
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 70 (Thursday, April 13, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17906-17913]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-07452]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-80395; File No. SR-FICC-2017-804]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Advance Notice To Enhance the Credit Risk Rating 
Matrix and Make Other Changes

April 7, 2017.
    Pursuant to Section 806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act entitled the Payment, 
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (``Clearing 
Supervision Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act''),\2\ notice is hereby given that on March 
22, 2017, Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (``FICC'') filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the advance notice 
SR-FICC-2017-804 (``Advance Notice'') as described in Items I, II and 
III below, which Items have been prepared by FICC.\3\ The

[[Page 17907]]

Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the Advance 
Notice from interested persons.
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    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i).
    \3\ On March 22, 2017, FICC filed this Advance Notice as a 
proposed rule change (SR-FICC-2017-006) with the Commission pursuant 
to Section 19(b)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1), and Rule 19b-4, 
17 CFR 240.19b-4. A copy of the proposed rule change is available at 
http://www.dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings.aspx.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Advance 
Notice

    This Advance Notice consists of proposed modifications to FICC's 
Government Securities Division (``GSD'') Rulebook (``GSD Rules'') and 
Mortgage-Backed Securities Division (``MBSD'') Clearing Rules (``MBSD 
Rules,'' and collectively with the GSD Rules, the ``Rules'').\4\ The 
proposed rule change would amend the Rules in order to (i) enhance the 
matrix (hereinafter referred to as the ``Credit Risk Rating Matrix'' or 
``CRRM'') \5\ developed by FICC to evaluate the risks posed by certain 
GSD Netting Members and MBSD Clearing Members (collectively, ``CRRM-
Rated Members'') to FICC and its members from providing services to 
these CRRM-Rated Members and (ii) make other amendments to the Rules to 
provide more transparency and clarity regarding FICC's current ongoing 
membership monitoring process.
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    \4\ Capitalized terms not defined herein are defined in the GSD 
Rules, available at www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/
rules/ficc_gov_rules.pdf, and the MBSD Rules, available at 
www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/
ficc_mbsd_rules.pdf.
    \5\ The proposed rule changes with respect to the enhancement of 
the CRRM are reflected in the inclusion of (1) qualitative factors 
and examples thereof in the definition of ``Credit Risk Rating 
Matrix'' in GSD Rule 1 and MBSD Rule 1 and (2) certain GSD Foreign 
Netting Members that are banks or trust companies and MBSD Bank 
Clearing Members that are Foreign Persons as CRRM-Rated Members in 
GSD Rule 3 (Section 12(b)(i)(II)) and MBSD Rule 3 (Section 
11(b)(i)(II)). The proposed enhancement to CRRM also necessitates a 
conforming change to the existing Section 12(b) (renumbered to 
Section 12(c) in this proposed rule filing) of GSD Rule 3 by 
deleting the reference to Foreign Netting Members and Bank Netting 
Members participating through their U.S. branches or agencies, as 
further discussed below.
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II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Advance Notice

    In its filing with the Commission, the clearing agency included 
statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the Advance Notice 
and discussed any comments it received on the Advance Notice. The text 
of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV 
below. The clearing agency has prepared summaries, set forth in 
sections A and B below, of the most significant aspects of such 
statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Advance Notice 
Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    Written comments relating to this proposal have not been solicited 
or received. FICC will notify the Commission of any written comments 
received by FICC.

(B) Advance Notice Filed Pursuant to Section 806(e) of the Payment, 
Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act

