

[Federal Register: December 22, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 245)]
[Proposed Rules]               
[Page 76115-76128]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr22de05-24]                         


[[Page 76115]]

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Part II





Securities and Exchange Commission





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17 CFR Part 240



Amendments to the Tender Offer Best-Price Rule; Proposed Rule


[[Page 76116]]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 240

[Release Nos. 34-52968; IC-27193; File No. S7-11-05]
RIN 3235-AJ50

 
Amendments to the Tender Offer Best-Price Rule

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: We are proposing amendments to the tender offer best-price 
rule to clarify that the rule applies only with respect to the 
consideration offered and paid for securities tendered in an issuer or 
third-party tender offer and should not apply to consideration offered 
and paid according to employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangements entered into with employees or directors 
of the subject company. The proposed rule also would provide a safe 
harbor in the context of third-party tender offers that would allow the 
compensation committee or a committee performing similar functions of 
the subject company's or bidder's board of directors, depending on 
whether the subject company or the bidder is the party to the 
arrangement, to approve an employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangement and thereby deem it to be such an 
arrangement within the meaning of the proposed exemption.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before February 21, 2006.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml.
); or     Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 

File Number S7-11-05 on the subject line; or
     Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov
). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.


Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Jonathan G. Katz, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-9303.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-11-05. This file number 
should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help us 
process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one 
method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's 
Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments 

also are available for public inspection and copying in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20549. All comments received will be posted without change; we do not 
edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian V. Breheny, Chief, or Mara L. 
Ransom, Special Counsel, Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, Division of 
Corporation Finance, at (202) 551-3440.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We are proposing amendments to Rule 13e-4 
\1\ and Rule 14d-10 \2\ under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.\3\
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    \1\ 17 CFR 240.13e-4.
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.14d-10.
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
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I. Executive Summary and Background

A. Reasons for the Proposed Amendments to the Best-Price Rule

    The tender offer best-price rule \4\ was adopted, as discussed in 
more detail below, to assure fair and equal treatment of all security 
holders of the class of securities that are the subject of a tender 
offer by requiring that the consideration paid to any security holder 
is the highest paid to any other security holder in the tender 
offer.\5\ We are proposing amendments to the best-price rule for three 
reasons. First, we want to make it clear that compensatory arrangements 
between subject company employees or directors and the bidder \6\ or 
subject company \7\ are not captured by the application of the best-
price rule. Second, we would like to alleviate the uncertainty that the 
various interpretations of the best-price rule by courts have produced. 
Finally, we want to remove any unwarranted incentive to structure 
transactions as statutory mergers, to which the best-price rule does 
not apply, instead of tender offers, to which it does apply.
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    \4\ For purposes of this release, unless otherwise indicated, 
our references to the ``tender offer best-price rule'' or the 
``best-price rule'' are intended to refer to both Exchange Act Rule 
13e-4(f)(8)(ii) and Exchange Act Rule 14d-10(a)(2).
    \5\ See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-
Price, Release No. 34-23421 (July 11, 1986) [51 FR 25873] (the 
``Rule 14d-10 Adopting Release'').
    \6\ The term ``bidder'' is used throughout this release to refer 
to the offeror or purchaser in a tender offer.
    \7\ The term ``subject company'' is used throughout this release 
to refer to the company to be acquired in a business combination 
transaction or the company whose securities are the subject of the 
transaction, whether the transaction is agreed upon or unsolicited.
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    Briefly, we propose to:
     Amend the language of Rules 13e-4(f)(8)(ii) and 14d-
10(a)(2) to clarify that the best-price rule applies only with respect 
to the consideration offered and paid for securities tendered in a 
tender offer;
     Add a new provision to Rule 14d-10(c) to provide an 
exemption from the third-party best-price rule for the negotiation,\8\ 
execution or amendment of payments made or to be made or benefits 
granted or to be granted according to employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangements that are entered into 
by the bidder or the subject company with current or future employees 
or directors of the subject company; and
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    \8\ We do not believe that an analogous exemption is needed in 
the issuer best-price rule, Rule 13e-4(f)(8), although we solicit 
comment on whether that rule should be changed as well in this 
respect. See Section II.B. below.
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     For purposes of the exemption, add a new provision to Rule 
14d-10(c) to include a safe harbor provision that provides that the 
compensation committee of the board of directors (or a committee 
performing similar functions) comprised solely of independent directors 
of the bidder or subject company, depending on which entity is party to 
the arrangement, may approve the employment compensation, severance or 
employee benefit arrangement and thereby deem it to be such an 
arrangement for purposes of the exemption.

B. History of the Adoption of the Best-Price Rule

    Congress adopted the Williams Act in 1968 to address potentially 
abusive tactics such as ``Saturday Night Specials'' and ``First-Come, 
First Served'' offers.\9\ The Williams Act amended the Exchange Act by 
adding the requirement for beneficial ownership reporting (Section 
13(d)),\10\ the procedural and disclosure requirements for purchases of 
securities by the issuer thereof (Section 13(e)),\11\ and the 
procedural and disclosure requirements for third-party tender offers 
(Sections 14(d)-(f)).\12\ With respect to tender offers, the Williams

[[Page 76117]]

Act was designed to achieve two main purposes: assure that public 
security holders of the target company are provided with adequate 
disclosure, and eliminate practices in connection with tender offers 
that may result in unfair discrimination among, and pressure on, 
tendering security holders.\13\ The second purpose was achieved through 
Congress's adoption of the substantive provisions of Section 14(d) of 
the Exchange Act \14\ and the Commission's adoption of Regulation 
14D.\15\
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    \9\ Hearings, Subcommittee on Securities, 90th Congress, First 
Session on S.510, March 21, 1967 at page 17.
    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(d).
    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(e).
    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)-(f).
    \13\ Hearings, Subcommittee on Securities, 90th Congress, First 
Session on S.510, April 4, 1967 at page 203.
    \14\ Hearings, Subcommittee on Securities, 90th Congress, First 
Session on S.510, March 21, 1967 at page 36.
    \15\ See the Rule 14d-10 Adopting Release.
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    Based on the objectives of the Williams Act and the substantive 
protections afforded by Section 14(d)(7) of the Exchange Act,\16\ which 
requires equal treatment of security holders, the staff of the 
Commission had taken the position that there were implicit requirements 
that a bidder make a tender offer to all holders of the subject 
securities and that the bidder make the offer to all holders on the 
same terms.\17\ After questions arose regarding the applicability of 
this implicit all-holders requirement to issuer tender offers,\18\ we 
adopted Rule 13e-4(f)(8) and Rule 14d-10 to codify the position that 
both an issuer tender offer and a third-party tender offer must be open 
to all holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer 
(commonly referred to as the ``all-holders rule''), and that all 
security holders must be paid the highest consideration paid to any 
security holder (commonly referred to as the ``best-price rule''). The 
rules provide that no bidder shall ``make a tender offer unless: (1) 
[t]he tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of 
securities subject to the tender offer; and (2) [t]he consideration 
paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender offer is the highest 
consideration paid to any other security holder during such tender 
offer.'' \19\
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    \16\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(7).
    \17\ See Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Release No. 
34-22198 (July 1, 1985) [50 FR 27976] (stating that ``* * * implicit 
in these provisions, and necessary for the functioning of the 
Williams Act, are the requirements that a bidder make a tender offer 
to all security holders of the class of securities which is the 
subject of the offer and that the offer be made to all holders on 
the same terms.'').
    \18\ Id. at 27977 (``* * * questions have arisen recently 
regarding the applicability of the all-holders requirement * * *'' 
in referring to Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985), in which the court held that a defensive issuer tender 
offer that excluded the hostile bidder who was also a shareholder of 
the issuer was lawful).
    \19\ Exchange Act Rule 13e-4(f)(8) (17 CFR 240.13e-4(f)(8)) and 
Exchange Act Rule 14d-10(a) (17 CFR 240.14d-10(a)).
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C. History of the Various Interpretations of the Best-Price Rule

