
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 14 (Thursday, January 22, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3287-3292]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00970]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-74073; File No. SR-OCC-2014-812]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Advance Notice Concerning Extended and Overnight 
Trading Sessions

January 15, 2015.
    Pursuant to Section 806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act entitled the Payment, 
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 \1\ (``Payment, 
Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act'') and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 \2\ notice is hereby given 
that on December 12, 2014, The Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'') 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the

[[Page 3288]]

advance notice as described in Items I and II below, which Items have 
been prepared by OCC.\3\ The Commission is publishing this notice to 
solicit comments on the advance notice from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(n)(1)(i).
    \3\ OCC initially filed a similar advance notice on September 
17, 2014. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73343 (October 14, 
2014), 79 FR 62684 (October 20, 2014), (SR-OCC-2014-805). OCC 
withdrew that advance notice on October 28, 2104. Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 73710 (December 1, 2014), 79 FR 72225 
(December 5, 2014), (SR-OCC-2014-805).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Advance 
Notice

    This advance notice is filed by OCC in connection with a proposed 
change to its operations concerning the clearance of confirmed trades 
executed in extended and overnight trading sessions (hereinafter, 
``overnight trading sessions'') offered by exchanges for which OCC 
provides clearance and settlement services.

II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Advance Notice

    In its filing with the Commission, OCC included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the advance notice and 
discussed any comments it received on the advance notice. The text of 
these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV 
below. OCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections (A) and (B) 
below, of the most significant aspects of these statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Advance Notice 
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments on the advance notice were not and are not 
intended to be solicited with respect to the advance notice and none 
have been received.

(B) Advance Notices Filed Pursuant to Section 806(e) of the Payment, 
Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act