Nature of the Proposed Change
    The proposed rule change would, among other things, enhance the 
CRRM to enable it to rate FICC members that are foreign banks or trust 
companies and have audited financial data that is publicly available. 
It would also enhance the CRRM by allowing it to take into account 
qualitative factors when generating credit ratings for FICC members. In 
addition, it would enhance the CRRM by shifting it from a relative 
scoring approach to an absolute scoring approach.
    This rule filing also contains proposed rule changes that are not 
related to the proposed CRRM enhancements but that provide specificity, 
clarity and additional transparency to the Rules related to FICC's 
current ongoing membership monitoring process.
(i) Background
    FICC occupies an important role in the securities settlement system 
by interposing itself through each of GSD and MBSD as a central 
counterparty between members that are counterparties to transactions 
accepted for clearing by FICC, thereby reducing the risk faced by 
members. FICC uses the CRRM, the Watch List (as defined below) and the 
enhanced surveillance to manage and monitor default risks of its 
members on an ongoing basis, as discussed below. The level and 
frequency of such monitoring for a member is determined by the member's 
risk of default as assessed by FICC. Members that are deemed by FICC to 
pose a heightened risk to FICC and its members are subject to closer 
and more frequent monitoring.
Existing Credit Risk Rating Matrix
    In 2004, the Commission approved a proposed rule change filed by 
FICC (``Initial Filing'') \6\ with respect to GSD and MBSD to establish 
new criteria for placing certain members of FICC on a list for closer 
monitoring (``Watch List'').
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    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49158 (January 30, 
2004), 69 FR 5624 (February 5, 2004) (SR-FICC-2003-03).
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    FICC proposed in the Initial Filing that all U.S. broker-dealers 
and U.S. banks that were GSD Netting Members and/or MBSD Clearing 
Members would be assigned a rating generated by entering financial data 
of those members into an internally generated credit rating scorecard, 
i.e., the CRRM.\7\ In the Initial Filing, FICC stated that all other 
types of GSD Netting Members and MBSD Clearing Members would be 
monitored by credit risk staff using financial criteria deemed relevant 
by FICC but would not be assigned a rating by the CRRM.\8\
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    \7\ Footnote 4 of the Initial Filing explained the new criteria 
for rating members: ``[FICC's] approach to the analysis of members 
is based on a thorough quantitative analysis. A broker-dealer 
member's rating on the [CRRM] will be based on factors including 
size (i.e., total excess net capital), capital, leverage, liquidity, 
and profitability. Banks will be reviewed based on size, capital, 
asset quality, earnings, and liquidity.'' Id. These quantitative 
factors are still being applied today, and FICC currently does not 
plan to change them.
    \8\ In the Initial Filing, FICC noted that these members would 
be monitored by credit risk staff by reviewing similar criteria as 
those reviewed for members included on the [CRRM] but such review 
would occur outside of the [CRRM] process. Id.
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    Following the approval of the Initial Filing, the Commission 
approved a subsequent proposed rule change filed by FICC that provided 
interpretive guidance to the Initial Filing (``Interpretive Guidance 
Filing'').\9\ In the Interpretive Guidance Filing, FICC reiterated that 
U.S. broker-dealers and U.S. banks would be assessed against the CRRM 
and assigned a credit rating based on quantitative factors. 
Unfavorably-rated members would be placed on the Watch List. In the 
Interpretive Guidance Filing, FICC explained that credit risk staff 
could downgrade a particular member's credit rating based on various 
qualitative factors. An example of such qualitative factors might be 
that the member in question received a qualified audit opinion on its 
annual audit. In the Interpretive Guidance Filing, FICC noted that, in 
order to protect FICC and its other members, it was important that 
credit risk staff maintain the discretion to downgrade a member's 
credit rating on the CRRM and thus subject the member to closer 
monitoring.
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    \9\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51355 (March 10, 
2005), 70 FR 12919 (March 16, 2005) (SR-FICC-2004-08).
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    The current CRRM is comprised of two credit rating models--one for 
the U.S. broker-dealers and one for the U.S. banks--and generates 
credit ratings for the relevant members based on a 7-point rating 
system, with ``1'' being the

[[Page 17908]]

