
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 152 (Friday, August 7, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47541-47546]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-19382]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-75589; File No. SR-CFE-2015-005]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC; Notice 
of Proposed Rule Change Regarding Disruptive Trading Practices

August 3, 2015.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act''),\1\ notice is hereby given that on July 16, 2015 CBOE Futures 
Exchange, LLC (``CFE'' or ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule 
change described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been 
prepared by CFE. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons. CFE also 
has filed this proposed rule change with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (``CFTC''). CFE filed a written certification with the CFTC 
under Section 5c(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') \2\ on July 
16, 2015.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(7).
    \2\ 7 U.S.C. 7a-2(c).
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Description of the Proposed Rule 
Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend its rules related to disruptive 
trading practices. The scope of this filing is limited solely to the 
application of the rule amendments to security futures that are 
permitted for trading on CFE. The only security futures that previously 
traded on CFE were traded under Chapter 16 of CFE's Rulebook, which is 
applicable to Individual Stock Based and Exchange-Traded Fund Based 
Volatility Index security futures. No security futures are currently 
listed for trading on CFE. The text of the proposed rule change is 
attached as Exhibit 4 to the filing but is not attached to the 
publication of this notice.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, CFE included statements 
concerning the

[[Page 47542]]

purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and discussed any 
comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these 
statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. 
CFE has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of 
the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The purpose of the proposed CFE rule amendments included as part of 
this rule change is to amend CFE Rule 620 (Disruptive Practices) and 
add CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII (Disruptive Trading Practices (Rule 
620)) to provide further guidance on prohibited disruptive trading 
practices. The rule amendments included as part of this rule change are 
to apply to all products traded on CFE. As previously noted, no 
security futures are currently listed for trading on the Exchange.
    CFE Rule 620 currently prohibits the disruptive practices 
enumerated in Section 4c(a)(5) of the CEA,\3\ which were added to the 
CEA by Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\4\ Specifically, Section 
4c(a)(5) and Rule 620 prohibit any trading, practice, or conduct that 
``(A) violates bids or offers; (B) demonstrates intentional or reckless 
disregard for the orderly execution of transactions during the closing 
period; or (C) is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the 
trade as, `spoofing' (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the 
bid or offer before execution).'' Additionally, on May 28, 2013, the 
CFTC made effective an interpretive guidance and policy statement 
regarding the scope and application of these prohibitions.\5\ The 
amendments amend CFE Rule 620 and add CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII to 
the Policies and Procedures section of the CFE Rulebook to provide 
greater detail regarding the type of activity that is prohibited under 
Rule 620.
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    \3\ 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5).
    \4\ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739, Sec. 747 (2010).
    \5\ Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 FR 31890 (May 28, 
2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-12365a.pdf.
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Amendments to CFE Rule 620
    The amendments add new paragraph (b) to Rule 620, which sets forth 
particular types of disruptive order entry and trading practices that 
CFE considers to be abusive to the orderly conduct of trading or the 
fair execution of transactions. Specifically, the amendments add the 
following language as new subsection (b) to Rule 620:
    (b) All Orders must be entered for the purpose of executing bona 
fide transactions. Additionally, all non-actionable messages must be 
entered in good faith for legitimate purposes.
    (i) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an Order or quote 
