[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 98 (Tuesday, May 21, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23090-23095]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-10522]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-85863; File No. SR-OCC-2019-802]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Advance Notice Related to the Introduction of a New 
Liquidation Cost Model in The Options Clearing Corporation's Margin 
Methodology

May 15, 2019.
    Pursuant to Section 806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, entitled Payment, Clearing 
and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (``Clearing Supervision Act'') 
\1\ and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) \2\ under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (``Exchange Act''),\3\ notice is hereby given that on April 18, 
2019, the Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') an advance notice 
(``Advance Notice'') as described in Items I, II and III below, which 
Items have been prepared by OCC. The Commission is publishing this 
notice to solicit comments on the advance notice from interested 
persons.
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    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i).
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Advance 
Notice

    This advance notice is submitted in connection with proposed 
changes to OCC's Margins Methodology, Margin Policy, and Stress Testing 
and Clearing Fund Methodology Description to add a risk-based 
liquidation charge based on bid-ask spreads to adjust the value of 
positions to account for the costs of liquidating a defaulting Clearing 
Member's portfolio. The proposed changes to OCC's Margins Methodology, 
Margin Policy, and Stress Testing and Clearing Fund Methodology 
Description are contained in confidential Exhibits 5A-5C of the filing. 
Material proposed to be added is marked by underlining and material 
proposed to be deleted is marked by strikethrough text. OCC also has 
included a summary of impact analysis of the proposed model changes in 
confidential Exhibit 3. The proposed changes are described in detail in 
Item II below.
    The advance notice is available on OCC's website at https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp. All terms with initial 
capitalization that are not otherwise defined herein have the same 
meaning as set forth in the OCC By-Laws and Rules.\4\
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    \4\ OCC's By-Laws and Rules can be found on OCC's public 
website: http://optionsclearing.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp.
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II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Advance Notice

    In its filing with the Commission, OCC included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the advance notice and 
discussed any comments it received on the advance notice. The text of 
these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV 
below.

[[Page 23091]]

OCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A and B below, of the 
most significant aspects of these statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Advance Notice 
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments were not and are not intended to be solicited with 
respect to the advance notice and none have been received. OCC will 
notify the Commission of any written comments received by OCC.

(B) Advance Notices Filed Pursuant to Section 806(e) of the Payment, 
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act