strongest credit rating and ``7'' being the weakest credit rating.
    Over time, the current CRRM has not kept pace with FICC's evolving 
membership base and heightened expectations from regulators and 
stakeholders for robustness of financial models. Specifically, the 
current CRRM only generates credit ratings for those GSD Netting 
Members and MBSD Clearing Members that are U.S. banks or U.S. broker-
dealers that file standard reports with their regulators, which 
currently comprise 77% of GSD Netting Members and 85% of MBSD Clearing 
Members, respectively; foreign banks and trust companies currently 
account for 21% of GSD Netting Members and 1% of MBSD Clearing 
Members.\10\ The numbers of GSD and MBSD members that are foreign banks 
or trust companies increased from 16 and zero in 2012 to 22 and one in 
2017, respectively, and are expected to continue to grow over the 
coming years. Foreign banks and trust companies are typically large 
global financial institutions that have complex businesses and conduct 
a high volume of activities. Although foreign banks and trust companies 
are not currently rated by the CRRM, they are monitored by FICC's 
credit risk staff using financial criteria deemed relevant by FICC and 
can be placed on the Watch List if they experience a financial change 
that presents risk to FICC. Given the increase in the number of foreign 
bank or trust company members in FICC in the recent years, there is a 
need to formalize FICC's credit risk evaluation process of these 
members by assigning credit ratings to them in order to better 
facilitate the comparability of credit risks among members.\11\
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    \10\ As of March 16, 2017, there are 105 GSD Netting Members and 
78 MBSD Clearing Members. Of the 105 GSD Netting Members, 13 (or 
12%) are U.S. banks, 68 (or 65%) are U.S. broker-dealers and 22 (or 
21%) are foreign banks or trust companies. Of the 78 MBSD Clearing 
Members, 14 (or 18%) are U.S. banks, 52 (or 67%) are U.S. broker-
dealers and one (or 1%) is a foreign bank or trust company.
    \11\ In the Interpretive Guidance Filing, FICC noted that CRRM 
is applied across FICC and its affiliated clearing agencies, 
National Securities Clearing Corporation (``NSCC'') and The 
Depository Trust Company (``DTC''). Specifically, in order to run 
the CRRM, credit risk staff uses the financial data of the 
applicable GSD and MBSD members in addition to data of applicable 
members and participants of NSCC and DTC, respectively. In this way, 
each applicable GSD and MBSD member is rated against other 
applicable members and participants of NSCC and DTC, respectively. 
SR-FICC-2004-08, 70 FR 12919.
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    In addition, the current CRRM assigns each GSD Netting Member and 
MBSD Clearing Member that is a U.S. bank or U.S. broker-dealer and that 
files standard reports with its regulator(s) a credit rating based on 
inputting certain quantitative data relative to the applicable member 
into the CRRM. Accordingly, a member's credit rating is currently based 
solely upon quantitative factors. It is only after the CRRM has 
generated a credit rating with respect to a particular member that such 
member's credit rating may be downgraded manually by credit risk staff, 
after taking into consideration relevant qualitative factors. The 
inability of the current CRRM to take into account qualitative factors 
requires frequent and manual overrides by credit risk staff, which may 
result in inconsistent and/or incomplete credit ratings for members.
    Furthermore, the current CRRM uses a relative scoring approach and 
relies on peer grouping of members to calculate the credit rating of a 
member. This approach is not ideal because a member's credit rating can 
be affected by changes in its peer group even if the member's financial 
condition is unchanged.
Proposed Credit Risk Rating Matrix Enhancements
    To improve the coverage and the effectiveness of the current CRRM, 
FICC is proposing three enhancements. The first proposed enhancement 
