
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 146 (Friday, July 29, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 50067-50129]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-16938]



[[Page 50067]]

Vol. 81

Friday,

No. 146

July 29, 2016

Part II





Department of Transportation





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





49 CFR Parts 130, 171, 173, et al.





Hazardous Materials: Oil Spill Response Plans and Information Sharing 
for High-Hazard Flammable Trains; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 146 / Friday, July 29, 2016 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 50068]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 130, 171, 173, and 174

[Docket No. PHMSA-2014-0105 (HM-251B)]
RIN 2137-AF08


Hazardous Materials: Oil Spill Response Plans and Information 
Sharing for High-Hazard Flammable Trains

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with the Federal Railroad 
Administration, is issuing this NPRM to propose revisions to 
regulations that would expand the applicability of comprehensive oil 
spill response plans (OSRPs) based on thresholds of liquid petroleum 
oil that apply to an entire train consist. Specifically, we are 
proposing to expand the applicability for comprehensive OSRPs so that 
any railroad that transports a single train carrying 20 or more loaded 
tank cars of liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block or a single 
train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of liquid petroleum oil 
throughout the train consist must also have a current comprehensive 
written OSRP. We are further proposing to revise the format and clarify 
the requirements of a comprehensive OSRP (e.g., requiring that covered 
railroads develop response zones describing resources available to 
arrive onsite to a worst-case discharge, or the substantial threat of 
one, which are located within 12 hours of each point along the route 
used by trains subject to the comprehensive OSRP). We also solicit 
comment on defining high volume areas and staging resources using 
alternative response times, including shorter response times for spills 
that could affect such high volume areas. Further, in accordance with 
the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015, this action 
proposes to require railroads to share information about high-hazard 
flammable train operations with state and tribal emergency response 
commissions to improve community preparedness and seeks comments on 
these proposals. Lastly, PHMSA is proposing to incorporate by reference 
an initial boiling point test for flammable liquids from the ASTM D7900 
method referenced in the American National Standards Institute/American 
Petroleum Institute Recommend Practices 3000, ``Classifying and Loading 
of Crude Oil into Rail Tank Cars,'' First Edition, September 2014 as an 
acceptable testing alternative to the boiling point tests currently 
specified in the HMR. PHMSA believes providing this additional boiling 
test option provides regulatory flexibility and promotes enhanced 
safety in transport through accurate packing group assignment.

DATES: Comments must be received by September 27, 2016. We are 
proposing a mandatory compliance date of 60 days after the date of 
publication of a final rule in the Federal Register. In this NPRM, we 
solicit comments from interested persons regarding the feasibility of 
the proposed compliance date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number, 
PHMSA-2014-0105 (HM-251B), by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management System; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing 
Symbol M-30, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: To the Docket Management System; Room W12-
140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number for this notice at the beginning of the comment. To avoid 
duplication, please use only one of these four methods. All comments 
received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov 
and will include any personal information you provide.
    Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or 
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket 
Operations Office located at U.S. Department of Transportation, West 
Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.
    Privacy Act: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits 
comment from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT 
posts these comments, without edit, to http://www.regulations.gov, as 
described in the system of records notice, DOT/ALL-14 FDMS, which is 
accessible through www.dot.gov/privacy. To facilitate comments tracking 
and response, we encourage commenters to provide their name or the name 
of their organization; however, submission of names is completely 
optional. Whether or not commenters identify themselves, all timely 
filed comments will be fully considered. If you wish to provide 
comments containing proprietary or confidential information, please 
contact the agency for alternate submission instructions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Victoria Lehman, (202) 366-8553, 
Standards and Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001; or Karl Alexy, (202) 493-
6245, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad 
Administration.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Abbreviations and Terms

AAR Association of American Railroads
ACP Area Contingency Plan
ANPRM Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
CDT Central Daylight Time
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
Crude Oil Petroleum crude oil
CST Central Standard Time
CWA Clean Water Act (See Federal Water Pollution Control Act)
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
DOI Department of the Interior
DOT Department of Transportation
EDT Eastern Daylight Time
E.O. Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
ESA Environmentally Sensitive/Significant Area (See Endangered 
Species Act)
EST Eastern Standard Time
FAST Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FR Federal Register
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act (See Clean Water Act)
HHFT High Hazard Flammable Train
HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations (See 49 CFR parts 171-180)
HMT Hazardous Materials Table (See 49 CFR 172.101)
IBP Initial Boiling Point

[[Page 50069]]

ICP Integrated Contingency Plan
LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee
MDT Mountain Daylight Time
NASTTPO National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials
NCP National Contingency Plan
NIMS National Incident Management System
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPA 90 Oil Pollution Act of 1990
OSC On-Scene Coordinator
OSRP Oil Spill Response Plan
PG Packing Group
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
PREP National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program
RCP Regional Contingency Plan
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RP Recommended Practice
RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration
SERC State Emergency Response Commission
TERC Tribal Emergency Response Commission
TRANSCAER Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TTCI Transportation Technology Center Inc.
U.S.C. United States Code
USCG United States Coast Guard
USFA United States Fire Administration

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
    A. Oil Spill Response Plans
    B. Information Sharing
    C. Initial Boiling Point Test
II. Background
    A. Current Oil Spill Response Requirements
    B. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    C. Summary of Proposed Oil Spill Response Requirements
    D. Related Actions
    E. HHFT Information Sharing Notification
    F. Security and Confidentiality for HHFT Information Sharing 
Notification
    G. Initial Boiling Point Test
III. Recent Spill Events
IV. National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendations
V. Summary and Discussion of Public Comments on Oil Spill Response 
Plans
    A. Overview of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans
    B. Plan Scope/Threshold of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response 
Plans
    C. Contents of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans
    D. Approval of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans
    E. Confidentiality/Security Concerns for Comprehensive Oil Spill 
Response Plans
    F. Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plan Costs
    G. Voluntary Actions
VI. Incorporated by Reference
VII. Section-by-Section Review
VIII. Regulatory Review and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 
13610, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
    B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    C. Executive Order 13132
    D. Executive Order 13175
    E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT 
Policies and Procedures
    F. Paperwork Reduction Act
    G. Environmental Assessment
    H. Privacy Act
    I. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
    J. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
    K. Executive Order 13211
IX. List of Subjects

I. Executive Summary

    The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
in coordination with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), is 
issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled ``Oil Spill 
Response Plans and Information Sharing for High-Hazard Flammable 
Trains,'' in order to improve oil spill response readiness and mitigate 
effects of rail incidents involving petroleum oil and certain high-
hazard flammable trains (defined in 49 CFR 171.8). This NPRM is 
necessary due to the expansion in the United States' (U.S.) energy 
production, which has led to significant challenges for the country's 
transportation system. PHMSA published an advanced notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPRM) on August 1, 2014 (79 FR 45079), under the title, 
``Oil Spill Response Plans for High-Hazard Flammable Trains.'' This 
proposed rule addresses comments to the ANPRM and proposes to modernize 
the comprehensive oil spill response plan (``comprehensive plan'') 
requirements under 49 CFR part 130 for petroleum oils. Additionally, 
consistent with the Emergency Order issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation (Secretary) on May 7, 2014, this NPRM proposes to 
require railroads to share information with state and tribal emergency 
response commissions (i.e., SERCs and TERCs) to improve community 
preparedness for potential high-hazard flammable train accidents. 
Lastly, PHMSA is proposing to incorporate by reference the ASTM D7900 
test method referenced by the American National Standards Institute/
American Petroleum Institute Recommend Practices 3000, ``Classifying 
and Loading of Crude Oil into Rail Tank Cars,'' First Edition, 
September 2014 related to initial boiling point for flammable liquids 
as an acceptable testing alternative to the boiling point tests 
specified in the current regulations. PHMSA believes the incorporation 
of this ASTM methodology into regulation provides regulatory 
flexibility and promotes enhanced safety in transport through accurate 
packing group (PG) assignment.
    The proposals in this NPRM work in conjunction with the 
requirements adopted in the final rule HM-251, ``Hazardous Materials: 
Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard 
Flammable Trains'' (80 FR 26643; May 8, 2015) (``HHFT Final Rule''). 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) continues its comprehensive 
approach to ensure the safe transportation of energy products.
    PHMSA discusses the proposed requirements further throughout this 
NPRM and seeks comments on the questions in the sections, as well as on 
all aspects of this proposal and its supporting analysis. PHMSA 
consolidates questions related to the proposed requirements for oil 
spill response plans in Section II, Subsection C (``Summary of Proposed 
Oil Spill Response Plan Requirements)'' of this rulemaking. PHMSA 
consolidates the questions related to information sharing in Section 
VII (``Section-by-Section Review'') under the discussion of Sec.  
174.312. PHMSA is also soliciting public comment on specific issues 
regarding our analysis and has consolidated these questions in Section 
4 of the draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA).
    Expansion in domestic oil production relative to the 2000s has 
resulted in a large volume of crude oil being transported to refineries 
and other transport-related facilities throughout the country.\1\ With 
the expectation of continued domestic production, rail transportation 
remains a flexible alternative to transportation by pipelines or 
vessels, which have historically delivered the vast majority of crude 
oil to U.S. refineries. The volume of crude oil carried by rail 
increased 423 percent between 2011 and 2012.2 3 In 2013, the 
number of rail carloads of crude oil approached 400,000, reached 
approximately 450,000 carloads in 2014, and fell to approximately 
390,000 carloads in

[[Page 50070]]

2015.\4\ Because rail transportation commonly includes petroleum oil 
shipped in high volumes and large quantities, either as several cars of 
material along with other commodities in a manifest train or as a 
single commodity train (commonly referred to as a ``unit train''), 
there is a significant risk of train accidents that could reasonably be 
expected to cause substantial harm to the environment by discharging 
product into or on the navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the 
exclusive economic zone.\5\ As detailed in the Section III (``Recent 
Spill Events'') of this rulemaking and the draft RIA, recent train 
accidents involving the discharge of petroleum oils have posed 
significant challenges for responders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretary 
of Transportation and the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) establishing jurisdictional guidelines for 
implementing Sec.  1321(j)(1)(C). 36 FR 24080; reprinted at 40 CFR 
part 112 App. A (December 18, 1971).
    \2\ See U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and 
Issues for Congress; http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf.
    \3\ See also ``Refinery receipts of crude oil by rail, truck, 
and barge continue to increase'' http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12131.
    \4\ http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=ESM_EPC0_RAIL_NUS-NUS_MBBL&f=M.
    \5\ See 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(C) and Section I. Statutory/Legal 
Authority for this Rulemaking of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rulemaking addresses issues related to preparedness and 
planning for the potential of train accidents involving the discharge 
of flammable liquid energy products. Specifically, this NPRM proposes 
to: (1) Expand the applicability of comprehensive oil spill response 
plans to include any single train transporting 20 or more loaded tank 
cars of liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block or a single train 
transporting 35 or more loaded tank cars of liquid petroleum oil 
throughout the train consist; (2) clarify and add new requirements for 
comprehensive oil spill response plans; (3) require railroads to share 
information with state and tribal emergency response commissions (i.e., 
SERCs and TERCs) for high-hazard flammable trains to improve community 
preparedness for potential accidents; and (4) provide an alternative 
test method for determining the initial boiling point of a flammable 
liquid. The proposals in this rulemaking are shaped by public comments, 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations, 
analysis of recent accidents, and input from stakeholder outreach 
efforts (including first responders). The estimated costs and benefits 
are described in Table 1 below:

              Table 1--10 Year and Annualized Costs and Benefits by Stand-Alone Regulatory Proposal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Benefits (7%)
            Provision            --------------------------------------------             Costs (7%)
                                       Qualitative            Breakeven
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil Spill Response Planning and    Improved     Cost-effective if     10-Year: $18,051,343. Annualized:
 Response.                         Communication/        this requirement      $2,570,105.
                                   Defined Command       reduces the
                                   Structure may         consequences of oil
                                   improve response.     spills by 4.1%.
                                   Pre-
                                   identified Access
                                   to Equipment and
                                   Staging of
                                   Appropriate
                                   Equipment for
                                   Response Zones.
                                   Trained
                                   Responders.
Information Sharing.............   Improved     Cost-effective if     10-Year: $3,650,832. Annualized:
                                   Communication.        this requirement      $519,796.
                                   Enhanced      reduces the
                                   Preparedness.         consequences of oil
                                                         spills by 0.8%.
IBR of ASTM D7900...............   Regulatory   ....................  No Cost Estimated.
                                   Flexibility.
                                   Enhanced
                                   Accuracy in Packing
                                   Group Assignments.
    Total.......................  ....................  Cost-effective if     10-Year: $21,702,175 Annualized:
                                                         this requirement      $3,089,901.
                                                         reduces the
                                                         consequences of oil
                                                         spills by 4.9%.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Oil Spill Response Plans

    The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 amended the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA), also known as the Clean Water Act (CWA) at 33 
U.S.C. 1321, by adding oil spill response planning requirements for 
``facilities'' that handle oil. The CWA requires that owners and 
operators of onshore facilities prepare and submit oil spill response 
plans for facilities that ``could reasonably be expected to cause 
substantial harm to the environment by discharging into or on the 
navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic 
zone.'' \6\ The CWA applies to railroads or ``rolling stock,'' which is 
included in the definition of ``onshore facility.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(C).
    \7\ ``Onshore facility'' means any facility (including, but not 
limited to, motor vehicles and rolling stock) of any kind located 
in, on, or under, any land within the United States other than 
submerged land.'' 33 U.S.C. 1321(a)(10). ``Rolling stock'' refers to 
rail cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department of Transportation's oil spill planning requirements 
for rolling stock and motor carriers are found at 49 CFR part 130. Part 
130 currently requires ``comprehensive written plans'' that comply with 
the CWA for the transportation of oil in a quantity greater than 1,000 
barrels or 42,000 gallons per package. The approximate capacity of a 
rail car carrying crude oil is 30,000 gallons. Therefore, part 130 does 
not currently require that railroads prepare comprehensive written 
plans. Part 130 also includes preparation of ``basic plans'' for 
containers with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more carrying petroleum 
oil. Therefore, basic oil spill response plans are currently required 
for most, if not all, tank car shipments of petroleum oil. This 
rulemaking does not propose changes to the basic plan requirements 
because there is no justification for such changes at this time.
    On January 23, 2014, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation R-14-05, 
recommending that PHMSA revise the oil spill response planning 
thresholds for comprehensive oil spill response plans.\8\ The NTSB also 
issued Safety Recommendation R-14-02, recommending that FRA audit spill 
response plans.\9\ These

[[Page 50071]]

recommendations are further discussed in Section IV (``National 
Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendation'') of this 
rulemaking. On August 1, 2014, PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, issued 
an ANPRM (79 FR 45079; HM-251B) seeking comment on potential revisions 
to its regulations that would expand the applicability of comprehensive 
oil spill response plans (OSRPs) to high-hazard flammable trains 
(HHFTs), based on thresholds of crude oil that apply to an entire train 
consist.\10\ The proposed changes in this rulemaking clarify the 
comprehensive plan requirements to address the risk posed by HHFTs 
carrying petroleum oils.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/PHMSA/Key_Audiences/Hazmat_Safety_Community/Regulations/NTSB_Safety_Recommendations/Rail/ci.R-14-5,Hazmat.print.
    \9\ http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-14-002.
    \10\ For the purposes of this discussion, train consist is 
considered the rolling stock, exclusive of the locomotive, making up 
a train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rulemaking addresses the risk of increased shipments of large 
quantities of petroleum oil being transported by rail and proposes to 
modernize and clarify the requirements for comprehensive OSRPs and more 
closely align these requirements with the statutory requirements of the 
CWA. This rulemaking proposes to expand the applicability for 
comprehensive OSRPs to railroads transporting a single train containing 
20 or more tank cars loaded with liquid petroleum oil in a continuous 
block, or a single train containing 35 or more tanks cars loaded with 
liquid petroleum oil throughout the train consist. This quantity aligns 
with the definition of a high-hazard flammable train in the HHFT Final 
Rule, which added new requirements and operational controls for these 
trains. The proposed changes respond to commenter requests for more 
specificity in plan requirements; provide a better parallel to other 
federal oil spill response plan regulations promulgated under the CWA; 
address the needs identified by first responders in the ``Crude Oil 
Rail Emergency Response Lessons Learned Roundtable Report''; and 
provide requirements to address the challenges identified through an 
analysis of recent spill events.\11\ The changes also propose to 
leverage the geographic information provided through the expanded 
routing analysis requirements of the HHFT Final Rule by applying a 
geographic component to the response plan structure. Railroads would 
divide their routes into ``response zones'' and connect notification 
procedures and available response resources to the specific geographic 
route segments that comprise the response zones. The proposed changes 
clarify the railroad's role in response activities and the 
communication procedures needed to notify Federal, State, and local 
agencies. A summary of the Clean Water Act statutory language, the 
current regulations of 49 CFR part 130, and the proposed changes to the 
comprehensive plan requirements under this rulemaking are further 
described in Section II, Subsection C (``Summary of Proposed Oil Spill 
Response Requirements'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/emergencyresponse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Information Sharing

    Federal hazardous materials transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5101-
5128) authorizes the Secretary to ``prescribe regulations for the safe 
transportation, including security, of hazardous material in 
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.'' The Secretary delegated 
this authority to PHMSA under 49 CFR 1.97(b). As such, PHMSA is 
responsible for overseeing a hazardous materials safety program that 
minimizes the risks to life and property inherent in transportation in 
commerce. The HMR include operational requirements applicable to each 
mode of transportation. On a yearly basis, the HMR provide safety and 
security requirements for the transportation of more than 2.5 billion 
tons of hazardous materials (hazmat), valued at about $2.3 trillion, 
over 307 billion miles on the nation's interconnected transportation 
network.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ 2012 Commodity Flow Survey, Research and Innovative 
Technology Administration (RITA), Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (BTS). See http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=CFS_2012_00H01&prodType=table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Secretary also has authority over all areas of railroad 
transportation safety (Federal railroad safety laws, principally 49 
U.S.C. chapters 201-213); this authority is delegated to FRA under 49 
CFR 1.89. Pursuant to its statutory authority, FRA promulgates and 
enforces a comprehensive regulatory program (49 CFR parts 200-244) and 
the agency inspects and audits railroads, tank car facilities, and 
hazardous material offerors for compliance with both FRA's regulations 
and the HMR. FRA also has an extensive, well-established research and 
development program to improve all areas of railroad safety, including 
hazardous materials transportation. As a result of the shared role in 
the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials by rail, 
PHMSA and FRA work closely when considering regulatory changes, and the 
agencies take a system-wide, comprehensive approach consistent with the 
risks posed by the bulk transport of hazardous materials by rail.
    On May 7, 2014, DOT issued an Emergency Restriction/Prohibition 
Order in Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067 (Order).\13\ That Order required 
each railroad transporting in commerce within the U.S. 1,000,000 
gallons or more of Bakken crude oil in a single train to provide 
certain information in writing to the SERC for each state in which it 
operates such a train. Subsequently, in August of 2014, PHMSA published 
an NPRM proposing to codify and clarify the requirements of the Order 
in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180) and 
requested public comment on the various facets of that proposal. See 79 
FR 45015 (Aug. 1, 2014) (HHFT NPRM). In the final rule of that 
proceeding, however, PHMSA did not adopt the notification requirements 
proposed in the NPRM. See 80 FR 26643 (May 8, 2015) (HHFT Final Rule). 
PHMSA determined the expansion of the existing route analysis and 
consultation requirements under Sec.  172.820 of the HMR to include 
HHFTs would be the best approach to ensuring that emergency responders 
and others involved with emergency response planning and preparedness 
would have access to sufficient information regarding crude oil 
shipments moving through their jurisdictions. PHMSA reasoned that 
expanding the existing route analysis and consultation requirements of 
Sec.  172.820 (which already apply to the rail transportation of 
certain hazardous materials historically considered to be highly 
hazardous) would preserve the intent of the Emergency Order to enhance 
information sharing with emergency responders and allow for the easy 
incorporation of HHFTs into the overall hazardous materials routing and 
information sharing scheme.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/emergency-order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 4, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Fixing 
America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (``FAST Act''). The FAST 
Act includes the ``Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety 
Improvement Act of 2015'' at Sec. Sec.  7001 through 7311, which 
provides direction for PHMSA's hazardous materials safety program. 
Section 7302 directs the Secretary to issue regulations that require 
real-time sharing of electronic train consist information for hazardous 
materials shipments and require Class I railroads to provide State 
Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) advanced notification of HHFTs 
traveling through

[[Page 50072]]

their respective jurisdictions. DOT will implement the requirements 
related to electronic train consists in a separate rulemaking, but is 
addressing the requirement for advanced notification of HHFTs to SERCs 
in this rule. Section 7302 requires Class I railroads to provide 
advanced notification and information on HHFTs to SERCs consistent with 
the notification requirements in the Secretary's May 2014 Emergency 
Order in docket number DOT-OST-2014-0067. Section 7302 further requires 
SERCs receiving this advanced notification to provide the information 
to law enforcement and emergency response agencies upon request and 
directs the Secretary to establish security and confidentiality 
protections for the electronic train consist information and advanced 
notification information required by Sec.  7302. In response to the 
FAST Act and the public's interest and feedback the Department 
previously received related to its May 7, 2014, Emergency Order,\14\ 
this NPRM proposes to add a new Sec.  174.312 to the HMR. This new 
section will establish the information sharing requirements, related to 
Emergency Order DOT-OST-2014-0067. As directed by the FAST Act, the 
proposed information requirements in Sec.  174.312 are generally 
consistent with the Order, but broaden the scope of trains covered by 
the requirement. Consistent with the FAST Act, the proposed regulation 
expands the notification requirement to apply to all HHFTs as defined 
in the HHFT Final Rule, not just trains transporting 1,000,000 or more 
gallons of Bakken crude oil, and requires railroads to provide the 
notification monthly. Also, Sec.  174.312 would require railroads to 
provide the required information to both SERCs and Tribal Emergency 
Response Commissions (TERCs), or other appropriate state designated 
agencies. Finally, under proposed Sec.  174.312, a railroad operating a 
train subject to the Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plan requirements 
of this proposed rule would also need to provide the relevant SERCs, 
TERCs, or other appropriate state agencies with the contact information 
for qualified individuals and the description of response zones 
required to be compiled under proposed 49 CFR part 130.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ A discussion regarding public interest and feedback can be 
found later in the preamble in the section on ``HHFT Rulemaking and 
Response.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 2 below describes, generally, how this proposed rule would 
address routing and information sharing issues, as compared to the 
Order (which remains in effect), the regulatory provisions implemented 
by the HHFT final rule, and the provisions of the FAST Act. PHMSA 
discusses the information sharing proposals further in the section-by-
section analysis for Sec.  174.312 later in this document and solicits 
comment on the questions listed there, as well as all aspects of this 
proposal.

                              Table 2--Information Sharing for Emergency Responders
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               FAST Act            OSRP NPRM
            Category                Emergency order     HHFT final rule        (advanced         (information
                                     and HHFT NPRM         (routing)         notification)         sharing)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Who is subject?.................  All railroads       All railroads       Class I railroads   All railroads
                                   transporting        transporting HHFT   transporting HHFT   transporting HHFT
                                   1,000,000 gallons   (20 cars in a       (20 cars in a       (20 cars in a
                                   or more of Bakken   block, 35 in        block, 35 in        block, 35 in
                                   crude oil in a      consist carrying    consist carrying    consist carrying
                                   single train.       ANY Class 3         ANY Class 3         ANY Class 3
                                                       flammable liquid).  flammable liquid).  flammable
                                                                                               liquid).
Who must the railroads notify?    Railroads notify    Railroads provide   Railroads must      Railroads must
                                   SERCs or other      point of contact    notify SERCs who    notify SERCs,
                                   appropriate state-  (POC) information   share information   TERCs. or other
                                   designated          to state and/or     with other state    appropriate state
                                   entities. Provide   regional fusion     and local public    designated
                                   the notification    centers and         agencies upon       entities who
                                   to FRA upon         state, local, and   request, as         share information
                                   request.            tribal officials    appropriate.        with other state
                                                       in jurisdictions                        and local public
                                                       that may be                             agencies upon
                                                       affected by a                           request, as
                                                       rail carrier's                          appropriate.
                                                       routing decisions                       Railroads provide
                                                       and who directly                        the notification
                                                       contact the                             to DOT upon
                                                       railroad to                             request.
                                                       discuss routing
                                                       decisions.
What type of notification?......  Active--Informatio  Passive--Informati  Active--Informatio  Active--Propose
                                   n must              on on routing and   n must              the active
                                   continuously be     risk analysis       continuously be     information
                                   supplied to these   will be discussed   supplied to these   sharing
                                   entities.           upon request with   entities.           requirements in
                                                       state, local, and                       the Order with
                                                       tribal officials                        certain changes
                                                       in jurisdictions                        described below.
                                                       that may be
                                                       affected by a
                                                       rail carrier's
                                                       routing decisions.
When/how often?.................  Update              Routing and risk    Update the          Monthly
                                   notifications       analysis is         notifications       notification or
                                   when Bakken crude   performed           prior to making     certification of
                                   oil traffic         annually.           any material        no change to
                                   materially                              changes to any      ensure that
                                   changes within a                        volumes or          changes to
                                   particular county                       frequencies of      frequency or
                                   or state (by 25%                        HHFTs traveling     volume are
                                   or more).                               through a county.   clearly
                                                                                               communicated.

[[Page 50073]]

 
What to include in the            A reasonable        Information on      A reasonable        A reasonable
 notification?                     estimate of the     results of          estimate of the     estimate of the
                                   number of           routing and risk    number of           number of HHFTs
                                   affected trains     analysis can be     implicated trains   that are expected
                                   that are expected   discussed upon      that are expected   to travel, per
                                   to travel, per      request. This       to travel, per      week, through
                                   week, through       includes the        week, through       each county
                                   each county         volume of           each county         within the state.
                                   within the state.   hazardous           within the
                                                       material            applicable state.
                                                       transported, rail
                                                       traffic density,
                                                       trip length, and
                                                       route among other
                                                       factors.
                                  The routes over     Information on      Identification of   The routes over
                                   which the           results of          the routes over     which the
                                   affected trains     routing and risk    which such liquid   affected trains
                                   will be             analysis can be     will be             will be
                                   transported.        discussed upon      transported.        transported.
                                                       request. This
                                                       includes routes
                                                       over which
                                                       affected trains
                                                       are transported.
                                  A description of    Compile under       Identification and  A description of
                                   the petroleum       current             a description of    the materials
                                   crude oil and       requirements in     the Class 3         shipped and
                                   applicable          subparts C and G    flammable liquid    applicable
                                   emergency           of part 172.        being transported   emergency
                                   response                                on such trains      response
                                   information                             and applicable      information
                                   required by                             emergency           required by
                                   subparts C and G                        response            subparts C and G
                                   of part 172 of                          information, as     of part 172 of
                                   this subchapter.                        required by         this subchapter.
                                                                           regulation.
                                  At least one point  A point of contact  A point of contact  At least one point
                                   of contact at the   (including the      at the Class I      of contact at the
                                   railroad            name, title,        railroad            railroad
                                   (including name,    phone number and    responsible for     (including name,
                                   title, phone        e-mail address)     serving as the      title, phone
                                   number and          who can provide     point of contact    number and
                                   address)            fusion centers      for State           address) for the
                                   responsible for     and consult with    emergency           SERC, TERC, and
                                   serving as the      other State,        response centers    relevant
                                   point of contact    local and tribal    and local           emergency
                                   for the State       officials (may      emergency           responders
                                   Emergency           include SERCs/      responders          related to the
                                   Response            TERCs) about the    related to the      railroad's
                                   Commission and      results of the      Class I             transportation of
                                   relevant            routing and risk    railroad's          affected trains.
                                   emergency           analysis            transportation of
                                   responders          (includes           such liquid.
                                   related to the      information on 27
                                   railroad's          factors) upon
                                   transportation of   request.
                                   affected trains.
Spill Response Plan Info........  N/A...............  N/A...............  N/A...............  For petroleum oil
                                                                                               trains subject to
                                                                                               Comprehensive Oil
                                                                                               Spill Response
                                                                                               Plan, the contact
                                                                                               info for the
                                                                                               qualified
                                                                                               individuals and
                                                                                               description of
                                                                                               response zones
                                                                                               compiled under
                                                                                               part 130 must
                                                                                               also be included.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Initial Boiling Point Test

    An offeror's responsibility to accurately classify and describe a 
hazardous material is a key requirement under the HMR. In accordance 
with Sec.  173.22 of the HMR, it is the offeror's responsibility to 
properly ``class and describe a hazardous material in accordance with 
parts 172 and 173 of the HMR.'' For transportation purposes, 
classification is ensuring the proper hazard class, packing group, and 
shipping name are assigned to a particular material. For a Class 3 
flammable liquid, the HMR provide two tests to determine 
classification. Both the flash point and initial boiling point (IBP) 
must be conducted to properly classify and assign an appropriate 
packing group (PG) for a Class 3 Flammable liquid with certain changes 
described below, in accordance with Sec. Sec.  173.120 and 173.121.
    In 2014, the rail and oil industry, with PHMSA's input, developed a 
recommended practice (RP) designed to improve crude oil rail safety 
through proper classification and loading practices. This effort was 
led by API and resulted in the development of an American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) recognized recommended practice (see ANSI/
API RP 3000, ``Classifying and Loading of Crude Oil into Rail Tank 
Cars''). The API RP 3000 provides guidance on the material 
characterization, transport classification, and quantity measurement 
for overfill prevention of petroleum crude oil for the loading of rail 
tank cars. With regard to classification, this recommended practice 
concluded that for crude oils containing volatile, low molecular weight 
components (e.g. methane), the recommended best practice is to test 
using American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D7900.
    The IBP test and practice recommended by industry (ASTM D7900) is 
not currently aligned with the testing requirements authorized in the 
HMR, forcing shippers to continue to use the testing methods authorized 
in Sec.  173.121(a)(2). The ASTM D7900 differs from the boiling point 
tests currently in the HMR, because it is the only test which ensures a 
minimal loss of light ends. Therefore, for initial

[[Page 50074]]

boiling point determination, PHMSA is proposing to incorporate by 
reference the ASTM D7900 test method identified within API RP 3000, 
thus permitting the industry best practice for testing Class 3 PG 
assignments. We note that the incorporation of the ASTM D7900, which 
aligns with the API RP 3000, will not replace the currently authorized 
initial boiling point testing methods, but rather serve as a testing 
alternative if one chooses to use that method. PHMSA believes this 
provides flexibility and promotes enhanced safety in transport through 
accurate packing group assignment.

