with the proposed rules would be much 
lower than costs for

[[Page 2553]]

other issuers.\315\ We identified 109 such issuers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \314\ We assume that an issuer is subject to the EEA or Canadian 
rules if it is listed on a stock exchange located in one of these 
jurisdictions or if it has a business address or is incorporated in 
the EEA or Canada and its total assets are greater than $50 million. 
The latter criterion is a proxy for multipronged eligibility 
criteria underlying both EEA and Canadian rules that include issuer 
assets, revenues, and the number of employees.
    \315\ We are proposing an alternative reporting option for 
resource extraction issuers that are subject to foreign disclosure 
requirements that the Commission determines satisfy the transparency 
objectives of Section 13(q). See infra Section III.C.4. for a 
discussion concerning how this alternative reporting option could 
potentially reduce compliance costs to a negligible amount for 
eligible issuers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, among the remaining 250 issuers (i.e., 359 minus 109) we 
searched for issuers that, in the most recent fiscal year as of the 
date of their Exchange Act annual report filing, reported that they are 
shell companies and thus have no or only nominal operations, or have 
both revenues and absolute value net cash flows from investing 
activities of less than the de minimis payment threshold of $750,000. 
Under these financial constraints, such issuers are unlikely to have 
made any non-de minimis and otherwise reportable payments to 
governments and therefore are unlikely to be subject to the proposed 
reporting requirements. We identified 14 such issuers.
    Taking these estimates of the number of excluded issuers together, 
we estimate that approximately 236 issuers (i.e., 677 minus 318 minus 
109 minus 14) would bear the full costs of compliance with the proposed 
rules.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \316\ Because it may be uncertain at the beginning of a 
financial period as to whether payments from an issuer will exceed 
the de minimis threshold by the end of such period, an excluded 
issuer may incur costs to collect the information to be reported 
under the proposed rules even if that issuer is not subsequently 
required to file an annual report on Form SD. To the extent that 
excluded issuers incur such costs, our estimate may understate the 
aggregate compliance costs associated with the proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the following economic analysis, we discuss the potential 
benefits and costs and likely effects on efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation that might result from both the new reporting 
requirement mandated by Congress and from the specific implementation 
choices that we have made in formulating the proposed rules.\317\ We 
analyze these potential economic effects through a qualitative 
discussion of the potential costs and benefits that might result from 
the payment reporting requirement (Sections III. B and III.C) and our 
specific implementation choices (Section III.D), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \317\ Our consideration of potential benefits and costs and 
likely effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation 
also is reflected throughout the discussion in Section II above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although aspects of the proposed rules are similar to the 2016 
Rules, we have proposed several changes that we believe would have a 
significant effect on the resulting compliance costs and burden. These 
proposed changes include: (1) The Modified Project Definition, which 
requires disclosure at the national and major subnational political 
jurisdiction, as opposed to the contract, level; (2) the addition of 
two new conditional exemptions for situations in which a foreign law or 
a pre-existing contract prohibits the required disclosure; (3) 
revisions to the definition of ``control'' to exclude entities or 
operations in which an issuer has a proportionate interest; (4) 
limitations on liability for the required disclosure by deeming the 
payment information to be furnished to, but not filed with, the 
Commission; (5) the addition of an instruction in Form SD that would 
permit an issuer to aggregate payments by payment type made at a level 
below the major subnational government level; (6) revisions to the 
filing deadline; and (7) the addition of transitional relief for 
issuers that have recently completed their U.S. initial public 
offerings. As explained below, we preliminarily believe that these 
proposed changes would meaningfully reduce the compliance costs and 
burden for issuers compared to the compliance costs and burden 
estimated for the 2016 Rules.\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \318\ We also are proposing two additional changes to the 2016 
Rules, which should further help to reduce the proposed rules' 
compliance costs or their potential for competitive harm. One change 
would provide transitional relief for issuers that have recently 
completed their U.S. initial public offerings. The other change 
would define ``not de minimis'' to mean any payment made to each 
foreign government in a host country or the Federal Government that 
equals or exceeds $150,000, subject to the condition that payment 
disclosure for a project is only required if the total project 
payments equal or exceed $750,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Potential Benefits Resulting From the Payment Reporting Requirement

    Section 13(q) seeks to combat global corruption by improving 
transparency about the payments that companies in the extractive 
industries make to foreign governments and the Federal Government. 
While these statutory goals and intended benefits are of potential 
global significance, the potential positive economic effects that may 
result cannot be readily quantified with any precision. The current 
empirical evidence on the direct causal effect of increased 
transparency in the resource extraction sector on societal outcomes is 
inconclusive,\319\ and several academic papers have noted the inherent 
difficulty in empirically validating a causal link between transparency 
interventions and governance improvements.\320\ Additionally, some 
countries may change their behavior as a result of the adoption of the 
proposed rules in a way that diminishes the potential benefits of the 
rules. For example, some foreign jurisdictions may prefer to deal with 
companies that are not subject to the Section 13(q) disclosure 
requirements, or take steps to prohibit such disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \319\ For positive findings, see Caitlin C. Corrigan, ``Breaking 
the resource curse: Transparency in the natural resource sector and 
the extractive industries transparency initiative,'' Resources 
Policy, 40 (2014), 17-30 (finding that the negative effect of 
resource abundance on GDP per capita, the capacity of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and the level of rule of 
law is mitigated in EITI countries but noting that the EITI has 
little effect on the level of democracy, political stability and 
corruption (the author also submitted a comment letter in the 2016 
rulemaking attaching an updated version of the study; see Letter 
from Caitlin C. Corrigan (Feb. 16, 2016))); Liz David-Barrett and 
Ken Okamura, ``The Transparency Paradox: Why Do Corrupt Countries 
Join EITI?'', Working Paper No. 38, European Research Centre for 
Anti-Corruption and State-Building (Nov. 2013) (finding that EITI 
compliant countries gain access to increased aid the further they 
progress through the EITI implementation process and that EITI 
achieves results in terms of reducing corruption), available at 
https://eiti.org/document/transparency-paradox-why-do-corrupt-countries-join-eiti, Maya Schmaljohann, ``Enhancing Foreign Direct 
Investment via Transparency? Evaluating the Effects of the EITI on 
FDI,'' University of Heidelberg Discussion Paper Series No. 538 
(Jan. 2013) (finding that joining the EITI increases the ratio of 
the net foreign direct investment inflow to GDP by two percentage 
points); Paul F. Villar and Elissaios Papyrakis, ``Evaluating the 
Impact of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
on Corruption in Zambia. The Extractive Industries and Society, 
(2017), forthcoming (finding that EITI implementation reduced 
corruption in Zambia); Elissaios Papyrakis, Matthias Rieger, and 
Emma Gilberthorpe, ``Corruption and the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative,'' Journal of Development Studies, 53 
(2017), 295-309 (finding that EITI reduces corruption). For negative 
findings, see [Ouml]lcer, Dilan (2009): Extracting the Maximum from 
the EITI (Development Centre Working Papers No. 276): Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (finding that the EITI has 
not been able to significantly lower corruption levels); Benjamin J. 
Sovacool, Goetz Walter, Thijs Van De Graaf, and Nathan Andrews, 
``Energy Governance, Transnational Rules, and the Resource Curse: 
Exploring the Effectiveness of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI),'' World Development, 83 (2017), 179-
192 (finding that the first 16 countries that attained EITI 
compliance do not perform better than other countries or their own 
past performance in terms of accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
corruption, foreign direct investment, and GDP growth); Kerem Oge, 
``Which transparency matters? Compliance with anti-corruption 
efforts in extractive industries,'' Resources Policy, 49 (2016), 41-
50 (finding that EITI disclosure had no significant effect on 
corruption in EITI countries).
    \320\ See Andr[eacute]s Mej[iacute]a Acosta, ``The Impact and 
Effectiveness of Accountability and Transparency Initiatives: The 
Governance of Natural Resources,'' Development Policy Review, 31-S1 
(2013), s89-s105; Alexandra Gillies and Antoine Heuty, ``Does 
Transparency Work? The Challenges of Measurement and Effectiveness 
in Resource-Rich Countries,'' Yale Journal of International Affairs, 
Spring/Summer 2011, 25-42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the 2016 Rules Proposing Release, we received 
several comments on quantifying the potential

[[Page 2554]]

economic benefits of the rules that we discuss in detail below.\321\ 
Although these comments presented studies that attempt to quantify 
those benefits, as discussed below, all have certain limitations that 
we believe prevent us from relying on them to quantify the proposed 
rules' potential to improve accountability and governance in resource-
rich countries. Furthermore, no other commenters included reliable data 
that would allow us to quantify the potential economic benefits of the 
proposed rules or suggested a source of data or a methodology that we 
could readily look to in doing so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \321\ See Letter from Profs. Anthony Cannizzaro & Robert Weiner 
(Feb. 11, 2016) (``Cannizzaro & Weiner''). See also Letter from API 
(Feb. 16, 2016) and Letter from Publish What You Pay--US (third of 
three letters on Mar. 8, 2016) (both referring to a study by P. 
Healy and G. Serafeim). These letters and studies primarily focus on 
benefits to issuers and investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is important to note, however, that Congress has directed us to 
promulgate a rule requiring disclosure of resource extraction payments. 
Thus, in assessing the potential benefits resulting from the rule, we 
believe it reasonable to rely on Congress' determination that such a 
rule will produce the foreign policy and other benefits discussed above 
that Congress sought in imposing this mandate.\322\ In that regard, we 
note that Congress did not repeal the mandate under Section 13(q), and 
in fact, some members of Congress who supported the joint resolution to 
disapprove the 2016 Rules also expressed their ``strong support'' for 
the transparency and anti-corruption objectives of the rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ We note that these intended benefits differ from the 
investor protection benefits that our disclosure rules typically 
strive to achieve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We further note that none of the industry commenters in the 2016 
rulemaking expressed the view that the disclosures required by Section 
13(q) would fail to help produce anti-corruption and accountability 
benefits. Indeed, several commenters expressly acknowledged that 
transparency produces such benefits (notwithstanding the inability to 
quantify those benefits reliably). For example, one industry commenter 
stated that ``[t]ransparency by governments and companies alike 
regarding revenue flows from the extraction of natural resources in a 
manner which is meaningful, practical and easily understood by 
stakeholders reduces the opportunity for corruption.'' \323\ Another 
industry commenter expressed its view ``that the disclosure of revenues 
received by governments and payments made by the extractive-industry 
companies to governments could lead to improved governance in resource-
rich countries.'' \324\ Yet another industry commenter stated that 
resource-revenue transparency efforts ``are fundamental building blocks 
of good resource governance and are key to fostering better decision-
making over public revenues.'' \325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \323\ See Letter from BHP Billiton (Jan. 25, 2016).
    \324\ See Letter from Chevron (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \325\ See Letter from Eni SpA (Jan. 31, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that the Section 13(q) disclosures increase 
transparency and reduce corruption, they could increase efficiency and 
capital formation either directly abroad or indirectly in the United 
States. While the objectives of Section 13(q) may not appear to be ones 
that would necessarily generate measurable, direct economic benefits to 
investors or issuers, investors and issuers might benefit from the 
proposed rules' indirect effects. In the following paragraphs, we 
discuss existing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that 
reduced corruption and better governance could have longer term 
positive impacts on economic growth and investment in certain countries 
where the affected issuers operate, which could in turn benefit issuers 
and their shareholders.
    Although the research and data available at this time do not allow 
us to draw any firm conclusions, we have considered several theoretical 
causal explanations for why reductions in corruption may increase 
economic growth and political stability, which in turn may reduce 
investor risk.\326\ High levels of corruption could introduce 
inefficiencies in market prices as a result of increased political 
risks and the potential awarding of projects to companies for reasons 
other than the merit of their bids. This, in turn, could prop up 
inefficient companies and limit investment opportunities for others. 
These potential distortions could have a negative impact on the 
economies of countries with high corruption, particularly to the extent 
that potential revenue streams are diminished or diverted. 
Additionally, the cost of corrupt expenditures, direct or indirect, 
impacts profitability, and, if the cost is sufficiently high, some 
potentially economically efficient or productive investments may not be 
made. Thus, reducing corruption could increase the number of productive 
investments and the level of profitability of each investment and could 
lead to improved efficiency in the allocation of talent, technology, 
and capital. Insofar as these effects are realized, each of them could 
benefit issuers operating in countries with reduced corruption levels. 
These and other considerations form a basis for several dynamic general 
equilibrium models predicting a negative relationship between 
corruption and economic development.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \326\ See, e.g., reviews by P. Bardhan, ``Corruption and 
Development: A Review of Issues,'' Journal of Economic Literature, 
35, no. 3, 1320-1346 (1997); J. Svensson, ``Eight Questions about 
Corruption,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, no. 3, 19-42 
(2005) (``Svensson Study'').
    \327\ See, e.g., I. Ehrlich and F. Lui ``Bureaucratic Corruption 
and Endogenous Economic Growth,'' Journal of Political Economy, 107 
(6), 270-293 (1999); K. Blackburn, N. Bose, and E.M. Haque, ``The 
Incidence and Persistence of Corruption in Economic Development,'' 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 2447-2467 (2006); C. 
Leite and J. Weidmann, ``Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural 
Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,'' International Monetary 
Fund Working Paper No. 99/85 (July 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of empirical studies have also shown that reducing 
corruption might result in an increase in the level of GDP and a higher 
rate of economic growth through more private investments, better 
deployment of human capital, and political stability.\328\ Other 
studies find that corruption reduces economic growth both directly and 
indirectly, through lower investments.\329\ To the extent that 
increased transparency could lead to a reduction in corruption and, in 
turn, improved political stability and investment climate, some 
investors may consider such factors in their investment decisions, 
including when pricing resource extraction assets of affected issuers 
operating in these countries.\330\ A commenter on the 2016 Rules cited 
its own study suggesting that high levels of corruption (measured by 
bribery) correspond to lower levels of economic development.\331\ The 
study

