
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 218 (Thursday, November 10, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70178-70183]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-29103]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-65678; File No. SR-ISE-2011-67]


 Self-Regulatory Organizations; International Securities 
Exchange, LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to Market Data Fees

November 3, 2011.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby 
given that, on October 24, 2011, the International Securities Exchange, 
LLC (the ``Exchange'' or the ``ISE'') filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as 
described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared 
by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend its Schedule of Fees to adopt 
subscription fees for the sale of a market data offering called the ISE 
Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed. The text of the proposed rule 
change is available on the Exchange's Web site http://www.ise.com, at 
the principal office of the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public 
Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements 
concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The self-regulatory organization has prepared summaries, 
set forth in Sections A, B and C below, of the most significant aspects 
of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    ISE proposes to amend its Schedule of Fees to adopt subscription 
fees for the sale of the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed. The 
Exchange previously submitted a proposed rule change to establish this 
data feed.\3\
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    \3\ See Exchange Act Release No. 65295 (September 8, 2011), 76 
FR 56832 (September 14, 2011) (SR-ISE-2011-55).
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ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed
    The ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed delivers real-time 
implied volatilities and risk parameters for equity, index and ETF 
options. This information is used to track an option's price relative 
to changes in volatility and the underlying security's price, which 
affects the theoretical price of an option. The risk parameters are 
useful for delta neutral option execution and monitoring an option's 
time premium decay. The ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed is also 
useful for investing and hedging strategies such as placing orders 
based on changes in levels of volatility. The ISE Implied Volatility 
and Greeks Feed includes real-time implied volatilities for the bid, 
ask and mid-point price as well as delta, gamma, vega, theta and rho 
for each option series. The ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed is a 
low latency feed that produces data for the entire universe of U.S. 
options disseminated by the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA). 
The Exchange believes the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed 
provides valuable information that can help users make informed 
investment decisions.

[[Page 70179]]