II. Background

A. Current Oil Spill Response Requirements

    The Clean Water Act (CWA), as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA 90), directs the President, at Sec.  1321(j)(1)(C),\15\ to 
issue regulations ``establishing procedures, methods, and equipment and 
other requirements for equipment to prevent discharges of oil and 
hazardous substances from vessels and from onshore facilities and 
offshore facilities, and to contain such discharges.'' The CWA directs 
the President to issue regulations requiring owners and operators of 
certain vessels and onshore and offshore facilities to develop, submit, 
update and in some cases obtain approval of Oil Spill Response Plans 
(OSRPs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ CWA Sec.  311(j)(1)(C). See also 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5); CWA 
Sec.  (j)(5), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5), an ``owner or operator'' of ``[a]n 
onshore facility that, because of its location, could reasonably be 
expected to cause substantial harm to the environment by discharging 
into or on the navigable waters, . . .'' must ``prepare and submit to 
the President a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, 
to a worst-case discharge, and to a substantial threat of such a 
discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance.'' Under 33 U.S.C. 
1321(j)(5)(D), if a response plan is required then it must have 
specific elements, including submission and review.
    On October 22, 1991, the President delegated to the Secretary 
authority to regulate certain transportation-related facilities (i.e., 
motor carriers and railroads) under Sec.  1321(j)(1)(C) and 1321(j)(5). 
See Executive Order 12777, 56 FR 54757, sections 2(b)(2), 2(d)(2). The 
Secretary later delegated his authority to regulate certain 
transportation-related facilities (i.e., motor carriers and railroads) 
to PHMSA's predecessor agency, the Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA). PHMSA's delegated authority under Sec.  
1321(j)(1)(C) and 1321(j)(5) for certain transportation-related 
facilities (i.e., motor vehicles and rolling stock) is solely the 
authority to promulgate regulations. The Federal Highway Administration 
and the FRA have the authority for OSRP review and approval for motor 
carriers and railroads, respectively.
    The terms ``transportation related facility'' and 
``nontransportation related facility'' are defined in a December 18, 
1971, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establishing jurisdictional 
guidelines for implementing Sec.  1321(j)(1)(C). 36 FR 24080; reprinted 
at 40 CFR part 112, appendix A. ``Transportation related facilities'' 
include: Highway vehicles and railroad cars which are used for the 
transport of oil in interstate or intrastate commerce and the equipment 
and appurtenances related thereto . . . . Excluded are highway vehicles 
and railroad cars and motive power used exclusively within the confines 
of a non transportation related facility or terminal facility and which 
are not intended for use in interstate or intrastate commerce.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 36 FR 24080.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 17, 1996, RSPA published a final rule at 49 CFR part 130 to 
carry out PHMSA's delegated authority under the CWA for motor carriers 
and railroads (61 FR 30533). This rule adopted general spill response 
planning and response plan implementation requirements intended to 
prevent and contain spills of oil during transportation. Requirements 
for the ``scope'' of the regulations were included in Sec.  130.2. 
Section 130.2(b) clarifies that the requirements of part 130 have no 
effect on ``the discharge notification requirements of the United 
States Coast Guard (33 CFR part 153) and EPA (40 CFR part 110).''
    Part 130 requires a basic OSRP for oil shipments in a packaging 
having a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more, which requires the 
preparation of a written plan that (1) ``sets forth the manner of 
response to discharges . . .'' (2) ``takes into account the maximum 
potential discharge of the contents from the packaging,'' (3) 
``identifies private personnel and equipment available to respond to a 
discharge,'' and (4) ``identifies the appropriate persons and agencies 
(including their telephone numbers) to be contacted in regard to such a 
discharge and its handling, including the National Response Center.'' 
The requirements for a basic response plan were issued as a 
``containment rule pursuant to Sec.  1321(j)(1)(C)'' of the CWA.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ 61 FR 30537
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The regulations at 49 CFR part 130 prohibit a person from 
transporting oil in a package containing more than 42,000 gallons 
(1,000 barrels) unless that person has a current comprehensive OSRP 
that: (1) Conforms to all requirements for a basic OSRP, (2) is 
consistent with the National Contingency Plan and Area Contingency 
Plans, (3) identifies the qualified individual with authority to 
implement removal and facilitate communication between federal 
officials and spill response personnel, (4) identifies and ensures by 
contract or other means response equipment and personnel to remove a 
worst-case discharge, (5) describes training, equipment testing, and 
drills, and (6) is submitted to FRA. The regulations also require motor 
carriers to submit plans to FHWA. However, motor carriers do not have 
packages capable of meeting the threshold for a comprehensive plan. The 
comprehensive OSRP addresses minimum requirements for a plan specified 
by 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D). In the 1996 final rule, a nationwide, 
regional or other generic plan is acceptable. The plan holder was not 
required to account for different response locations.
    Table 3 outlines the specific differences between a basic and 
comprehensive OSRP. The shaded rows of the table indicate requirements 
that are not part of the basic OSRP, but are included in the 
comprehensive OSRP requirements in 49 CFR 131(b).

                   Table 3--Comparison of Current Basic and Comprehensive OSRPs by Requirement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Type of OSRP
           Category                         Requirement            ---------------------------------------------
                                                                            Basic              Comprehensive
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preparation...................  Sets forth the manner of response   Yes..................  Yes.
                                 to a discharge.

[[Page 50075]]

 
Preparation...................  Accounts for the maximum potential  Yes..................  Yes.
                                 discharge of the packaging.
Personnel/Equipment...........  Identifies private personnel and    Yes..................  Yes.
                                 equipment available for response.
Personnel/Coordination........  Identifies appropriate persons and  Yes..................  Yes.
                                 agencies (including telephone
                                 numbers) to be contacted,
                                 including the National Response
                                 Center (NRC).
Documentation.................  Is kept on file at the principal    Yes..................  Yes.
                                 place of business and at the
                                 dispatcher's office.
Coordination..................  Reflects the requirements of the    No...................  Yes.
                                 National Contingency Plan (40 CFR
                                 part 300) and Area Contingency
                                 Plans.
Personnel/Coordination........  Identifies the qualified            No...................  Yes.
                                 individual with full authority to
                                 implement removal actions, and
                                 requires immediate communications
                                 between the individual and the
                                 appropriate Federal official and
                                 the persons providing spill
                                 response personnel and equipment.
Personnel/Equipment/            Identifies and ensures by contract  No...................  Yes.
 Coordination.                   or other means the availability
                                 of, private personnel, and the
                                 equipment necessary to remove, to
                                 the maximum extent practicable, a
                                 worst-case discharge (including
                                 that resulting from fire or
                                 explosion) and to mitigate or
                                 prevent a substantial threat of
                                 such a discharge.
Training......................  Describes the training, equipment,  No...................  Yes.
                                 testing, periodic unannounced
                                 drills, and response actions of
                                 personnel, to be carried out
                                 under the plan to ensure safety
                                 and to mitigate or prevent
                                 discharge or the substantial
                                 threat of such a discharge.
Documentation.................  Is submitted (and resubmitted in    No...................  Yes.
                                 the event of a significant
                                 change) to the Administrator of
                                 FRA.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    On August 1, 2014, PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, published an 
ANPRM to seek comment on potential revisions to its regulations that 
would expand the applicability of comprehensive OSRPs to HHFTs 
transporting petroleum oil based on thresholds of crude oil that apply 
to an entire train consist (79 FR 45079). On the same day, also in 
consultation with FRA, PHMSA published the HHFT NPRM, which proposed to 
define HHFT to mean a single train carrying 20 or more carloads of a 
Class 3 flammable liquid (79 FR 45015). As discussed above, trains 
transporting a package (i.e., rail car) containing 3,500 gallons or 
more of oil are subject to the basic OSRP requirement at 49 CFR 
130.31(a). However, part 130 only requires a comprehensive OSRP when 
the quantity of oil is greater than 42,000 gallons per package. Because 
the typical rail tank car has a capacity around 30,000 gallons, few if 
any rail carriers are currently subject to the comprehensive OSRP plan 
requirements.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The 2014 AAR's Universal Machine Language Equipment 
Register (UMLER) numbers showed 5 tank cars listed with a capacity 
equal to or greater than 42,000 gallons, and none of these cars were 
being used to transport oil or petroleum products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In setting the current OSRP threshold quantities, RSPA considered a 
1,000,000-gallon threshold that would apply to shipments, rather than 
individual packages. Specifically, RSPA stated,

    Conversely, the 1,000,000-gallon threshold adopted by EPA 
[Environmental Protection Agency] is contingent on several factors, 
including restrictive provisions that the facility may not transfer 
oil over water to or from vessels and that the facility's proximity 
to a public drinking water intake must be sufficiently distant to 
assure that the intake would not be shut down in the event of a 
discharge. Further, the EPA threshold refers to the capacity not of 
a single fixed storage tank, but of the entire facility, including 
barrels and drums stored at the facility. In summary, this example 
also is not analogous to hazards routinely encountered during 
transportation by railway and highway.
    During the June 28, 1993 public meeting, the ``substantial 
harm'' threshold was discussed at length, but participants did not 
agree on what volume of oil reasonably could cause substantial harm 
to the marine environment. Also, the 42,000-gallon threshold is 
supported by a number of comments to the docket citing its use by 
the EPA in related sections of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
Consequently, RSPA believes its determination to use a threshold 
value of 42,000 gallons in a single packaging is appropriate and 
reasonable.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ 61 FR 30537.

    As discussed in the June 17, 1996 RSPA final rule, RSPA recognized 
that an incident involving the transportation of 1,000,000 gallons of 
crude oil could reasonably be expected to cause substantial harm, even 
if not in a single packaging. Under the same CWA authority, delegated 
to EPA for non-transportation-related facilities, EPA requires Facility 
Response Plans (FRPs) for facilities with 1,000,000 gallons or more in 
aggregate oil storage capacity and which meet one or more of the harm 
factors at 40 CFR part 112.20(f)(1)(ii) and for facilities with 
transfers of oil over water to or from vessels that have aggregate oil 
storage capacities of 42,000 gallons or more.\20\ EPA also requires 
Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) plans under the CWA 
authority for onshore non-transportation related facilities with an 
aggregate aboveground oil storage capacity of more than 1,320 gallons 
of oil or completely buried storage capacity greater than 42,000 
gallons and which have a reasonable expectation of an oil discharge to 
navigable waters or adjoining shorelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The terms comprehensive plan, oil spill response plan 
(OSRP) and facility response plan (FRP) are often used 
interchangeably.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA recognizes that a single tank car is not likely to hold 
42,000 gallons of crude oil, but the increasing reliance on HHFTs 
increases the risk that more than one tank car could rupture during a 
derailment and result in the discharge of the contents of more than one 
rail car. RSPA either did not consider this risk or did not consider it 
significant when it established the current threshold. In the ANPRM, 
PHMSA sought comments on what impact changing the applicability 
threshold would have on

[[Page 50076]]

current business practices for shipping crude oil by rail. The ANPRM 
also explained that since the typical capacity for a rail tank car used 
in the transport of crude oil is around 30,000 gallons, a 1,000,000-
gallon threshold for oil per train consist would translate to requiring 
a comprehensive OSRP for trains composed of approximately 35 cars of 
crude oil. PHMSA expected the business practices for HHFTs would result 
in train consists that often exceed 35 crude oil tank cars. The ANPRM 
also explained that a 42,000 gallon per train consist threshold would 
translate to requiring comprehensive OSRPs for trains composed of 
approximately two cars of crude oil.
    Also in the ANPRM, PHMSA sought comments on nine questions to 
inform our understanding of adjusting the threshold quantities that 
would trigger comprehensive OSRP requirements for HHFTs of petroleum 
oil as well as adjusting the plan requirements. PHMSA requested that 
comments reference a specific portion of the ANPRM, explain the reason 
for any recommended change, include supporting data, and explain the 
source, methodology, and key assumptions of the supporting data.
    The ANPRM described the consequences, including environmental 
impacts, of several recent HHFT derailments, including Lac-
M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada; Aliceville, Alabama; and Casselton, 
North Dakota. In response to its participation in the investigation of 
the Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation 
R-14-05, which requested that PHMSA revise the spill response planning 
thresholds prescribed in 49 CFR part 130 to require comprehensive OSRPs 
that effectively provide for the carriers' ability to respond to worst-
case discharges resulting from accidents involving unit trains or 
blocks of tank cars transporting oil and other petroleum products. In 
this recommendation, the NTSB raised a concern that, ``[b]ecause there 
is no mandate for railroads to develop comprehensive plans or ensure 
the availability of necessary response resources, carriers have 
effectively placed the burden of remediating the environmental 
consequences of an accident on local communities along their routes.'' 
In light of these incidents (as well as others described in this 
rulemaking and the accompanying regulatory impact analysis) and NTSB 
Safety Recommendation R-14-05, PHMSA is now proposing to revise the 
applicability and requirements for comprehensive OSRPs.

C. Summary of Proposed Oil Spill Response Requirements

    A summary of the Clean Water Act statutory language, the current 
regulations of 49 CFR part 130 for comprehensive plans, and the 
proposed changes to the comprehensive plan requirements under this 
rulemaking are further described in the Tables 4, 5, & 6 below.

                    Table 4--Applicability Comparison
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Current regulatory   Proposed changes
                                   applicability for   to applicability
           CWA statute               comprehensive    for  comprehensive
                                         plans               plans
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)--The   49 CFR Part 130--   49 CFR Part 130--
 President shall issue             Comprehensive       Restructures part
 regulations which require an      plan requirements   130 to include
 owner or operator of a tank       include both the    comprehensive oil
 vessel or facility described in   general elements    spill response
 subparagraph (C) to prepare and   for the basic       plans in subpart
 submit to the President a plan    plan in 130.31(a)   C.
 for responding, to the maximum    and the            Provides general
 extent practicable, to a worst-   additional          requirements for
 case discharge, and to a          measures in         recordkeeping,
 substantial threat of such a      130.31(b).          plan format and
 discharge, of oil or a                                information about
 hazardous substance.                                  response
                                                       structure to
                                                       facilitate
                                                       usability and
                                                       enforceability of
                                                       plan
                                                       requirements. All
                                                       proposed changes
                                                       better align the
                                                       requirements with
                                                       other regulations
                                                       for oil spill
                                                       response plans
                                                       under other
                                                       federal agencies,
                                                       including
                                                       optional use of
                                                       the Integrated
                                                       Contingency Plan
                                                       (ICP) format.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(C)(iv)--An   Sec.                Sec.   130.101--
 onshore facility that, because    130.31(b)(1)--42,   Expands the
 of its location, could            000 gallons of      current
 reasonably be expected to cause   liquid oil in a     applicability to
 substantial harm to the           single package.     include trains
 environment by discharging into                       transporting:
 or on the navigable waters,                           42,000
 adjoining shorelines, or the                          gallons of liquid
 exclusive economic zone.                              oil in a single
                                                       package (current
                                                       applicability);
                                                       OR
                                                       At least
                                                       20 cars of liquid
                                                       petroleum oil in
                                                       a continuous
                                                       block or 35 cars
                                                       of liquid
                                                       petroleum oil in
                                                       a consist.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  Table 5--Plan Requirements Comparison
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Current regulatory   Proposed changes
  Plan elements required by CWA      comprehensive     to comprehensive
             statute                 plan elements       plan elements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(i)--A     Sec.                Sec.   130.103--
 response plan must be             130.31(b)(2)--A     Requires
 consistent with the               comprehensive       certification
 requirements of the National      plan must be        that the plan is
 Contingency Plan and Area         consistent with     consistent with a
 Contingency Plans.                the requirements    list of specific
                                   of the National     NCP/ACP
                                   Contingency Plan    requirements for
                                   and Area            ``minimum
                                   Contingency Plans.  compliance,'' to
                                                       clarify the
                                                       elements of NCP/
                                                       ACP applicable to
                                                       rail shipments.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(ii)--A    Sec.                Sec.  Sec.
 response plan must identify the   130.31(b)(3)--A     130.104-130.105--
 qualified individual having       comprehensive       Requires
 full authority to implement       plan must           identification of
 removal actions, and require      identify the        qualified
 immediate communications          qualified           individual for
 between that individual and the   individual having   each response
 appropriate federal official      full authority to   zone in quickly
 and the persons providing         implement removal   accessible
 personnel and equipment.          actions, and        information
                                   requires            summary.
                                   immediate          Requires that the
                                   communications      plan include a
                                   between that        checklist of
                                   individual and      necessary
                                   the appropriate     notifications,
                                   federal official    contact
                                   and the persons     information, and
                                   providing spill     necessary
                                   response            information to
                                   personnel and       clarify
                                   equipment.          communication
                                                       procedures.

[[Page 50077]]

 
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii)--A   Sec.                Sec.   Sec.
 response plan must identify,      130.31(b)(4)--A     130.102 &
 and ensure by contract or other   comprehensive       130.106--Includes
 means approved by the President   plan must           the establishment
 the availability of, private      identify, and       of response
 personnel and equipment           ensure by           zones, to ensure
 necessary to remove to the        contract or other   the availability
 maximum extent practicable a      means the           of personnel and
 worst-case discharge (including   availability of,    equipment in
 a discharge resulting from fire   private personnel   different
 or explosion), and to mitigate    (including          geographic route
 or prevent a substantial threat   address and phone   segments.
 of such a discharge.              number), and the   Demonstrate that
                                   equipment           the response
                                   necessary to        management system
                                   remove, to the      uses the National
                                   maximum extent      Incident
                                   practicable, a      Management System
                                   worst-case          (NIMS) for common
                                   discharge           terminology and
                                   (including a        has a manageable
                                   discharge           span of control,
                                   resulting from      a clearly defined
                                   fire or             chain of command,
                                   explosion) and to   and trained
                                   mitigate or         personnel to fill
                                   prevent a           each position.
                                   substantial        Includes
                                   threat of such a    requirements to
                                   discharge.          identify the
                                                       organization,
                                                       personnel,
                                                       equipment, and
                                                       deployment
                                                       location thereof
                                                       capable of
                                                       removal and
                                                       mitigation of a
                                                       worst-case
                                                       discharge.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(iv)--A    Sec.                Sec.   130.107--
 response plan must describe the   130.31(b)(5)--A     Requires
 training to be carried out        comprehensive       certification and
 under the plan to ensure the      plan must           documentation
 safety of the facility and to     describe the        that employees
 mitigate or prevent the           training to be      have been trained
 discharge.                        carried out under   in carrying out
                                   the plan to         their
                                   ensure the safety   responsibilities
                                   of the facility     under the plan.
                                   and to mitigate
                                   or prevent the
                                   discharge.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(iv)--A    Sec.                Sec.   130.108--
 response plan must describe the   130.31(b)(5)--A     Requires
 equipment testing to be carried   comprehensive       description and
 out under the plan.               plan must           certification
                                   describe the        that equipment
                                   equipment testing   testing meets the
                                   to be carried out   manufacturer's
                                   under the plan.     minimum
                                                       requirements,
                                                       which is
                                                       equivalent to
                                                       U.S. Coast Guard
                                                       (USCG)
                                                       requirements.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(iv)--A    Sec.                Sec.   130.108--
 response plan must describe the   130.31(b)(5)--A     Requires drills
 periodic unannounced drills to    comprehensive       to be equivalent
 be carried out under the plan.    plan must           to the DOT PREP
                                   describe the        standard. PREP
                                   periodic            includes sections
                                   unannounced         for each agency
                                   drills to be        regulated under
                                   carried out under   CWA.
                                   the plan.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(iv)--A    Sec.                Sec.   130.106--
 response plan must describe the   130.31(b)(5)--A     Requires a
 response actions of persons on    comprehensive       description of
 the vessel or at the facility.    plan must           all of the
                                   describe the        following:
                                   response actions   
                                   of facility         Activities and
                                   personnel, to be    responsibilities
                                   carried out under   of railroad
                                   the plan to         personnel prior
                                   ensure the safety   to arrival of
                                   of the facility     Qualified
                                   and to mitigate     Individual (QI)
                                   or prevent the      QI
                                   discharge, or the   responsibilities
                                   substantial         and actions
                                   threat of such a   
                                   discharge.          Procedures
                                                       coordinating
                                                       railroad/QI
                                                       actions with the
                                                       Federal On-Scene
                                                       Coordinator
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(v)--A     49 CFR part 130     Sec.   130.109--
 response plan must be updated     does not specify    Clarifies that
 periodically.                     clearly if or       plans should be
                                   when the railroad   reviewed
                                   must update a       internally in
                                   comprehensive       full every 5
                                   plan.               years at a
                                                       minimum, when new
                                                       or different
                                                       conditions or
                                                       information
                                                       changes within
                                                       the plan, or
                                                       after a discharge
                                                       requiring plan
                                                       activation
                                                       occurs.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(vi)--A    Sec.                Sec.   130.109--
 response plan must be             130.31(b)(6)--Is    Requires plans to
 resubmitted for approval of       submitted, and      be resubmitted to
 each significant change.          resubmitted in      FRA in the event
                                   the event of any    of new or
                                   significant         different
                                   change, to the      operating
                                   Federal Railroad    conditions or
                                   Administrator       information that
                                   (for tank cars).    would
                                                       substantially
                                                       affect the
                                                       implementation of
                                                       the plan.
                                                      Provides examples
                                                       of significant
                                                       changes for
                                                       clarity.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                    Table 6--Plan Approval Comparison
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Approval and review required by  Current regulatory
           CWA statute                requirement      Proposed changes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(E)--With     Sec.                Sec.   130.111--
 respect to any response plan      130.31(b)(6)--Is    Requires explicit
 submitted under this paragraph    submitted, and      approval of plans
 for an onshore facility that,     resubmitted in      by FRA.
 because of its location, could    the event of any   Specifies process
 reasonably be expected to cause   significant         for FRA to notify
 significant and substantial       change, to the      railroads of any
 harm to the environment by        Federal Railroad    sections of
 discharging into or on the        Administrator       alleged
 navigable waters or adjoining     (for tank cars).    deficiencies in
 shorelines or the exclusive                           plan and provides
 economic zone, and with respect                       railroads the
 to each response plan submitted                       opportunity to
 under this paragraph for a tank                       respond.
 vessel, nontank vessel, or                           Clarifies
 offshore facility, the                                railroads will
 President shall--                                     review plans five
                                                       years from the
                                                       date of last
                                                       approval and
                                                       resubmit plans
                                                       after significant
                                                       changes.
    (i) promptly review such
     response plan;
    (ii) require amendments to
     any plan that does not meet
     the requirements of this
     paragraph;

[[Page 50078]]

 
    (iii) approve any plan that
     meets the requirements of
     this paragraph;
    (iv) review each plan
     periodically thereafter;
     and
    (v) in the case of a plan
     for a nontank vessel,
     consider any applicable
     State-mandated response
     plan in effect on August 9,
     2004, and ensure
     consistency to the extent
     practicable
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(F) A tank    ..................  Sec.   130.101--
 vessel, nontank vessel,                               Prohibits the
 offshore facility, or onshore                         transportation of
 facility required to prepare a                        oil subject to
 response plan under this                              comprehensive
 subsection may not handle,                            plans unless the
 store, or transport oil unless--                      requirements for
                                                       submission,
(i) in the case of a tank                              review and
 vessel, nontank vessel,                               approval in Sec.
 offshore facility, or onshore                          130.111 are met
 facility for which a response                         and the railroad
 plan is reviewed by the                               is operating in
 President under subparagraph                          compliance with
 (E), the plan has been approved                       the plan.
 by the President; and
    (ii) the vessel or facility
     is operating in compliance
     with the plan.
33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(G)--         ..................  Sec.   130.111--
 Notwithstanding subparagraph                          Allows railroads
 (E), the President may                                to temporarily
 authorize a tank vessel,                              continue
 nontank vessel, offshore                              operating without
 facility, or onshore facility                         plan approval,
 to operate without a response                         provided the plan
 plan approved under this                              has been
 paragraph, until not later than                       submitted to FRA
 2 years after the date of the                         and the railroad
 submission to the President of                        submits a
 a plan for the tank vessel,                           certification to
 nontank vessel, or facility, if                       FRA that the
 the owner or operator certifies                       railroad has
 that the owner or operator has                        obtained, through
 ensured by contract or other                          contract or other
 means approved by the President                       approved means,
 the availability of private                           the necessary
 personnel and equipment                               personnel and
 necessary to respond, to the                          equipment to
 maximum extent practicable, to                        respond, to the
 a worst-case discharge or a                           maximum extent
 substantial threat of such a                          practicable, to a
 discharge.                                            worst-case
                                                       discharge or a
                                                       substantial
                                                       threat of such a
                                                       discharge.
                                                      Requires that the
                                                       certificate be
                                                       signed by the
                                                       qualified
                                                       individual or an
                                                       appropriate
                                                       corporate
                                                       officer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA solicits comment on the proposed oil spill response plan 
requirements in the following areas:
    1. On ways to effectively provide regulatory flexibility to bona 
fide small entities that pose a lesser safety risk and may not be able 
to comply with the requirements of the proposed rule due to cost 
concerns, limited benefit, or practical considerations.
    2. On whether the 12-hour response time is sufficient for all areas 
subject to the plan, or whether a shorter response time (e.g., 6-hours) 
is appropriate for certain areas (e.g. High Volume Areas) which pose an 
increased risk for higher consequences from a spill; on criteria to 
define such ``High Volume Areas'' where a shorter response time should 
be required, as well as whether the definition for ``High Volume Area'' 
in 49 CFR 194.5 (excluding pipeline diameter) captures this increased 
risk, or if there is other criteria which can be used to reasonably and 
consistently identify such areas for rail; on whether requiring 
response resources to be capable of arriving within 6 hours will lead 
to improvements in response, and for specific evidence of these 
improvements; and on whether the final rule should have a longer 
response time than 12 hours for spills for all other areas subject to 
the plan requirements in order to offset costs from requiring shorter 
response times for High Volume Areas.
    3. On whether the proposed training requirements are sufficient, or 
whether the Qualified Individual should be trained to the Incident 
Commander level using the Incident Command System (ICS).

D. Related Actions

    PHMSA and FRA have taken a comprehensive approach to responding to 
the risks posed by large quantities of flammable liquids by rail. The 
HHFT Final Rule outlines many of these actions under the Sections III 
(``Regulatory Actions Addressing Rail Safety'') and IV (``Non-
Regulatory Actions Addressing Rail Safety'').\21\ A brief summary of 
significant actions relating to response planning and information 
sharing are included in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See 80 FR 26654 and 80 FR 26657, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Call to Action
    On January 9, 2014, the Secretary issued a ``Call to Action'' to 
actively engage all the stakeholders in the crude oil industry, 
including CEOs of member companies of the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) and CEOs of railroads. In a meeting held on January 16, 2014, the 
Secretary and the Administrators of PHMSA and FRA requested that 
offerors and carriers identify prevention and mitigation strategies 
that can be implemented quickly. As a result of this meeting, the rail 
and crude oil industries agreed to voluntarily consider or implement 
potential improvements, including speed restrictions in high 
consequence areas, alternative routing, the use of distributive power 
to improve braking, and improvements in emergency response preparedness 
and training. The following are some of the call-to-action items 
related to emergency response and classification over the past year.

