[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 218 (Tuesday, November 12, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61114-61120]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-24549]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-87476; File No. SR-OCC-2019-807]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Advance Notice Related to Proposed Changes to The 
Options Clearing Corporation's Rules, Margin Policy, Margin 
Methodology, Clearing Fund Methodology Policy, and Clearing Fund and 
Stress Testing Methodology To Address Specific Wrong-Way Risk

November 6, 2019.
    Pursuant to Section 806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, entitled Payment, Clearing 
and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (``Clearing Supervision Act'') 
\1\ and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) \2\ under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (``Act'' or ``Exchange Act''),\3\ notice is hereby given that on 
October 10, 2019, the Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') an advance 
notice as described in Items I, II and III below, which Items have been 
prepared by OCC. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the advance notice from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i).
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Advance 
Notice

    This advance notice is submitted in connection with proposed 
enhancements to OCC's Rules, margin policy and methodology, Clearing 
Fund policy, and Clearing Fund and stress testing methodology to adopt 
new margin charges and other risk measures to address the specific 
wrong-way risk presented by certain cleared positions.
    The proposed amendments to OCC's Rules are included in Exhibit 5A 
of the filing. The proposed amendments to OCC's Margin Policy and 
Margins Methodology are included in Exhibits 5B and 5C, respectively. 
The proposed amendments to OCC's Clearing Fund Methodology Policy 
(``CFM Policy'') and Stress Testing and Clearing Fund Methodology 
Description (``Methodology Description'') are included in Exhibits 5D 
and 5E, respectively. Material proposed to be added to the Rules, 
Margin Policy and Margins Methodology as currently in effect is marked 
by underlining, and

[[Page 61115]]

material proposed to be deleted is marked in strikethrough text; 
however, the proposed Specific Wrong-Way Risk Add-On chapter of the 
Margins Methodology is presented without marking to improve readability 
as the entire chapter is newly proposed rule text.\4\ Material proposed 
to be added to the CFM Policy and Methodology Description is marked by 
double underlining, and material proposed to be deleted is marked in 
double strikethrough text.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ OCC also has filed a proposed rule change with the 
Commission in connection with the proposed changes. See SR-OCC-2019-
010.
    \5\ OCC also filed with the Commission proposed rule change and 
advance notice filings concerning enhancements to its CFM Policy and 
Methodology Description, which are currently pending Commission 
review. See OCC filings SR-OCC-2019-009 and SR-OCC-2019-806. OCC has 
marked proposed changes to the CFM Policy and Methodology 
Description described herein in double marking to clearly 
differentiate those changes from other changes currently pending 
Commission review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The advance notice is available on OCC's website at https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp. All terms with initial 
capitalization that are not otherwise defined herein have the same 
meaning as set forth in the OCC By-Laws and Rules.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ OCC's By-Laws and Rules can be found on OCC's public 
website: http://optionsclearing.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Advance Notice

    In its filing with the Commission, OCC included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the advance notice and 
discussed any comments it received on the advance notice. The text of 
these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV 
below. OCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A and B below, 
of the most significant aspects of these statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Advance Notice

    Written comments were not and are not intended to be solicited with 
respect to the advance notice and none have been received. OCC will 
notify the Commission of any written comments received by OCC.

(B) Advance Notices Filed Pursuant to Section 806(e) of the Payment, 
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act

