
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 14 (Tuesday, January 22, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4482-4494]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-01108]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-68641; File No. SR-BX-2012-063]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc.; Notice of 
Filing of Amendment No. 1, and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of 
Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To Amend the 
Listing Rules for Compensation Committees To Comply With Rule 10C-1 
Under the Act and Make Other Related Changes

January 11, 2013.

I. Introduction

    On September 25, 2012, NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc. (``BX'' or ``Exchange'') 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission''), 
pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a proposed rule change to 
modify the Exchange's rules for compensation committees of listed 
issuers to comply with Rule 10C-1 under the Act and make other related 
changes. The proposed rule change was published for comment in the 
Federal Register on October 15, 2012.\3\ The Commission subsequently 
extended the time period in which to either approve the proposed rule 
change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings 
to determine whether to disapprove the proposed rule change, to January 
13, 2013.\4\ The Commission received no comment letters on the proposed 
rule change.\5\ On January 8, 2013, the Exchange filed Amendment No. 1 
to the proposed rule change.\6\ This order approves the proposed rule 
change, as modified by Amendment No. 1 thereto, on an accelerated 
basis.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68018 (October 9, 
2012), 77 FR 62547 (``Notice'').
    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68313 (November 28, 
2012), 77 FR 71853 (December 4, 2012).
    \5\ The Commission received eight comments on a substantially 
similar proposal by The Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC (``Nasdaq'') by 
parties that did not specifically comment on the BX filing, and 
received a response letter from Nasdaq on these comment letters. See 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68013 (October 9, 2012), 77 FR 
62563 (October 15, 2012) (Notice of File No. SR-NASDAQ-2012-109) 
(``Nasdaq Proposal'') and comment letters relating to the Nasdaq 
Proposal. See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68640 
(January 11, 2013) (``Nasdaq Approval Order''). The Nasdaq Approval 
Order contains a discussion of the comments received on the Nasdaq 
Proposal and Nasdaq's response. See also Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 68639 (January 11, 2013) (File No. SR-NYSE-2012-49) 
(``NYSE Approval Order'').
    \6\ In Amendment No. 1, BX: (a) Added language to proposed Rule 
5605(d)(3) to set forth in detail the requirements of Rule 10C-
1(b)(2)-(4) regarding the authority of a compensation committee to 
retain compensation advisers, the requirement that a listed company 
fund such advisers, and the independence assessment required to be 
made before selecting or receiving advice from such advisers, rather 
than incorporating these details by reference as in the original 
proposal, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text; (b) revised 
the dates by which companies currently listed on BX will be required 
to comply with the new rules, see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying 
text; (c) revised the phase-in schedule for companies that cease to 
be Smaller Reporting Companies to comply with the full range of the 
new requirements, see infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text; (d) 
added a preamble to the new rules clarifying that, during the 
transition periods until the new rules apply, a company must 
continue to comply with the corresponding provisions, if any, in the 
current rules, see infra note 76; and (e) revised the proposed rules 
to state that the independence assessment of compensation advisers 
required of compensation committees does not need to be conducted 
for advisers whose roles are limited to those entitled to an 
exception from the adviser disclosure rules under Item 
407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K. See infra notes 59-60 and 
accompanying text.
    In Amendment No. 1 the Exchange also made conforming changes to 
the Purpose section of the proposal, provided explanations for the 
revisions, and clarified certain matters, see, e.g., infra notes 58, 
114, and 119 and accompanying text; and also added, as Exhibit 3 to 
the proposal, the form that it will provide for companies to certify 
their compliance with the rules. The Exchange states that, while no 
comments were submitted regarding its proposed rule change, some of 
the changes contained in Amendment No. 1 were made in response to 
comments submitted on Nasdaq's substantially similar proposal. See 
supra note 5 and infra note 123.
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II. Description of Proposed Rule Change

A. Background: Rule 10C-1 Under the Act

    On March 30, 2011, to implement Section 10C of the Act, as added by 
Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (``Dodd-Frank Act''),\7\ the Commission proposed 
Rule 10C-1 under the Act,\8\ which directs each national securities 
exchange (hereinafter, ``exchange'') to prohibit the listing of any 
equity security of any issuer, with certain exceptions, that does not 
comply with the rule's requirements regarding compensation committees 
of listed issuers and related requirements regarding compensation 
advisers. On June 20, 2012, the Commission adopted Rule 10C-1.\9\
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    \7\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1900 (2010).
    \8\ See Securities Act Release No. 9199, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 64149 (March 30, 2011), 76 FR 18966 (April 6, 2011) 
(``Rule 10C-1 Proposing Release'').
    \9\ See Securities Act Release No. 9330, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 67220 (June 20, 2012), 77 FR 38422 (June 27, 2012) 
(``Rule 10C-1 Adopting Release'').
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    Rule 10C-1 requires, among other things, each exchange to adopt 
rules providing that each member of the compensation committee \10\ of 
a listed issuer must be a member of the board of directors of the 
issuer, and must otherwise be independent.\11\ In determining the 
independence standards for members of compensation committees of listed 
issuers, Rule 10C-1 requires the exchanges to consider relevant 
factors, including, but not limited to: (a) The source of compensation 
of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other 
compensatory fee paid by the issuer to the director (hereinafter, the 
``Fees Factor''); and (b) whether the director is affiliated with the 
issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an affiliate of a subsidiary of 
the issuer (hereinafter, the ``Affiliation Factor'').\12\
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    \10\ For a definition of the term ``compensation committee'' for 
purposes of Rule 10C-1, see Rule 10C-1(c)(2)(i)-(iii).
    \11\ See Rule 10C-1(a) and (b)(1).
    \12\ See id. See also Rule 10C-1(b)(1)(iii)(A), which sets forth 
exemptions from the independence requirements for certain categories 
of issuers. In addition, an exchange may exempt a particular 
relationship with respect to members of a compensation committee 
from these requirements as it deems appropriate, taking into 
consideration the size of an issuer and any other relevant factors. 
See Rule 10C-1(b)(1)(iii)(B).
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    In addition, Rule 10C-1 requires the listing rules of exchanges to 
mandate that compensation committees be given the authority to retain 
or obtain the advice of a compensation adviser, and have direct 
responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the 
work of any compensation adviser they retain.\13\ The exchange rules 
must also provide that each listed issuer provide for appropriate 
funding for the payment of reasonable compensation, as determined by 
the compensation committee, to any compensation adviser retained by the 
compensation committee.\14\ Finally, among other things, Rule 10C-1 
requires each exchange to provide in its rules that the compensation 
committee of each listed issuer may select a compensation consultant, 
legal counsel or other adviser to the compensation committee only after 
taking into consideration six factors specified in Rule 10C-1,\15\ as 
well as any other

[[Page 4483]]

factors identified by the relevant exchange in its listing 
standards.\16\
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    \13\ See Rule 10C-1(b)(2).
    \14\ See Rule 10C-1(b)(3).
    \15\ See Rule 10C-1(b)(4). The six factors, which BX proposes to 
set forth explicitly in its rules, are specified in the text 
accompanying note 55, infra.
    \16\ Other provisions in Rule 10C-1 relate to exemptions from 
the rule and a requirement that each exchange provide for 
appropriate procedures for a listed issuer to have a reasonable 
opportunity to cure any defects that would be the basis for the 
exchange, under Rule 10C-1, to prohibit the issuer's listing.
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B. BX's Proposed Rule Change, as Amended