[[Page 50079]]

    In February 2014, under an agreement between DOT and AAR, railroads 
developed a $5 million specialized crude-by-rail training and tuition 
assistance program for local first responders at the Transportation 
Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI). The funding provided for the 
development of a training curriculum for emergency responders in 
petroleum crude oil response and tuition assistance for over a 1,500 
first responders in 2014.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ TTCI is wholly owned subsidiary of the Association of 
American Railroads. TTCI is a transportation research and testing 
organization, providing emerging technology solutions for the 
railway industry throughout North America and the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of the call to action in 2014, the rail and oil 
industry, along with PHMSA's input, developed a RP designed to improve 
rail safety through the proper classification and loading of crude oil. 
This effort was led by the API and resulted in the development of an 
ANSI recognized recommend practice (see ANSI/API RP 3000, ``Classifying 
and Loading of Crude Oil into Rail Tank Cars''). This recommend 
practice, which, during its development, went through a public comment 
period in order to be designated as an American National Standard, 
addresses the proper classification of crude oil for rail 
transportation and the quantity measurement for overfill prevention 
when loading crude oil into rail tank cars. RP 3000 provides guidance 
on the material characterization, transport classification, and 
quantity measurement for overfill prevention of petroleum crude oil for 
the loading of rail tank cars.
2. Emergency Order
    As noted in the Executive Summary above, on May 7, 2014, DOT issued 
the Order.\23\ The Order requires each railroad transporting in 
commerce within the U.S. 1,000,000 gallons or more of Bakken crude oil 
in a single train to provide certain information in writing to the SERC 
for each state in which it operates such a train. The Order requires 
railroads to provide (1) the expected volume and frequency of affected 
trains transporting Bakken crude oil through each county in a state (or 
a commonwealth's equivalent jurisdiction (e.g., Louisiana parishes, 
Alaska boroughs, Virginia independent cities), (2) the routes over 
which the identified trains are expected to be operated; (3) a 
description of the petroleum crude oil and applicable emergency 
response information, and (4) contact information for at least one 
responsible party at the railroad. The Order requires railroads to 
provide SERCs updated notifications when there is a ``material change'' 
in the volume of affected trains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/emergency-order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DOT subsequently issued a frequently asked questions document 
clarifying several aspects of the Order (e.g., the required level of 
specificity of the data to be shared, the duty of railroads to provide 
updated information to the SERCs and the railroad's ability to share 
the same data with state agencies other than the SERCs). See document 
number 0003 in Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067 and the more detailed 
discussion of the Order in the ``HHFT Information Sharing 
Notification'' section of this discussion.
3. Rulemaking Actions
    On May 8, 2015, PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, published the HHFT 
Final Rule. Several provisions adopted in the HHFT Final Rule relate to 
this NPRM, including the definition of a HHFT and the information 
sharing portion of the route analysis and consultation requirements.
    The HHFT Final Rule defined High-Hazard Flammable Train as a 
continuous block of 20 or more tank cars in a single train or 35 or 
more cars dispersed through a train loaded with a Class 3 flammable 
liquid. This definition served as the applicable threshold of many of 
the requirements in the HHFT Final Rule and is the threshold at which, 
per the HHFT Final Rule, the route analysis and consultation 
requirements of Sec.  172.820 apply to HHFTs. That section prescribes 
additional safety and security planning requirements for the 
transportation of certain hazardous materials by rail. Prior to the 
HHFT Final Rule, Sec.  172.820 applied to the rail transportation of 
bulk packages of materials poisonous by inhalation and certain 
explosive and radioactive materials. In the HHFT Final Rule, PHMSA 
expanded the applicability of Sec.  172.820 to include HHFTs. Thus, in 
accordance with the HHFT Final Rule, rail carriers that operate HHFTs 
must annually assess the safety and security risks of routes used to 
transport those materials, as well as all practicable alternative 
routes, using a minimum of 27 risk factors identified in appendix D to 
part 172 of the HMR. Based on this analysis, rail carriers must 
identify and use the safest and most secure routes for the 
transportation of HHFTs (as well as the other covered hazardous 
materials). Paragraph (g) of Sec.  172.820 requires rail carriers 
subject to the rule to identify a point of contact for routing issues 
and provide that contact information to the following:
     State and/or regional fusion centers that have been 
established to coordinate with State, local, and tribal officials on 
security issues within the area encompassed by the rail carrier's rail 
system; \24\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     State, local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that 
may be affected by a rail carrier's routing decisions and who have 
contacted the carrier regarding routing decisions.
4. Safety Advisories
    Safety advisories are documents published by PHMSA and FRA in the 
Federal Register that inform the public and regulated community of a 
potential dangerous situation or issue. In addition to safety 
advisories, PHMSA and FRA may also issue other notices, such as safety 
alerts. PHMSA and FRA published the following safety advisories and 
notices related to information sharing and emergency response planning.
    On April 17, 2015, PHMSA issued a safety advisory notice (Notice 
No. 15-7; 80 FR 22781) to remind hazardous materials shippers and 
carriers of their responsibility to ensure that current, accurate, and 
timely emergency response information is immediately available to 
emergency response officials for shipments of hazardous materials, and 
that such information is maintained on a regular basis.\25\ This notice 
outlined existing regulatory requirements applicable to hazardous 
materials shippers (including re-offerors) and carriers found in the 
HMR, specifically in subpart G of part 172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ See: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-23/pdf/2015-09436.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA Notice 15-7 emphasized that the responsibility to provide 
accurate and timely information is a shared responsibility for all 
persons involved in the transportation of hazardous materials. This 
information includes, but is not limited to, identification and volume 
of the specific hazardous material; location of the hazardous material 
on the train; risks of fire and explosion; immediate precautions to be 
taken in the event of an incident; initial methods for handling spills 
or leaks in the absence of fire; and preliminary first aid measures. It 
is a shipper's responsibility to provide accurate emergency response 
information that is consistent with both the information provided on a 
shipping paper and the material being transported. Likewise, re-
offerors of hazardous materials must ensure that this information can 
be verified to be accurate, particularly if

[[Page 50080]]

the material is altered, mixed, or otherwise repackaged prior to being 
placed back into transportation. In addition, carriers must ensure that 
emergency response information is maintained appropriately, is 
accessible, and can be communicated immediately in the event of a 
hazardous materials incident. All of this information must be 
immediately available to any person who, as a representative of 
Federal, State, local or tribal governments (including a SERC), 
responds to an incident involving hazardous material or is conducting 
an investigation which involves a hazardous material.
    On April 17, 2015 FRA and PHMSA also issued a joint safety advisory 
notice (FRA Safety Advisory 2015-02; PHMSA Notice No. 15-11; 80 FR 
22778). The agencies issued the joint safety advisory notice to remind 
railroads operating an HHFT--defined as a train comprised of 20 or more 
loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block, 
or a train with 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable 
liquid across the entire train--as well as the offerors of Class 3 
flammable liquids transported on such trains, that certain information 
may be required by PHMSA and/or FRA personnel during the course of an 
investigation immediately following an accident.
5. Stakeholder Outreach
    PHMSA and FRA have also taken specific actions to develop 
appropriate response outreach and training tools to mitigate the impact 
of future incidents. The following are some of PHMSA's actions related 
to emergency response and information sharing for rail crude oil 
incidents over the past year.
    In February 2014, PHMSA hosted a stakeholder meeting with 
participants from the emergency response community, railroad industry, 
Transport Canada, and its federal agency partners, FRA and Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The objective was to discuss 
emergency preparedness related to incidents involving transportation of 
crude oil by rail. The discussion topics included: Current state of 
crude oil risk awareness and operational readiness/capability; 
familiarity with bulk shippers of crude oil and emergency response 
plans and procedures; available training resources (e.g., sources, 
accessibility, gaps in training); and the needs of emergency 
responders/public safety agencies.
    In May 2014, in conjunction with the Virginia Department of Fire 
Programs, PHMSA hosted a ``Lessons Learned'' forum that consisted of a 
panel of fire chiefs and emergency management officials from some of 
the jurisdictions that experienced a crude oil or ethanol rail 
transportation incident. The purpose of this forum was to share 
firsthand knowledge about their experiences responding to and managing 
these significant rail incidents. In attendance were public safety 
officials from Aliceville, AL; Cherry Valley, IL; Cass County, ND; and 
Lynchburg, VA. Based on the input received from the forum participants, 
PHMSA published the ``Crude Oil Rail Emergency Response Lessons Learned 
Roundtable Report,'' which outlined the key factors that were 
identified as having a direct impact on the outcomes of managing a 
crude oil transportation incident.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_0903D018579BF84E6914C0BB932607F5B3F50300/filename/Lessons_Learned_Roundtable_Report_FINAL_070114.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the ``Lessons Learned Roundtable Report'' was focused on 
public emergency responders, some of the key findings also addressed 
the railroads:
     All agencies involved in emergency response operations 
need to understand NIMS [National Incident Management System], their 
specific role within NIMS, and must have a representative assigned to 
the Command Post to facilitate communications and coordination with all 
response assets.
     Pre-incident planning and communication with all 
organizations, specifically shippers and carriers (railroads), is 
essential to learn about the product(s) being transported and the 
availability of emergency response resources.
     Emergency responders are not fully aware of the response 
resources available from the railroads and other organizations (e.g., 
air monitoring capabilities). This information would be useful in pre-
incident planning, preparedness, and response operations.In June 2014, 
in partnership with FRA and the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA),
    PHMSA hosted a stakeholder meeting with hazardous materials 
response subject matter experts from public safety organizations, 
railroads, government, and industry to discuss the best practices for 
responding to a crude oil incident by rail. In coordination with the 
working group, PHMSA drafted the ``Commodity Preparedness and Incident 
Management Reference Sheet.'' This document contains incident 
management best practices for emergency response operations, including 
a risk-based hazardous materials emergency response operational 
framework. The framework provides first responders with key planning, 
preparedness, and response principles to successfully manage a crude 
oil rail transportation incident. The document also assists fire and 
emergency services personnel in decision-making and developing an 
appropriate response strategy to an incident (i.e., defensive, 
offensive, or non-intervention strategies).\27\ In partnership with the 
USFA's National Fire Academy (NFA), a series of six coffee break 
training bulletins were published and widely distributed to the 
emergency response community providing reference to this response 
document.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ This document has been widely distributed throughout the 
emergency response community and is also available on the PHMSA 
Operation Safe Delivery Web site at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/emergencyresponse.
    \28\ See http://www.usfa.fema.gov/training/coffee_break/hazmat_index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In October 2014, to further promote the ``Commodity Preparedness 
and Incident Management Reference Sheet,'' PHMSA contracted with the 
Department of Energy, Mission Support Alliance-Hazardous Materials 
Management and Emergency Preparedness (MSA-HAMMER) to develop the 
Transportation Rail Incident Preparedness and Response (TRIPR) for 
Flammable Liquid Unit Trains training modules. In 2015, the web-
accessible Transportation Rail Incident Preparedness and Response 
(TRIPR) modules became available to provide emergency responders with 
critical information on best practices related to rail incidents 
involving Class 3 flammable liquids such as crude oil and ethanol.\29\ 
The curriculum consists of nine training modules that focus on key 
response functions and incorporates three animated, interactive 
training scenarios and introductory videos to help instructors lead 
tabletop discussions. TRIPR offers a flexible approach to increasing 
the awareness of emergency response personnel on the best practices and 
principles related to rail incidents involving Class 3 flammable 
liquids. A key component of this initiative is to learn from past 
experiences and to leverage the expertise of public safety agencies, 
rail carriers, and industry subject matter experts in order to prepare 
first responders to safely manage rail incidents. These modules are not 
intended to be a standalone training program, but are offered to 
supplement existing programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/emergencyresponse/TRIPR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In December 2014, PHMSA hosted a follow-up meeting which re-engaged 
the

[[Page 50081]]

emergency response stakeholder group to allow all parties within the 
Federal Government, railroad industry, and response community to 
provide updates on the various emergency response-related initiatives 
aimed to improve community awareness and preparedness for responding to 
incidents involving crude oil and other Class 3 flammable liquid 
shipments by rail.
    In addition to PHMSA's efforts mentioned above, in January 2015, 
the National Response Team (NRT), led by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), conducted a webinar, titled ``Emerging Risks, Responder 
Awareness Training for Bakken Crude Oil,'' to educate responders on 
Bakken crude oil production and transportation along with the health 
and safety issues facing first responders. In addition to the training 
webinar, the NRT also intends to conduct a large-scale exercise 
scenario in 2015 to assess Federal, State, and local response 
capabilities to a crude oil incident.
    Also in January 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
along with other federal partners, including FEMA, USCG, DOE, DOT, and 
DHS, hosted conference calls with State officials and representatives 
from the appropriate offices, boards, or commissions that play a role 
in preparing or responding to an incident involving crude-by-rail. The 
purpose of these discussions was to gain a better understanding of how 
States are preparing to respond to rail incidents involving crude oil 
and to identify key needs from each State. Questions centered on what 
actions (e.g., planning, training, exercises) have been planned or 
conducted in the State or local communities, what communities or areas 
have the greatest risk, what regional actions or activities states have 
participated in and any other related concerns states would like to 
discuss.
    In August 2015 and May 2016, PHMSA representatives attended the 
Northwest Tribal Emergency Management Council's annual meeting in 
Spokane, Washington. This provided PHMSA with the opportunity to speak 
directly with tribal emergency management leaders and emphasize the 
importance of effective tribal and federal cooperation.
    In addition to these sources of information described above, PHMSA 
provides resources to the emergency response community in many other 
forms. Some of the key resources provided by PHMSA include:
     Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) Grant 
Program: On an annual basis, PHMSA awards over $20M in grant funding 
through its HMEP grant program to States, Territories, and Tribes to 
carry out planning and training activities to ensure state and local 
emergency responders are properly prepared and trained to respond to 
hazmat transportation incidents. These activities include conducting 
hazardous materials commodity flow surveys, drafting and updating 
hazmat operations plans, funding emergency response exercises, and 
NFPA-472 related training.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/grants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Assistance for Local Emergency Response Training (ALERT) 
Grant: Additionally, in FY15 PHMSA will award its ALERT grant. This is 
a competitive grant opportunity using prior year recovery funds to a 
non-profit organization(s) that can provide direct or web-based 
hazardous materials training for volunteer or remote emergency 
responders. The priority for this grant will be emergency response 
activities for the transportation of crude oil, ethanol and other 
flammable liquids by rail. The anticipated award for this grant is 
September 2015.
     Emergency Response Guidebook: This guidebook provides 
emergency responders with a go-to manual to help deal with hazardous 
materials incidents during the critical first 30 minutes. It is also 
available as a free mobile app. The Emergency Response Guidebook is 
available at: http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/outreach-training/erg.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/outreach-training/erg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Hazardous Materials Information Center: The Center 
provides live, one-on-one assistance Monday-Friday, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
(ET). The Hazardous Materials Information Center is available at: 
http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/standards-rulemaking/hmic.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/standards-rulemaking/hmic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Outreach: PHMSA has a staff of highly trained individuals 
skilled in training known as the Hazardous Materials Safety Assistance 
Team (HMSAT). The HMSAT team is part of our field operations personnel 
and is available in all regions of the United States to answer 
questions and provide on-site assistance to customers of the Hazardous 
Materials Transportation-State and Local Education (HMT-SALE) program, 
State, local and tribal governments, and industry associations with 
technical issues, outreach, training, and compliance assistance in the 
field of hazardous materials transportation: http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/phmsa-ext/feedback/hmsatPresenterRequestForm.jsp.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/phmsa-ext/feedback/hmsatPresenterRequestForm.jsp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A myriad of other sources of information and support are available 
to State, local and tribal governments' emergency preparedness and 
response efforts, including other federal agencies, and industry 
groups. For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security operates 
the National Operations Center 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to 
interact with State governors, emergency responders, and perform 
critical infrastructure operations across the country to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from hazardous materials incidents.
    Complementing the Federal Government's efforts, the railroad and 
shipping industries have also made efforts to improve crude oil by rail 
safety. API has built new partnerships between rail companies and oil 
producers. At the request of FRA, API is developing an outreach program 
to train first responders in HHFT derailment response throughout the 
U.S., particularly in states that have seen a rise in the transport of 
crude oil by rail. The oil and rail industries have worked to identify 
where existing training initiatives and conferences can be held to 
provide the training to as many responders as possible. The AAR is also 
worked to develop an inventory of emergency response resources and 
resource staging locations along routes utilized by HHFTs.
    The railroad industry, hazardous materials shippers, and other 
organizations also provide emergency response assistance and training 
to communities through a variety of means, including the Transportation 
Community Awareness and Emergency Response (TRANSCAER[supreg]) program. 
The TRANSCAER program offers emergency response information, emergency 
planning assistance, and training to Local Emergency Planning 
Committees (LEPCs) under the AAR Circular OT-55-O protocol. AAR and API 
are working together to produce a crude oil by rail safety training 
video through their partnership with the TRANSCAER program.
    The AAR Circular OT-55-O also outlines a procedure whereby local 
emergency response officials and emergency planning organizations may 
obtain a list of the types and volumes of hazardous materials that are 
transported through their communities. On January 27, 2015, AAR 
published revisions to the Circular for members to ``provide bona fide 
emergency response

[[Page 50082]]

agencies or planning groups with specific commodity flow information 
covering all hazardous commodities transported through the community 
for a 12 month period in rank order.'' Previously only the top 25 
commodities were available. The railroad industry considers this 
information to be restricted information for business confidential and 
security reasons, and that the recipient of the information must agree 
to release the information only to bona fide emergency response 
planning and response organizations and not distribute the information 
publicly in whole or in part without the individual railroad's express 
written permission. Additional description of voluntary efforts by the 
regulated community is provided under the Section V, Subsection G 
(``Voluntary Actions'') of this rulemaking.

E. HHFT Information Sharing Notification

    As previously discussed, on May 7, 2014, the Secretary of 
Transportation, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 5121(d), issued an 
Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order in Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067 
(Order).\34\ The Order requires each railroad transporting in commerce 
within the United States, 1,000,000 gallons or more of Bakken crude oil 
in a single train to provide certain information in writing to the SERC 
for each state in which it operates such a train. The Order requires 
railroads to provide (1) the expected volume and frequency of affected 
trains transporting Bakken crude oil through each county in a state (or 
a commonwealth's equivalent jurisdiction (e.g., Louisiana parishes, 
Alaska boroughs, Virginia independent cities)), (2) the routes over 
which the identified trains are expected to be operated; (3) a 
description of the petroleum crude oil and applicable emergency 
response information, and (4) contact information for at least one 
responsible party at the railroad. Further, the EO requires railroads 
to provide SERCs updated notifications prior to any ``material change'' 
in the volume of affected trains and requires railroads to provide 
copies of notifications made to each SERC to FRA upon request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/emergency-order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DOT subsequently issued a frequently asked questions document 
(FAQs) clarifying several aspects of the Order.\35\ The FAQs clarified 
that for purposes of the Order, ``Bakken crude oil'' is any crude oil 
tendered to railroads for transportation from any facility located 
within the Williston Basin (North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana in 
the United States or Saskatchewan or Manitoba in Canada).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See document number 0003 in Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the FAQs clarified the level of specificity of the traffic 
data railroads are required to provide the SERCs and the requirement to 
provide updated information in anticipation of a ``material change'' in 
estimated volumes or frequency of trains traveling through a particular 
local jurisdiction. Specifically, citing the Order's stated goal of 
providing first responders an understanding of the volume and 
frequencies with which Bakken crude oil is transported through their 
communities so that they can prepare appropriate response plans, the 
FAQs explained that when reporting traffic data required by the Order, 
railroads should look at their aggregate traffic of Bakken crude oil 
through the jurisdiction for the prior year and after considering any 
reasonably anticipated changes in that traffic, provide a reasonable 
estimate of the weekly traffic along the affected routes. The FAQs 
explained that the estimate could be provided in range to account for 
normal variations in traffic, but any changes of 25 percent or more 
from the aggregate estimates provided are considered a ``material 
change'' requiring a railroad to provide updated information to the 
relevant SERC.
    Third, the FAQs addressed issues related to the potential 
confidentiality of the data railroads submit to SERCs under the Order. 
DOT explained that the data is intended for persons with a need-to-
know; that is, first responders at the state and local level, as well 
as other appropriate emergency response planners. Noting that 
historically railroads and states have routinely entered into 
confidentiality agreements prior to railroads providing states with 
information on commodities transported in trains within their 
jurisdictions, the FAQs clarified that railroads may require reasonable 
confidentiality agreements prior to providing the required information 
to SERCs or other state agencies. As discussed later in the following 
section, confidentiality concerns have been the subject of further 
analysis and discussion.
    Fourth, recognizing that different states have different methods 
and agencies responsible for emergency response planning and 
preparedness within their jurisdictions and a state's SERC may not 
always be the state agency most directly involved in emergency response 
planning and preparedness, the FAQs provided that if a state agrees 
that it would be advantageous for the information required by the Order 
to be shared with another state agency (such as a fusion center) 
involved with emergency response planning and/or preparedness, as 
opposed to the SERC, a railroad may share the required information with 
that agency instead of the SERC.
    Finally, the FAQs addressed railroads' responsibilities as applied 
to tribal lands and clarified that the Order does not require railroads 
to reach out to Tribal Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs), as DOT 
itself planned outreach to Tribal leaders to let them know that their 
TERCs can coordinate with the appropriate SERCs for access to data 
supplied under the Order. The FAQs did make clear, however, that 
railroads must ensure that SERCs (or relevant fusion centers or other 
state agencies) are also supplied with information for traffic through 
tribal lands.
    Following the issuance of the Order, some stakeholders, including 
the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the American Shortline 
and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), expressed concern that the 
crude oil routing information the Order requires railroads to provide 
to SERCs is sensitive information from a security perspective and 
should only be available to persons with a need-to-know the information 
(e.g., emergency responders and emergency response planners). The AAR 
and ASLRRA also expressed the view that commercially sensitive 
information should remain confidential and not be publically available. 
See the discussion of AAR and ASLRRA's concerns published at 79 FR 
59891 on October 3, 2014 (FRA's ``Proposed Agency Information 
Collection Activities; Notice and Request for Comments'' related to the 
Order). After consulting with DOT, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FRA 
responded to AAR and ASLRRA's concerns, by explaining that the 
information the Order requires railroads to supply to SERCs is not 
commercially sensitive or Security Sensitive Information (SSI) defined 
by DOT, DHS, or TSA regulations. Id. at 59892. FRA further noted that 
DOT found no basis to conclude that the public disclosure of the 
information is detrimental to transportation safety. Id.
    After the issuance of the Emergency Order in August 2014, PHMSA 
published the High-Hazard Flammable Train NPRM. In that NPRM, PHMSA 
proposed to codify the requirements of the Emergency Order and 
requested

[[Page 50083]]

public comment on the various facets of that proposal. Specifically, 
PHMSA proposed to add a new Sec.  174.310, ``Requirements for the 
operation of high-hazard flammable trains,'' to subpart G of part 174. 
Proposed Sec.  174.310 set forth additional requirements for the 
operation of HHFTs including making such trains subject to the route 
analysis and consultation requirements of existing Sec.  172.820, 
certain speed restrictions and specific braking standards, as well as 
notifications to SERCs consistent with the Order. Specifically, 
paragraph (a)(2) of proposed Sec.  174.310 required railroads 
transporting in a single train 1,000,000 gallons or more of Bakken 
crude to provide certain information about these trains to the SERCs or 
other appropriate state delegated entities in which it operates. 
Generally consistent with the Order, the NPRM's proposal required 
railroads to provide the following information to the SERCs or ``other 
appropriate state delegated entities'': (1) A reasonable estimate of 
the number of affected trains that expected to travel, per week, 
through each county within the state; (2) the routes over which the 
affected trains will be transported; (3) a description of the crude oil 
being transported and applicable emergency response information; and 
(4) updates in the event of any ``material change.'' Table 7 depicts 
the comments received in response to this proposal, representing 
approximately 99,856 signatories.

            Table 7--Commenter Composition: NPRM Notification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Commenter type                         Signatories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization.............................          90,869
Individuals.............................................           8,888
Industry stakeholders...................................              22
Government organizations or representatives.............              77
                                                         ---------------
  Totals................................................          99,856
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The vast majority of commenters generally supported PHMSA's efforts 
to establish some level of notification requirements for the operation 
of trains carrying large quantities of crude oil as proposed in Sec.  
174.310(a)(2). However, commenters were divided on some of the specific 
requirements of the proposal. Some commenters were opposed to the 
public dissemination of information, citing business confidentiality or 
security concerns.
    Based on the public comments on the NPRM as well as PHMSA and FRA's 
analysis of the issues from the HHFT Final Rule, PHMSA did not adopt 
the notification requirements of proposed Sec.  174.310(a)(2). PHMSA 
determined that the expansion of the existing route analysis and 
consultation requirements of 49 CFR 172.820 to include HHFTs would be 
the best approach to ensuring that emergency responders and others 
involved with emergency response planning and preparedness would have 
access to sufficient information regarding crude oil shipments moving 
through their jurisdictions to enable them to adequately plan and 
prepare from an emergency response perspective. PHMSA reasoned that 
expanding the existing route analysis and consultation requirements of 
Sec.  172.820 (which already apply to the rail transportation of 
certain hazardous materials historically considered to be highly-
hazardous \36\) would preserve the intent of the Emergency Order to 
enhance information sharing with emergency responders in areas through 
which HHFTs move and that, in combination with the other new safety 
requirements in the HHFT Final Rule, obviated the need to continue 
notification to the SERCs as required by the Order and as proposed in 
the HHFT NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ TSA regulations under 49 CFR 1580.100 define certain types 
and quantities of material as ``rail security sensitive materials 
(RSSM). Class 3 flammable liquids, including crude oil and ethanol 
are not defined as RSSM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After PHMSA published the HHFT Final Rule, FRA, PHMSA and the 
Department received feedback from stakeholders, expressing concern 
about the Department's decision to forgo the proactive notification 
requirements of the Emergency Order and in the NPRM. Those stakeholders 
include Congressional representatives, State and local government 
officials, representatives of emergency response and planning 
organizations, and the public. Generally, these stakeholders expressed 
the view that given the unique risks posed by the frequent rail 
transportation of large volumes of flammable liquids, including Bakken 
crude oil, PHMSA should not eliminate the proactive information sharing 
provisions of the Order and rely solely on the consultation and 
communication requirements in existing Sec.  172.820. Stakeholders, 
including emergency responders, expressed concern that the HHFT Final 
Rule may limit the availability of emergency response information by 
superseding the Order.
    In response to these concerns and after further evaluating the 
issue within the Department, in a May 28, 2015, notice (Notice), PHMSA 
announced that it would extend the Order indefinitely, while it 
considered options for codifying the disclosure requirement on a 
permanent basis.\37\ In the Notice, PHMSA recognized the desire of 
local communities to know what hazardous materials are moving through 
their cities and towns and noted that transparency is a critical piece 
of the Department's comprehensive approach to safety. Further, PHMSA 
expressed its support for the public disclosure of this information to 
the extent allowed by the applicable state, local and tribal laws and 
noted that the Order and HHFT Final Rule all emphasize transparency and 
information sharing. The Notice explained that longstanding federal law 
requires shippers and offerors of hazardous materials to carry the 
critical information necessary for emergency responders to respond 
appropriately to an incident involving the transportation of any 
hazardous material and to have someone available to provide emergency 
response information at all times that the hazardous material is in 
transportation. See 49 CFR 174.26 and part 172, subpart G. PHMSA issued 
a safety advisory reminding the regulated community of these legal 
obligations and outlining the myriad of additional emergency response 
resources available (e.g., PHMSA's Emergency Response Guidebook and 
Hazardous Materials Information Center, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security's National Operations Center, industry's TRANSCAER[supreg] 
program, as well as AAR's Circular OT-55-N that outlines a procedure 
whereby local emergency response officials and emergency response 
planning organizations may obtain a list of the types and volumes of 
hazardous materials that are transported through their communities). 
See the detailed discussion of PHMSA's April 17, 2015, Safety Advisory 
and Stakeholder Outreach in Section II, Subsection C (``Summary of 
Proposed Oil Spill Response Requirements'') above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/phmsa-notice-regarding-emergency-response-notifications-for-shipments-of-petroleum-crude-oil-by-rail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 4, 2015, President Obama signed into law the ``Fixing 
America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (``FAST Act''). The FAST 
Act includes the ``Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety 
Improvement Act of 2015'' at Sec. Sec.  7001 through 7311, which 
provides direction for the hazardous materials safety program. Section 
7302 directs the Secretary to issue regulations that require real-time 
sharing of the electronic train consist information for hazardous 
materials shipments and require advanced notification of certain HHFTs. 
The DOT will address the

[[Page 50084]]

requirements in Sec.  7302 related to electronic train consists in a 
future rulemaking. The FAST Act directs Class I railroads to provide 
advanced notification and information on high-hazard flammable trains 
to each State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), consistent with the 
notification requirements in the Order. The FAST Act requires that 
SERCs receiving this advanced notification must provide the information 
to law enforcement and emergency response agencies upon request. The 
FAST Act also directs the Secretary to establish security and 
confidentiality protections for electronic train consist information 
and advanced notification information.
    The FAST Act limits the applicability of the advanced notification 
requirements for HHFT to the Class I railroads. In this NPRM, PHMSA is 
proposing that the information-sharing requirements apply to all 
railroads with HHFT operations. This proposal fulfills the 
Congressional mandate and is within PHMSA's regulatory authority. 
Through the authority of Federal hazmat transportation law and the 
delegation of this authority to PHMSA by the Secretary, PHMSA is 
responsible for overseeing a hazmat safety program that protects 
against the risks to life, property, and the environment inherent in 
the transportation of hazmat in commerce. In proposing that the 
information-sharing requirements apply to all railroads with HHFT 
operations, PHMSA is addressing the provisions of the FAST Act, as well 
as acting in accordance with our delineated authority by addressing the 
potential safety risks posed by HHFT operations of all railroads. 
Requiring advanced notification from Class I, II, and III railroads is 
consistent with DOT's Order addressing information-sharing. While we 
acknowledge that the HHFT operations of Class II and Class III 
railroads are relatively limited in comparison to those of Class I 
railroads, and thus pose fewer safety risks in the rail transportation 
system, the HHFT operations of Class II and Class III railroads 
nonetheless pose safety risks that justify adherence to the proposed 
information-sharing requirements of this NPRM.
    Recent railroad accidents demonstrate that accidents involving 
HHFTs are not limited to Class I railroads. In particular, the 
accidents in Aliceville, AL, and New Augusta, MS involved two Class III 
railroads, the Alabama Gulf Coast Railway and Illinois Central 
Railroad. If PHMSA were to limit the requirement to Class I railroads 
as described in the FAST Act, these railroads and other Class II or 
Class III railroads would not be required to provide advanced 
notification and information to SERCs or TERCs. Therefore, in order to 
effectively address the safety risks posed by HHFTs by increasing the 
level of information sharing between railroads and SERCs, TERCs, and 
other affected jurisdictions, PHMSA proposes that the information-
sharing requirements of this NPRM apply to all classes of railroads 
that transport HHFTs. The intent of the information sharing provision 
of this rule is to ensure that local emergency responders and emergency 
planning officials have access to sufficient information regarding the 
movement of HHFTs in their jurisdictions to adequately plan and prepare 
for emergency events involving HHFTs. This purpose is reaffirmed by the 
FAST Act's requirements addressing requirements for both sharing and 
protection of information required by the advanced notification. Under 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) in Title 
III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 
the Governor of each state is required to establish a state emergency 
response commission (SERC). The SERC is responsible for establishing 
emergency planning districts and appointing, supervising, and 
coordinating local emergency planning committees (LEPCs). EPCRA section 
303 requires LEPCs to develop a comprehensive emergency response plans 
for their emergency planning districts. The SERC is also responsible 
for reviewing the emergency response plans and make recommendations to 
revise the plans as necessary for each community. The emergency 
response plan includes facilities that handle extremely hazardous 
substances (EHSs) defined under section 302 of EPCRA as well as 
transportation routes of EHSs. Many LEPCs include EHSs as well other 
chemicals that pose a risk in their emergency response plan. As 
previously noted, another agency is sometimes delegated by the state to 
be directly involved in emergency response planning and preparedness. 
In both instances, state delegated agencies are connected to the local 
response and planning framework. The information required to be shared 
in this rulemaking is largely consistent with the information required 
by the Order.

F. Security and Confidentiality for HHFT Information Sharing 
Notification

    In response to the Order's information-sharing provisions, 
railroads raised particular concerns that the sharing of routing 
information for HHFTs required them to reveal proprietary business 
information. The railroads argued that the routing information, if 
published or shared widely, could reveal information about customers. 
After considering the claim in an October 2014 information collection 
notice, FRA concluded that the information would not constitute 
business confidential or proprietary under federal law. See the 
discussion of AAR and ASLRRA's concerns published at 79 FR 59891 on 
October 3, 2014 (FRA's ``Proposed Agency Information Collection 
Activities; Notice and Request for Comments'' related to the Order). In 
its discussion, the FRA noted that the railroads did not specifically 
identify any prospective harm caused by the sharing of this 
information. Nonetheless, if a railroad claims that routing information 
contains confidential business information, the merits of that claim 
would be analyzed under state open records and sunshine laws.
    Section 7302 of the FAST Act directs the Secretary to ``establish 
security and confidentiality protections, including protections from 
the public release of proprietary information or security-sensitive 
information, to prevent the release to unauthorized persons any 
electronic train consist information or advanced notification or 
information provided by Class I railroads under this section.'' In 
fact, railroads previously raised concerns that the sharing of routing 
information for HHFTs required them to reveal proprietary business 
information. As discussed above, railroads argued that the Emergency 
Order routing information, if published or shared widely, could reveal 
information about customers. After considering the claim in an October 
2014 information collection notice, FRA concluded that the information 
would not be considered business confidential or SSI under federal law. 
See the discussion of AAR and ASLRRA's concerns published at 79 FR 
59891 on October 3, 2014 (FRA's ``Proposed Agency Information 
Collection Activities; Notice and Request for Comments'' related to the 
Order). In its discussion, the FRA noted that the railroads did not 
specifically identify any prospective harm caused by the sharing of 
this information. DOT's previous analysis and conclusion determined 
that the information shared by railroads does not qualify for 
withholding under federal standards on business confidential or SSI. As 
proposed, DOT will require railroads to share aggregated information 
about the volumes of crude oil that travel through a jurisdiction on a 
weekly basis. This

[[Page 50085]]

information does not include customer information or other business 
identifying details. Further, it does not provide specifics about the 
timing of HHFT trains. Accordingly, PHMSA believes it is limited in its 
ability to establish security and confidentiality protections, 
particularly in light of the FAST Act's dual mandates for PHMSA to 
ensure free-flowing information to SERCs and first responders and 
provide protections for further disclosures. However, as noted in FRA's 
discussion of this matter in its October 2014 Information Disclosure 
Notice, State laws control, and may limit, the disclosure and 
dissemination of this information. Accordingly, PHMSA added the 
following language to the notification requirements: ``If the 
disclosure includes information that railroads believe is security 
sensitive or proprietary and exempt from public disclosure, the 
railroads should indicate that in the notification.'' This will help 
guard against inadvertent public disclosure by ensuring that the 
information that railroads believe to be business confidential is 
marked appropriately. Before fulfilling a request for information and 
releasing the information, States will be on notice of which 
information the railroads consider to be inappropriate for public 
release. We welcome comments on this discussion and particularly invite 
comments on means by which PHMSA can fulfill the FAST Act's direction 
to establish security and confidentiality protections, where this 
information is not subject to security and confidentiality protections 
under Federal standards.