Description of the Proposed Change
Background
    As a central counterparty (``CCP''), OCC is exposed to wrong-way 
risk, which is the risk that arises when exposure to a counterparty is 
adversely correlated with the credit quality and probability of default 
of that counterparty. Specific wrong-way risk (``SWWR'') arises when an 
exposure to a participant is highly likely to increase when the 
creditworthiness of that participant is deteriorating.\7\ For example, 
SWWR arises where a Clearing Member's cleared positions contain equity 
securities issued by the Clearing Member or its affiliates (i.e., the 
Clearing Member Group) (such positions referred to herein as ``SWWR 
Equity positions'') as the equity issued by the Clearing Member Group 
may be assumed to have a price at or near zero in a default or 
bankruptcy scenario, and those positions (e.g., equity used as a hedge, 
stock loans, options on equity, single-stock futures) may experience 
substantial losses. In addition, SWWR may arise where uncollateralized 
exchange-traded notes (``ETNs'') issued by a Clearing Member or its 
affiliates (``SWWR ETN positions'') are part of the Clearing Member's 
cleared positions (these positions, collectively with ``SWWR Equity 
positions,'' are hereinafter referred to as ``SWWR positions''). SWWR 
may also arise when a Clearing Member posts equity securities or ETNs 
issued by it or of its affiliates as margin collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (September 28, 
2016), 81 FR 70786, 70816, n. 317 (October 13, 2016) (S7-03-14) 
(``Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies''). See also Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Principles for 
financial market infrastructures (Apr. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC currently accounts for SWWR as it relates to margin collateral 
by generally prohibiting a Clearing Member from pledging equities 
issued by it or one of its affiliates as margin collateral unless this 
pledge provides a hedge against a cleared position in the same 
account.\8\ OCC does not, however, currently account for SWWR as it 
relates to cleared positions. As a result, OCC is proposing a new 
``add-on'' charge \9\ for its margin methodology, the System for 
Theoretical Analysis and Numerical Simulations (``STANS''),\10\ and new 
stress test scenarios that may result in intra-day margin calls and, in 
more extreme cases, intra-month increases in the size of OCC's Clearing 
Fund \11\ to address the wrong-way risk of OCC's cleared positions 
involving Clearing Member-issued securities. In addition, OCC proposes 
to introduce certain restrictions on stock lending activity related to 
SWWR positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See OCC Rule 604, Interpretation and Policy .16.
    \9\ Under OCC's Margin Policy, OCC may collateralize certain 
exposures through the use of add-on charges.
    \10\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53322 (February 15, 
2006), 71 FR 9403 (February 23, 2006) (SR-OCC-2004-20). A detailed 
description of the STANS methodology is available at http://optionsclearing.com/risk-management/margins/.
    \11\ Under OCC's existing stress testing and Clearing Fund 
methodology, OCC runs on a daily basis a set of stress test 
scenarios designed to measure the exposure of the Clearing Fund to 
the portfolios of individual Clearing Member Groups and determine 
whether any such exposure is sufficiently large as to necessitate 
OCC calling for additional resources so that OCC continues to 
maintain sufficient financial resources to guard against potential 
losses under a wide range of stress scenarios, including extreme but 
plausible market conditions (``Sufficiency Scenarios,'' and such 
scenarios collectively constituting ``Sufficiency Stress Tests''). 
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83714 (July 26, 2018), 83 FR 
37570 (August 1, 2018) (SR-OCC-2018-803) and Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 83735 (July 27, 2018), 83 FR 37855 (August 2, 2018) (SR-
OCC-2018-008). Under OCC Rule 609, the CFM Policy, and the 
Methodology Description, if a Sufficiency Stress Test identifies 
exposures that exceed 75% of the current Clearing Fund requirement 
less deficits (the ``75% threshold'' or ``Sufficiency Stress Test 
Threshold 1''), OCC may require additional margin deposits from the 
Clearing Member Group(s) driving the breach. If a Sufficiency Stress 
Test identifies exposures that exceed 90% of the current Clearing 
Fund, OCC would perform an intra-month resizing of the Clearing 
Fund. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed Changes
    OCC proposes to enhance its management of SWWR by: (1) Imposing 
certain restrictions on stock lending activity at OCC; (2) adopting a 
new SWWR margin add-on for STANS (``SWWR Add-on''); (3) introducing new 
stress test scenarios to capture the SWWR of cleared positions 
involving Clearing Member-issued ETNs beyond certain pre-defined 
thresholds; and (4) making other clarifying and conforming changes to 
the CFM Policy and Methodology Description. The proposed changes are 
intended to address the credit risks arising from SWWR positions at 
OCC. The proposed changes are described in detail below.
1. Prohibition on Lending Clearing Member/Affiliate-Issued Securities
    OCC operates two programs for stock loan transactions: (1) The 
Stock Loan/Hedge Program and (2) the Market Loan Program (collectively, 
the ``Stock Loan Programs''). In the Stock Loan/Hedge Program, 
prospective Lending and Borrowing Clearing Members identify each other 
(independent of OCC), agree to bilaterally negotiated terms of the 
stock loan (in this case, a ``Hedge Loan''), and then send the details 
of the stock loan to the Depository Trust Company (``DTC'') designating 
the stock loan as a Hedge Loan for guaranty and clearance at OCC. The 
Lending Clearing Member then instructs DTC to transfer

[[Page 61116]]