[[Page 2555]]

found that higher levels of bribery were associated with higher 
maternal mortality, lower youth literacy rate, and lower access to 
basic sanitation. The same commenter cited another study that suggested 
that even small improvements in a country's governance resulted in 
higher income and lower infant mortality rates in the long run.\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ See, e.g., P. Mauro, ``The effects of corruption on 
growth, investment and government expenditure: A cross country 
analysis,'' in K.A. Elliot (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy, 
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 83-107 
(1997); H. Poirson, ``Economic Security, Private Investment, and 
Growth in Developing Countries,'' International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper No. 98/4 (Jan. 1998); Institute for Economics and 
Peace, Peace and Corruption Report (2015).
    \329\ See Pak Hung Mo, ``Corruption and Economic Growth,'' 
Journal of Comparative Economics 29, 66-79 (2001); K. Gyimah-
Brempong, ``Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in 
Africa,'' Economics of Governance 3, 183-209 (2002); Pierre-
Guillaume M[eacute]on and Khalid Sekkat, ``Does corruption grease or 
sand the wheels of growth?'' Public Choice 122, 69-97 (2005).
    \330\ Several studies present evidence that reduction in 
corruption increases foreign direct investments. See, e.g., S.J. 
Wei, ``How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?'' NBER 
Working Paper 6030 (1997); G. Abed and H. Davoodi, ``Corruption, 
Structural Reforms, and Economic Performance in the Transition 
Economies,'' International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 00/132 
(July 2000).
    \331\ See Letter from Transparency International-USA (Feb. 16, 
2016).
    \332\ See id., referring to Daniel Kaufmann, ``Governance 
Matters 2010: Worldwide Governance Indicators Highlight Governance 
Successes, Reversals and Failures,'' available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/09/24-wgi-kaufmann.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There also could be positive externalities from increased investor 
confidence to the extent that improved economic growth and investment 
climate could benefit other issuers working in those countries. 
Although we believe the evidence is presently too inconclusive to allow 
us to predict the likelihood that such a result would occur, we note 
that there is some empirical evidence suggesting that lower levels of 
corruption might reduce the cost of capital and improve valuations for 
some issuers.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \333\ See D. Kaufmann and S.J. Wei ``Does `Grease Money' Speed 
Up the Wheels of Commerce?'' NBER Working Paper 7093 (1999) 
(finding, based on survey evidence, that firms that pay fewer bribes 
have lower, not higher, cost of capital); C. Lee and D. Ng, 
``Corruption and International Valuation: Does Virtue Pay?'' Journal 
of Investing, 18, no. 4, 23-41 (2009) (finding that firms from more 
corrupt countries trade at significantly lower market multiples).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One prior commenter asserted that the studies cited above discuss 
primarily a single form of corruption--bribery--that in the commenter's 
view is not subject to the disclosures required under Section 13(q) and 
hence the commenter contended that these studies do not support our 
view that the required disclosures might achieve economic benefits 
resulting from reduced corruption.\334\ We acknowledge that the 
specific studies that the commenter mentions do focus on bribery as a 
form of corruption. All the other studies that we cite, however, do 
discuss corruption in general and its effect on economic growth. In 
fact, some specifically discuss the type of corruption addressed by the 
statute and proposed rules.\335\ Furthermore, to the extent that 
Section 13(q) disclosures are successful in reducing corruption in the 
form of misuse of funds, they could also reduce quid pro quo 
corruption. For example, if Section 13(q) and the related rules enable 
citizens and society to monitor the government and issuers more 
strictly, they may become less likely to engage in quid pro quo 
corruption. It is also possible that some of the payments that are 
reportable under Section 13(q) are an implicit form of bribery: For 
example, government officials could agree, instead of a bribe, to 
receive another type of payment from an issuer later, after the payment 
is made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \334\ See Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \335\ See, e.g., Svensson Study at n.326 above, which defines 
corruption as misuse of public office for private gain. This study 
cites examples of corruption that are similar to the types of 
corruption the proposed rules seek to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also note that global transparency efforts such as the EITI and 
others are relatively new, which makes it difficult at this time to 
draw any firm empirical conclusions about the potential long-term 
benefits that such transparency regimes may produce for resource-rich 
countries. Many studies suggest a possible link between improvements in 
transparency, which they measure as a resource-rich country joining the 
EITI, and increases in GDP and net foreign direct investments, 
reduction in conflict and unrest, and effects on economic 
development.\336\ The causal mechanisms involved, however, are complex 
(impacted by myriad factors) and it may take several decades before 
those mechanisms yield empirically verifiable social gains. While some 
of these studies provide useful insight into the potential benefits to 
be derived from resource payment transparency regimes, we believe that 
there are limitations associated with each of these studies that make 
it difficult for us to draw firm conclusions based on their findings. 
Additionally, other factors could affect both corruption and economic 
development (e.g., a country's institutions), making it difficult to 
detect a causal relationship between the former and the latter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \336\ See Letter from C. Corrigan (Feb. 16, 2016) (referring to 
her earlier study: Corrigan, C. C. (2014), ``Breaking the Resource 
Curse: Transparency in the Natural Resource Sector and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,'' Resources Policy, 
41(1), 17-30); Letter from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016) (referring to 
Fernando Londo[ntilde]o, ``Does Joining the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative Have an Impact on Extractive and Non-
Extractive FDI Inflows?'' (2014), available at http://gppreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Londono-F.pdf) (``Londo[ntilde]o Study'') 
and Maya Schmaljohann, ``Enhancing Foreign Direct Investment via 
Transparency? Evaluating the Effects of the EITI on FDI'' (Jan. 
2013), available at http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/14368/1/Schmaljohann_2013_dp538.pdf (``Schmaljohann 
Study'')); Letter from ONE Campaign (Mar. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notwithstanding the foregoing views, we believe the direct 
incremental benefit to investors from the Section 13(q) disclosures may 
be limited. Most impacted issuers, other than smaller reporting 
companies, are already required to disclose their most significant 
operational and financial risks \337\ as well as certain financial 
information related to the geographic areas in which they operate, in 
their Exchange Act annual reports.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ See Items 305 and 503 of Regulation S-K, (17 CFR 229.305 
and 229.503).
    \338\ See Item 101(d) of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.101(d)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Potential Costs Resulting From the Payment Reporting Requirement

    The disclosures required by Section 13(q) could result in direct 
and indirect compliance costs and competitive effects for affected 
issuers. The direct compliance costs would stem from the anticipated 
need to modify issuers' core enterprise resource planning systems and 
financial reporting systems to capture and report payment data at the 
project level, for each type of payment, government payee, and currency 
of payment, to the extent that such payments are not currently tracked 
by the issuers' reporting systems. Examples of modifications that may 
be necessary include establishing additional granularity in existing 
coding structures (e.g., splitting accounts that contain both 
government and non-government payment amounts), developing a mechanism 
to appropriately capture data by ``project,'' building new collection 
tools within financial reporting systems, establishing a trading 
partner structure to identify and provide granularity around government 
entities, establishing transaction types to accommodate different types 
of payment (e.g., royalties, taxes, or bonuses), and developing a 
systematic approach to handle ``in-kind'' payments.
    In addition, we anticipate that the statutory reporting 
requirements could result in indirect costs and competitive effects. 
Issuers that have a reporting obligation under Section 13(q) could be 
at a competitive disadvantage compared to private companies and foreign 
companies that are not subject to payment reporting requirements under 
the U.S. Federal securities laws or analogous foreign disclosure 
regimes. For example, such competitive disadvantage could result from, 
among other things, any preference by the government of the host 
country to avoid disclosure of covered payment information, or any 
ability of market participants to use the information disclosed by 
reporting issuers to derive contract terms, reserve data, or other 
confidential information. Governments of host countries could try to 
avoid Section 13(q) payment disclosure by either prohibiting it 
outright, or by changing their preferences in favor of dealing with 
private and foreign companies that do not have such reporting 
obligations. We are unable to estimate how many governments of

[[Page 2556]]

resource-rich host countries would try to avoid Section 13(q) payment 
disclosure, and by what means.
    Commenters in the 2016 rulemaking were split in their opinion on 
the competitive effect of payment information disclosure. Some 
commenters argued that confidential production and reserve data could 
be derived by competitors or other interested persons with industry 
knowledge by extrapolating from the payment information required to be 
disclosed.\339\ Other commenters asserted, however, that such 
extrapolation is not possible or that such information is readily 
available from certain commercial databases. These commenters stated 
that information of the type required to be disclosed by Section 13(q) 
therefore would not confer a competitive advantage on industry 
participants not subject to such disclosure requirements.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ See Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016) and ExxonMobil (Feb. 
16, 2016).
    \340\ See Letters from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016) and Oxfam America 
(Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Whatever the effect, any competitive impact arising from Section 
13(q)'s mandated disclosures should be substantially reduced to the 
extent that companies are required to disclose payment information in 
other jurisdictions, such as the European Union and Canada, which have 
adopted laws that require more granular disclosure than that required 
by Section 13(q) and the proposed rules.\341\ In that regard, the 
proposed rules may provide competitive advantages to U.S. issuers that 
are subject to the proposed rules but not subject to the European Union 
and Canadian regimes. This is because companies are required to 
disclose more granular payment information under the European Union and 
Canadian disclosure regimes and those regimes cover a wider pool of 
affected issuers (i.e., both registered issuers and large private 
issuers are subject to payment disclosure in these regimes). We note, 
however, that if industry commenters are accurate in their assessment 
of the competitive effects arising from such disclosure requirements, 
U.S. issuers that are subject to the proposed rules but not subject to 
the EU Directives or other international disclosure regimes might lose 
some of the competitive advantage they might enjoy but for the proposed 
rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \341\ One commenter suggested that if both the United States and 
European Union implement disclosure requirements regarding payments 
to governments ``around 90% of the world's extractive companies will 
be covered by the rules.'' See Letter from Arlene McCarthy (Aug. 10, 
2012) (Ms. McCarthy is a member of the European Parliament and the 
parliamentary draftsperson on the EU transparency rules for the 
extractive sector).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters on the 2016 Rules suggested that we permit issuers 
to submit payment data confidentially to the Commission and make public 
only an aggregated compilation of the information.\342\ These 
commenters stated that such an approach would address many of their 
concerns about the disclosure of commercially sensitive information or 
information that companies were legally or contractually prohibited 
from disclosing and would significantly mitigate the costs of the 
mandatory disclosure under Section 13(q). Although we are not proposing 
this approach, we consider the costs and benefits of this alternative 
means of implementation in Section III.D.4 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \342\ See, e.g., Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016); Chevron 
(February 16, 2016); Exxon (February 16, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rules differ from the 2016 Rules in that they include 
a definition of project that is not contract-based and that would allow 
for greater aggregation of payment information than under the 2016 
Rules. The proposed rules also include two new exemptions for conflicts 
with foreign law and contract prohibitions, in addition to the targeted 
exemption for payments made in connection with exploratory activities 
that was included in the 2016 Rules.\343\ Furthermore, the proposed 
rules would permit an issuer to aggregate payments by payment type made 
at a level below the major subnational level (e.g., at the county or 
municipality level) and disclose such payments without having to 
identify the particular subnational government payee. Together, we 
believe that these provisions would significantly alleviate, and in 
some cases could eliminate, the potential for competitive harm under 
the Section 13(q) rules. We also note that in situations involving more 
than one payment, the information would be aggregated by payment type, 
government, and/or project, which may further limit the ability of a 
company's competitors to use the publicly disclosed information to 
their advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \343\ As discussed below, the proposed rules also include 
transitional relief for newly acquired companies and newly public 
companies that should further limit the compliance burdens 
associated with the rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We discuss below the significant choices we have made to implement 
the statutory requirements that are the main drivers of the direct and 
indirect compliance costs and of the proposed rules' competitive 
effects. We then discuss the associated benefits and costs of those 
choices. In that regard, we are unable to quantify the impact of each 
of the choices discussed below with precision because reliable, 
empirical evidence about the effects is not readily available to the 
Commission. We are asking commenters to provide us with empirical 
evidence that will allow us to evaluate these various choices.

D. Discussion of Discretionary Choices

1. Definition of ``Project''
    Section 13(q) requires a resource extraction issuer to disclose 
information about the type and total amount of payments made to a 
foreign government or the Federal Government for each project relating 
to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, but it 
does not define the term ``project.'' The proposed rules define 
``project'' using a three-pronged definition: (1) The type of resource 
being commercially developed; (2) the method of extraction; and (3) the 
major subnational political jurisdiction where the commercial 
development of the resource is taking place.