would expand the scope of CRRM coverage by enabling the CRRM to 
generate credit ratings for GSD Netting Members and MBSD Clearing 
Members that are foreign banks or trust companies and that have audited 
financial data that is publicly available. The second proposed 
enhancement would incorporate qualitative factors into the CRRM and 
therefore is expected to reduce the need and the frequency of manual 
overrides of member credit ratings. The third enhancement would replace 
the relative scoring approach currently used by CRRM with a statistical 
approach to estimate the absolute probability of default of each 
member.
A. Enable the CRRM To Generate Credit Ratings for Foreign Bank or Trust 
Company Members
    The current CRRM is comprised of two credit rating models--one for 
the U.S. broker-dealers and one for the U.S. banks. FICC is proposing 
to enhance the CRRM by adding an additional credit rating model for the 
foreign banks and trust companies. The additional model would expand 
the membership classes to which the CRRM would apply to include foreign 
banks and trust companies that are GSD Netting Members and/or MBSD 
Clearing Members and that have audited financial data that is publicly 
available. The CRRM credit rating of a foreign bank or trust company 
that is a GSD Netting Member and/or MBSD Clearing Member would be based 
on quantitative factors, including size, capital, leverage, liquidity, 
profitability and growth, and qualitative factors, including market 
position and sustainability, information reporting and compliance, 
management quality, capital management and business/product diversity. 
By enabling the CRRM to generate credit ratings for these GSD Netting 
Members and MBSD Clearing Members, the enhanced CRRM would provide more 
comprehensive credit risk coverage of FICC's membership base.
    With the proposed enhancement to the CRRM as described above, 
applicable foreign bank or trust company GSD Netting Members and MBSD 
Clearing Members would be included in the CRRM process and be evaluated 
more effectively and efficiently because financial data with respect to 
these foreign bank or trust company members could be extracted from 
data sources in an automated form.\12\
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    \12\ In the Initial Filing, FICC noted that these members would 
be monitored by credit risk staff by reviewing similar criteria as 
those reviewed for members included on the CRRM, but such review 
would occur outside of the CRRM process. SR-FICC-2003-03, 69 FR 
5624.
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    After the proposed enhancement, CRRM would be able to generate 
credit ratings on an ongoing basis for all GSD Netting Members and MBSD 
Clearing Members that are U.S. banks, U.S. brokers-dealers and foreign 
banks and trust companies, which together represent approximately 99% 
of the GSD Netting Members and 86% of the MBSD Clearing Members, 
respectively.\13\
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    \13\ As of March 16, 2017, there are two GSD Netting Members 
that are government sponsored entities and therefore would not be 
rated by the enhanced CRRM, as proposed; there are also 11 MBSD 
Clearing Members that would not be rated by the enhanced CRRM, as 
proposed, because they are government sponsored entities, registered 
investment companies, unregistered investment pools (``UIPs'') or 
other entities that are eligible for MBSD Clearing Membership 
pursuant to Section 1(i) of MBSD Rule 2A. MBSD Rules, supra note 4.
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B. Incorporate Qualitative Factors Into the CRRM
    In addition, as proposed, the enhanced CRRM would blend qualitative 
factors with quantitative factors to produce a credit rating for each 
applicable member in relation to the member's credit risk. For U.S. and 
foreign banks and trust companies, the enhanced CRRM would use a 70/30 
weighted split between quantitative and qualitative factors to generate 
credit ratings. For U.S. broker-dealers, the weight split between 
quantitative and qualitative factors would be 60/40.

[[Page 17909]]