Description of Change
    This advance notice is being filed in connection with a proposed 
change to OCC's operations concerning the clearance of confirmed trades 
executed in overnight trading sessions offered by exchanges for which 
OCC provides clearance and settlement services. OCC currently clears 
overnight trading activity for CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC (``CFE'').\4\ 
The total number of trades submitted to OCC from overnight trading 
sessions is nominal, typically less than 3,000 contracts per session. 
However, OCC has recently observed an industry trend whereby exchanges 
are offering overnight trading sessions beyond traditional hours. 
Exchanges offering overnight trading sessions have indicated that such 
sessions benefit market participants by providing additional price 
transparency and hedging opportunities for products traded in such 
sessions, which, in turn, promotes market stability.\5\ In light of 
this trend, OCC proposes to implement a framework for clearing trades 
executed in such sessions that includes: (1) Qualification criteria 
used to approve clearing members for overnight trading sessions, (2) 
systemic controls to identify trades executed during overnight trading 
sessions by clearing members not approved for such sessions, (3) 
enhancements to OCC's overnight monitoring of trades submitted by 
exchanges during overnight trading sessions, (4) enhancements to OCC's 
credit controls with respect to monitoring clearing members' credit 
risk during overnight trading sessions, including procedures for 
contacting an exchange offering overnight trading sessions in order to 
invoke use of the exchange's kill switch, and (5) taking appropriate 
disciplinary action against clearing members who attempt to clear 
during overnight trading session without first obtaining requisite 
approvals. These changes (described in greater detail below) are 
designed to reduce and mitigate the risks associated with clearing 
trades executed in overnight trading sessions. In addition, the only 
products that will be eligible for overnight trading sessions are index 
options and index futures products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ ELX Futures LP (``ELX'') previously submitted overnight 
trading activity to OCC, but currently does not submit trades from 
overnight trading sessions to OCC. OCC will re-evaluate ELX's risk 
controls in the event ELX re-institutes its overnight trading 
sessions.
    \5\ See CFE-2014-010 at http://cfe.cboe.com/publish/CFErulefilings/SR-CFE-2014-010.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC's standards for determining whether to provide clearing 
services for overnight trading sessions offered by an exchange and the 
implementation of a framework are designed to work in conjunction with 
the risk controls of the exchanges that offer overnight trading 
sessions. OCC would confirm an exchange's risk controls as well as its 
staffing levels as they relate to overnight trading sessions to 
determine if OCC may reasonably rely on such risk controls to reduce 
risk presented to OCC by the exchange's overnight trading sessions. 
Such exchange risk controls will consist of: (1) Price reasonability 
checks, (2) controls to prevent orders from being executed beyond a 
certain percentage (determined by the exchange) from the initial 
execution price, (3) activity based protections which focus on risk 
beyond price, such as a high number of trades occurring in a set period 
of time, and (4) kill switch capabilities, which may be initiated by 
the exchange and can cancel all open quotes or all orders of a 
particular participant. OCC believes that confirming the existence of 
applicable pre-trade risk controls as well as overnight staffing at the 
relevant exchanges is essential to mitigating risks presented to OCC 
from overnight trading sessions.\6\ Providing clearing services to 
exchanges offering such sessions is consistent with OCC's mission to 
provide market participants with clearing and risk management solutions 
that respond to changes in the marketplace and may result in increased 
cleared contract volume.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Comparable controls are applied to futures and future option 
trades executed in overnight trading sessions currently cleared by 
OCC, although such controls have been implemented by clearing 
futures commission merchants (``clearing FCMs'') pursuant to 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') Regulation 1.73, 
which also requires such clearing FCMs to monitor for adherence to 
such controls during regular and overnight trading sessions. OCC 
believes that it may reasonably rely on such regulation to reduce 
risk presented to OCC during futures markets overnight trading 
sessions. See 17 CFR 1.73. OCC also confirmed CFE maintains kill 
switch capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Qualification Criteria
    In order to mitigate risks associated with clearing for overnight 
trading sessions, clearing members that participate in such trading 
sessions would be required to provide contact information to OCC for 
operational and risk personnel available to be contacted by OCC during 
such sessions. In addition, OCC would require that clearing members 
participating in an overnight trading session to post additional margin 
in a designated account in order to mitigate against the risk that OCC 
cannot draft a clearing member's bank account during an overnight 
trading session.\7\ OCC would also adopt a procedure whereby, on a 
quarterly basis, it confirms its record of clearing members eligible 
for overnight trading sessions with a similar record maintained by 
exchanges offering such overnight trading sessions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Clearing members will be required to designate a firm 
account to ensure that OCC has a general lien on the assets in the 
account and can use them to satisfy any obligation of the clearing 
member to OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to providing operational and risk contacts, under OCC 
Rule 201, each clearing member is required to maintain facilities for 
conducting

[[Page 3289]]