[[Page 2557]]

    The definition of ``project'' appears to be a major determinant of 
issuers' costs resulting from the Section 13(q) rules. First, the 
definition can affect the extent of direct compliance costs imposed on 
affected issuers. The extent of this effect depends on the degree to 
which issuers' financial and reporting systems use a different 
definition of project (or no definition at all) compared to the one 
included in the proposed rules. A number of commenters pointed out that 
the more granular contract-based definition of ``project'' that was 
proposed in the 2016 Rules would require modifications to issuers' core 
enterprise resource planning systems and financial reporting systems to 
capture and report payment data for each type of payment, government 
payee, and currency of payment.\344\ We also note that some commenters 
on the 2016 rulemaking questioned the assertion that the definition of 
``project'' would increase compliance costs. They argued that most 
issuers already have internal systems in place for recording payments 
that would be required to be disclosed under Section 13(q), or that any 
adjustments to issuers existing reporting systems needed because of 
Section 13(q) could be done in a timely and cost-effective manner.\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section III.B.2., citing 
Letters from API (Jan. 28, 2011); ExxonMobil (Jan. 31, 2011); and 
RDS (Jan. 28, 2011).
    \345\ See id., citing Letters from EarthRights International 
(Sept. 20, 2011); Global Witness (Feb. 25, 2011); and Publish What 
You Pay U.S. (Feb. 25, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the definition of ``project'' could potentially create 
indirect costs in the form of competitive harm for affected issuers. 
Such competitive harm could occur if the definition of ``project'' 
reveals sensitive and proprietary commercial information to 
competitors. For example, several commenters in the 2016 rulemaking 
suggested that a contract-based definition of ``project'' would result 
in the loss of trade secrets and intellectual property more 
generally.\346\ One commenter stated that trade secrets and 
intellectual property were especially valuable in the resource 
extraction industry because of the large sunk costs investments and 
uncertain, long-term payoffs.\347\ According to some industry 
commenters, a contract-based definition of ``project'' would allow 
competitors to derive important information about the new areas under 
exploration for potential resource development, the value the company 
places on such resources, and the costs associated with acquiring the 
right to develop these new resources. This would in turn enable 
competitors to evaluate the new resources more precisely, and as a 
result, structure their bids for additional opportunities in the areas 
with new resources more effectively. Commenters on the 2016 rulemaking 
also stated that a contract-based definition of ``project'' would allow 
competitors to reverse-engineer proprietary commercial information: for 
example, to determine the commercial and fiscal terms of the 
agreements, get a better understanding of an issuer's strategic 
approach to bidding and contracting, and identify rate of return 
criteria.\348\ In contrast with these views, we note that several 
commenters in the 2016 rulemaking disputed the assertion that the 
contract-based definition of ``project'' would create any competitive 
disadvantages to affected issuers.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \346\ See Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016) and ExxonMobil (Feb. 
16, 2016).
    \347\ See Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \348\ See Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016) and ExxonMobil (Feb. 
16, 2016).
    \349\ See, e.g., letters from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016) (stating 
that the required payment information would not disclose 
competitively sensitive information because such information would 
not include contractual relationships with downstream processors, 
the contribution of the project to the overall profitability of the 
reporting issuer, trade secrets, and techniques related to 
intellectual property; and denying both that payment transparency is 
a decisive factor in competitive bidding processes with host states 
to access resources, and that project payment disclosure can be used 
by competitors to reverse-engineer commercial terms and succeed in 
future bids); see also Global Witness (Mar. 8, 2016). See also 
letter from Global Witness (Mar. 8, 2016) (asserting that ``there is 
no merit to the claim that US companies would lose out to unlisted 
state companies as a result of this rule. In fact, most of the 
largest state-owned companies are listed on US and/or European stock 
exchanges and would therefore be subject to the same rules as other 
US and European issuers.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Modified Project Definition represents a major change from the 
definition adopted by the 2016 Rules. We believe that it should 
significantly alleviate direct and indirect compliance costs, including 
potential competitive harm, for affected issuers. With respect to 
direct compliance costs, the proposed definition of ``project'' would 
allow an issuer to make the payment disclosure at a higher level of 
aggregation than under the 2016 Rules' contract-based definition. 
Instead of tracking, recording, and disclosing payment information at 
the single contract, license, or lease level, under the proposed 
definition, affected issuers would have to report this information at 
the resource type, extraction method, and the major subnational 
political jurisdiction level. This higher level of information 
aggregation should lower the cost of providing the required payment 
disclosure because there would be fewer individual data points to be 
electronically tagged and reported.\350\ It should also make it easier 
for the issuer to report the payment information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \350\ See the letter from API (Nov. 7, 2013) (noting that ``an 
additional benefit of API's project recommendation is clarity and 
ease of use for all stakeholders,'' including ``for reporting 
companies in submitting data'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, because as proposed the required payment information 
is at a higher level of aggregation than under the 2016 Rules, it is 
likely that an issuer already aggregates some of the required payment 
information for its own internal accounting or financial reporting 
purposes. In that event, requiring payment information at a higher 
level of aggregation may be less costly because the issuer may be able 
to modify its existing internal accounting systems to collect the 
required payment information rather than having to build a new system 
to collect the payment information on a contract-by-contract basis.
    Additionally, the proposed definition of ``project'' lacks the 
granularity of a contract-based definition, making it less likely that 
competitors would be able to reverse-engineer contract terms or glean 
sensitive contract information from the disclosure. In this regard, we 
note that many of the concerns expressed in the 2016 rulemaking about 
revealing sensitive and proprietary commercial information to 
competitors derived from the fact that the required disclosure was at 
the contract, license or lease level. Thus, the proposed definition of 
``project'' should also alleviate potential competitive harm concerns 
that affected issuers might have regarding the latter.
    At the same time, the proposed definition of ``project'' would 
continue to provide a level of transparency that people could use to 
assess revenue flows from projects in their local communities. As we 
discuss above in Section III.B, this should have a number of potential 
benefits for information users seeking to prevent corruption and 
promote accountability.
    We note that, even with the proposed modifications to the 
definition of ``project,'' affected issuers would incur significant 
compliance costs. Issuers would still be required to track each payment 
that they make to foreign governments and the Federal Government in 
furtherance of resource extraction activities and thus would likely 
need to modify their systems to some degree to collect data on each 
payment. In addition, they would be required to electronically tag a 
significant amount of information about each payment. Additional 
compliance

[[Page 2558]]

costs could result from training local personnel on tracking and 
reporting, and developing guidance to ensure consistency across 
reporting units.
    Finally, we acknowledge that the proposed definition of ``project'' 
may narrow the scope of the transparency benefits compared to the 
previous definition proposed in 2016. We believe, however, that the 
revised definition, because it considers the type of resource, the 
method of extraction, and the location, will provide substantial 
transparency about the overall revenue flows to national and 
subnational governments.
2. Exemptions From Disclosure
    Absent potential exemptive relief, resource extraction issuers 
operating in countries that prohibit, or may in the future prohibit, 
the disclosure required under Section 13(q) could bear substantial 
costs. Such costs could arise if issuers are forced to cease operations 
in certain countries or otherwise violate local law. In addition, the 
country's laws could have the effect of preventing them from 
participating in future projects. Alternatively, the host country may 
prefer to engage in deals with companies that are not required to 
provide disclosure required under Section 13(q). If an issuer violates 
local law, it could suffer expropriation of its facilities in the host 
country, the imposition of fines or the withholding of permits. In 
connection with the 2016 Rules, some commenters asserted that at least 
two countries--Qatar and China--prohibit the required disclosures.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ See Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016) and ExxonMobil (Feb. 
16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that such prohibitions exist and are enforced without 
any type of waiver, affected issuers could be motivated to sell assets 
affected by such competitive disadvantage at a price that does not 
fully reflect the value of such assets absent such competitive impact. 
Thus, affected issuers could suffer substantial losses if they have to 
terminate their operations and redeploy or dispose of their assets in 
the particular foreign jurisdiction. These losses would be magnified if 
an issuer could not easily redeploy the assets in question or if it had 
to sell them at a steep discount (a fire sale). Even if the assets 
could be easily redeployed, an issuer could suffer opportunity costs if 
they were redeployed to projects with inferior rates of return. In the 
2016 Rules, we estimated that such losses could amount to billions of 
dollars.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \352\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section III.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These potentially large indirect costs should be generally 
eliminated under the proposed rules. We are proposing an exemption for 
situations in which an issuer is unable to provide the required 
disclosure without violating the laws of the jurisdiction where the 
project is located. The exemption would apply not only to pre-existing 
but also to future prohibitions on disclosure, in recognition of the 
fact that issuers do not have control over the laws of the jurisdiction 
where they are engaged in the commercial development of natural 
resources.
    Some commenters in the 2016 rulemaking also suggested that issuers 
with existing contracts that prohibit the disclosure required under 
Section 13(q) may find themselves in breach of contract if they make 
the required disclosure. This, in turn, could result in termination of 
ongoing contracts and inability to participate in future projects.\353\ 
While we do not have data on how often existing contracts contain such 
prohibitions, to address the concerns raised by commenters, we are 
proposing an exemption for situations in which a pre-existing contract 
prohibits the required disclosure. This exemption would differ from the 
conflict of law exemption in that, if adopted as proposed, it would 
only apply to written terms of contracts that were entered into prior 
to the date the Section 13(q) rules are effective. As explained above, 
we believe that this limitation is justified because issuers have 
control over the terms of their contracts and would be in a position to 
modify future contract terms accordingly.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \353\ See Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016) and Chevron (Feb. 16, 
2016).
    \354\ See supra Section II.J.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Neither of these proposed exemptions would require an issuer to 
apply to the Commission for exemptive relief. This approach should 
significantly decrease compliance and indirect costs for issuers that 
qualify for either exemption, potentially saving affected issuers 
millions of dollars. Compared to the approach taken in the 2016 Rules, 
in which affected issuers were required to seek individual relief on a 
case-by-case basis, the proposed exemptions would give such issuers 
more certainty about the availability of the exemptions. In addition, 
the corresponding relief would be available in a timelier manner.
    We note, however, that in addition to reducing costs, the 
exemptions might have the unintended consequence of diminishing some of 
the benefits of enhanced transparency. For example, it could create a 
stronger incentive for host countries that want to prevent transparency 
to pass laws that prohibit such disclosure, potentially undermining the 
purpose of Section 13(q) to compel disclosure in jurisdictions that 
have failed to do so voluntarily. As mentioned above, we believe that 
the likelihood that jurisdictions will pass such laws is limited by the 
absence of a similar exemption under the EU Directives or Canada's 
ESTMA, which generally require disclosure at a more granular level, and 
by the growing global influence of the EITI.\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \355\ See discussion in Section II.J.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the exemptions for conflicts with foreign law and 
pre-existing contracts, similar to the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules 
would allow for delayed reporting for explorative activities and 
transitional relief for recently acquired companies not previously 
obliged to disclose resource extraction payment information. In a 
change from the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules would also provide 
transitional relief for companies that have completed their U.S. 
initial public offering in the last full fiscal year. These additional 
forms of exemptive relief should alleviate compliance costs for 
affected issuers. Finally, as in the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules 
would allow issuers to apply for exemptive relief on a case-by-case 
basis using the procedures set forth in Rule 0-12 of the Exchange Act 
for situations posing a significant threat of commercial harm that fall 
outside the scope of the other proposed exemptions. We cannot reliably 
estimate how frequently potential issuers would apply for exemptive 
relief on a case-by-case basis.
    We believe that the exemptions provided under the proposed rules, 
subject to issuers meeting specified conditions, would substantially 
decrease any indirect costs and competitive effects that may result 
from conflicts with foreign law and pre-existing contracts, or from 
other situations where the required payment disclosure would pose a 
significant threat of commercial harm. However, we acknowledge that, if 
issuers cannot meet the conditions for the proposed exemptions, issuers 
could potentially incur costs associated with the conflict between the 
proposed requirements and those foreign law or pre-existing contract 
prohibitions. Similarly, issuers could potentially incur costs in 
situations where the Commission denies an issuer's claim for exemptive 
relief on a case-by-case basis. Due to lack of data, we cannot reliably 
estimate the number of affected issuers that may be unable to

[[Page 2559]]

meet the conditions for the proposed exemptions.
    We are also proposing to provide an exemption from the disclosure 
requirements for smaller reporting companies and/or emerging growth 
companies, or to provide for different disclosure requirements for 
these entities. Because the proposed rules could result in significant 
fixed compliance costs for resource extraction issuers, smaller 
entities that are required to provide the payment disclosure mandated 
by Section 13(q) may face particular difficulties meeting those costs. 
As noted above, 211 issuers reported being SRCs, 191 issuers reported 
being EGCs and 84 issuers reported being both SRCs and EGCs in the 
period January 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019. This results in 318 
issuers that would not bear compliance costs under the proposed rules 
because they reported being SRCs and/or EGCs. The proposed exemption 
for smaller reporting companies and emerging growth companies would 
avoid adding to the costs of being a public reporting company for these 
companies.
3. Annual Report Requirement
    Section 13(q) provides that the resource extraction payment 
disclosure must be ``include[d] in an annual report.'' In a change from 
the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules require an issuer to furnish the 
payment disclosure in an annual report on Form SD instead of filing it. 
Requiring covered issuers to furnish, rather than file, the payment 
information in Form SD may limit the incremental risk of liability 
under Section 18 of the Exchange Act. This limit to the incremental 
risk of liability could decrease the quality of payment information 
reported to the extent that issuers are less attentive to collecting 
and submitting the information. We note, however, that Section 18 does 
not create strict liability for ``filed'' information.\356\ In 
addition, issuers would still be subject to antifraud liability under 
the U.S. Federal securities laws for material misstatements, which 
should mitigate the risk of decreased quality of the reported payment 
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \356\ See Exchange Act Section 18 (15 U.S.C. 78r). A plaintiff 
asserting a claim under Section 18 would need to meet the elements 
of the statute to establish a claim, including purchasing or selling 
a security in reliance on the misstatement and incurring damages 
caused by that reliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As under the 2016 Rules, the required payment information would be 
reported under the cover of Form SD. The Form SD would be due no later 
than March 31 in the calendar year following its most recent fiscal 
year for issuers with a fiscal year ending on or before June 30 and no 
later than March 31 in the second calendar year following its most 
recent fiscal year for issuers with a fiscal year ending after June 30. 
This should lessen the burden of compliance with Section 13(q) and the 
related rules because issuers generally would not have to incur the 
burden and cost of providing the payment disclosure at the same time 
that they must fulfill their disclosure obligations with respect to 
Exchange Act annual reports.\357\ An additional benefit is that this 
requirement would provide payment information to users in a 
standardized manner for all issuers rather than in different annual 
report forms depending on whether a resource extraction issuer is a 
domestic or foreign filer. Moreover, requiring the disclosure in Form 
SD, rather than in issuers' Exchange Act annual reports, should 
alleviate any concerns and costs associated with the disclosure being 
subject to the officer certifications required by Exchange Act Rules 
13a-14 and 15d-14. Finally, we also believe that the lengthened 
submission deadlines would also address the concerns that the public 
disclosure of the payment information could cause competitive harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \357\ For example, a resource extraction issuer may potentially 
be able to save resources to the extent that the timing of its 
obligations with respect to its Exchange Act annual report and its 
obligations to provide payment disclosure allow for it to allocate 
its resources, in particular personnel, more efficiently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Resource extraction issuers would incur costs associated with 
preparing and furnishing the required information on Form SD. We do not 
believe, however, that the costs associated with furnishing the 
information on Form SD instead of providing it in an existing Exchange 
Act form would be significant given that the existing form would have 
to be modified to accommodate the requirements of Section 13(q) 
disclosure.
4. Public Availability of Data
    The proposed rules would require a resource extraction issuer to 
provide the required payment disclosure publicly, including the name of 
the issuer. As an alternative to requiring payment disclosure by 
individual issuers, we could have proposed implementing Section 13(q) 
by permitting resource extraction issuers to provide the information 
non-publicly and having the Commission publish, an aggregated and 
anonymized compilation of company-provided resource extraction payment 
information. Such an approach would mitigate concerns regarding the 
disclosure of potentially sensitive information that could create 
competitive harm. Additionally, such an alternative would still result 
in the disclosure of the type and amount of payments to governments, 
albeit on an aggregated basis. According to a commenter in the 2016 
rulemaking, such an approach would yield the benefits intended by 
Congress and at the same time reduce potential competitive harm.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \358\ See Letter from API (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Such anonymized public compilation, however, may not further 
transparency efforts to the same degree as company-specific disclosure. 
Public individual issuer information may help people monitor individual 
issuer's contributions to the public finances and ensure that firms are 
meeting their payment obligations and that governments are properly 
collecting and accounting for payments. Additionally, the public 
disclosure of company-specific, project-level data may help to reduce 
corruption to the extent that resource extraction issuers are unwilling 
to participate in deals where they believe the revenues may be 
corruptly diverted from the government coffers. Requiring issuers to 
disclose their payment information publicly would also provide users 
with more current and immediately available information than a separate 
compilation produced by the Commission. In contrast, under an approach 
that depends upon the Commission publishing a separate public 
compilation of previously submitted non-public information, users of 
the information would have to wait to access the information in an 
issuer's Form SD until the Commission publishes its periodic 
compilation. We do not believe that the proposed requirement for 
issuers to disclose the payment information publicly would increase an 
issuer's compliance burden compared to the alternative of issuers 
submitting the payment information non-publicly (and the Commission 
using the nonpublic submissions to produce a publicly available 
compilation). The compliance costs would be similar under each 
alternative because the issuer would have to provide the same payment 
information to the Commission. Regarding the potential increase in the 
risk of competitive harm that may result from public disclosure, we 
believe that such increase would be marginal because of the Modified 
Project Definition, which, as mentioned above, should significantly 
alleviate the likelihood of competitive harm from the disclosure, and 
because of the extended filing deadline.