a specified number of shares of Eligible Stock \12\ to the account of 
the Borrowing Clearing Member, and the Borrowing Clearing Member 
instructs DTC to transfer the appropriate amount of cash collateral to 
the account of the Lending Clearing Member. In the Market Loan Program, 
stock loans are initiated through the matching of bids and offers that 
are either agreed upon by the Market Loan Clearing Members or matched 
anonymously through a Loan Market (such stock loans being ``Market 
Loans''). In order to initiate a Market Loan, the Loan Market sends a 
matched transaction to OCC, which in turn sends two separate but linked 
settlement instructions to DTC to effect the movement of Eligible Stock 
and cash collateral between the accounts of the Market Loan Clearing 
Members through OCC's account at DTC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ OCC's By-Laws define ``Eligible Stock'' to mean, in part, 
any security that is eligible for lending in the Stock Loan/Hedge 
Program and the Market Loan Program. See Article I, Section 1.E(3) 
of the OCC By-Laws. Eligible Stock may include ETNs issued by OCC's 
Clearing Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regardless of whether a transaction is initiated under the Stock 
Loan/Hedge Program or Market Loan Program, OCC novates the transaction 
and becomes the lender to the Borrowing Clearing Member and the 
borrower to the Lending Clearing Member. As the principal counterparty 
to the Borrowing and Lending Clearing Members, OCC guarantees the 
return of the full value of cash collateral to a Borrowing Clearing 
Member and guarantees the return of the Loaned Stock (or value of that 
Loaned Stock) to the Lending Clearing Member.\13\ As noted above, OCC 
may be exposed to SWWR in its Stock Loan Programs where Clearing 
Members lend equity securities or ETNs issued by the Clearing Member or 
its affiliates. Specifically, the lending of Clearing Member or Member 
Affiliate-issued equity or ETNs creates a long exposure and liability 
in the case when a Clearing Member defaults and its own or affiliated 
equity or ETN declines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Under the Market Loan Program, OCC also provides a limited 
guaranty of dividend and rebate payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC proposes to mitigate SWWR in its Stock Loan Programs by 
prohibiting Clearing Members from lending any Eligible Stock issued by 
such Clearing Member or any affiliate of such Clearing Member. The 
proposed restriction would apply to both SWWR Equity positions and SWWR 
ETN positions. OCC does not believe that the proposed restriction on 
lending SWWR Equity positions would have a material impact on Clearing 
Members in the Stock Loan Programs as Clearing Members do not typically 
engage in lending of their own equity securities and borrowers 
typically do not accept equity securities issued by their lending 
counterparty.\14\ The proposed restrictions on lending SWWR ETN 
positions would, however, impact a very small segment of Clearing 
Members that lend SWWR ETNs.\15\ OCC believes that the impact of the 
proposed changes would be limited by the fact that, unlike listed 
options, Clearing Members are able to lend SWWR positions on an 
uncleared basis outside of OCC. The proposed restrictions on lending 
activity in the Stock Loan Programs would not prevent Clearing Members 
from lending equities or ETNs issued by the Clearing Member or any 
affiliate of such Clearing Member on a bilateral basis if members wish 
to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ As of the start of September 2019, OCC had 107 Clearing 
Members, of which 64 have member or affiliate-issued securities 
eligible for lending in the Stock Loan Programs. OCC analyzed SWWR 
Equity lending activity for its Clearing Members from January 2018 
through the beginning of September 2019. During this period, less 
than 10 Clearing Members had stock lending activity in SWWR Equity 
positions, and loans of SWWR Equity positions constituted less than 
three percent of each of those Clearing Members' average notional 
stock lending activity for the period.
    \15\ OCC analyzed SWWR ETN lending activity for its Clearing 
Members from January 2018 through the beginning of September 2019. 
Only 11 of OCC's 107 Clearing Members have member or affiliate 
issued ETNs. During this period, less than 10 Clearing Members had 
stock lending activity for SWWR ETN positions. For the majority of 
these Clearing Members, lending in SWWR ETN positions constituted 
approximately 13 percent or less of each of those Clearing Members' 
average notional stock lending activity for the period. For Clearing 
Members that averaged higher notational lending activity, OCC has 
observed significant reductions in this activity over recent months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed prohibition on lending Clearing Member or Member 
Affiliate-issued Eligible Stock would be included in new OCC Rules 
2202(f) and 2202A(f) for the Stock Loan/Hedge Program and Market Loan 
Program, respectively. OCC would also make conforming changes to its 
Margin Policy and Margins Methodology to reflect the newly proposed 
restrictions in stock lending activity.
    The proposed change would only apply to stock lending activity as 
of the time of implementation of the proposed change. The proposed 
change would not be applied retroactively to existing open positions, 
and Clearing Members with open stock loans involving Clearing Member or 
Member Affiliate-issued Eligible Stock would not be forced to terminate 
those existing positions. Any SWWR stock lending positions in existence 
as of the implementation of the proposed change would be subject to the 
SWWR charges described below until such positions are closed out 
through the normal course stock loan termination process.
2. SWWR Add-on
    OCC proposes to adopt a new margin add-on (i.e., the SWWR Add-on) 
to address SWWR from cleared positions involving Clearing Member and 
affiliate issued equities and ETNs. The SWWR Add-on would be calculated 
for each margin tier account of a Clearing Member Group having 
positions related to either publicly traded equities or ETNs issued by 
the Clearing Member Group and would cover all types of positions 
(equity used as collateral, equity and ETN options, single-stock 
futures). The proposed SWWR Add-on is comprised of three main 
components: (1) ``SWWR Equity Charge,'' (2) ``SWWR ETN Charge,'' and 
(3) ``SWWR Residual.'' Each of these components is discussed below.
a. SWWR Equity Charge
    Under the proposal, when a Clearing Member defaults, it is assumed 
that the price of any equity security issued by the Clearing Member 
Group would fall to zero. As a result, OCC would calculate the SWWR 
Equity Charge by assuming that a Clearing Member's and its affiliates' 
equity securities would be priced at zero and value all cleared 
positions accordingly (i.e., all stocks, single stock futures, call 
options, and put options would be valued at zero) to provide full 
protection for the risk of potential market exposure to products on a 
Clearing Member Group's own equity in a default or bankruptcy scenario. 
In each margin account, the profit and loss (``P&L'') of SWWR Equity 
positions would be calculated as the difference of the theoretical 
value of such securities (i.e., zero) and the closing price of the 
position multiplied by the net quantity.\16\ Moreover, any potential 
gain from the SWWR positions would be excluded by flooring the SWWR 
Equity Charge at zero.\17\ As a result, OCC believes that the proposed 
SWWR Equity Charge would adequately cover the SWWR arising from a 
Clearing Member's SWWR Equity positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Because SWWR of equity-related positions would be fully 
covered as part of margins, these positions would be removed from 
Clearing Fund shortfall calculations under OCC's stress testing and 
Clearing Fund methodology. Accordingly, OCC proposes to revise its 
Methodology Description to reflect the exclusion of SWWR Equity 
positions from the synthetic accounts used in OCC's stress testing.
    \17\ For example, suppose the P&L from the SWWR equity price 
going to 0 for all SWWR equity-related positions were a loss of $1 
million. The SWWR Equity Charge in this case would be $1 million. If 
the P&L were a gain of $1 million, the SWWR Equity Charge would be 
$0.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 61117]]