    To comply with Rule 10C-1, BX proposes to amend two sections of its 
rules \17\ concerning corporate governance requirements for companies 
listed on the Exchange: BX Venture Market Rule 5605, ``Boards of 
Directors and Committees,'' and Rule 5615, ``Exemptions from Certain 
Corporate Governance Requirements.'' In addition, BX proposes to make 
some other changes to its rules regarding compensation committees.\18\
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    \17\ References in this filing to BX Rules refer to the listing 
rules for the Exchange's BX Venture Market.
    \18\ While BX does not presently list any securities, its rules 
for the BX Venture Market have been approved by the Commission. BX 
is proposing to modify its compensation-related listing rules for 
this market, as required by Rule 10C-1.
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    To accomplish these changes, the Exchange proposes to replace 
current paragraph (d) of Rule 5605, entitled ``Independent Director 
Oversight of Executive Officer Compensation,'' with a new paragraph (d) 
entitled ``Compensation Committee Requirements.'' Current paragraph (d) 
provides that compensation of the executive officers of a listed 
company must be determined, or recommended to the company's board for 
determination, either by a compensation committee comprised solely of 
``Independent Directors'' \19\; or, as an alternative to a formal 
committee, by a majority of the board's Independent Directors in a vote 
in which only Independent Directors participate (``Alternative 
Option'').\20\
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    \19\ ``Independent Directors,'' as defined in BX Rule 5605(a)(2) 
and used herein, includes a two-part test for independence. The rule 
sets forth seven specific categories of directors who cannot be 
considered independent because of certain discrete relationships 
(``the bright-line tests''); and also provides that a listed 
company's board must make an affirmative determination that each 
independent director has no relationship that, in the opinion of the 
board, ``would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment 
in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.'' Id. See also 
the Interpretive Material to Rule 5605.
    \20\ The current rule also provides that the chief executive 
officer (``CEO'') may not be present during voting or deliberations 
regarding the CEO's own compensation. See Rule 5605(d)(1).
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1. Compensation Committee Composition and Independence Standards
    First, BX proposes that each listed company be required to have a 
compensation committee.\21\ The Alternative Option described above 
would be eliminated. In addition, BX proposes that the compensation 
committee be required to be composed of at least two members, each of 
whom must be an Independent Director as defined in BX's rules and also 
meet the additional independence requirements described below.\22\
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    \21\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(2).
    \22\ Id. For the definition of ``Independent Director, see supra 
note 19.
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    In discussing the proposed elimination of the Alternative Option, 
BX stated that it had considered whether the Alternative Option remains 
appropriate, ``given the heightened importance of compensation 
decisions in today's corporate governance environment.'' The Exchange 
concluded that ``there are benefits from a board having a standing 
committee dedicated solely to oversight of executive compensation.'' 
\23\ BX added that, since it does not currently have any listed 
companies, it does not believe that eliminating the Alternative would 
be unduly burdensome. In discussing the proposed requirement that the 
committee have at least two members, the Exchange stated that ``[g]iven 
the importance of compensation decisions to stockholders, BX believes 
that it is appropriate to have more than one director responsible for 
these decisions.'' \24\
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    \23\ See Notice, supra note 3, for the Exchange's more complete 
explanation of its reasons for the proposed change, including a 
discussion of whether eliminating the Alternative Option would pose 
an undue hardship on companies to be listed on the Exchange.
    \24\ See id. for the Exchange's more complete discussion of the 
proposed size requirement.
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    BX also proposes that a compensation committee must have a formal 
written charter.\25\ Under this provision, a listed company must 
certify that it has adopted such a charter and that its compensation 
committee will review and reassess the adequacy of that charter on an 
annual basis.\26\
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    \25\ See proposed BX Rule 5605(d)(1). As discussed further in 
Section II.B.3., a Smaller Reporting Company may adopt either a 
formal written compensation committee charter or a board resolution 
that specifies the committee's responsibilities and authority.
    \26\ The Commission notes that Rule 10C-1 does not require a 
listed issuer specifically to have a charter. As noted above, 
however, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text, Rule 10C-1 
does require a compensation committee to have certain specified 
authority and responsibilities. Often, listed issuers will specify 
authority and responsibilities of this kind in a charter in any 
case. The proposed rule requires them to have a charter, and to 
include this authority and set of responsibilities in addition to 
the required content discussed infra at text accompanying notes 27-
29.
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    The charter must specify the scope of the committee's 
responsibilities and how it carries out those responsibilities, 
including structure, processes, and membership requirements.\27\ It 
must specify the committee's responsibility for determining or 
recommending to the board for determination, the compensation of the 
CEO and all other executive officers of the company, and provide that 
the CEO may not be present during voting or deliberations on his or her 
compensation.\28\ In addition, the charter must specify the committee's 
responsibilities and authority set forth in the Exchange's rules with 
respect to retaining its own advisers; appointing, compensating, and 
overseeing such advisers; considering certain independence factors 
before selecting advisers; and receiving funding from the company to 
engage them, which are discussed in detail below.\29\
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    \27\ Proposed Rule 5605(d)(1)(A). BX states that this 
requirement is copied from the Exchange's similar listing rule 
relating to audit committee charters, Rule 5605(c)(1), except that 
the annual review and reassessment requirement is written 
prospectively, rather than retrospectively. The proposed rule change 
includes a conforming revision to make the audit committee review 
and reassessment prospective, as well. See Notice.
    \28\ Proposed Rule 5605(d)(1)(B)-(C). BX states that these 
provisions are based upon BX's current compensation-related listing 
rules, except that the Alternative Option discussed above is not 
available under the proposed rule change. See supra note 21 and 
accompanying text.
    \29\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(1)(D) and infra notes 49-58 and 
accompanying text. Because Smaller Reporting Companies are not 
required to comply with the provisions relating to compensation 
advisers in proposed BX Rule 5605(d)(3), see infra notes 62-67, 
their charters or board resolutions are not required to reflect 
these responsibilities.
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    BX's rules currently require each member of a listed company's 
compensation committee to be an Independent Director as defined in BX 
Rule 5605(a)(2).\30\ Rule 10C-1, as discussed above, provides that 
exchange standards must require compensation committee members to be 
independent, and further provides that each exchange, in determining 
independence for this purpose, must consider relevant factors, 
including the Fees Factor and Affiliation Factor described above. In 
its proposal, BX discussed its consideration of these factors,\31\ and 
proposed the following \32\:
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    \30\ See supra note 19.
    \31\ Notice, supra note 3.
    \32\ These additional factors would not apply to the selection 
of members of the compensation committee of a Smaller Reporting 
Company. See infra note 64.
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    With respect to the Fees Factor, BX proposes to adopt a provision 
stating that each member of a compensation committee of a listed 
company must not accept directly or indirectly any consulting, advisory 
or other compensatory fee from the listed

[[Page 4484]]

company or any of its subsidiaries.\33\ In discussing its review of its 
current listing rules and the Fees Factor, BX noted that its rules for 
audit committees of listed companies, in meeting the criteria of Rule 
10A-3 under the Act, prohibit an audit committee member from accepting 
such fees. The Exchange concluded that ``there is no compelling 
justification to have different standards for audit and compensation 
committee members'' with respect to the Fees Factor.\34\
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    \33\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(2)(A).
    \34\ See Notice.
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    As currently permitted under BX's rules for audit committee 
members, however, the proposed rule would permit a compensation 
committee member to receive fees for his or her membership on the 
committee, on the company's board, or on any other board committee.\35\ 
In addition, a compensation committee member would be permitted to 
receive fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan 
(including deferred compensation) for prior service with the company, 
provided that such compensation is not contingent in any way on 
continued service.\36\
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    \35\ See supra note 33.
    \36\ Id.
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    With respect to the Affiliation Factor, BX proposes that, in 
determining whether a director is eligible to serve on the compensation 
committee, the company's board also must consider whether the director 
is affiliated with the company, a subsidiary of the company, or an 
affiliate of a subsidiary of the company to determine whether such 
affiliation would impair the director's judgment as a member of the 
compensation committee.\37\ In discussing its review of its current 
rules and its consideration of the Rule 10C-1 requirement in this 
area,\38\ the Exchange noted that its rules for audit committees of 
listed companies, in meeting the criteria of Rule 10A-3 under the Act, 
prohibit an audit committee member from being an affiliated person of 
the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. The Exchange said that it 
concluded, however, that ``such a blanket prohibition would be 
inappropriate for compensation committees.'' \39\ BX believes that ``it 
may be appropriate for certain affiliates, such as representatives of 
significant stockholders, to serve on compensation committees since 
their interests are likely aligned with those of other stockholders in 
seeking an appropriate executive compensation program.'' \40\
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    \37\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(2)(A).
    \38\ See Notice.
    \39\ Id.
    \40\ Id.
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    Although Rule 10C-1 requires that exchanges consider ``relevant 
factors'' not limited to the Fees and Affiliation Factors, BX states 
that, after reviewing its current and proposed listing rules, it 
concluded that these rules are sufficient to ensure the independence of 
compensation committee members. The Exchange therefore determined not 
to propose further independence requirements.\41\
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    \41\ Id.
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    BX proposes a cure period for a failure of a listed company to meet 
its committee composition requirements. The proposed cure period is the 
same as the cure period currently provided in BX's rules for 
noncompliance with the requirement to have a majority independent 
board.\42\ Under the provision, if a listed company fails to comply 
with the compensation committee composition requirements due to one 
vacancy, or if one compensation committee member ceases to be 
independent due to circumstances beyond the member's reasonable 
control, the company must regain compliance by the earlier of the next 
annual shareholders meeting or one year from the occurrence of the 
event that caused the noncompliance.\43\ The proposed rule also 
requires a company relying on this provision to provide notice to BX 
immediately upon learning of the event or circumstance that caused the 
noncompliance.
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    \42\ See Rule 5605(b)(1)(A) regarding the majority board 
requirement.
    \43\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(4).
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    However, if the annual shareholders meeting occurs no later than 
180 days following the event that caused the noncompliance, the company 
instead has 180 days from the event to regain compliance. As explained 
by BX, this provides a company at least 180 days to cure noncompliance 
and would typically allow a company to regain compliance in connection 
with its next annual meeting.\44\
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    \44\ See Notice.
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    BX's current rules relating to compensation committees include an 
exception that allows a director who is not an Independent Director to 
be appointed to such a committee under exceptional and limited 
circumstances, as long as that director is not a current officer, an 
employee, or the family member of an officer or employee.\45\ The 
exception applies, however, only if the committee is comprised of at 
least three members and the company's board determines that the 
individual's membership on the committee is required by the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders.\46\ A compensation 
committee member may not serve longer than two years under this 
exception, and a company relying on the exception must make certain 
disclosures on its Web site or in its proxy statement regarding the 
nature of the relationship and the reasons for the determination.
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    \45\ See current Rule 5605(d)(3).
    \46\ See id.
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    BX proposes to retain the exception under the proposed rule change, 
and to permit a listed company to avail itself of the allowance even 
for a director who fails the new requirements regarding the Fees and 
Affiliation Factors,\47\ with an additional change pertaining to the 
exception, generally. Nasdaq recently amended an identical provision 
for exceptional and limited circumstances in its rules to allow a 
company to rely on the exception for a non-Independent Director who is 
a family member of a non-executive employee of the company, and BX 
proposes to make the same revision.\48\
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    \47\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(2)(b).
    \48\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67468 (July 19, 
2012), 77 FR 43618 (July 25, 2012) (File No. SR-NASDAQ-2012-062). 
Nasdaq made the same change to its exceptional and limited 
circumstances exception for audit committee members, and BX also 
proposes, in its filing, to make a conforming change to its 
identical exception for audit committee members. BX notes that under 
both the current and proposed versions of the exception for audit 
committee members, a company could not rely on the exception for a 
director who does not meet the criteria set forth in Section 
10A(m)(3) of the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder to allow a 
director to serve on the audit committee. See 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m)(3) 
and 17 CFR. 240.10A-3(b)(1).
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    The Exchange believes that this exception is an important means to 
allow companies flexibility as to board and committee membership and 
composition in unusual circumstances. The Exchange further believes 
that the exception may be particularly important for smaller companies.
2. Authority of Committees to Retain Compensation Advisers; Funding; 
and Independence of Compensation Advisers
    In its proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1,\49\ BX 
proposes to fulfill the requirements imposed by Rule 10C-1(b)(2)-(4) 
under the Act by setting forth those requirements in full in its own 
rules.\50\