Description of the Proposed Change
Background
    OCC's margin methodology, the System for Theoretical Analysis and 
Numerical Simulations (``STANS''), is OCC's proprietary risk management 
system that calculates Clearing Member margin requirements.\5\ STANS 
utilizes large-scale Monte Carlo simulations to forecast price and 
volatility movements in determining a Clearing Member's margin 
requirement.\6\ The STANS margin requirement is calculated at the 
portfolio level of Clearing Member legal entity marginable net 
positions tier account (tiers can be customer, firm, or market marker) 
and consists of an estimate of a 99% 2-day expected shortfall (``99% 
Expected Shortfall'') and an add-on for model risk (the concentration/
dependence stress test charge). The STANS methodology is used to 
measure the exposure of portfolios of options and futures cleared by 
OCC and cash instruments in margin collateral.
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    \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53322 (February 15, 
2006), 71 FR 9403 (February 23, 2006) (SR-OCC-2004-20). A detailed 
description of the STANS methodology is available at http://optionsclearing.com/risk-management/margins/.
    \6\ See OCC Rule 601.
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    STANS margin requirements are comprised of the sum of several 
components, each reflecting a different aspect of risk. The base 
component of the STANS margin requirement for each account is obtained 
using a risk measure known as 99% Expected Shortfall. Under the 99% 
Expected Shortfall calculation, an account has a base margin excess 
(deficit) if its positions in cleared products, plus all existing 
collateral--whether of types included in the Monte Carlo simulation or 
of types subjected to traditional ``haircuts''--would have a positive 
(negative) net worth after incurring a loss equal to the average of all 
losses beyond the 99% value at risk (or ``VaR'') point. This base 
component is then adjusted by the addition of a stress test component, 
which is obtained from consideration of the increases in 99% Expected 
Shortfall that would arise from market movements that are especially 
large and/or in which various kinds of risk factors exhibit perfect or 
zero correlations in place of their correlations estimated from 
historical data, or from extreme adverse idiosyncratic movements in 
individual risk factors to which the account is particularly 
exposed.\7\ STANS margin requirements are intended to cover potential 
losses due to price movements over a two-day risk horizon; however, the 
base and stress margin components do not cover the potential 
liquidation costs OCC may incur in closing out a defaulted Clearing 
Member's portfolio.\8\ Closing out positions in a defaulted Clearing 
Member's portfolio could entail selling longs at bid price and covering 
shorts at ask price. This means that additional liquidation costs may 
need to take into account the bid-ask price spreads.
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    \7\ STANS margins may also include other add on charges, which 
are considerably smaller than the base and stress test components, 
and many of which affect only a minority of accounts.
    \8\ A liquidation cost model was introduced into STANS in 2012 
as part of OCC's OTC clearing initiatives. The model is only applied 
to long-dated options on the Standard & Poor's (``S&P'') 500 index 
(``SPX'') that have a tenor of three-years or greater. See 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-70719 (October 18, 2013), 78 
FR 63548 (October 24, 2013) (SR-OCC-2013-16). The existing 
liquidation model for long-dated SPX options would be replaced by 
this new model. OCC currently does not have any open interest in OTC 
options. OCC does currently clear similar exchange traded long-dated 
FLEX SPX options; however, these options make up less than 0.5% of 
SPX options open interest.
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Proposed Changes
    OCC is proposing to enhance its margin methodology by introducing a 
new model to estimate the liquidation cost for all options and futures, 
as well as the securities in margin collateral. As noted above, closing 
out positions of a defaulted Clearing Member in the open market could 
entail selling longs at bid price and covering shorts at ask price. 
These closing-out costs are currently not taken into account in STANS 
for all options (with the exception of long-dated SPX index option 
series, as noted above).\9\ Therefore, the purpose of the proposed 
change is to add additional financial resources in the form of margin, 
based on liquidation cost grids calibrated using historical stressed 
periods, to guard against potential shortfalls in margin requirements 
that may arise due to the costs of liquidating Clearing Member 
portfolios in the event of a default. The liquidation cost charge would 
be applied as an add-on to all accounts incurring a STANS margin 
charge.
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    \9\ Id.
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    The proposed liquidation cost model calculates liquidation cost 
based on risk measures, gross contract volumes and market bid-ask 
spreads. In general, the proposed model would be used to calculate two 
risk-based liquidation costs for a portfolio, Vega \10\ liquidation 
cost (``Vega LC'') and Delta liquidation cost (``Delta LC''), using 
``Liquidation Grids.'' \11\ Options products will incur both Vega and 
Delta LCs while Delta-one \12\ products such as futures contracts, 
Treasury securities and equity securities, will have only a Delta 
charge.
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    \10\ The Delta and Vega of an option represent the sensitivity 
of the option price with respect to the price and volatility of the 
underlying security, respectively.
    \11\ ``Liquidation Grids'' would be comprised collectively of 
Vega Liquidation Grids, Vega Notional Grids, Delta Liquidation 
Grids, and Delta Notional Grids. Liquidation Grids are discussed in 
more detail below in the Creation and Calibration of Liquidation 
Grids section.
    \12\ ``Delta one products'' refer to products for which a change 
in the value of the underlying asset results in a change of the 
same, or nearly the same, proportion in the value of the product.
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    The proposed liquidation cost model described herein would include: 
(1) The decomposition of the defaulter's portfolio into sub-portfolios 
by underlying security; (2) the creation and calibration of Liquidation 
Grids used to determine liquidation costs; (3) the calculation of the 
Vega LC (including a minimum Vega LC charge) for options products; (4) 
the calculation of Delta LCs for both options and Delta-one products; 
(5) the calculation of Vega and Delta concentration factors; (6) the 
calculation of volatility correlations for Vega LCs; (7) the 
establishment of a STANS margin floor based on the liquidation cost; 
and (8) conforming changes to OCC's Margin Policy and Stress Testing 
and Clearing Fund Methodology Description.
    The new liquidation cost model would cover the following cleared 
products in a Clearing Member's portfolio: Options on indices, 
equities, Exchange Traded Funds (``ETFs'') and futures; FLEX options; 
future contracts; Treasury securities; and stock loan and collateral 
securities. The securities not included in STANS margin calculations 
would not be covered by the new model.
    The proposed approach to calculating liquidation costs and the 
conforming changes to OCC's Margin Policy are described in further 
detail below.