b. SWWR ETN Charge
    In addition to SWWR that arises from equity securities issued by a 
Clearing Member or its affiliates, OCC is also exposed to SWWR from 
open positions related to the uncollateralized ETNs issued by a 
Clearing Member/Group, which are adversely correlated with the credit 
quality of that Clearing Member Group. These ETNs are generally 
equivalent to unsecured senior debt issued by the Clearing Member/
Group. While a Clearing Member default can be triggered by its failure 
to meet other obligations, the firm may or may not default on its ETNs. 
Hence, the recovery rate for ETNs is uncertain and could be between 0% 
and 100%.
    To address SWWR presented by ETNs issued by a Clearing Member/
Group, OCC proposes to calculate an SWWR ETN Charge as part of the SWWR 
Add-on. OCC notes that, unlike SWWR Equity positions, for which it is 
assumed that the price of any equity security issued by the Clearing 
Member Group would fall to zero, the recovery rate for ETNs would not 
necessarily fall to zero. As a result, the proposed SWWR ETN Charge 
would utilize an industry standard recovery rate assumption designed to 
reflect the credit risk associated with such ETN positions.\18\ OCC 
would also adopt additional stress test scenarios to monitor and 
measure SWWR ETN position exposures and allow for OCC to call for 
additional financial resources from its Clearing Members when certain 
thresholds are breached. These SWWR stress test scenarios are discussed 
in further detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ ETNs issued by a Clearing Member Group would still be 
stressed in OCC's Clearing Fund as only a part of the credit risk is 
covered by the SWWR ETN Charge. Additionally, any credit from margin 
assets would be adjusted by the direct charges related to the risk 
of the equity and ETNs issued by each Clearing Member Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. SWWR Residual
    To ensure that OCC appropriately calculates margins to capture SWWR 
Equity and SWWR ETN position exposures, OCC proposes to include an SWWR 
Residual component in SWWR Add-on. Under the proposal, OCC would 
continue to calculate base STANS margin requirements for Clearing 
Members with SWWR positions including SWWR Equity and SWWR ETN 
positions under its current methodology (i.e., without assuming that 
all SWWR Equity positions fall to a value of zero and without assuming 
all SWWR ETN positions are valued at the recovery rate times their 
current price).\19\ OCC would then also calculate a residual STANS 
margin with the SWWR Equity and SWWR ETN positions removed since for 
SWWR their P&L would be captured through the SWWR Equity and SWWR ETN 
Charges. The SWWR Residual would then be the difference between the 
residual margin and the base margin. If the sum of the SWWR Equity 
Charge, SWWR ETN Charge and SWWR Residual would result in a net credit 
to the Clearing Member,\20\ then the SWWR Residual would be adjusted to 
ensure that OCC always uses a more conservative measure that captures 
the greater of either the base STANS margin or the residual STANS 
margin plus the SWWR Equity and SWWR ETN Charges.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ STANS margin requirements are comprised of the sum of 
several components, each reflecting a different aspect of risk. The 
base component of the STANS margin requirement for each account is 
obtained using a risk measure known as 99% Expected Shortfall. The 
Expected Shortfall component is established as the estimated average 
of potential losses higher than the 99% value at risk threshold. The 
term ``value at risk'' or ``VaR'' refers to a statistical technique 
that, generally speaking, is used in risk management to measure the 
potential risk of loss for a given set of assets over a particular 
time horizon. This base component is then adjusted by the addition 
of a stress test component, which is obtained from consideration of 
the increases in 99% Expected Shortfall that would arise from market 
movements that are especially large and/or in which various kinds of 
risk factors exhibit perfect or zero correlations in place of their 
correlations estimated from historical data (``Dependence Add-on''), 
or from extreme adverse idiosyncratic movements in individual risk 