[[Page 2560]]

    We are considering, however, the alternative of publishing only an 
aggregated, anonymous compilation based on confidentially furnished 
Forms SD. This approach would both ensure the public availability of 
information about payments made in particular jurisdictions--which may 
be sufficient to meet the statute's objectives--without potentially 
subjecting affected issuers to competitive harm.
5. Alternative Reporting
    The proposed rules would allow resource extraction issuers subject 
to a foreign jurisdiction's resource extraction payment disclosure 
requirements to meet their reporting obligations by submitting the 
report required by that foreign jurisdiction with the Commission 
subject to the condition that the Commission has determined that the 
foreign jurisdiction's reporting obligations satisfy the transparency 
objectives of Section 13(q). Concurrently with the 2016 Rules Adopting 
Release, the Commission issued an order designating the EU Directives 
and ESTMA as eligible substitute reporting regimes for purposes of the 
alternative reporting provision in those rules. To the extent that the 
Commission makes a similar determination upon or following adoption of 
the proposed rules, this approach would significantly decrease 
compliance costs for issuers that are cross-listed or incorporated in 
these jurisdictions. As noted above, we estimated that approximately 
109 issuers are subject to other regulatory regimes that may allow them 
to utilize this provision.\359\ For these issuers, the costs associated 
with preparing and furnishing a Form SD should be negligible, although 
they would be required to format the data in interactive (XBRL) format 
and potentially translate it into English before submitting it with the 
Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \359\ These are issuers that have a business address, are 
incorporated, or are listed on exchanges in the EEA or Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As an alternative, we could have proposed not to include such a 
provision. Such an alternative may increase the compliance costs for 
issuers that are subject to foreign disclosure requirements that 
satisfy the transparency objectives of Section 13(q). These issuers 
would have to comply with multiple disclosure regimes and bear 
compliance costs for each regime, although it is possible that the 
marginal costs for complying with an additional disclosure regime would 
not be significant given the potential overlap that may exist between 
these reporting regimes and the proposed rules.
6. Definition of ``Control''
    Section 13(q) requires resource extraction issuers to disclose 
payments made by a subsidiary or entity under the control of the 
issuer. As discussed in Section II.E above, we are proposing rules that 
define the term ``control'' based on accounting principles. 
Alternatively, we could have proposed a definition based on Exchange 
Act Rule 12b-2, as in the 2012 Rules.\360\ We believe that the approach 
we are proposing would be less costly for issuers to comply with than 
such an alternative because issuers are currently required to apply the 
accounting concept of ``control'' on at least an annual basis for 
financial reporting purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \360\ See 2012 Rules Proposing Release, Section II.D.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using a definition based on Rule 12b-2 would require issuers to 
undertake additional steps beyond those currently required for 
financial reporting purposes. Specifically, a resource extraction 
issuer would be required to make a factual determination as to whether 
it has control of an entity based on a consideration of all relevant 
facts and circumstances. Thus, this alternative would require issuers 
to engage in a separate analysis of which entities are included within 
the scope of the required disclosures (apart from the consolidation 
determinations made for financial reporting purposes) and could 
increase the compliance costs for issuers compared to the approach we 
are proposing.
    In addition, there are several other advantages of using a 
definition based on accounting principles. There will be audited 
financial statement disclosure of an issuer's significant consolidation 
of accounting policies in the footnotes to its audited financial 
statements contained in its Exchange Act annual reports. Also, an 
issuer's determination of control under the proposed rules would be 
subject to the audit process as well as subject to the internal 
accounting controls that issuers are required to have in place with 
respect to audited financial statements filed with the Commission.\361\ 
All of these advantages may lead to more accurate, reliable, and 
consistent reporting of subsidiary payments, thereby enhancing the 
quality of the reported data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \361\ See supra Section II.E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a change from the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules do not require 
disclosure of the proportionate amount of the payments made by a 
resource extraction issuer's proportionately consolidated entities or 
operations. Excluding proportionate interest entities or operations 
from the proposed definition of control would ameliorate concerns about 
the ability of an issuer to obtain sufficiently detailed payment 
information from proportionately consolidated entities or operations 
when it is not the operator of that venture, thereby limiting 
compliance costs for affected issuers. At the same time, this approach 
would exclude some joint ventures from the scope of the proposed rules, 
thereby limiting the transparency benefits of the Section 13(q) 
disclosures. It also could potentially provide an incentive for 
affected parties to structure their resource extraction operations in a 
manner to avoid disclosure. We note, however, that many other factors, 
other than Section 13(q) disclosure, likely would influence how parties 
structure their operations and agreements, and some of these factors 
may outweigh the disclosure consideration.
    As an alternative, we could have proposed to require disclosure of 
payments made by a resource extraction issuer's proportionately 
consolidated entities or operations. This alternative would result in 
disclosure of payments made by some joint ventures that would not be 
covered by the scope of the proposed rules, which would increase the 
transparency benefits of the Section 13(q) disclosures compared to the 
proposed approach. However, it also would increase compliance costs for 
issuers by potentially compelling them to renegotiate their joint 
venture agreements or make other arrangements to obtain sufficiently 
detailed payment information to comply with the Section 13(q) rules. In 
this regard, we note that several commenters in the 2016 rulemaking 
expressed concern about the ability of an issuer to obtain sufficiently 
detailed payment information from proportionately consolidated entities 
or operations when it is not the operator of that venture.\362\ Similar 
considerations would apply with respect to a definition of control that 
includes a ``significant influence'' test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \362\ See Letters from API (Feb. 16, 2016); BP (Feb. 16, 2016); 
Chevron (Feb. 16, 2016) ; Encana (Jan. 25, 2016); ExxonMobil (Feb. 
16, 2016); Petrobras (Feb. 16, 2016); and Royal Dutch Shell (Feb. 5, 
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Definition of ``Commercial Development of Oil, Natural Gas, or 
Minerals''
    The proposed rules define ``commercial development of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals'' to include exploration, extraction, processing, and 
export, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity. As 
described above, the proposed rules generally track the

[[Page 2561]]

language in the statute. We are sensitive to the fact that a broader 
definition of ``commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals'' could increase issuers' costs. We are also sensitive to the 
fact that expanding the definition in a way that is broader than other 
reporting regimes could potentially lead to a competitive disadvantage 
for those issuers covered only by our rules, provided that issuers 
subject to other disclosure regimes are exempt from the proposed rules 
under the alternative reporting provision. Further, we recognize that 
limiting the definition to these specified activities could adversely 
affect those using the payment information if disclosure about payments 
made for activities not included in the list of specified activities, 
such as refining, smelting, marketing, or stand-alone transportation 
services (i.e., transportation that is not otherwise related to 
export), would be useful to users of the information.
8. Types of Payments
    As under the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules include the specific 
types of payments identified in the statute, as well as CSR payments 
that are required by law or contract, payments of certain dividends, 
and payments for infrastructure. We propose to include payments of 
certain dividends and payments for infrastructure because, based on 
comments received in prior rulemakings, we believe they are part of the 
commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas and minerals. For example, payments for infrastructure 
improvements have been required under the EITI since 2011. 
Additionally, the EU Directives and ESTMA require these payment types 
to be disclosed. Thus, including dividends and payments for 
infrastructure improvements (e.g., building a road) in the list of 
payment types required to be disclosed under the proposed rules would 
further the statutory objective of supporting the commitment of the 
Federal Government to international transparency promotion efforts.
    As under the 2016 Rules, the proposed rules would include CSR 
payments that are required by law or contract in the list of covered 
payment types. Some commenters in the 2016 rulemaking argued that these 
payments are of material benefit in resource-dependent countries to 
both governments and local communities.\363\ One commenter suggested 
that some resource extraction issuers already disclose such payments 
voluntarily and presented survey data indicating that such payments 
could be quite large.\364\ We also note that the EITI requires the 
disclosure of CSR payments if required by law or contract.\365\ Thus, 
the addition of CSR payments to the list of types of payments that must 
be disclosed should improve the quality of the disclosure required by 
the statute and would further the statutory objective of supporting the 
commitment of the Federal Government to international transparency 
promotion efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, 
natural gas or minerals. Additionally, to the extent that it is 
difficult for certain resource extraction issuers to distinguish 
between CSR payments and infrastructure payments, requiring both types 
of payments when required by law or contract may lead to lower 
compliance costs for those issuers.\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \363\ See Letters from Africa Centre for Energy Policy (Feb. 16, 
2016); Prof. Harry G. Broadman and Bruce H. Searby (Jan. 25, 2016); 
ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016); Eugen Falik (Mar. 7, 2016); and PWYP-US 
(Feb. 16, 2016).
    \364\ See Letter from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \365\ See supra Section II.C.5.
    \366\ See Letter from ExxonMobil (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed earlier, under the proposed rules, resource extraction 
issuers would incur costs to provide the payment disclosure for the 
required payment types. For example, there would be costs to modify the 
issuers' core enterprise resource planning systems and financial 
reporting systems so that they can track and report payment data at the 
project level, for each type of payment, government payee, and currency 
of payment. Since some of the payments would be required to be 
disclosed only if they are required by law or contract (e.g., CSR 
payments), resource extraction issuers presumably already track such 
payments and hence the costs of disclosing these payments may not be 
large. Nevertheless, the addition of dividends, payments for 
infrastructure improvements, and CSR payments to the list of payment 
types for which disclosure is required may marginally increase some 
issuers' costs of complying with the proposed rules. For example, 
issuers may need to add these types of payments to their tracking and 
reporting systems. We understand that these types of payments are more 
typical for mineral extraction issuers than for oil issuers,\367\ and 
therefore only a subset of the issuers subject to the proposed rules 
might be affected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ See, e.g., Letters from PWYP-US (Feb. 16, 2016) and Global 
Witness (Feb. 16, 2016). See also Chapter 19 ``Advancing the EITI in 
the Mining Sector: Implementation Issues'' by Sefton Darby and 
Kristian Lempa, in Advancing the EITI in the Mining Sector: A 
Consultation with Stakeholders (EITI 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address previously expressed concerns about the difficulty of 
allocating payments that are made for obligations levied at the entity 
level, such as corporate income taxes, to the project level, the 
proposed rules would permit issuers to disclose those payments at the 
entity level rather than the project level. This accommodation also 
should help limit compliance costs for issuers without significantly 
interfering with the goal of achieving increased payment transparency.
    Under the proposed rules, issuers must disclose payments made in-
kind. The EU Directives and ESTMA also require disclosure of in-kind 
payments, as does the EITI. Consequently, this requirement should help 
further the goal of supporting international transparency promotion 
efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas or 
minerals and enhance the effectiveness of the payment disclosure. At 
the same time, this requirement could impose costs if issuers have not 
previously had to value their in-kind payments. To minimize the 
potential additional costs, the proposed rules provide issuers with the 
flexibility of reporting in-kind payments at cost, or if cost is not 
determinable, at fair market value. We believe this approach should 
help limit the overall compliance costs associated with our proposal to 
require the disclosure of in-kind payments.
9. Definition of ``Not De Minimis''
    Section 13(q) requires the disclosure of payments that are ``not de 
minimis,'' leaving that term undefined. Under the proposed rule's 
definition of ``not de minimis,'' resource extraction issuers would be 
required to disclose payments made to each foreign government in a host 
country or the Federal Government that equal or exceed $150,000, or its 
equivalent in the issuer's reporting currency, whether made as a single 
payment or series of related payments, when the total of the individual 
payments related to that project equal or exceed $750,000. Thus, no 
payment disclosure is required for projects where the total of the 
individual payments related to that project is less than $750,000.\368\ 
Even if the aggregate payments for a project are equal to or greater 
than $750,000, if no single payment or series of related payments of 
the same type exceeds $150,000, no