[[Page 23092]]

1. Portfolio Decomposition and Creation of Sub-Portfolios
    For a portfolio consisting of many contracts and underlyings, the 
proposed model would first divide (or decompose) the portfolio into 
sub-portfolios by underlying security such that all contracts with the 
same underlying are grouped into the same sub-portfolio. The Vega LC 
and Delta LC are first calculated at a sub-portfolio level and then 
aggregated to derive the final liquidation cost for the total 
portfolio. All the option positions with the same fundamental 
underlying would form one sub-portfolio because they share the same 
risk characteristics. The equity index, index future and index ETFs 
would all be categorized by the underlying index that is the basis for 
the index, future, and ETF-underlying securities. The corresponding 
options on the index, index future, and ETFs would therefore fall into 
the same sub-portfolio. In addition, FLEX options on the same 
underlying would be included in the same sub-portfolio of the regular 
options. Similarly, cash products such as equities and futures would be 
grouped in the same sub-category based on their underlying symbols. All 
Treasury security positions would form one sub-portfolio. The 
calculation of Vega LC and Delta LC for each sub-portfolio is 
summarized in the next sections.
2. Creation and Calibration of Liquidation Grids
    A key element of the proposed liquidation cost model is the 
``Liquidation Grids.'' The calculations of Vega LC and Delta LC involve 
a number of liquidity-related quantities such as volatility bid-ask 
spreads, price bid-ask spreads, Vega notional, and Delta notional. The 
collection of these quantities would be used to create the following 
Liquidation Grids.
    1. Vega Liquidation Grids (or volatility grids): The Vega 
Liquidation Grids would represent the level of bid-ask spreads on the 
implied volatility of option contracts for a given underlying. Since 
the volatility spreads of option contracts vary by the Delta and tenor 
of the option, OCC would divide the contracts into several Delta 
buckets by tenor buckets.\13\ Each pair (Delta, tenor) is referred to 
as a Vega bucket. For each bucket, an average volatility spread is 
estimated and defined as the volatility grid for the bucket. The size 
of grid would essentially represent the cost for liquidating one unit 
of Vega risk in the bucket.
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    \13\ Initially, Vega Liquidation Grids would consist of 5 Delta 
buckets by 5 tenor buckets, with a total of 25 pairs; however, the 
Vega Liquidation Grids would be reviewed annually or at a frequency 
determined by OCC's Model Risk Working Group (``MRWG'') and updated 
as needed as determined by the MRWG. The MRWG is responsible for 
assisting OCC's Management Committee in overseeing and governing 
OCC's model-related risk issues and includes representatives from 
OCC's Financial Risk Management department, Quantitative Risk 
Management department, Model Validation Group, and Enterprise Risk 
Management department.
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    2. Vega Notional Grid: The Vega Notional Grid of an underlying 
security would be the average trading options volume weighted by the 
Vega of all options on the given underlying. The size of Vega Notional 
grids would indicate the average daily trading volume in terms of 
dollar Vegas (i.e., the Vega multiplied by the volume of the option).
    3. Delta Liquidation Grid: The Delta liquidation grid would 
represent an estimated bid-ask price spread (in percentage) on the 
underlying.\14\ It represents the cost of liquidating one dollar unit 
of the underlying security. The Delta liquidation grid for Treasury 
securities represents bid-ask yield spreads, expressed in basis points.
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    \14\ Delta Liquidation Grids are comprised of several rows 
representing liquidity categories for the underlying security 
(initially 14 rows, subject to periodic review and modification) and 
one column representing the cost of liquidating one dollar unit of 
the underlying security. The Delta Liquidation Grids would be 
reviewed annually or at a frequency determined by OCC's MRWG and 
updated as needed as determined by the MRWG.