[[Page 4485]]

Thus, proposed BX Rule 5605(d)(3), as amended, provides that the 
compensation committee of a listed company may, in its sole discretion, 
retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant, legal counsel 
or other adviser.\51\ Further, the compensation committee shall be 
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight of 
the work of any compensation consultant, legal counsel and other 
adviser retained by the compensation committee.\52\ In addition, the 
listed company must provide for appropriate funding, as determined by 
the compensation committee, for payment of reasonable compensation to a 
compensation consultant, legal counsel or any other adviser retained by 
the compensation committee.\53\
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    \49\ See supra note 6. BX's proposal as submitted originally 
incorporated the requirements of Rule 10C-1(b)(2)-(4) by reference. 
The Exchange amended the proposal to set forth those requirements 
explicitly.
    \50\ Rule 10C-1(b)(4) does not include the word ``independent'' 
before ``legal counsel'' and requires an independence assessment for 
any legal counsel to a compensation committee, other than in-house 
counsel. In setting forth the requirements of Rule 10C-1(b)(2) and 
(3), BX has deleted the word ``independent'' prior to ``legal 
counsel'' so as to avoid confusion.
    \51\ See Item 9 of Amendment No. 1.
    \52\ See id. The proposal, as amended, also includes a 
provision, derived from Rule 10C-1, stating that nothing in these 
rules may be construed: (i) To require the compensation committee to 
implement or act consistently with the advice or recommendations of 
the compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser to the 
compensation committee; or (ii) to affect the ability or obligation 
of a compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in 
fulfillment of the duties of the compensation committee. Id.
    \53\ See id.
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    Proposed BX Rule 5605(d)(3), as amended, also sets forth 
explicitly, in accordance with Rule 10C-1, that the compensation 
committee may select, or receive advice from, a compensation 
consultant, legal counsel or other adviser to the compensation 
committee, other than in-house legal counsel, only after taking into 
consideration the six factors set forth in Rule 10C-1 regarding 
independence assessments of compensation advisers.\54\
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    \54\ See Rule 10C-1(b)(4).
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    The six factors, which are set forth in full in the proposed rule, 
are: (i) The provision of other services to the issuer by the person 
that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel or other 
adviser; (ii) the amount of fees received from the issuer by the person 
that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel or other 
adviser, as a percentage of the total revenue of the person that 
employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser; 
(iii) the policies and procedures of the person that employs the 
compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser that are 
designed to prevent conflicts of interest; (iv) any business or 
personal relationship of the compensation consultant, legal counsel or 
other adviser with a member of the compensation committee; (v) any 
stock of the issuer owned by the compensation consultant, legal counsel 
or other adviser; and (vi) any business or personal relationship of the 
compensation consultant, legal counsel, other adviser or the person 
employing the adviser with an executive officer of the issuer.\55\
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    \55\ Rule 10C-1(b)(4)(i)-(vi).
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    Proposed Rule 5605(d)(3), as amended, also clarifies that nothing 
in the rule requires a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other 
compensation adviser to be independent, only that the compensation 
committee consider the enumerated independence factors before 
selecting, or receiving advice from, a compensation adviser.\56\ It 
further clarifies that compensation committees may select, or receive 
advice from, any compensation adviser they prefer, including ones that 
are not independent, after considering the six independence factors set 
forth in the rule.\57\ In Amendment No. 1, BX emphasizes that a 
compensation committee is not required to retain an independent 
compensation adviser; rather, a compensation committee is required only 
to conduct the independence analysis described in Rule 10C-1 before 
selecting a compensation adviser.\58\
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    \56\ See id.
    \57\ See id.
    \58\ See Item 2 of Amendment No. 1.
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    In Amendment No. 1, BX also added language to the provision 
regarding the independence assessment of compensation advisers \59\ to 
state that the compensation committee is not required to conduct an 
independence assessment for a compensation adviser that acts in a role 
limited to the following activities for which no disclosure is required 
under Item 407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K: (a) Consulting on any 
broad-based plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or 
operation, in favor of executive officers or directors of the company, 
and that is available generally to all salaried employees; and/or (b) 
providing information that either is not customized for a particular 
issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed 
by the adviser, and about which the adviser does not provide advice.
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    \59\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(3), as amended by Amendment No. 
1.
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    BX states that this exception copies language from Item 
407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K, which provides a limited exception to 
the Commission's requirement for a registrant to disclose any role of 
compensation consultants in determining or recommending the amount and 
form of a registrant's executive and director compensation.\60\ The 
Exchange believes that its proposed exception from the independence 
assessment requirement is appropriate because the types of services 
excepted do not raise conflict of interest concerns, and noted that 
this is the same reason for which the Commission excluded these types 
of services from the disclosure requirement in Item 407(e)(3)(iii) of 
Regulation S-K.\61\
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    \60\ See 17 CFR 229.407(e)(3)(iii).
    \61\ See Amendment No. 1.
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3. Application to Smaller Reporting Companies
    Rule 10C-1 includes an exemption for smaller reporting companies 
from all the requirements included within the rule.\62\ Consistent with 
this Rule 10C-1 provision, BX, as a general matter, proposes that a 
smaller reporting company, as defined in Rule 12b-2 under the Act 
(hereinafter, a ``Smaller Reporting Company''), not be subject to the 
new requirements set forth in its proposal specifically to comply with 
Rule 10C-1.\63\ Thus, BX proposes not to require Smaller Reporting 
Companies to comply with the enhanced independence standards for 
members of compensation committees relating to compensatory fees and 
affiliation.\64\
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    \62\ See supra Section II.A.
    \63\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(5).
    \64\ See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 37.
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    In addition, a Smaller Reporting Company will not be required to 
include in its compensation committee charter (or, as discussed below, 
in a board resolution) a grant of authority to the committee to retain 
compensation advisers, a requirement that the company fund such 
advisers, and a requirement that the committee consider independence 
factors before selecting such advisers. As stated by BX, the exception 
for Smaller Reporting Companies also means that the compensation 
committees of such companies are not required to review and reassess 
the adequacy of their charters on an annual basis.\65\ The

[[Page 4486]]