[[Page 2562]]

payments disclosure would be required for that project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \368\ In crafting this proposal, we also have relied on the 
Commission's general definitional and exemptive authority. See 
Exchange Act Sections 3(b) and 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We considered proposing a definition of ``not de minimis'' based on 
a qualitative standard or a relative quantitative standard rather than 
an absolute quantitative standard. We are proposing an absolute 
quantitative approach because an absolute quantitative approach would 
be easier for issuers to apply than a definition based on either a 
qualitative standard or relative quantitative standard. Thus, using an 
absolute dollar amount threshold for disclosure purposes should help 
limit compliance costs by reducing the work necessary to determine what 
payments must be disclosed.
    We believe that this higher ``not de minimis'' threshold is 
necessary to take into account the proposed definition of project, 
which aggregates payments at a higher level, which would likely 
increase the value of the individual types of payments. As such, we 
believe that using the 2016 threshold of $100,000 would likely require 
more payment disclosure, thus increasing rather than decreasing the 
cost and disclosure burden on issuers, contrary to the guidance 
provided by Congress in its disapproval of the 2016 Rules. We further 
believe that, in light of the larger aggregations permitted under the 
revised definition of project, a quantitative standard based upon 
project level and individual payment information establishes a more 
appropriate threshold for determining ``not de minimis.'' In addition, 
we believe that $750,000 in total payments is the appropriate project 
threshold and $150,000 is the appropriate individual payment threshold 
because we are proposing to exempt smaller reporting companies and 
emerging growth companies from the Section 13(q) disclosure 
requirements,\369\ thereby resulting in larger companies, with larger 
projects and larger individual payments, being primarily affected by 
the proposed rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \369\ See supra Section II.J.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that this approach, presents a more accurate definition 
of ``not de minimis'' from both an issuer's and the host country's 
perspective. Although commenters in the previous rulemakings suggested 
various thresholds, no commenter provided data to assist us in 
determining an appropriate threshold amount.\370\ One commenter 
criticized the proposed $100,000 threshold as too low, although the 
commenter did not suggest an alternative amount or provide data to 
support why the threshold was too low.\371\ For issuers (or their 
subsidiaries) that are already providing payment information under 
other resource extraction disclosure regimes, our definition of ``not 
de minimis'' would likely help minimize compliance costs associated 
with determining which payments should be reported because these 
issuers could report under the proposed rule using the payment 
thresholds under their respective jurisdiction and be in compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \370\ See, e.g., 2012 Rules Adopting Release, n.235 and n.243 
and accompanying text.
    \371\ See Letter from Nouveau (Feb. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also considered defining ``not de minimis'' either in terms of a 
materiality standard or by using a larger dollar threshold for 
individual payment disclosure, such as $1,000,000. Both of these 
alternatives might result in lower compliance costs and might lessen 
competitive concerns relative to the proposal. They also would result 
in less payment transparency, thereby reducing the intended benefits of 
the Section 13(q) disclosures.
10. Exhibit and Interactive Data Requirement
    Section 13(q) requires the payment disclosure to be electronically 
formatted using an interactive data format. The proposed rules would 
require a resource extraction issuer to provide the required payment 
disclosure in an XBRL exhibit to Form SD that includes all of the 
electronic tags required by Section 13(q) and the proposed rules.\372\ 
We believe that requiring the specified information to be presented in 
XBRL format would offer advantages to issuers and users of the 
information by promoting consistency and standardization of the 
information and increasing the usability of the payment disclosure. 
Providing the required disclosure elements in a machine-readable 
(electronically tagged) format would allow users to quickly examine, 
extract, aggregate, compare, and analyze the information in a manner 
that is most useful to them. This includes searching for specific 
information within a particular submission as well as performing large-
scale statistical analysis using the disclosures of multiple issuers 
and across date ranges. The proposed rules also require issuers to tag 
the subnational geographic location of a project using ISO codes. Using 
ISO codes would standardize references to those subnational geographic 
locations and would benefit the users of this information by making it 
easier for them to sort and compare the data. It also would increase 
compliance costs for issuers to the extent that they do not currently 
use such codes in their reporting systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \372\ Users of this information should be able to render the 
information by using software available on the Commission's website 
at no cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifying XBRL as the required interactive data format may 
increase compliance costs for some issuers. The electronic formatting 
costs would vary depending upon a variety of factors, including the 
amount of payment data disclosed and an issuer's prior experience with 
XBRL. We expect that most issuers are already familiar with XBRL as 
they use it to tag financial information in their annual and quarterly 
reports filed with the Commission. Thus, we do not expect most affected 
issuers to incur start-up costs associated with the format. 
Additionally, we do not believe that the ongoing costs associated with 
this formatting requirement would be significantly greater than filing 
the data in XML.\373\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \373\ See 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section II.C.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the statute, the proposed rules require a resource 
extraction issuer to include an electronic tag that identifies the 
currency used to make the payments. Under the proposed rules, if 
multiple currencies are used to make payments for a specific project or 
to a government, a resource extraction issuer may choose to provide the 
amount of payments made for each payment type and the total amount per 
project or per government in either U.S. dollars or the issuer's 
reporting currency.\374\ We recognize that a resource extraction issuer 
could incur costs associated with converting payments made in multiple 
currencies to U.S. dollars or its reporting currency. Nevertheless, 
given the statute's tagging requirements and the requirement to 
disclose total amounts, we believe reporting in one currency is 
necessary.\375\ The proposed rules provide flexibility to issuers in 
how to perform the currency conversion, which may help to limit 
compliance costs by allowing issuers to choose the option that works 
best for them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \374\ See Instruction 2 to Item 2.01 of Form SD.
    \375\ See supra Section II.K.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. Quantitative Estimates of Costs Resulting From the Proposed 
Rulemaking
    In the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, the Commission quantified the 
direct compliance costs of the 2016 Rules based on information provided 
by commenters. The Commission estimated initial compliance costs to be 
in the

[[Page 2563]]

range of $54.7 to $574.4 million assuming no fixed costs and in the 
range of $238.8 to $700.2 million assuming the rule requirements would 
generate fixed costs for affected issuers. The Commission estimated the 
ongoing compliance costs to be in the range of $21.9 to $547.3 million 
assuming no fixed costs and in the range of $95.5 to $590.7 million 
assuming fixed costs.
    In the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, the Commission also attempted 
to quantify some of the indirect costs resulting from the rule and 
specifically quantified the costs arising from a foreign law 
prohibition against Section 13(q) disclosure. For eight potentially 
affected issuers domiciled in the United States that had assets in 
China or Qatar, the estimated total loss range was between $1.7 million 
and $3.1 billion, with a median loss of $291.4 million. The aggregate 
fraction of total assets that might be affected was 2.7 percent. We 
note that these estimates applied only to issuers that had assets in 
one of the host countries. The Commission also estimated the fire sale 
prices at which affected issuers could dispose of their assets in 
countries with laws prohibiting disclosure, should such need arise. The 
analysis suggested that a discount of 69 percent was warranted. For 
U.S.-based issuers, applying the highest discount of 69 percent to the 
market value of the issuers' assets in these host countries suggested a 
range of losses between $1.2 million and $2.1 billion, with a median 
loss of $201.1 million.
    Given the substantial changes introduced into the proposed rules 
compared to the 2016 Rules, we believe that the estimates from the 2016 
Rules are no longer accurate. At present, we do not have data that will 
allow us to quantify reliably the costs (either direct compliance costs 
or indirect competitive harm) resulting from the proposed rules. For 
example, we lack data on the main components of initial and ongoing 
compliance costs, the fraction of compliance costs that are fixed, and 
how the various statutory and similar foreign law requirements affect 
compliance costs. Since issuers currently are not required to disclose 
such costs in their SEC filings, and since such costs generally are not 
otherwise made publicly available, we do not have information about 
them.
    A 2018 study by the UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy (the ``UK study'') is another source of potential cost 
estimates.\376\ We reviewed that data but found it is of limited use 
for the following reasons. First, we are unable to use the data to 
determine the cost estimates for the rules we are proposing in this 
release because the Modified Project Definition in the proposed rules 
is different from the definition in the UK rules. Specifically, the 
payment disclosure would be provided at a greater level of aggregation 
under the proposed rules than under the UK contract-level definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \376\ See supra n. 67 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the small sample size in the UK study makes it difficult 
for us to assess with any confidence the actual costs of the UK's 
regime (which, broadly speaking, is very similar to the 2016 Rules that 
were rejected by Congress under the Congressional Review Act). The 
majority of companies (84%) surveyed in the UK study indicated that 
they do not track compliance costs. As such, the study relied on actual 
or estimated compliance cost data from 15 companies that may or may not 
be representative of the broader population. In any event, the 
estimates of total compliance costs (initial and ongoing) in the UK 
report are broadly consistent with the range we estimated in the 2016 
Rules, which like the UK regime had a contract-level definition of 
project. Based on the data provided by the 15 companies that responded, 
the total compliance costs under the UK rules ranged from approximately 
$24,547 per company for small companies to approximately $2,260,263 per 
company for large companies. The range that we estimated in connection 
with the 2016 rules was $180,302 per company to $2,937,319 per company.
Request for Comments
    We request comment on the potential costs and benefits of the 
proposed rules and whether the rules, if adopted, would promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation or have an impact or 
burden on competition. In particular, we request comments on the 
potential effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation 
should the Commission not adopt certain exceptions or accommodations. 
Commenters are requested to provide empirical data, estimation 
methodologies, and other factual support for their views, in 
particular, on costs and benefits estimates. Our specific questions 
follow.
    87. Are there any additional benefits from the proposed rules than 
the ones mentioned discussed above? Is there information that could 
help us quantify any benefits of the proposed rules?
    88. What are the lessons about the benefits from the resource 
extraction payment disclosure regimes that already exist in other 
jurisdictions? Is there empirical evidence on benefits from the 
disclosure regimes that are already in place?
    89. We seek information that would help us quantify compliance 
costs (both initial and ongoing) more precisely. In particular, we 
invite issuers and other commenters that have experience with the costs 
associated with reporting under the EU Directives or ESTMA to provide 
us with information about those costs. What are the actual compliance 
costs for issuers that have started to comply with the disclosure 
requirements imposed under the EU Directives or ESTMA?
    90. What is the breakdown of various compliance costs, such as 
legal fees, direct administrative costs, information technology/
consulting costs, training costs, and travel costs? What are the main 
drivers of compliance costs?
    91. What is the proportion of fixed costs in the direct compliance 
costs structure of potentially affected resource extraction issuers? 
Would smaller resource extraction issuers incur proportionally lower 
compliance costs than larger resource extraction issuers? Would 
affiliated issuers be able to save on fixed costs of developing 
compliance systems through sharing such costs? If so, what is the 
estimate of such savings?
    92. Are there additional costs and benefits from the proposed 
definition of ``project''? How do issuers typically define ``project'' 
in their reporting systems? How costly would it be for issuers to 
switch from the definition of ``project'' that they currently use to 
the one being proposed in these rules? Would our proposed definition of 
project reduce compliance costs for issuers compared to a contract-
based definition of project?
    93. Are there any additional effects on efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation that we have not considered? Are there any 
additional indirect costs or competitive harm that we have not 
considered?
    94. Is our approach to identify small issuers that likely do not 
make any payments above the proposed de minimis amount reasonable? Are 
annual revenues and net cash flows from investing activities taken 
together an appropriate measure for such purpose?
    95. What are the costs of converting a resource extraction payment 
report in the format required by the EU Directives or ESTMA (e.g., XLS 
or PDF) to the report format required by the proposed rules (i.e., 
XBRL)?
    96. What are the costs and benefits arising from confidential 
submission of the payment information? What are the costs and benefits 
arising from public disclosure of the payment information? How do the 
potential costs of public

[[Page 2564]]

disclosure to issuers compare to its potential benefits of the 
information?
    97. Are there studies on the potential effects of the proposed 
rules, the disclosure rules under the EU Directives or ESTMA, or EITI 
compliance on efficiency, competition, and capital formation? What are 
the potential competitive effects of the proposed rules and how might 
they be impacted by regulations promulgated pursuant to the EU 
Directives and ESTMA? What fraction of international extractive 
companies would be affected by at least one of the U.S., EU, or 
Canadian rules?
    98. What are the benefits and costs of an alternative reporting 
option for issuers that are subject to a foreign jurisdiction's 
resource extraction payment disclosure requirements that are determined 
to satisfy the transparency objectives of Section 13(q)? How much would 
such issuers save in compliance costs if they have the option to 
satisfy their filing obligations by filing the report required by that 
foreign jurisdiction with the Commission?