    Since the adoption of the best-price and all-holders rules, the 
best-price rule has been the basis for litigation brought in connection 
with tender offers in which it is claimed that the best-price rule was 
violated as a result of the bidder entering into new agreements or 
arrangements, or adopting the subject company's pre-existing agreements 
or arrangements, with security holders of the subject company.\20\ The 
agreements or arrangements with security holders that most frequently 
are the subject of best-price rule litigation have involved employment 
compensation, severance or other employee benefit arrangements with 
employees or directors of the subject company--although certain 
commercial agreements also have been the basis for these actions.\21\ 
When ruling on these best-price rule claims, courts generally have 
interpreted the best-price rule in two different ways--employing either 
an ``integral-part test'' or a ``bright-line test'' to determine 
whether the arrangement violates the best-price rule.
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    \20\ See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. 
v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Lerro v. Quaker Oats, 84 F.3d 239 
(7th Cir. 1996); Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp.2d 
1360 (N.D. GA 2001).
    \21\ Id.
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1. The integral-part test
    The integral-part test states that the best-price rule applies to 
all integral elements of a tender offer, including employment 
compensation, severance and other employee benefit arrangements or 
commercial arrangements that are deemed to be part of the tender offer, 
regardless of whether the arrangements are executed and performed 
outside of the time that the tender offer formally commences and 
expires.\22\ In 1995, in Epstein v. MCA Inc.,\23\ the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first court to apply the 
integral-part test to an action brought pursuant to, inter alia, the 
best-price rule. The Epstein court rejected the defendants' argument 
that no liability existed pursuant to the best-price rule because a 
transaction between the bidder and one of the security holders of the 
subject company in a tender offer closed after the tender offer period 
expired. Instead, the Court held that ``[a]n inquiry more in keeping 
with the language and purposes of Rule 14d-10 focuses not on when [the 
individual shareholder] was paid but on whether the [individual 
shareholder transaction] was an integral part of [the bidder's] tender 
offer.'' \24\ Analyzing the transaction based on this test, the Epstein 
court held that ``[b]ecause the terms of the [individual shareholder 
transaction] were in several material respects conditioned on the terms 
of the public tender offer, we can only conclude that the [individual 
shareholder transaction] was an integral part of the offer and subject 
to Rule 14d-10's requirements.'' \25\ Courts following the integral-
part test have ruled that agreements or arrangements made with security 
holders that constituted what they determined to be an integral part of 
the tender offer violate the best-price rule.\26\
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    \22\ See Epstein, 50 F.3d 644; Perera v. Chiron Corp., 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22503 (N.D. CA 1996); Padilla v. MedPartners, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22839 (C.D. CA 1998); Millionerrors Investment Club v. 
General Electric, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778 (W.D. PA 2000); Maxick 
v. Cadence Design Systems, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14099 (N.D. CA 
2000); McMichael v. United States Filter Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3918 (C.D. CA 2001); Karlin v. Alcatel, S.A., 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12349 (C.D. CA 2001); Harris v. Intel Corp., 2002 WL 1759817 
(N.D. CA 2002); Cummings v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V., 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23383 (N.D. CA 2002); In re: Luxottica Group 
S.p.A., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21389 (E.D. N.Y. 2003).
    \23\ 50 F.3d 644.
    \24\ Id. at 655.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Although originally adopted by the Ninth Circuit in the 
Epstein case, decisions rendered by district courts in the Second 
and Third Circuits also have applied the integral-part test when 
addressing best-price rule claims. See, e.g., Millionerrors, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778; Luxottica, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21389.
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2. The Bright-Line Test
    The bright-line test, on the other hand, states that the best-price 
rule applies only to agreements and arrangements executed and performed 
between the time a tender offer formally commences \27\ and 
expires.\28\ Both before and after the Epstein decision, jurisdictions 
following the bright-line test have held that agreements or 
arrangements with security holders of the subject company do not 
violate the best-price rule if they are not executed and performed 
``during the tender

[[Page 76118]]

offer.'' \29\ In this regard, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit stated in Lerro v. Quaker Oats Company \30\ that 
``[b]efore the offer is not `during' the offer,'' ``[t]he difference 
between `during' and `before' (or `after') is not just linguistic'' and 
``* * * the point of Rules 10b-13, 14d-10, and their cousins is to 
demark clearly the periods during which the special Williams Act rules 
apply.'' \31\
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    \27\ See Exchange Act Rule 13e-4(a)(4) (17 CFR 240.13e-4(a)(4)) 
and Exchange Act Rule 14d-2 (17 CFR 240.14d-2) (relating to 
procedures for formal commencement of tender offers).
    \28\ Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Lerro, 84 F.3d 239; Gerber v. Computer Associates Int'l, 303 F.3d 
126 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Digital Island Securities Litigation, 357 
F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004); Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. 
Supp.2d 1360 (N.D. GA 2001); Susquehanna Capital Group v. Rite Aid 
Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18290 (E.D. PA 2002); Katt v. Titan 
Acquisitions, Inc., 244 F. Supp.2d 841 (M.D. TN 2003).
    \29\ Kramer, 937 F.2d 767; Gerber, 303 F.3d 126; Priddy v. 
Edelman, 679 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd on other 
grounds, 833 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1989).
    \30\ Lerro, 84 F.3d 239.
    \31\ Id. at 242.
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3. Impact of Split in Court Interpretations
    The resulting uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the best-
price rule has made parties that are considering commencing a tender 
offer and intend to enter into or amend any agreements or arrangements 
with employees or directors of the subject company reluctant to engage 
in a tender offer.\32\ We understand that this reluctance is present 
even if the negotiation, execution or amendment of any agreement or 
arrangement, or related payments, has no relation to the securities 
tendered by such employees or directors in a tender offer. Because the 
retention of key employees or directors, or the execution of definitive 
severance arrangements, can be such an important aspect of a merger or 
acquisition, the bidder and subject company are not likely to forgo 
entering into or modifying employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangements in favor of retaining the tender offer 
structure. Instead, even where a tender offer may be the most 
attractive method of acquiring another company, the resulting 
uncertainty and the drastic consequences of a violation (payment of the 
per share value of the other arrangements to all security holders) have 
caused bidders to refrain from conducting tender offers, in favor of 
structuring extraordinary transactions as statutory mergers \33\ where 
the best-price rule is inapplicable.\34\ This disfavoring of tender 
offers in favor of statutory mergers is contrary to our goals 
articulated in the adoption of Regulation M-A.\35\
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    \32\ See, e.g., Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M. Hoff, 
Developments Concerning SEC All Holders, Best Price Rules, N.Y. 
L.J., June 28, 2001, at 5; Clifford E. Neimeth, Inconsistent 
Application of the SEC's ``All Holders-Best Price'' Rule Continues 
to Chill Tender Offers, The Journal of Investment Compliance, Winter 
2002/2003, at 43.
    \33\ Statutory mergers are also known as ``long-form'' or 
``unitary'' mergers, the requirements of which generally are 
governed by applicable state law.
    \34\ See, e.g., Stephen I. Glover, Applying the Best Price Rule 
to Employee Retention Bonuses, The M & A Lawyer, April 2001, at 26.
    \35\ 17 CFR 229.1000--229.1016. See Regulation of Takeovers and 
Security Holder Communications, Release No. 34-42055 (Oct. 22, 1999) 
[64 FR 61408](``We also noted unnecessary differences in regulatory 
requirements between tender offers and other types of extraordinary 
transactions, such as mergers * * *. Our goals in proposing and 
adopting these changes are to * * * harmonize inconsistent 
disclosure requirements and alleviate unnecessary burdens associated 
with the compliance process * * *.''). We acknowledge, however, that 
other factors, including the adoption of poison pills and staggered 
boards by companies and the passage of anti-takeover legislation by 
states, may otherwise have caused, and may continue to cause, 
bidders to refrain from conducting tender offers.
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D. Proposed Approach to Addressing Split in Court Interpretations

    We do not believe that the best-price rule should be subject to a 
strict temporal test. We also do not believe that all payments that are 
conditioned on or otherwise somehow related to a tender offer, 
including payments under compensatory or commercial arrangements that 
are made to persons who happen to be security holders, whether made 
before, during or after the tender offer period, should be subject to 
the best-price rule. Accordingly, we are proposing amendments to the 
best-price rule that do not follow the approach of either the integral-
part or the bright-line test. Instead, the proposed amendments would 
refocus the determination as to potential violations of the best-price 
rule on whether any consideration paid to security holders for 
securities tendered into an offer is the highest consideration paid to 
any other security holder for securities tendered into the tender 
offer.
    The proposed amendments are premised on the view that the best-
price rule was not intended to apply to consideration paid pursuant to 
arrangements, including employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangements, entered into by the bidder or the 
subject company with the employees or directors of the subject company, 
so long as the consideration paid pursuant to such arrangements to 
persons that happen to be security holders was not to acquire their 
securities. As such, we are proposing amendments that establish that 
the best-price rule applies only to consideration paid for securities 
tendered. In light of the particular difficulties that have arisen 
under the existing rules regarding compensatory arrangements, we also 
are proposing an exemption and safe harbor regarding these arrangements 
in the context of third-party tender offers. The fact that we are 
proposing a safe harbor for compensatory arrangements in third-party 
tender offers would not affect the impact of the proposed rule change 
on payments made pursuant to other arrangements, such as commercial 
arrangements, provided that the consideration paid is not for 
securities tendered.
    The commercial realities of merger and acquisition transactions are 
that key employees (without any regard to their holdings of securities) 
may represent a significant portion of the value that inheres in a 
continuing business enterprise. Alternatively, it may be advantageous 
for those employees (again, without any regard to their holdings of 
securities) to be replaced or otherwise terminated after the 
transaction. To ensure that key employees remain with the subject 
company, or to ensure a smooth transition for employees who will not 
remain with the subject company after the transaction is complete, 
critical personnel decisions often are required to be made concurrently 
with decisions regarding whether to pursue a transaction with the 
subject company. While these decisions may be an ``integral part'' of 
the transaction of which the tender offer is a part, they also may have 
nothing to do with the consideration paid for securities tendered in 
the tender offer. Indeed, we believe that the fact that most recipients 
of such payments are security holders is pure happenstance insofar as 
these payments are concerned and that such payments would be made to 
the recipients whether or not they were security holders. We therefore 
believe that the proposed specific exemption from the third-party best-
price rule for employment compensation, severance or other employee 
benefit arrangements strikes the proper balance between these realities 
and the statutory purpose of the best-price rule.