G. Initial Boiling Point Test

    An offeror's responsibility to classify and describe a hazardous 
material is a key requirement under the HMR. In accordance with Sec.  
173.22 of the HMR, it is the offeror's responsibility to properly 
``class and describe a hazardous material in accordance with parts 172 
and 173 of the HMR.'' For transportation purposes, classification is 
ensuring the proper hazard class, packing group, and shipping name are 
assigned to a particular material. For a Class 3 Flammable liquid, the 
HMR provide two tests to determine PG. Both the flash point and IBP 
must be determined to properly classify and assign an appropriate 
packing group for a Class 3 Flammable liquid in accordance with 
Sec. Sec.  173.120 and 173.121. The HMR authorize all of the following 
IBP tests for classification of flammable liquids:

 ASTM D-86--Distillation of Petroleum Products at Atmospheric 
Pressure
 ASTM D-1078--Standard Test Method for Distillation Range of 
Volatile, Organic Liquids
 ISO 3405--Petroleum Products--Determination of Distillation 
Characteristics at Atmospheric Pressure
 ISO 3924--Petroleum Products--Determination of Boiling Range 
Distribution--Gas Chromatography Method
 ISO 4626--Volatile Organic Liquids--Determination of Boiling 
Range of Organic Solvents Used as Raw Materials

    Table 8 provides a description of the flash point tests currently 
authorized in the HMR for petroleum liquids.

     Table 8--Flash Point Testing Requirements for Petroleum Liquids
                          Currently in the HMR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Material                         Flash point test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homogeneous, single-phase liquid having  ASTM D-56--Standard Method of
 a viscosity less than 45 S.U.S. at 38    Test for Flash Point by Tag
 [deg]C (100 [deg]F).                     Closed Cup Tester.
                                         ASTM D-3278--Standard Test
                                          Methods for Flash Point by
                                          Small Scale Closed-Cup
                                          Apparatus.
                                         ASTM D-3828--Standard Test
                                          Methods for Flash Point by
                                          Small Scale Closed Tester.
All other liquids......................  ASTM D-93--Standard Test
                                          Methods for Flash Point by
                                          Pensky-Martens Closed Cup
                                          Tester.
                                         ASTM D-3278--Standard Test
                                          Methods for Flash Point of
                                          Liquids by Small Scale Closed-
                                          Cup Apparatus.
For mixtures...........................  Method specified in Sec.
                                          173.120(c)(2).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2014, the rail and oil industry, along with PHMSA's input, 
developed an RP designed to improve rail safety through the proper 
classification of crude oil and loading practices. This effort was led 
by API and resulted in the development of an ANSI-recognized 
recommended practice (see ANSI/API RP 3000, ``Classifying and Loading 
of Crude Oil into Rail Tank Cars''). This recommended practice, which, 
during its development, went through a public comment period in order 
to be designated as an American National Standard, addresses the proper 
classification of crude oil for rail transportation and the quantity 
measurement for overfill prevention when loading crude oil into rail 
tank cars. The API RP 3000 provides guidance on the material 
characterization, transport classification, and quantity measurement 
for overfill prevention of petroleum crude oil for the loading of rail 
tank cars.
    The API RP 3000 provides best practices for both sampling and 
testing. The API RP 3000 best practices for flash point testing align 
with the flash point test options currently in the HMR. For the initial 
boiling point test, the API RP 3000 concluded that for crude oils 
containing volatile, low molecular weight components (e.g. methane), 
the recommended best practice is to test using ASTM D7900. This test 
ensures a minimal loss of light ends because it determines the boiling 
range distribution from methane through n-nonane with an IBP defined as 
the temperature at which 0.5 weight percent loss is observed when 
determining the boiling range distribution defined in ASTM D7169. This 
test differs from the boiling point test options currently in the HMR, 
which do not remove and recover the light ends. The development of this 
recommended practice demonstrates the importance of proper 
classification.
    In the May 8, 2015, Final Rule HM-251(80 FR 26644), PHMSA adopted 
requirements for a sampling and testing program. The API RP 3000 was 
finalized in September 2014, after the HM-251 NPRM was published, and 
the public was unable to have the opportunity comment on the API RP 
3000's incorporation into the HMR. Therefore, PHMSA did not incorporate 
API RP 3000 by reference; however, we noted that it could be used as a 
method to comply with certain requirements the testing and sampling 
program. The sampling requirements adopted in

[[Page 50086]]

Sec.  173.41 of the HMR are consistent with API RP 3000, but provide 
greater flexibility. PHMSA stated that:

shippers may still use API RP 3000 as a voluntary way to comply with 
the newly adopted sampling requirements. It should be noted that all 
of the testing provisions of API RP 3000 do not align with the 
requirements in the HMR. As the testing provisions were not proposed 
to be modified, shippers must continue to use the testing methods 
for classification of flammable liquids outlined in Sec.  173.120 
and flammable gases in Sec.  173.115.

    PHMSA further noted that we might consider the adoption of the non-
codified testing provisions of API RP 3000, such as the ASTM D7900 
boiling point test in a future rulemaking.
    As specified in the final rule, the ASTM D7900 IBP test and 
practice recommended by industry in the API RP 3000 is not currently 
aligned with the testing requirements authorized in the HMR, forcing 
shippers to continue to use the testing methods authorized in Sec.  
173.121(a)(2). This misalignment results in a situation where an 
industry best practice for the testing of crude oil (ASTM D7900 for 
initial boiling point) that was developed in concert with PHMSA is not 
authorized by the HMR. Therefore, for initial boiling point 
determination, PHMSA is proposing to incorporate ASTM D7900 by 
reference, thus permitting the industry best practice for testing Class 
3 PG assignments. We note that the incorporation of ASTM D7900, which 
aligns with the API RP 3000 will not replace the currently authorized 
testing methods; rather, it serves as a testing alternative if one 
chooses to use that method. PHMSA believes this provides flexibility 
and promotes enhanced safety in transport through accurate PG 
assignment.

III. Recent Spill Events

    PHMSA collected and reviewed information from various sources 
pertaining to recent derailments involving discharges of crude oil. In 
this rulemaking and the accompanying analysis, PHMSA has focused on the 
following derailments: Watertown, WI (November 2015); Culbertson, MT 
(July 2015); Heimdal, ND (May 2015); Galena, IL (March 2015); Mt. 
Carbon, WV (February 2015); La Salle, CO (May 2014); Lynchburg, VA 
(April 2014); Vandergrift, PA (February 2014); New Augusta, MS (January 
2014); Casselton, ND (December 2013); Aliceville, AL (November 2013); 
and Parkers Prairie, MN (March 2013). In the RIA, PHMSA provides 
narratives and discussion of the circumstances and consequences of 
these derailments. PHMSA has identified these derailments as involving 
trains transporting 20 or more tank cars of petroleum oil in a 
continuous block or 35 or more tank cars dispersed throughout the train 
in conformance with the proposed applicability of this rule. 
Furthermore, these derailments resulted in discharges of petroleum oil 
that harmed or posed a threat of harm to the nation's waterways or the 
environment.
    By reviewing and analyzing the experience of the response to these 
derailments, PHMSA seeks to identify oil spill response challenges that 
have occurred in the past and could occur in future derailment 
scenarios. PHMSA incorporates this understanding of response challenges 
into this NPRM, which proposes to amend the requirements of 49 CFR part 
130 to improve comprehensive oil spill response plans by way of new and 
revised requirements. PHMSA holds that improved oil spill response 
planning will, in turn, improve the actual response to future 
derailments involving petroleum oil and lessen potential negative 
impacts to the environment and communities.
    In general, there have been a variety of challenges apparent in the 
responses to recent derailments involving petroleum oil. In multiple 
instances, those responding to oil spills have encountered difficulties 
in assessing the extent of oil spills due to smoke or fire. In several 
of the derailments discussed in this rulemaking, the relatively remote 
location of the town or derailment site limited responders' access to 
the derailment site and encumbered the deployment of response equipment 
(e.g., heavy machinery) at the site. Response providers have also faced 
adverse weather or the potential for adverse weather, which can 
complicate response protocols and compound the adverse effects of 
spills. Communications between railroads, response providers, and 
Federal, State, and local officials are often challenging due to the 
broad array of organizational representation at derailment sites and 
the lack of formal response communications protocols. Further, 
derailments involving energetic ruptures and fires can threaten public 
safety, necessitating evacuations that span multiple days and require 
significant resources, including personnel and leadership with 
experience and training in emergency management.
    Derailments often require a significant, long-term commitment of 
personnel and equipment to remediate an oil spill. Moreover, 
derailments involving petroleum oil typically require diverse technical 
or scientific response services. For example, monitoring a direct 
discharge into a waterway requires water sampling services to detect if 
harmful levels of compounds found in petroleum oils have contaminated 
affected waterways. Depending on the proximity of an oil spill to 
rivers, the spill response could also require monitoring of river 
levels, since rising river levels could rapidly exacerbate the extent 
of an oil spill. The smoke emanating from fires requires air monitoring 
services to detect if harmful levels of air pollutants have jeopardized 
local air quality and public health.
    Thus, in the draft RIA, PHMSA has identified and summarized several 
recent derailments to illustrate the circumstances and consequences of 
derailments involving petroleum oil transported in higher-risk train 
configurations. We have outlined some of the challenges faced by the 
response to each spill event and discussed ways in which comprehensive 
oil spill response plans may have improved spill response efforts and/
or alleviated the adverse consequences to the nation's waterways or 
environment.

IV. National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendations

    As previously discussed, in addition to the efforts of PHMSA and 
FRA, the NTSB has taken a very active role in identifying the risks 
posed by the transportation of large quantities of flammable liquids by 
rail, as well as emergency response activities. Table 9 provides a 
summary of the rail-related NTSB Safety Recommendations related to this 
rulemaking.

[[Page 50087]]



                           Table 9--NTSB Recommendations Addressed in This Rulemaking
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NTSB recommendation                    Summary            Addressed in this rule?       Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R-14-02--Issued January 23, 2014...  Recommends that FRA develop  Yes....................  Propose requirements
                                      a program to audit                                    for FRA to approve
                                      response plans for rail                               comprehensive oil
                                      carriers of petroleum                                 spill response plans
                                      products to ensure that                               for rail.
                                      adequate provisions are in
                                      place to respond to and
                                      remove a worst-case
                                      discharge to the maximum
                                      extent practicable and to
                                      mitigate or prevent a
                                      substantial threat of a
                                      worst-case discharge.
R-14-05--Issued January 23, 2014...  Recommends that PHMSA        Yes....................  Propose to revise the
                                      revise the spill response                             spill planning
                                      planning thresholds                                   thresholds to
                                      contained in 49 CFR part                              address 20 cars of
                                      130 to require                                        liquid petroleum oil
                                      comprehensive response                                in a continuous
                                      plans to effectively                                  block or 35 cars of
                                      provide for the carriers'                             liquid petroleum oil
                                      ability to respond to                                 in a consist.
                                      worst-case discharges
                                      resulting from accidents
                                      involving unit trains or
                                      blocks of tank cars
                                      transporting oil and
                                      petroleum products.
R-14-14--Issued August 22, 2014....  Recommends that PHMSA        Yes....................  The proposed
                                      require railroads                                     information sharing
                                      transporting hazardous                                requirements in this
                                      materials through                                     rulemaking and the
                                      communities to provide                                adopted routing
                                      emergency responders and                              requirements in
                                      local and state emergency                             final rule HM-251
                                      planning committees with                              (80 FR 26643, May 8,
                                      current commodity flow                                2015) address this
                                      data and assist with the                              recommendation.
                                      development of emergency
                                      operations and response
                                      plans.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Summary and Discussion of Public Comments on Oil Spill Response 
Plans

A. Overview of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans

    In the August 1, 2014, ANPRM, PHMSA solicited public comment on 
questions about potential revisions to its regulations that would 
expand the applicability of comprehensive oil spill response plans 
(OSRPs) to high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs) based on amounts of 
crude oil in an entire train consist, rather than a single package or 
tank car. PHMSA received 259 submissions representing more than 70,000 
signatories. Over 67,000 signatories included comments directly 
addressing the ANPRM rulemaking that were submitted to a related docket 
for the NPRM HM-251, Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and 
Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car 
Transportation (RRR). These comments were identified and considered to 
the extent practicable. Comments were received from a broad array of 
stakeholders, including trade organizations, intermodal carriers, 
consultants, environmental groups, emergency response organizations, 
other non-government or advocacy organizations, local government 
organizations or representatives, tribal governments, state 
governments, Members of Congress, and other interested members of the 
public. Comments and all corresponding rulemaking materials received 
may be viewed on the www.regulations.gov Web site (Docket ID: PHMSA-
2014-0105). Additional comments may be viewed under Docket ID: PHMSA-
2012-0082.
    In general, comments on the ANPRM were: (1) General statements of 
support or opposition; (2) personal anecdotes or general statements not 
specifically related to the proposed changes; (3) comments beyond the 
scope of the oil spill response planning provisions of the CWA; or (4) 
identical or nearly identical letter write-in campaigns submitted as 
part of comment initiatives sponsored by organizations. For example, 
many commenters recommend insurance or liability requirements for 
railroads that are not within the scope of PHMSA's statutory authority. 
Although PHMSA does not have statutory authority to impose insurance or 
liability requirements, the FAST Act mandates the Secretary initiate a 
study on the levels and structure of insurance for railroad carriers 
transporting hazmat under Sec.  7310. That action is underway. The 
remaining comments reflect a wide variety of differing views on the 
proposed regulations. The substantive comments received on the ANPRM 
are organized by topic and discussed in the appropriate section, 
together with the PHMSA's response to those comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ It should be noted that individuals and non-government 
organization signatories were not categorized consistently due to 
limitations from transferring capturing comments initially submitted 
to PHMSA-2012-0082.

               Table 10--Overall Commenter Breakdown \38\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Description and
           Background              Signatories           examples
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Government Organization....          65,044  Environmental groups,
                                                  emergency response
                                                  organizations, and
                                                  other non-governmental
                                                  organizations.
Government.....................           3,299  Local, state, tribal
                                                  governments or
                                                  representatives, U.S.
                                                  Congress members, etc.
Individual.....................           2,079  Public submissions not
                                                  directly representing
                                                  a specific
                                                  organization.
Industry Stakeholder...........              30  Trade organizations,
                                                  intermodal carriers,
                                                  offerors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Plan Scope/Threshold of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans

    In order to inquire about the potential impact of different 
thresholds on the regulated community, PHMSA asked the public to 
comment on the following question: ``When considering appropriate 
thresholds for comprehensive OSRPs, which of the following thresholds 
would be most appropriate and provide the greatest potential for 
increased safety? The following thresholds were provided as examples: 
(a) 1,000,000 gallons or more of crude oil per train consist; (b) an 
HHFT of 20 or more carloads of crude oil per train consist; (c) 42,000 
gallons

[[Page 50088]]

of crude oil per train consist; or (d) another threshold. In addition, 
PHMSA asked: What thresholds would be most cost-effective?''
    Comments to the ANPRM on the scope of the rule were wide-ranging. 
Many commenters commented on this question directly, voicing support of 
one or more of the proposed thresholds or suggesting a different 
threshold, while other commenters chose to comment generally.
    The first threshold, (a) 1,000,000 gallons or more of crude oil per 
train consist was not supported by any commenters as a single metric. 
Two commenters: The Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the 
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA) did 
incorporate 1,000,000 gallons as part of another threshold, as 
discussed further below.
    In opposition to the first proposed threshold, many commenters have 
suggested that the 1,000,000 gallons threshold is not effective because 
oil spills involving quantities below this threshold could cause 
considerable harm to the environment and in particular, rivers or 
waterways. On this point, LRT-Done Right has reiterated the 
significance of PHMSA's derailment data, stating that ``. . . less than 
one carload of spilled oil or ethanol can present great danger.'' 
Similarly, the Delaware Riverkeeper Network commented that, for 
example, ``a spill of 25,000 gallons of oil in Wyoming . . . resulted 
in a three mile trail of contamination.''
    Commenters have also suggested that 1,000,000 gallons is not an 
adequate threshold because preventing oil spills within the context of 
rail transport differs substantially from the context of fixed oil 
facilities. The Delaware Riverkeeper Network has stated, ``A threshold 
of 1,000,000 gallons is . . . inappropriate because the current 
1,000,000 gallon threshold [under EPA regulations] applies to 
stationary facilities and includes all oil containers, including drums, 
at the facility. Trains carrying volatile crude oil are substantially 
different than such facilities.'' Similarly, the Center for Biological 
Diversity has said, ``[42,000 gallons as a threshold for rail] would be 
more consistent with established law than a 1,000,000 gallon threshold 
. . . since trains are not storing oil in a controlled facility, but 
rather moving it around the country on rail systems that experience 
fatigue and unforeseen circumstances such as derailments.''
    PHMSA's second proposed threshold, (b) an HHFT of 20 or more 
carloads of crude oil per train consist, was supported at least in part 
by three commenters.\39\ Namely, the Independent Fuel Terminal 
Operators Association, the Flathead Lakers, and the Honorable Paul D. 
Tonko submitted comments in support of a threshold aligned with the 
definition of an HHFT. The Flathead Lakers, in particular, have noted 
that incidents involving quantities carried by HHFTs could be 
catastrophic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ It should be noted that the HMR now define an HHFT as ``as 
a train comprised of 20 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 
flammable liquid in a continuous block or 35 or more loaded tank 
cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid across the entire train.'' The 
(b) threshold was based on the HHFT definition proposed in the 
August 1, 2014 NPRM which was ``as a train comprised of 20 or more 
tank cars containing a flammable liquid.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In opposition to a threshold based on the HHFT definition, and 
similar to commenters' opposition to the first threshold of 1,000,000 
gallons, some commenters have indicated that incidents need not involve 
an HHFT in order to cause considerable harm to the environment. The 
National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials (NASTTPO) and 
the Oklahoma Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Commission (OHMERC) 
have suggested that the threshold for developing a comprehensive oil 
spill response plan should involve fewer tank cars carrying crude oil 
because one tank car ``is more than enough flammable material to 
present a risk to first responders and the local community.'' Various 
individual commenters have echoed this sentiment and suggested that a 
threshold based on the HHFT definition would allow significant 
quantities of crude oil to be transported by rail carriers that lack 
comprehensive oil spill response plans.
    Several commenters supported the third proposed threshold: (d) 
42,000 gallons of crude oil per train consist. Commenters have shown 
that it is at least numerically consistent with current regulations in 
49 CFR part 130, even though there is a key distinction in which part 
130 upholds a threshold of 42,000 gallons for a single package (i.e., a 
single tank car) and the ANPRM has proposed 42,000 gallons as a 
threshold within a single train consist. As the New York State 
Department of Transportation has stated, ``[A 42,000 gallon per train 
consist threshold] would maintain consistency with the existing 
threshold for comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans (OSRP) while 
recognizing the hazard posed by the derailment of even a small number 
of crude oil cars.''
    Many commenters have supported the third proposed threshold (i.e., 
(d) 42,000 gallons of crude oil per train consist) on the basis that it 
was the lowest quantity threshold that PHMSA proposed. Given that 
approximately 30,000 gallons can be carried in a single tank car, 
42,000 gallons amounts to the quantity of crude oil that could be 
contained and transported in two tank cars. Therefore, among the 
proposed thresholds, the 42,000 gallons per train consist threshold 
would plausibly have a high applicability and require the development 
of a comprehensive plan by the greatest number of railroads. Thus, 
commenters supporting this threshold have held that it would plausibly 
result in the greatest amount of prevention and preparation on the part 
of affected entities and consequently, the greatest amount of risk 
reduction, enhancement of public safety, and protection of the 
environment.
    Similarly, the threshold of 42,000 gallons received some support 
from commenters that propose lower quantities of crude oil as a 
threshold (e.g., 1 gallon, 24,000 gallons, 30,000 gallons, etc.), but 
acknowledged that a threshold of 42,000 gallons for practical purposes 
would result in approximately the same amount of applicability and 
affected entities. Assuming the typical tank car contains 27,000 to 
30,000 gallons of crude oil, the main difference between a threshold of 
1 gallon and 42,000 gallons would be whether a railroad could legally 
transport one tank car of crude oil without a comprehensive oil spill 
response plan. Accordingly, the Delaware Bay & River Cooperative has 
commented, ``. . . one rail car of 30,000 gallons of crude can have 
significant environmental impacts if spilled in a sensitive area along 
the Delaware River or other body of water. Therefore, 42,000 gallons 
may be the appropriate threshold level to trigger the comprehensive 
plans requirement.''
    Nevertheless, some commenters have suggested that the threshold 
should be one tank car or any quantity of crude oil. The Waterkeeper 
Alliance has stated, ``Whether one car, twenty cars, or one hundred and 
twenty cars in a train are carrying crude oil, crude-by-rail is 
inherently dangerous, and PHMSA should require the railroad industry to 
adequately prepare for any size spill. In sum, the new PHMSA Response 
Rule must set the comprehensive oil spill response planning threshold 
at one railcar.'' Thus, commenters in support of a threshold of one 
tank car or any quantity of crude oil hold that even the transport of 
small amounts of crude oil entail substantial risk and should

[[Page 50089]]

necessitate a comprehensive oil spill response plan, rather than a 
basic plan.
    In the ANPRM, PHMSA encouraged commenters to provide additional 
thresholds differing from those that PHMSA explicitly proposed. 
According to AAR and ASLRRA, the scope of the rule should involve a 
threshold based on ``Petroleum Crude Oil Routes'' (PCORs). AAR and 
ASLRRA define PCORs as ``. . . a railroad line where there is a minimum 
of twelve trains a year, which is an average of one train a month, that 
transport 1,000,000 gallons of petroleum crude oil (UN1267 and/or 
UN3494) or more that is within 800 feet or closer from the centerline 
of track to a river or waterway that is used for interstate 
transportation and commerce for more than 10 miles.'' Assuming each 
tank car has a capacity of 30,000 gallons, the transport of 1,000,000 
gallons of crude oil would require around 33 tank cars.
    The AAR and the ASLRRA also proposed geographical criteria as part 
of their PCOR definition, differing from PHMSA's proposed thresholds, 
which are based on a quantity transported or number of carloads within 
a train consist. As part of its geographical criteria, the AAR suggests 
that a PCOR must be within 800 feet of a river or waterway used for 
interstate transportation and commerce for more than 10 miles. The AAR 
claims that the 800 feet figure is based on a railroad's experience 
following a discharge. The AAR does not give further details on how the 
800 feet figure was developed. The AAR also claims that the 10 miles 
figure used in its PCOR definition is based on regulations within 49 
CFR part 194, which are applicable to oil pipeline owners and operators 
and are overseen by PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). Discussion 
of this claim can be found in the ``Discussion of Public Comments: Plan 
Scope/Threshold'' section.
    In addition, the AAR has limited the scope of its proposed 
threshold to include only those railroad lines that move at least 
twelve trains a year, an average of one train per month. The AAR did 
not include any data to support incorporating the parameter of twelve 
trains per year into the NPRM's thresholds or to show that the use of 
the PCOR definition as a threshold would improve safety or be cost-
effective.
    Many other commenters proposed alternative thresholds, such as five 
carloads or 3,500 gallons per tank car. In support of a five carload 
threshold, NASTTPO has stated that ``it is common for more than one 
HHFT tank car to be involved [in a derailment].'' In support of a 3,500 
gallons per tank car threshold, commenters, such as safety consultant 
John Joeckel, have suggested that the current, 3,500-gallon threshold 
in 49 CFR part 130 for basic oil spill response plans could become the 
new threshold that triggers the need to develop a comprehensive plan. 
These commenters reiterate that the current regulations for 
comprehensive plans under 49 CFR 130 do not generally apply to 
railroads given that tank cars used to ship crude oil do not have 
capacities of 42,000 gallons or greater. They suggest that PHMSA could 
remove part 130's reference to a basic plan and repurpose the 3,500 
gallon per packaging threshold so that it would trigger the need for a 
comprehensive plan.
    In addition, some commenters restated the need to revise the 
thresholds in 49 CFR part 130 and suggested that they align with 
probable spill volumes or other planning volumes found in other federal 
regulations (e.g., ``average most probable'' or ``maximum most 
probable''). In particular, the Response Group has stated that the 
threshold should relate to probable spill volumes and historical data 
but did not specifically propose as a threshold a numerical value.
    Similarly, the American Petroleum Institute (API) did not express 
support for PHMSA's proposed thresholds nor did API specifically 
propose a new threshold. However, API emphasized that ``DOT should 
choose a threshold that is reasonable and practical . . . Onerous 
planning requirements with an extremely low threshold could 
exponentially increase the cost and burden on the railroads, while 
vague planning requirements triggered by a baseless threshold would be 
equally challenging.'' Thus, API has expressed that the cost to 
railroads in developing and implementing comprehensive plans could be 
substantial, and PHMSA should consider and analyze the costs of 
applying different thresholds.
    In addition to API's above comment, PHMSA received additional 
commenter input on the cost-effectiveness of the proposed thresholds. 
Environmental groups and others have expressed that cost concerns 
should be secondary to concerns about the potential benefits of 
enhancing public safety and reducing damage to the environment. For 
example, the Center for Biological Diversity has stated that the cost-
effectiveness of thresholds ``. . . is somewhat immaterial, and cost 
should not be considered in establishing a threshold for comprehensive 
OSRPs for oil trains, since this is an issue of public health.'' Safety 
consultant John Joeckel has offered a similar comment, stating, ``Are 
we concerned with the cost to the responsible party to develop and 
implement the OSRP? Or, should we be concerned of the cost to the 
public arising from an ineffective response with the consequences of 
significant environmental damage or risks to public safety?''
    Many commenters have suggested that the scope of this rule be 
expanded to include other materials besides oil. Commenters have asked 
PHMSA to require comprehensive oil spill response plans for rail cars 
transporting any type of hazardous materials. The Village of 
Barrington, IL and the TRAC Coalition, in particular, have stated, 
``Given the clear authority that PHMSA has to issue regulations under 
federal law for a broad range of hazardous goods, TRAC strongly 
believes the rules being promulgated under this ANPRM should be applied 
to all hazmat transported on trains.'' This commenter has cited the 
Cherry Valley, IL ethanol train derailment to show that, ``While the 
ANPRM is about oil spill response plans, clearly other hazardous 
material poses similar threats to human and environmental safety.'' 
Other commenters, such as LRT-Done Right, have stated that carriers of 
ethanol should also be subject to comprehensive OSRP requirements.
    Conversely, other commenters have suggested that the scope of the 
rule be limited in order to more specifically address the risks of 
petroleum crude oil transport. ``Petroleum crude oil'' (UN1267) is a 
specific entry in the Hazardous Materials Table (HMT) under 49 CFR 
172.101. ``Petroleum sour crude oil, flammable, toxic'' (UN3494) is a 
similar entry. On this basis, AAR has asked that the scope of the rule 
be limited explicitly to these entries in the HMT. The Dangerous Goods 
Advisory Council (DGAC) has offered an analogous suggestion, stating, 
``[DGAC] believe[s] that the OPRP [sic] should be limited to crude oil 
trains only which are comprised of tank cars originating from one 
consignee to one consignor.'' In other words, by limiting the scope of 
the rule to ``crude oil'' or ``petroleum crude oil'' only, commenters 
are suggesting that the transport of refined petroleum products, 
ethanol, or other flammable liquids should not be relevant to the 
determination of whether a rail carrier must have a comprehensive OSRP.
Discussion of Comments: Plan Scope/Threshold
    PHMSA carefully considered the comments submitted to the ANPRM 
regarding the scope of the rule in order to apply comprehensive OSRP 
requirements to address the increased