These weight splits are chosen by FICC based on the industry best 
practice as well as research and sensitivity analysis conducted by 
FICC. FICC would review and adjust the weight splits as well as the 
quantitative and qualitative factors, as needed, based on recalibration 
of the CRRM to be conducted by FICC approximately every three to five 
years.
    Although there are advantages to measuring credit risk 
quantitatively, quantitative evaluation models alone are incapable of 
fully capturing all credit risks. Certain qualitative factors may 
indicate that a member is or will soon be undergoing financial 
distress, which may in turn signal a higher default exposure to FICC 
and its other members. As such, a key enhancement being proposed to the 
CRRM is the incorporation of relevant qualitative factors into each of 
the three credit rating models mentioned above. By including 
qualitative factors in the three credit rating models, the enhanced 
CRRM would capture risks that would otherwise not be accounted for with 
quantitative factors alone.\14\ Adding qualitative factors to the CRRM 
would not only enable it to generate more consistent and comprehensive 
credit ratings for applicable members, but it would also help reduce 
the need and frequency of manual credit rating overrides by the credit 
risk staff because overrides would likely only be required under more 
limited circumstances.\15\
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    \14\ The initial set of qualitative factors that would be 
incorporated into the CRRM includes (a) for U.S. broker dealers, 
market position and sustainability, management quality, capital 
management, liquidity management, geographic diversification, 
business/product diversity and access to funding, (b) for U.S. 
banks, environment, compliance/litigation, management quality, 
liquidity management and parental demands and (c) for foreign banks 
and trust companies, market position and sustainability, information 
reporting and compliance, management quality, capital management and 
business/product diversity.
    \15\ Once a member is assigned a credit rating, if circumstances 
warrant, credit risk staff would still have the ability to override 
the CRRM-issued credit rating by manually downgrading such rating as 
they do today. To ensure a conservative approach, the CRRM-issued 
credit ratings cannot be manually upgraded.
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C. Shifting From Relative Scoring to Absolute Scoring
    As proposed, the enhanced CRRM would use an absolute scoring 
approach and rank each member based on its individual probability of 
default rather than the relative scoring approach that is currently in 
use. This proposed change is designed to have a member's CRRM-generated 
credit rating reflect an absolute measure of the member's default risk 
and eliminate any potential distortion of a member's credit rating from 
the member's peer group that may occur under the relative scoring 
approach used in the existing CRRM.
D. Watch List and Enhanced Surveillance
    In addition to the Watch List, FICC also maintains an enhanced 
surveillance list (referenced herein and in the proposed rule text as 
``enhanced surveillance'') for membership monitoring. The enhanced 
surveillance list is generally used when members are undergoing drastic 
and unexpected changes in their financial conditions or operation 
capabilities and thus are deemed by FICC to be of the highest risk 
level and/or warrant additional scrutiny due to FICC's ongoing concerns 
about these members. Accordingly, members that are subject to enhanced 
surveillance are reported to FICC's management committees and are also 
regularly reviewed by a cross-functional team comprised of senior 
management of FICC. More often than not, members that are subject to 
enhanced surveillance are also on the Watch List. The group of members 
that is subject to enhanced surveillance is generally much smaller than 
the group on the Watch List. The enhanced surveillance list is an 
internal tool for FICC that triggers increased monitoring of a member 
above the monitoring that occurs when a member is on the Watch List.
    A member could be placed on the Watch List either based on its 
credit rating of 5, 6 or 7, which can either be generated by the CRRM 
or from a manual downgrade, or when FICC deems such placement as 
necessary to protect FICC and its members. In contrast, a member would 
be subject to enhanced surveillance only when close monitoring of the 
member is deemed necessary to protect FICC and its members.
    The Watch List and enhanced surveillance tools are not mutually 
exclusive; they may complement each other under certain circumstances. 
A key distinction between the Watch List and enhanced surveillance is 
that being placed on the Watch List may result in Clearing Fund related 
consequences under the Rules, whereas enhanced surveillance does 
not.\16\ For example, a member that is in a precarious situation could 
be placed on the Watch List and be subject to enhanced surveillance; 
however, because the Watch List status could require additional 
Clearing Fund deposits, when FICC has preliminary concerns about a 
member, to avoid potential increase to a member's Clearing Fund 
deposit, FICC may opt not to place the member on the Watch List until 
it is certain that such concerns would not be alleviated in the short-
term. Instead, in such a situation, FICC might first subject the member 
to enhanced surveillance in order to closely monitor the member's 
situation without affecting the member's Clearing Fund deposits. If the 
member's situation improves, then it will no longer be subject to 
enhanced surveillance. If the situation of the member worsens, the 
member may then be placed on the Watch List as deemed necessary by 
FICC.
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    \16\ FICC expects to provide additional clarity to members 
regarding the Watch List and its impact on Clearing Fund deposits in 
a subsequent proposed rule change to be filed with the Commission in 
2017.
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(ii) Detailed Description of the Proposed Rule Changes Related to the 
Proposed CRRM Enhancements
    In connection with the proposed enhancements to the CRRM, FICC 
proposes to amend the GSD Rules and the MBSD Rules to (1) incorporate 
qualitative factors into CRRM and (2) add foreign banks and trust 
companies that are GSD Netting Members and MBSD Clearing Members to the 
categories of members that would be assigned credit ratings by FICC 
using the CRRM.
A. Proposed Changes to GSD Rule 1 (Definitions) and MBSD Rule 1 
(Definitions)
    FICC is proposing to amend the ``Credit Risk Rating Matrix'' 
definition in GSD Rule 1 and MBSD Rule 1 to include qualitative 
factors, such as management quality, market position/environment and 
capital and liquidity risk management, because, as proposed, the 
enhanced CRRM would blend both qualitative factors and quantitative 
factors to produce a credit rating for each applicable FICC member.
B. Proposed Changes to Section 12(b)(i)(II) of GSD Rule 3 (Ongoing 
Membership Requirements) and Section 11(b)(i)(II) of MBSD Rule 3 
(Ongoing Membership Requirements)
    FICC is proposing to amend Section 12(b)(i)(III) of GSD Rule 3 and 
Section 11(b)(i)(III) of MBSD Rule 3 to expand the membership types to 
which the CRRM would apply to include GSD Netting Members and MBSD 
Clearing Members, as applicable, that are foreign banks or trust 
companies and that have audited financial data that are publicly 
available.
    The enhanced CRRM would assign credit ratings for each GSD Netting 
Member and/or MBSD Clearing Member that is a foreign bank or trust 
company based on its publicly available audited