Exchange believes that this approach will minimize new costs imposed on 
Smaller Reporting Companies and allow them some flexibility not allowed 
for larger companies.
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    \65\ See Notice. In addition, a Smaller Reporting Company, like 
other listed companies, will be required to certify that it has 
adopted a formal written compensation committee charter (or, if it 
so chooses, a board resolution) that specifies the scope of the 
committee's responsibilities and its responsibility for determining 
or recommending to the board for determination the compensation of 
the CEO and other executive officers. See supra notes 27-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    BX proposes not to exclude a Smaller Reporting Company, however, 
from its proposal to require a listed company to have, and to certify 
that it has and will continue to have, a compensation committee of at 
least two members, each of whom must be an Independent Director as 
defined in the Exchange's Rule 5605(a)(2).\66\ In its discussion of the 
rules from which Smaller Reporting Companies are not exempt, BX notes 
that its current listing rules regarding compensation committees do not 
provide any exemptions for Smaller Reporting Companies.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(5). See also proposed 
interpretive material IM-5605-6. As noted above, listed companies 
other than Smaller Reporting Companies and other exempted issuers 
must comply with the additional independence requirements for 
compensation committee members set forth in proposed BX Rule 
5605(d)(2)(A). See discussion in Section II.B.1., supra.
    \67\ See Notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Exemptions
    BX proposes that its existing exemptions from the Exchange's 
compensation-related listing rules currently in place, which are set 
forth in BX Rule 5615, apply also to the new requirements of the 
proposed rule change. These include exemptions for asset-backed issuers 
and other passive issuers, limited partnerships, management investment 
companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(``registered management investment companies'').\68\ BX states that 
each of these categories has ``traditionally been exempt from BX's 
compensation-related listing rules,'' and believes that the reasons for 
the exemptions apply to the new requirements, as well.\69\
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    \68\ See Rule 5615(a)(1), (4), and (5).
    \69\ See Notice. See also discussion below at note 79, infra, 
for transition periods for companies that currently use the 
Alternative Option and do not have compensation committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Asset-backed issuers and other passive issuers have been exempted, 
according to the Exchange, because they do not have a board of 
directors or persons acting in a similar capacity and their activities 
are limited to passively owning or holding (as well as administering 
and distributing amounts in respect of) assets on behalf of or for the 
benefit of the holders of the listed securities. BX further states that 
the structure of limited partnerships requires that public investors 
have limited rights and the general partners make all significant 
decisions about the operation of the limited partnership, and, as such, 
limited partners do not expect to have a voice in the operations of the 
partnership. Registered management investment companies, the Exchange 
states, are already subject to a pervasive system of federal regulation 
in certain areas of corporate governance.
    Finally, BX proposes to add exemptions to its compensation 
committee rules for cooperatives and controlled companies, which BX 
proposes to define as companies ``of which more than 50% of the voting 
power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group 
or another company.'' Certain member-owned cooperatives that list their 
preferred stock are required to have their common stock owned by their 
members, and BX believes that because of their unique structure and the 
fact that they do not have a publicly traded class of common stock, 
they should be exempt from its compensation committee rules.\70\ The 
proposed exemption for controlled companies, BX states, recognizes that 
majority shareholders, including parent companies, have the right to 
select directors and control certain key decisions, such as executive 
officer compensation, by virtue of their ownership rights.\71\ The 
Exchange further states that the proposed exemptions for cooperatives 
and controlled companies are modeled after the similar exemptions in 
Nasdaq's rules.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See Notice.
    \71\ See id. BX further notes that controlled companies also are 
exempt from all of the requirements of Rule 10C-1. See Rule 10C-
1(b)(5)(ii).
    \72\ See Nasdaq Listing Rule 5615(a)(2), Nasdaq IM-5615-2, 
Nasdaq Listing Rule 5615(c) and Nasdaq IM-5615-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Concerning foreign private issuers, BX's current rules permit any 
such issuer to follow its home country practice in lieu of many of BX's 
corporate governance listing standards, including the Exchange's 
compensation-related listing rules.\73\ This allowance is granted on 
condition that the issuer discloses in its annual report filed with the 
Commission each requirement that it does not follow and describes the 
home country practice followed by the issuer in lieu of such 
requirement.\74\ BX proposes that this allowance continue to apply 
generally to the Exchange's compensation committee rules as revised by 
the instant proposal on the same condition, namely that the issuer 
discloses each requirement it does not follow and describes the home 
country practice it follows in lieu of such requirement. However, with 
respect, specifically, to the enhanced standards of independence for 
compensation committees (concerning fees received by members and their 
affiliations) BX proposes that, if a listed company follows its home 
country practice, it must additionally disclose in its annual report 
filed with the Commission the reasons why it does not have an 
independent compensation committee as set forth in these standards.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See Rule 5615(a)(3). Under BX's listing rules, ``foreign 
private issuer'' has the same meaning as under Rule 3b-4 under the 
Exchange Act. See Rule 5005(a)(18). BX's listing rules have 
traditionally provided qualified exemptions for foreign private 
issuers so that such issuers are not required to do any act that is 
contrary to a law, rule or regulation of any public authority 
exercising jurisdiction over such issuer or that is contrary to 
generally accepted business practices in the issuer's country of 
domicile, except to the extent such exemptions would be contrary to 
the public securities laws. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
48745 (November 4, 2003), 68 FR 64154, 64165 (November 12, 2003) 
(SR-NASD-2002-138).
    \74\ A Foreign Private Issuer that is not required to file its 
annual report with the Commission on Form 20-F may make this 
disclosure only on its Web site.
    \75\ As stated by BX, this proposed condition adopts the 
requirements of Rule 10C-1(b)(1)(iii)(A)(4), which provides an 
exemption from the independence requirements of Rule 10C-1 for a 
``foreign private issuer that discloses in its annual report the 
reasons that the foreign private issuer does not have an independent 
compensation committee.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Transition to the New Rules for Companies Listed as of the Effective 
Date \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ During the transition periods described herein, until a 
company is required to comply with a particular provision of the new 
rules, the company must continue to comply with the corresponding 
provision, if any, in the current rules, which are re-designated as 
Rule 5605A(d) and IM-5605A-6 (``Sunsetting Provisions). See 
Amendment No. 1, which added this clarification as a preamble to the 
new Rule 5605(d). The addition mirrors a similar statement already 
included in the original proposal as a preamble to the Sunsetting 
Provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change, as amended, provides that certain of the 
new requirements for listed companies will be effective on July 1, 
2013.\77\ Specifically, as of that date, listed companies will be 
required to comply with the provisions of the proposed rule change 
relating to the authority of a compensation committee to retain 
compensation consultants, legal counsel, and other compensation 
advisers; the authority to fund such advisers; and the responsibility 
of the committee to consider independence factors before selecting such 
advisers.\78\ To the extent a company does not yet have a compensation 
committee by that

[[Page 4487]]

date,\79\ these provisions will apply to the Independent Directors who 
determine, or recommend to the board for determination, the 
compensation of the CEO and all other executive officers of the 
company.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(6), as modified by Amendment No. 
1 to the proposed rule change. The original proposal provided that 
these provisions were to be effective immediately.
    \78\ Id.
    \79\ A listed company that does not currently have a 
compensation committee is not required to meet the requirement to 
have such a committee until the earlier of its first annual meeting 
after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014. See infra note 81 and 
accompanying text.
    \80\ While the provisions of the proposed rule change relating 
to the authority of a compensation committee to retain compensation 
advisers, the company's obligation to fund such advisers, and the 
responsibility of the committee to consider independence factors 
before selecting such advisers must be assigned to the committee or 
Independent Directors acting in lieu of a committee by July 1, 2013, 
the requirement that they be included in a written committee charter 
does not apply until a later date, as it is one of the remaining 
provisions of the new compensation committee rule subject to the 
transition period discussed below. Rule 5605(d)(6) states that 
companies should consider under state corporate law whether to grant 
the specific responsibilities and authority referenced through a 
charter, resolution or other board action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the remaining new provisions for compensation committees, 
the proposed rule change, as amended, provides that, in order to allow 
listed companies to make necessary adjustments in the course of their 
regular annual meeting schedule, they will have until the earlier of 
their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 
2014,\81\ to comply with these remaining provisions.\82\ A listed 
company must certify to BX, no later than 30 days after the final 
implementation deadline applicable to it, that it has complied with 
Rule 5605(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(6), as modified by Amendment No. 
1 to the proposed rule change. The original proposal had required 
these provisions to be implemented by the company's second annual 
meeting after the proposal was approved, but no later than December 
31, 2014.
    \82\ The remaining provisions subject to this schedule include 
IM-5605-6, which is new interpretive material to be included in the 
text of BX's rules that elaborates on the compensation committee 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Phase-In Schedules: IPOs; Companies that Lose their Exemptions; 
Companies Transferring From Other Markets
    BX's existing rules permit a company listing in connection with its 
initial public offering (``IPO'') to phase in its compliance with the 
Exchange's independence requirements for compensation and nominations 
committees,\83\ as follows: Each such committee must have one 
independent member at the time of listing; a majority of members must 
be independent within 90 days of listing; and all members of such 
committees must be independent within one year of listing. The same 
phase-in schedule is permitted for companies emerging from 
bankruptcy.\84\ BX proposes that this schedule continue to apply and 
that it remain the same with respect to the new compensation committee 
composition requirements set forth in the proposed rule change.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See Rule 5615(b)(1).
    \84\ See Rule 5615(b)(2).
    \85\ Specifically, the phase-in schedule would apply to proposed 
Rule 5605(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As stated by BX, this would mean that a company listing on the 
Exchange in connection with its IPO or a company emerging from 
bankruptcy would be permitted to phase in its compliance with the 
requirements that a compensation committee have at least two members, 
that these members be Independent Directors as defined in BX's rules, 
and that they meet the enhanced standards of independence for 
compensation committees (concerning fees received by members and their 
affiliations) adopted pursuant to Rule 10C-1.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See Notice for an illustration provided by BX of how the 
compensation committee composition requirement will interact with 
the minimum size requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since BX is proposing to add to its rules an exemption for 
controlled companies, as discussed above, BX also proposes to add a 
phase-in schedule for companies ceasing to be controlled companies. 
This proposed phase-in schedule is modeled after the similar phase-in 
schedule in Nasdaq's rules.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See Nasdaq Rule 5615(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, BX proposes minor clarifying changes to the phase-in 
schedule in its current listing rules for companies transferring from 
other markets, which will now applied to the new compensation-related 
rules under the proposal.\88\ Under this schedule, companies 
transferring from another national securities exchange with a 
substantially similar requirement shall be immediately subject to the 
compensation committee requirement, provided that such companies will 
be afforded the balance of any grace period afforded by the other 
market. Companies that are not subject to a substantially similar 
requirement at the time of listing on BX, such as a company quoted in 
the over-the-counter market, will be permitted to phase in compliance 
with the compensation committee composition requirements in Rule 
5605(d)(2)(A), including the requirement that compensation committee 
members be Independent Directors, the minimum size requirement and the 
additional eligibility requirements adopted pursuant to Rule 10C-1, on 
the same schedule as companies listing in connection with an initial 
public offering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See Rule 5615(b)(3). For example, BX proposes to delete the 
sentence in this provision stating that companies may choose not to 
adopt a compensation committee and may instead rely upon a majority 
of the Independent Directors to discharge these responsibilities, as 
BX has eliminated the Alternative Option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a company that was, but has ceased to be, a Smaller Reporting 
Company, the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, 
establishes a phase-in schedule based on certain dates relating to the 
company's change in status.\89\ Pursuant to Rule 12b-2 under the Act, a 
company tests its status as a Smaller Reporting Company on an annual 
basis as of the last business day of its most recently completed second 
fiscal quarter (the ``Determination Date''). A company with a public 
float of $75 million or more as of the Determination Date will cease to 
be a Smaller Reporting Company as of the beginning of the fiscal year 
following the Determination Date. Under BX's proposal, the day of this 
change in status is the beginning of the phase-in period (``Start 
Date'').\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(4), as amended. In the proposal 
as originally submitted, the phase-in schedule was to be the same as 
the phase-in schedule for a company listing in conjunction with an 
IPO, and was to start to run on the due date of the filing with the 
Commission in which the company is required to report that it is an 
issuer other than a Smaller Reporting Company. In Amendment No. 1, 
BX states that while the revised phase-in schedule is different from 
what it originally proposed, the amended version will allow 
companies sufficient time to adjust to the differences.
    \90\ See Amendment No. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By six months from the Start Date, the company will be required to 
comply with Rule 5605(d)(3), which sets forth the provisions described 
above relating to authority of a compensation committee to retain 
compensation advisers, the requirement that the company fund such 
advisers, and the requirement that the committee consider independence 
factors before selecting such advisers. By six months from the Start 
Date, the company will also be required to certify to BX (i) that it 
has complied with the requirement in Rule 5605(d)(1) to adopt a formal 
written compensation committee charter including the content specified 
in Rule 5605(d)(1)(A)-(D); \91\ and (ii) that it has complied, or 
within the applicable phase-in schedule will comply, with the 
additional requirements in Rule