II. The Current Proposals

A. Proposed Amendments to Rules 13e-4(f)(8)(ii) and 14d-10(a)(2)

    The premise of the best-price rule is that bidders must pay 
consideration of equal value to all security holders for the securities 
that they tender in a tender offer.\36\ Accordingly, an analysis of the 
best-price rule must include a consideration of whether any security

[[Page 76119]]

holders have been paid additional or different consideration for the 
securities they tendered in the offer.\37\
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    \36\ ``The objective of the * * * best-price provision is to 
make explicit the requirements that issuers and bidders alike * * * 
must pay every tendering security holder the highest consideration 
paid to any other security holder.'' See the Rule 14d-10 Adopting 
Release at 25881.
    \37\ This analysis assumes, of course, that the transaction is a 
tender offer. For purposes of this release, we assume the presence 
of a tender offer and, therefore, the application of the best-price 
rule.
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    Our proposed amendments recognize that if purchases of securities 
are deemed to be made as part of a tender offer, then the consideration 
paid for all securities tendered in the offer must satisfy the best-
price rule. We propose to amend the best-price rule to establish 
clearly that it applies with respect to the consideration offered and 
paid for securities tendered in the tender offer. Specifically, we 
propose to revise the best-price rule to state that a bidder shall not 
make a tender offer unless ``[t]he consideration paid to any security 
holder for securities tendered in the tender offer is the highest 
consideration paid to any other security holder for securities tendered 
in the tender offer.'' In doing so, the clause ``for securities 
tendered in the tender offer'' would replace the current clauses 
``pursuant to the tender offer'' and ``during such tender offer'' to 
clarify the intent of the best-price rule.
    Congress and the Commission \38\ have declined to define the term 
``tender offer'' in consideration of the complex structure of 
acquisitions, the constant changes affecting tender offers and, most 
importantly, to avoid compromising substantive protections as a result 
of a narrowly construed definition.\39\ The best-price rule was not 
intended to presuppose a bright-line standard such that a tender offer 
is always deemed to commence and expire as of a formal stated date.\40\ 
The flexible concept of a tender offer is consistent with the purpose 
of the best-price rule, in that it prevents bidders from impermissibly 
circumventing the rule. We do not intend to change this approach, and 
the elimination of the words ``during the tender offer'' would not do 
so.
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    \38\ Although the Commission proposed to define the term 
``tender offer'' in 1979, no such definition has been adopted. See 
Proposing Release Regarding Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, 
Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979) [44 FR 70349].
    \39\ Id. at page 70349 (``This position has been premised upon 
the dynamic nature of these transactions and the need for the 
Williams Act to be interpreted flexibly in a manner consistent with 
its purposes to protect investors. Consequently, the Commission 
specifically declined to define the term * * *'').
    \40\ We recognize that certain courts have wrestled with the 
concept of ``whether'' a tender offer exists as opposed to ``when'' 
a tender offer begins and ends. See, e.g., Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656 
(``Rule 14d-10 does not prohibit transactions entered into or 
effected before, or after, a tender offer--provided that all 
material terms of the transaction stand independent of the tender 
offer.'') Often, however, these questions cannot be determined 
independently of each other. Depending on the facts, multiple 
purchases of a subject company's securities over an extended period 
of time may be determined to be private transactions or open market 
purchases or, alternatively, multiple purchases may be deemed to be 
a tender offer. If the purchases are deemed a tender offer, then, 
beginning with the first purchase, the security holders who sold 
their securities should have had the procedural protections of 
Regulation 14E and, if the securities are registered pursuant to 
section 12 of the Exchange Act, Regulation 14D or, if the issuer has 
a class of equity securities registered pursuant to section 12 of 
the Exchange Act, or is required to file periodic reports pursuant 
to section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or which is a closed-end 
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940, Rule 13e-4, including the best-price rule.
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    The proposed revisions also would remove the potentially expansive 
concept of consideration paid ``pursuant to'' the tender offer in order 
to focus the analysis as to whether the consideration to which the 
best-price rule would apply was paid ``for securities tendered in'' the 
tender offer. While we believe that the best-price rule was not 
intended in all cases to be limited to formal stated dates, we also 
believe that the best-price rule was not intended to apply to all 
payments made to persons who happen to be security holders of a subject 
company, whether made before, during or after the formal tender offer 
period. After concluding that a tender offer exists, a proper analysis 
of whether the best-price rule has been violated must address whether 
each security holder was paid consideration equal to the consideration 
paid to all other security holders for securities tendered in the 
offer. The proposed language ``for securities tendered in'' would 
result in a narrower scope of consideration falling within the best-
price rule than would potentially be the case if the integral-part test 
were applied.\41\ Consideration paid under other arrangements, 
including compensatory and commercial arrangements, that is not 
consideration for securities tendered in the tender offer, also would 
fall outside the scope of the best-price rule.
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    \41\ We recognize that neither the integral-part test nor the 
bright-line test precedent specifically relies on the ``pursuant 
to'' provisions of Rule 13e-4(f)(8)(ii) or Rule 14d-10(a)(2) when 
deciding best-price rule actions. Most bright-line opinions focus on 
the ``during'' such tender offer provisions. We are proposing this 
amendment and providing this interpretive guidance to clarify for 
practitioners and the courts the proposed rule's application.
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    It has been suggested that it would be appropriate to adopt a 
specific time frame during which the best-price rule would apply.\42\ 
Certain of the Commission's rules include such specific time frames 
during which those rules apply. For instance, the prohibitions 
contained in Rule 14e-5 apply ``from the time of public announcement of 
the tender offer until the tender offer expires,'' \43\ and Rule 10b-
18's safe harbor generally is not available for purchases ``[e]ffected 
during the period from the time of public announcement * * * of a 
merger, acquisition, or similar transaction involving a 
recapitalization, until the earlier of the completion of such 
transaction or the completion of the vote by target shareholders.'' 
\44\ We believe, however, that it would be inappropriate to limit the 
application of the best-price rule to a specific time frame, as the 
abuses at which the best-price rule is aimed are not triggered by 
particular time frames.
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    \42\ See, e.g., American Bar Association comment letter in 
response to changes to the regulations governing tender offers, 
mergers, going-private transactions and security holder 
communications proposed in Regulation of Takeovers and Security 
Holder Communications, Release No. 33-7607 (Nov. 3, 1998) in File 
No. S7-28-98, Apr. 30, 1999, which states ``[i]t is important that 
there be a ``bright line'' test to measure the time period during 
which the restrictions under Rule 14e-5 (as well as Rule 14d-10) are 
applicable;'' Michael D. Ebert, ``During the Tender Offer'' (or some 
other time near it): Insider Transactions Under the All Holders/Best 
Price Rule, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 677 (2002); Jason K. Zachary, Love Me 
Tender, Love Me True: Compensating Management and Shareholders under 
the ``All-Holders/Best-Price'' Rule, 31 Sec. Reg. L.J. 81 (2003).
    \43\ Exchange Act Rule 14e-5(a) (17 CFR 240.14e-5(a)).
    \44\ Exchange Act Rule 10b-18(a)(13) (17 CFR 240.10b-18(a)(13)). 
See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 
Release No. 34-48766 (Nov. 17, 2003) [68 FR 64952].
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    Request for comment:
     What effect would the removal of ``during'' from the best-
price rule have on the bright-line case law precedent? Would the change 
in this language broaden the scope of potential future claims to 
include allegations that payments made at any time violate the best-
price rule?
     If the ``for securities tendered'' language is added to 
the best-price rule, would employees and directors who enter into 
arrangements with the bidder or subject company, and who do not tender 
their securities into a tender offer, avoid the strictures of the best-
price rule? Is this the appropriate outcome of the proposed amendment? 
Would a similar outcome result under the current language of the best-
price rule? If this outcome is a possibility, should we revise the 
proposed language of the best-price rule so that the best-price rule 
would apply to arrangements entered into by employees and directors 
with the bidder or subject company regardless of whether they tender 
their securities in the offer?
     If officers or directors recommend that security holders 
tender into the transaction but, in order to avoid

[[Page 76120]]

implicating the best-price rule, the same officers or directors opted 
to withhold tendering their own securities, what would be the outcome? 
Could this result in an alleged breach of fiduciary duty? What effect 
or impact is this type of behavior likely to have on tender offers? 
Would it discourage officers or directors from recommending that 
security holders tender into the offer?