business with OCC, and a representative of the clearing member 
authorized in the name of the clearing member to take all action 
necessary for conducting business with OCC is required to be available 
at the facility during such hours as may be specified from time-to-time 
by OCC. Similarly, OCC Rules 214(c) and (d) require clearing members to 
ensure that they have the appropriate number of qualified personnel and 
to maintain the ability to process anticipated volumes and values of 
transactions. OCC would use this existing authority to require clearing 
members trading during overnight trading sessions to maintain 
operational and risk staff that may be contacted by OCC during such 
sessions.
    OCC would impose upon clearing members qualified to participate in 
overnight trading sessions additional margin requirement in an amount 
of the lesser of $10 million or 10% of the clearing member's net 
capital (``Additional Margin''), which would be equal to the first 
monitoring risk threshold (described below) and which would be 
collected the morning before each overnight trading sessions. Clearing 
members must identify the proprietary account that would be charged the 
Additional Margin amount. The Additional Margin requirement is intended 
to provide OCC with additional margin assets should a clearing member's 
credit risk increase during overnight trading sessions.\8\ OCC proposes 
to adopt a process whereby each morning OCC Financial Risk Management 
staff would assess the Additional Margin requirement against clearing 
members eligible to participate in overnight trading sessions. Clearing 
members that do not have sufficient excess margin on deposit with OCC 
to meet the Additional Margin amount would be required to deposit 
additional funds with OCC to satisfy the Additional Margin 
requirement.\9\ This process would be adopted under existing rule 
authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Clearing members approved for overnight trading sessions who 
do not meet the Additional Margin requirement for a given overnight 
trading session would be treated like a clearing member not approved 
overnight trading sessions, as described below.
    \9\ Under OCC Rule 601, OCC has the discretion to fix the margin 
requirement for any account at an amount that it deems necessary or 
appropriate under the circumstances to protect the interests of 
clearing members, OCC and the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, OCC also would confirm that an exchange offering 
overnight trading sessions has adopted a procedure whereby such 
exchange would contact OCC when a trader requests trading privileges 
during overnight trading sessions. The purpose of this contact is to 
verify that the trader's clearing firm (i.e., the OCC clearing member) 
is approved for overnight trading sessions. If the applicable OCC 
clearing member is not approved for overnight trading sessions, then 
the clearing member must receive OCC's approval for overnight trading 
sessions, or the exchange would not provide the trader trading 
privileges during overnight trading sessions. Moreover, OCC would 
confirm that an exchange offering overnight trading sessions has 
implemented a procedure to periodically (i.e., quarterly) validate its 
record of approved clearing firms against OCC's record of clearing 
members approved for overnight trading sessions. Any discrepancies 
between the two records would be promptly resolved by either the 
clearing member obtaining approval at OCC for overnight trading 
sessions, or by the exchange revoking the clearing firm's trading 
privileges for overnight trading sessions.
Systemic Controls
    OCC plans to implement system changes so that trades submitted to 
OCC during overnight trading sessions that have been executed by 
clearing members not approved for such trading sessions would be 
reviewed by OCC staff after acceptance but before being processed (each 
such trade a [sic] being a ``Reviewed Trade''). OCC would contact the 
submitting exchange regarding each Reviewed Trade in order to determine 
if the trade is a valid trade. If the exchange determines that the 
Reviewed Trade was in error such that, as provided in Article VI, 
Section 7(c), new or revised trade information is required to properly 
clear the transaction, OCC expects the exchange would instruct OCC to 
disregard or ``bust'' the trade. If the exchange determines that the 
Reviewed Trade was not in error, then OCC would clear the Reviewed 
Trade and take appropriate disciplinary action against the non-approved 
clearing member, as described below. OCC believes that clearing the 
Reviewed Trade is appropriate in order to avoid potentially harming the 
clearing member approved for overnight trading sessions that is on the 
opposite side of the transaction.
Overnight Monitoring
    OCC plans to implement additional overnight monitoring in order to 
better monitor clearing members' credit risk during overnight trading 
sessions. Such monitoring of credit risk is similar to existing OCC 
practices concerning futures cleared during overnight trading hours and 
includes automated processes within ENCORE to measure, by clearing 
member: (i) The aggregate mark-to-market amounts of a clearing member's 
positions, including positions created during overnight trading, based 
on current prices using OCC's Portfolio Revaluation system, (ii) the 
aggregate incremental margin produced by all positions resulting from 
transactions executed during overnight trading, and (iii) with respect 
to options cleared during overnight trading hours, the aggregate net 
trade premium positions resulting from trades executed during overnight 
trading (each of these measures being a ``Credit Risk Number''). Hourly 
credit reports would be generated by ENCORE containing the Credit Risk 
Numbers expressed in terms of both dollars and, except for the mark-to-
market position values, as a percentage of net capital for each 
clearing member trading during overnight trading sessions. The Credit 
Risk Numbers are the same information used by OCC staff to evaluate 
clearing member exposure during regular trading hours and, in addition 
to OCC's knowledge of its clearing members' businesses, are effective 
measures of the risk presented to OCC by each clearing member. OCC's 
Operations staff would review such reports as they are generated and, 
in the event that any of the Credit Risk Numbers for positions 
established by a clearing member during an overnight trading session 
exceeds established thresholds, staff would alert OCC's Market Risk 
staff \10\ of the exceedance in accordance with established procedures, 
as described below. Market Risk staff would follow a standardized 
process concerning such exceedances, including escalation to OCC's 
management, if required by such process. Given the nominal volume of 
trades executed in overnight trading sessions that are presently 
submitted for clearance, no changes in current staffing levels that 
support overnight clearing activities is contemplated at this time, 
however, such staffing levels will be periodically assessed and 
adjusted, as appropriate. As part of the overnight clearing activities, 
OCC has, however, designated an on-call Market Risk duty officer who 
would be responsible for reviewing issues that arise when clearing for 
overnight trading session and determining what measures to be taken as 
well as additional escalation, if necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ OCC's Member Services staff will also receive alerts in 
order to contact clearing members as may be necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to OCC's escalation thresholds, if any Credit Risk 
Number of a clearing member approved for overnight trading sessions is 
$10 million