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    4. Delta Notional Grid: The Delta Notional grid of an underlying 
security would represent the average trading volume in dollars of the 
security.\15\
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    \15\ Delta Notional Grids are comprised of several rows 
representing liquidity categories for the underlying security 
(initially 14 rows, subject to periodic review and modification) and 
one column representing the average trading volume in dollars of the 
underlying security. The Delta Notional Grids would be reviewed 
annually or at a frequency determined by OCC's MRWG and updated as 
needed as determined by the MRWG.
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    Vega Notional Grids are calibrated at the security level; that is, 
each individual underlying security would have its own Vega Notional. 
The Delta Notional Grid and both Vega and Delta Liquidation Grids for 
all underlying securities are estimated at the levels of a fixed number 
of classes based on their liquidity level.\16\ All equity securities 
would be divided, based on their membership in commonly used market 
indices (including, but not limited to, the S&P 100 and 500 index) or 
other market liquidity measurements, into liquidity classes (which may 
include, but are not limited to, High Liquid Equities, Medium Liquid 
Equities and Low Liquid Equities). Any new equity security would 
generally default to the lowest liquidity classification unless 
otherwise assigned to a higher liquidity classification when deemed 
necessary. Major indices (e.g., SPX or the Cboe Volatility Index 
(``VIX'')) may form their own index liquidity class, which may cover 
indices, index ETFs, and index futures. In addition, sector ETFs, ETFs 
on a major commodity (such as Gold, Crude/Natural Gas, Metals, and 
Electricity), and Treasury ETFs would generally each form individual 
classes of their own, subject to the availability of liquidation data. 
Pursuant to the proposed Margins Methodology, these liquidity classes 
would be reviewed annually or at a frequency determined by OCC's MRWG 
and updated as needed, taking into consideration such factors 
including, but not limited to, changes in membership of the S&P 100 
index and S&P 500 index, listing and delisting of securities, and any 
corporate actions on the existing securities.
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    \16\ Within the same liquidity group, the Vega Notional can vary 
dramatically from name to name. Moreover, Vega risk can be much 
greater than Delta risk. As a result, OCC would calculate Vega 
Notionals at the security level as opposed to the liquidity level.
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    Because the bid-ask spreads can change daily, the use of spreads 
from current market conditions could cause liquidation costs to 
fluctuate dramatically with market volatility, especially during a 
stressed market period. To mitigate this procyclicality issue, 
Liquidation Grids would be calibrated from several historical stressed 
periods, which are selected based on the history of VIX index levels 
and would remain unchanged with time until a new stressed period is 
selected and added to the calibrations in accordance with the 
requirements of the proposed Margins Methodology.\17\
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    \17\ The Liquidation Grids will be reviewed annually or at a 
frequency determined by the MRWG.
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3. Vega Liquidation Cost
Vega Liquidation Cost Calculation
    Vega LC is the main component of the proposed liquidation cost 
model. For a simple option contract, the Vega LC would be its position 
Vega multiplied by its respective bucket in the Vega Liquidation Grid. 
The result is approximately equal to one half of the bid-ask price 
spread. For a portfolio consisting of many contracts and underlyings, 
the model first divides the portfolio into sub-portfolios by underlying 
security such that all contracts with the same underlying are grouped 
into the same sub-portfolio (as described above). The Vega LCs for sub-
portfolios are calculated first and then aggregated to derive the Vega 
LC for the total portfolio.