[[Page 50090]]

risks posed by the expansion of domestic energy production and 
subsequent rail transportation. PHMSA recognizes the importance of 
establishing a threshold that enhances public safety, protects the 
environment, is reasonable and practical, and facilitates compliance 
and enforcement. PHMSA acknowledges that an effective threshold will 
take into account a range of factors, and might include distinctions 
regarding the quantity of petroleum oil transported, the number of 
carloads within a train consist, the definition of different materials 
subject to regulation, geographic or location-based criteria, and cost/
benefit or practical considerations.
    PHMSA emphasizes that safety and environmental risks are related to 
the quantity of oil transported by trains, and the configuration of 
tank cars loaded with petroleum oil. Thus, PHMSA has proposed in this 
NPRM to expand applicability for petroleum oil based on the number and 
configuration of tank cars transporting petroleum oil in a train. 
Specifically, this rulemaking proposes that comprehensive oil spill 
response plans be required of railroads that transport 20 or more tank 
cars loaded with liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block in a single 
train or 35 or more of such tank cars dispersed throughout the train. 
We propose the comprehensive OSRP requirements continue to apply to 
tank cars exceeding 42,000 gallons carrying petroleum or other non-
petroleum oil. In this NPRM, we discuss our basis for this proposed 
applicability, as well as how it may differ from commenters' 
suggestions or proposals.
    The scope of this rule is directly related to the definition of oil 
because the statutory authority to require OSRPs comes from Sec.  1321 
of the CWA, as amended by OPA, which applies solely to oil and 
hazardous substances. The CWA applies to both petroleum and non-
petroleum oils. In the 1996 final rule, PHMSA incorporated the 
definition of ``oil'' from OPA into the current requirements 49 CFR 
part 130 and developed definitions for ``petroleum oil'' and ``other 
non-petroleum oil'' in order to differentiate petroleum oils from non-
petroleum oils throughout the requirements in part 130.
    This rulemaking has been initiated to respond to the changing 
conditions from the increase in the volume of petroleum oil transported 
by rail and consequences of resulting incidents. PHMSA is not aware of 
incidents of unit trains carrying other non-petroleum oils which have 
demonstrated a need to expand the applicability of comprehensive plans 
for these oils. Therefore, instead of proposing that the expanded 
applicability of the comprehensive plan apply to all oils (as defined 
in 33 U.S.C. 1321), PHMSA proposes to limit the proposed expanded 
applicability to petroleum oils, whether refined or unrefined, 
transported in certain train configurations. PHMSA proposes to continue 
to apply the threshold of tank cars exceeding 42,000 gallons carrying 
petroleum or other non-petroleum oil.
    Further, we propose to revise the definition of ``petroleum oil'' 
in this rulemaking as ``any oil extracted or derived from geological 
hydrocarbon deposits, including oils produced by distillation or their 
refined products.'' This definition continues to include mixtures of 
both refined products, such as gasoline and unrefined products, such as 
petroleum crude oil. We are not proposing any changes to the scope in 
Sec.  130.2(c)(1) which clarifies that the requirements of part 130 do 
not apply to ``Any mixture or solution in which oil is in a 
concentration by weight of less than 10 percent.'' Therefore petroleum 
oil in part 130 includes mixtures containing at least 10% petroleum 
oil, such as denatured ethanol fuel E85 (ethanol containing 15% 
gasoline). However, mixtures containing less than 10% petroleum oil, 
such as diluted waste water or E95 (ethanol with 5% gasoline) are not 
included. Oils which do not contain petroleum, such as synthetic oils 
or essential oils continue to be defined as ``other non-petroleum oil'' 
in Sec.  130.5.
    PHMSA disagrees with AAR that the applicability of the 
comprehensive plans should be limited to petroleum crude oil, as 
described by HMT entries UN 1267 and UN3494. Limiting the applicability 
of comprehensive plans to solely these entries would result in 
regulating oils that generally present a similar type of risk in an 
incongruous manner. On this point, PHMSA holds that liquid petroleum 
oils, such as crude oil, diesel fuel, gasoline, or other petroleum 
distillates, present similar safety risks in commercial transportation.
    There are several factors to consider when determining which 
hazardous materials should be subject to the new or revised 
requirements of this proposed rule. In general, PHMSA assesses the 
risks of hazardous materials in transportation in accordance with the 
nine different hazard classes under the HMR; however, the regulations 
we seek to amend in 49 CFR part 130 are not part of the HMR. Namely, 
part 130 is authorized under 33 U.S.C. 1321--Oil and hazardous 
substance liability, not the Federal hazardous materials transportation 
law of 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128.
    Moreover, the proposed applicability in this NPRM generally aligns 
with the definition of a ``High-Hazard Flammable Train'' (HHFT) as 
published in the final rule, ``Enhanced Tank Car Standards and 
Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains'' (``HM-251''). 
The proposed applicability differs, however, in the types of materials 
affected. By way of HM-251, the definition of an HHFT involved the 
transport of all Class 3 flammable liquids; whereas the comprehensive 
OSRP requirements in this rulemaking involve the transport of petroleum 
oil for consistency with part 130's statutory authority. Therefore, the 
proposed expanded applicability applies to those HHFTs which carry 
petroleum oil. This creates an integrated approach between the planning 
requirements in this rulemaking and the other operational controls in 
the HMR. To better facilitate this integration, residue or diluted 
mixtures of petroleum oils that no longer meet the definition of a 
Class 3 flammable or combustible liquid per 49 CFR 173.120 are not 
included in expanded applicability.
    In the ANPRM, PHMSA asked if the 1,000,000 gallons threshold is 
appropriate for safety and cost-effectiveness. No commenters supported 
using 1,000,000 gallons as a single metric for applicability. Many 
commenters have suggested that the 1,000,000 gallons threshold is not 
effective because oil spills involving trains with quantities below 
this threshold could cause substantial harm to the environment. While 
commenters provided many examples of thresholds below 1,000,000 
gallons, commenters provided insufficient data about the likelihood of 
a release from these tank car volumes to demonstrate such thresholds 
are ``reasonably expected'' to cause substantial harm. Thus, in order 
to better understand this differential of risk and the most likely 
number of punctures resulting in a derailment, PHMSA looks to the 
modeling conducted by FRA in support of HM-251.\40\ In particular, HM-
251 offered a scientific justification for the HHFT definition and 
using this threshold of tank cars as an identifier of higher-risk train 
configurations. Based on modeling and analysis performed by FRA, 20 
tank cars in a continuous block loaded with a flammable liquid and 35 
tank cars loaded with a flammable liquid dispersed throughout a train 
display consistent characteristics as to the number of tank cars likely 
to be

[[Page 50091]]

breached in a derailment. The operating railroads commented on HM-251 
and indicated that this threshold would exclude ``manifest'' trains and 
focus on higher risk, ``unit'' trains. FRA completed an analysis of a 
hypothetical train set consisting of 100 cars. The analysis assumes 20 
cars derailed. The highest probable number of cars losing containment 
in a derailment involving a train with a 20-car block (loaded with 
flammable liquid) located immediately after the locomotive and buffer 
cars would be 2.78 cars. In addition, the most probable number of cars 
losing containment in a derailment involving a manifest train 
consisting of 35 cars containing flammable liquids dispersed throughout 
the train would be 2.59 cars. Therefore, 20 tank cars in a block and 35 
tank cars dispersed throughout a train display consistent 
characteristics (i.e., 2.78 cars breached vs. 2.59 cars breached). If 
the number of flammable liquid cars in a manifest train were increased 
to 40 or 45, the most likely number of cars losing containment would be 
3.12 and 3.46 cars, respectively. This analysis served as one basis for 
the selection of the revised HHFT definition for HM-251, and it also 
helps to shape our discussion of applicability in this proposed rule 
for oil spill response plans (HM-251B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 80 FR 26665; 5/8/2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of this modeling, PHMSA holds that a derailment 
involving a train moving less than 20 tank cars in a continuous block, 
or less than 35 tank cars throughout the train, would result in 
relatively fewer punctures than derailments involving more than this 
number of tank cars. Specifically, as a result of this modeling, PHMSA 
suggests that the most likely number of tank car punctures for a train 
with less than 20 tank cars in a block would be less than 2.78, and in 
a derailment scenario with less than this number of punctures, the 
derailment is significantly less likely to cause substantial harm to 
the environment. In more general terms, PHMSA would suggest, as a 
result of these modeling outcomes from FRA, that a derailment involving 
two or fewer tank car punctures is less likely, and therefore not 
``reasonably expected'' to cause substantial harm to the environment. 
Therefore, we believe the applicability proposed in this NPRM 
appropriately indicates the trains that can reasonably be expected to 
cause substantial harm to the environment. Consequently, by way of this 
rulemaking, PHMSA proposes to require these higher-risk train 
configurations to operate in conformance with comprehensive oil spill 
response plans.
    In addition to the data on the most likely number of tank car 
punctures in a derailment, PHMSA further maintains that lower-risk 
train configurations should not be the focus of this rulemaking because 
extending the requirements of this rule to operators of lower-risk 
configurations could be burdensome, costly, and inefficient. There are 
many costs involved in developing and implementing a comprehensive oil 
spill response plan, such as retainer fees, training and drill costs, 
and plan development and submission costs. For more information 
regarding regulatory flexibility, please see Section VIII, Subsection E 
(``Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies 
and Procedures''). For more information regarding the costs of this 
rule on the regulated community, please see the draft RIA and the 
associated discussion in Section VIII, Subsection A (``Executive Order 
12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 13610, and DOT Regulatory 
Policies and Procedures'').
    Commenters have also suggested that 1,000,000 gallons, which is 
used as a threshold in the development of non-transportation-related 
facility response plans, is not an adequate threshold because the 
context of rail transport differs substantially from the context of 
fixed facilities. PHMSA agrees. PHMSA believes that a threshold based 
on a number of carloads is more effective and practical, and the 
proposed applicability in this rulemaking is specific to the context of 
rail transportation. Moreover, as previously discussed, the proposed 
applicability identifies higher-risk train configurations which could 
reasonably be expected to cause substantial harm to the environment in 
the event of a derailment.
    A few commenters voiced support for the second threshold of the HM-
251B ANPRM, which aligned with the HHFT definition proposed in the HM-
251 NPRM and published on August 1, 2014 (i.e., 20 tank cars in a 
train). Given the proposed applicability in this rulemaking, PHMSA 
generally agrees with these commenters; however, the nature of the HHFT 
definition has changed since HM-251B's ANPRM publication. On May 8, 
2015, PHMSA published the final HM-251 and revised the HHFT definition 
to comprise 20 tank cars loaded with a Class 3 flammable liquid in a 
continuous block or 35 or more tank cars loaded with a Class 3 
flammable liquid dispersed throughout the train. Thus, by way of HM-
251, the HHFT definition came to reference the configuration of tank 
cars in the train as well as an additional threshold for the number of 
tank cars in a train. Furthermore, PHMSA has adapted the HHFT 
definition of HM-251 to form the basis for the applicability for 
comprehensive oil spill response plans, but notably restricts this 
applicability to liquid petroleum oils, rather than all Class 3 
flammable liquids. For these reasons, PHMSA has not proposed to codify 
the HHFT definition under part 130.
    Moreover, this applicability is important because it is likely that 
trains with less than 20 tank cars of petroleum oil in a continuous 
block, or less than 35 of such cars dispersed throughout the train, are 
the result of configuring ``manifest'' trains. Manifest trains involve 
combining multiple shipments of potentially various materials from 
various shippers to form a single train consist. These trains differ 
substantially from ``unit'' trains, which generally involve a single 
commodity offered by a single shipper (the consignor) and delivered to 
a single entity (the consignee). As discussed in the final rule 
document for HM-251, the rail industry has noted that manifest trains 
carrying limited loads of oil along with other commodities pose less of 
a risk than unit trains with significantly larger loads of oil. 
Further, the rail industry commented on the NPRM of HM-251, relaying 
that in many situations it would be difficult to pre-determine when an 
HHFT would be used and that shippers of smaller volumes of oil would 
not know if their shipment would ultimately be configured into an HHFT.
    PHMSA carries these concerns and related analyses from HM-251 into 
this proposed rule, as we believe it is still pertinent to the 
discussion of comprehensive oil spill response plans. In this 
rulemaking, PHMSA intends to identify higher-risk train configurations 
that pose a threat of substantial harm to the environment. Conversely, 
PHMSA does not intend to affect lower-risk train configurations moving 
smaller quantities of petroleum oil, which are more likely to be the 
result of configuring a manifest train. Lower-risk train configurations 
are significantly less likely to cause substantial harm to the 
environment and extending the full breadth of the proposed requirements 
for a comprehensive plan to entities transporting lower-risk train 
configurations would likely be too burdensome and costly, for the 
limited safety benefits provided. Furthermore, the proposed quantity 
provides an integrated approach to the comprehensive OSRP requirements 
and the requirements of HHFTs.

[[Page 50092]]

    In opposition to an HHFT-like applicability, many commenters have 
argued that oil spills involving carloads below this threshold could 
cause considerable harm to the environment. On this point, PHMSA 
acknowledges that oil spills of a lesser amount can cause harm, but 
holds that trains carrying less than 20 tank cars of petroleum oil in a 
continuous block, or less than 35 of such tank cars dispersed 
throughout the train, are effectively lower-risk train configurations, 
and they cannot be reasonably expected to cause substantial harm. In 
other words, these trains may be capable of causing harm, but the harm 
they can cause is significantly less likely to qualify as substantial 
harm. As previously discussed, modeling data from FRA indicates that 
trains with less than 20 tank cars in a block, or less than 35 tank 
cars dispersed throughout a train, could not be reasonably expected to 
cause substantial harm because, in derailment scenarios, relatively few 
tank cars containing petroleum oil would be breached on average. As 
previously discussed, this modeling demonstrated that the most likely 
number of punctures in a derailment scenario involving a train with 20 
tank cars in a continuous block would be 2.78.
    Furthermore, given the enhanced tank car standards promulgated in 
HM-251 and resulting improvements in tank car integrity, PHMSA believes 
the likelihood of a tank car releasing all of its contents in a 
derailment has been significantly reduced. Thus, in relation to the 
derailment modeling data (discussed above), PHMSA maintains that a 
train with a 20-car block of petroleum oil would not result in 83,400 
gallons spilled (2.78 tank car punctures x 30,000 gallons per tank car 
= 83,400 gallons discharged from the breached tank cars). Rather, a 
derailment scenario involving 20 tank cars of petroleum oil in a 
continuous block would most likely result in less than 83,400 gallons 
discharged. For these reasons, PHMSA cautions against the assumption 
implicit in some commenters' comments that the derailment of one tank 
car automatically results in the discharge of 30,000 gallons of 
product, and the derailment of two tank cars is equivalent to the 
discharge of 60,000 gallons of product, and so forth. As the modeling 
data from FRA indicates, the number of tank cars that breach in a 
derailment scenario is in all likelihood fewer than the number of tank 
cars that derail. Separately, given the tank car design enhancements 
promulgated by HM-251, the likelihood that breached tank cars would 
release all of their contents has been reduced. Accordingly, PHMSA 
feels that extending the requirement to develop a comprehensive OSRP to 
entities operating lower-risk train configurations would not be 
efficient. It would require significant investments on the part of 
small entities that are not key factors in the transport of petroleum 
oil by rail, and these investments would not yield analogous safety 
benefits. Please see Section VIII, Subsection E (``Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies and 
Procedures'') for impacts on small entities and the draft RIA for 
further discussion of safety benefits and costs to industry.
    Many commenters voiced support for the third threshold proposed in 
the ANPRM, which was 42,000 gallons. PHMSA disagrees with these 
comments because we believe that a threshold based on the number of 
carloads of petroleum oil in a train would be more practical for 
compliance and enforcement purposes than a threshold based on gallons. 
In general, 42,000 gallons as a threshold could be impractical or 
burdensome. Since tank cars tend to carry around 30,000 gallons of 
product, a threshold of 42,000 gallons would effectively equate to 
differentiating a train with one carload of petroleum oil and a train 
with two carloads and thus, requiring a comprehensive plan for the 
transport of two carloads of petroleum oil. As previously discussed, 
PHMSA affirms that higher risk train configurations should be the focus 
of the proposed rule and that a train transporting two tank cars of 
petroleum oil simply does not present the same amount of risk as 
higher-risk train configurations. While a train with two tank cars of 
petroleum oil could derail, potentially releasing its contents and 
harming the environment, it is not nearly as likely to cause 
substantial harm as higher-risk trains with much larger quantities of 
petroleum oil.
    In the ANPRM, PHMSA asked the public if ``another threshold'' were 
appropriate or cost-effective. In response to PHMSA's inquiry of 
``another threshold,'' many commenters offered thresholds that are less 
than 42,000 gallons, such as one tank car, 24,000 gallons, 3,500 
gallons, or any quantity of petroleum oil. PHMSA disagrees with these 
suggestions. Rail industry practices demonstrate that there is only a 
slight distinction between the threshold of 42,000 gallons, which was 
proposed by PHMSA in the ANPRM, and the lesser quantities proposed by 
some commenters in response to the ANPRM. In practical terms, the 
thresholds of any quantity, 3,500 gallons, and 24,000 gallons would 
result in regulating trains with one tank car of petroleum oil, whereas 
a 42,000-gallon threshold would result in regulating trains with two 
tank cars. PHMSA maintains that this distinction is slight and in 
either case, requiring comprehensive plans of trains that transport 
merely one or two tank cars of petroleum oil would most likely be 
burdensome upon implementation and be costly relative to the limited 
safety benefit it would offer, especially for small entities. As 
previously discussed, PHMSA also holds that a threshold based on a 
number of carloads is more practical than a threshold based on a gallon 
amount.
    In a similar vein, PHMSA holds that imposing an applicability of 
five tank cars, or any other number of tank cars that is less than 20 
in a continuous block or 35 when dispersed throughout a train, would 
most likely be costly or burdensome and yield limited safety benefits 
due to the impacts on small entities as well as ``manifest'' train 
configurations involving petroleum oil. Please see the draft RIA for 
further discussion of the costs and benefits of the proposed rule.
    In response to the comment by AAR and ASLRRA, PHMSA disagrees with 
using the definition of a Petroleum Crude Oil Route (PCOR) of `` . . . 
a railroad line where there is a minimum of twelve trains a year, which 
is an average of one train a month, that transport 1,000,000 gallons of 
petroleum crude oil (UN1267 and/or UN3494) or more that is within 800 
feet or closer from the centerline of track to a river or waterway that 
is used for interstate transportation and commerce for more than 10 
miles'' to determine whether a rail carrier must develop a 
comprehensive plan. We do not have information on exactly how many rail 
carriers or trains would be permitted to transport petroleum oil 
without a comprehensive plan if the applicability of this rulemaking 
were to incorporate the AAR and ASLRAA's proposed PCOR definition or 
the quantity of 1,000,000 gallons, and invite public commenters to 
provide information to assist in further evaluating the benefits and 
costs of these alternative applicability thresholds. Overall, PHMSA 
believes that the PCOR definition is overly complicated, and creates 
uncertainty for FRA, communities, and responders about which unit 
trains of petroleum oil are excluded from the requirement to have a 
comprehensive plan. PHMSA seeks to align increased risk with improved 
oil spill response planning such that higher risk unit train 
configurations would require comprehensive plans. PHMSA

[[Page 50093]]

suggests that AAR and ASLRRA's PCOR definition might permit an 
unwarranted number of trains which present the potential of substantial 
harm to the environment to operate without a comprehensive plan. 
Additional concerns with this definition are described in the following 
discussion.
    Further, as previously discussed, PHMSA disagrees with the PCOR 
definition because PHMSA believes that using a gallons basis for the 
threshold could present compliance and enforcement issues, especially 
relative to the use of a number of tank cars. Since tank cars vary in 
the quantity of product that they can transport, PHMSA suggests it is 
much easier to determine the number of tank cars in a train carrying 
petroleum crude oil than it is to assess the exact amount of gallons 
carried by any number of tank cars designed with potentially different 
capacities. For example, a train carrying 35 tank cars of petroleum oil 
would likely be ``around the margin'' of 1,000,000 gallons of petroleum 
oil. In other words, accurately determining if the train as configured 
has 990,000 gallons of product, versus 1,000,000 gallons, might be 
difficult for compliance and enforcement purposes; whereas, it is 
easier to observe that the train as configured has 35 tank cars. While 
we proposed two thresholds based on gallon amounts in the ANPRM, we 
have since crafted our proposed threshold in the NPRM to reflect this 
updated viewpoint and analysis.
    Moreover, PHMSA disagrees with the AAR's use of 800 feet as a 
geographic criterion in the PCOR definition because it might present 
compliance and enforcement issues. Assessing the need for a 
comprehensive plan or a potential violation would require a potentially 
taxing confirmation of the distance of a waterway from the centerline 
of the track, especially ``around the margin'' of 800 feet. In 
addition, this geographic criterion might result in different outcomes 
of response preparedness despite nearly identical levels of risk. For 
example, in a scenario wherein one waterway is 790 feet from the 
centerline of the track, and another scenario wherein a different 
waterway is 801 feet from the centerline of the track, the second 
waterway might be better protected from an oil spill than the first. 
Thus, the 800 feet geographic criterion appears to be arbitrary given 
that the commenter has not offered data to suggest that 800 feet would 
be an appropriate ``buffer'' zone between a potential derailment site 
and navigable water and as such, enhance safety and prevent the entry 
of oil into the waterway. Further, the distance between the centerline 
of the track and navigable water is but one of the several factors that 
could influence the probability of a spill damaging navigable water; 
that is, other geographical factors exist that might increase this 
probability substantially.
    PHMSA also disagrees with AAR's contention that in order to trigger 
the response plan requirement, the waterway in question must be a 
maximum distance of 800 feet from the centerline of the tracks and the 
waterway must be ``a river or waterway used for interstate 
transportation and commerce.'' Both the distance from and criteria for 
a waterway as proposed by AAR are inconsistent with the CWA, which 
provides the statutory authority for this rulemaking. For example, 
rather than a distance of ``800 feet'' from navigable waters, the CWA 
requires oil spill response plans for any facility that ``because of 
its location, could reasonably be expected to cause substantial harm to 
the environment by discharging into or on the navigable waters, 
adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone.'' PHMSA is not 
aware of evidence demonstrating that all spills originating more than 
800 feet away from navigable waters could not be reasonably expected to 
cause substantial harm to these resources. PHMSA assumes that all 
routes are expected to have the potential to impact navigable waters 
and that performing an analysis for every point along the route is not 
practical, as there are various factors that could complicate this 
analysis and hinder the ability to foresee an impact to navigable 
waters. For example, identification of navigable waters requires 
consideration of geographical features, seasonal variation, vegetation, 
etc. The possible impact zone surrounding the track could also depend 
on topography or the viscosity of the petroleum product transported. 
Therefore, the entire route should be covered by the Oil Spill Response 
Plan and after a discharge of oil occurs, the Federal On-Scene 
Coordinator should make the determination of the threat in the specific 
conditions.
    In addition, per AAR's PCOR definition, a track or segment of track 
over which only eleven crude oil-carrying trains travel per year would 
not require a comprehensive plan; however, if a twelfth train travels 
over this same segment or track, it would necessitate a comprehensive 
plan. Thus, PHMSA suggests that this aspect of the PCOR definition may 
be impractical for compliance and enforcement efforts. We anticipate 
that it would not be possible for a railroad to make an accurate, 
advance prediction of commodity flows and train consists, because that 
prediction would rely on external factors beyond the railroad's 
control. For example, commodity flows and train consists would be 
affected by fluctuations in oil or other commodity prices, decisions by 
customers to pursue different shipping routes, or overall economic 
factors.
    However, PHMSA recognizes that AAR has proactively identified ways 
to target the affected entities that present higher safety risks while 
trying to limit the impact of the proposed rule and associated costs on 
entities that pose significantly less risk. To that end, PHMSA 
appreciates the attentiveness to providing regulatory flexibility and 
holds that it may be acceptable to except certain small entities from 
the proposed requirements of comprehensive oil spill response plans if 
they are overly costly or burdensome for these entities. For more 
information regarding regulatory flexibility, please see Section VIII, 
Subsection E (``Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and 
DOT Policies and Procedures''). Moreover, PHMSA seeks comment on ways 
that might be used to effectively provide regulatory flexibility to 
bona fide small entities that pose a lesser safety risk and may not be 
able to comply with the requirements of the proposed rule due to cost 
concerns, limited benefit, or practical considerations.

C. Contents of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans

    Commenters submitted a variety of comments regarding plan contents 
to the ANPRM. In the ANPRM, PHMSA asked the public two questions that 
were specific to the area of plan contents. To paraphrase, the first 
question asked whether the current requirements for comprehensive OSRPs 
were ``clear'' or if greater specificity should be added to 49 CFR part 
130 (``Part 130''). The second question asked if any comprehensive OSRP 
elements should be ``added, removed, or modified.''
    Regarding the first question, the majority of commenters stated 
that they were not clear and needed greater specificity. For example, 
the Response Group has said that the current requirements under part 
130 are ``too generic in nature.'' In addition, API has stated, ``The 
current PHMSA spill response plan requirements applicable to the 
railroads do not provide the clarity needed to develop comprehensive, 
responsive and consistent spill response plans . . . PHMSA should 
consider revising part 130 to provide better specificity to the

[[Page 50094]]

regulated community and should look to EPA, USCG and BSEE for examples 
and practices that would work with the operational requirements of the 
railroads.'' Further, DGAC has stated that ``it would be advisable to 
develop training and outreach information'' to assist affected entities 
in the development of comprehensive OSRPs. Overall, commenters from a 
variety of backgrounds have asked PHMSA to clarify the current 
requirements under part 130, reference other agencies' plans (e.g., 
plans under USCG, BSEE, EPA, or PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety), 
provide further instructions and guidance to affected entities, and 
ensure that new requirements reflect the context of rail 
transportation. Commenters such as California's Office of Spill 
Prevention Response and Washington State's Department of Ecology also 
highlighted the requirements aligned necessary to align with 
obligations in the CWA statute.
    However, some commenters stated that the existing requirements are 
adequate as currently written. The New York State Department of 
Transportation has stated, ``The use of comprehensive OSRPs is not a 
new concept . . . New York State believes the requirements of OSRPs are 
clear enough for railroads and shippers to understand what is required 
of them.'' The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) has 
stated that the ``requirements of OSRPs in 49 CFR 130.31 provide 
sufficient clarity for the railroads to take steps to plan for and 
address potential discharges of crude oil. The focus of PHMSA's efforts 
should be . . . ensuring appropriate oversight and enforcement of 
existing spill planning obligations, including ensuring that railroads 
have available the equipment and personnel necessary to address 
discharges.'' Similarly, the City of Seattle claims that the current 
comprehensive OSRP requirements are clear for railroads and shippers, 
but states that the plan requirements are not clear to the public and 
``do not properly engage the public.'' Regarding the City of Seattle's 
comment and public engagement, please refer to the summary and 
discussion of comments under Section V, Subsection E 
(``Confidentiality/Security Concerns for Comprehensive Oil Spill 
Response Plans'').
    PHMSA also asked the public if any plan elements within part 130 
should be added, removed, or modified. Several commenters identified 
plan elements that could be added, removed, or modified, and suggested 
different means of addressing: Adverse weather conditions; topological 
and geographic risks near rail routes; environmentally sensitive or 
significant areas; temporary storage of loaded rail cars; worst-case 
discharge planning; communication between Qualified Individuals and 
local, state, and federal officials; training standards; drills; 
equipment inspection; private and public resource contracting; response 
time requirements; timeframes for reviewing or updating OSRPs; public 
awareness; alternative plans; and NTSB safety recommendations, among 
other issues.
    The Association of American Railroads (AAR) and American Short Line 
and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), in particular, have made 
several suggestions regarding potential additions or modifications to 
part 130. AAR and ASLRRA have submitted ``proposed regulatory 
language'' for OSRPs. Within this language, they have suggested that 
rail carriers determine the worst-case discharge amount and provide 
their methodology within the OSRP. They have referenced National Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) and Area 
Contingency Plans (ACP) and provided a description of the requirements 
that a rail carrier must follow to be ``consistent'' with the NCP and 
each applicable ACP. In the same proposed language, AAR and ASLRRA have 
outlined the format of a possible comprehensive OSRP, which would 
include requirements for response resources, training, plan summaries 
and other administrative aspects of an OSRP. AAR and ASLRRA have also 
asked that an Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP) be acceptable if it 
``provides equivalent or greater spill protection'' than the plan 
required under part 130. The joint comments also made suggestions 
related to recordkeeping, plan retention, periodic plan reviews, and 
submission/approval. For more information regarding the approval of 
plans, please refer to Section V, Subsection D (``Approval of 
Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans'').
    The American Petroleum Institute (API) has suggested that 
comprehensive OSRP requirements be re-structured to be ``consistent and 
complementary with other legal spill prevention rules.'' API holds that 
comprehensive OSRP requirements could use a different format. In 
addition, API asks that DOT consider adopting the ``Response Zone'' 
concept that is currently utilized by pipeline operators. API also asks 
that DOT consider the public awareness programs under 49 CFR part 195 
in which pipeline operators take part.
    The Village of Barrington, Illinois and the TRAC Coalition have 
asked that comprehensive OSRP requirements enhance an ``ongoing 
partnership'' between railroads and local communities and include 
requirements for more effective communication between railroads and 
first responders. The commenter states that railroads must supply 
railroads with ``response information for the particular type of hazmat 
being transported'' and reiterates findings of an NTSB report 
suggesting a ``documented failure of the railroad to provide 
immediately the emergency response information and . . . shipping 
papers, in printed form or electronically, to the incident commander.'' 
The commenter also states that communities need to know ``where needed 
response assets are located.''
    Safety consultant John Joeckel has offered several suggestions for 
modifying the current OSRP requirements. In general, this commenter has 
stated that OSRP requirements should be more ``prescriptive'' and 
``specific'' and follow the example of other agencies' regulations 
(e.g., 49 CFR part 194--Response Plans for On-shore Oil Pipelines; 33 
CFR 155--Tank Vessel Response Plans, etc.). For example, Mr. Joeckel 
has said that comprehensive OSRPs should include: Planning standards to 
be used in determining potential worst-case discharges and ``response 
planning targets'' to specify the amount and types of response 
resources that would arrive at the scene of an incident within specific 
timeframes. He also suggests that current OSRP requirements include 
more specific instructions for communications between the Qualified 
Individual and local first responders, and that drills and exercises 
follow the guidelines within the National Preparedness Response and 
Exercise Program (NPREP). Mr. Joeckel offers several other areas in 
need of modifications or additions to part 130, such as training 
requirements, requirements for assurances of firefighting resources, 
development of response zone appendices, descriptions of the 
responsible parties within the response management system, and 
requirements to address environmentally and economically sensitive 
areas.
    In a similar vein, the Center for Biological Diversity and partner 
commenters have asked that PHMSA include requirements for rail carriers 
to analyze environmentally-sensitive or significant areas, mitigate 
impacts to habitats and ecological services, and ``ensure that response 
actions do not harm endangered species.'' The Center