[[Page 3290]]

or more, or any Credit Risk Number equals 10% or more of the clearing 
member's net capital, OCC's Operations staff would be required to 
provide email notification to Market Risk and Member Services staff. If 
any Credit Risk Number of a clearing member not approved for overnight 
trading sessions is $10 million or more, or any Credit Risk Number 
equals 10% or more of the clearing member's net capital, OCC's 
Operations would also notify Market Risk and Member Services staff as 
well as its senior management. Such departments would take action to 
prevent additional trading by the non-approved clearing member, 
including contacting the exchange to invoke use of the exchange's kill 
switch.
    If any Credit Risk Number of a clearing member approved for 
overnight trading sessions is $50 million or more, or equals 25% or 
more of the clearing member's net capital, Operations staff would be 
required to contact, by telephone: (i) Market Risk and Member Services, 
(ii) the applicable exchange for secondary review, and (iii) the 
clearing member's designated contacts. The on-call Market Risk duty 
officer would also consider if additional action is necessary, which 
may include contacting a designated executive officer in order to issue 
an intra-day margin call, increase the clearing member's margin 
requirement in order to prevent the withdrawal of a specified amount of 
excess margin collateral, if any, the clearing member has on deposit 
with OCC or contacting the exchange in order to invoke use of its kill 
switch. If any Credit Risk Number is $75 million or more, or equals 50% 
or more of the clearing member's net capital, Operations staff would be 
required to contact, by telephone, Market Risk staff, the on-call 
Market Risk duty officer and a designated executive officer. Such 
officer would be responsible for reviewing the situation and 
determining whether to implement credit controls, which are described 
in greater detail below and include: issuing an intra-day margin call, 
increasing a clearing member's margin requirement in order to prevent 
the withdrawal of a specified amount of excess margin collateral, if 
any, the clearing member has on deposit with OCC, whether further 
escalation is warranted in order for OCC to take protective measures 
pursuant to OCC Rule 305, or contact the exchange in order to invoke 
use of its kill switch. OCC chose the above described escalation 
thresholds based on its analysis of historical overnight trading 
activity across the futures industry. OCC believes that these 
thresholds strike an appropriate balance between effective risk 
monitoring and operational efficiency.
Credit Controls
    In order to address credit risk associated with trading during 
overnight trading sessions, and as described above, OCC would collect 
Additional Margin from clearing members as well as monitor and analyze 
the impact that positions established during such sessions have on a 
clearing member's overall exposure. Should the need arise based on 
threshold breaches described above, and pursuant to OCC Rule 609, OCC 
may require the deposit of additional margin (``intra-day margin'') by 
any clearing member that increases its incremental risk as a result of 
trading activity during overnight trading sessions. Accordingly, a 
clearing member's positions established during such sessions will be 
incorporated into OCC's intra-day margin process. Should a clearing 
member's exposure significantly increase while settlement banks are not 
open to process an intra-day margin call, OCC has the authority under 
OCC Rule 601 to increase a clearing member's margin requirement which 
would restrict its ability to withdraw excess margin collateral. The 
implementation of these measures is discussed more fully below.
    In the event that a clearing member's exposure during overnight 
trading sessions causes a clearing member to exceed OCC's intra-day 
margin call threshold for overnight night trading sessions, OCC would 