Proposed Fees for ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed
    The Exchange proposes to make the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks 
Feed available to both members and non-members on a subscription basis, 
as follows:
     $5,000 per month per Business Unit \4\ for Subscribers \5\ 
who are Professionals, and $50 per controlled device \6\ per month 
after the first 50 controlled devices. This subscription level is for 
internal use only and includes the first 50 controlled devices.
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    \4\ A ``Business Unit'' is a separate and distinct business 
group at a Subscriber firm that has access to the ISE Implied 
Volatility and Greeks Feed. A market making desk, a risk management 
group, etc. would each be considered a Business Unit.
    \5\ A ``Subscriber'' is any firm that receives the ISE Implied 
Volatility and Greeks Feed directly from the ISE or indirectly 
through a redistributor and then distributes it either internally or 
externally. A redistributor includes market data vendors and 
connectivity providers such as extranet and private network 
providers.
    \6\ A ``controlled device'' is any device that a Subscriber or 
Managed Data Access Distributor of the ISE Implied Volatility and 
Greeks Feed permits to access the information in the ISE Implied 
Volatility and Greeks Feed.
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    In addition, the Exchange is proposing to create a new data 
distribution model, called the Managed Data Access Service \7\ to 
further the distribution of the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks 
Feed.\8\ Under this distribution model, Managed Data Access 
Distributors \9\ are required to monitor the delivery of the data in 
the Managed Data Access Service to their clients, the Managed Data 
Access Recipients.\10\ This new pricing and administrative option is in 
response to industry demand, as well as due to changes in the 
technology used to distribute market data.
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    \7\ ``Managed Data Access Service'' is any retransmission data 
product containing the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed 
offered by a Managed Data Access Distributor, as defined below, 
where the Managed Data Access Distributor manages and monitors, but 
does not necessarily control, the information.
    \8\ The Exchange notes that a managed data solution is not a 
novel distribution model. At least one other exchange currently 
offers a managed data solution to distribute its proprietary market 
data. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-63276 (November 8, 2010), 75 
FR 69717 (November 15, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-138).
    \9\ A ``Managed Data Access Distributor'' is a subscriber of the 
ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed that permits access to the 
information in the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed through a 
``controlled device.'' A Managed Data Access Distributor can also 
offer a data feed solution, including an Application Programming 
Interface (API) or similar automated delivery solutions, with only 
limited entitlement controls (e.g., usernames and/or passwords) to a 
recipient of the information.
    \10\ A ``Managed Data Access Recipient'' is a subscriber to the 
Managed Data Access Service for the purpose of accessing the ISE 
Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed offered by a Managed Data Access 
Distributor.
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    Managed Data Access Service provides an alternative delivery option 
for the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed. The Managed Data Access 
Distributor must agree to reformat, redisplay and/or alter the ISE 
Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed prior to retransmission, but not to 
affect the integrity of the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed and 
not to render it inaccurate, unfair, uninformative, fictitious, 
misleading, or discriminatory.
    The Exchange will maintain contracts with Managed Data Access 
Recipients, who may use the information in the ISE Implied Volatility 
and Greeks Feed for internal purposes only and may be liable for any 
unauthorized use under the Managed Data Access Service.
    In the past, the Exchange has considered this type of distribution 
to be an uncontrolled data product if the Managed Data Access 
Distributor does not control both the entitlements and the display of 
the information. Over the last several years, Managed Data Access 
Distributors have improved the technical delivery and monitoring 
capabilities of data therefore Managed Data Access Service is a 
response to an industry need to administer new types of technical 
deliveries.
Proposed Fees for ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed as a Managed 
Data Access Service
    The Exchange proposes to charge for Managed Data Access Service for 
the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed, as follows:
     $1,500 per month for Managed Data Access Distributors who 
distribute the data feed externally through a controlled device to Non-
Professional recipients, and $1 per controlled device per month.
     $1,500 per month for Managed Data Access Distributors who 
distribute the data feed externally through a controlled device to 
Professional recipients, and $50 per controlled device per month.
     $1,500 per month for Managed Data Access Distributors who 
distribute the data feed internally from an Application Programming 
Interface (API) to Professional recipients, and a monthly fee based on 
the number of unique option symbols received by the recipient, as 
follows:
      $1,000 per month for up to 10,000 unique option symbols.
      $2,000 per month for up to 25,000 unique option symbols.
      $3,000 per month for up to 50,000 unique option symbols.
      $4,000 per month for up to 100,000 unique option symbols.
      $5,000 per month for an unlimited number of unique option 
symbols.
     $250 per month API log-in fee for Managed Data Access 
Recipients. This fee is only applicable to recipients who utilize an 
API to receive the ISE Implied Volatility & Greeks Feed from a Managed 
Data Access Distributor.
2. Statutory Basis
    The basis under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ``Act'') 
for this proposed rule change is the requirement under Section 6(b)(4) 
that an exchange have an equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees 
and other charges among its members and other persons using its 
facilities. The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is 
consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\11\ in general, 
and with Sections 6(b)(4) of the Act,\12\ in particular, in that it 
provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and 
other charges among members and issuers and other persons using any 
facility or system which ISE operates or controls.
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    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
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    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is also 
consistent with Section 6(b)(8) of the Act \13\ in that it does not 
impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The fees charged would be the 
same for all market participants, and therefore do not unreasonably 
discriminate among market participants.
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    \13\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
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    In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-regulatory 
organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and flexibility of 
offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that 
this authority would expand the amount of data available to consumers, 
and also spur innovation and competition for the provision of market 
data.
    The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the 
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of 
facilitating efficiency and competition:

    [E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the 
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the 
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to 
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that 
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive 
(and

[[Page 70180]]

pay for) additional market data based on their own internal analysis 
of the need for such data.\14\
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    \14\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 
2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).

By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability of 
exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of 
the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the 
free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to 
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is 
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sold should be set by the market as well.