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Background

    Certain provisions of the proposed rules contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\377\ The Commission is submitting the 
proposal to the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review in 
accordance with the PRA.\378\ An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and 
a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information 
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The title for 
the collection of information is:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \377\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \378\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     ``Form SD'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0697).\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \379\ As discussed above, proposed Rule 13q-1 requires a 
resource extraction issuer to submit the payment information 
specified in Form SD. The collection of information requirements 
associated with the proposed rules would be reflected in the burden 
hours estimated for Form SD. Therefore, there is no separate burden 
estimate for Rule 13q-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Form SD is currently used to file Conflict Minerals Reports 
pursuant to Rule 13p-1 of the Exchange Act. We are proposing amendments 
to Form SD to accommodate disclosures required by proposed Rule 13q-1. 
It would require resource extraction issuers to disclose information 
about payments made by the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer, or an 
entity under the control of the issuer to foreign governments or the 
U.S. Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas, or minerals. Form SD would be submitted to the 
Commission on EDGAR.
    The proposed rules and amendment to the form would implement 
Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act, which was added to the Exchange Act 
by Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. As described in detail 
above,\380\ Section 13(q) directs the Commission to issue rules 
requiring resource extraction issuers to include in an annual report 
certain specified information relating to payments made to a foreign 
government or the Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. In addition, Section 
13(q) requires a resource extraction issuer to provide information 
about those payments in an interactive data format. We are proposing to 
require that the mandated payment information be provided in an XBRL 
exhibit to Form SD. The disclosure requirements would apply equally to 
U.S. issuers and foreign issuers meeting the definition of ``resource 
extraction issuer.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \380\ See supra Section I.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Compliance with the rules by affected issuers would be mandatory. 
Responses to the information collections would not be kept confidential 
and there would be no mandatory retention period for the collection of 
information.

B. Estimate of Issuers

    The number, type, and size of the issuers that would be required to 
file the payment information required in Form SD, as proposed to be 
amended, is uncertain, but, as discussed in the economic analysis 
above, we estimate that the number of potentially affected issuers is 
677.\381\ Of these issuers, we excluded 318 issuers that reported being 
either smaller reporting companies, emerging growth companies, or both, 
because the proposed rules would exempt both types of issuers from the 
Section 13(q) requirements. In addition, we excluded 109 issuers that 
are subject to resource extraction payment disclosure rules in other 
jurisdictions that require more granular payment disclosure than would 
be required by the proposed rules, and 14 issuers with no or only 
nominal operations, or that are unlikely to make any payments that 
would be subject to the proposed disclosure requirements.\382\ For the 
109 issuers subject to those alternative reporting regimes, the 
additional costs to comply with the proposed rules would likely be much 
lower than costs for other issuers.\383\ For the 14 issuers that are 
unlikely to make payments subject to the proposed rules, we believe 
there would be no additional costs associated with the proposed 
rules.\384\ Accordingly, we estimate that 236 issuers would bear the 
full costs of compliance with the proposed rules \385\ and 109 would 
bear significantly lower costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \381\ See supra Section III.A. (explaining how we use data from 
Exchange Act annual reports for the period January 1, 2018 through 
September 30, 2019 to estimate the number of issuers that might make 
payments covered by the proposed rules). As noted in that section, 
this number does not reflect the number of issuers that actually 
made resource extraction payments to governments.
    \382\ See id. (describing how we identify issuers that may be 
subject to those alternative reporting regimes and how we use shell 
company status and revenues and net cash flows from investing 
activities to identify issuers that would be unlikely to make 
payments exceeding the proposed ``not de minimis'' threshold).
    \383\ Issuers subject to the alternative reporting regimes 
described above would already be gathering, or have systems in place 
to gather, resource extraction payment data, which should reduce 
their compliance burden. In addition, under the proposed rules, a 
resource extraction issuer that is subject to the resource 
extraction payment disclosure requirements of an alternative 
reporting regime, deemed by the Commission to require disclosure 
that satisfies Section 13(q)'s transparency objectives, may satisfy 
its payment disclosure obligations by including, as an exhibit to 
Form SD, a report complying with the reporting requirements of the 
alternative jurisdiction. See proposed Item 2.01(c) of Form SD. When 
adopting its Section 13(q) rules in 2016, in a concurrent order, the 
Commission determined that an issuer could substitute a report 
prepared pursuant to the EU Directives or Canada's ESTMA to satisfy 
its disclosure obligations under the 2016 Rules. If the Commission 
were to make a similar determination in respect of the proposed 
rules, the 109 issuers subject to those foreign laws would incur 
relatively small compliance burdens and costs associated with the 
proposed rules. We have nevertheless included them in our estimate 
of affected issuers for PRA purposes because under the proposed 
rules they would still have an obligation to furnish a report on 
Form SD in XBRL, although with a significantly lower associated 
burden.
    \384\ See supra Section III.A.
    \385\ 677 minus 318 minus 109 minus 14 = 236.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Estimate of Issuer Burdens

    We derive our burden estimates by estimating the average number of 
hours it would take an issuer to prepare and furnish the required 
disclosure. In deriving our estimates, we recognize that the burdens 
would likely vary among individual issuers based on a number of 
factors, including the size and complexity of their operations and 
whether they are subject to similar disclosure requirements in other 
jurisdictions.
    When determining the estimates described below, we have assumed 
that 75 percent of the burden of preparation is carried by the issuer 
internally and 25 percent of the burden of preparation is carried by 
outside professionals retained

[[Page 2565]]

by the issuer at an average cost of $400 per hour.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \386\ We recognize that the costs of retaining outside 
professionals may vary depending on the nature of the professional 
services, but for purposes of this PRA analysis, we estimate that 
such costs would be an average of $400 per hour. This is the rate we 
typically estimate for outside legal services used in connection 
with public company reporting. We note that in the 2016 rulemaking, 
one commenter used $150 per hour in its analysis of the costs 
associated with the proposed rules. See letter from Claigan 
Environmental (Feb. 16, 2016). The Commission disagreed with that 
estimate, however, because the rate did not factor in the outside 
professional costs associated with preparing a document under 
applicable securities laws. We believe a resource extraction issuer 
would likely seek the advice of an attorney to help it comply with 
the rule and form requirements under U.S. Federal securities laws. 
Accordingly, we continue to use the $400 per hour estimate when 
considering the applicable costs and burdens of this collection of 
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The portion of the burden carried by outside professionals is 
reflected as a cost, while the portion of the burden carried by the 
issuer internally is reflected in hours. We expect that the proposed 
rules' burden would be greatest during the first year of their 
effectiveness and diminish in subsequent years. To account for this 
expected diminishing burden, we use a three-year average of the 
expected implementation burden during the first year and the expected 
ongoing compliance burden during the next two years.
    We believe that the burden associated with this collection of 
information would be greatest during the initial compliance period in 
order to account for initial set up costs, including initial 
adjustments to an issuer's internal books and records, plus costs 
associated with the collection, verification and review of the payment 
information for the first year. We believe that ongoing compliance 
costs would be less because an issuer would have already made any 
necessary modifications to its internal systems to capture and report 
the information required by the proposed rules.
    When conducting the PRA analysis in connection with the 2016 Rules, 
the Commission used an estimate for compliance costs and burden 
provided by a commenter on the 2012 Rules Proposing Release.\387\ That 
commenter estimated that, for an issuer bearing the full costs and 
burden, compliance with those rules would require 500 hours to make 
initial changes to the issuer's internal books and records and another 
500 hours a year on an ongoing basis to review and verify the payment 
information.\388\ Based on the commenter's estimates, the Commission 
estimated that the 2016 Rules would result in 217,408.65 total 
incremental company burden hours and $71,487,820 total outside 
professional costs.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \387\ See the 2016 Rules Adopting Release, Section IV.C., citing 
the letter from Barrick Gold (Feb. 28, 2011). When presenting its 
own cost estimates for the 2016 Rules, one commenter stated that 
``the Barrick costing model seems to be the most valid and accurate 
costing model submitted to SEC and should be attributed more weight 
by the SEC when calculating expected industry costs.'' Letter from 
Claigan Environmental (Feb. 16, 2016).
    \388\ Barrick Gold also estimated that its initial compliance 
with the rules would require $100,000 for IT consulting, training 
and travel costs. See id.
    \389\ These total burden and cost estimates were based on the 
Commission's estimates that 425 issuers would bear the full burden 
and costs of the 2016 Rules and 192 issuers would bear a 
significantly reduced burden and costs because they were already 
subject to similar payment disclosure requirements in foreign 
jurisdictions. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission's PRA burden estimates for the 2016 Rules were based 
on a version of Section 13(q) rules that would have been more onerous 
than the proposed rules.\390\ As discussed more fully in Section III 
above, we believe that the proposed changes to the 2016 Rules, in 
particular the proposed definition of project and the proposed 
exemptions for conflicts with foreign law and pre-existing contracts, 
would meaningfully reduce the compliance burden and costs for issuers 
compared to the 2016 Rules. Because of these proposed changes, we 
believe that it would be appropriate to adjust the 2016 PRA burden 
estimates to account for this reduction in burden and costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \390\ For example, neither the 2012 Rules nor the 2016 Rules 
provided for exemptions for conflicts with foreign law or pre-
existing contracts, which we are proposing in this rulemaking. See 
supra Section II.J. Moreover, the Commission adopted a contract-
based definition of ``project'' in 2016 and, although the Commission 
left ``project'' undefined in 2012, it provided guidance in that 
rulemaking suggesting that project was to be determined based on the 
underlying contract. See 2012 Rules Adopting Release, Section 
II.D.3. In contrast, among other changes, the proposed rules include 
a broader definition of project and would permit greater aggregation 
of payment information at the major subnational jurisdiction level. 
See supra Sections II.F. and II.G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For PRA purposes, we estimate that the incremental burden of the 
proposed rules would be at least 25 percent less than the incremental 
burden of the 2016 Rules. We believe that this reduction in the burden 
estimate is reasonable because of the proposed changes to the 
definition of project, which should generally simplify and reduce the 
collection and reporting of payment information for a resource 
extraction issuer.\391\ We note that this reduction in the burden 
estimate does not take into account the two new proposed exemptions for 
conflicts with foreign law and pre-existing contracts.\392\ While we 
expect these proposed exemptions would result in a reduced PRA burden 
compared to the 2016 Rules,\393\ because it is more difficult to 
estimate the effects of the proposed exemptions, and to avoid 
underestimating the proposed rules' burden and costs, we have not 
factored them into the current PRA estimates. We have relied on a prior 
commenter's estimates for the limited purpose of this PRA analysis, 
and, as indicated above, we request commenters to provide us with more 
accurate estimates of the compliance costs and burden of the proposed 
rules.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \391\ See supra Section II.F.2.
    \392\ See supra Section III.C.
    \393\ For example, issuers may spend fewer internal hours and/or 
incur fewer professional costs to prepare case-specific exemptive 
relief requests in connection with the required disclosures.
    \394\ See discussion of quantitative estimate of costs in 
Section III.C.11., above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, for an issuer bearing the full costs and burden of the 
proposed rules, we estimate that compliance with the proposed rules 
would require 375 hours to make initial changes to the issuer's 
internal books and records and another 375 hours a year on an ongoing 
basis to review and verify the payment information,\395\ resulting in 
750 hours per respondent for the initial incremental PRA burden. Using 
the three-year average of the expected burden during the first year and 
the expected ongoing burden during the next two years, we estimate that 
the incremental PRA burden would be 500 hours per fully affected 
respondent (750 + 375 + 375 hours/3 years).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \395\ 500 hours x .25 = 125 hours. 500 hours-125 = 375 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following table shows the estimated internal burden hours and 
professional and other external costs for the 236 issuers bearing the 
full costs and burden of the proposed rules and for the 109 issuers 
subject to more granular resource extraction payment disclosure 
requirements in foreign jurisdictions when preparing and submitting 
Form SD. These total burden hours and total external costs would be in 
addition to the existing estimated hour and cost burdens applicable to 
Form SD because of compliance with Exchange Act Rule 13p-1.

[[Page 2566]]



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                    Additional
                                                   Burden       Total       Internal   Professional  Professional   (external)
                                    Number of    hours per      burden       burden     (external)    (external)     IT costs      Total        Total
   Whether issuer is subject to     estimated     current     hours for    hours for     hours for     costs for     \2\ per     additional    external
similar foreign disclosure regime    affected     affected     current      current       current       current      current      IT costs      costs
                                    responses     response     affected     affected     affected      affected      affected
                                                              responses    responses     responses     responses     response
                                           (A)          (B)          (C)          (D)           (E)           (F)          (G)          (H)          (I)
                                                             = (A) x (B)  = (C) x .75   = (C) x .25  = (E) x $400               = (A) x (G)  = (F) + (H)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No...............................          236          500      118,000       88,500        29,500   $11,800,000      $75,000  $17,700,000  $29,772,500
Yes..............................          109           25    \1\ 2,725        2,044        681.25       272,500            0            0      272,500
                                  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total........................          345  ...........  ...........       90,544  ............    12,072,500  ...........   17,700,000   30,045,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As we did in the 2016 rulemaking, we estimate that an issuer that is already subject to a qualifying alternative reporting regime would incur an
  internal burden that is five percent of the burden incurred by a fully affected issuer. 500 hours x .05 = 25 hours. 25 hours x 109 = 2,725 hours.
\2\ We estimate that an issuer bearing the full costs of the proposed rules would incur additional initial compliance costs for IT consulting, training
  and travel of $75,000. We do not, however, believe that these initial IT costs would apply to the issuers that are already subject to a qualifying
  alternative reporting regime since those issuers should already have IT systems in place to comply with the foreign regime. Similar to our estimate of
  the incremental PRA burden of the proposed rules, we estimate that the additional initial compliance costs for IT consulting, training and travel
  would be at least 25 percent less than the estimate for those costs ($100,000 per respondent) that was factored into the PRA estimate of total
  professional costs for the 2016 Rules. $100,000 x .25 = $25,000. $100,000-25,000 = $75,000.

D. Request for Comment

    We request comment in order to:
     Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information would have practical utility;
     Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the burden of the 
proposed collection of information;
     Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality, 
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected;
     Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of 
the collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology; and
     Evaluate whether the proposed amendments would have any 
effects on any other collections of information not previously 
identified in this section.\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \396\ We request comment pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Any member of the public may direct to us any comments about the 
accuracy of these burden estimates and any suggestions for reducing 
these burdens. Persons submitting comments on the collection of 
information requirements should direct the comments to the Office of 
Management and Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
Washington, DC 20503, and should send a copy to Vanessa A. Countryman, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549-1090, with reference to File No. S7-24-19. 
Requests for materials submitted to OMB by the Commission with regard 
to these collections of information should be in writing, refer to File 
No. S7-24-19, and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Office of FOIA Services, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549-2736. OMB is required to make a decision concerning the 
collection of information between 30 and 60 days after publication of 
this release. Consequently, a comment to OMB is best assured of having 
its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication.

V. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996,\397\ a rule is ``major'' if it has resulted, or is likely 
to result in:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \397\ 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     An annual effect on the U.S. economy of $100 million or 
more;
     A major increase in costs or prices for consumers or 
individual industries; or
     Significant adverse effects on competition, investment, or 
innovation.
    We request comment on whether our proposal would be a ``major 
rule'' for purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act. We solicit comment and empirical data on:
     The potential effect on the U.S. economy on an annual 
basis;
     Any potential increase in costs or prices for consumers or 
individual industries; and
     Any potential effect on competition, investment, or 
innovation.

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    When an agency issues a rulemaking proposal, the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \398\ requires the agency to prepare and make 
available for public comment an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(``IRFA'') that will describe the impact of the proposed rule on small 
entities.\399\ Section 605 of the RFA allows an agency to certify a 
rule, in lieu of preparing an IRFA, if the proposed rulemaking is not 
expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities.\400\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \398\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \399\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \400\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rules would exempt smaller reporting companies and 
emerging growth companies from the requirements of Section 13(q) and 
proposed Rule 13q-1. Most small entities \401\ would fall within the 
scope of this exemption and, therefore, would not be subject to the 
proposed rules. Accordingly, the Commission hereby certifies, pursuant 
to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the proposed rules, including proposed Rule 
13q-1 and the amendments to Form SD, if adopted, would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
for purposes of the RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \401\ For purposes of the RFA, Exchange Act Rule 0-10(a) [17 CFR 
240.0-10(a)] defines an issuer (other than an investment company) to 
be a ``small business'' or ``small organization'' if it had total 
assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its most recent 
fiscal year. Because Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 defines a smaller 
reporting company as an issuer (that is not an investment company) 
with either a public float of less than $250 million, or annual 
revenues of less than $100 million for the previous year and either 
no public float or a public float of less than $700 million, most 
small entities would likely fall within the definition of smaller 
reporting company and, therefore, would be exempt from the proposed 
rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    We request comment on this certification. In particular, we solicit 
comment on the following: Do commenters agree with the certification? 
If not, please describe the nature of any impact of the proposed 
amendments on small entities and provide empirical data to illustrate 
the extent of the impact. Such comments will be considered in the 
preparation of the

[[Page 2567]]

final rules (and in a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis if one is 
needed) and, if the proposed rules are adopted, will be placed in the 
same public file as comments on the proposed rules themselves.

VII. Statutory Authority and Text of Proposed Rule and Form Amendments

    We are proposing the rule and form amendments contained in this 
document under the authority set forth in Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 15, 
23(a), and 36 of the Exchange Act.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

    In accordance with the foregoing, we propose to amend title 17, 
chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

0
1. The general authority citation for part 240 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78o-4, 
78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78ll, 78mm, 80a-20, 
80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, and 7201 et seq., and 
8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; and 
Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 112-106, 
secs. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise noted.

* * * * *
0
2. Section 240.13q-1 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  240.13q-1  Disclosure of payments made by resource extraction 
issuers.

    (a) Resource extraction issuers. Every issuer that is required to 
file an annual report with the Commission on Form 10-K (17 CFR 
249.310), Form 20-F (17 CFR 249.220f), or Form 40-F (17 CFR 249.240f) 
pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78m or 
78o(d)) and engages in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, 
or minerals must furnish a report on Form SD (17 CFR 249b.400) within 
the period specified in that Form disclosing the information required 
by the applicable items of Form SD as specified in that Form.
    (b) Anti-evasion. Disclosure is required under this section in 
circumstances in which an activity related to the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, or a payment or series of 
payments made by a resource extraction issuer to a foreign government 
or the Federal Government for the purpose of commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals, is not, in form or characterization, 
within one of the categories of activities or payments specified in 
Form SD, but is part of a plan or scheme to evade the disclosure 
required under this section.
    (c) Alternative reporting. An application for recognition by the 
Commission that an alternative reporting regime requires disclosure 
that satisfies the transparency objectives of Section 13(q) (15 U.S.C. 
78m(q)), for purposes of alternative reporting pursuant to Item 2.01(c) 
of Form SD, must be filed in accordance with the procedures set forth 
in Sec.  240.0-13, except that, for purposes of this paragraph (c), 
applications may be submitted by resource extraction issuers, 
governments, industry groups, or trade associations.
    (d) Exemptions--(1) Conflicts of law. A resource extraction issuer 
that is prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction where the project is 
located from providing the payment information required by Form SD may 
exclude such disclosure, subject to the following conditions:
    (i) The issuer has taken all reasonable steps to seek and use any 
exemptions or other relief under the applicable law of the foreign 
jurisdiction, and has been unable to obtain or use such an exemption or 
other relief;
    (ii) The issuer must disclose on Form SD:
    (A) The foreign jurisdiction for which it is omitting the 
disclosure pursuant to this paragraph (d)(1);
    (B) The particular law of that jurisdiction that prevents the 
issuer from providing such disclosure; and
    (C) The efforts the issuer has undertaken to seek and use 
exemptions or other relief under the applicable law of that 
jurisdiction, and the results of those efforts; and
    (iii) The issuer must furnish as an exhibit to Form SD a legal 
opinion from counsel that opines on the issuer's inability to provide 
such disclosure without violating the foreign jurisdiction's law.
    (2) Conflicts with pre-existing contracts. A resource extraction 
issuer that is unable to provide the payment information required by 
Form SD without violating one or more contract terms that were in 
effect prior to the effective date of this section may exclude such 
disclosure, subject to the following conditions:
    (i) The issuer has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the consent 
of the relevant contractual parties, or to seek and use another 
contractual exception or relief, to disclose the payment information, 
and has been unable to obtain such consent or other contractual 
exception or relief;
    (ii) The issuer must disclose on Form SD:
    (A) The jurisdiction for which it is omitting the disclosure 
pursuant to this paragraph (d)(2);
    (B) The particular contract terms that prohibit the issuer from 
providing such disclosure; and
    (C) The efforts the issuer has undertaken to obtain the consent of 
the contracting parties, or to seek and use another contractual 
exception or relief, to disclose the payment information, and the 
results of those efforts; and
    (iii) The issuer must furnish as an exhibit to Form SD a legal 
opinion from counsel that opines on the issuer's inability to provide 
such disclosure without violating the contractual terms.
    (3) Exemption for emerging growth companies and smaller reporting 
companies. An issuer that is an emerging growth company or a smaller 
reporting company, each as defined under Sec.  240.12b-2, is exempt 
from, and need not comply with, the requirements of this section.
    (4) Case-by-case exemption. A resource extraction issuer may file 
an application for exemptive relief under this section in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in Sec.  240.0-12.
    (e) Compilation. To the extent practicable, the staff will 
periodically make a compilation of the information required to be 
submitted under this section publicly available online. The staff may 
determine the form, manner and timing of the compilation, except that 
no information included therein may be anonymized (whether by redacting 
the names of the resource extraction issuers or otherwise).

PART 249b--FURTHER FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

0
3. The authority citation for part 249b continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *

    Section 249b.400 is also issued under secs. 1502 and 1504, Pub. 
L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2213 and 2220.

0
4. Amend Form SD (referenced in Sec.  249b.400) by:
0
a. Adding a check box for Rule 13q-1;
0
b. Revising instruction A. under ``General Instructions'';
0
c. Redesignating instruction B.2. as B.3 and adding new instructions 
B.2.

[[Page 2568]]

and B.4. under the ``General Instructions''; and
0
d. Redesignating Section 2 as Section 3, adding new Section 2, and 
revising newly redesignated Section 3 under the ``Information to be 
Included in the Report''.
    The addition and revision read as follows:

    Note: The text of Form SD does not, and this amendment will not, 
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.


                                UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                                              Washington, DC 20549
                                                     FORM SD
                                          Specialized Disclosure Report
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           (Exact name of the registrant as specified in its charter)
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(State or other jurisdiction of       (Commission                           (I.R.S. Employer
incorporation or organization)        File Number)                          Identification No.)
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              (Full mailing address of principal executive offices)
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   (Name and telephone number, including area code, of the person to contact in connection with this report.)
 
Check the appropriate box to indicate the rule pursuant to which this Form is being submitted, and provide the
 period to which the information in this Form applies:
 
__Rule 13p-1 under the Securities Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13p-1) for the reporting period from January 1 to
 December 31, ____.
__Rule 13q-1 under the Securities Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13q-1) for the fiscal year ended ____.
 

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. Rule as to Use of Form SD

    This Form shall be used for a report pursuant to Rule 13p-1 (17 CFR 
240.13p-1) and Rule 13q-1 (17 CFR 240.13q-1) under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the ``Exchange Act'').

B. Information To Be Reported and Time for Furnishing Reports

    1. * * *
    2. Form furnished under Rule 13q-1. If your fiscal year ends on or 
before June 30, furnish the information required by Section 2 of this 
form on EDGAR no later than March 31 in the calendar year following 
your most recent fiscal year. If your fiscal year ends after June 30, 
furnish this required information no later than March 31 in the second 
calendar year following your most recent fiscal year.
    3. If the deadline for furnishing this Form occurs on a Saturday, 
Sunday or holiday on which the Commission is not open for business, 
then the deadline shall be the next business day.
    4. The information and documents furnished in this report shall not 
be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the 
Securities Act or the Exchange Act, unless a registrant specifically 
incorporates it by reference into such filing.
* * * * *

INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE REPORT

* * * * *

Section 2--Resource Extraction Issuer Disclosure

Item 2.01 Resource Extraction Issuer Disclosure and Report

    (a) Required Disclosure. (1) A resource extraction issuer must 
furnish an annual report on Form SD with the Commission, and include as 
an exhibit to this Form SD, the information specified in Item 
2.01(a)(5) of this Form, relating to any payment made during the fiscal 
year covered by the annual report by the resource extraction issuer, a 
subsidiary of the resource extraction issuer, or an entity under the 
control of the resource extraction issuer, to a foreign government or 
the Federal Government, for the purpose of the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas, or minerals.
    (2) The resource extraction issuer is not required to have the 
information audited. The payment information must be provided on a cash 
basis and not an accrual basis.
    (3) The resource extraction issuer must provide a statement in the 
body of the Form SD, under the caption ``Disclosure of Payments by 
Resource Extraction Issuers,'' that the specified payment disclosure 
required by this Form is included in an exhibit to the Form SD.
    (4) A resource extraction issuer that is claiming an exemption 
under Rule 13q-1(d)(1) or (2) (17 CFR 240.13q-1(d)(1) or (2)) must 
provide the disclosure required by those rules, as applicable, in the 
body of the Form SD. If applicable, a resource extraction issuer must 
disclose in the body of Form SD that it has filed an application for 
exemptive relief pursuant to Rule 13q-1(d)(4) (17 CFR 240.13q-1(d)(4)).
    (5) The resource extraction issuer must include the following 
information in the exhibit to Form SD, which must present the 
information in the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) 
electronic format:
    (i) The type and total amount of such payments, by payment type 
listed in paragraph (d)(9)(iii) of this Item, made for each project of 
the resource extraction issuer relating to the commercial development 
of oil, natural gas, or minerals;
    (ii) The type and total amount of such payments, by payment type 
listed in paragraph (d)(9)(iii) of this Item, for all projects made to 
each government;
    (iii) The total amounts of the payments, by payment type listed in 
paragraph (d)(9)(iii) of this Item;
    (iv) The currency used to make the payments;
    (v) The fiscal year in which the payments were made;
    (vi) The business segment of the resource extraction issuer that 
made the payments;

[[Page 2569]]