[[Page 23093]]

    The Vega LC for a sub-portfolio, which consists of all the 
contracts with the same underlying security, would be calculated in 
several steps. First, the Liquidation Grids would be calibrated for 
Vega ``buckets'' that consist of Delta bins by tenor bins as discussed 
above. These Vega buckets are used to represent the volatility risk at 
the different areas on the implied volatility surface. Next, the Vega 
of each contract position in a given sub-portfolio would be calculated 
and bucketed into one of the Vega buckets. The Vegas falling into the 
same Vega bucket would then be netted. The Vega LC for each of the Vega 
buckets is calculated as the net Vega multiplied by the Vega grid of 
the buckets. Finally, the total liquidation cost for the sub-portfolio 
would be aggregated from these bucket Vega LCs by using correlations 
between the Vega buckets. Since the sub-portfolios are formed by the 
fundamental equity or index underlying the option, the Vega LCs of 
closely related but different underlying securities are allowed to net. 
For example, Vega LCs for SPX and related indices, futures, and ETFs 
that are based on the S&P 500 index would be allowed 100% netting.
    The Vega LC for the total portfolio would be a similar correlation-
based sum of Vega LCs of all the sub-portfolios, taking into account 
correlations between the products' implied volatility.\18\
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    \18\ See infra, Volatility Correlations section.
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Minimum Liquidation Cost
    Because the proposed model allows risk netting across closely 
related option contracts, it is possible that a well-hedged option 
strategy could result in a very small or zero liquidation cost. To 
prevent this from happening, a minimum liquidation cost would be 
introduced to the Vega liquidation charges. The minimum liquidation 
cost for a sub-portfolio would be calculated as the gross number of 
option contracts multiplied by a minimum cost per contract value.\19\ 
The minimum cost amount would be calculated for the entire portfolio 
and would be used to floor the final total Vega LC. The proposal would 
not apply a minimum cost for Delta LC due to the immaterial impact a 
minimum Delta LC would have on the overall liquidation cost charge.
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    \19\ The minimum cost rate would initially be set as $2 per 
contract, unless the position is long and the net asset value per 
contract is less than $2. (For a typical option with a contract size 
of 100, this would occur if the option was priced below 0.02.) This 
value would be reviewed annually or at a frequency determined by 
OCC's MRWG and recalibrated as needed over time.
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4. Delta Liquidation Cost
    In addition to Vega risk, the model also considers the Delta risk 
presented in an entire portfolio. If a portfolio has positions in 
either options, futures, equities, or Treasury securities, it will 
contain some Delta risk. Under the proposed model, the liquidation cost 
due to Delta risk in a sub-portfolio (as defined by the underlying) 
would be approximated by the net dollar Delta of the sub-portfolio 
multiplied by its respective bucket in the Delta Liquidation Grid.
    The proposed model would allow netting of Delta LC if the option 
contracts, futures, or equity positions belong to or are related to a 
top index (such as SPX or VIX). For example, in a portfolio, positions 
in SPX-related options, options on futures, futures, or collateral have 
their Delta LC netted.
    Under the proposed model, U.S. dollar Treasury bonds would form one 
sub-portfolio. The Delta or DV01 (i.e., dollar value of one basis 