factors to which the account is particularly exposed 
(``Concentration Add-on'').
    \20\ For example, where a customer of a Clearing Member has net 
short positions referencing that Clearing Member's issued equities, 
such positions may actually present so-called ``right-way risk'' 
whereby the position would result in a gain or margin credit for 
that account as the credit quality of the Clearing Member 
deteriorates.
    \21\ For example, suppose that there are no SWWR ETN positions 
and the Expected Shortfall of a portfolio including all positions 
was a $10 million loss and the Expected Shortfall with the SWWR 
Equity-related positions removed was a greater loss of $11 million. 
In this case, the SWWR Residual would be -$1 million. If the 
Expected Shortfall with the SWWR Equity-related positions removed 
was reduced to a loss of $9 million then the SWWR Residual would 
depend on the SWWR Equity Charge: If the SWWR Equity Charge was more 
negative than -$1 million, then the SWWR Residual would be +$1 
million; if the SWWR Equity Charge was $0, then SWWR Residual would 
be $0; and if SWWR Equity Charge was between $0 and -$1 million 
(e.g., -$0.4 million), then SWWR Residual would be positive and the 
opposite value of SWWR Equity Charge (e.g., +$0.4 million). Thus, 
the sum of the SWWR Equity Charge, SWWR ETN Charge, and SWWR 
Residual cannot be positive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Enhancements to Sufficiency Stress Test Scenarios for ETNs
    OCC proposes to revise its CFM Policy and Methodology Description 
to introduce new stress test scenarios designed to capture SWWR 
exposures for Clearing Member-issued ETNs that are not accounted for in 
the SWWR ETN Charge and that exceed certain thresholds of OCC's 
Clearing Fund (``SWWR Sufficiency Scenarios'').\22\ Under the proposal, 
certain Sufficiency Scenarios \23\ would be evaluated with Clearing 
Member-issued ETNs declining to zero within the respective Clearing 
Member's accounts. Such scenarios would include, but would not be 
limited to, the 1987 ``Black Monday'' market event on a Cover 1 basis 
and the two most extreme moves from the 2008 historical market event on 
a Cover 2 basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ OCC notes that it may also develop additional Informational 
Scenarios to monitor SWWR; however, these Informational Scenarios 
would not be used to call for additional financial resources from 
Clearing Members.
    \23\ See supra note 1111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SWWR Sufficiency Scenarios would value Clearing Member-issued ETNs 
at a price of zero within their own accounts capturing impacts to any 
cleared positions tied to those ETNs. Calls, equities, and single-stock 
futures would all be valued at zero and puts would be valued at their 
strike price. For these scenarios, margin assets for shortfall 
calculations would not be adjusted by the SWWR ETN Charge. In addition, 
other scenarios may be created that embed the SWWR Equity risk by not 
excluding positions related to the Clearing Member Group's own equity 
but using an equity price of zero to value all related products.
    In the event an SWWR Sufficiency Scenario identifies exposures that 
exceed 75% of the current Clearing Fund requirement less deficits, OCC 
may require additional margin deposits from the Clearing Member 
Group(s) driving the breach. If an SWWR Sufficiency Stress Scenario 
identifies exposures that exceed 90% of the current Clearing Fund, OCC 
would perform an intra-month resizing of the Clearing Fund. The 
proposed change would enable OCC to more accurately measure its credit 
risks as they relate to SWWR and better test the sufficiency of its 
overall financial resources and would allow OCC to call for additional 
financial resources when SWWR ETN position exposures exceed certain 
thresholds of OCC's Clearing Fund. As a result of these proposed 
enhancements, OCC believes it would have sufficient financial resources 
to cover the SWWR associated with SWWR ETN positions if such positions 
were to be liquidated for less than the assumed recovery rate.
    OCC notes that, under its current CFM Policy, in the event results 
of a daily Sufficiency Stress Test over the final