with the intent, at the time of entry, to cancel the Order or quote 
before execution or to modify the Order or quote to avoid execution;
    (ii) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an actionable or 
non-actionable message or messages with intent to mislead other market 
participants;
    (iii) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an actionable or 
non-actionable message or messages with intent to overload, delay, or 
disrupt the systems of the Exchange or other market participants; and
    (iv) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an actionable or 
non-actionable message with intent to disrupt, or with reckless 
disregard for the adverse impact on, the orderly conduct of trading or 
the fair execution of transactions.
    The provisions of this Rule apply to all market states, including 
the pre-opening period, the closing period, and all trading sessions.
    These amendments are consistent with similar rules and guidance 
established and provided by other designated contract markets 
(``DCMs'') regarding disruptive practices.\6\
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    \6\ These DCMs are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. and its 
affiliated DCMs (``CME''), ICE Futures U.S., Inc. (``ICE'') and 
NASDAQ Futures, Inc. (``NFX''), which each submitted self-
certification rule filings to the CFTC pursuant to CFTC Regulation 
Sec.  40.6(a) to effectuate their respective changes. Copies of 
these filings (CME Submission No. 14-367 (August 28, 2014); ICE 
Submission No. 14-144 (December 29, 2014); and NFX Submission No. 
15-16 (April 6, 2015)) may be accessed at the CFTC's Web site. CME 
amended its filing and submitted CME Submission No. 14-367R on 
September 12, 2014. That filing may be accessed at the CME's Web 
site.
    The Exchange understands that there is a desire by many market 
participants for uniformity and consistency among DCMs to have 
similar rules and interpretations regarding disruptive trading 
practices. CFE states that this current filing closely tracks the 
provisions adopted by CME, ICE and NFX and deviates as needed when 
issues or topics addressed by the other DCMs do not apply to CFE, 
e.g., CFE does not have all of the same order types as some of the 
other DCMs.
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New CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII
    The amendments add new CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII, which lists 
various factors that the Exchange may consider in assessing whether 
conduct violates CFE Rule 620 and provides a non-exhaustive list of 
examples of activity considered by CFE to be in violation of Rule 620. 
Specifically, the amendments provide the following as new Policy and 
Procedure XVIII:
    Rule 620 prohibits disruptive trading practices as described by the 
Rule. The following are a non-exclusive list of factors that the 
Exchange may consider in assessing whether conduct violates Rule 620.
A. Factors the Exchange May Consider in Assessing Whether Conduct 
Violates Rule 620
    The Exchange may consider a variety of factors in assessing whether 
conduct violates Rule 620, including, but not limited to:
     Whether the market participant's intent was to induce 
others to trade when they otherwise would not;
     whether the market participant's intent was to affect a 
price rather than to change the market participant's position;
     whether the market participant's intent was to create 
misleading market conditions;
     market conditions in the impacted market(s) and related 
markets;
     the effect on other market participants;
     the market participant's historical pattern of activity;
     the market participant's Order \7\ entry and cancellation 
activity;
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    \7\ For purposes of this Policy and Procedure, all references to 
Orders include Orders and quotes.
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     the size of the Order(s) relative to market conditions at 
the time the Order(s) was placed;
     the size of the Order(s) relative to the market 
participant's position and/or capitalization;
     the number of Orders;
     the ability of the market participant to manage the risk 
associated with the Order(s) if fully executed;
     the duration for which the Order(s) is exposed to the 
market;
     the duration between, and frequency of, non-actionable 
messages;
     the queue position or priority of the Order in the order 
book;
     the prices of preceding and succeeding bids, offers, and 
trades;
     the change in the best offer price, best bid price, last 
sale price, or other price (such as the Expected Opening Price 
(``EOP'')) that results from the entry of the Order; and
     the market participant's activity in related markets.

[[Page 47543]]