point) of all the bonds would be calculated and bucketed into six tenor 
buckets. For each bucket, the liquidation cost would be approximated by 
the absolute value of the net DV01 of the bucket multiplied by the 
Liquidation Grid (in basis points) in the corresponding tenor bucket. 
The total liquidation cost for the Treasury security sub-portfolio 
would then be a sum of the costs over all the buckets.
    The Delta LC for the total portfolio would be simple sum of the 
Delta LCs over all sub-portfolios.
5. Concentration Charges
    In addition to Vega and Delta LCs, the proposed model also would 
incorporate the potential risks involved in closing out large or 
concentrated positions in a portfolio. The ``largeness'' of an option 
position is typically measured in terms of Average Daily Volume 
(``ADV''). The Vega volume or notional, defined as ``Vega-weighted 
ADV,'' is also a relevant measure of options trading volume. Closing 
out large or concentrated positions with one or more Vega notional may 
either take longer to liquidate or demand wider spreads, and therefore 
could incur additional cost. To cover this additional risk, the 
proposed model would use Vega concentration factors (``Vega CF'') to 
scale the Vega LC for option positions. The Vega CFs would be equal to 
one for small positions that are less than one Vega notional, but may 
be scaled up for large positions as a function of the size of the 
positions. Similar to Vega CF, Delta concentration factors (``Delta 
CF'') would be used to scale the Delta LC to account for the 
concentration risk associated with large Delta positions.
6. Volatility Correlations
    Under the proposed model, the Vega LC for each underlying sub-
portfolio is calculated using correlations between the Vega buckets. 
The correlation matrix from the most liquid product (SPX) would be used 
as the base and would be scaled for other underlyings based on their 
liquidity class. These would be calibrated from time periods that 
overlap the stress periods used to calculate Liquidation Grids.
    To aggregate the liquidation cost at the portfolio level, the pair-
wise correlations of implied volatilities between different underlyings 
are needed. OCC would use a single correlation value for all cross-
underlying correlations rather than a correlation matrix for all cross-
underlying correlations to simplify the calibration of the grids. To 
account for potential errors that may arise from using a single 
correlation value, OCC would calculate three single correlations 
representing the minimum, average, and maximum correlation across the 
liquidity class to determine three different Vega LCs. The highest of 
these three Vega LCs would be used as the final Vega LC.
7. STANS Margin Floor
    The proposed liquidation costs would be added to the base and 
stress margin components of STANS that are intended to cover the 
potential losses due to price movements over a two-day risk horizon. In 
certain cases, well-hedged portfolios may not experience any loss and 
the resultant STANS margin requirement is close to zero or may even 
become positive in some extreme cases. If the STANS requirement is 
positive, this may result in a credit instead of a charge for the 
Clearing Member. To account for the risk of potentially liquidating a 
portfolio at current (instead of two-day ahead) prices, no credit from 
the margin would be allowed so that the final margin requirement would 
not be lower than the amount of the liquidation cost.
8. Margin Policy and Stress Testing and Clearing Fund Methodology 
Description
    OCC also would make conforming changes to its Margin Policy and 
Stress Testing and Clearing Fund Methodology Description to reflect the 
inclusion of the new liquidation cost charge as an add-on charge to the 
base STANS margin and how the liquidation cost