require the clearing member to deposit intra-day margin equal to the 
increased incremental risk presented by the clearing member. 
Specifically, if a clearing member has a total risk charge \11\ 
exceeding 25% (a reduction of the usual figure of 50%), as computed 
overnight by OCC's STANS system, and a loss of greater than $50,000 
from an overnight trading session(s), as computed by Portfolio 
Revaluation, OCC would initiate an intra-day margin call. OCC would 
know at approximately 8:30 a.m. (Central Time) if an intra-day margin 
call on a clearing member would be initiated based on breaches of these 
thresholds. This ``start of business'' margin call is in addition to 
daily margin OCC collects from clearing members pursuant to OCC Rule 
605, any intra-day margin call that OCC may initiate as a result of 
regular trading sessions or special margin call that OCC may initiate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Total risk charge is a number derived from STANS outputs 
and is the sum of expected shortfall, stress test charges and any 
add-on charges computed by STANS. STANS is OCC's proprietary margin 
methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to, or instead of, requiring additional intra-day 
margin, OCC Rule 601 \12\ and OCC's Clearing Member Margin Call Policy 
work together to authorize Market Risk staff to increase a clearing 
member's margin requirement which may be in an amount equal to an 
intra-day margin call.\13\ (Any increased margin requirement will 
remain in effect until the next business day.) This action would 
immediately prevent clearing members from withdrawing any excess margin 
collateral (in the amount of the increased margin requirement) the 
clearing member has deposited with OCC. With respect to clearing trades 
executed in overnight trading sessions, and in the event OCC requires 
additional margin from a clearing member, Market Risk staff may use 
increased margin requirements as a means of collateralizing the 
increase in incremental risk a clearing member incurred during such 
sessions without having to wait for banks to open to process an intra-
day margin call.\14\ Such action may be taken by OCC instead of or in 
addition to issuing an intra-day margin call depending on the amount of 
excess margin a clearing member has on deposit with OCC and the amount 
of the incremental risk presented by such clearing member. The 
expansion of OCC's intra-day margin call process as described in the 
preceding paragraph, including OCC's ability to manually increase 
clearing members' margin requirements, would mitigate the risk that OCC 
is under-collateralized as a result of overnight trading hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ In addition, OCC Rule 601 provides OCC with the authority 
to fix the margin requirement for any account or any class of 
cleared contracts at such amount as it deems necessary or 
appropriate under the circumstances to protect the respective 
interests of clearing members, OCC and the public.
    \13\ Clearing members frequently deposit margin at OCC in excess 
of requirements.
    \14\ Clearing members would be able to substitute the locked-up 
collateral during normal time frames (i.e., 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
(Central Time) for equity securities).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, a designated executive officer may call an exchange 
offering overnight trading sessions to invoke use of its kill switch. 
The kill switch would prevent a clearing member (or the market 
participant clearing through a clearing member) from executing trades 
on the exchange during a given overnight trading session or, if needed, 
stop all trading during a given overnight trading session. Finally, 
pursuant to OCC Rule 305, the Executive Chairman or the President of 
OCC, in certain situations, has the authority to impose limitations and 
restrictions on the transactions, positions and activities of