    On July 21, 2010, President Barak [sic] Obama signed into law H.R. 
4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among 
other things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) 
of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person, 
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory 
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all SRO rule proposals 
establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately 
effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other 
charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both. 
Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the 
Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any time within the 60-day period 
beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule change in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section 19(b)], the 
Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in the rules of 
the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it appears to the 
Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance 
of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes such action, the 
Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph (2)(B) [of 
Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should be 
approved or disapproved.''
    ISE believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act reflect 
Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the forces of 
competition to ensure that fees for market data are reasonable and 
equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly authorized 
immediate effectiveness for a ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the 
self-regulatory organization,'' the Commission adopted a policy and 
subsequently a rule stipulating that fees for data and other products 
available to persons that are not members of the self-regulatory 
organization must be approved by the Commission after first being 
published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the 
adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike 
members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization 
governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the 
opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and 
that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees. ISE 
believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects Congress's 
conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory organization 
governance and competitive market structure have rendered the 
Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete. Specifically, 
many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-for-profit 
corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or 
subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no 
longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive 
benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the 
appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or 
nonmembers, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, 
we believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the 
Commission's determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an 
appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply 
put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be 
permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are 
constrained by competitive forces.
    The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton [sic] v. SEC, No. 09-1042 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior 
to the effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's 
reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably 
allocated fees for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history 
indicates that the Congress intended that the market system `evolve 
through the interplay of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory 
restrictions are removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power 
`in those situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as 
in the creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.''' 
\15\
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    \15\ NetCoaltion [sic], at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 
92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323).
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    The court's conclusions about Congressional intent are therefore 
reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, which create a presumption 
that exchange fees, including market data fees, may take effect 
immediately, without prior Commission approval, and that the Commission 
should take action to suspend a fee change and institute a proceeding 
to determine whether the fee change should be approved or disapproved 
only where the Commission has concerns that the change may not be 
consistent with the Act.
    The Exchange believes that the proposed market data fees are 
consistent with the requirements of the Act because competition 
provides an effective constraint on the market data fees that the 
Exchange has the ability and the incentive to charge. ISE has a 
compelling need to attract order flow from market participants in order 
to maintain its share of trading volume. This compelling need to 
attract order flow imposes significant pressure on ISE to act 
reasonably in setting the fees for its market data offerings, 
particularly given that the market participants that will pay such fees 
often will be the same market participants from whom ISE must attract 
order flow. These market participants include broker-dealers that 
control the handling of a large volume of customer and proprietary 
order flow. Given the portability of order flow from one exchange to 
another, any exchange that sought to charge unreasonably high market 
data fees would risk alienating many of the same customers on whose 
orders it depends for competitive survival. ISE currently competes with 
eight options exchanges for order flow.\16\
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    \16\ The Commission has previously made a finding that the 
options industry is subject to significant competitive forces. See 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59949 (May 20, 2009), 74 FR 
25593 (May 28, 2009) (SR-ISE-2009-97) (order approving ISE's 
proposal to establish fees for a real-time depth of market 
offering).
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    ISE is constrained in pricing the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks 
Feed by the availability to market participants of alternatives to 
purchasing ISE products. ISE must consider the extent to which market 
participants would choose one or more alternatives instead of 
purchasing the Exchange's data.
    For the reasons cited above, the Exchange believes that the 
proposed fees for the ISE Implied Volatility and

[[Page 70181]]

Greeks Feed are equitable, fair, reasonable and not unreasonably 
discriminatory. The Exchange further believes that the continued 
availability of the ISE Implied Volatility and Greeks Feed enhances 
transparency, fosters competition among orders and markets, and enables 
buyers and sellers to obtain better prices. In addition, the Exchange 
believes that no substantial countervailing basis exists to support a 
finding that the proposed terms and fees for this product fails to meet 
the requirements of the Act.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    ISE does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in 
any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its 
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to 
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the 
NetCoaltion [sic] court found that the Commission had not, in that 
case, compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that 
the market for the data at issue in the case was competitive.
    For the reasons discussed above, ISE believes that the Dodd-Frank 
Act amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the 
Commission's review of future market data filings, by creating a 
presumption that all fees may take effect immediately, without prior 
analysis by the Commission of the competitive environment. Even in the 
absence of this important statutory change, however, ISE believes that 
a record may readily be established to demonstrate the competitive 
nature of the market in question.
    As recently noted by a number of exchanges,\17\ there is intense 
competition between trading platforms that provide transaction 
execution and routing services and proprietary data products. 
Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary 
in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution 
service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic 
example of joint products with joint costs. The decision whether and on 
which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the 
platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, 
data quality and price and distribution of its data products. Without 
the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to a posted order on 
a particular platform, the posting of the order would accomplish 
little. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. 
Data products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they 
provide information that end users expect will assist them or their 
customers in making trading decisions.
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    \17\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 63084 (October 13, 
2010), 75 FR 64379 (October 19, 2010) (Notice of Filing and 
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Revise an 
Optional Depth Data Enterprise License Fee for Broker-Dealer 
Distribution of Depth-of-Book Data) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-125); and 62887 
(September 10, 2010), 75 FR 57092 (September 17, 2010) (Notice of 
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Relating 
to Market Data Feeds) (SR-PHLX-2010-121).
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    The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of 
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, 
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution 
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair 
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a 
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both 
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's 
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a 
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will 
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues 
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution 
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to 
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice 
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in 
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds 
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it.
    Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a 
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer 
decrease, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less 
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not 
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product 
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide 
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data 
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders 
will become correspondingly more valuable. Thus, a super-competitive 
increase in the fees charged for either transactions or data has the 
potential to impair revenues from both products. ``No one disputes that 
competition for order flow is `fierce'.'' \18\ However, the existence 
of fierce competition for order flow implies a high degree of price 
sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers with order flow, since they 
may readily reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost 
trading venues. A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one 
platform to another in response to order execution price differentials 
would both reduce the value of that platform's market data and reduce 
its own need to consume data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, 
if a platform increases its market data fees, the change will affect 
the overall cost of doing business with the platform, and affected 
broker-dealers will assess whether they can lower their trading costs 
by directing orders elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the 
more expensive data.
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    \18\ NetCoalition, at 24.
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    Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from 
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data 
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is 
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and 
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs 
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, 
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data 
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's 
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, 
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about 
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the 
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the 
joint products.
    Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain 
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint 
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, 
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering 
total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay rebates to 
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or 
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices 
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy 
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting 
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively 
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there 
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint 
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints 
with regard to the joint offering.