B. Meaning of the Term ``Misleading'' in the Context of Rule 620(b)(ii)
    The language is intended to be a more specific statement of the 
general requirement that market participants are not permitted to act 
in violation of just and equitable principles of trade. This section of 
the Rule prohibits a market participant from entering Orders or 
messages with the intent of creating the false impression of market 
depth or market interest. The Exchange generally will find the 
requisite intent where the purpose of the participant's conduct was, 
for example, to induce another market participant to engage in market 
activity.
C. Specific Amount of Time an Order Should Be Exposed to the Market
    Although the amount of time an Order is exposed to the market may 
be a factor that is considered when determining whether the Order 
constituted a disruptive trading practice, there is no prescribed safe 
harbor. The Exchange will consider a variety of factors, including 
exposure time, to determine whether an Order or Orders constitute a 
disruptive practice.
D. Modification or Cancellation of an Order Once it has Been Entered
    An Order, entered with the intent to execute a bona fide 
transaction, that is subsequently modified or cancelled due to a 
perceived change in circumstances does not constitute a violation of 
Rule 620.
E. Orders Entered by Mistake
    An unintentional, accidental, or ``fat-finger'' Order will not 
constitute a violation of Rule 620, but such activity may be a 
violation of other Exchange rules, including, but not limited to, Rule 
608 (Acts Detrimental to the Exchange; Acts Inconsistent with Just and 
Equitable Principles of Trade; Abusive Practices). Market participants 
are expected to take steps to mitigate the occurrence of errors, and 
their impact on the market. This is particularly true for entities that 
run algorithmic trading applications, or otherwise submit large numbers 
of automated Orders to the market.
F. Partial Fill of an Order
    While execution of an Order, in part or in full, may be one 
indication that an Order was entered in good faith, an execution does 
not automatically cause the Order to be considered compliant with Rule 
620. Orders must be entered in an attempt to consummate a trade. A 
variety of factors may lead to a violative Order ultimately achieving 
an execution. The Exchange will consider a multitude of factors in 
assessing whether Rule 620 has been violated.
G. Making a Two-Sided Market With Unequal Quantities (e.g., 100 Bid at 
10 Offered)
    Market participants are not precluded from making unequal markets 
as long as the Orders are entered for the purpose of executing bona 
fide transactions. If either (or both) Order(s) are entered with 
prohibited intent, including recklessness, such activity will 
constitute a violation of Rule 620.
H. Stop Limit Orders Entered for Purposes of Protecting a Position
    Market participants may enter Stop Limit Orders as a means of 
minimizing potential losses with the hope that the Order will not be 
triggered. However, it must be the intent of the market participant 
that the Order will be executed if the specified condition is met. Such 
an order entry is not prohibited by this Rule.
I. Entering Order(s) at Various Price Levels Throughout the Order Book 
in Order to Gain Queue Position and Subsequently Canceling Those Orders 
as the Market Changes
    It is understood that market participants may want to achieve queue 
position at certain price levels, and given changing market conditions 