B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14d-10(c)

    We propose to revise Rule 14d-10 to include not only the general 
provision that the best-price rule applies solely to payments in 
consideration for securities tendered in a tender offer, but also a 
specific exemption from the third-party best-price rule for the 
following:

    The negotiation, execution or amendment of an employment 
compensation, severance or other employee benefit arrangement, or 
payments made or to be made or benefits granted or to be granted 
according to such arrangements, with respect to employees and 
directors of the subject company, where the amount payable under the 
arrangement: (i) Relates solely to past services performed or future 
services to be performed or refrained from performing, by the 
employee or director (and matters incidental thereto), and (ii) is 
not based on the number of securities the employee or director owns 
or tenders.\45\

    \45\ See proposed Exchange Act Rule 14d-10(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that amounts paid pursuant to employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangements should not be 
considered when calculating the price paid for tendered securities. 
These payments are made for a different purpose.
    We are not proposing an analogous exemption to the issuer best-
price rule. We do not believe that issuers generally have the same need 
to negotiate, execute or amend compensatory arrangements when they 
structure and commence tender offers and, thus, the additional 
clarification afforded by such an exemption is unnecessary. We solicit 
comment, however, on whether adopting a similar exemption from the 
issuer best-price rule is necessary or would be practical.
1. Requirements of the Exemption
    For purposes of the exemption included in proposed Rule 14d-10(c), 
the amounts to be paid pursuant to such an arrangement must:
     Relate solely to past services performed or future 
services to be performed or refrained from performing (e.g., covenants 
not to compete), by the employee or director, and matters incidental 
thereto; and
     Not be based on the number of securities the employee or 
director owns in the subject company.\46\

    \46\ Our proposals do not address whether the employment 
compensation, severance or other employee benefit arrangements need 
always be for the purpose of incentivizing an individual with 
respect to future performance. We recognize that there are instances 
in which the issuance of additional consideration may be necessary 
to serve a contrary purpose, such as to persuade departing employees 
to relinquish or renegotiate long-term employment contracts, golden 
parachutes and other arrangements that the bidder would prefer not 
to honor upon successful consummation of the tender offer. These 
arrangements also can fall within the exemption under the proposed 
amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

We have included these additional requirements to ensure that the 
amounts paid pursuant to employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangements are based on legitimate compensatory 
reasons. Under our proposed amendments to the third-party best-price 
rule, part of the consideration required for the exemption must be past 
or future services, or refraining from performing such services.
    The requirement in the proposed amendments to the third-party best-
price rule that the amounts payable under the employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangement must not be based on 
the number of securities the employee or director owns is intended to 
exclude from the exemption those types of arrangements to which the 
best-price rule is intended to apply. Specifically, if the payments to 
be made pursuant to an arrangement are proportional to or otherwise 
based on the number of securities held by the employee or director, 
then this relationship between the payment and the securities would 
defeat the purpose of the exemption and would, accordingly, subject the 
payments to the application of the third-party best-price rule.
    While the exemption that we have proposed specifically covers 
employment compensation, severance and other employee benefit 
arrangements and thus does not specifically extend to other 
arrangements, such as commercial arrangements, the fact that an 
arrangement does not fall within the exemption would not raise any 
inference that the arrangement constitutes consideration paid for 
securities tendered in a tender offer. We have proposed a new 
instruction to Rule 14d-10 to that effect.
    Request for comment:
     The proposed rule does not specifically define or refer to 
examples of employment compensation, severance or other employee 
benefit arrangements that would be captured in the exemption. Should we 
define these arrangements? If so, would a definition similar to 
Instruction 7(ii) to Item 402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K \47\ be helpful? 
Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to providing a definition, would 
it be more helpful if we gave examples? If so, what examples of 
employment compensation, severance and employee benefit arrangements 
should be included? Are we risking making the exemption too broad by 
providing a list of examples (e.g., would parties simply call the 
arrangement something in the list, even where it is some other 
arrangement entirely, in the hopes of triggering application of the 
exemption)?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ 17 CFR 229.402(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Should we include a list of non-exclusive factors in our 
proposed amendments to Rule 14d-10(c) to assist bidders and subject 
companies in making a determination as to whether an employment 
compensation, severance or employee benefit arrangement falls within 
the exemption? Such factors could include: Timing of the execution of 
the arrangements; timing of payments to be made pursuant to the 
arrangements; the reasonable and customary nature of the arrangements; 
endorsement or recommendation of the tender offer; and whether the 
arrangement is conditioned on tendering into the tender offer. Should 
we include additional factors or modify or exclude some of these 
proposed factors? Is there a certain factor or combination of factors 
that should always be present to conclude that an arrangement falls 
within the exemption? Should a certain factor or combination of factors 
be deemed dispositive as to whether an arrangement falls within the 
exemption? Would the inclusion of the non-exclusive factors be helpful 
in determining what arrangements fall within the exemption? Would some 
or all of these factors currently be considered by boards of directors 
and courts when deciding whether an arrangement falls within the 
exemption? If the non-exclusive factors were not included in the 
proposed rule, would it be helpful if a discussion of certain non-
exclusive factors were included in the adopting release?
     What would be the impact on the proposed rule if an 
exemption for commercial arrangements also was included in the best-
price rule? Should we expand the proposed amendment to Rule 14d-10(c) 
to cover any commercial arrangement (e.g. distribution rights 
arrangements) where the party received an economic benefit beyond the 
price

[[Page 76121]]

paid for the securities? Some commenters have raised this issue in 
their analysis of the judicial precedent to date. Are the proposed 
amendments to Rule 14d-10(a)(2) broad enough to provide commercial 
arrangements protection from the potential application of the best-
price rule?
     The proposed exemption would require that the arrangement 
relate to past or future services and matters incidental thereto. We 
solicit comment on the appropriateness of this requirement. 
Specifically, should we give guidance as to what evidence would be 
necessary to prove that the agreement or arrangement relates to past or 
future services? Is it clear what the clause ``matters incidental 
thereto'' would capture? Should we give guidance as to what this was 
intended to cover?
     The proposed exemption would require that the payments 
made pursuant to an arrangement not be based on the number of 
securities the employee or director owns or tenders. We solicit comment 
on the appropriateness of this requirement. For example, would it be 
helpful if we included the word ``specifically'' in front of the 
requirement ``based on the number of securities the employee or 
director owns or tenders?'' Should we give guidance as to what standard 
would be applied to avoid having payments be based on the number of 
securities owned or tendered?
     The proposed exemption would cover arrangements or 
agreements entered into with employees and directors of the subject 
company. Should the exemption be restricted to only such employees and 
directors? Is it possible that these types of arrangements or 
agreements would be entered into with employees and directors of the 
bidder?
     Would the proposed exemption help alleviate the litigation 
risk currently posed by the best-price rule? Would it make it less 
likely that cases involving a violation of the best-price rule survive 
a summary judgment motion, and, if so, is this preferable?
     Should we amend the issuer tender offer rules contained in 
Rule 13e-4 to provide a similar exemption? Are similar issues present 
in issuer tender offers, particularly where a going-private transaction 
is involved? Would the failure to include a similar exemption with 
respect to the issuer tender offer rules contained in Rule 13e-4 create 
a negative implication that employment compensation, severance and 
other employee benefit arrangements would or should be covered by the 
issuer best-price rule?
2. The Compensation Committee Safe Harbor
    To provide increased certainty to bidders and subject companies in 
connection with the application of the third-party best-price rule to 
employment compensation, severance and other employee benefit 
arrangements, we propose to amend Rule 14d-10(c) to include a non-
exclusive safe harbor provision. The safe harbor provision would allow 
the compensation committee or a committee performing similar functions 
of the subject company's or bidder's board of directors, depending on 
whether the subject company or the bidder is the party to the 
arrangement, to approve an employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangement and thus have it deemed to be an 
arrangement within the exemption of the proposed rule.\48\ The proposed 
safe harbor would require that the compensation committee or the 
committee performing similar functions be comprised solely of 
independent directors. Specifically, the proposals would add the 
following sentence to new proposed Rule 14d-10(c)(3):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Where the bidder or subject company does not have an 
established compensation committee, one or more directors who have 
been selected to form a committee that conducts similar functions as 
a compensation committee may be used for purposes of this safe 
harbor.

    For purposes of paragraph (c)(2) of this section, pursuant to 
this non-exclusive safe harbor, an arrangement shall be deemed an 
employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangement if it is approved as meeting the requirements of 
paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section by the compensation 
committee of the subject company's or bidder's (depending on whether 
the subject company or bidder is a party to the arrangement) board 
of directors. If that company's board of directors does not have a 
compensation committee, the arrangement shall be deemed an 
employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangement if it is so approved by the committee of that board of 
directors that performs functions similar to a compensation 
committee. In each circumstance, the arrangement shall be deemed an 
employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangement only if the approving compensation committee or the 
committee performing similar functions is comprised solely of 
independent directors.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See proposed Exchange Act Rule 14d-10(c)(3).