[[Page 23094]]

charge add-on would be incorporated in Clearing Fund shortfall 
calculations.\20\
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    \20\ The Stress Testing and Clearing Fund Methodology 
Description would be revised to note that the shortfall of a 
portfolio is calculated by offsetting its profit and loss (``PnL'') 
in a stress scenario with its STANS margin assets, which include 
base margin (i.e., 99% Expected Shortfall), excess net asset value 
related to long option premium, any non-collateral-in-margins 
haircut amounts, and various other Add-On Charges such as the 
proposed liquidation cost charges. Since the cost of liquidation is 
not considered in stress scenario PnL, a charge for liquidation 
costs using the same values as calculated for margins is included in 
shortfall calculations to ensure that the liquidation cost charge is 
part of the required total credit financial resources.
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Clearing Member Outreach
    To inform Clearing Members of the proposed change, OCC has provided 
overviews of its proposed liquidation cost model to the Financial Risk 
Advisory Council (``FRAC''), a working group comprised of exchanges, 
Clearing Members and indirect participants of OCC, and the OCC 
Roundtable, which was established to bring Clearing Members, exchanges 
and OCC together to discuss industry and operational issues,\21\ during 
2016 and 2017. OCC has also published Information Memos to all Clearing 
Members discussing the proposed change.
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    \21\ The OCC Roundtable is comprised of representatives of the 
senior OCC staff, participant exchanges and Clearing Members, 
representing the diversity of OCC's membership in industry segments, 
OCC-cleared volume, business type, operational structure and 
geography.
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    Under the proposed liquidation cost model, each Clearing Member/
account would independently observe different levels of impact based on 
the composition of their cleared portfolios. Based on OCC's analysis 
to-date, directional portfolios containing more outright positions, 
which are more typically associated with customer accounts, are most 
likely to see the largest impact from the proposed liquidation cost 
charges, while more well-hedged portfolios, such as market maker 
accounts, would be less impacted (and are more likely to incur the 
minimum liquidation cost charge). In the aggregate, OCC expects the 
proposed liquidation cost charges to make up approximately 5-8% of 
total risk margin charges, with customer accounts accounting for 
roughly 60% of the proposed liquidation cost charges, and proprietary 
accounts and market markers generating approximately 25% and 15% of the 
proposed liquidation cost charges, respectively.
    Given the magnitude of expected changes in margins, OCC expects to 
conduct an extended parallel implementation for Clearing Members prior 
to implementation. Additionally, OCC will perform additional outreach 
to the FRAC upon submission of its regulatory filings to remind 
Clearing Members of the pending changes and direct outreach with those 
Clearing Members that would be most impacted by the proposed change and 
would work closely with such Clearing Members to coordinate the 
implementation and associated funding for such Clearing Members 
resulting from the proposed change.\22\
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    \22\ Specifically, OCC will discuss with those Clearing Members 
how they plan to satisfy any increase in their margin requirements 
associated with the proposed change.
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Implementation Timeframe
    OCC expects to implement the proposed changes no sooner than thirty 
(30) days and no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date 
that OCC receives all necessary regulatory approvals for the filings. 
OCC will announce the implementation date of the proposed change by an 
Information Memo posted to its public website at least two (2) weeks 
prior to implementation.
Expected Effect on and Management of Risk
    OCC believes that the proposed change, which would introduce a new 
liquidation cost model into OCC's margin methodology, would reduce the 
overall level of risk to OCC, its Clearing Members, and the markets 
served by OCC. As described above, STANS margin requirements are 
comprised of the sum of several components, each reflecting a different 
aspect of risk. These margins are intended to cover the potential 
losses due to price movements over a two-day risk horizon; however, the 
base and stress margin components do not cover the potential 
liquidation cost OCC may incur in closing out a defaulted Clearing 
Member's portfolio. Closing out positions in a defaulted portfolio 
could entail selling longs at bid price and covering shorts at ask 
price. This means that additional liquidation costs may need to take 
into account the bid-ask price spreads. The proposed liquidation cost 
model would calculate liquidation costs for OCC's cleared products 
based on risk measures, gross contract volumes and market bid-ask 
spreads. The proposed model is designed to provide additional financial 
resources in the form of margin, based on liquidation costs and current 
market prices, to guard against potential shortfalls in margin 
requirements that may arise due to the costs of liquidating Clearing 
Member portfolios. OCC uses the margin it collects from a defaulting 
Clearing Member to protect other Clearing Members from losses they 
cannot anticipate or control as a result of such a default. As a 
result, OCC believes the proposed changes would reduce the overall 
level of risk to OCC, its Clearing Members, and the markets served by 
OCC.
Consistency With the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act
    The stated purpose of the Clearing Supervision Act is to mitigate 
systemic risk in the financial system and promote financial stability 
by, among other things, promoting uniform risk management standards for 
systemically important financial market utilities and strengthening the 
liquidity of systemically important financial market utilities.\23\ 
Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act \24\ also authorizes 
the Commission to prescribe risk management standards for the payment, 
clearing and settlement activities of designated clearing entities, 
like OCC, for which the Commission is the supervisory agency. Section 
805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act \25\ states that the objectives 
and principles for risk management standards prescribed under Section 
805(a) shall be to:
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    \23\ 12 U.S.C. 5461(b).
    \24\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).
    \25\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
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     Promote robust risk management;
     promote safety and soundness;
     reduce systemic risks; and
     support the stability of the broader financial system.
    OCC believes that the proposed changes described herein would 
enhance its margin methodology in a manner consistent with the 
objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision 
Act \26\ and the risk management standards adopted by the Commission in 
Rule 17Ad-22 under the Act for the reasons set forth below.\27\
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    \26\ Id.
    \27\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22. See Securities Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 68080 (October 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (November 2, 2012) (S7-
08-11) (``Clearing Agency Standards''); 78961 (September 28, 2016), 
81 FR 70786 (October 13, 2016) (S7-03-14) (``Standards for Covered 
Clearing Agencies''). OCC is a ``covered clearing agency'' as 
defined in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5) and therefore must comply with the 
requirements of Rule 17Ad-22(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC believes the proposed changes are consistent with the 
objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision 
Act.\28\ As described above, STANS margin requirements are comprised of 
the sum of several components, each reflecting a different aspect of 
risk. These margins are intended to cover the potential