may wish to modify or cancel those Orders. In the absence of other 
indicia that the Orders were entered for disruptive purposes, they 
would not constitute a violation of Rule 620.
J. ``Actionable'' and ``non-actionable messages in relation to rule 
620(b)(ii), (iii), and (iv)
    Actionable messages are messages that can be accepted by another 
party or otherwise lead to the execution of a trade. An example of an 
actionable message is an Order message. Non-actionable messages are 
those messages submitted to the Exchange that relate to a non-
actionable event. An example of a non-actionable message is a Request 
for Quote.
K. The Exchange's Definition of ``orderly conduct of trading or the 
fair execution of transactions''
    Whether a market participant intends to disrupt the orderly conduct 
of trading or the fair execution of transactions or demonstrates a 
reckless disregard for the orderly conduct of trading or the fair 
execution of transactions may be evaluated only in the context of the 
specific instrument, market conditions, and other circumstances present 
at the time in question. Some of the factors that may be considered in 
determining whether there was orderly conduct or the fair execution of 
transactions were described by the Commission as follows: ``[A]n 
orderly market may be characterized by, among other things, parameters 
such as a rational relationship between consecutive prices, a strong 
correlation between price changes and the volume of trades, levels of 
volatility that do not dramatically reduce liquidity, accurate 
relationships between the price of a derivative and the underlying such 
as a physical commodity or financial instrument, and reasonable spreads 
between contracts for near months and for remote months.'' 
Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 FR at 31,895-96. Volatility 
alone, however, will not be presumptively interpreted as disorderly or 
disruptive as market volatility can be consistent with markets 
performing their price discovery function.
L. Entering Orders That May Be Considered Large for a Particular 
Market, and Thus May Have a Potential Impact on the Market
    The size of an Order or cumulative Orders may be deemed to violate 
Rule 620 if the entry results in disorderliness in the markets, 
including, but not limited to, price or volume aberrations. Market 
participants should further be aware that the size of an Order may be 
deemed to violate Rule 620 if that Order distorts the integrity of the 
settlement prices. Accordingly, market participants should be cognizant 
of the market characteristics of the products they trade and ensure 
that their Order entry activity does not result in market disruptions. 
Exigent circumstances may be considered in determining whether a 
violation of Rule 620 has occurred and, if so, what the appropriate 
sanction should be for such violation.
M. Meaning of the ``closing period'' in Rule 620
    ``Closing period'' typically refers to the period during which 
transactions, bids, and offers are reviewed for purposes of informing 
settlement price determinations.
N. Factors the Exchange Will Consider in Determining if an Act Was Done 
With the Prohibited Intent or Reckless Disregard of the Consequences
    Proof of intent is not limited to instances in which a market 
participant admits the market participant's state of mind. Where the 
conduct was such that it more likely than not was intended to produce a 
prohibited disruptive consequence, intent may be found. Claims of 
ignorance, or lack of