[[Page 61118]]

five business days preceding the monthly Clearing Fund sizing exceed 
90% of the projected Clearing Fund size for the upcoming month, the 
Clearing Fund size is set such that the peak Sufficiency Stress Test 
draw is no greater than 90% of the Clearing Fund size. OCC proposes to 
revise the CFM Policy to provide that OCC generally does not intend to 
mutualize exposures resulting from the proposed SWWR Sufficiency 
Scenarios and therefore SWWR Sufficiency Scenarios would not be 
included for purposes of this anti-procyclicality measure. The proposed 
change is generally aligned with OCC's intention to appropriately 
charge individual Clearing Members based on the SWWR they bring to OCC.
4. Other Clarifying and Conforming Changes to CFM Policy and 
Methodology Description
    In addition to the proposed changes described above, OCC would 
revise the CFM Policy and Methodology Description to provide that, with 
respect to stress test portfolio construction, SWWR single-name equity 
positions would be removed from stress test portfolios as they are 
fully collateralized in margins. Additionally, the Methodology 
Description would be revised to provide that when adding STANS margin 
asset amounts to scenario gains and losses, the SWWR Equity Charge, 
SWWR ETN Charge, and certain other Add-ons from STANS margin asset 
amounts are excluded.
    Finally, OCC would revise its Methodology Description to clarify 
that for Idiosyncratic Scenarios,\24\ the four riskiest names used to 
calculate idiosyncratic stress test exposures would exclude any equity 
issued by the Clearing Member's own firms and make other clarifying, 
non-substantive changes to the Methodology Description concerning 
stress testing price shocks for products with multiple risk factors and 
Idiosyncratic Scenarios that are unrelated to the proposal described 
herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ OCC has proposed in separate proposed rule change and 
advance notice filings to adopt a new set of stress scenarios to be 
used in the monthly sizing of OCC's Clearing Fund that are designed 
to capture the risks of extreme moves in individual or small subsets 
of securities (``Idiosyncratic Scenarios''). These Idiosyncratic 
Scenarios would consider the four single-name securities with the 
worst P&L in a Clearing Member's portfolio. See supra note 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Clearing Member Outreach
    To inform Clearing Members of the proposed changes, OCC has 
provided an overview of the proposed changes to the Financial Risk 
Advisory Council (``FRAC''), a working group comprised of exchanges, 
Clearing Members and indirect participants of OCC. OCC has also 
performed direct outreach to Clearing Members that would be most 
impacted by the proposed changes. To-date, OCC has not received any 
material objections or concerns in response to this outreach.
Implementation Timing
    OCC expects to implement the proposed changes within sixty (60) 
days after the date that OCC receives all necessary regulatory 
approvals for the proposed changes. OCC will announce the 
implementation date of the proposed change by an Information Memorandum 
posted to its public website at least two (2) weeks prior to 
implementation.
Expected Effect on and Management of Risk
    The proposed changes are designed to enhance OCC's overall 
framework for managing credit risk and reduce the overall level of risk 
presented to and presented by OCC. OCC believes that prohibiting 
Clearing Members from lending their own or Member Affiliate-issued 
securities in the Stock Loan Programs and introducing the proposed SWWR 
Add-on charge would improve OCC's ability to manage the credit risks 
presented by its Clearing Members' SWWR positions and would reduce the 
risk that OCC's financial resources would be insufficient in the event 
of a Clearing Member default. As a result, the proposed change is 
designed, in general, to enhance OCC's framework for measuring and 
managing its credit risks so that it can continue to provide prompt and 
accurate clearance and settlement of securities and derivatives 
transactions in the event of a Clearing Member default.
    In addition, OCC believes that introducing new SWWR Sufficiency 
Scenarios designed to capture SWWR exposures for Clearing Member-issued 
ETNs that are not accounted for in the SWWR ETN Charge would provide 
OCC with a more comprehensive approach to managing OCC's credit risks 
as they relate to SWWR ETN positions. The proposed change would enable 
OCC to more accurately measure its credit risks and better test the 
sufficiency of its overall financial resources and would allow OCC to 
call for additional financial resources when those exposures exceed 
certain thresholds of OCC's Clearing Fund.
    OCC also proposes a number of other clarifying and conforming 
changes to its CFM Policy and Methodology Description required to 
implement the proposed SWWR Add-on and SWWR Sufficiency Scenarios 
described herein and to more clearly describe OCC's stress testing 
practices. OCC believes that these changes would enhance OCC's overall 
framework for measuring and managing its credit risks so that it can 
continue to provide prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of 
securities in the event of a Clearing Member default.
Consistency With the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act
    The stated purpose of the Clearing Supervision Act is to mitigate 
systemic risk in the financial system and promote financial stability 
by, among other things, promoting uniform risk management standards for 
systemically important financial market utilities and strengthening the 
liquidity of systemically important financial market utilities.\25\ 
Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act \26\ also authorizes 
the Commission to prescribe risk management standards for the payment, 
clearing and settlement activities of designated clearing entities, 
like OCC, for which the Commission is the supervisory agency. Section 
805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act \27\ states that the objectives 
and principles for risk management standards prescribed under Section 
805(a) shall be to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ 12 U.S.C. 5461(b).
    \26\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).
    \27\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     promote robust risk management;
     promote safety and soundness;
     reduce systemic risks; and
     support the stability of the broader financial system.
    OCC believes that the proposed changes described herein are 
consistent with the objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the 
Clearing Supervision Act \28\ and the risk management standards adopted 
by the Commission in Rule 17Ad-22 under the Act for the reasons set 
forth below.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Id.
    \29\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22. See Securities Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 68080 (October 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (November 2, 2012) (S7-
08-11) (``Clearing Agency Standards''); 78961 (September 28, 2016), 
81 FR 70786 (October 13, 2016) (S7-03-14) (``Standards for Covered 
Clearing Agencies''). OCC is a ``covered clearing agency'' as 
defined in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5) and therefore must comply with the 
requirements of Rule 17Ad-22(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC believes the proposed changes are consistent with the 
objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision 
Act.\30\ The proposed changes are designed to improve OCC's overall 
framework for managing SWWR brought by its Clearing Members. OCC 
believes that prohibiting Clearing Members from