    We believe that this proposed non-exclusive safe harbor provision 
strikes a proper balance between the need for certainty in planning and 
structuring proposed acquisitions and the statutory purposes of the 
third-party best-price rule. The fiduciary duty requirements of board 
committee members, coupled with significant advances in the 
independence requirements for compensation committee members \50\ and 
recent advances in corporate governance, suggest that independent 
compensation committee members and groups of independent board members 
provide the necessary safeguards to approve as employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangements only arrangements that 
fall within those categories, and would be thus subject to the 
exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Release No. 34-48745 (Nov. 4, 
2003) [68 FR 64154]. See also 303A.05 of the New York Stock 
Exchange's Listed Company Manual (requiring the compensation 
committee to be comprised solely of independent directors); Rule 
4350(c) of the NASDAQ's Marketplace Rules for Listed Companies 
(requiring compensation to be approved by independent directors). 
While the NASD listing standards do not mandate the establishment of 
a compensation committee, they do require that the compensation of 
the CEO of a listed company be determined or recommended to the 
board by either a majority of the independent directors or a 
compensation committee comprised solely of independent directors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Any action by a compensation committee or other group of directors 
that violates a fiduciary duty generally would be an issue of state 
law.\51\ An approval in accordance with the proposed rule that 
comprised such a violation would, as a result, be subject to state law 
remedies but would not necessarily result in a violation of the third-
party best-price rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Smith 
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont 
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); In re The Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). See generally, 
Dennis J. Block, Stephen A. Radin and Nancy E. Barton, The Business 
Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors (5th ed.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We recognize that, under certain circumstances, security holders of 
the subject company may not be able to make a successful claim of a 
breach of fiduciary duty for actions taken by the bidder's compensation 
committee or other group of directors because fiduciary duties 
generally are not owed to prospective security holders.\52\ We do not 
believe that this eliminates the utility of the safe harbor because the 
bidder's directors are obligated to act in the best interests of the 
security holders of the bidder, who likely will remain security holders 
of the combined company. Further, security holders of the subject 
company may have breach of fiduciary duty remedies available where 
members of the subject company board of directors recommend that 
security

[[Page 76122]]

holders tender into a tender offer that contemplates employment 
compensation, severance or other employee benefit arrangements to be 
granted to employees or directors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See e.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 
545 A. 2d 1171 (Del. 1988), Sanders v. Devine, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
131 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of determining whether the members of the bidder's or 
the subject company's compensation committee or the committee 
performing similar functions are independent, we propose to include an 
instruction to Rule 14d-10(c)(3) providing that if the bidder or the 
subject company, as the case may be, is a listed issuer whose 
securities are listed on a registered national securities exchange or 
in an automated inter-dealer quotation system of a national securities 
association that has independence requirements for compensation 
committee members, the independence standards for compensation 
committee members as defined in the listing standards applicable to 
listed issuers should be used. Alternatively, if the bidder or the 
subject company is not a listed issuer, in determining whether a member 
of the compensation committee is independent, the bidder or subject 
company would use a definition of independence of a national securities 
exchange or a national securities association, so long as whatever 
definition is chosen is used consistently for all members of the 
compensation committee.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ This approach is consistent with the disclosure 
requirements regarding nominating committee member independence 
contained in Item 7 of Schedule 14A (17 CFR 240.14a-101).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Request for comment:
     We have proposed that either the bidder's or the subject 
company's (depending which entity is a party) compensation committee or 
similar committee would be allowed to approve the arrangement. Will the 
respective state law fiduciary duties protect security holders' 
interests in these arrangements? For example, is it clear that the 
compensation committee members of the entity approving an arrangement 
will owe fiduciary duties to the security holders of that entity? If 
the compensation committee of the bidder does not owe fiduciary duties 
to subject company shareholders, are there alternative remedies 
available to protect their interests? What if the arrangement that is 
entered into between the subject company and the employee or director 
provides for payment over an extended period of time? Would that 
implicate a fiduciary duty of the bidder to its security holders for 
future obligations? Are there other state law protections apart from 
those arising from fiduciary duties? Can the safe harbor be modified to 
work better with state law protections?
     Could the proposed safe harbor be relied on in both 
negotiated or ``friendly'' tender offers and unsolicited or ``hostile'' 
tender offers? Should changes be made to the language of the proposed 
safe harbor to make it clear that the safe harbor can or cannot be 
relied on in hostile transactions? Would the hostile nature of a 
takeover preclude the ability to negotiate arrangements that would 
involve additional consideration that would violate the best-price 
rule?
     For those companies, such as small business issuers, that 
may not have established a compensation committee or a committee 
performing similar functions, would full board approval provide an 
equally useful standard in establishing that the arrangement falls 
within the safe harbor? If so, would it matter whether or not the full 
board was comprised of at least a majority of independent directors, 
utilizing the independence standard provided in the instruction to the 
proposed safe harbor?
     The proposed safe harbor benefits are available only if 
the arrangements are approved by the compensation committee or a 
committee performing similar functions. Should the language of the safe 
harbor require, as a basis for reliance on the safe harbor, approval of 
specific arrangements? Are there circumstances under which approval for 
entire plans or arrangements would be sufficient? Do bidders in a 
tender offer enter into employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangements with officers or directors of the subject 
company without first obtaining compensation committee approval? Do 
compensation committees generally set broad parameters that the 
officers of the company use when negotiating and entering into 
compensation arrangements?
     Should we address specifically the timing of the approval 
of the compensation committee (or the committee performing similar 
functions) of arrangements for purposes of the safe harbor? Should 
benefits granted or to be granted to an employee or director in 
connection with a tender offer pursuant to existing employment 
compensation, severance or other employee benefit arrangements that 
were approved by the compensation committee or the full board of 
directors when adopted be eligible for the safe harbor protections? If 
the proposal is adopted, should the safe harbor have retroactive 
applicability? If so, should the safe harbor be available for 
arrangements approved not sooner than, for example, the date the 
changes to the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange 
requiring that the compensation committee be comprised solely of 
independent directors were adopted, or is some other date appropriate?
     If a member of the compensation committee or a committee 
performing similar functions is a party to the employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangement, should the safe harbor 
still be available? Should the safe harbor address recusal or leave it 
to the committee members to determine how to handle this or similar 
situations that may arise?
     Is the independence test that is tied to the listing 
standards sufficient? Should we define ``independent'' by some other 
standard? Should the subject company directors also be independent from 
the bidder? Should we consider using the Non-Employee Director standard 
used in Rule 16b-3(d)? \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ 17 CFR 240.16b-3(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     How would the independence test affect bidders that are 
foreign private issuers? Should we consider an alternative standard for 
foreign private issuers? Will the fiduciary duties of the members of 
the compensation committee of a foreign private issuer adequately serve 
to ensure that the agreement or arrangement falls within the exemption?
     Should we consider allowing the compensation committee or 
the committee performing similar functions to rely exclusively on the 
opinion of a compensation consultant in making its determination that 
an agreement or arrangement falls within the exemption for purposes of 
the proposed best-price rule amendments?
     If a bidder or subject company intended to rely on the 
proposed safe harbor, is it clear, based on existing rules and 
regulations, whether such reliance would be required to be disclosed in 
the tender offer documents? If not, should a specific requirement be 
adopted to ensure that adequate disclosure would be made to the 
security holders? Should reliance on the safe harbor be conditioned on 
corresponding disclosure by the bidder or subject company, as 
appropriate, about how the safe harbor was satisfied, including what 
factors were used in determining that the arrangement was deemed an 
employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangement?
     If we were to include a list of non-exclusive factors in 
our proposed amendments to Rule 14d-10(c) to assist bidders and subject 
companies in making a determination as to whether

[[Page 76123]]

an employee compensation, severance or employee benefit arrangement 
falls within the exemption, should we require that the compensation 
committee, or a committee performing similar functions, examine the 
non-exclusive factors in connection with its determination as to what 
arrangements fall within the exemption for purposes of the safe harbor?
     To what extent would the proposed safe harbor provide 
bidders and subject companies with an adequate means to avoid 
implicating the best-price rule when it comes to employment 
compensation, severance and other employee benefit arrangements? Is 
there a risk that the proposed safe harbor would merely shift scrutiny 
by the courts to the determination as to whether the compensation 
committee has properly exercised its duties? Is that an appropriate 
outcome? Should approval that a court determines violates a fiduciary 
duty result in loss of the safe harbor? Will the fiduciary duties of 
the members of the compensation committee or a committee performing 
similar functions adequately serve to ensure that the agreement or 
arrangement falls within the exemption? Are there impediments to 
seeking judicial review of a determination that the agreement or 
arrangement falls within the exemption? Will the bidder's incentive to 
consummate a transaction impede the compensation committee members' 
exercise of their fiduciary duties? Will the fact that the members of 
the subject company's compensation committee may not be part of the 
ongoing business operation after the consummation of the transaction 
impede the exercise of their fiduciary duties?
    General request for comment:
     Would the proposed amendments accomplish the goal of 
clarifying the scope of Rule 14d-10? If not, what other or additional 
language would accomplish this goal more effectively?
     Should we amend the issuer best-price rules as well as the 
third-party best-price rules? Are there issues that differ in issuer 
tender offers such that we should not consider making uniform changes 
to both sets of best-price rules? Would the failure to make uniform 
changes to both sets of best-price rules create any implication that 
employment compensation, severance and other employee benefit 
arrangements, as well as other commercial arrangements, would or should 
be covered by the issuer best-price rule? How should we address any 
such implication?
     Would it be appropriate to also include a de minimis 
exclusion to the best-price rule? For example, would it be appropriate 
to carve out of the application of Rule 14d-10 the negotiation or 
execution of any employment compensation, severance or other employee 
benefit arrangement with an employee or director of the subject company 
who, together with any affiliates, beneficially owns less than a 
nominal threshold amount (e.g., 1% of the class of securities that is 
the subject of the tender offer)?