[[Page 47544]]

knowledge, are not acceptable defenses to intentional or reckless 
conduct. Recklessness has been commonly defined as conduct that 
``departs so far from the standards of ordinary care that it is very 
difficult to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was 
doing.'' See Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
O. Orders Entered for the Purpose of Igniting Momentum in the Market
    A ``momentum ignition'' strategy occurs when a market participant 
initiates a series of Orders or trades in an attempt to ignite a price 
movement in that market or a related market.
    This conduct may be deemed to violate Rule 620 if it is determined 
the intent was to disrupt the orderly conduct of trading or the fair 
execution of transactions, if the conduct was reckless, or if the 
conduct distorted the integrity of the determination of settlement 
prices. Further, this activity may violate Rule 620(b)(i) if the 
momentum igniting Orders were intended to be canceled before execution, 
or if the Orders were intended to mislead others. If the conduct was 
intended to create artificially high or low prices, this may also 
constitute a violation of Rule 603 (Market Manipulation).
P. ``Flipping'' Orders
    Flipping is defined as the entry of Orders or trades for the 
purpose of causing turns of the market and the creation of volatility 
and/or instability.
    A ``flip'' Order typically has two main characteristics. First, it 
is an aggressor Order (i.e., an Order that takes liquidity). Second, 
shortly before the entry of the Order, the market participant cancels 
an Order(s) on the opposite side of the market, typically at the same 
price as the aggressor Order. The market participant, for example, has 
flipped from offering to bidding at the same price. The Exchange 
recognizes there are many variables that can cause a market participant 
to change that market participant's perspective of the market. This 
Rule, therefore, does not prohibit a market participant from changing 
that market participant's bias from short (long) to long (short).
    Flipping activity may, however, be disruptive to the marketplace. 
For example, repeated instances of a market participant entering 
flipping Orders that are each large enough to turn the market (i.e., 
being of a sufficient quantity to sweep the entire quantity on the book 
at the particular price level and create a new best bid or best offer 
price with any remaining quantity from the aggressor flipping Order) 
can be disruptive to the orderly conduct of trading or the fair 
execution of transactions. In considering whether this conduct violates 
Rule 620, the Exchange would consider, among other factors:
     The impact on other market participants;
     price fluctuations;
     market conditions in the impacted market(s) and related 
markets;
     the participant's activity in related markets;
     whether the flip involved the cancellation of a large 
sized Order(s) relative to the existing bid or offer depth; and
     whether repeated flipping turns the market back and forth 
(e.g., the first flip turns the market in favor of the offer (bid) and 
the second flip turns the market in favor of the bid (offer)).
Q. Cancelling an Order Via the Exchange's Self-Trade Prevention 
Functionality or Other Self-Match Prevention Technology
    The means by which an Order is cancelled, in and of itself, is not 
an indicator of whether an Order violates Rule 620. The use of self-
trade prevention functionality in a manner that causes a disruption to 
the market may constitute a violation of Rule 620. Further, if the 
resting Order that was cancelled was non-bona fide ab initio, it would 
be considered to have been entered in violation of Rule 620.
R. Type of Pre-Open Activity Prohibited by Rule 620
    Orders entered during the pre-opening period and opening rotation 
period must be entered for the purpose of executing bona fide 
transactions upon the opening of the market.
    The entry and cancellation of Orders during the pre-opening period 
and opening rotation period for the purpose of either manipulating the 
EOP or attempting to identify the depth of the order book at different 
price levels is prohibited and may be deemed a violation of Rule 620 or 
other rules.
    Other activity related to the pre-opening period may also be 
considered disruptive, including but not limited to the entry of orders 
prior to the commencement of the pre-opening period in an attempt to 
``time'' the price-time priority queue for Trade at Settlement 
(``TAS'') transactions, or other similar purposes.
S. Orders Entered Into the CBOE System for the Purpose of Testing, Such 
as To Verify a Connection to the CBOE System or a Data Feed From the 
CBOE System
    The entering of an Order(s) without the intent to execute a bona 
fide transaction, including for the purpose of verifying connectivity 
or checking a data feed, is not permissible. CFE provides a testing 
environment and test symbols in CBOE Command for TPHs to use for the 
purpose of testing.
T. Creation or Execution of User-Defined Spreads for the Purposes of 
Deceiving or Disadvantaging Other Market Participants
    Trading Privilege Holders are not permitted to attempt to create 
any user-defined spreads (i.e., spreads created by Trading Privilege 
Holders on their own) in the CBOE System. If a Trading Privilege Holder 
would like a type of CFE spread to be created that is not already 
available in the CBOE System, the Trading Privilege Holder should 
contact the Help Desk to request creation of the spread.
    Market participants are reminded that knowingly creating and/or 
trading spreads in a manner intended to deceive or unfairly 
disadvantage other market participants is considered a violation of 
Rule 620.
U. Examples of Prohibited Activity
    The following is a non-exhaustive list of various examples of 
conduct that may be found to violate Rule 620.
     A market participant enters one or more Orders to generate 
selling or buying interest in a specific contract. By entering the 
Orders, often in substantial size relative to the contract's overall 
pending order volume, the market participant creates a misleading and 
artificial appearance of buy- or sell-side pressure. The market 
participant places these large Orders at or near the best bid and offer 
prevailing in the market at the time. The market participant benefits 
from the market's reaction by either receiving an execution on an 
already resting Order on the opposite side of the book from the larger 
Order(s) or by obtaining an execution by entering an opposing side 
Order subsequent to the market's reaction. Once the smaller Orders are 
filled, the market participant cancels the large Orders that had been 
designed to create the false appearance of market activity. Placing a 
bona fide Order on one side of the market while entering Order(s) on 
the other side of the market without intention to trade those Orders 
violates Rule 620.
     A market participant places buy (or sell) Orders that the 
market participant