[[Page 50095]]

for Biological Diversity has asked that OSRPs address consultations 
with the Fish and Wildlife Service as well as the National Marine 
Fisheries Service.
    The Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic of Harvard Law 
School, in collaboration with other environmental groups such as Sierra 
Club, have asked for certain modifications to comprehensive OSRP 
requirements. This commenter asks that the ``range of oils carried by 
the railroad'' be described in OSRPs, as well as the ``variations in 
topographical and climatological conditions.'' Similar to the comment 
from the Center for Biological Diversity, the commenter also stipulates 
that plans ``minimize the use of oil spill dispersants, whose effects 
in freshwater environments are not well understood.''
    Several other commenters have asked that comprehensive OSRP 
requirements be amended to address specific areas of environmental, 
cultural, or national significance. For example, the National Parks 
Conservation Association has recommended that ``site-specific response 
plans'' be required of HHFTs that passes through national park 
boundaries. The Flathead Basin Commission has relayed similar concerns 
regarding site-specific response plans. In addition, the Waterkeeper 
Alliance and partner commenters have stated that specific environmental 
areas and water resources are at risk of experiencing oil spills, such 
as the Spokane Valley, Columbia River, Puget Sound, Milwaukee River, 
Lake Ontario watershed, San Francisco Bay, and Hudson River, and 
suggested that OSRPs afford these areas consideration.
    Washington State's Department of Ecology, Department of Fish and 
Wildlife, and Department of Natural Resources have proposed adding 
several plan elements. For example, they have proposed a ``robust 
drills and exercise program'' following the National Preparedness 
Response Exercise Program (NPREP). They have proposed standards for 
``oiled wildlife,'' response arrival times, and ``Group 5 oils,'' as 
well as requirements for financial responsibility, sensitive site 
strategies, and waste storage and management.
    In regard to changing the comprehensive OSRP requirements, New York 
State's Department of Transportation has stated that an existing 
requirement in part 130 must address the impacts of discharges upon 
land and groundwater as well as surface waters. In addition, New York 
State asks that OSRPs include more specific requirements to identify 
the roles and responsibilities of rail carriers and their supporting 
contractors relative to local communities and county/regional or state 
agencies.
    Several firefighting and/or emergency response organizations have 
commented on the need to add, remove, or modify the elements of part 
130. The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force has said 
that OSRPs for the rail system should have a regulatory framework that 
is similar to the United States Coast Guard's. The National Association 
of SARA Title III Program Officials (NASTTPO) and the Oklahoma OHMERC 
have said that comprehensive OSRPs should enable first responders to 
have ``real time information'' on the contents of rail cars involved in 
accidents and require training and drills to be provided by railroads 
to local first responders. The City and County of Denver's Local 
Emergency Planning Committee has also commented in support of NASTTPO's 
suggestions on modifying comprehensive OSRP requirements. The National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has advised that two NFPA standards 
be incorporated into the comprehensive OSRP requirements in order to 
ensure that personnel responding to hazardous materials incidents be 
adequately qualified and trained.
    In addition, the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD), 
which represents transportation workers under the International 
Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), has offered some suggestions 
regarding potential modifications or additions to part 130. TTD has 
noted that the current requirements ``appear to require coordination 
with only private personnel and not public first responders.'' They 
advocate that the role of public response personnel should also be 
incorporated into comprehensive OSRP requirements. Further, they ask 
that OSRPs be shared with fire fighters and paramedics. Please see 
Section V, Subsection E (``Confidentiality/Security Concerns for 
Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans'') for further discussion 
regarding the distribution of OSRPs.
    With respect to adding elements to part 130, the Oregon Department 
of Environmental Quality has shared its state planning standards, 
including ``response time objectives'' for the use of containment booms 
as well as oil recovery operations. Oregon also recommends that 
comprehensive OSRPs require the establishment of equipment caches along 
HHFT rail corridors.
    Similarly, the State of Minnesota shared some of the developments 
of the state's recent oil transportation safety law. On behalf of the 
state, Representative Frank Hornstein and Senator D. Scott Dibble have 
outlined state requirement that ensure accurate train manifests, 
establish response timeframes, institute a term of validity of three 
years for response plans, require that railroads participate in ``take 
home'' drills, and encourage the creation of cooperative equipment 
caches.
    The Honorable Edward B. Murray and the City of Seattle have also 
outlined OSRP elements that need to be added or modified. They have 
stated that comprehensive OSRPs should provide: A clear understanding 
of the federal response structure; safety procedures at the response 
site and for obtaining required state and federal permissions for using 
alternative response strategies; identification of environmentally and 
economically sensitive areas; descriptions of the responsibilities of 
the operator and government officials; and a training program that 
satisfies the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program 
(PREP).
Discussion of Comments: Content of Plan
    We agree with the majority of commenters that the current 
regulations lack specificity and it can be difficult to understand the 
requirements of the plan. The lack of specificity is reflected in the 
recommended elements provided by commenters. Commenters from diverse 
backgrounds suggested that additional requirements for comprehensive 
oil spill response plans should add greater specificity to existing 
plan elements. For example, many commenters recommended that drills 
should satisfy the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program 
(PREP). Many commenters also recommended adding elements that were 
already encompassed in the current comprehensive plan requirements. For 
example, the requirement to identify environmentally sensitive areas is 
a component of the current requirement to comply with the National 
Contingency Plan (NCP) and applicable Area Contingency Plan (ACP). 
However, the general reference to be consistent with the NCP and ACP in 
40 CFR part 300 is unclear, as this is a voluminous citation with many 
sections that do not apply to rail. Overall, the input from commenters 
demonstrated a clear need to improve the comprehensive plan 
requirements. Therefore, we are proposing to separate the requirements 
for basic and comprehensive plans. The following discussion focuses on 
the proposed changes to comprehensive plans. As discussed in the 
previous section, this rulemaking proposes to require

[[Page 50096]]

comprehensive plans for tank cars containing more than 42,000 gallons 
of oil in a single package or railroads that transport 20 or more tank 
cars loaded with liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block in a single 
train or 35 or more of such tank cars dispersed throughout the train. 
Thus, the 12-hour response timeframe applies only to track where 
covered trains traverse.
    While it is not feasible to include every element recommended by 
commenters, we looked for common themes and recommendations between 
different commenters, requirements which would address challenges faced 
in recent spill incidents, and requirements addressed by first 
responders during PHMSA's stakeholder outreach efforts. We have 
restructured and clarified the requirements of a comprehensive oil 
spill response plan to be more similar to other federal agencies and to 
provide greater specificity to assist in the regulated community's 
compliance with plan elements. We did not propose to adopt the 
recommendations from commenters that did not have a clear connection to 
the statutory requirements or parallel requirements in other federal 
regulations for oil spill response. Overall, the proposed changes are 
most similar to PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) OSRP 
requirements under 49 CFR part 194, as they address OSRPs which must 
account for large geographic areas, instead of fixed facilities. 
However, we note there are some differences between responses to 
pipelines and railroads and we have tailored the proposed requirements 
appropriately. The proposed changes are intended to clarify the chain 
of command and communication requirements, and to provide more 
information about the resources available for response and the 
conditions the plan addresses, while retaining the same overall plan 
elements described in the statute.
    We agree with the multiple commenters such as API and Mr. Joeckel 
who recommended using a requirement similar to response zones in 
pipeline regulations. This approach was identified as the best 
framework to address the unique challenge of creating a plan which 
spans large geographic distances. The CWA statute requires that the 
spill response plans make resources available by ``contract or other 
means.'' It is unlikely and sometimes impossible for the same 
responders and resources will be available at all points on a 
particular route. Therefore, it is important that response zones in the 
plan both identify the response resources, and ensure the response 
resources are capable of covering the entire response zone.
    Commenters provided different recommendations for response times. 
Washington State's Department of Ecology, Department of Fish and 
Wildlife, and Department of Natural Resources; California Department of 
Fish & Wildlife, Office of Spill Prevention & Response (OSPR), and 
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality provided 6 hours as an 
example of a possible response time for illustrative purposes. Both the 
National Association of SERA Title Three Professionals Organization 
(NASTTPO) and the Oklahoma Hazardous Materials Emergency Response 
Commission assumed railroads are capable of mobilizing response 
resources in 4-6 hours. On this issue of response time frames, AAR and 
ASLRRA proposed that ``[e]ach railroad shall identify in the plan the 
response resources which are available to respond within the time 
specified, after discovery of a worst case discharge, as follows: (1) 
[W]ithin 6 hours for designated high volume area as defined by the plan 
and (2) [w]ithin 24 hours for all other river or waterways used for 
interstate transportation and commerce.'' No commenters provided data 
to support proposed response times.
    Commenters also requested that plans more closely align with other 
federal agencies, such as the OPS requirements. In Sec.  194.115 ``Tier 
1'' response resources must be available in six hours for ``High Volume 
Areas'' and 12 hours for ``All Other Areas.'' Tier 2 and 3 require 
resources to be available between 30 and 60 areas depending on the 
designation. Part 194 of the 49 CFR does not include a definition for 
``Tier,'' when describing the type of resources. OPS defines ``High 
volume area'' in 49 CFR 194.5 as ``an area which an oil pipeline having 
a nominal outside diameter of 20 inches (508 millimeters) or more 
crosses a major river or other navigable waters, which, because of the 
velocity of the river flow and vessel traffic on the river, would 
require a more rapid response in case of a worst case discharge or 
substantial threat of such a discharge. Appendix B to this [40 CFR part 
194] part contains a list of some of the high volume areas in the 
United States. To ensure response resources are adequately placed, USCG 
gauges whether response resources can make it to a given location by 
assuming response resources can travel 35 mile per hour.
    This rulemaking proposes to provide a single metric of 12 hours to 
describe the location of response equipment, which is within the 4 to 
24 hour range suggested by commenters. The 12 hour metric aligns with 
the timeframe for `tier 1' resources for `all other areas' required by 
OPS in part 194. We are also proposing to adopt the USCG assumption 
that that response resources can travel according to a land speed of 35 
miles per hour. Therefore, for response resources traveling by land, 
the comprehensive OSRP will only be approved if response resources are 
staged within 420 miles of any point in the response zone, or the 
railroad demonstrates that a faster speed is achievable (e.g. air 
support to transport resources).
    We did not propose a tiered approach to the response resources. The 
AAR and ASLRRA proposal recommended allowing railroads to define ``High 
Volume Area'' within each plan without any criteria for such a 
definition. As there is nothing prohibiting railroads from staging 
resources closer to specific route segments, we disagree that a 
voluntary designation will increase coverage for sensitive areas. We 
also disagree that 24 hours provides adequate coverage as a single 
metric. As described above, OPS provides specific criteria used in 
determining and defining high volume areas that were absent in the AAR 
and ASLRRA proposal. However, not all the criteria in the OPS 
definition of ``High Volume Area'' translate easily to rail 
transportation (e.g., pipeline diameter). As we stated previously, we 
assume the entire route threatens navigable water, and further 
identification for every point along the route is impracticable. 
Therefore, we assume if even if a shorter response time for spills more 
likely to impact navigable waters, and a longer response for spills 
that are less likely to impact navigable waters, railroads may need to 
locate response resources using the shorter response time requirement 
for its entire track network where covered trains traverse. This would 
increase costs with uncertain corresponding benefit. We note that we 
solicit comment in both this NPRM and the RIA on whether the rule 
should define specific track locations where shorter response times 
might be warranted and provide the defining criteria for these 
locations.
    PHMSA acknowledges that some areas in proximity to certain 
navigable waters may benefit more than other areas from staging and 
deploying resources in closer proximity, due to the potentially higher 
consequences of spills in these areas. Therefore, PHMSA will consider 
adopting shorter response time requirements than 12 hours in the final 
rule based on information provided by commenters and other

[[Page 50097]]

information which may become available before a final rule is 
published. Specifically, PHMSA solicits comments on whether the 12-hour 
response time is sufficient for all areas subject to the plan, or 
whether a shorter response time (e.g., 6 hours) is appropriate for 
certain areas (e.g. High Volume Areas) which pose an increased risk for 
higher consequences from a spill. We request comments on criteria to 
define such ``High Volume Areas'' where shorter response time should be 
required. Additionally, we ask whether the definition for ``High Volume 
Area'' in 49 CFR 194.5 (excluding pipeline diameter) captures this 
increased risk, or if there is other criteria which can be used to 
reasonably and consistently identify such areas for rail. PHMSA also 
asks whether requiring response resources to be capable of arriving 
within 6 hours will lead to improvements in response, and for specific 
evidence of these improvements. Further, PHMSA requests public comments 
on whether the final rule should have a longer response time than 12 
hours for spills for all other areas subject to the plan requirements 
in order to offset costs from requiring shorter response times for High 
Volume Areas.
    In addition to the time frame in which response resources must 
arrive, the effectiveness and adequacy of these resources must also be 
assessed. To that end, PHMSA has proposed in this rulemaking that 
affected entities determine a worst-case discharge (WCD) planning 
volume. PHMSA maintains that, without this particular planning volume, 
rail carriers that transport petroleum oil in higher-risk train 
configurations would most likely be unable to ``ensure by contract or 
other means . . . the availability of, private personnel and equipment 
necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst case 
discharge (including a discharge resulting from fire or explosion), and 
to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge,'' as 
stipulated in the statute of the CWA.
    For purposes of understanding what constitutes a worst-case 
discharge in the context of rail transportation of petroleum oil, PHMSA 
has identified and analyzed the quantity released from tank cars in the 
major derailments involving petroleum oil that have occurred in recent 
years in the U.S. This analysis indicates that the worst-case 
discharge, in terms of the quantity released from tank cars that 
punctured or experienced thermal tears, would be approximately 500,000 
gallons of petroleum oil. In particular, PHMSA has identified the 
quantity released in the Casselton, ND derailment, wherein 474,936 
gallons of crude oil was released, as an approximation of a worst-case 
discharge.\41\ Moreover, the Aliceville, AL derailment involved a 
comparable quantity released: 455,520 gallons.\42\ These derailments 
signal approximately the volume of petroleum oil that would constitute 
a worst-case discharge in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See Appendix B, from the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis 
from ``HM-251: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls 
for High-Hazard Flammable Trains.''
    \42\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, PHMSA has not proposed in this rulemaking that the 
planning volume for a worst-case discharge be 500,000 gallons because 
we recognize that the tank car design enhancements promulgated in HM-
251 would reduce the overall quantity released in a derailment scenario 
occurring in the future. In other words, the Casselton, ND derailment 
involved the release of 474,936 gallons of crude oil, but if a similar 
derailment were to occur in the future, it would most likely involve a 
lesser quantity released due to improvements in the puncture resistance 
and thermal protection of tank cars achieved through HM-251. For this 
reason, PHMSA has proposed a lesser planning volume for worst-case 
discharges, adjusting the largest quantity released within the crude-
by-rail derailment history (i.e., 474,936 gallons) by the forecasted 
average effectiveness rate (0.33) that we expect as a result of HM-251-
related safety improvements over the ten-year period from 2017-2026. 
This calculation (474,936 x 0.67) yields 318,000 gallons. Therefore, as 
our determination of an appropriate WCD planning volume for use in 
comprehensive OSRPs, PHMSA proposes in this rulemaking that a worst-
case discharge be equal to 300,000 gallons.
    Nevertheless, PHMSA recognizes that the number of tank cars loaded 
with petroleum oil in a train consist can vary widely and that 300,000 
gallons as a worst-case discharge planning volume may not be 
appropriate for very large, higher-risk train configurations involving 
petroleum oil. For example, assuming 30,000 gallons is contained in a 
single tank car; a 50-tank car train carrying crude oil would carry 
approximately 1,500,000 gallons, whereas a 100-tank car train would 
carry approximately 3,000,000 gallons. Thus, PHMSA maintains that a 
300,000 gallon planning volume would be appropriate for the 50-tank car 
train, but it would not be appropriate for the 100-tank car train, 
which carries substantially more petroleum oil product and as such, 
presents a much greater risk in the transportation system. Further, 
PHMSA acknowledges the existence of even larger trains (e.g., 120-tank 
car trains), as well as the uncertainty surrounding the number of tank 
cars loaded with petroleum oil that might be transported by rail in the 
future.
    For these reasons, PHMSA has supplemented the 300,000 gallon figure 
to include another parameter that adequately increases the WCD planning 
volume for train configurations involving a greater number of tank cars 
and thus presenting greater risk. The parameter we propose, as a 
supplementation to the 300,000 gallons WCD planning volume, is the 
ratio of petroleum oil that could reasonably be expected to release in 
a derailment to the total quantity of petroleum oil carried within a 
train consist (i.e., the total petroleum oil lading), most easily 
expressed as a percentage. PHMSA maintains that a percentage of the 
total petroleum oil lading in a train consist can be used to identify 
and differentiate risk among the different types of train 
configurations that can reasonably be expected to transport large 
quantities of petroleum oil within a given response zone. Again, we 
have focused our analysis on the recent U.S. crude-by-rail derailment 
history and the associated data on the quantity released from the 
derailed tank cars in these derailments. Specifically, the quantity 
released in the Casselton, ND indicates that a worst-case discharge 
would involve 474,936 gallons. If you express this quantity released as 
a percentage of the total petroleum oil lading carried by the derailed 
Casselton, ND train, a worst-case discharge would involve approximately 
15% of the total petroleum oil lading. This percentage (15%) results 
from the following calculation: 474,936 gallons released divided by 
3,088,000 gallons, which is approximately the quantity of petroleum oil 
that the train in the Casselton, ND derailment carried. Namely, 104 
tank cars loaded with petroleum oil were involved in that derailment 
and we have assumed that the all tank cars contained 29,700 
gallons.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=425467&docketID=55926&mkey=88606.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the statutory requirements of CWA state explicitly 
that a worst-case discharge includes a discharge resulting from fire or 
explosion. Per 33 U.S.C. 1321 (j)(5)(D)(iii), a response plan must 
``identify, and ensure by contract or

[[Page 50098]]

other means . . . the availability of, private personnel and equipment 
necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst-case 
discharge (including a discharge resulting from fire or explosion), and 
to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge.'' 
PHMSA understands this statutory language to mean that railroads must 
consider the total quantity of petroleum oil released from tank cars in 
a derailment, rather than solely the quantity of petroleum oil that 
does not burn off as a result of fire or explosion and remains to be 
recovered. Therefore, in this rulemaking, PHMSA has crafted the 
definition of worst-case discharge to be consistent with the statutory 
language set forth in 33 U.S.C. 1321 (j)(5)(D)(iii). Moreover, we hold 
that the worst-case discharge planning volumes used by railroads, and 
delineated in their comprehensive plans, must take into account the 
quantity of petroleum oil that is combusted in fiery or explosive 
derailments.
    In reflection of these analyses, PHMSA proposes that the worst-case 
discharge for comprehensive plans be defined as follows:
    Worst-case discharge means ``the largest foreseeable discharge in 
adverse weather conditions,'' as defined at 33 U.S.C. 1321(a)(24). The 
largest foreseeable discharge includes discharges resulting from fire 
or explosion. The worst-case discharge from a train consist is the 
greater of: (1) 300,000 gallons of liquid petroleum oil; or (2) 15% of 
the total lading of liquid petroleum oil transported within the largest 
train consist reasonably expected to transport liquid petroleum oil in 
a given response zone.''
    As previously discussed, PHMSA used an average effectiveness rate 
achieved through HM-251 to determine the proposed 300,000 gallon WCD 
planning volume. However, for the proposed WCD planning volume based on 
the percentage of the total petroleum oil lading within a train 
consist, PHMSA has not incorporated the average effectiveness rate 
because we believe that this percentage should be more conservative 
such that very large train configurations (e.g., 135-tank car trains) 
would have an appropriate WCD planning volume commensurate with their 
presentation of increased risk within the rail transportation system. 
As an illustration of the WCD definition and its application to WCD 
planning volumes for use in comprehensive OSRPs, consider a 50-tank car 
train and a 100-tank car train carrying petroleum oil. For the 50-tank 
car train, the worst case planning volume would be 300,000 gallons, 
since 300,000 gallons is greater than 15% of the total petroleum oil 
lading carried by that train (i.e., 225,000 gallons, assuming each tank 
car carries 30,000 gallons). For the 100-tank car train, the worst case 
planning volume would be 450,000 gallons, since 15% of the petroleum 
oil carried by that train, or 450,000 gallons, is greater than 300,000 
gallons. PHMSA maintains that distinguishing larger train 
configurations from relatively smaller ones is appropriate given 
differences in risk, and we further maintain that this calculation is 
to be used to determine the ``planning volume'' for worst-case 
discharges within a given response zone. It is not re-calculated for 
each and every train in operation within a given response zone; rather, 
it is based on the largest train configuration that can reasonably be 
expected to transport petroleum oil within a response zone. At this 
time, we do not expect that the proposed worst-case discharge 
definition will result in benefits or costs. Our preliminary analysis 
assumes railroads will contract with USCG-certified OSROs to comply 
with the proposed response and mitigations activities requirements in 
Sec.  130.106, and it suggests that USCG-certified OSRO coverage is 
sufficient across the country to meet the proposed response time 
requirement and that the USCG OSRO classification system assures that 
classified OSROs have sufficient response resources to respond to a 
worst-case discharge as proposed this rule.\44\ We include questions 
for comment in Section 4 of our RIA about the benefits and costs of our 
proposed definition of worst-case discharge and alternative 
definitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ http://www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfweb/nsf/nsfcc/ops/ResponseSupport/RRAB/osro_files/0313Classification%20Guidelines.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We generally agree with AAR and ASLRRA with respect to the overall 
plan format. Our proposal for requirements includes an information 
summary, core plan, response zone appendices, clarification of which 
elements are necessary for a minimum consistency with the NCP and 
applicable ACP, and a separate training section. We also proposed to 
allow use of an Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP) to provide 
flexibility, in recognition that railroads may additionally be subject 
to the OSRP requirements of other agencies. We also added requirements 
to describe the railroad's response management system which will help 
clarify the roles of responders and require use of National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) for common 
response terminology. Use of a common terminology is also necessary for 
the railroad to be able to certify compliance with the NCP and ACP. The 
importance of describing the management response system and use of NIMS 
was highlighted by first responders in the ``Crude Oil Rail Emergency 
Response Lessons Learned Roundtable Report.'' We further request 
questions on whether the Qualified Individual (QI) should be trained to 
the Incident Commander level or whether requiring training in use of 
plan is sufficient.
    We further note that use of dispersants is generally not authorized 
by the NCP or ACP for use on inland oil discharges. We specify that the 
plans must identify the procedures to obtain any required federal and 
state authorization for using alternative response strategies such as 
in-situ burning and/or chemical agents as provided for in the 
applicable ACP and subpart J of 40 CFR part 300. We disagree with 
commenters that requirements for dispersants should be further 
addressed by DOT.
    For equipment testing and drills, we proposed requirements which 
harmonize with OPS. Specifically, we agree with commenters who 
recommended the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program 
(PREP) as the appropriate standard for drills. On April 11, 2016, USCG 
announced that the updated 2016 PREP Guidelines have been finalized and 
are now publicly available. These updates included broadening Section 5 
of the PREP Guidelines to allow for the inclusion of other DOT/PHMSA-
regulated facilities, such as rail.\45\ USCG, EPA, BSEE, and OPS 
require operators to carry out response plan exercises, or periodic 
testing that affirms whether the response plans are implementable. 
Response exercises validate the effectiveness of plans, and ensure any 
deficiencies or shortcomings in their implementation are discovered and 
fixed via exercise after action reports, instead of during a worst-case 
discharge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 81 FR 21362.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We disagree with commenters who recommend adopting requirements 
which are duplicative of other regulations, such as shipping paper 
manifest information or the proposed information sharing requirements. 
As described in greater detail in Section II, Subsection D (``Related 
Actions''), on April 17, 2015 PHMSA and FRA issued notices and a safety 
advisory notice reminding and clarifying shippers and railroads of 
their existing obligations to

[[Page 50099]]

provide certain information during transportation and after incidents.
    We agree with commenters that highlighting the need to address 
adverse weather conditions is important for both response activities 
and under the statutory requirements. Therefore, we have added a 
definition for adverse weather, and clarified that equipment must be 
suitable for adverse weather conditions and planning must incorporate 
adverse weather preparedness.
    We agree with commenters that strengthening the communication 
requirements is important. Recent incidents and input from first 
responders in the ``Crude Oil Rail Emergency Response Lessons Learned 
Roundtable Report'' highlight the need for better communication 
procedures. Our proposed changes once again are similar to the OPS, as 
well as the AAR and ASLRRA, by specifying the need to provide 
checklists which clarify the order and type of notification to be 
provided.
    Overall, our proposed changes build on the existing framework for 
OSRPs both in the current regulations and the requirements by other 
federal agencies. The proposed requirements provide greater specificity 
than the current requirements, but still allow sufficient flexibility 
for railroads to tailor the requirements to the unique needs of their 
organizations and the diverse routes covered by their plans. Most 
importantly, the proposed changes clarify the need for better 
communication, identification of resources, and information.

D. Approval of Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans

    In the ANPRM, PHMSA asked the public if any costs would be incurred 
in submitting comprehensive OSRPs to the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA). In addition, PHMSA asked if other federal 
agencies with responsibilities under the NCP should review or comment 
on rail carriers' comprehensive OSRPs. In sum, these questions inquire 
about the comprehensive OSRP approval process and consequently, the 
agency that would have the authority to process rail carriers' 
submissions of comprehensive OSRPs.
    In general, industry stakeholders requested that there be one 
approving federal agency for comprehensive OSRPs, citing concerns about 
costs, security, and the clarity of the approvals process. In general, 
environmental groups, government representatives and other commenters 
supported additional oversight, including oversight or review by 
federal agencies, states, SERCs, LEPCs, and/or the public. Commenters 
also had different suggestions as to which federal agency should 
ultimately fulfill the responsibilities of approval.
    For example, AFPM has stated, ``. . .only one agency should 
ultimately review and comment on a completed comprehensive OSRP. Review 
by multiple agencies is both duplicative and time-consuming . . . PHMSA 
is the appropriate agency to provide review . . . [and] there are 
concerns that a multi-agency review may increase the security risk of 
OSRPs being disseminated to individuals or groups who should not be 
privy to this information.''
    Without expressing support for a particular agency to approve 
comprehensive OSRPs, API has submitted a similar comment, stating, 
``[w]hile other agencies, such as USCG and EPA, can offer useful 
guidance on the process and administration of OSRPs, they should not 
necessarily comment on the specific aspects that relate to rail 
operations. Federal multiagency review would . . . likely be an 
administrative burden for DOT that could be bureaucratically 
prohibitive to developing an OSRP process that should be implemented in 
a reasonable time frame.''
    AAR also holds that only one federal agency should ultimately be 
responsible for the approval process, but suggests that FRA be the 
agency that undertakes this. On behalf of its member railroads, AAR 
states, ``[t]he railroads offer that OSRPs should . . . be submitted 
only to FRA, as primary regulator for rail safety issues, for review.'' 
AAR further specifies that PHMSA already has rail-specific regulations 
that stipulate FRA enforcement responsibilities.
    Some commenters have given considerations related to the approval 
process itself. DGAC states, ``. . . if prior FRA approval is required 
before shipments can be made, serious and costly economic impacts could 
be expected. Delays in shipments would have a significant negative 
economic impact on the U.S. economy.'' Thus, DGAC also acknowledges the 
notion of FRA approval, but suggests that the approval process should 
have a regulatory mechanism to allow for shipments of crude oil while 
the approval process is pending.
    States and environmental organizations highlighted the importance 
of approval as a requirement under the statute. For example, Washington 
State Department of Ecology (Ecology), the Washington State Department 
of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW), and the Washington State Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) stated ``33 U.S.C. 1321(j) expressly requires 
the President to review and approve the oil spill response plans.'' The 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network, however, similarly stated: ``approval of 
these plans [comprehensive OSRPs] should be required before transport 
of petroleum oil products is permitted.'' In addition, this commenter 
has suggested that plans should be submitted to, reviewed, and approved 
by FRA. Safety consultant John Joeckel highlighted NTSB's Safety 
Recommendations R-14-01 through R-14-03 to the FRA Administrator on 
January 23, 2014 which stated,

    [a]lthough 49 CFR 130.31 requires comprehensive response plans 
to be submitted to the FRA, there is no provision for the FRA to 
review and approve plans, which calls into question why these plans 
are required to be submitted. The FRA would be better prepared to 
identify deficient response plans if it had a program to thoroughly 
review and approve each plan before carriers are permitted to 
transport petroleum oil products. In comparison to other DOT 
regulations for oil transportation in pipelines, an operator may not 
handle, store, or transport oil in a pipeline unless it has 
submitted a response plan for PHMSA approval. The NTSB strongly 
believes there must be an equivalent level of preparedness across 
all modes of transportation to respond to major disasters involving 
releases of flammable liquid petroleum products.


    California's Office of Spill Prevention Response and Washington 
State's Department of Ecology also reaffirmed the statute's requirement 
to approve plans and along with partner commenters within these states, 
have stated that either PHMSA or FRA could be responsible for plan 
review and approval.
    Commenters have suggested that the approval process include review 
by several federal agencies. For example, safety consultant John 
Joeckel has said that OSRPs should be submitted to PHMSA for review and 
approval, with additional review and comments by the USCG, EPA, and 
appropriate individual States. The Center for Biological Diversity 
states, ``EPA and USCG should not only review the OSRPs, but PHMSA 
should require coordination with those agencies through a specific 
consultation and approval process.''
    With an emphasis on NEPA and the Endangered Species Act, Harvard 
Law School's Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic, along with 
partner commenters, have suggested that FRA's ``review of draft OSRPs 
should include public participation under NEPA and the ESA . . . 
Similarly, under Section 7 of the ESA, an agency must consult with

[[Page 50100]]

the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service 
when it authorizes a private action.''
    Thus, several commenters have advised that the review and approval 
of comprehensive OSRPs include multiple federal agencies, such as the 
USCG, EPA, PHMSA, FRA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and/or the 
National Marine Fisheries Service.
    Some commenters suggested that state-based approval processes be 
adopted. For example, the League of California Cities has stated, ``. . 
. in California, there are regional OSPRs that are coordinated through 
the state. Railroads' OSPRs should also be coordinated and consistent 
with state and regional plans.'' Similarly, several members of the 
concerned public, such as Daniel Wiese, Jared Howe, and Mary Ruth and 
Phillip Holder, have recommended that the authority for plan approval 
be granted to states.
    In regard to state-based approval processes, some commenters have 
proposed that state approval be coordinated through SERCs, TERCs, and/
or LEPCs. For example, King County, WA has recommended that the ``OSRP 
be developed in consultation . . . with [the] SERC or other appropriate 
state delegated entity,'' and the City of Seattle has asked that SERCs 
and LEPCs ``have the opportunity to review and comment on the OSRPs.'' 
Other commenters have noted that SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs and/or other local 
emergency responders should be provided with the plans, but do not 
specify whether this type of coordination between rail carriers and 
these entities would explicitly become part of the plan approval 
process. For more information regarding the distribution of plans for 
purposes of disclosure, preparedness, and implementation, please see 
the comment summaries and discussion within Section V, Subsection E 
(``Confidentiality/Security Concerns for Comprehensive Oil Spill 
Response Plans'').
    Other commenters from the concerned public and departments within 
city and state governments highlighted state legislation related to oil 
spill response plans and request that PHMSA provide assurance that such 
legislation will not be preempted by this rule. Joint comments from the 
Washington State DNR, Ecology, and WDFW stated ``This clearly preserves 
state authority to adopt requirements for response plans from 
railroads. PHMSA's rulemaking should confirm this understanding in its 
Federalism analysis.'' Specific commenters have proposed that cities or 
local governments are considering developing permitting processes to 
require review and comment on OSRPs at this level. The City of Seattle 
has stated that the ``City of Seattle is developing a new Right of Way 
Term Permitting process to be applied to expired railroad franchise 
agreements . . . and enables local jurisdictions with Rail--Arterial 
Right of Way impacts to better enforce public safety, environment, and 
liability issues such as making review and approval of the OSRPs for 
High Hazard Flammable Trains a mandatory requirement . . . 
Unfortunately, until federal legislation is passed requiring all 
railroad companies to develop and submit OSRPs to municipalities for 
review, this process will be difficult to enact and enforce.'' For 
further discussion of preemption issues, please see the Section VIII, 
Subsection C (``Executive Order 13132'').
    Some commenters have indicated that the general public should be 
allowed to review and comment on OSRPs and as a result, be involved in 
the plan approval process. Harvard Law School's Emmett Environmental 
Law and Policy Clinic, along with partner commenters, have recommended 
that plan approval include a ``robust public participation process.'' 
This commenter continues, ``[t]o this end, the regulations should 
require the publication of draft OSRPs followed by a period for public 
comment upon them.''
    Commenters have suggested terms of validity for plan approval. 
Safety consultant John Joeckel, in particular, has suggested that the 
plans be approved for a period of five years. Commenters have also 
explained that plans should be re-submitted in the event of any 
significant changes.
Discussion of Comments: Approval of Plans
    We agree with industry commenters that mandating multiagency 
approval could cause undue delays, burdens, and security risks. 
Furthermore, 33 U.S.C. 1321 (j)(5)(E) requires a plan that meets the 
minimum requirements to be approved. Therefore, we disagree with the 
premise that mandating multi-agency or public participation would 
provide enough value in an explicit approval process to justify the 
increased burden and potential delay. Furthermore, the resources for 
mandatory consultation with other agencies and public participation 
could potentially divert resources from safety activities. However, we 
encourage the comments of Federal, State, and local agencies and tribal 
authorities addressing the proposed requirements for the development of 
OSRPs.
    As FRA is the agency which has delegated authority to approve oil 
spill response plans for rail tank cars, we are proposing FRA as the 
sole agency required to approve railroad comprehensive oil spill 
response plans. Under 33 U.S.C. 1321 (j)(5)(D)(vi), spill response 
plans must ``be resubmitted for approval of each significant change.'' 
However, we agree with commenters that ensuring plan consistency with 
the NCP and ACP is important. We are clarifying that FRA may consult 
with the EPA or the USCG, if needed. This may be necessary to 
facilitate the needs of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, such as 
verifying compliance with elements related to consistency with the NCP 
or ACP. This also aligns with the requirements for plan approval under 
PHMSA OPS.
    The current requirements for plan submission are under Sec.  
130.31(b)(6), which requires comprehensive plans to be ``submitted, and 
resubmitted in the event of any significant change, to the Federal 
Railroad Administrator.'' Under 33 U.S.C. 1321 (j)(5)(E), guidelines 
for review and approval by the President are specified when ``any 
response plan submitted under this paragraph for an onshore facility 
that, because of its location, could reasonably be expected to cause 
significant and substantial harm to the environment by discharging into 
or on the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive 
economic zone.'' As discussed previously in the background section of 
this document, the President's authority to approve plans was delegated 
to the Secretary of Transportation and then to the Federal Highway 
Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) for motor 
carriers and railroads, respectively. USCG, EPA, BSEE, and PHMSA Office 
of Pipeline Safety (OPS) were delegated the authority to regulate and 
approve plans for their respective facility types.
    As requested by commenters, we are further clarifying the 
submission and approval procedures to align with both the statute and 
other federal agencies. AAR and ASLRRA submitted proposed regulatory 
text with many similarities to PHMSA OPS requirements. We have proposed 
to adopt many requirements similar to the OPS submission and approval 
under sections 194.119 and 194.121. Among other changes, we are 
clarifying that electronic copies are the preferred format. At this 
time, railroads may mail copies of plans contained on CD-ROMs, USB 
flash drive, or similar electronic formats. FRA may make other versions 
of electronic submission available in the future. We are requiring 
railroads to review plans every five

[[Page 50101]]

years, or after an incident requiring use of the plan occurs. Plans 
must also be updated if a significant change occurs. Significant 
changes must be approved by FRA. Significant changes are those that 
affect the operation of the plan, such as establishment of a new 
railroad route not covered by the previously approved plan, or changing 
the name of the emergency response organizations identified in the 
plan.
    In accordance with both the statute and requests from commenters, 
we have clarified the process for railroads to respond to alleged 
deficiencies in the plan identified by FRA and to allow railroads to 
continue to operate after they have submitted the plan and are awaiting 
approval decision. We are further clarifying that railroads may follow 
the existing procedures under section 209.11 in the FRA regulations to 
request confidential treatment for documents filed with the agency, 
provided the information is exempt by law from public disclosure (e.g., 
exempt from the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Freedom of 
Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), required to be held in confidence by 18 
U.S.C. 1905). Under this process, FRA retains the right to make its own 
determination in this regard. Therefore, this change clarifies the 
process to comply with existing laws and confidential treatment will 
not be extended to other information in the plan which is not currently 
exempt under other existing laws. PHMSA provides similar procedures for 
similar requests for confidential treatment of documents under Sec.  
105.30. Overall, the proposed requirements help create an equivalent 
level of safety for petroleum oil across all facility types.