[[Page 61119]]

lending their own or Member Affiliate-issued securities in the Stock 
Loan Programs and introducing the proposed SWWR Add-on charge would 
enhance OCC's ability to manage the credit risks presented by its 
Clearing Members' SWWR positions and would reduce the risk that OCC's 
financial resources would be insufficient in the event of a Clearing 
Member default. In addition, OCC believes that introducing new SWWR 
Sufficiency Scenarios designed to capture SWWR exposures for Clearing 
Member-issued ETNs that are not accounted for in the SWWR ETN Charge 
would provide OCC with a comprehensive approach to managing OCC's 
credit risks as they relate to SWWR ETN positions. The proposed change 
would enable OCC to more accurately measure its credit risks and better 
test the sufficiency of its overall financial resources and would allow 
OCC to call for additional financial resources when those exposures 
exceed certain thresholds of OCC's Clearing Fund. OCC also proposes a 
number of other clarifying and conforming changes to its CFM Policy and 
Methodology Description required to implement the proposed SWWR Add-on 
and SWWR Sufficiency Scenarios described herein and to more clearly 
describe OCC's stress testing practices. Accordingly, OCC believes the 
proposed changes are designed to promote robust risk management, 
promote safety and soundness, reduce systemic risks, and support the 
stability of the broader financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC also believes the proposed changes are consistent with the risk 
management standards adopted by the Commission in Rule 17Ad-22 under 
the Act. Rule 17Ad-22(b)(2) \31\ requires a registered clearing agency 
that performs CCP services to establish, implement, maintain and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, in 
part, use margin requirements to limit its credit exposures to 
participants under normal market conditions and use risk-based models 
and parameters to set such margin requirements. In addition, Rules 
17Ad-22(e)(6)(i) and (v) \32\ require a covered clearing agency that 
provides CCP services to establish, implement, maintain and enforce 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to cover its credit 
exposures to its participants by establishing a risk-based margin 
system that, at a minimum: (1) Considers and produces margin levels 
commensurate with the risks and particular attributes of each relevant 
product, portfolio, and market, and (2) uses an appropriate method for 
measuring credit exposure that accounts for relevant product risk 
factors and portfolio effects across products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(b)(2).
    \32\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(i) and (v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed changes to OCC's margin and Clearing Fund policies and 
methodologies to adopt the SWWR Add-on would utilize a risk-based model 
designed to limit OCC's credit exposures to Clearing Members that 
present SWWR exposure to OCC through the clearing of Clearing Member-
issued equity and ETN positions. OCC believes the proposed SWWR Add-on 
is reasonably designed to produce margin levels commensurate with the 
risks and particular attributes SWWR Equity and ETN positions and would 
use an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts 
for relevant product risk factors such as SWWR.
    The proposed SWWR Add-on would include both an SWWR Equity Charge 
and SWWR ETN Charge to address the SWWR attributes and exposures 
presented to OCC by each type of product. For example, the SWWR Equity 
Charge assumes that when a Clearing Member defaults the price of any 
equity security issued by the Clearing Member Group would fall to zero. 
As a result, OCC would calculate the SWWR Equity Charge by assuming 
that a Clearing Member's and its affiliates' equity securities would be 
priced at zero and value all cleared positions accordingly to provide 
full protection for the risk of potential market exposure to products 
on a Clearing Member Group's own equity in a default or bankruptcy 
scenario. Moreover, the SWWR Add-on charge would include an SWWR 
Residual component to ensure that OCC takes the more conservative of 
the base STANS margin requirement or margin requirements including the 
SWWR Equity Charge (particularly in circumstances where using the SWWR 
Equity Charge would result in a net credit to the Clearing Member).
    In addition, OCC would adopt an SWWR ETN Charge to address the SWWR 
presented by Clearing Member-issued ETNs. ETNs have different 
characteristics than equity securities and more closely reflect those 
characteristics of other unsecured debt obligations. For example, if a 
Clearing Member defaults that does not necessarily imply that it will 
automatically default on its ETNs. Therefore, ETNs are not necessarily 
valued at 0 and in fact may retain 100% of their value and be exposed 
to normal market risk. OCC proposes to measure the risk of these 
positions using an industry standard recovery rate assumption designed 
to calculate a margin charge that reflects the expected credit risk 
associated with such ETN positions. The potential market risk of the 
ETNs would still be covered by including ETNs in regular margin 
calculations, whereas the SWWR Equity positions are assumed to be 
heading towards bankruptcy and necessarily valued near 0 in a default 
situation.
    For these reasons, OCC believes the proposed SWWR Add-on would 
enhance OCC's margin system by providing for a risk-based model that: 
(1) Sets margin requirements designed to limit OCC's SWWR exposures to 
its participant; (2) considers and produces margin levels commensurate 
with the risks and particular attributes SWWR positions cleared by OCC; 
and (3) uses an appropriate method for measuring such SWWR exposures 
consistent with the requirements of Rules 17Ad-22(b)(2), (e)(6)(i) and 
(e)(6)(v).\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(b)(2), (e)(6)(i), and (e)(6)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rules 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (vi) \34\ require that a covered 
clearing agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to effectively identify, 
measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and 
those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, 
including by: (1) Maintaining additional financial resources at the 
minimum to enable it to cover a wide range of foreseeable stress 
scenarios that include, but are not limited to, the default of the 
participant family that would potentially cause the largest aggregate 
credit exposure for the covered clearing agency in extreme but 
plausible market conditions and (2) testing the sufficiency of its 
total financial resources available to meet these minimum financial 
resource requirements. OCC believes that introducing new SWWR 
Sufficiency Scenarios designed to capture SWWR exposures for Clearing 
Member-issued ETNs that are not accounted for in the SWWR ETN Charge 
would enable OCC to more accurately measure its credit risks and better 
test the sufficiency of its overall financial resources, particularly 
in stressed marked conditions. The proposed change would also allow OCC 
to call for additional financial resources when those exposures exceed 
certain thresholds of OCC's Clearing Fund. The proposed change is 
therefore designed to enhance OCC's overall framework for measuring and 
managing its credit risks and would reduce the risk that OCC's 
financial resources would be