[[Page 47545]]

intends to have executed, and then immediately enters numerous sell (or 
buy) Orders for the purpose of attracting interest to the resting 
Orders. The market participant placed these subsequent Orders to induce 
or trick other market participants to execute against the initial 
Order. Immediately after the execution against the resting Order, the 
market participant cancels the open Orders.
     A market participant enters one or more Orders in a 
particular market (Market A) to identify algorithmic activity in a 
related market (Market B). Knowing how the algorithm will react to 
order activity in Market A, the participant first enters an Order or 
Orders in Market B that the market participant anticipates would be 
filled opposite the algorithm when ignited. The participant then enters 
an Order or Orders in Market A for the purpose of igniting the 
algorithm and creating momentum in Market B. This results in the market 
participant's Order(s) in Market B being filled opposite the algorithm. 
This conduct violates Rule 620(b)(i), as the Orders in Market A were 
not intended to be executed, and Rule 620(b)(ii), as the Orders in 
Market A were intended to mislead participants in related markets. If 
the conduct resulted in a disruption to the orderly execution of 
transactions, it may also violate Rule 620(b)(iv).
     A market participant enters a large aggressor buy (sell) 
Order at the best offer (bid) price, trading opposite the resting sell 
(buy) Orders in the book, which results in the remainder of the 
original aggressor Order resting first in the queue at the new best bid 
(offer). As the market participant anticipated and intended, other 
participants join the market participant's best bid (offer) behind the 
market participant in the queue. The market participant then enters a 
large aggressor sell (buy) Order into the market participant's now 
resting buy (sell) Order at the top of the book. The market 
participant's use of CFE's Self-Trade Prevention functionality or other 
wash blocking functionality cancels the market participant's resting 
buy (sell) Order, such that market participant's aggressor sell (buy) 
Order then trades opposite the Orders that joined and were behind the 
market participant's best bid (offer) in the book.
     A market participant places large quantity Orders during 
the pre-opening period in an effort to artificially increase or 
decrease the EOP with the intent to attract other market participants. 
Once others join the market participant's bid or offer, the market 
participant cancels the market participant's Orders shortly before the 
opening.
     During the pre-opening period, a market participant enters 
a large Order priced at a bid higher than the existing best bid or at 
an offer lower than the existing best offer, and continues to 
systematically enter successive Orders priced further through the book 
until it causes a movement in the best bid or best offer. These Orders 
are subsequently cancelled. The market participant continues to employ 
this strategy on both sides of the market for the purpose of 
determining the depth of support at a specific price level for the 
product before the market opens.
     A market participant enters a large number of messages for 
the purpose of overloading the quotation systems of other market 
participants with excessive market data messages to create 
``information arbitrage.''
     A market participant enters messages for the purpose of 
creating latencies in the market or in information dissemination by the 
Exchange for the purpose of disrupting the orderly functioning of the 
market.
    As with the amendments to CFE Rule 620, these amendments are 
consistent with similar rules and guidance established and provided by 
other DCMs regarding disruptive practices.\8\
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    \8\ See supra note 6.
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2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent 
with Section 6(b) of the Act,\9\ in general, and furthers the 
objectives of Sections 6(b)(5) \10\ and 6(b)(7) \11\ in particular in 
that it is designed:
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    \9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(7).
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     To prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,
     to promote just and equitable principles of trade,
     to foster cooperation and coordination with persons 
engaged in facilitating transactions in securities, and
     to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a 
free and open market and a national market system, and in general, to 
protect investors and the public interest.
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change would 
strengthen its ability to carry out its responsibilities as a self-
regulatory organization by providing further guidance regarding the 
type of activity that is prohibited under CFE Rule 620. CFE Rule 620 
currently prohibits the disruptive trading practices that were added to 
the CEA by the Dodd-Frank Act and are codified under Section 4c(a)(5) 
of the CEA. The proposed rule change sets forth particular types of 
disruptive order entry and trading practices that are prohibited under 
Rule 620, lists various factors that the Exchange may consider in 
assessing whether conduct violates Rule 620, and provides a non-
exhaustive list of examples of activity considered by CFE to be in 
violation of Rule 620. By providing this further guidance, the proposed 
rule change not only will provide greater clarity to market 
participants regarding prohibited disruptive trading practices but also 
will strengthen the Exchange's disciplinary program for these types of 
violative behavior. As a result, the Exchange believes that the 
proposed rule change is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory 
because the amendments regarding disruptive trading practices will 
apply equally to all market participants. In addition, the proposed 
rule change will promote consistency in guidance for market 
participants regarding disruptive trading practices by paralleling 
similar guidance provided by other DCMs.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    CFE does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any 
burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of 
the purposes of the Act, in that the rule change will enhance CFE's 
ability to carry out its responsibilities as a self-regulatory 
organization. The proposed rule change is not designed to address any 
aspect of competition, whether between the Exchange and its 
competitors, or among market participants. Instead, the proposed rule 
change is designed to make CFE's disruptive trading practice rules 
consistent with the existing rules and guidance published by other 
DCMs.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the 
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The proposed rule change will become effective on July 30, 2015. At 
any time within 60 days of the date of effectiveness of the proposed 
rule change, the Commission, after consultation with the CFTC, may 
summarily abrogate the proposed rule

[[Page 47546]]

change and require that the proposed rule change be refiled in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) of the Act.\12\
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    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-CFE-2015-005 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CFE-2015-005. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All 
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does 
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-CFE-2015-005, and should be 
submitted on or before August 28, 2015.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\13\
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    \13\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(73).
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Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-19382 Filed 8-6-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