III. Request for Comment

    Any interested persons wishing to submit written comments on the 
proposals, as well as on other matters that might have an impact on the 
proposals, are requested to do so. We solicit comments from the point 
of view of bidders, subject companies, other participants in 
transactions, security holders of bidders and subject companies and 
other investors.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

    We have not prepared a submission to the Office of Management and 
Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 because the proposals 
do not impose recordkeeping or information collection requirements, or 
other collections of information requiring the approval of the Office 
of Management and Budget.

V. Cost-Benefit Analysis

    The overall objective of the proposed reforms is to make it clear 
that employment compensation, severance and other employee benefit 
arrangements between subject company employees or directors and the 
subject company or bidder are not captured by the application of the 
best-price rule. We also seek to alleviate the uncertainty bidders and 
subject companies face in planning and structuring third-party and 
issuer tender offers due to varying judicial interpretations of the 
best-price rule. Finally, we want to remove any unwarranted incentive 
to structure transactions as statutory mergers, to which the best-price 
rule does not apply, instead of tender offers, to which it does apply.

A. Benefits

    We believe that the proposed rules would benefit bidders because 
the amendments would have the effect of correcting unintended 
consequences of the present regulatory scheme, which has been 
interpreted by certain courts to include compensation merely due to the 
time in which the compensation was offered or paid. Further, the 
proposed safe harbor would provide bidders and subject companies with 
the ability to ensure that the compensation being awarded to employees 
and directors of the subject company does not run afoul of the best-
price rule by providing greater certainty as to the situations in which 
the compensation being granted is outside the rule. Finally, these 
amendments also would provide parties that are in the process of 
negotiating mergers and acquisitions with greater flexibility in 
determining which structure they choose to effectuate the transaction.
    Presently, a split by courts in their interpretation of the best-
price rule has left bidders with uncertainty as to the application of 
the best-price rule. Because the proposed amendments to the best-price 
rule are intended to clarify the application of the best-price rule, 
thereby mitigating the uncertainty of potential litigation risk, the 
costs of litigation being avoided could be significant. We believe that 
this serves as the primary benefit of the proposed amendment as the 
costs of litigation borne by security holders of bidders choosing to 
engage in tender offers where the best-price rule is applicable could 
be avoided.
    The proposed amendments also would benefit security holders in that 
the proposed changes accomplish the aforementioned purposes without 
undermining the statutory objective of ensuring that all tendering 
security holders are paid the highest consideration paid to any other 
security holder tendering into the offer. Without the proposed 
amendments, bidders, subject companies and security holders may have 
difficulty determining what constitutes the ``highest consideration'' 
when bidders conduct a tender offer at the same time employees or 
directors of the subject company enter into employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangements with the bidder or 
subject company.
    We do not believe that clarification of the best-price rule by 
virtue of the proposed amendments is likely to result in a modification 
of behavior on the part of bidders or subject companies in entering 
into employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangements with employees or directors. We do, however, believe that 
the proposed amendments may provide bidders and subject companies with 
more options when they are determining a means to accomplish mergers 
and acquisitions. Absent the changes being proposed to the best-price 
rule, we understand that some bidders have avoided engaging in tender 
offers for fear of being subject to litigation regarding the 
application of the best-price rule.

[[Page 76124]]

    We solicit quantitative data to assist our assessment of the 
benefits of the amendments to the best-price rule.

B. Costs

    We note that the conduct the proposed rule prohibits already is 
prohibited by the existing rule and related statute. Therefore, the 
amended best-price rule does not add any additional requirements. 
Rather, it more clearly prohibits certain conduct by clarifying the 
language of the best-price rule and adds a means by which bidders can 
ensure, via a safe harbor, that they are complying with the rule. In 
that regard, compliance with the best-price rule could be achieved in 
the same manner and by the same persons responsible for compliance 
under the current rule. We understand that, to take advantage of the 
safe harbor, bidders and subject companies may need to take extra steps 
to ensure compliance with the rule, but such compliance could entail a 
relatively small burden. Most bidders and subject companies already are 
required to have a compensation committee or a committee performing 
similar functions, so the cost of forming, organizing and convening a 
committee should be a cost that already is being incurred by the bidder 
or subject company. Further, it may be likely that many bidders or 
subject companies already ensure that their compensation committee or a 
committee performing similar functions approve employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangements. Such bidders or 
subject companies likely would not incur additional costs to comply 
with the best-price rule and, for those that are not already engaging 
their compensation committee to perform this function, the cost should 
be limited to the time and expense associated with reviewing the 
specific arrangement and holding a meeting of the committee.
    While we believe that the proposed changes to the best-price rule 
and, more specifically, the safe harbor, would provide increased 
certainty to bidders and subject companies in structuring tender 
offers, the proposed rule does not eliminate the potential costs of 
litigation entirely, including those that arise under state law. 
Security holders may claim that members of the compensation committee 
or a committee performing similar functions have breached their state 
fiduciary duties owed to security holders in approving employment 
compensation, severance or employee benefit arrangements entered in 
connection with a tender offer. Whether such behavior will be 
identifiable on the part of potential plaintiffs such that a successful 
claim can be made against members of the board of directors for breach 
of their fiduciary duties in approving the arrangement is uncertain. As 
a result, the potential costs associated with identifying the alleged 
illegal behavior and bringing a claim of liability could be imposed on 
potential plaintiffs. However, such costs currently would exist to the 
extent transactions are structured not to be tender offers.
    Overall, we believe that the proposed amendments to the rule would 
impose minimal costs, if any, on bidders and subject companies and 
would support investor protection.
     What are the direct and indirect costs associated with the 
proposed rules?
     Would there be increased costs for compliance with the 
best-price rule in order to take advantage of the proposed safe harbor 
or are companies already implementing the steps necessary to take 
advantage of the proposed safe harbor, such that no additional costs 
would be applicable to the proposed amendment to the rule?
     Would there be increased costs associated with shifting 
the litigation from claims of violations of the best-price rule under 
federal law as compared to claims of breach of fiduciary duties under 
state law? What is the implication for such costs given that such 
litigation currently arises under state law for transactions that are 
structured not to be tender offers?
     We solicit quantitative data to assist our assessment of 
the costs associated with compliance with the best-price rule.

C. Small Business Issuers

    Although the proposed rules apply to small business issuers, we do 
not anticipate any disproportionate impact on small business issuers. 
Like other issuers, small business issuers should incur relatively 
minor compliance costs, and should find it unnecessary to hire extra 
personnel. The issues of equal treatment among security holders in the 
context of tender offers affect small companies as much as they affect 
large companies. Thus, we do not believe that applying the proposed 
rules to small business issuers would be inconsistent with the policies 
underlying the small business issuer disclosure system.