[[Page 4488]]

5605(d)(2)(A) regarding compensation committee composition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See supra notes 26-29. This includes the provisions with 
which the company is now required to comply relating to authority of 
a compensation committee to retain compensation advisers, the 
requirement that the company fund such advisers, and the requirement 
that the committee consider independence factors before selecting 
such advisers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, as amended, a company that has ceased to be a 
Smaller Reporting Company will be permitted to phase in its compliance 
with the enhanced independence requirements for compensation committee 
members (relating to compensatory fees and affiliation) as follows: (i) 
One member must satisfy the requirements by six months from the Start 
Date; (ii) a majority of members must satisfy the requirements by nine 
months from the Start Date; and (iii) all members must satisfy the 
requirements by one year from the Start Date.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ During the phase-in schedule, a company that has ceased to 
be a Smaller Reporting Company will be required to continue to 
comply with the rules previously applicable to it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, because a Smaller Reporting Company is required to have a 
compensation committee and such committee is required to be comprised 
of at least two Independent Directors, a company that has ceased to be 
a Smaller Reporting Company will not be permitted to use the phase-in 
schedule for these requirements.
7. Conforming Changes and Correction of Typographical Errors
    Finally, BX proposes to make minor conforming changes to its 
requirements relating to audit and nominations committees and to 
correct certain typographical errors in its current corporate 
governance requirements.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ See Exhibit 5 of the proposed rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Discussion

    After careful review, the Commission finds that the BX proposal, as 
amended, is consistent with the Act and the rules and regulations 
thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange.\94\ In 
particular, the Commission finds that the amended proposed rule change 
is consistent with the requirements of Section 6(b) of the Act,\95\ as 
well as with Section 10C of the Act \96\ and Rule 10C-1 thereunder.\97\ 
Specifically, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change, as 
amended, is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\98\ which 
requires that the rules of a national securities exchange be designed, 
among other things, to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and 
practices; to promote just and equitable principles of trade; to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and 
a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the 
public interest; and not be designed to permit, among other things, 
unfair discrimination between issuers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ In approving the BX proposed rule change, as amended, the 
Commission has considered its impact on efficiency, competition and 
capital formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \95\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \96\ 15 U.S.C. 78j-3.
    \97\ 17 CFR 240.10C-1.
    \98\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The development and enforcement of meaningful listing standards for 
a national securities exchange is of substantial importance to 
financial markets and the investing public. Meaningful listing 
standards are especially important given investor expectations 
regarding the nature of companies that have achieved an exchange 
listing for their securities. The corporate governance standards 
embodied in the listing rules of national securities exchanges, in 
particular, play an important role in assuring that companies listed 
for trading on the exchanges' markets observe good governance 
practices, including a reasoned, fair, and impartial approach for 
determining the compensation of corporate executives. The Commission 
believes that the BX proposal will foster greater transparency, 
accountability, and objectivity in the oversight of compensation 
practices of listed issuers and in the decision-making processes of 
their compensation committees.
    In enacting Section 10C of the Act as one of the reforms of the 
Dodd-Frank Act,\99\ Congress resolved to require that ``board 
committees that set compensation policy will consist only of directors 
who are independent.'' \100\ In June 2012, as required by this 
legislation, the Commission adopted Rule 10C-1 under the Act, which 
directs the national securities exchanges to prohibit, by rule, the 
initial or continued listing of any equity security of an issuer (with 
certain exceptions) that is not in compliance with the rule's 
requirements regarding issuer compensation committees and compensation 
advisers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See supra note 7.
    \100\ See H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, Joint Explanatory Statement of 
the Committee of Conference, Title IX, Subtitle E ``Accountability 
and Executive Compensation,'' at 872-873 (Conf. Rep.) (June 29, 
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response, BX submitted the proposed rule change, which includes 
rules intended to comply with the requirements of Rule 10C-1 and 
additional provisions designed to strengthen the Exchange's listing 
standards relating to compensation committees. The Commission believes 
that the proposed rule change, as amended, satisfies the mandate of 
Rule 10C-1 and otherwise will promote effective oversight of its listed 
issuers' executive compensation practices, for the following reasons:

A. Compensation Committee Composition and Charter

    The Commission believes that it is reasonable for BX to require 
each company listed on its market to have a compensation committee. 
Although the Alternative Option to a formal committee in the Exchange's 
current rules could be useful to a small number of companies, the 
Commission agrees that the heightened importance of compensation 
decisions and oversight of executive compensation in today's 
environment, as well as the benefits that can result for investors of 
having a standing committee overseeing compensation matters, makes it 
appropriate and consistent with investor protection and the public 
interest under Section 6(b)(5) of the Act for BX to raise its standards 
in this regard. In making this determination the Commission is aware 
that Rule 10C-1 does not require listed companies of national 
securities exchanges to have a committee dedicated to compensation 
matters. Nevertheless, it is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act 
for BX to require all its listed companies to have an independent 
compensation committee overseeing executive compensation matters 
because of the importance and accountability to investors that such a 
formal structure can provide.\101\ The Commission also notes that some 
of the other requirements of Rule 10C-1 apply only when a company has a 
committee overseeing compensation matters.\102\ Thus, the requirement 
to have a compensation committee will trigger the additional 
protections for shareholders created by these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See, e.g., Section 303A.05 of the New York Stock Exchange 
(``NYSE'') Listed Company Manual, which does not provide for an 
Alternative Option as is currently allowed under BX rules.
    \102\ Under Rule 10C-1, the provisions of Rule 10C-1(b)(2)(i) 
(concerning the authority to retain or obtain the advice of a 
compensation adviser) and Rule 10C-1(b)(3) (concerning funding for 
compensation advisers) do not apply to members of the board of 
directors who oversee executive compensation matters on behalf of 
the board of directors outside a committee structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, the Commission believes that it is appropriate for BX to 
raise its standards to require the compensation committee of each 
issuer to have at least two members, instead of permitting a sole 
individual to be responsible for compensation policy, and that this 
furthers investor protection and the public interest in accordance with 
Section 6(b)(5). In light of the importance of compensation matters, 
the added thought and objectivity that is

[[Page 4489]]