[[Page 17910]]

financial data. The credit rating would be based on an 18-point scale, 
which is then mapped to the 7-point rating system currently in use 
today, with ``1'' being the strongest credit rating and ``7'' being the 
weakest credit rating.
(iii) Other Proposed Rule Changes
    This rule filing also contains proposed rule changes that are 
unrelated to the proposed enhancement of the CRRM. These proposed rule 
changes would provide specificity, clarity and additional transparency 
to the Rules with respect to FICC's current ongoing membership 
monitoring process, as described below.
A. Proposed Changes to the Definitions of ``Credit Risk Rating Matrix'' 
and ``Watch List'' in GSD Rule 1 (Definitions) and MBSD Rule 1 
(Definitions)
    FICC is proposing to amend the definition of ``Credit Risk Rating 
Matrix'' in GSD Rule 1 and MBSD Rule 1 to state that, in addition to 
the proposed qualitative factors described above, the CRRM is also 
based on quantitative factors, such as capital, assets, earnings and 
liquidity.
    FICC is also proposing to amend the definition of ``Watch List'' in 
GSD Rule 1 and MBSD Rule 1 to state that the Watch List is comprised of 
members whose credit ratings derived from the CRRM are 5, 6 or 7 as 
well as members that are deemed by FICC to pose a heightened risk to 
FICC and its members based on FICC's consideration of relevant factors, 
including those set forth in Section 12(d) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 
11(d) of MBSD Rule 3, as applicable.
B. Proposed Changes to GSD Rule 3 and MBSD Rule 3
Section 7 of GSD Rule 3 and Section 6 of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to amend Section 7 of GSD Rule 3 and Section 6 of 
MBSD Rule 3 to state that review of a GSD Member's or MBSD Member's 
financial or operational conditions may (1) include FICC requesting 
information regarding the businesses and operations of the member and 
its risk management practices with respect to FICC's services utilized 
by the member for another Person and (2) result in the member being 
placed on the Watch List and/or being subject to enhanced surveillance 
as determined by FICC.
    FICC members are direct participants of GSD and/or MBSD, as 
applicable. However, there are firms that rely on the services provided 
by GSD Members or MBSD Members in order to have their activity cleared 
and settled through FICC's facilities (the ``indirect participants''). 
These indirect participants pose certain risks to FICC that need to be 
identified and monitored as part of FICC's ongoing member due diligence 
process. In order for FICC to understand (1) the material dependencies 
between FICC members and the indirect participants that rely on the 
FICC members for the clearance and settlement of the indirect 
participants' transactions, (2) significant FICC member-indirect 
participant relationships and (3) the various risk controls and 
mitigants that these FICC members employ to manage their risks with 
respect to such relationships, FICC may request information from GSD 
Members or MBSD Members regarding the members' businesses and 
operations as well as their risk management practices with respect to 
services of FICC utilized by the FICC members for indirect 
participants. The information provided by FICC members would then be 
taken into consideration by FICC when determining whether a GSD Member 
or an MBSD Member, as applicable, may need to be placed on the Watch 
List, be subject to enhanced surveillance or both.
Section 12(a) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(a) of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to amend Section 12(a) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 
11(a) of MBSD Rule 3 in order to specify the membership types that are 
currently subject to FICC's ongoing monitoring and review. FICC 
currently monitors and reviews all (a) GSD Netting Members, Sponsoring 
Members and Funds-Only Settling Bank Members and (b) MBSD Members on an 
ongoing and periodic basis, which may include monitoring news and 
market developments relating to these members and conducting reviews of 
financial reports and other public information of these members.
Section 12(b)(i) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(b)(i) of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to add Section 12(b)(i) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 
11(b)(i) of MBSD Rule 3 to (1) clarify that FICC is currently using the 
CRRM to generate credit ratings for (A) GSD Members that are Bank 
Netting Members and MBSD Members that are Bank Clearing Members; 
provided that each such member files the Consolidated Report of 
Condition and Income (``Call Report'') and (B) GSD Members that are 
Dealer Netting Members or Inter-Dealer Broker Netting Members and MBSD 
Members that are Dealer Clearing Members or Inter-Dealer Broker 
Clearing Members; provided that each such member files the Financial 
and Operational Combined Uniform Single Report (``FOCUS Report'') or 
the equivalent with its regulator, (2) clarify that each CRRM-Rated 
Member's credit rating would be reassessed upon receipt of additional 
information from the member and (3) delete language that states members 
may be placed on the Watch List based on their ratings as determined by 
CRRM or based on their failure to comply with operational standards and 
requirements.
    Currently, Section 11(a) of MBSD Rule 3 states that UIPs are rated 
by the CRRM. FICC proposes to delete this statement and amend it to 
state that FICC reviews and monitors UIPs (as with all MBSD 
Members).\17\ This proposed change corrects an error in the MBSD Rules 
and does not affect any rights or obligations of the MBSD Members 
because UIPs are still reviewed by FICC through proposed Section 11(a) 
of MBSD Rule 3.
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    \17\ Amendment No. 1 to SR-FICC-2008-01, approved by the 
Commission in 2012, eliminated any reference to the CRRM with 
regards to UIPs; however, due to a clerical error, this change was 
not included in the Exhibit 5 thereto and therefore not reflected in 
the current MBSD Rules. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
66550 (March 9, 2012), 77 FR 15155 (March 14, 2012) (SR-FICC-2008-
01). FICC is proposing to correct this error.
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Section 12(b)(ii) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(b)(ii) of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to add Section 12(b)(ii) of GSD Rule 3 and 
Section 11(b)(ii) of MBSD Rule 3 to provide that, because the factors 
used as part of the CRRM may not identify all risks that a member may 
pose to FICC, FICC may, in addition to other actions permitted by the 
Rules, downgrade the member's credit rating derived from the CRRM if 
FICC believes the CRRM-generated rating is insufficiently conservative 
or if it deems such downgrade as necessary to protect FICC and its 
members. Depending on the credit rating of the member, a downgrade may 
result in the member being placed on the Watch List and/or being 
subject to enhanced surveillance based on relevant factors.
Section 12(c) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(c) of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to re-number the existing Section 12(b) of GSD 
Rule 3 and Section 11(b) of MBSD Rule 3 to Section 12(c) and Section 
11(c) of the respective Rules as well as to amend these sections to 
state that, other than those members specified in Section 12(b)(i) of 
GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(b)(i) of MBSD Rule 3, FICC may place (1) GSD 
Sponsoring Members, Funds-Only Settling Bank Members and Netting 
Members and (2) MBSD Members, on the Watch List and/