[[Page 70182]]

    The market for market data products is competitive and inherently 
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs 
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing 
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges 
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, 
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish 
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data 
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in 
a vigorously competitive market.
    Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their 
order flow, including numerous self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') 
markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various 
forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools 
and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market 
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two 
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to 
attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order 
flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline 
for the inputs of proprietary data products. The large number of SROs, 
TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently produce proprietary data or are 
currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline 
for proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently 
permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently do 
or have announced plans to do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, 
NYSEArca, and BATS.
    Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs 
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order 
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple 
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential 
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless. The fact that 
proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-pass SROs is 
significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete directly with 
SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data products, as BATS 
and Arca did before registering as exchanges by publishing proprietary 
book data on the Internet. Second, because a single order or 
transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO 
proprietary product, or both, the data available in proprietary 
products is exponentially greater than the actual number of orders and 
transaction reports that exist in the marketplace. Market data vendors 
provide another form of price discipline for proprietary data products 
because they control the primary means of access to end users. Vendors 
impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, 
vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters that assess a surcharge on data 
they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end users will 
not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, 
impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable them to 
attract ``eyeballs'' that contribute to their advertising revenue. 
Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their 
customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates 
sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, 
these vendors' pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse 
to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide 
sufficient value. NASDAQ and other producers of proprietary data 
products must understand and respond to these varying business models 
and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products 
successfully.
    Competition among platforms has driven ISE continually to improve 
its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data needs. For 
example, ISE has developed and maintained multiple delivery mechanisms 
that enable customers to receive data in the form and manner they 
prefer and at the lowest cost to them. ISE offers front end 
applications such as its PrecISE Trade application which helps 
customers utilize data. ISE offers data via multiple extranet 
providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its 
data products. Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in 
message traffic, ISE's fees for market data have, for the most part, 
remained flat.
    The vigor of competition for market data is significant and the 
Exchange believes that this proposal clearly evidences such 
competition. ISE is offering a new pricing model in order to keep pace 
with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    The Exchange has not solicited, and does not intend to solicit, 
comments on this proposed rule change. The Exchange has not received 
any unsolicited written comments from members or other interested 
parties.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act \19\ and Rule 19b-4(f)(2) \20\ thereunder. 
At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, 
the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it 
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such 
action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether 
the proposed rule change should be approved or disapproved.
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    \19\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
    \20\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Exchange Act. Comments may be submitted 
by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-ISE-2011-67 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-ISE-2011-67. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be

[[Page 70183]]

available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission's Public 
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official 
business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the 
filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the 
principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted 
without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying 
information from submissions. You should submit only information that 
you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to 
File Number SR-ISE-2011-67 and should be submitted on or before 
December 1, 2011.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\21\
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    \21\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-29103 Filed 11-9-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