likely to result when two or more individuals deliberate over how much 
a listed company should pay its executives, and what form such 
compensation should take, is consistent with the goal of promoting more 
accountability to shareholders on executive compensation matters. 
Moreover, given the complexity of executive compensation packages for 
corporate executives, it is reasonable for BX to require listed 
companies to have the input of more than one committee member on such 
matters. The Commission believes that the two-member requirement will 
not be an onerous burden for companies and should actually strengthen 
their review of compensation matters.
    The proposal by the Exchange to require a compensation committee to 
have a written charter detailing the committee's authority and 
responsibility is also consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act and 
will help listed companies to comply with the rules being adopted by BX 
to fulfill its mandate under Rule 10C-1. For example, as noted above, 
under BX's proposal the charter must set forth the compensation 
committee's responsibilities as well as the specific authority 
concerning compensation advisers as required under Rule 10C-1.\103\ A 
written charter will also provide added transparency for shareholders 
regarding how a company determines compensation and may clarify and 
improve the process itself. In this regard, the Commission notes that 
BX's requirement that listed companies review and reassess the adequacy 
of the compensation's committee charter on an annual basis will also 
help to ensure accountability and transparency on an on-going basis. 
The Commission also notes that several exchanges already require their 
compensation committees to have written charters.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ The Commission notes that the provision that is required 
in the charter regarding the authority of the committee to retain 
compensation advisers, the requirement that the company fund such 
advisers, and the requirement that the committee consider 
independence factors before selecting such advisers does not apply 
under the BX proposal to Smaller Reporting Companies. See supra 
notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
    \104\ See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 303A.05.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, under Rule 10C-1 the exchanges must adopt 
listing standards that require each member of a compensation committee 
to be independent, and to develop a definition of independence after 
considering, among other relevant factors, the source of compensation 
of a director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory 
fee paid by the issuer to the director as well as whether the director 
is affiliated with the issuer or any of its subsidiaries or their 
affiliates.
    The Commission notes, however, that Rule 10C-1 leaves it to each 
exchange to formulate a final definition of independence for these 
purposes, subject to review and final Commission approval pursuant to 
Section 19(b) of the Act. As the Commission stated in the Rule 10C-1 
Adopting Release, ``given the wide variety of issuers that are listed 
on exchanges, we believe that the exchanges should be provided with 
flexibility to develop independence requirements appropriate for the 
issuers listed on each exchange and consistent with the requirements of 
the independence standards set forth in Rule 10C-1(b)(1).'' \105\ This 
discretion comports with the Act, which gives the exchanges the 
authority, as self-regulatory organizations, to propose the standards 
they wish to set for companies that seek to be listed on their markets, 
consistent with the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, and, 
in particular, Section 6(b)(5) of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ As explained further in the Rule 10C-1 Adopting Release, 
prior to final approval, the Commission will consider whether the 
exchanges' proposed rule changes are consistent with the 
requirements of Section 6(b) and Section 10C of the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, in addition to retaining its existing independence 
standards that currently apply to board and compensation committee 
members, which include certain bright-line tests, BX has determined to 
adopt a definition that prohibits a director who receives compensation 
or fees from a listed company (other than, among other things, director 
compensation) from serving on the company's compensation 
committee.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ See supra note 33-36 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the Exchange noted in its proposal, under the bright-line tests 
of its general rules for director independence, directors can still be 
considered independent and serve on listed companies' compensation 
committees if they receive fees that do not exceed certain 
thresholds.\107\ This is in contrast to BX's requirements to serve on a 
listed company's audit committee, which bar a director who receives any 
compensatory fees from the company. In considering the Fees Factor 
under Rule 10C-1, BX stated that it did not see any compelling 
justification to set a different standard with respect to the 
acceptance of compensatory fees for members of the compensation 
committee than for members of audit committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ See BX Listing Rules 5605(a)(2)(B) and (D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the Exchange has complied with Rule 
10C-1 and Section 10C and that the proposed compensatory fee 
restriction, which is designed to protect investors and the public 
interest, is consistent with the requirements of Section 6(b)(5) of the 
Act. The Commission notes that the compensatory fee restriction will 
help to ensure that compensation committee members cannot receive 
directly or indirectly fees that could potentially influence their 
decisions on compensation matters.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ See Nasdaq Approval Order, supra note 5, for a discussion 
of the comments received on Nasdaq's substantially similar proposal 
on compensatory fees for compensation committee members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the Affiliation Factor of Rule 10C-1, BX has 
concluded that an outright bar from service on a company's compensation 
committee of any director with an affiliation with the company, its 
subsidiaries, and their affiliates is inappropriate for compensation 
committees. BX's existing independence standards will also continue to 
apply to those directors serving on the compensation committee. BX 
maintains that it may be appropriate for certain affiliates, such as 
representatives of significant stockholders, to serve on compensation 
committees ``since their interests are likely aligned with those of 
other stockholders in seeking an appropriate executive compensation 
program.'' The Commission believes that BX's approach of requiring 
boards only to consider such affiliations, rather than an outright ban 
on them, is reasonable and consistent with the requirements of the Act.
    The Commission notes that Congress, in requiring the Commission to 
direct the exchanges to consider the Affiliation Factor, did not 
declare that an absolute bar was necessary. Moreover, as the Commission 
stated in the Rule 10C-1 Adopting Release, ``In establishing their 
independence requirements, the exchanges may determine that, even 
though affiliated directors are not allowed to serve on audit 
committees, such a blanket prohibition would be inappropriate for 
compensation committees, and certain affiliates, such as 
representatives of significant shareholders, should be permitted to 
serve.'' \109\ In determining that BX's

[[Page 4490]]

affiliation standard is consistent with Sections 6(b)(5) and 10C under 
the Act, the Commission notes that BX's proposal requires a company's 
board, in selecting compensation committee members, to consider whether 
any such affiliation would impair a director's judgment as a member of 
the compensation committee. We believe that this should give companies 
the flexibility to assess whether a director who is an affiliate, 
including a significant shareholder, should or should not serve on the 
company's compensation committee, depending on the director's 
particular affiliations with the company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ Rule 10C-1 Adopting Release. At the same time, the 
Commission noted that significant shareholders may have other 
relationships with the listed company that would result in such 
shareholders' interests not being aligned with those of other 
shareholders and that the exchanges may want to consider these other 
ties between a listed issuer and a director. While the Exchange did 
not adopt any additional factors, the current affiliation standard 
would still allow a company to prohibit a director whose 
affiliations ``impair the director's judgment'' as a member of the 
committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As to consideration by BX of whether it should adopt any additional 
relevant independence factors, the Exchange stated that it reviewed its 
rules in the light of Rule 10C-1, but concluded that its existing rules 
together with its proposed rules are sufficient to ensure committee 
member independence. The Commission believes that, through this review, 
the Exchange has complied with the requirement that it consider 
relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the Fees and 
Affiliation Factors in determining its definition of independence for 
compensation committee members.
    The Commission notes that BX discussed in its proposal why it did 
not include, specifically, personal and business relationships as a 
factor. BX cites its standards for Independent Directors, generally, 
which require the board of directors of a listed issuer to make an 
affirmative determination that each such director has no relationship 
that, in the opinion of the board, would interfere with the exercise of 
independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a 
director.\110\ All compensation committee members must meet the general 
independence standards under BX's rules in addition to the two new 
criteria being adopted herein. The Commission therefore expects that 
boards, in fulfilling their obligations, will apply this standard to 
each such director's individual responsibilities as a board member, 
including specific committee memberships such as the compensation 
committee. The Commission further notes that compliance with BX's rules 
and the provision noted above would demand that a board consider 
personal and business relationships and related party transactions, 
among other factors that may be relevant, when evaluating the 
independence of compensation committee members and, for that matter, 
all Independent Directors on the board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ See BX Rule 5605(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    BX proposes that the ``Exceptional and Limited Circumstances'' 
provision in its current rules, which allows one director who fails to 
meet the Exchange's Independent Director definition to serve on a 
compensation committee under certain conditions, apply to the enhanced 
independence standards discussed above that the Exchange is adopting to 
comply with Rule 10C-1. The Commission believes that the discretion 
granted to each exchange by Rule 10C-1, generally, to determine the 
independence standards it adopts to comply with the Rule includes the 
leeway to carve out exceptions to those standards, as long as they are 
consistent with the Act. BX also cites, in justifying the exception, 
the provision of Rule 10C-1 that permits an exchange to exempt a 
particular relationship with respect to members of the compensation 
committee as the exchange determines is appropriate, taking into 
consideration the size of an issuer and any other relevant factors. In 
this respect, BX states that the flexibility afforded by the exception 
is particularly important for a smaller company.
    Moreover, the Commission approved as consistent with the Act the 
same exception and concept in the context of BX's current rules 
requiring each member of a compensation committee to be an Independent 
Director under Exchange Rule 5605(a)(2), as well in the context of the 
independence requirements for nominations committees and audit 
committees. Although the additional independence standards required by 
Rule 10A-3 for audit committees are not subject to this exception, the 
Commission notes that Rule 10C-1 grants exchanges more discretion than 
Rule 10A-3 when considering independence standards for compensation 
committee membership. The Commission also notes that a member appointed 
under the Exceptional and Limited Circumstances provision may not serve 
longer than two years. As BX notes, the additional change to allow a 
company to rely on the exception for a non-Independent Director who is 
a family member of a non-executive employee of the company--which the 
Exchange is proposing to adopt with respect to the Exceptional and 
Limited Circumstances provisions in both its compensation and audit 
committee rules--has already been approved by the Commission for the 
Nasdaq market as an allowance in the corporate governance listing 
standards of that exchange for both types of committees.\111\ The 
Commission therefore finds that applying this additional change in the 
BX rules for both committees is consistent with Section 6(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ Nasdaq's rules regarding the independence of audit, 
nominations, and compensation committee members have included an 
allowance for Exceptional and Limited Circumstances when a member 
ceases to be independent since 2003. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 48745 (November 4, 2003), 68 FR 64154 (November 12, 
2003). (The allowance did not apply to the audit committee standards 
required by Rule 10A-3. See id.) In June 2012, when Nasdaq amended 
its rules to allow the provision to be used when a family member of 
the director is an employee of the company, as long as the family 
member is not an executive officer, see supra note 48, the change 
was made to the rules for compensation committees in tandem with the 
similar change for the other two committees and the Commission found 
these changes consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act. The 
Commission notes that, when Nasdaq recently proposed additional 
independence standards for compensation committees to comply with 
Rule 10C-1, it proposed to extend the Exceptional and Limited 
Circumstances allowance, including the change regarding family 
members of non-executive officers, to the new requirements.
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B. Authority of Committees to Retain Compensation Advisers; Funding; 
and Independence of Compensation Advisers and Factors

    As discussed above, BX proposes to set forth explicitly in its 
rules the requirements of Rule 10C-1 regarding a compensation 
committee's authority to retain compensation advisers, its 
responsibilities with respect to such advisers, and the listed 
company's obligation to provide appropriate funding for payment of 
reasonable compensation to a compensation adviser retained by the 
committee.\112\ As such, the Commission believes these provisions meet 
the mandate of Rule 10C-1 and are consistent with the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ The Commission notes that, in Amendment No. 1, BX revised 
its proposed rule text to set forth these requirements in full.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the proposed rule change requires the 
compensation committee of a listed company to consider the six factors 
relating to independence that are enumerated in the proposal before 
selecting a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser to 
the compensation committee. The Commission believes that this provision 
is consistent with Rule 10C-1 and Section 6(b)(5) of the Act.
    The Commission notes that Rule 10C-1 includes an instruction that 
specifically requires a compensation committee to conduct the 
independence assessment with respect to ``any compensation consultant, 
legal counsel or other adviser that provides advice to the compensation 
committee, other than