[[Page 3291]]

a clearing member. This authority would be used, as needed, in the 
event a clearing member accumulates significant credit risk during 
overnight trading sessions, or a clearing member's activities during 
such trading sessions otherwise warrant OCC taking protective action.
Rule Enforcement Actions
    In order to deter clearing members from attempting to participate 
in overnight trading sessions without authorization as well as 
appropriately enforce the above described processes, OCC would ensure 
that any attempt by a clearing member to participate in overnight 
trading sessions without first obtaining the necessary approval would 
result in the initiation of a rule enforcement action against such 
clearing member. As described above, clearing members not approved for 
overnight trading sessions who trade during such overnight sessions 
would have their trades reviewed by OCC staff. Clearing members who 
attempted to participate in overnight trading sessions that did not 
obtain the necessary approval to do so would be subject to a minor rule 
violation fine.\15\ In addition, if a clearing member's operational or 
risk contacts for overnight trading sessions were unavailable had OCC 
attempted to contact such individuals, the clearing member would be 
subject to a minor rule violation fine. OCC has existing processes in 
place to monitor for clearing member violations of OCC's rules and such 
processes would also apply to clearing member activity during overnight 
trading sessions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See OCC Rule 1201(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Anticipated Effect on and Management of Risk
    Clearing transactions executed in overnight trading sessions may 
increase risk presented to OCC due to the period of time between trade 
acceptance and settlement, the staffing levels at clearing members 
during such trading sessions and the deferment of executing intra-day 
margin calls until banking settlement services are operational. 
However, OCC would expand its risk management practices in order to 
mitigate these risks by implementing, and expanding, the various tools 
discussed above. For example, OCC would enhance its monitoring 
practices in order to closely monitor clearing members' credit risk 
from trades placed during overnight trading sessions as well as 
implement processes so that OCC takes appropriate action when such 
credit risk exceeds certain limits. OCC would also use its existing 
authority to require adequate clearing member staffing during such 
trading sessions, in order to mitigate the operational risk associated 
with clearing members trading while they are not fully staffed. These 
risk management functions would work in tandem with risk controls, 
including the implementation of kill switch capabilities, adopted by 
the exchanges operating overnight trading sessions or by clearing FCMs, 
as applicable.
    In addition to the above, OCC would adapt existing processes so 
that such processes can be used to mitigate risk associated with 
overnight trading sessions. Specifically, OCC would exercise its 
authority to issue margin calls, and prevent the withdrawal of excess 
margin on deposit at OCC, as a result of activity during such trading 
sessions as a means of reducing risk. OCC also would implement a 
systemic function to identify trades executed during overnight trading 
sessions by clearing members not approved for such trading sessions for 
further review prior to allowing such trades to proceed further through 
OCC's clearance processing, and therefore mitigate the risk of losses 
from erroneous trades. Finally, OCC would be able to assess the need to 
take protective action pursuant to OCC Rule 305 as a result of clearing 
member activity during such sessions.
Consistency With the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act
    OCC believes that the proposed change is consistent with Section 
805(b)(1) of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act \16\ 
because the proposed change would promote robust risk management.\17\ 
OCC believes that the proposed changes described above would provide 
OCC with the tools necessary to mitigate risks that may occur as a 
result of overnight trading sessions. Specifically, OCC would implement 
risk monitoring processes designed to identify increases in credit risk 
presented to OCC as a result of such sessions as well as implement 
changes designed to mitigate operational risk associated with overnight 
trading sessions. In addition, OCC would adapt certain existing 
practices to accommodate these overnight trading sessions including its 
margin call process and its authority to take protective action 
pursuant to OCC Rule 305. These practices are designed to identify and 
mitigate risks that may be presented to OCC as a result of overnight 
trading sessions and thereby promote robust risk management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
    \17\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Advance Notice and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The proposed change may be implemented if the Commission does not 
object to the proposed change within 60 days of the later of (i) the 
date that the Commission receives the notice of proposed change, or 
(ii) the date the Commission receives any further information it 
requests for consideration of the notice. The clearing agency shall not 
implement the proposed change if the Commission has any objection to 
the proposed change.
    The Commission may extend the period for review by an additional 60 
days if the proposed change raises novel or complex issues, subject to 
the Commission providing the clearing agency with prompt written notice 
of the extension. A proposed change may be implemented in less than 60 
days from the date the advance notice is filed, or the date further 
information requested by the Commission is received, if the Commission 
notifies the clearing agency in writing that it does not object to the 
proposed change and authorizes the clearing agency to implement the 
proposed change on an earlier date, subject to any conditions imposed 
by the Commission.
    The clearing agency shall post notice on its Web site of proposed 
changes that are implemented.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed 
change, is consistent with the Payment, Clearing and Settlement 
Supervision Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following 
methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-OCC-2014-812 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2014-812. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use

[[Page 3292]]

only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the 
Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the advance notice that are filed with the 
Commission, and all written communications relating to the advance 
notice between the Commission and any person, other than those that may 
be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 
U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. 
Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying 
at the principal office of OCC and on OCC's Web site http://www.theocc.com/components/docs/legal/rules_and_bylaws/sr_occ_14_812.pdf.
    All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission 
does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You 
should submit only information that you wish to make available 
publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2014-812 
and should be submitted on or before February 6, 2015.

    By the Commission.
Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-00970 Filed 1-21-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