E. Confidentiality/Security Concerns for Comprehensive Oil Spill 
Response Plans

    In the ANPRM, PHMSA asked the public the following question: 
``Should PHMSA require that the basic and/or the comprehensive OSRPs be 
provided to State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), Tribal 
Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs), Fusion Centers, or other 
entities designated by each state, and/or made available to the 
public?'' Commenters submitted a variety of comments regarding the 
distribution of OSRPs and relayed ideas about which entities should be 
provided with or provided access to comprehensive OSRPs. This 
distribution might include SERCs, TERCs, Fusion Centers, other state 
entities, or the general public.
    The majority of commenters support the distribution of OSRPs to 
SERCs or other emergency response organizations. Among the commenters 
in support are: The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA); the 
Department of Law, City of Chicago; LRT-Done Right; the Center for 
Biological Diversity; NASTTPO; the Riverfront Park Association; the 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network; the Flathead Basin Commission; King 
County, WA; New York State Department of Transportation; OHMERC; The 
Response Group; the Village of Barrington, IL and the TRAC Coalition; 
Washington State; the Waterkeeper Alliance; and the Solano County 
Department of Resource Management. In general, these commenters hold 
that SERCs should have the plans and could oversee the transmission of 
plan information to emergency response organizations within cities, 
counties, or other localities. These commenters emphasize that 
emergency responders would benefit from having the plan so as to 
prepare more effectively for rail accidents involving crude oil.
    Other commenters have expressed support for the distribution or 
disclosure of OSRPs to SERCs or other appropriate emergency response 
organizations, but expressed concerns about security risks and the 
distribution or disclosure of OSRPs to the general public. Among these 
commenters are: AFPM, AAR, and ASLRRA.
    With regard to security concerns, AFPM has said, ``[a]lthough 
communications are vital . . . SSI [sensitive security information] 
should be disclosed to only a limited group of people on a ``need to 
know'' basis . . . Broader dissemination raises significant security 
concerns in light of the possible targeting of rail by terrorist and 
others.'' AAR and ASLRRA have provided a similar comment on this issue, 
stating, ``[i]f required by DOT to share very specific OSRP information 
with the SERCs, the railroads are concerned that a potential bad actor 
would be able to obtain the information . . . Releasing to the public 
the worst case scenarios and the available response resources and 
equipment in the OSRPs could provide a bad actor with key information 
crucial to planning environmental terrorism activities.'' Thus, while 
acknowledging the potential value of distributing OSRPs, industry 
commenters have expressed security concerns and advised there should be 
limitations imposed on the distribution of OSRPs and certain types of 
information (i.e., SSI).
    AAR and ASLRRA have also articulated that the distribution of 
OSRPs, even to bona fide emergency response organizations such as 
SERCs, could result in further dissemination to the general public. 
Regarding this point, AAR and ASLRRA have referred to the example of 
Emergency Order Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067, which required railroads 
to make crude oil routing information available to SERCs. AAR states, 
``[w]hile the railroads do not believe it was DOT's intention, the EO 
has often resulted in the information it requires railroads to disclose 
to SERCs being made publically available.'' AFPM has voiced similar 
concerns. Thus, according to some industry stakeholders, security 
concerns would remain even if the distribution of OSRPs were limited to 
SERCs or other appropriate emergency response organizations.
    Other commenters have stated that OSRPs would or would not be 
restricted due to security concerns. The Waterkeeper Alliance has 
communicated, ``[i]n our view, this data should not be restricted . . . 
Furthermore, the data should not be deemed a security issue, nor should 
there be any restrictions placed on intra-government dissemination of 
the data. This data is vital to the public welfare . . . To keep these 
train movements secret would directly endanger the public.'' Hence, 
some commenters disagree that distributing or disclosing OSRPs would 
entail security concerns.
    Commenters have also relayed that the entities developing OSRPs may 
have rights of confidentiality (i.e., OSRPs are ``proprietary''). In 
relating the context of the State of California, the Office of Spill 
Prevention and Response has stated, ``[i]n California, the oil spill 
contingency plans submitted to OSPR are available for public review by 
law, but a plan submitter can request that a portion of a plan that is 
proprietary or is a trade secret can be designated accordingly.''
    On the issue of confidential business rights, other commenters have 
stated that OSRPs should or would not be confidential business 
information. Accordingly, Harvard Law School's Emmett Environmental Law 
and Policy Clinic, along with partner commenters, have said, 
``[m]andatory disclosure only to federal officials, as is currently the 
case, is inadequate given that state and local authorities will usually 
be the first responders to an accident and bear the burden of ensuring 
preparedness and the consequences of failing to do so. PHMSA should 
also mandate public disclosure of OSRPs. The contents of such plans 
will not be . . . confidential business information.''
    Thus, many commenters suggested that OSRPs be made available to the 
public. For example, the Delaware Riverkeeper Network has commented,

[[Page 50102]]

``[t]hese plans should also be made available to the public via an 
easily accessible web platform. The Web site should include everything 
interested parties need or want to know and everything an emergency 
response team would want to tell them.'' Other commenters have 
supported making OSRPs available to the general public, such as: The 
Riverfront Park Association; the Center for Biological Diversity; the 
Waterkeeper Alliance; and Harvard Law School's Emmett Environmental Law 
and Policy Clinic.
    A few commenters have agreed that plans can be made available to 
the public, but clarified that this disclosure would include only non-
SSI material. Accordingly, New York State has commented, ``[r]elease of 
the non-security sensitive portions of these plans to the public can 
also be accommodated using the policies already established for the 
Area Contingency Plans established by OPA 90.'' Therefore, disclosure 
to the public need not include entire copies of comprehensive OSRPs.
    On this topic, a safety consultant, John Joeckel stated, ``I do not 
see the need to have the Comprehensive OSRPs available to the public as 
long as the local responding agencies have the necessary information 
contained in the OSRP, e.g., the response zone/geographic zone 
appendices containing notification procedures, response resource 
availability, etc.'' Thus, commenters have also identified that the 
disclosure of comprehensive OSRPs may not be necessary, irrespective of 
whether the information within OSRPs is deemed to be SSI or 
confidential.
    Some commenters have asked that the distribution of plans involve 
processes beyond the provision of OSRPs to appropriate emergency 
response entities. For example, the Oklahoma OHMERC has said, ``[t]he 
delivery should be more than mailing a plan to the LEPC, the railroad 
should present the plan in person so that local emergency response 
planners and responders have the opportunity to ask questions and 
discuss roles under the OSRP.'' In addition, the Delaware Riverkeeper 
Network has expressed that ``meetings should be used to educate 
community members about evacuation plans and how to access up-to-date 
information in the event of an emergency.'' Further, The Response Group 
has asked that railroad companies be required to ``follow the precepts 
that PHSMA expects pipeline companies to follow and align those 
requirements . . . [with] API RP 1162.'' \46\ Thus, multiple commenters 
have stated that plan distribution should involve more than the 
provision of OSRPs to specific entities; it could also include meetings 
with local communities, as well as presentations delivered to local 
emergency responders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Federal pipeline safety regulations (49 CFR 192.616 and 49 
CFR 195.440) require pipeline operators to develop and implement 
public awareness programs that follow the guidance provided by the 
American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1162, 
``Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators'' (incorporated 
by reference in federal regulations). More information is available 
at: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PublicAwareness/PARPI1162.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion of Comments: Confidentiality/Security Information
    Transparency is important to PHMSA as the agency provides resources 
to the emergency response community in many forms. As described in the 
Section II, Subsection D-5 (``Stakeholder Outreach''), PHMSA and the 
railroads have been engaged in multiple activities and partnerships to 
take a comprehensive approach to providing training and emergency 
response information resources about the hazard of crude oil. We 
disagree however that providing the entire OSRP to emergency responders 
will lead to better preparedness. Some elements of the OSRP may be 
sensitive for security, business, or privacy reasons. Other elements 
are specific to railroad operations, and will not inform the actions of 
first responders or communities.
    To ensure emergency responders have pertinent information from 
plans, we are proposing that information describing the response zones 
and contact information for the qualified individual are provided to 
SERCs and TERCs as part of the information sharing requirements 
proposed in section 174.312. This allows emergency responders to 
understand which communities are included in the same response zone and 
the appropriate contact for the OSRP information at the railroad. 
Adding these requirements takes an integrated approach to the 
regulations and ensures the different types of emergency response 
information will be presented in a cohesive, usable format. We believe 
that the current requirements to notify fusion centers under routing 
information, and the proposed information sharing requirements for 
SERCs and TERCs described under Section II, Subsection E (``HHFT 
Information Sharing Notification'') will work cumulatively to provide 
emergency response organizations with the complete information they 
need about a route to prepare for flammable liquids transiting their 
communities without compromising security. In addition, by clarifying 
requirements for the OSRP (including notification procedures and the 
roles and responsibilities of individuals within the plan), railroads 
will be able to more quickly disseminate the information and conditions 
specific to the incident to appropriate local, state, and Federal 
agencies.

F. Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plan Costs

    In the ANPRM, PHMSA asked the public what costs the regulated 
community would incur in order to: (1) Develop comprehensive OSRPs; (2) 
remove or remediate discharges; and (3) conduct training, drills and 
equipment testing. PHMSA also asked about commenters' assumptions and 
requested that commenters provide detailed estimates.
    With regard to plan development costs, two commenters provided 
estimates of labor costs; however, PHMSA did not receive any detailed 
cost estimates. The majority of commenters chose to emphasize other 
considerations that they deemed to be relevant in estimating the costs 
of OSRPs.
    AAR and ASLRRA, in particular, have stated that PHMSA would need to 
supply more information about plan requirements in order to develop 
detailed cost estimates. AAR states, ``[w]ithout further guidance from 
PHMSA . . . the railroads are unable to provide more specific cost 
estimates.'' However, as a general estimate, AAR and ASLRRA estimate 
that a ``petroleum crude oil spill response plan, without equipment 
cost included, could cost a railroad anywhere from $100,000-$500,000.''
    Other commenters provided general cost estimates for plan 
development. For example, the Response Group has stated that labor 
would cost $100 per hour and that a new plan would require 
approximately 120 hours of work. This yields $12,000 as the labor cost 
component of the overall plan development costs per railroad. John 
Joeckel, a safety consultant, has offered another estimate, stating 
that an individual railroad's ``core'' plan would cost approximately 
$31,000. This estimate includes: 250 labor hours, compensated at $115 
per hour, and $2,250 in printing and administration costs. The 
commenter has also estimated that the ``core'' plan would need to be 
supplemented by

[[Page 50103]]

``geographic response zone appendices,'' which would require 50 labor 
hours, compensated at $115 per hour, and $250 in printing and 
miscellaneous costs. Thus, the development of the response zone 
appendices would add at least an additional $6,000 to overall plan 
development costs, yielding $37,000 in total. While it is not clear if 
$6,000 in costs would be incurred for the development of each 
additional response zone appendix, this commenter has clarified that 
each railroad will need a different number of response zone appendices, 
since some railroads have extensive track networks and other rail 
carriers (e.g., Short Lines and Regional Railroads) do not.
    As previously stated, several commenters did not supply cost 
estimates but chose to draw attention to other considerations, such as 
the estimated cost of cleaning up oil spills. For example, the Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network has articulated, ``[t]he costs incurred to create 
and implement a comprehensive OSRP . . . should be considered the cost 
of doing business, and are minimal when compared to the costs incurred 
to clean up and attempt to remedy crude rail accidents. For example, in 
2013, over 1.15 million gallons of crude oil were spilled in over 35 
accidents, and clean-up costs of one accident alone are estimated to 
total at least $180 million.'' In addition, a concerned member of the 
public has said, ``[f]or consideration of costs (see advance notice 
items 4, 5, and 6), the agency should include costs to communities and 
their economies from crude oil spills.''
    In addition to AAR and ASLRRA, other commenters have expressed that 
they were not certain of the costs of developing a comprehensive OSRP. 
For example, New York State has asked PHMSA to ``ascertain cost 
estimates.'' Similarly, other commenters have communicated that, while 
they are uncertain of the plan development costs that railroads would 
face, pipeline oil spill response plans are likely to be analogous in 
some respects. To that effect, the City of Seattle has commented, 
``[w]hile we do not have the information necessary to know what costs 
the railroads and shippers may incur for developing the comprehensive 
OSRPs, we know that there are current pipeline response plans through 
the U.S. While they do not directly apply to rail activities, portions 
of these existing plans are applicable and will provide the railroad 
industry with a head start toward a comprehensive plan.'' Thus, 
multiple commenters have expressed some uncertainty regarding the costs 
of developing a comprehensive OSRP.
    Some commenters have stated that the cost of developing a 
comprehensive OSRP would be ``nominal'' or ``not significant'' since 
railroads are already compliant with many of the current OSRP 
requirements under part 130, including the requirements for a basic 
OSRP. For example, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality has 
said, ``[m]ost railroad companies currently have basic oil spill 
response plans. Many of these plans already identify additional 
equipment and personnel available to them by contract or other approved 
means. These companies have also identified the equivalent of a 
qualified individual. Rail companies should not incur significant costs 
in developing comprehensive OSRPs.'' Similarly, NASTTPO has stated, 
``[a]ssuming the rail carriers are already doing a compliant basic 
OSRP, the incremental cost should be nominal.'' Further, the City and 
County of Denver, Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 
as well as the OHMERC, have expressed their support of the comments by 
NASTTPO. However, these commenters did not supply additional 
information to clarify the threshold at which costs could be considered 
``significant'' or ``nominal.''
    In addition to asking the public about plan development costs, 
PHMSA inquired about the costs incurred to remove discharges. PHMSA 
asked about the placement of equipment along the track, the types of 
equipment needed to remove or contain discharges, and the maximum time 
needed to contain a worst-case discharge. Some commenters have 
suggested maximum response times, as well as limited cost estimates, 
but overall the comments received lack detail and do not identify the 
range of costs that would be incurred to remove discharges. In 
addition, commenters have specified some types of equipment, such as 
containment booms, work boats, skimmers, and foam concentrate, but the 
commenters' listing of equipment does not appear to be exhaustive.
    With regard to discharge removal, AAR and ASLRRA have stated that 
equipment costs can be substantial. Without providing detailed cost 
information, AAR has cited that deploying a single containment boom 
could cost $15,000. AAR has not included other information regarding 
the costs of response resources and equipment.
    Safety consultant John Joeckel has identified a variety of 
potential costs that might be incurred in removing discharges. On this 
issue, Mr. Joeckel has stated, ``[c]osts will either be directly 
capitalized by the rail operator for company owned resources to 
inventory, for membership dues increases for a cooperative to purchase 
and stockpile resources or for increased ``retainer'' fees from 
contractors that will charge the rail operator for their listing as a 
contracted resource in the OSRP.'' In addition, Mr. Joeckel clarifies, 
``there are substantial resources already available throughout the 
nation in many areas, including locations in near proximity to rail 
trackage, so it is not necessarily a given that any new response 
requirements will automatically result in the need to purchase and 
stockpile and thus won't necessarily entail new significant costs for 
the railroad industry.'' Further, this commenter has stated that 
response resources for discharge removal are generally ``secondary'' to 
the resources that would be necessary for ensuring public safety 
immediately following an incident, such as foam, foam application 
systems, and ``toxic emission plume monitoring'' equipment. As a 
result, this commenter has suggested that planning standards for 
response resources should allow for the ``cascading'' of resources, or 
in other words, a ``tiered'' response wherein some types of equipment 
are required at the site of an incident before others.
    NASTTPO has not specified any types of equipment or cost estimates, 
but has offered relevant assumptions regarding planning and the use of 
response resources. The commenter states, ``[w]e presume that rail 
carriers should be able to mobilize contract responders to any point on 
their system within 4-6 hours dependent on weather. Contractors that 
provide such services are common and the trucking industry along with 
insurance carriers routinely pre-contract for these services.'' Thus, 
according to this commenter and partner commenters, contracting for 
response resources is ``routine'' and as a result, industry 
stakeholders should be able to identify response providers and are 
aware of the costs involved.
    New York State and the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality 
have emphasized that discharge removal and other response resources 
must be allocated according to a risk analysis. New York State, in 
particular, has suggested that the 27 factors that railroads use for 
routing analyses (under Sec.  172.820) could serve as a way to identify 
``the areas of highest vulnerability or . . . areas that have 
impediments to access for first responders.'' In addition, this 
commenter has provided estimates for foam concentrate, stating, ``[t]he 
cost for 600 or more gallons of Class B foam concentrate estimated as 
necessary for

[[Page 50104]]

fire control and post-fire vapor suppression for an incident involving 
a single DOT-111 rail car carrying crude oil, pursuant to the flow 
rates identified in NFPA II, exceeds $23,000 at current New York State 
Contract pricing. Combined with the costs of the apparatus needed to 
apply ``finished'' foam onto a fire or spill, the estimated cost can 
total $40,000 or more per unit.'' Consequently, the potential high cost 
of response equipment underscores the commenter's emphasis on risk 
analyses to determine equipment allocation along train routes.
    The City of Seattle has estimated $20,000 as the cost of air 
monitoring and personal protection equipment (PPE). The commenter 
states that these costs are not currently budgeted by Seattle Public 
Utilities, which, according to the commenter, is one of the city's 
agencies that would respond to an incident.
    The Delaware River and Bay Oil Spill Advisory Committee has offered 
estimates of the capital investments needed to prepare for a ``debris 
mission.'' The commenter states, ``the capital cost to stand up a 
floating debris collection mission could be in the range of $14 million 
to $21 million.'' According to the commenter, city or state authorities 
would undertake these capital investments, so it is not clear if these 
costs would be included in cost estimates for a comprehensive OSRP.
    With respect to the costs of cleaning up oil spills, The League of 
California Cities has stated, ``[m]ost importantly, these plans [OSRPs] 
should provide for the obligation to pay for recovery, including all 
required clean-up.'' Other commenters have communicated that the costs 
of discharge removal are ``minimal'' and are the ``cost of doing 
business.'' Thus, these commenters seek to stress that the costs to 
communities that experience an oil spill can be large and must be 
considered alongside the costs to implement OSRPs.
    In the ANPRM, PHMSA also asked the public to comment on training 
costs, such as the costs of conducting drills or testing equipment. In 
addition, many commenters discussed which entities would be responsible 
for providing training or ensuring that training is adequately funded. 
Commenters have also supplied some basic cost estimates for different 
components of training.
    AAR and ASLRRA have stated that training costs can be substantial 
and estimated that a single training exercise or drill could cost 
between $60,000 and $150,000. AAR and ASLRRA have also stated, 
``[w]ithout further guidance from PHMSA . . . the railroads are unable 
to provide more specific cost estimates.''
    New York State has identified various costs associated with the 
training of first responders and emergency personnel. The commenter has 
cited ``the costs of providing staffing (backfills) for career fire 
departments and . . . consumables required for effective and realistic 
training such as training foam. Staffing backfill costs will vary by 
jurisdiction but can be significant, and if not addressed, limit 
participation of critical response agencies with a corresponding 
negative impact upon effectiveness.'' The commenter has not provided 
any cost estimates related to backfills or consumables.
    Some commenters have suggested that the cost of training be funded 
by railroads. For example, the City of Lockport, IL has said, ``[t]he 
new guidelines proposed by Federal Pipeline and Hazard Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) must include adequate emergency preparation and 
response protocols for local agencies responding to these incidents and 
the Railroads profiting from this transportation should provide this at 
no cost to local responders.'' The commenter has not estimated the cost 
to rail carriers if they were to provide this training.
    The League of California Cities has made a similar comment, 
stating, ``[f]ully-funded regular training programs that cover the cost 
of training, including backfill employee costs, to ensure that first 
responders are trained, and remain trained, on up-to-date procedures to 
address the unique risks posed by these shipments.'' In this case, the 
commenter has not specified the source of this funding.
    Other commenters have suggested that rail carriers should not be 
expected to pay for the costs of training local first responders. 
NASTTPO has expressed, ``[w]e have no expectation that the rail 
carriers would be paying for the attendance of local first responders 
at training events and exercises.'' The commenter has also expressed 
that, since the rulemaking should not require railroads to pay for the 
training of local first responders, the costs imposed on the regulated 
community as a result of training requirements should be ``nominal.'' 
In agreement, the City and County of Denver's Office of Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security has stated that they support all the 
comments made by NASTTPO.
    Oklahoma's OHMERC has similarly stated that railroads should not be 
expected to pay the costs of training local first responders, but 
emphasizes that ``given the fact that volunteer fire fighters have 
other job obligations, training would be most effective delivered 
locally.''
    The Dangerous Goods Advisory Council has suggested that ensuring 
training among emergency responders will be difficult due to practical 
and financial concerns. DGAC has stated, ``DGAC supports the training 
of emergency responders in how to properly respond to hazardous 
materials incidents. However, it may be difficult, time consuming, and 
costly to individually train each emergency response organization in 
the areas through which a `key' or `unit' train transporting crude oil 
travels. It is unlikely that every local emergency response 
organization located along the route could afford to develop and 
maintain the necessary resources to respond to significant incidents 
involving crude oil derailments.'' Given this concern, the commenter 
holds that ``regional response teams'' may be an effective alternative.
    Various commenters have suggested that PHMSA adopt training 
elements from the National Preparedness, Response and Exercise Program 
(PREP) guidelines, which have been developed through multi-agency 
participation and coordination, including DOT, USCG, EPA, and DOI. 
Safety consultant, John Joeckel, the Office of Spill Prevention & 
Response (OSPR), and Washington State have voiced support for NPREP. 
According to commenters, NPREP training covers a variety of training 
exercises (e.g., table-top, seminar, announced and unannounced 
exercises, etc.) which entail different costs.
    Commenters have mentioned other standards for training or equipment 
testing requirements. For example, Safety consultant John Joeckel has 
referenced a 1994 publication entitled, ``Training Reference for Oil 
Spill Response,'' as well as the U.S. Coast Guard's Oil Spill Response 
Organization (OSRO) Classification program for the testing of 
equipment. Further, the commenter maintains that contractors working 
with rail carriers would ``in all likelihood'' already be participating 
in the OSRO Classification program, suggesting that the industry's 
available response resources could be compliant with existing equipment 
testing requirements under USCG. With regard to cost estimates, Mr. 
Joeckel is unable to quantify a monetary value for relevant training 
exercises.
    OSPR has suggested other training sources, such as the Hazardous 
Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER), a set of guidelines 
overseen by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
and regulated in 29 CFR part 1910. OSPR

[[Page 50105]]

has also mentioned free, online training on the Incident Command System 
(ICS) offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). With 
regard to training cost estimates, OSPR has stated, ``In California, 
OSPR has been informed that an OSRO-managed drill could cost about 
$2,000 for a small tabletop drill and up to $500,000 or more for a full 
scale multi-day exercise; but regulated entities could agree to share 
these costs for a particular drill.''
    Given the variety of training sources and opportunities available, 
the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) has suggested that 
DOT facilitate the creation of a standardized training curriculum. The 
commenter states, ``U.S. DOT should work with railroads, the U.S. Fire 
Administration and fire service organizations toward developing a 
standardized curriculum for responding to railroad emergencies for the 
Bakken Crude. This will ensure that firefighters are equally trained in 
the event of an incident involving more than one state.'' Regarding the 
funding of training, this commenter has asked that DOT ensure that the 
Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) Grant Program be used 
to fund regional and interagency drills for rail safety response.
Discussion of Comments: Plan Costs
    We appreciate commenters' efforts to provide initial cost 
considerations and estimations, despite the challenges they cited in 
providing data. We have incorporated commenters' cost estimates to the 
extent possible, but note that these estimates lacked detail and data. 
We further clarify that the estimated cost of the proposed oil spill 
response plan requirements is the cost of plan development, submission, 
and maintenance; contract services for OSROs; and training and 
exercises.
    To elaborate, the costs of plan development were estimated as a 
function of the time and compensation that a senior railroad employee 
or contractor needs to develop the plan, as well as the number of 
response zone appendices needed in connection with the railroad's core 
plan. PHMSA estimated that on average it would cost a Class I railroad 
about $15,000 to develop a plan, it would cost a Class II railroad 
$8000 to develop a plan, and it would cost a Class III railroad $7000 
to develop a plan. Plan submission and maintenance were also estimated 
as a function of the time and compensation of the employee that submits 
and maintains the plan. PHMSA estimated that on average it would cost a 
Class I railroad about $1,500 for plan submission and maintenance, it 
would cost a Class II railroad $800 for plan submission and 
maintenance, and it would cost a Class III railroad $700 for plan 
submission and maintenance. We estimated the cost of OSRO services by 
interviewing an OSRO and obtaining a range for potential retainer fees. 
Retainer fees may vary based on the Class (I, II, III) of the railroad 
as well as the number of response zones that PHMSA-OHMS expects the 
railroads to have. PHMSA estimated that on average it would cost a 
Class I railroad about $40,000 annually to retain an ORSO for each of 
its 8 response zones, it would cost a Class II railroad $6000 annually 
to retain an ORSO for each of its 2 response zones, and it would cost a 
Class III railroad $2500 annually to retain an ORSO for its single 
response zone. The costs of training are estimated as a function of the 
number of employees requiring training, the duration of the training in 
hours, and the wage rate applied. Separate from training, we have also 
estimated costs of exercises, such as those prescribed in PREP 
guidelines. Since PREP guidelines are consistent across Federal 
agencies, we used costs estimated by the USCG, including travel costs 
and additional OSRO fees for drill-related deployment of resources.
    Please see the draft RIA for the quantitative aspect of this 
discussion and further explanation of the anticipated cost impacts of 
the proposed rule.