[[Page 4491]]

in-house counsel,'' \113\ and thus requires an independence assessment 
with respect to regular outside legal counsel. To avoid any confusion, 
BX, in Amendment No. 1, added rule text that reflects this instruction 
in its own rules.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See Instruction to paragraph (b)(4) of Rule 10C-1.
    \114\ See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In approving this aspect of the proposal, the Commission notes that 
compliance with the rule requires an independence assessment of any 
compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser that provides 
advice to the compensation committee, and is not limited to advice 
concerning executive compensation. However, BX has proposed, in 
Amendment No. 1, to add language to the provision regarding the 
independence assessment of compensation advisers \115\ to state that 
the compensation committee is not required to conduct an independence 
assessment for a compensation adviser that acts in a role limited to 
the following activities for which no disclosure is required under Item 
407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K: (a) Consulting on any broad-based 
plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or operation, in favor 
of executive officers or directors of the company, and that is 
available generally to all salaried employees; and/or (b) providing 
information that either is not customized for a particular issuer or 
that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the 
adviser, and about which the adviser does not provide advice. BX states 
that this exception is based on Item 407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K, 
which provides a limited exception to the Commission's requirement for 
a registrant to disclose any role of compensation consultants in 
determining or recommending the amount and form of a registrant's 
executive and director compensation.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See proposed Rule 5605(d)(3), as amended by Amendment No. 
1.
    \116\ See 17 CFR 229.407(e)(3)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission views BX's proposed exception as reasonable, as the 
Commission determined, when adopting the compensation consultant 
disclosure requirements in Item 407(e)(3)(iii), that the two excepted 
categories of advice do not raise conflict of interest concerns.\117\ 
The Commission also made similar findings when it noted it was 
continuing such exceptions in the Rule 10C-1 Adopting Release, 
including excepting such roles from the new conflict of interest 
disclosure rule required to implement Section 10C(c)(2). The Commission 
also believes that the exception should allay some of the concerns 
raised by the commenters on other filings regarding the scope of the 
independence assessment requirement.\118\ Based on the above, the 
Commission believes these limited exceptions are consistent with the 
investor protection provisions of Section 6(b)(5) of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release 
No. 9089 (Dec. 19, 2009), 74 FR 68334 (Dec. 23, 2009), at 68348 
(``We are persuaded by commenters who noted that surveys that 
provide general information regarding the form and amount of 
compensation typically paid to executive officers and directors 
within a particular industry generally do not raise the potential 
conflicts of interest that the amendments are intended to 
address.'').
    \118\ See Nasdaq Approval Order and NYSE Approval Order, supra 
note 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As already discussed, nothing in the proposed rule prevents a 
compensation committee from selecting any adviser that it prefers, 
including ones that are not independent, after considering the six 
factors. In this regard, the Commission notes that, in Amendment No. 1, 
BX added specific rule language to clarify, among other things, that 
the rule does not require a compensation adviser to be independent, 
only that the compensation committee must consider the six independence 
factors before selecting or receiving advice from a compensation 
adviser.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As previously stated by the Commission in adopting Rule 10C-1, the 
requirement that compensation committees consider the independence of 
potential compensation advisers before they are selected should help 
assure that compensation committees of affected listed companies are 
better informed about potential conflicts, which could reduce the 
likelihood that they are unknowingly influenced by conflicted 
compensation advisers.\120\ The changes to BX's rules on compensation 
advisers should therefore benefit investors in BX listed companies and 
are consistent with the requirements in Section 6(b)(5) of the Act that 
rules of the exchange further investor protection and the public 
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See Rule 10C-1 Adopting Release, supra note 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, one commenter on the substantially similar proposal 
relating to the Rule 10C-1 requirements submitted by Nasdaq \121\ 
requested guidance ``on how often the required independence assessment 
should occur.'' \122\ This commenter observed that it ``will be 
extremely burdensome and disruptive if prior to each compensation 
committee meeting, the committee had to conduct a new assessment.'' The 
Commission anticipates that compensation committees will conduct such 
an independence assessment at least annually.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ See Nasdaq Approval Order, supra note 5.
    \122\ See id.
    \123\ See id.
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C. Application to Smaller Reporting Companies

    The Commission believes that the requirement for Smaller Reporting 
Companies, like all other listed companies, to have a compensation 
committee, composed solely of Independent Directors, with at least two 
members is reasonable and consistent with the protection of investors. 
The Commission notes that BX's rules for compensation committees have 
not made a distinction for Smaller Reporting Companies in the past. 
However, consistent with the exemption of Smaller Reporting Companies 
from Rule 10C-1, the Exchange has decided not to require Smaller 
Reporting Companies to meet its proposed new independence requirements 
as to compensatory fees and affiliation as well as the requirements 
concerning compensation advisers.
    BX will also require a Smaller Reporting Company to adopt a formal 
written compensation committee charter or board resolution that 
specifies the compensation committee's responsibilities and authority, 
but the company will not be required to review and reassess the 
adequacy of the charter or board resolution on an annual basis. This is 
different from the rules for other listed companies, which will be 
required to include the committee's responsibilities and authority 
specifically in a formal written charter and to review the charter's 
adequacy on an annual basis.
    The Commission believes that these provisions are consistent with 
the Act and do not unfairly discriminate between issuers. The 
Commission believes that, for similar reasons to those for which 
Smaller Reporting Companies are exempted from the Rule 10C-1 
requirements, it makes sense for BX to provide some flexibility to 
Smaller Reporting Companies regarding whether the compensation 
committee's responsibilities should be set forth in a formal charter or 
through board resolution. Further, because a Smaller Reporting Company 
does not need to include in its charter or board resolution the 
additional provisions regarding compensation advisers that BX is 
requiring all other listed companies to

[[Page 4492]]

include to comply with Rule 10C-1,\124\ and in view of the potential 
additional costs of an annual review, it is reasonable not to require a 
Smaller Reporting Company to conduct an annual assessment of its 
charter or board resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ As discussed supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text, the 
charter or board resolution of a Smaller Reporting Company will not 
be required to include, like the charters of other listed companies, 
a grant of authority to the committee to retain compensation 
advisers, a requirement that the company fund such advisers, and a 
requirement that the committee consider independence factors before 
selecting such advisers, because Smaller Reporting Companies are not 
subject to these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Opportunity to Cure Defects

    Rule 10C-1 requires the rules of an exchange to provide for 
appropriate procedures for a listed issuer to have a reasonable 
opportunity to cure any defects that would be the basis for the 
exchange, under Rule 10C-1, to prohibit the issuer's listing. Rule 10C-
1 also specifies that, with respect to the independence standards 
adopted in accordance with the requirements of the Rule, an exchange 
may provide a cure period until the earlier of the next annual 
shareholders meeting of the listed issuer or one year from the 
occurrence of the event that caused the member to be no longer 
independent.
    The Commission notes that the cure period that BX proposes for 
companies that fail to comply with the enhanced independence 
requirements designed to comply with Rule 10C-1 is not exactly the same 
as the cure period that the Rule sets forth as an option.\125\ The BX 
proposal adds the proviso that, if the annual shareholders meeting 
occurs no later than 180 days following the event that caused the 
noncompliance, the company instead has 180 days from the event to 
regain compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that, although the cure period proposed by 
BX gives a company more leeway in certain circumstances than the cure 
period suggested under Rule 10C-1, the accommodation is fair and 
reasonable. As a general matter, it allows all companies at least 180 
days to cure noncompliance. To give a specific example, the proposal 
would afford a company additional time to comply, than the Rule 10C-1 
option, where a member of the compensation committee ceases to be 
independent two weeks before the company's next annual meeting. The 
Commission further notes BX already has a similar cure period with 
respect to other BX corporate governance requirements.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ See supra note 42. The existing and proposed cure 
provisions in BX's rules mirror similar accommodations in Nasdaq's 
rules for issuers that lose an independent director or audit 
committee member. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54421 
(September 11, 2006), 71 FR 54698 (September 18, 2006) (Commission 
approval of File No. SR-NASDAQ-2006-011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes that Rule 10C-1 requires that an exchange 
provide a company an opportunity to cure any defects in compliance with 
any of the new requirements. The Commission believes that BX's general 
due process procedures for the delisting of companies that are out of 
compliance with the Exchange's rules satisfy this requirement.\127\ In 
particular, BX's rules provide that, unless continued listing of the 
company raises a public interest concern, when a company is deficient 
in compliance with, among other rules, Rule 5605, which includes the 
Exchange's standards for compensation committees, the listed company 
may submit a plan for compliance. The rules permit the Exchange's staff 
to extend the deadline for regaining compliance, under established 
parameters, and, if the company does not regain compliance within the 
time period provided by all applicable staff extensions--at which point 
the staff will immediately issue a determination indicating the date on 
which the company's securities will be suspended--a company can still 
request review by a hearings panel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ See, generally, BX Rule 5810.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that these general procedures for companies 
out of compliance with listing requirements, in addition to the 
particular cure provisions for failing to meet the new independence 
standards, adequately meet the mandate of Rule 10C-1 and also are 
consistent with investor protection and the public interest since they 
give a company a reasonable time period to cure non-compliance with 
these important requirements before they will be delisted.