VI. Consideration of Burden on Competition and Promotion of Efficiency, 
Competition and Capital Formation

    Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act \55\ and Section 2(c) \56\ of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 \57\ require the Commission, whenever it 
engages in rulemaking, to consider or determine if an action is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and to consider whether 
the action would promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. In addition, Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires 
the Commission, when making rules under the Exchange Act, to consider 
the impact such rules would have on competition.\58\ Exchange Act 
Section 23(a)(2) prohibits the Commission from adopting any rule that 
would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \56\ 5 U.S.C. 80a-2(c).
    \57\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et. seq.
    \58\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to the best-price rule are intended to 
improve on market efficiency by providing greater clarity to bidders, 
subject companies and security holders as to the situations in which 
compliance with the best-price rule has been met. This would facilitate 
the planning and negotiation of tender offers by clarifying the 
application of the best-price rule when an employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangement is expected to be 
entered into.
    As to the impact on competition, the proposed amendments to the 
best-price rule are intended to have a positive impact on competition 
for the same reasons that the proposed amendments would have a positive 
impact on market efficiency--companies desiring to merge with or 
acquire another company by conducting a tender offer would have the 
benefit of the amendments to the best-price rule that more clearly 
delineate the instances in which the negotiation or execution of 
employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangements would not run afoul of the requirements of the best-price 
rule. It is possible, however, that because bidders and subject 
companies may desire to take advantage of the amendment to the best-
price rule that provides for a safe harbor where the compensation 
committee, or committee performing similar functions, approves the 
arrangement, bidders and subject companies may need to reevaluate 
whether they have adequate policies and procedures in place for their 
compensation committee. Bidders and subject companies that do not 
consider using the safe harbor may be at a competitive disadvantage as 
compared to those bidders and subject companies that do because, absent 
the safe harbor, bidders and subject companies are

[[Page 76125]]

potentially subject to lawsuits alleging a violation of the best-price 
rule if they negotiate or execute employment compensation, severance or 
other employee benefit arrangements that are outside the terms of the 
safe harbor.
    In this regard, we request comment regarding the degree to which 
our proposed changes to the best-price rule would create competitively 
harmful effects on public companies, and how to minimize those effects.
    The proposed amendments should promote capital formation since the 
amendments seek to eliminate the uncertainty caused by the varying 
judicial interpretations of the best-price rule, which would remove any 
disincentive to the use of tender offers as a means to accomplish 
mergers and acquisitions. The clarifications to the best-price rule 
would have the added effect of leveling the regulatory playing field 
between statutory mergers and tenders offers, which we understand has 
been disfavored recently in favor of statutory mergers because the 
best-price rule is not applicable to statutory mergers. Further, for 
similar reasons, these proposed amendments would promote investor 
confidence in the tender offer context, as well as in the market as a 
whole, which would further contribute to capital formation. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the safe harbor exclusion from the 
amended best-price rule may serve to impede capital formation because 
of the additional time that may need to be spent in ensuring that the 
compensation committee or committee performing similar functions 
approves the employment compensation, severance or employee benefit 
arrangement. We believe, however, that any additional time and effort 
that may be expended in order to take advantage of the safe harbor from 
the best-price rule would be appropriate in order to ensure that the 
best-price rule continues to serve its purpose in ensuring equal 
treatment among security holders.
    The possibility of these effects, their magnitude, if they were to 
occur, and the extent to which they would be offset by the costs of the 
proposals are difficult to quantify, and we request comment on how the 
proposed amendments to the best-price rule, if adopted, would affect 
efficiency and capital formation. Where empirical data or other factual 
support is available, we encourage commenters to provide it.

VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    This Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis has been prepared 
in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603. It relates to proposed revisions to 
the best-price rule under the Exchange Act to clarify that the rule 
applies only with respect to the consideration offered and paid for 
securities tendered in an issuer or third-party tender offer and should 
not apply to consideration offered and paid according to employment 
compensation, severance or other employee benefit arrangements entered 
into with employees or directors of the subject company.

A. Reasons for the Proposed Action

    The best-price rule was adopted originally to assure fair and equal 
treatment of all security holders of the class of securities that are 
the subject of a tender offer by requiring that the consideration paid 
to any security holder is the highest paid to any other security holder 
in the tender offer. We are proposing amendments to the best-price rule 
for three reasons.
    First, we want to make it clear that compensatory arrangements 
between employees and directors and the subject company or bidder are 
not captured by the application of the best-price rule. We believe that 
amounts paid pursuant to employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangements should not be deemed included in the 
consideration paid for tendered securities. These payments are made for 
a different purpose that is compensatory in nature in exchange for 
services rendered or that is related to severance or similar events.
    Second, since the adoption of the best-price rule, it has been the 
basis for litigation brought in connection with tender offers in which 
it is claimed that the best-price rule was violated as a result of the 
bidder in a tender offer entering into new, or adopting the subject 
company's pre-existing, employment compensation, severance or other 
employee benefit arrangements with security holders of the subject 
company. In the process of resolving these claims, courts have 
interpreted the best-price rule in different ways. We are proposing 
changes to the rule to alleviate the uncertainty that the various 
interpretations of the best-price rule by courts have produced.
    Finally, we want to reduce any unwarranted incentive to structure 
transactions as statutory mergers, to which the best-price rule does 
not apply, instead of tender offers, to which it does apply. We 
understand that the uncertainty regarding the application of the best-
price rule has made parties reluctant to utilize tender offers as a 
means to accomplish extraordinary transactions, and we believe the 
proposed changes to the rule would alleviate the need for this 
reluctance.

B. Objectives

    The overall objective of the proposed reforms is to make it clear 
that employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangements between employees and directors of the subject company or 
bidder are not captured by the application of the best-price rule. We 
also seek to alleviate the uncertainty bidders and subject companies 
face in planning and structuring third-party and issuer tender offers 
due to varying judicial interpretations of the best-price rule. 
Finally, we want to remove any unwarranted incentive to structure 
transactions as statutory mergers, to which the best-price rule does 
not apply, instead of tender offers, to which it does apply.
    First, we propose to clarify that the best-price rule applies only 
with respect to the consideration offered and paid for securities 
tendered in a tender offer. Second, we propose amending the rule in the 
context of third-party tender offers to make it clear that the 
negotiation, execution or amendment of payments made or to be made or 
benefits granted or to be granted according to employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangements that are entered into 
by the bidder or the subject company with current or future employees 
or directors of the subject company were never intended to trigger the 
best-price rule. Lastly, to give additional comfort to parties entering 
into employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangements, we propose to add a safe harbor to assist parties in the 
determination of whether such arrangements are outside the best-price 
rule. These modifications to the best-price rule would provide greater 
certainty to the parties in structuring the terms of tender offers and 
would also give security holders greater confidence that the best-price 
rule is continuing to ensure equal treatment among security holders.

C. Legal Basis

    We are proposing amendments to the best-price rule under Sections 
3(b), 10, 13, 14, 23(a) and 36 of the Exchange Act, as amended, and 
Section 23(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

D. Small Entities Subject to the Proposed Rules

    The proposed changes to the best-price rule would affect issuers 
that are

[[Page 76126]]

small entities. Exchange Act Rule 0-10(a) \59\ defines an issuer, other 
than an investment company, to be a ``small business'' or ``small 
organization'' for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act if it had 
total assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its most recent 
fiscal year. An investment company is considered to be a ``small 
business'' or ``small organization'' if it, together with other 
investment companies in the same group of related investment companies, 
has net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its most recent 
fiscal year.\60\ We estimate that there were approximately 3,500 public 
issuers, other than investment companies, that may be considered small 
entities. We estimate that there are approximately 240 investment 
companies that may be considered small entities. Of these 240 
investment companies that may be considered small entities, we estimate 
that 97 are closed-end investment companies, including closed-end 
investment companies electing to be treated as business development 
companies, as defined in Section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940,\61\ that may be affected by these proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ 17 CFR 240.0-10(a).
    \60\ 17 CFR 270.0-10.
    \61\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(48).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission received a total of 362 issuer and 110 third-party 
tender offer schedules in its 2005 fiscal year. We estimate that 13 of 
the issuer tender offer schedules were issuer tender offers that were 
filed by subject companies that were small entities, including 
investment companies. We further estimate that 41 of those tender offer 
schedules were third-party tender offers where the subject companies 
were small entities, including investment companies. Therefore, as 
discussed below, we believe that the proposals would affect a limited 
number of small entities that are reporting companies. However, we 
request comment on the number of small entities that would be impacted 
by our proposals, including any available empirical data.

E. Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements

    The proposed changes to the best-price rule are expected to result 
in minimal additional costs to all bidders and subject companies, large 
or small. Because the current best-price rule already requires bidders 
to ensure that the consideration paid to any security holder pursuant 
to the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other 
security holder during such tender offer, the proposed changes to the 
best-price rule should not impose significant additional costs, if any, 
and should not require any additional professional skills. Thus, the 
task of complying with the proposed changes could be performed by the 
same person or group of persons responsible for compliance under the 
current rules at a minimal incremental cost.
    We understand that one aspect of the proposed changes, the safe 
harbor, may impose extra steps on the bidder and/or subject company to 
ensure compliance with the safe harbor, and such compliance could 
entail new costs. Most bidders and subject companies already are 
required to have a compensation committee or a committee performing 
similar functions, so the cost of forming and organizing a committee 
should be a cost that is already being incurred by the bidder or 
subject company. This is particularly the case where the bidder or 
subject company either has a class of securities listed on a registered 
national securities exchange or on an automated inter-dealer quotation 
system of a national securities association because the listing 
standards of each generally impose certain requirements regarding the 
formation and composition of the members of the board of directors and 
its committees.
    Small entities or organizations might be less likely to have a 
class of securities listed on a registered national securities exchange 
or on an automated inter-dealer quotation system of a national 
securities association. As a result, it is possible that small entities 
or organizations would be less likely to have the pre-existing 
infrastructure in place for compensation committees or a committee 
performing similar functions to approve employment compensation, 
severance or other employee benefit arrangements. Such small entities 
or organizations would likely incur additional costs to take advantage 
of the safe harbor. The cost, however, should be limited to the expense 
of organizing a committee, reviewing the specific arrangement and 
holding a meeting of the committee. Further, bidders and subject 
companies that are small entities or organizations would not be 
required to take advantage of the safe harbor, so any additional 
expenses that may be incurred, if any, would be optional on the part of 
the small entity or organization. Therefore, the proposed rule would 
likely have virtually no adverse impact upon small entities.
    We encourage written comments regarding this analysis. We solicit 
comments as to whether the proposed changes could have an effect that 
we have not considered. We request that commenters describe the nature 
of any impact on small entities and provide empirical data to support 
the extent of the impact.