[[Page 17911]]

or subject them to enhanced surveillance even though they are not being 
assigned credit ratings by FICC in accordance with the CRRM.
Section 12(d) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(d) of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to add Section 12(d) to GSD Rule 3 and Section 
11(d) to MBSD Rule 3 to describe some of the factors that could be 
taken into consideration by FICC when downgrading a member's credit 
rating, placing a member on the Watch List and/or subjecting a member 
to enhanced surveillance. These factors include but are not limited to 
(i) news reports and/or regulatory observations that raise reasonable 
concerns relating to the member, (ii) reasonable concerns around the 
member's liquidity arrangements, (iii) material changes to the member's 
organizational structure, (iv) reasonable concerns of FICC about the 
member's financial stability due to particular facts and circumstances, 
such as material litigation or other legal and/or regulatory risks, (v) 
failure of the member to demonstrate satisfactory financial condition 
or operational capability or if FICC has a reasonable concern regarding 
the member's ability to maintain applicable membership standards and 
(vi) failure of the member to provide information required by FICC to 
assess risk exposures posed by the member's activity.
Section 12(e) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(e) of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to re-number the existing Section 12(c) of GSD 
Rule 3 and Section 11(c) of MBSD Rule 3 to Section 12(e) and Section 
11(e) of the respective Rules and refer to FICC's ability to retain any 
Excess Clearing Fund Deposits of a GSD Netting Member or an MBSD 
Clearing Member, as applicable, that has been placed on the Watch List 
pursuant to Section 9 of GSD Rule 4 or Section 9 of MBSD Rule 4, as 
applicable. In addition, FICC is proposing technical modifications in 
these sections to correct grammatical errors and add a section 
reference.
Section 12(f) of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(f) of MBSD Rule 3
    FICC is proposing to re-number the existing Section 12(d) of GSD 
Rule 3 and Section 11(d) of MBSD Rule 3 to Section 12(f) and Section 
11(f) of the respective Rules and provide that FICC would, in addition 
to other actions permitted by the Rules, conduct a more thorough 
monitoring of the financial condition and/or operational capability of, 
and require more frequent financial disclosures from, not only those 
members that are placed on the Watch List but also members subject to 
enhanced surveillance, including examples of how the monitoring could 
be conducted and the types of disclosures that may be required. In 
addition, members that are subject to enhanced surveillance would be 
reported to FICC's management committees and regularly reviewed by a 
cross-functional team comprised of senior management of FICC.
Other Proposed Changes to GSD Rule 3 and MBSD Rule 3
    In addition to the proposed changes described above, FICC is 
proposing to delete the existing Section 12(e) of GSD Rule 3 and 
Section 11(e) of MBSD Rule 3 to eliminate FICC's right to place a 
member with an Excess Capital Ratio of 0.5 or greater on the Watch List 
because FICC has not used, nor does it plan to use, this threshold.
    In addition, FICC is proposing to delete the existing Section 12(f) 
of GSD Rule 3 and Section 11(f) of MBSD Rule 3 to eliminate language 
that requires FICC to place a GSD Netting Member or an MBSD Clearing 
Member, as applicable, on the Watch List if FICC takes any action 
against the GSD Netting Member or the MBSD Clearing Member under GSD 
Rule 3, Section 7 (General Continuance Standards) and MBSD Rule 3, 
Section 6 (General Continuance Standards), respectively. FICC is 
proposing these deletions because placement of a member on the Watch 
List would be covered by the proposed changes to Sections 12(b), (c) 
and (d) of GSD Rule 3 and Sections 11(b), (c) and (d) of MBSD Rule 3. 
As such, the language being deleted by this proposed change would no 
longer be needed.
    Similarly, FICC is proposing to delete language that requires a GSD 
Netting Member or an MBSD Clearing Member, as applicable, to remain on 
the Watch List until the condition(s) that resulted in its placement on 
the Watch List are no longer present or if close monitoring by FICC is 
no longer warranted. FICC is proposing this deletion because whether a 
member remains on the Watch List would be covered by the proposed 
changes to Sections 12(b), (c) and (d) of GSD Rule 3 and Sections 
11(b), (c) and (d) of MBSD Rule 3. As such, the language being deleted 
by this proposed change would no longer be needed.
C. Proposed Changes to GSD Rules 5, 11 and 18
    FICC is also proposing to amend GSD Rules 5 (Comparison System), 11 
(Netting System) and 18 (Special Provisions for Repo Transactions) to 
clarify that FICC may subject (1) a Comparison-Only Member to enhanced 
surveillance if FICC has determined that the Comparison-Only Member has 
violated its obligations under Section 1 of GSD Rule 5 and (2) a 
Netting Member to enhanced surveillance if FICC has determined that the 
Netting Member has violated its obligations under Section 3 of GSD Rule 
11 or Section 2 of GSD Rule 18. In addition, FICC is proposing to amend 
GSD Rule 11 to correct a typographical error.
Implementation Timeframe
    Pending Commission approval, FICC expects to implement this 
proposal promptly. Members would be advised of the implementation date 
of this proposal through issuance of a FICC Important Notice.
Expected Effect on Risks to the Clearing Agency, Its Participants and 
the Market
    The proposed rule changes would mitigate counterparty credit risk 
for FICC by allowing FICC to more accurately monitor the 
creditworthiness and risk profile of its members. The enhanced CRRM 
would provide a more robust credit rating methodology by incorporating 
qualitative factors and adopting an absolute scoring approach. Both of 
these enhancements would improve FICC's ability to monitor the credit 
risk of its members and are expected to lessen the frequency of manual 
overrides. The enhanced CRRM would also expand the coverage of FICC's 
membership by providing credit ratings for members that are foreign 
banks or trust companies, which are not covered under the existing 
CRRM.
    By mitigating counterparty credit risk for FICC as described above, 
the enhanced CRRM would also mitigate risk for FICC members because 
lowering the risk profile for FICC would in turn lower the risk 
exposure that FICC members may have with respect to FICC in its role as 
a central counterparty.
Management of Identified Risks
    The proposed rule changes are designed to mitigate counterparty 
credit risk for FICC and to provide greater clarity and transparency to 
FICC's members regarding the counterparty credit risk management 
approach used by FICC.
    The enhanced CRRM would improve FICC's ability to monitor the 
probability of default for members that are rated by the CRRM and is 
expected to lessen the need and the frequency of manual downgrades due 
to the anticipated improvement in the accuracy of the credit ratings 
generated by the enhanced CRRM.

[[Page 17912]]