E. Exemptions

    As discussed above, asset-backed issuers and other passive issuers, 
limited partnerships, and registered management investment companies 
are exempt from BX's existing rules relating to compensation, and BX 
proposes to extend the exemptions for these entities to the new 
requirements of the proposed rule change. The Commission notes that 
Rule 10C-1 allows exchanges to exempt from the listing rules adopted 
pursuant to Rule 10C-1 certain categories of issuers, as the national 
securities exchange determines is appropriate.\128\ The Commission 
believes that, given the specific characteristics of the aforementioned 
types of issuers,\129\ it is reasonable and consistent with Section 
6(b)(5) of the Act for the Exchange to exempt them from the new 
requirements. Similarly, the specific characteristics of cooperatives 
and controlled companies make it reasonable for BX to adopt the 
proposed exemptions for these entities.\130\ The Commission notes, in 
addition, that other exchanges already have exemptions for these kinds 
of issuers.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ The Commission notes, moreover, that, in the case of 
limited partnerships and open-end registered management investment 
companies, Rule 10C-1 itself provides exemptions from the 
independence requirements of the Rule.
    \129\ See supra Section II.B.4.
    \130\ The Commission notes that controlled companies are 
provided an automatic exemption from the application of the entirety 
of Rule 10C-1 by Rule 10C-1(b)(5). The additional BX provisions 
requiring listed companies to have a two-member compensation 
committee and a written committee charter, will, of course, not 
apply to the exempted entities, which are currently required to have 
neither a compensation committee nor the Alternative Option.
    \131\ See supra note 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically with regard to BX's proposed exemption for registered 
management investment companies, the Commission notes that, although 
Rule 10C-1 exempts certain entities, including registered open-end 
management investment companies, from the enhanced independence 
requirements for members of compensation committees, it does not 
explicitly exempt other types of registered management investment 
companies, including closed-end funds, from any of the requirements of 
Rule 10C-1. Under the BX proposal, both closed-end and open-end funds 
would be exempt from all the requirements of the rule.
    The Commission believes that it is reasonable to extend its 
exemption to all registered investment companies, including closed-end 
funds, because the Investment Company Act of 1940 already assigns 
important duties of investment company governance, such as approval of 
the investment advisory contract, to independent directors, and because 
such entities were already generally exempt from BX's existing 
compensation committee requirements. The Commission notes that almost 
all registered investment companies do not employ executives or 
employees or have compensation committees.
    The Commission notes that BX proposes, however, to amend its 
current rule for foreign private issuers, which allows such issuers to 
follow their home country practice in lieu of the

[[Page 4493]]

Exchange's standards regarding a company's compensation decision-making 
process. The current rule includes the proviso that the issuer must 
disclose its reliance on the exemption. BX proposes to conform its 
rules in this regard with the provision of Rule 10C-1 permitting a 
foreign private issuer to follow home country practice only when it 
meets the additional condition that the issuer disclose the reasons why 
it does not have an independent compensation committee.

F. Transition to the New Rules for Companies Listed as of the Effective 
Date

    The Commission believes that the deadlines for compliance with the 
proposal's various provisions are reasonable and should afford 
companies that may be listed on BX as of the effective date adequate 
time to make the changes, if any, necessary to meet the new standards. 
The Commission notes that the provision in the original proposal 
requiring companies to comply with certain of the requirements 
immediately has been revised in Amendment No. 1 to allow companies 
until July 1, 2013 to satisfy these requirements.\132\ The Commission 
also believes that the revised deadline proposed in Amendment No. 1, 
which gives companies until the earlier of their first annual meeting 
after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the 
remaining provisions is more clear-cut than the deadline in the 
original proposal and also matches the deadline set forth by the New 
York Stock Exchange in its proposed rule change to comply with Rule 
10C-1.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See supra notes 73-74 for the provisions to which the new 
transition date applies.
    \133\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68011 (October 9, 
2012), 77 FR 62541 (October 15, 2012) (Notice of File No. SR-NYSE-
2012-49).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Phase-In Schedules: IPOs; Companies That Lose Their Exemptions; 
Companies Transferring From Other Markets

    The Commission believes that it is reasonable for BX to allow, with 
respect to IPOs, companies emerging from bankruptcy, companies ceasing 
to be controlled companies, and companies transferring from other 
markets, the same phase-in schedule for compliance with the new 
requirements as is permitted under its current compensation-related 
rules.
    The Commission also believes that the phase-in schedule for 
companies that cease to be Smaller Reporting Companies, as revised in 
Amendment No. 1, affords such companies ample time to come into 
compliance with the full panoply of rules that apply to other 
companies. In the Commission's view, the revised schedule also offers 
such companies more clarity in determining when they will be subject to 
the heightened requirements.

IV. Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 1 to the Proposed Rule Change

    The Commission finds good cause, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of 
the Act,\134\ for approving the proposed rule change, as modified by 
Amendment No. 1, prior to the 30th day after the date of publication of 
notice in the Federal Register. The change made to the proposal by 
Amendment No. 1 to set forth in detail the requirements of Rule 10C-
1(b)(2)-(4) explicitly in the Exchange's rules, rather than 
incorporating these details by reference as in the original 
proposal,\135\ is not a substantive one and merely codifies the 
original intent of that provision. Moreover, the change improves the 
proposal because it brings together the full set of the Exchange's 
rules on compensation committees in one place, thereby easing 
compliance for listed companies and benefiting investors seeking an 
understanding of an issuer's obligations with regard to determining 
executive compensation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \135\ See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The change made by Amendment No. 1 to require companies listed on 
BX as of the effective date of the proposal to comply with certain of 
the new rules by July 1, 2013 rather than immediately, as originally 
proposed,\136\ reasonably affords companies more time to take the steps 
necessary for compliance. The change to require such companies to 
comply with the remaining provisions by the earlier of their first 
annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, rather than 
by the deadline originally proposed,\137\ still allows ample time for 
companies to adjust to the new rules, and accords with the deadline set 
by NYSE in its proposed rule change to comply with Rule 10C-1, which 
was published at the same time as the BX proposal.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
    \137\ See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
    \138\ The Commission received one comment letter relating to 
this provision in the NYSE proposal, in which the commenter 
supported this transition period for compliance with the new 
compensation committee independence standards but believed that a 
longer period should be provided to implement the other listing 
standards that NYSE proposed. See Letter to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Commission, from Robert B. Lamm, Chair, Securities Law 
Committee, The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance 
Professionals, concerning File No. SR-NYSE-2012-49, dated December 
7, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The revision made by Amendment No. 1 to the phase-in rules for 
companies that cease to be Smaller Reporting Companies \139\ 
establishes a schedule that is easier to understand, while still 
affording such companies adequate time to come into compliance. The 
Commission notes that the Start Date of the phase-in period for such a 
company is six months after the Determination Date, and the company is 
given no less than another six months from the Start Date to gain 
compliance with the rules from which it had been previously exempt. 
Moreover, with respect to the enhanced independence standards for 
compensation committee members (relating to fees and affiliation with 
the company), only one member must meet these standards within six 
months after the Start Date. The company is given nine months from the 
Start Date (i.e., fifteen months from the Determination Date) to have a 
majority of committee members meeting the standards, and a full year 
from the Start Date (i.e., eighteen months from the Determination Date) 
to fully comply with the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The addition by Amendment No. 1 of a preamble to proposed Rule 
5605(d) to set forth the obligations of a company during the transition 
period until the new rules apply introduces no substantive change.\140\ 
It merely mirrors the instructions in the preamble to the Sunsetting 
Provisions, providing clarity for listed companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ See supra note 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The inclusion in Amendment No. 1 of language in BX's rules that 
requires a compensation committee to conduct the independence 
assessment with respect to ``any compensation consultant, legal counsel 
or other adviser that provides advice to the compensation committee, 
other than in-house counsel'' merely reflects an instruction in Rule 
10C-1 itself.\141\ The addition of further guidance by Amendment No. 1 
merely clarifies that nothing in the Exchange's rules requires a 
compensation adviser to be independent, only that the compensation 
committee consider the independence factors before selecting or 
receiving advice from a compensation adviser,\142\ and is not a 
substantive change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
    \142\ See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Amendment No. 1 also excluded advisers that provide certain types 
of services from the independence assessment.\143\ As discussed above, 
the Commission has already determined to exclude such advisers from the

[[Page 4494]]

disclosure requirement regarding compensation advisers in Regulation S-
K because these types of services do not raise conflict of interest 
concerns. For all the reasons discussed above, the Commission finds 
good cause to accelerate approval of the proposed changes made by 
Amendment No. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing and whether Amendment No. 1 are 
consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the 
following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-BX-2012-063 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-BX-2012-063. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used.
    To help the Commission process and review your comments more 
efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all 
comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, 
all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that 
are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating 
to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, 
other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance 
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site 
viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room on 
official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. 
Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying 
at the principal office of BX. All comments received will be posted 
without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying 
information from submissions. You should submit only information that 
you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to 
File Number SR-BX-2012-063, and should be submitted on or before 
February 12, 2013.

VI. Conclusion

    In summary, and for the reasons discussed in more detail above, the 
Commission believes that the rules being adopted by BX, taken as whole, 
should benefit investors by helping listed companies make informed 
decisions regarding the amount and form of executive compensation. BX's 
new rules will help to meet Congress's intent that compensation 
committees that are responsible for setting compensation policy for 
executives of listed companies consist only of independent directors.
    BX's rules also, consistent with Rule 10C-1, require compensation 
committees of listed companies to assess the independence of 
compensation advisers, taking into consideration six specified factors. 
This should help to assure that compensation committees of BX-listed 
companies are better informed about potential conflicts when selecting 
and receiving advice from advisers. Similarly, the provisions of BX's 
standards that require compensation committees to be given the 
authority to engage and oversee compensation advisers, and require the 
listed company to provide for appropriate funding to compensate such 
advisers, should help to support the compensation committee's role to 
oversee executive compensation and help provide compensation committees 
with the resources necessary to make better informed compensation 
decisions.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Commission finds that the proposed 
rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is consistent with the Act 
and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national 
securities exchange, and, in particular, with Section 6(b)(5) of the 
Act.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the 
Act,\145\ that the proposed rule change, SR-BX-2012-063, as modified by 
Amendment No. 1, is approved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-01108 Filed 1-18-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