    (vii) The governments (including any foreign government or the 
Federal Government) that received the payments and the country in which 
each such government is located;
    (viii) The project of the resource extraction issuer to which the 
payments relate;
    (ix) The particular resource that is the subject of commercial 
development;
    (x) The method of extraction used in the project; and
    (xi) The major subnational political jurisdiction of the project.
    (b) Delayed Reporting. (1) A resource extraction issuer may delay 
disclosing payment information related to exploratory activities until 
the Form SD submitted for the fiscal year immediately following the 
fiscal year in which the payment was made. For purposes of this 
paragraph, payment information related to exploratory activities 
includes all payments made as part of the process of (i) identifying 
areas that may warrant examination, (ii) examining specific areas that 
are considered to have prospects of containing oil and gas reserves, or 
(iii) as part of a mineral exploration program, in each case limited to 
exploratory activities that were commenced prior to the commercial 
development (other than exploration) of the oil, natural gas, or 
minerals on the property, any adjacent property, or any property that 
is part of the same project.
    (2) A resource extraction issuer that has acquired (or otherwise 
obtains control over) an entity that has not been obligated to provide 
disclosure pursuant to Rule 13q-1, or pursuant to another alternative 
reporting regime deemed by the Commission to require disclosure that 
satisfies the transparency objectives of Section 13(q) (15 U.S.C. 
78m(q)), in such entity's last full fiscal year is not required to 
commence reporting payment information for such acquired entity until 
the Form SD submitted for the fiscal year immediately following the 
effective date of the acquisition. A resource extraction issuer must 
disclose that it is relying on this accommodation in the body of its 
Form SD submission.
    (3) A resource extraction issuer that has completed its initial 
public offering in the United States in its last full fiscal year is 
not required to commence reporting payment information pursuant to Rule 
13q-1 until the Form SD submitted for the fiscal year immediately 
following the fiscal year in which the registration statement for its 
U.S. initial public offering became effective.
    (c) Alternative Reporting. (1) A resource extraction issuer that is 
subject to the resource extraction payment disclosure requirements of 
an alternative reporting regime, which has been deemed by the 
Commission to require disclosure that satisfies the transparency 
objectives of Section 13(q) (15 U.S.C. 78m(q)), may satisfy its 
disclosure obligations under paragraph (a) of this Item 2.01 by 
including, as an exhibit to this Form SD, a report complying with the 
reporting requirements of the alternative jurisdiction.
    (2) The alternative report must be the same as the one prepared and 
made publicly available pursuant to the requirements of the approved 
alternative reporting regime, subject to changes necessary to comply 
with any conditions to alternative reporting set forth by the 
Commission.
    (3) The resource extraction issuer must: (i) State in the body of 
the Form SD that it is relying on the alternative reporting provision; 
(ii) identify the alternative reporting regime for which the report was 
prepared; (iii) describe how to access the publicly submitted report in 
the alternative jurisdiction; and (iv) specify that the payment 
disclosure required by this Form is included in an exhibit to this Form 
SD.
    (4) The alternative report must be provided in XBRL format.
    (5) A fair and accurate English translation of the entire report 
must be submitted if the report is in a foreign language. Project names 
may be presented in their original language, in addition to the English 
translation of the project name, if the resource extraction issuer 
believes that such an approach would facilitate identification of the 
project by users of the disclosure.
    (6) A resource extraction issuer may follow the submission deadline 
of an approved alternative jurisdiction if it submits a notice on Form 
SD-N on or before the due date of its Form SD indicating its intent to 
submit the alternative report using the alternative jurisdiction's 
deadline. If a resource extraction issuer fails to submit such notice 
on a timely basis, or submits such a notice but fails to submit the 
alternative report within four business days of the alternative 
jurisdiction's deadline, it may not rely on this Item 2.01(c) for the 
following fiscal year.
    (7) Resource extraction issuers must also comply with any 
additional requirements that are provided by the Commission upon 
granting an alternative reporting accommodation, as well as subsequent 
changes in such requirements.
    (d) Definitions. For purposes of this item, the following 
definitions apply:
    (1) Business segment means a business segment consistent with the 
reportable segments used by the resource extraction issuer for purposes 
of financial reporting.
    (2) Commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals means 
exploration, extraction, processing, and export of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity.
    (3) Control means that the resource extraction issuer consolidates 
the entity under the accounting principles applicable to the financial 
statements included in the resource extraction issuer's periodic 
reports filed pursuant to the Exchange Act (i.e., under generally 
accepted accounting principles in the United States (U.S. GAAP) or 
International Financial Reporting Standards as issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IFRS)). A foreign private 
issuer that prepares financial statements according to a comprehensive 
set of accounting principles, other than U.S. GAAP, and files with the 
Commission a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP must determine control using 
U.S. GAAP.
    (4) Export means the movement of a resource across an international 
border from the host country to another country by a company with an 
ownership interest in the resource. Export does not include the 
movement of a resource across an international border by a company that 
(i) is not engaged in the exploration, extraction, or processing of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals and (ii) acquired its ownership interest 
in the resource directly or indirectly from a foreign government or the 
Federal Government. Export also does not include cross-border 
transportation activities by an entity that is functioning solely as a 
service provider, with no ownership interest in the resource being 
transported.
    (5) Extraction means the production of oil and natural gas as well 
as the extraction of minerals.
    (6) Federal Government means the Federal Government of the United 
States.
    (7) Foreign Government means a foreign government, a department, 
agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government, or a company at 
least majority owned by a foreign government. As used in this Item 
2.01, foreign government includes a foreign national government as well 
as a foreign subnational government, such as the government of a state, 
province, county, district, municipality, or territory under a foreign 
national government.
    (8) Not de minimis means any Payment made to each Foreign 
Government in a host country or the Federal Government that equals or

[[Page 2570]]

exceeds $150,000, or its equivalent in the issuer's reporting currency, 
whether made as a single payment or series of related payments, subject 
to the condition that single payment (or a series of related payments) 
disclosure for a Project is only required if the total Payments for a 
Project equal or exceed $750,000. In the case of any arrangement 
providing for periodic payments or installments, a resource extraction 
issuer must use the aggregate amount of the related periodic payments 
or installments of the related payments in determining whether the 
payment threshold has been met for that series of payments, and 
accordingly, whether disclosure is required.
    (9) Payment means an amount paid that:
    (i) Is made to further the commercial development of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals;
    (ii) Is not de minimis; and
    (iii) Is one or more of the following:
    (A) Taxes;
    (B) Royalties;
    (C) Fees;
    (D) Production entitlements;
    (E) Bonuses;
    (F) Dividends;
    (G) Payments for infrastructure improvements; and
    (H) Community and social responsibility payments that are required 
by law or contract.
    (10) Project is defined by using the following three criteria:
    (i) The type of resource being commercially developed;
    (ii) The method of extraction; and
    (iii) The major subnational political jurisdiction where the 
commercial development of the resource is taking place.
    (11) Resource extraction issuer means an issuer that:
    (i) Is required to file an annual report with the Commission on 
Form 10-K (17 CFR 249.310), Form 20-F (18 CFR 249.220f), or Form 40-F 
(17 CFR 249.240f) pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act 
(15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
    (ii) Engages in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals.
    (12) Subsidiary means an entity controlled directly or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries.

Instructions to Item 2.01

Disclosure by Subsidiaries and Other Controlled Entities

    (1) If a resource extraction issuer is controlled by another 
resource extraction issuer that has submitted a Form SD disclosing the 
information required by Item 2.01 for the controlled entity, then such 
controlled entity is not required to provide the disclosure required by 
Item 2.01 separately. In such circumstances, the controlled entity must 
submit a notice on Form SD indicating that the required disclosure was 
submitted on Form SD by the controlling entity, identifying the 
controlling entity and the date it submitted the disclosure. The 
reporting controlling entity must note that it is submitting the 
required disclosure for a controlled entity and must identify the 
controlled entity on its Form SD submission.

Currency Disclosure and Conversion

    (2) A resource extraction issuer must report the amount of payments 
made for each payment type, and the total amount of payments made for 
each project and to each government, during the reporting period in 
either U.S. dollars or the resource extraction issuer's reporting 
currency. If a resource extraction issuer has made payments in 
currencies other than U.S. dollars or its reporting currency, it may 
choose to calculate the currency conversion between the currency in 
which the payment was made and U.S. dollars or the resource extraction 
issuer's reporting currency, as applicable, in one of three ways: (a) 
By translating the expenses at the exchange rate existing at the time 
the payment is made; (b) using a weighted average of the exchange rates 
during the period; or (c) based on the exchange rate as of the resource 
extraction issuer's fiscal year end. When calculating whether the de 
minimis threshold has been exceeded, a resource extraction issuer may 
be required to convert the payment to U.S. dollars, even though it is 
not required to disclose those payments in U.S. dollars. For example, 
this may occur when the resource extraction issuer is using a non-U.S. 
dollar reporting currency. In these instances, the resource extraction 
issuer may use any of the three methods described above for calculating 
the currency conversion. In all cases a resource extraction issuer must 
disclose the method used to calculate the currency conversion and must 
choose a consistent method for all such currency conversions within a 
particular Form SD submission.

Location Tagging

    (3) When identifying the country and major subnational political 
jurisdiction where the commercial development of the resource is taking 
place, a resource extraction issuer must use the combined country and 
subdivision code provided in ISO 3166, if available. When identifying 
the country in which a government is located, a resource extraction 
issuer must use the two letter country code provided in ISO 3166, if 
available.

Entity Level Disclosure and Tagging

    (4) If a government levies a payment obligation, such as a tax or a 
requirement to pay a dividend, at the entity level rather than on a 
particular project, a resource extraction issuer may disclose that 
payment at the entity level. To the extent that payments, such as 
corporate income taxes and dividends, are made for obligations levied 
at the entity level, a resource extraction issuer may omit certain tags 
that may be inapplicable (e.g., project tag, business segment tag) for 
those payment types as long as it provides all other electronic tags, 
including the tag identifying the recipient government.

Project Disclosure

    (5)(i) When identifying the type of resource that is being 
commercially developed for purposes of identifying a project, the 
resource extraction issuer must identify whether the resource is oil, 
natural gas, or a type of mineral. A resource extraction issuer should 
identify synthetic oil obtained through processing tar sands, bitumen, 
or oil shales as ``oil'' and should identify gas obtained from methane 
hydrates as ``natural gas.'' Synthetic oil or gas obtained through 
processing of coal should be identified as ``coal.'' Minerals must be 
identified by type, such as gold, copper, coal, sand, or gravel, but 
additional detail is not required. For information on which materials 
are covered by the term ``minerals,'' refer to Instruction 13 below.
    (ii) When identifying the method of extraction for purposes of 
identifying a project, the resource extraction issuer must choose from 
the following three parameters: well, open pit, or underground mining.
    (iii) When identifying the national and major subnational political 
jurisdiction for purposes of identifying a project, refer to 
Instruction 3 to Item 2.01. Onshore and offshore development of 
resources may not be treated as a single project. A resource extraction 
issuer must identify when a project is offshore and identify the 
nearest major subnational political jurisdiction pursuant to 
Instruction 3 of Item 2.01.
    (iv) A resource extraction issuer may treat all the activities 
within a major subnational political jurisdiction as a single project, 
but must describe each type of resource being commercially developed 
and each method of extraction used in the description of the

[[Page 2571]]

project. A resource extraction issuer may not combine as one project 
activities that cross the borders of a major subnational political 
jurisdiction.

Payment Disclosure

    (6) When a resource extraction issuer proportionately consolidates 
an entity or operation under U.S. GAAP or IFRS, as applicable, the 
resource extraction issuer must disclose its proportionate amount of 
the payments made by such entity or operation pursuant to this Item and 
must indicate the proportionate interest.
    (7) Although an entity providing only services to a resource 
extraction issuer to assist with exploration, extraction, processing or 
export would generally not be considered a resource extraction issuer, 
where such a service provider makes a payment that falls within the 
definition of ``payment'' to a government on behalf of a resource 
extraction issuer, the resource extraction issuer must disclose such 
payment.
    (8) ``Processing,'' as used in Item 2.01, includes, but is not 
limited to, midstream activities such as removing liquid hydrocarbons 
from gas, removing impurities from natural gas prior to its transport 
through a pipeline, and upgrading bitumen or heavy oil, through the 
earlier of the point at which oil, gas, or gas liquids (natural or 
synthetic) are either sold to an unrelated third party or delivered to 
a main pipeline, a common carrier, or a marine terminal. It also 
includes the crushing or preparing of raw ore prior to the smelting 
phase. It would not include the downstream activities of refining or 
smelting.
    (9) A resource extraction issuer must disclose payments made for 
taxes on corporate profits, corporate income, and production. 
Disclosure of payments made for taxes levied on consumption, such as 
value added taxes, personal income taxes, or sales taxes, is not 
required.
    (10) Royalties include unit-based, value-based, and profit-based 
royalties. Fees include license fees, rental fees, entry fees, and 
other considerations for licenses or concessions. Bonuses include 
signature, discovery, and production bonuses.
    (11) Dividends paid to a government as a common or ordinary 
shareholder of the resource extraction issuer that are paid to the 
government under the same terms as other shareholders need not be 
disclosed. The resource extraction issuer, however, must disclose any 
dividends paid in lieu of production entitlements or royalties.
    (12) If a resource extraction issuer makes an in-kind payment of 
the types of payments required to be disclosed, the resource extraction 
issuer must disclose the payment. When reporting an in-kind payment, a 
resource extraction issuer must determine the monetary value of the in-
kind payment and tag the information as ``in-kind'' for purposes of the 
currency. For purposes of the disclosure, a resource extraction issuer 
must report the payment at cost, or if cost is not determinable, fair 
market value and must provide a brief description of how the monetary 
value was calculated. If a resource extraction issuer makes an in-kind 
production entitlement payment under the rules and then repurchases the 
resources associated with the production entitlement within the same 
fiscal year, the resource extraction issuer must report the payment 
using the purchase price (rather than at cost, or if cost is not 
determinable, fair market value). If the in-kind production entitlement 
payment and the subsequent repurchase are made in different fiscal 
years and the purchase price is greater than the previously reported 
value of the in-kind payment, the resource extraction issuer must 
report the difference in values in the latter fiscal year (assuming the 
amount of that difference exceeds the de minimis threshold). In other 
situations, such as when the purchase price in a subsequent fiscal year 
is less than the in-kind value already reported, no disclosure relating 
to the purchase price is required.
    (13) ``Minerals,'' as used in Item 2.01, includes any material for 
which an issuer with mining operations would provide disclosure under 
the Commission's existing disclosure requirements and policies, 
including Industry Guide 7 or any successor requirements or policies 
(see subpart 1300 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.1300). It does not 
include oil and gas resources (as defined in 17 CFR 210.4-10(a)(16)(D) 
or any successor provision).
    (14) For payments made at a level below the major subnational 
government level, such as a county, district, or municipality, an 
issuer may aggregate all of its payments of a particular payment type 
made to such subnational governments and disclose the aggregate amount 
without having to identify the particular subnational government payee. 
The issuer should instead generically identify the subnational 
government payee (e.g., as ``county,'' ``municipality,'' or some 
combination of subnational governments).

Section 3--Exhibits

Item 3.01 Exhibits

    List below the following exhibits submitted as part of this report:
    Exhibit 1.01--Conflict Minerals Report as required by Items 1.01 
and 1.02 of this Form.
    Exhibit 2.01--Resource Extraction Payment Report as required by 
Item 2.01 of this Form.
    Exhibit 3.01--Opinion of Counsel as required by Rule 13q-1(d)(1) or 
(2) (17 CFR 240.13q-1(d)(1) or (2)).

SIGNATURES

    Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its 
behalf by the duly authorized undersigned.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(Registrant)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
By (Signature and Title) *

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(Date)

* Print name and title of the registrant's signing executive officer 
under his or her signature.
* * * * *

    By the Commission.

    Dated: December 18, 2019.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-28407 Filed 1-14-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