    FICC employs a risk-based approach to conducting monitoring and 
review of its members by using the CRRM to identify higher risk 
members. Once identified, FICC would place these members on the Watch 
List, which would result in more frequent review by FICC of these 
members than the other members. For members that are placed on the 
Watch List, FICC would conduct more thorough monitoring of these 
members' financial condition and/or operational capability, which could 
include, for example, on-site visits or additional due diligence 
information requests.
    FICC members that have been placed on the Watch List may also be 
required to maintain a higher deposit to the GSD Clearing Fund or MBSD 
Clearing Fund, as applicable, which would help offset potential risks 
to FICC and its members arising from activity submitted by these 
members.
    The enhanced CRRM would also expand the coverage of FICC's 
membership by providing credit ratings for foreign banks and trust 
companies, which are not currently rated under the existing CRRM. The 
addition of these entities would allow FICC to employ its risk-based 
approach to identify those higher risk members for additional 
monitoring with more efficiency (by reducing the need for manual 
overrides) and effectiveness (by generating a more comprehensive and 
accurate credit rating after taking into account both quantitative and 
qualitative factors and adopting the absolute scoring approach).
    Thus, the enhanced CRRM would help FICC to identify those members 
that could present credit risk to FICC, which then would allow FICC to 
better manage the potential risks from these members.
Consistency With the Clearing Supervision Act
    The proposed enhancements to the CRRM as described in detail above 
would be consistent with Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision 
Act.\18\ The objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the 
Clearing Supervision Act include, among other things, the promotion of 
robust risk management.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b)
    \19\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By enhancing the CRRM to enable it to assign credit ratings to 
members that are foreign banks or trust companies and that have audited 
financial data that is publicly available, the proposed rule change 
would expand the CRRM's applicability to a wider group of members, 
which would improve FICC's membership monitoring process and promote 
robust risk management, consistent with the objectives and principles 
of Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act cited above.
    Similarly, by enhancing the CRRM to enable it to incorporate 
qualitative factors when assigning a member's credit rating, the 
proposed change would enable FICC to take into account relevant 
qualitative factors in an automated and more effective manner when 
monitoring the credit risks presented by the GSD Netting Members and 
MBSD Clearing Members, which would improve FICC's membership monitoring 
process overall and promote robust risk management, consistent with the 
objectives and principles of Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision 
Act cited above.
    Likewise, by enhancing the CRRM to shift from a relative scoring 
approach to an absolute scoring approach when assigning a member's 
credit rating, the proposed rule change would enable FICC to generate 
credit ratings for members that are more reflective of the members' 
default risk, which would improve FICC's membership monitoring process 
and promote robust risk management, consistent with the objectives and 
principles of Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act cited 
above.
    The proposed enhancements to the CRRM are consistent with Rule 
17Ad-22(e)(3)(i) under the Act, which was recently adopted by the 
Commission.\20\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(i) will require FICC to establish, 
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to maintain a sound risk management framework for 
comprehensively managing risks that arise in or are born by FICC, which 
includes . . . systems designed to identify, measure, monitor and 
manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by FICC.\21\ The 
proposed enhancements to the CRRM have been designed to assist FICC in 
identifying, measuring, monitoring and managing the credit risks to 
FICC posed by its members. The proposed enhancements to the CRRM 
accomplish this by (i) expanding the CRRM's applicability to a wider 
group of members to include members that are foreign banks or trust 
companies, (ii) enabling the CRRM to take into account relevant 
qualitative factors in an automated and more effective manner when 
monitoring the credit risks presented by FICC's members and (iii) 
enabling the CRRM to generate credit ratings for members that are more 
reflective of the members' default risk by shifting to an absolute 
scoring approach, all of which would improve FICC's membership 
monitoring process overall. Therefore, FICC believes the proposed 
enhancements to the CRRM would assist FICC in identifying, measuring, 
monitoring and managing risks that arise in or are born by FICC, 
consistent with the requirements of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(3)(i). The Commission adopted 
amendments to Rule 17Ad-22, including the addition of new subsection 
17Ad-22(e), on September 28, 2016. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 78961 (September 28, 2016), 81 FR 70786 (October 13, 
2016) (S7-03-14). FICC is a ``covered clearing agency'' as defined 
by the new Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5) and must comply with new subsection 
(e) of Rule 17Ad-22 by April 11, 2017. Id.
    \21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change to Section 7 of GSD Rule 3 and Section 6 
of MBSD Rule 3 with respect to the scope of information that may be 
requested by FICC from its members has been designed to be consistent 
with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(19) under the Act, which was recently adopted by 
the Commission.\22\ Rule 17Ad-22(e)(19) will require FICC to establish, 
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to identify, monitor, and manage the material risk 
to FICC arising from arrangements in which firms that are indirect 
participants in FICC rely on the services provided by GSD Members and 
MBSD Members to access FICC's payment, clearing, or settlement 
facilities.\23\ By expressly reflecting in the Rules what is already 
FICC's current practice associated with its request for additional 
reporting of a GSD Member's or MBSD Member's financial or operational 
conditions to state that such request may include information regarding 
the businesses and operations of the member, as well as its risk 
management practices with respect to services of FICC utilized by the 
member for another Person, this proposed rule change would help enable 
FICC to have rule provisions that are reasonably designed to identify, 
monitor and manage the material risks to FICC arising from tiered 
participation arrangements consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(19).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(19). Id.
    \23\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Advance Notice, and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The proposed change may be implemented if the Commission does not 
object to the proposed change within 60 days of the later of (i) the 
date that the proposed change was filed with the Commission or (ii) the 
date that any additional information requested by the

[[Page 17913]]

Commission is received. The clearing agency shall not implement the 
proposed change if the Commission has any objection to the proposed 
change.
    The Commission may extend the period for review by an additional 60 
days if the proposed change raises novel or complex issues, subject to 
the Commission providing the clearing agency with prompt written notice 
of the extension. A proposed change may be implemented in less than 60 
days from the date the advance notice is filed, or the date further 
information requested by the Commission is received, if the Commission 
notifies the clearing agency in writing that it does not object to the 
proposed change and authorizes the clearing agency to implement the 
proposed change on an earlier date, subject to any conditions imposed 
by the Commission.
    The clearing agency shall post notice on its Web site of proposed 
changes that are implemented.
    The proposal shall not take effect until all regulatory actions 
required with respect to the proposal are completed.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the Advance 
Notice is consistent with the Clearing Supervision Act. Comments may be 
submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form
    (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-FICC-2017-804 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-FICC-2017-804. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the Advance Notice that are filed 
with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the 
Advance Notice between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, 
DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of FICC and on DTCC's Web site 
(http://dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings.aspx). All comments received 
will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal 
identifying information from submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions 
should refer to File Number SR-FICC-2017-804 and should be submitted on 
or before April 28, 2017.

    By the Commission.
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-07452 Filed 4-12-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