[[Page 61120]]

insufficient in the event of a Clearing Member default consistent with 
Rules 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (vi).\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(iii) and (vi).
    \35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4) \36\ generally requires that a covered clearing 
agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to effectively identify, measure, 
monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those 
arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. By 
prohibiting Clearing Members from lending Eligible Stock issued by the 
Clearing Member or any affiliate of such Clearing Member, OCC would 
mitigate the SWWR that currently exists in its Stock Loan Programs and 
thereby reduce the risk that OCC's financial resources would be 
insufficient in the event such a Clearing Member would default. OCC 
believes the proposed change is therefore reasonably designed to help 
OCC manage the credit risks associated with SWWR Equity and SWWR ETN 
positions in the Stock Loan Programs and is therefore consistent with 
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4).\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4).
    \37\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Advance Notice and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The proposed change may be implemented if the Commission does not 
object to the proposed change within 60 days of the later of (i) the 
date the proposed change was filed with the Commission or (ii) the date 
any additional information requested by the Commission is received. OCC 
shall not implement the proposed change if the Commission has any 
objection to the proposed change.
    The Commission may extend the period for review by an additional 60 
days if the proposed change raises novel or complex issues, subject to 
the Commission providing the clearing agency with prompt written notice 
of the extension. A proposed change may be implemented in less than 60 
days from the date the advance notice is filed, or the date further 
information requested by the Commission is received, if the Commission 
notifies the clearing agency in writing that it does not object to the 
proposed change and authorizes the clearing agency to implement the 
proposed change on an earlier date, subject to any conditions imposed 
by the Commission.
    OCC shall post notice on its website of proposed changes that are 
implemented. The proposal shall not take effect until all regulatory 
actions required with respect to the proposal are completed.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the advance 
notice is consistent with the Clearing Supervision Act. Comments may be 
submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-OCC-2019-807 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2019-807. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the advance notice that are filed with the 
Commission, and all written communications relating to the advance 
notice between the Commission and any person, other than those that may 
be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 
U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the self-regulatory 
organization.
    All comments received will be posted without change. Persons 
submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit 
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
    All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2019-807 and 
should be submitted on or before November 27, 2019.

    By the Commission.
Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-24549 Filed 11-8-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