[[Page 23095]]

losses due to price movements over a two-day risk horizon; however, the 
base and stress margin components do not cover the potential 
liquidation cost OCC could incur in closing out a defaulted Clearing 
Member's portfolio. Closing out positions in a defaulted portfolio 
could entail selling longs at bid price and covering shorts at ask 
price. This means that additional liquidation costs may need to take 
into account the bid-ask price spreads. The proposed model is designed 
to provide additional financial resources in the form of margin to 
guard against potential shortfalls in margin requirements that may 
arise due to the costs of liquidating Clearing Member portfolios. OCC 
uses the margin it collects from a defaulting Clearing Member to 
protect other Clearing Members from losses as a result of the default. 
As a result, OCC believes the proposed change would promote robust risk 
management and safety and soundness while reducing systemic risks and 
would thereby support the stability of the broader financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 17Ad-22(b)(2) \29\ requires, in part, that a registered 
clearing agency that performs central counterparty services establish, 
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to use margin requirements to limit its credit 
exposures to participants under normal market conditions and use risk-
based models and parameters to set margin requirements. As described 
above, the proposed liquidation cost model is a risk-based model that 
calculates liquidation cost based on risk measures, gross contract 
volumes, and market bid-ask spreads. The proposed model is designed to 
provide additional financial resources in the form of margin, based on 
liquidation costs and current market prices, to guard against potential 
shortfalls in margin requirements that may arise due to the costs of 
liquidating Clearing Member portfolios, which currently are not taken 
into account in STANS for all of OCC's cleared products. Accordingly, 
the proposed risk-based model would be used to calculate margin 
requirements designed to limit OCC's credit exposures to participants 
under normal market conditions in a manner consistent with Rule 17Ad-
22(b)(2).\30\
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    \29\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(b)(2).
    \30\ Id.
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    Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i) \31\ further requires a covered clearing 
agency that provides central counterparty services to establish, 
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to cover its credit exposures to its participants 
by establishing a risk-based margin system that considers, and produces 
margin levels commensurate with, the risks and particular attributes of 
each relevant product, portfolio, and market. The proposed liquidation 
cost model is a risk-based model that would calculate additional margin 
charges designed to account for potential shortfalls in margin 
requirements that may arise due to the costs of liquidating Clearing 
Member portfolios by taking into consideration the risks and attributes 
associated with relevant products and portfolios cleared by OCC (e.g., 
volatility bid-ask spreads, price bid-ask spreads, Vega notional, and 
Delta notional). Accordingly, OCC believes the proposed changes are 
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i).\32\
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    \31\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(i).
    \32\ Id.
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III. Date of Effectiveness of the Advance Notice and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The proposed change may be implemented if the Commission does not 
object to the proposed change within 60 days of the later of (i) the 
date the proposed change was filed with the Commission or (ii) the date 
any additional information requested by the Commission is received. OCC 
shall not implement the proposed change if the Commission has any 
objection to the proposed change.
    The Commission may extend the period for review by an additional 60 
days if the proposed change raises novel or complex issues, subject to 
the Commission providing the clearing agency with prompt written notice 
of the extension. A proposed change may be implemented in less than 60 
days from the date the advance notice is filed, or the date further 
information requested by the Commission is received, if the Commission 
notifies the clearing agency in writing that it does not object to the 
proposed change and authorizes the clearing agency to implement the 
proposed change on an earlier date, subject to any conditions imposed 
by the Commission.
    OCC shall post notice on its website of proposed changes that are 
implemented. The proposal shall not take effect until all regulatory 
actions required with respect to the proposal are completed.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the advance 
notice is consistent with the Clearing Supervision Act. Comments may be 
submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-OCC-2019-802 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2019-802. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the advance notice that are filed with the 
Commission, and all written communications relating to the advance 
notice between the Commission and any person, other than those that may 
be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 
U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the self-regulatory 
organization.
    All comments received will be posted without change. Persons 
submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit 
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
    All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2019-802 and 
should be submitted on or before June 5, 2019.

    By the Commission.
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-10522 Filed 5-20-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