F. Duplicative, Overlapping or Conflicting Federal Rules

    We believe that there are no rules that conflict with or completely 
duplicate the proposed changes to the best-price rule.

G. Significant Alternatives

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs us to consider significant 
alternatives that would accomplish the stated objective, while 
minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entities. In 
connection with the proposals, we considered the following 
alternatives:
    1. Establishing different compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources of small entities;
    2. The clarification, consolidation, or simplification of the 
compliance or reporting requirements for small entities;
    3. The use of performance rather than design standards; and
    4. An exemption for small entities from coverage of the best-price 
rule, or any part thereof, for small entities.
    We have considered a variety of reforms to achieve our regulatory 
objectives. However, we believe that the original intent of the best-
price rule, to require equal treatment of security holders, would not 
be served by a best-price rule that applied only to bidders and subject 
companies of a certain size. Further, we believe that in order to 
alleviate the uncertainty that the parties to tender offers face, 
uniform rules applicable to all bidders and subject companies, 
regardless of size, is necessary. Therefore, the establishment of 
different requirements for small entities would not be practicable, nor 
would it be in the public interest. For similar reasons, the 
clarification, consolidation or simplification of the compliance and 
reporting requirements for small entities also would not be 
practicable.
    Although the best-price rule generally employs performance 
standards rather than design standards, the proposed changes to the 
rule would implement certain design standards in order to clarify that 
the rule should not apply where employment compensation, severance or 
other employee benefit arrangements are made or will be made or have 
been granted or will be granted. The implementation of design standards 
in this case, however, would be more useful to bidders and subject 
companies because the circumstances in which the

[[Page 76127]]

best-price rule is applicable would be delineated more clearly. This 
would provide greater certainty in the application of the rule and the 
enforcement of the application of the rule. Therefore, implementing 
design rather than performance standards in the application of the rule 
appears to be more effective in ensuring compliance with the proposed 
rule.
    The majority of bidders and subject companies that engage in tender 
offers and are subject to the best-price rule are not small entities. 
Further, where small entities are bidders and/or subject companies in 
the tender offer, the proposed changes to the best-price rule, in 
general, and the invocation of the safe harbor, in particular, impose 
minimal additional costs or burdens so exempting small entities from 
the best-price rule altogether would not be justified in this context.

H. Solicitation of comments

    We encourage the submission of comments with respect to any aspect 
of this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. In particular, we 
request comments regarding:
    1. The number of small entities that may be affected by the 
proposals;
    2. The existence or nature of the potential impact of the proposed 
changes on small entities discussed in the analysis; and
    3. How to quantify the impact of the proposed revisions.
    Such comments will be considered in the preparation of the Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, or in the alternative, a certification 
under Section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, if the proposed 
changes are adopted, and will be placed in the same public file as 
comments on the proposed amendments themselves.

VIII. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996, or (SBREFA),\62\ we must advise the Office of Management 
and Budget as to whether the proposed amendments constitute a ``major'' 
rule. Under SBREFA, a rule is considered ``major'' where, if adopted, 
it results or is likely to result in:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Pub. L. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
     A major increase in costs or prices for consumers or 
individual industries; or
     Significant adverse effects on competition, investment, or 
innovation.
    We request comment on the potential impact of the proposed 
amendments on the U.S. economy on an annual basis, any potential 
increase in costs or prices for consumers or individual industries, and 
any potential effect on competition, investment or innovation. 
Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and other factual 
support for their view to the extent possible.

IX. Statutory Basis

    The amendments to the best-price rule are proposed pursuant to 
Sections 3(b), 10, 13, 14, 23(a) and 36 of the Exchange Act, as 
amended, and Section 23(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as 
amended.

X. Text of the Proposed Amendments

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 240

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

    In accordance with the foregoing, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission proposes to amend Title 17, chapter II of the Code of 
Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

    1. The authority citation for Part 240 continues to read, in part, 
as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78d, 78e, 78f, 78g, 78i, 
78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o, 78p, 78q, 78s, 78u-5, 
78w, 78x, 78ll, 78mm, 79q, 79t, 80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-
3, 80b-4, 80b-11, and 7201 et seq.; and 18 U.S.C. 1350, unless 
otherwise noted.
* * * * *
    2. Amend Sec.  240.13e-4 by revising paragraph (f)(8)(ii) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  240.13e-4  Tender offers by issuers.

* * * * *
    (f) * * *
    (8) * * *
    (ii) The consideration paid to any security holder for securities 
tendered in the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any 
other security holder for securities tendered in the tender offer.
* * * * *
    3. Amend Sec.  240.14d-10 by revising paragraphs (a)(2), (c) and 
(d)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  240.14d-10  Equal treatment of security holders.

    (a) * * *
    (2) The consideration paid to any security holder for securities 
tendered in the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any 
other security holder for securities tendered in the tender offer.
* * * * *
    (c) Paragraph (a)(2) of this section shall not prohibit:
    (1) The offer of more than one type of consideration in a tender 
offer, where:
    (i) Security holders are afforded equal right to elect among each 
of the types of consideration offered; and
    (ii) The highest consideration of each type paid to any security 
holder is paid to any other security holder receiving that type of 
consideration.
    (2) The negotiation, execution or amendment of an employment 
compensation, severance or other employee benefit arrangement, or 
payments made or to be made or benefits granted or to be granted 
according to such arrangements, with respect to employees and directors 
of the subject company, where the amount payable under the arrangement:
    (i) Relates solely to past services performed or future services to 
be performed or refrained from performing, by the employee or director 
(and matters incidental thereto); and
    (ii) Is not based on the number of securities the employee or 
director owns or tenders.

    Instruction to paragraph (c)(2): The fact that the exemption in 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section extends only to employment 
compensation, severance and other employee benefit arrangements and 
not to other arrangements, such as commercial arrangements, does not 
raise any inference that a payment under any such other arrangement 
constitutes consideration paid for securities in a tender offer.

    (3) For purposes of paragraph (c)(2) of this section, pursuant to 
this non-exclusive safe harbor, an arrangement shall be deemed an 
employment compensation, severance or other employee benefit 
arrangement if it is approved as meeting the requirements of paragraphs 
(c)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section by the compensation committee of the 
subject company's or bidder's (depending on whether the subject company 
or bidder is a party to the arrangement) board of directors. If that 
company's board of directors does not have a compensation committee, 
the arrangement shall be deemed an employment compensation, severance 
or other employee benefit arrangement if it is so approved by the 
committee of that board of directors that performs functions similar to 
a compensation committee. In each circumstance, the arrangement shall 
be deemed an employment compensation, severance or other employee 
benefit arrangement only if the approving compensation committee or the 
committee performing

[[Page 76128]]

similar functions is comprised solely of independent directors.

    Instruction to paragraph (c)(3): For purposes of determining 
whether the members of the bidder's or subject company's 
compensation committee or the committee performing similar functions 
are independent, the following provisions shall apply:
    1. If the bidder or subject company, as applicable, is a listed 
issuer (as defined in Sec.  240.10A-3) whose securities are listed 
on a national securities exchange registered pursuant to section 
6(a) of the Act or in an automated inter-dealer quotation system of 
a national securities association registered pursuant to section 
15A(a) of the Act that has independence requirements for 
compensation committee members, apply the independence standards for 
compensation committee members as defined in the listing standards 
applicable to listed issuers; or
    2. If the bidder or subject company, as applicable, is not a 
listed issuer (as defined in Sec.  240.10A-3), in determining 
whether a member of the compensation committee is independent, the 
bidder or subject company, as applicable, shall use a definition of 
independence of a national securities exchange registered pursuant 
to section 6(a) of the Act or a national securities association 
registered pursuant to section 15A(a) of the Act that has been 
approved by the Commission (as that definition may be modified or 
supplemented). Whatever definition the bidder or subject company, as 
applicable, chooses, it must apply that definition consistently to 
all members of the compensation committee or the committee 
performing similar functions.

    (d) * * *
    (2) Paragraph (c)(1) of this section shall not operate to require 
the bidder to offer or pay the alternative form of consideration to 
security holders in any other state.
* * * * *

    Dated: December 16, 2005.

    By the Commission.

Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 05-24359 Filed 12-21-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8010-01-P