G. Voluntary Actions

    In the ANPRM, PHMSA asked the public to comment on the role of 
industry's voluntary and current actions regarding oil spill response 
planning. In particular, PHMSA asked, ``What, if any, aspects beyond 
the basic plan requirements do these plans voluntarily address?''
    In regard to the information contained within basic OSRPs, 
commenters offered a variety of ideas, but the majority of commenters 
have relayed that the current knowledge base surrounding basic oil 
spill response plans is limited. Commenters have stated that this 
knowledge of basic plans is limited because many entities, including 
states, cities, local community groups, and some emergency response 
organizations, do not have access to rail carriers' basic plans. In 
addition, some commenters stated that they have encountered issues in 
coordinating with rail carriers on this issue. Further, other 
commenters have voiced that basic OSRPs do not provide adequate 
information to local first responders, even if they are communicated 
effectively to those responders.
    The Response Group has stated, ``I have never seen a current 
railroad oil spill response plan . . . I have developed a prototype oil 
spill response plan suitable for rail based upon experience with Coast 
Guard, EPA, PHMSA and OSHA.''
    Safety consultant John Joeckel has stated, ``[a]nswers [to ANPRM 
question #7] should be provided by the rail operators . . . since they 
are the only entity that currently has access to the Basic OSRPs . . . 
and have not been reviewed or approved by State or Federal agencies and 
have not been seen by the general public.'' However, Mr. Joeckel 
comments further, stating that, despite the public's limited knowledge 
of OSRPs, ``I would have to assume that there will be a wide range of 
differences between basic OSRPs amongst the rail industry sector 
particularly differences between a Class I rail operator versus a Class 
II and Class III rail operator.'' Thus, Mr. Joeckel has explained that 
only the rail carriers understand what is currently addressed in 
existing OSRPs, and he suggests that there is a ``potential wide 
variance in response preparedness amongst the industry.''
    Similarly, New York State has commented that, ``[t]o date, the 
railroads and associated shippers have not shared their OSRPs with New 
York State as they currently are not required to under federal law or 
regulations.'' Thus, New York State has underscored that the knowledge 
surrounding oil spill response plans and their contents is limited and 
reiterated that the requirements under part 130 do currently not 
address the distribution of plans or which entities might have access 
to them. For more discussion on plan distribution, please see Section 
V, Subsection E (``Confidentiality/Security Concerns for Comprehensive 
Oil Spill Response Plans'').
    The City of Seattle has made a similar comment. This commenter 
states, ``[w]ithout access to review and comment on OSRP the City of 
Seattle cannot determine compliance with requirements.'' As previously 
noted, the City of Seattle also seeks to make review and approval at 
the municipal level a part of the permitting and permit renewal 
processes for ``Right of Way Franchise Agreements.''
    Some commenters have stated that current OSRPs are not adequate, 
which suggests at least a familiarity with their current form and 
contents. For example, NASTTPO has stated, ``[b]asic OSRPs are not 
successful as noted . . . They do not provide adequate information to 
local first responders even if they are communicated to those 
responders.'' OHMERC has also stated, ``OSRPs

[[Page 50106]]

should be more detailed and contain better information for 
responders.''
    AAR and ASLRRA have held a different opinion than the majority of 
commenters due to their unique understanding of OSRPs and industry 
background. Regarding current OSRPs, AAR and ASLRRA have stated, 
``[r]ailroads have been very proactive in emergency response planning 
and outreach . . .'' They cited implementation of the AAR Circular OT-
55, training efforts, and efforts to provide an inventory of emergency 
response resources. However, these comments did not include any details 
describing whether railroads were providing voluntary compliance with 
specific comprehensive oil spill response plan requirements.
    In the ANPRM, PHMSA specifically asked, ``[t]o what extent do 
current plans meet the comprehensive OSRP requirements, including 
procurement or contracting for resources to be present to respond to 
discharges?'' As previously mentioned, the majority of commenters have 
stated that their knowledge of current OSRPs is limited due to limited 
access and challenges of coordination with railroads. For this reason, 
most commenters were unable to answer this question, as it requires an 
understanding of the form and contents of current OSRPs. Without this 
understanding, it is difficult to assess to what degree current plans 
have incorporated response resources contracting as would be required 
under the part 130 requirements for comprehensive OSRPs.
    AAR and ASLRRA have addressed this question, stating, ``[p]ursuant 
to the industry's commitment to Secretary Foxx, AAR has developed an 
inventory of emergency response resources along routes over which Key 
Crude Oil Trains operate for responding to the release of large amounts 
of petroleum crude oil in the event of an incident. This inventory also 
includes locations for the staging of emergency response equipment and, 
where appropriate, contacts for the notification of communities.'' 
Thus, according to this commenter, voluntary actions combined with 
compliance to the basic OSRPs currently required already include 
planning for response resources. However, these comments did not 
include any additional data or details describing whether railroads 
were providing voluntary compliance with specific comprehensive oil 
spill response plan requirements.
Discussion of Comments: Voluntary Actions
    While we applaud the voluntary efforts railroads have taken to 
improve safety, they do not carry the weight of law and the extent to 
which these voluntary efforts meet the requirements of current 
comprehensive oil spill response plans is difficult to quantify based 
on the comments received. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires the 
creation of oil spill response plans with specific minimum elements for 
``an onshore facility that, because of its location, could reasonably 
be expected to cause substantial harm to the environment by discharging 
into or on the navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive 
economic zone.'' Furthermore, voluntary actions do not carry the weight 
of regulations to ensure continued compliance and enforceability.
    We agree with NTSB's safety recommendation that the recent spill 
history demonstrates that unit trains and other trains carrying large 
quantities of petroleum oil meet this definition of ``substantial harm 
to the environment'' and thus require comprehensive plans. Furthermore, 
basic plans are not sufficient for higher-risk train configurations as 
they do not require the railroad to ensure the availability of response 
resources or provide other elements to address the response challenges 
we have identified in this rulemaking. Comments addressing plan 
contents describe the clear need to require additional elements for 
comprehensive plans and to provide additional clarifications to those 
elements.

VI. Incorporated by Reference

    Section 171.7 lists all standards incorporated by reference into 
the HMR that are not specifically set forth in the regulations. This 
NPRM proposes to incorporate by reference the ASTM D7900-13 Standard 
Test Method for Determination of Light Hydrocarbons in Stabilized Crude 
Oils by Gas Chromatography, 2013, available for interested parties to 
purchase in either print or electronic versions through the parent 
organization's Web site at the following URL: http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?D7900-13e1. The price charged for these standards to 
interested parties helps to cover the cost of developing, maintaining, 
hosting, and accessing these standards. This publication (i.e., test 
method) ensures a minimal loss of light ends for crude oils, containing 
volatile, low molecular weight components (e.g. methane) because it 
determines the boiling range distribution from methane through n-
nonane. The specific standards are discussed in greater detail in the 
Section II, Subsection G. (``Initial Boiling Point Test'') of this 
rulemaking.

VII. Section-by-Section Review

Part 130

    We propose to restructure part 130 to establish the following 
subparts:
    Subpart A--Applicability and General Requirements contains current 
Sec. Sec.  130.1-21 with minor revisions and clarifications.
    Subpart B--Basic Spill Prevention and Response Plans contains 
current Sec. Sec.  130.31-33 with minor revisions to remove 
comprehensive plan requirements.
    Subpart C--Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans is a new Subpart 
with new requirements for comprehensive oil spill response plans.
Section 130.2
    Paragraph (d) is updated to show that the requirements in Sec.  
130.31(b) have moved to subpart C. PHMSA does not propose any other 
changes to this section.
Section 130.5
    The introductory text is reformatted, including moving the 
definition for ``Animal fat'' to the correct alphabetical order. 
Definitions for ``Adverse Weather,'' ``Environmentally Sensitive or 
Significant Areas,'' ``Maximum Potential Discharge,'' ``Oil Spill 
Response Organization,'' ``On-scene Coordinator (OSC),'' ``Response 
activities,'' ``Response Plan,'' and ``Response Zone'' are added in 
response to commenters. Definitions for ``Petroleum Oil'' and ``Worst-
case discharge'' are revised to better clarify the applicability of the 
terms. The term ``Person'' is revised to clarify railroads are included 
in the term. The term ``Maximum Potential Discharge'' is currently used 
in the requirements for basic plans and is currently ``synonymous with 
Worst-Case Discharge.'' We are proposing to separate the definitions to 
facilitate the newly proposed definition for ``Worst-Case Discharge'' 
for comprehensive plans. The mailing address for the Office of 
Hazardous Materials Safety is updated in the note for the definition of 
``Liquid.''
Section 130.31
    This section is revised editorially to clarify that it applies to 
basic oil spill response plans only. References to comprehensive oil 
spill response plans are removed.
Section 130.33
    This section is revised to clarify that it only applies to basic 
oil spill response plans.

[[Page 50107]]

Section 130.101
    Establishes a new section which moves the current applicability for 
comprehensive oil spill response plans of 42,000 gallons per packaging 
from Sec.  130.31 to Sec.  130.101, and expands the applicability for 
comprehensive oil spill response plans to include ``Any railroad which 
transports a single train transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of 
liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block or a single train carrying 
35 or more loaded tank cars of liquid petroleum oil throughout the 
train consist must submit a comprehensive plan meeting the requirements 
of this subpart.''
Section 130.102
    Establishes a new section for general requirements for the overall 
development of the comprehensive response plan and requires the plan 
uses the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident 
Command System (ICS).
    This section also establishes general requirements for the plan 
format including the development a core plan and the establishment of 
geographic response zones and accompanying response zone appendixes.
    This section also allows for use of the Integrated Contingency Plan 
(ICP) format to provide greater flexibility.
Section 130.103
    Establishes a new section which requires a railroad to certify in 
the comprehensive response plan that it reviewed the NCP and each 
applicable ACP and that its response plan is consistent with the NCP 
and each applicable ACP through compliance with a list of minimum 
requirements.
Section 130.104
    Establishes a new section which requires a comprehensive response 
plan to include an information summary.
Section 130.105
    Establishes a new section with requirements for the notification 
procedures and contact information that a railroad must include in a 
comprehensive oil spill response plan.
Section 130.106
    Establishes a new section for railroads to describe the response 
and mitigation activities and the roles and responsibilities of 
participants in the comprehensive oil spill response plans.
Section 130.107
    Establishes a new section for railroads to certify employees are 
trained in accordance with the requirements of this section.
Section 130.108
    Establishes a new section for requirements for equipment testing 
and drill procedures consistent with PREP requirements for 
comprehensive oil spill response plans.
Section 130.109
    Establishes a new section with requirements for recordkeeping, 
review, and submission of comprehensive oil spill response plans.
Section 130.111
    Establishes a new section with the requirements and procedures to 
submit comprehensive oil spill response plans for approval to FRA.
Section 130.112
    Establishes a new section to apply the same plan implementation 
requirements for comprehensive oil spill response plans formerly under 
in Sec.  130.33.

Part 171

Section 171.7
    Add paragraph 173.121(a)(2)(vi) titled ``Petroleum products 
containing known flammable gases'' stating, ``Standard Test Method for 
Determination of Light Hydrocarbons in Stabilized Crude Oils by Gas 
Chromatography (ASTM D7900). The initial boiling point is the 
temperature at which 0.5 weight percent is eluted when determining the 
boiling range distribution.''

Part 173

Section 173.121
    Add paragraph 173.121(a)(2)(vi) titled ``Petroleum products 
containing known flammable gases'' stating, ``Standard Test Method for 
Determination of Light Hydrocarbons in Stabilized Crude Oils by Gas 
Chromatography (ASTM D7900). The initial boiling point is the 
temperature at which 0.5 weight percent is eluted when determining the 
boiling range distribution.''

Part 174

    The authority is updated to include 33 U.S.C. 1321.
Section 174.310
    Section 174.310 provides a list of the additional requirements for 
the operation of HHFTs. A new paragraph (a)(6) titled ``Oil spill 
response plans'' is added for clarity to provide a reference to the 
part 130 requirements for HHFTs composed of trains carrying petroleum 
oil.
Section 174.312
    Part 174, subpart G provides detailed requirements for flammable 
liquids by rail. The HHFT Final Rule added Sec.  174.310 to this 
subpart to establish requirements for HHFTs. In this NPRM, we are 
proposing to add a new Sec.  174.312 to subpart G of part 174 to 
require rail carriers that operate HHFTs to provide monthly 
notifications to each applicable SERC, TERC, or other appropriate state 
delegated agencies for further distribution to appropriate local 
authorities, upon request. New proposed Sec.  174.312 specifies that 
the notifications must include:
     A reasonable estimate of the number of HHFTs that the 
railroad expects to operate each week, through each county within the 
state or through each tribal jurisdiction;
     the routes over which the HHFTs will operate;
     a description of the hazardous material being transported 
and all applicable emergency response information required by subparts 
C and G of part 172; at least one point of contact at the railroad 
(including name, title, phone number and address) with knowledge of the 
railroad's transportation of affected trains (referred to as the ``HHFT 
point of contact''); and
     If a route is subject to the comprehensive spill plan 
requirements, the notification must include a description of the 
response zones (including counties and states) and contact information 
for the qualified individual and alternate, as specified under Sec.  
130.104(a).
    As proposed, railroads may provide the required notifications 
electronically or in hard copy and will be required to update the 
notifications monthly. If there are no material changes to the 
estimates provided in a month, proposed paragraph (a)(2)(i) would 
require the railroad to provide a certification of no change. As 
proposed, paragraph (a)(2)(iii) would require that each point of 
contact be clearly identified by name or title and role (e.g., 
qualified individual, HHFT point of contact).
    Through the expansion of the applicability of the routing 
requirements in Sec.  172.820 in the HHFT Final Rule to in include 
HHFTs and this NPRM's new proposed Sec.  174.312, we have established 
an information sharing framework that enables the railroads to work 
with state officials to ensure that safety and security planning is 
occurring. Under existing Sec.  172.820(g) of the HMR, fusion centers 
and other state, local, and tribal officials with a need-to-know will 
continue to work with the railroads on

[[Page 50108]]

routing and risk analysis information conducted pursuant to part 172, 
subpart I, for information that is deemed SSI. At the same time, 
proposed new Sec.  174.312 will ensure that SERCs, TERCs or other 
appropriate state agencies will routinely receive and share non-
sensitive information from rail carriers regarding the movement of 
HHFTs in their jurisdictions that can aid local emergency responders 
and law enforcement in emergency preparedness and community awareness.
    PHMSA seeks public comment on all aspects of this proposal and in 
particular the issues identified below. When commenting, please 
reference the specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for 
any recommended change, and include the source, methodology, and key 
assumptions of any supporting evidence.
    1. Whether particular public safety improvements could be achieved 
by requiring the railroads to provide the notification proposed in 
paragraph Sec.  174.312 directly to organizations other than SERCs, 
TERCs, or other state delegated agencies?
    2. Whether requiring the information sharing notifications to be 
made by railroads directly to the TERCs is the best approach to provide 
information to tribal governments or whether providing a notification 
to the National Congress of American Indians to disseminate to affected 
tribes or another entity is more appropriate?
    3. Whether there are alternative means by which PHMSA can fulfill 
the FAST Act's direction to establish security and confidentiality 
protections, where this information is not subject to security and 
confidentiality protections under Federal standards.

VIII. Regulatory Review and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 13610, 
and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This NPRM is considered a significant regulatory action under 
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). It is also considered a significant 
regulatory action under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures order 
issued by DOT (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). PHMSA has prepared and 
placed in the docket a draft Regulatory Impact Assessment addressing 
the economic impact of this proposed rule.
    Executive Orders 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and Review'') and 
13563 (``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review'') require agencies 
to regulate in the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs,'' and to develop regulations that ``impose the least burden on 
society.'' Executive Order 13610 (``Identifying and Reducing Regulatory 
Burdens''), issued May 10, 2012, urges agencies to conduct 
retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether they remain 
justified and whether they should be modified or streamlined in light 
of changed circumstances, including the rise of new technologies. DOT 
believes that streamlined and clear regulations are important to ensure 
compliance with important safety regulations. As such, the Department 
has developed a plan detailing how such reviews are conducted.
    Additionally, Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13610 require 
agencies to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation. 
Accordingly, PHMSA invites comments on these considerations, including 
information to improve the estimates of costs and benefits; alternative 
approaches; and relevant scientific, technical, and economic data. 
These comments will help PHMSA evaluate whether the proposed 
requirements are appropriate. PHMSA also seeks comment on potential 
data and information gathering activities that could be useful in 
designing an evaluation and/or retrospective review of this rulemaking.
    The proposed rule became necessary due to relatively recent 
expansions in U.S. energy production, which has led to significant 
challenges in the transportation system. Expansion in oil production in 
North America relative to the 2000s has led to increasing volumes of 
this product transported to refineries and other transport-related 
facilities.
    The U.S. is now a global leader in crude oil production. With the 
expectation of continued domestic production, rail transportation 
remains a flexible alternative to transportation by pipeline or vessel. 
The number of intra-U.S. rail carloads of crude oil approached 370,000 
in 2013, reached approximately 450,000 carloads in 2014, and fell to 
approximately 390,000 carloads in 2015.\47\ Total crude-by-rail 
movements in the United States and between the United States and Canada 
were more than 1 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2014, up from 
55,000 bbl/d in 2010.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=ESM_EPC0_RAIL_NUS-NUS_MBBL&f=M
    \48\ http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20592.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of April 2016, the Bakken region of the Williston basin was 
producing over one million barrels of oil per day, which is commonly 
transported by rail.\49\ The U.S. Energy Information Administration's 
``Annual Survey of Domestic Oil and Gas Reserves'' reports that in 
addition to North Dakota's Bakken region, the shale plays in reserves 
in North America are extensive.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Information regarding oil and gas production is available 
at the following URL: http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/#tabs-summary-2 .
    \50\ EIA ``U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, 
2013,'' available at: http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/pdf/uscrudeoil.pdf .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Expansion in oil production in North America has led to increasing 
volumes of this product transported to refineries. Traditionally, 
pipelines and oceangoing tankers have delivered the vast majority of 
crude oil to U.S. refineries, accounting for approximately 93 percent 
of total receipts (in barrels) in 2012. Although other modes of 
transportation--rail, barge, and truck--have accounted for a relatively 
minor portion of crude oil shipments historically, volumes have risen 
very rapidly relative to the 2000s. The transportation of large volumes 
of crude oil and other petroleum products by rail under the current 
regulatory scheme poses a risk to life, property, and the environment. 
Figure 1 provides the average monthly U.S. rail movements of crude oil 
from 2010 through January 2016.

[[Page 50109]]



 
 
 
FIGURE 1:
 

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP29JY16.000

    Figure 2 shows the growth in U.S. crude oil production since 2000, 
as well as growth in the number of rail carloads shipped. Figure 2 also 
shows forecasted domestic crude oil production from EIA and projections 
to 2034 for the rail shipment of crude oil.

 
 
 
FIGURE 2:
 

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP29JY16.001


[[Page 50110]]

    Rail accidents have risen along with the increase in crude oil 
production and rail shipments of crude oil relative to the 2000s. 
Figure 3 below shows this rise.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Source: STB Waybill Sample and PHMSA Incident Report 
Database.

 
 
 
FIGURE 3:
 

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP29JY16.002

    Based on these train accidents, the expectation of continued 
domestic crude oil production, and the number of train accidents 
involving crude oil, PHMSA maintains that improved oil spill response 
planning is essential to protecting the environment against the risks 
of derailments involving large quantities of petroleum oil.
    PHMSA has identified several recent derailments to illustrate the 
circumstances and consequences of derailments involving petroleum oil 
transported in higher-risk train configurations: Watertown, WI 
(November 2015); Culbertson, MT (July 2015); Heimdal, ND (May 2015); 
Galena, IL (March 2015); Mt. Carbon, WV (February 2015); La Salle, CO 
(May 2014); Lynchburg, VA (April 2014); Vandergrift, PA (February 
2014); New Augusta, MS (January 2014); Casselton, ND (December 2013); 
Aliceville, AL (November 2013); and Parkers Prairie, MN (March 2013).
    For example, on December 30, 2013, a train carrying crude oil 
derailed and ignited near Casselton, North Dakota, prompting 
authorities to issue a voluntary evacuation of the city and surrounding 
area. On November 7, 2013, a train carrying crude oil to the Gulf Coast 
from North Dakota derailed in Aliceville, Alabama, spilling crude oil 
in a nearby wetland and igniting into flames.
    These derailments of HHFTs transporting crude oil have resulted in 
releases of petroleum oil that harmed or posed a threat of harm to the 
nation's waterways. Of note here is Safety Recommendation R-14-5, which 
recommended that PHMSA revise the spill response planning thresholds 
prescribed in 49 CFR part 130 to require comprehensive OSRPs that 
effectively provide for the carriers' ability to respond to worst-case 
discharges resulting from accidents involving unit trains or blocks of 
tank cars transporting oil and petroleum products.\52\ PHMSA developed 
the revisions included in this NPRM in response to NTSB's safety 
recommendations, as well as the aforementioned recent derailments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ National Transportation Safety Board. (2014, January 21). 
Safety Recommendation R-14-4 through -6. Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/R-14-004-006.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 17, 1996, DOT's Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA) published a final rule issuing requirements that 
sought to meet the intent of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(Clean Water Act; 61 FR 30533) and Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (see 33 
U.S.C. 1321). This rule adopted requirements for packaging, 
communication, spill response planning, and response plan 
implementation intended to prevent and contain spills of oil during 
transportation. Under these current requirements, railroads are 
required to complete a basic OSRP for oil shipments

[[Page 50111]]

in a package with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more, and a 
comprehensive OSRP is required for oil shipments in a package 
containing more than 42,000 gallons (1,000 barrels).
    Currently, all of the rail community that transports oil, including 
crude oil transported as a hazardous material, is subject to the basic 
OSRP requirement of 49 CFR 130.31(a) since most, if not all, rail tank 
cars being used to transport crude oil have a capacity greater than 
3,500 gallons. However, a comprehensive OSRP for shipment of oil is 
only required when the quantity of oil is greater than 42,000 gallons 
per tank car. Accordingly, the number of railroads required to have a 
comprehensive OSRP is much lower, or possibly non-existent, because a 
very limited number of rail tank cars in use would be able to transport 
a volume of 42,000 gallons in a car.\53\ Thus, the existing regulatory 
framework for basic plans in part 130 constitutes the regulatory 
baseline and PHMSA anticipates that many railroads are likely to meet 
the basic plan requirements under part 130.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ The 2014 AAR's Universal Machine Language Equipment 
Register numbers showed five tank cars listed with a capacity equal 
to or greater than 42,000 gallons, and none of these cars were being 
used to transport oil or petroleum products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, many railroads may voluntarily exceed the minimum 
standards set forth by basic plans. Given that similar oil spill 
response planning requirements are already in place for facilities, 
pipelines, and vessels, PHMSA anticipates that response resources are 
currently available across the U.S. As we anticipate that many 
railroads may voluntarily exceed the minimum standard for compliance, 
the change to the current planning and response baseline is likely to 
be less than the change in the regulatory baseline (i.e., the change 
from basic to comprehensive plans).
    PHMSA's preliminary analysis indicates that the planning and 
response baseline currently provides for a level of OSRO coverage and 
response resource availability that is consistent with the proposed 
rule's response timeframe of 12 hours. In the aggregate, PHMSA-OHMS 
could not identify any rail routes within the continental U.S. that 
lack coverage from the network of USCG-certified OSROs analyzed. By our 
estimation, all potential rail routes transporting large quantities of 
petroleum oil in the continental U.S. could be serviced by an OSRO in 
the event of a petroleum oil train derailment within 12 hours. For 
additional discussion of our baseline analyses, please refer to the 
``Baseline Analysis'' section in the draft RIA for this proposed rule.
    In summary, the proposed rule would expand the applicability of 
comprehensive OSRPs based on thresholds of crude oil that apply to an 
entire train consist. Specifically, the proposed rule would expand the 
applicability for OSRPs so that no person may transport a single train 
transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of liquid petroleum oil in a 
continuous block or a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars 
of liquid petroleum oil throughout the train consist unless that person 
has implemented a comprehensive OSRP. Furthermore, this NPRM proposes 
to require railroads to share additional information with state and 
tribal emergency response organizations (i.e. SERCs and TERCs) to 
improve community preparedness and to incorporate the voluntary use of 
the IBP test (ASTM D7900) to determine classification and packing group 
for Class 3 Flammable liquids.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ The ASTM D7900 is not currently aligned with the testing 
requirements authorized in the HMR forcing shippers to continue to 
use the testing methods authorized in Sec.  173.121(a)(2). This 
misalignment results in a situation wherein an industry best 
practice for testing of crude oil (ASTM D7900 for initial boiling 
point) that was developed in concert with PHMSA is not authorized by 
the HMR. We note that the incorporation of API RP 3000 and 
consequently ASTM D7900 will not replace the currently authorized 
testing methods, rather serve as a testing alternative if one 
chooses to use that method. PHMSA believes this provides flexibility 
and promotes enhanced safety in transport through accurate PG 
assignment. This provision would not pose any costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the sections that follow, we outline the costs of OSRPs and 
information sharing provisions, as well as the breakeven analysis we 
developed in order to proactively generate a benefits outlook for this 
rule. The provision to incorporate by reference ASTM D7900 is not 
expected to impose costs on the regulated community; thus, we estimate 
no quantitative benefits for that particular provision.
Costs
    Each railroad subject to the proposed rule must prepare and submit 
a comprehensive OSRP that includes a plan for responding, to the 
maximum extent practicable, to a worst-case discharge and to a 
substantial threat of such a discharge of oil. The OSRP must also be 
submitted to the FRA, where it will be reviewed and approved by FRA 
personnel.
    The following entities would be subject to the comprehensive plan 
requirements in the proposed rule:
    1. Any railroad transporting any liquid petroleum or non-petroleum 
oil in a quantity greater than 42,000 gallons per packaging must submit 
a comprehensive plan meeting the requirements of this subpart.
    2. Any railroad transporting any single train carrying 20 or more 
tank cars of liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block or 35 or more 
of such cars in a single train must submit a comprehensive plan.
    a. In determining number of tank cars, the railroad is not required 
to include tank cars carrying mixtures of petroleum oil not meeting the 
criteria for Class 3 flammable or combustible hazardous material in 49 
CFR 173.120 or containing residue.
    3. A railroad meeting the requirements for a comprehensive plan 
need not submit a plan if otherwise excepted in 49 CFR 130.2(c).
    For determining the entities that would be affected by the proposed 
threshold, PHMSA used the definition of ``high hazard flammable train'' 
(HHFT) established in the ``Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational 
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains--Final Rule'' published on 
May 8, 2015.\55\ PHMSA narrowed the affected entities to only include 
railroads that transport crude oil and, in consultation with FRA, 
revised the estimated number of Class III carriers that would be 
subject to the rulemaking. Based on this assessment, PHMSA estimates 
there are 73 railroads (7 Class I, 11 Class II, and 55 Class III) that 
would be subject to this proposed rulemaking. In addition, PHMSA 
evaluated several alternatives related to the threshold quantities that 
trigger the need for a comprehensive plan in order to develop a range 
for the entities affected by the OSRP provisions proposed in this rule. 
The results of that analysis are presented further in the draft RIA, 
available in the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ 80 FR 26643, pp 26643-26750. May 8, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These estimates were derived for the purpose of estimating the 
costs and benefits associated with the proposed rule. PHMSA believes 
that the approach used represents a conservative estimate for the 
number of affected entities and specifically solicits comment on the 
approach and estimated values used in this analysis.
    The universe of affected entities for the information sharing 
requirements is different than the number of entities affected under 
the comprehensive response plan requirement. The applicability of this 
requirement is derived from the information published in the HM-251 
Final Rule; specifically, the definition of a high-hazard

[[Page 50112]]

flammable train (HHFT) and the information sharing portion of the 
routing requirements of that final rule. The universe of affected 
entities for this provision includes all HHFTs transporting crude 
petroleum oil and ethanol, or 178 railroads (7 Class I, 11 Class II, 
and 160 Class III). For purposes of assessing costs for this provision, 
however, PHMSA determined there should be no additional costs for Class 
I railroads to comply with this proposed revision per the AAR Circular 
OT 55-O revision on January 27, 2015, which required AAR members to 
provide bona fide emergency response agencies or planning groups with 
specific commodity flow information covering all hazardous commodities 
transported through the community for a 12-month period in rank order. 
We assume this includes the proposed information to be shared with 
SERCs and TERCs as required in this proposed rule. In addition, on May 
7, 2014, DOT issued an Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order in 
Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067 \56\ that required each railroad 
transporting 1,000,000 gallons or more of Bakken crude oil in a single 
train in commerce within the U.S. to provide certain information in 
writing to the SERC for each state in which it operates such a train. 
PHMSA determined that 40 Class II and Class III railroads were part of 
this order and have already developed the required notification. As 
such, those entities are only subject to the proposed on-going updates 
and submission requirements included in this rulemaking. Therefore, we 
estimate that 131 railroads will be required to develop notifications 
as a result of the proposed rule and 171 railroads will be affected by 
the proposed monthly updates and recordkeeping requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/emergency-order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 11 provides a summary of the estimated per carrier cost 
associated with the proposed rule requirements for response plans and 
information sharing. For purposes of this analysis, PHMSA has 
identified several categories of costs related to the development of a 
comprehensive response plan. Those costs include: Plan development, 
submission, and maintenance; contract fees for designating an OSRO; 
training and drills; and plan review and approval costs to the Federal 
government. For additional information about the development of these 
cost estimates, see the draft RIA.

                         Table 11--Undiscounted Unit Cost per Railroad by Railroad Class
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                   Unit cost per
                Category                           Frequency                   Railroad               carrier
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plan Development........................  Once every 5 years........  Class I...................         $14,777
                                                                      Class II..................           8,128
                                                                      Class III.................           7,019
Plan Maintenance........................  Annual....................  Class I...................           1,478
                                                                      Class II..................             813
                                                                      Class III.................             702
Plan Submission.........................  Once every 5 years........  Class I...................              20
                                                                      Class II..................              20
                                                                      Class III.................              20
OSRO Fee................................  Annual....................  Class I...................          40,000
                                                                      Class II..................           6,000
                                                                      Class II..................           2,500
Training and Drills.....................  Varies....................  Class I...................          65,203
                                                                      Class II..................          41,559
                                                                       Class III................          27,373
Information Sharing.....................  Year 1....................  All Railroads.............           7,589
                                          Annual....................  All Railroads.............           2,319
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of this analysis, PHMSA assumed a 10-year timeframe to 
outline, quantify, and monetize the costs and benefits of the proposed 
rule and to demonstrate the net effects of the proposal. Table 12 
provides a summary of the undiscounted costs by year for this 10-year 
period by railroad class, and Table 13 provides a summary of the 
undiscounted costs by provision for this 10-year period.

                        Table 12--Summary of Undiscounted 10-Year Costs by Railroad Class
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Oil spill response plans               Information
                                 ------------------------------------------------     sharing
              Year                                                               ----------------      Total
                                      Class I        Class II        Class III     All railroads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1...............................        $850,342        $621,706      $2,068,728      $1,076,029      $4,616,806
2...............................         416,246         272,731       1,165,012         384,558       2,238,547
3...............................         416,749         273,465       1,168,636         387,477       2,246,327
4...............................         417,257         274,208       1,172,303         390,430       2,254,198
5...............................         865,737         635,420       2,111,227         393,418       4,005,803
6...............................         418,293         275,720       1,179,767         396,441       2,270,220
7...............................         418,820         276,489       1,183,565         399,499       2,278,373
8...............................         419,353         277,267       1,187,408         402,594       2,286,622
9...............................         419,892         278,055       1,191,296         405,725       2,294,969
10..............................         886,026         653,493       2,167,234         408,894       4,115,646
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................       5,528,716       3,838,553      14,595,175       4,645,065      28,607,509
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 50113]]


                                             Table 13--Summary of 10-Year Costs by Provision (Undiscounted)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Plan            Plan            Plan                        Training and     Information
                  Year                      development     maintenance     submission       OSRO fees        drills          sharing          Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.......................................        $578,907         $57,891          $1,421        $483,500      $2,419,058      $1,076,029      $4,616,806
2.......................................               0          58,328               0         483,500       1,312,161         384,558       2,238,547
3.......................................               0          58,771               0         483,500       1,316,579         387,477       2,246,327
4.......................................               0          59,219               0         483,500       1,321,049         390,430       2,254,198
5.......................................         596,719          59,672           1,465         483,500       2,471,029         393,418       4,005,803
6.......................................               0          60,130               0         483,500       1,330,149         396,441       2,270,220
7.......................................               0          60,594               0         483,500       1,334,779         399,499       2,278,373
8.......................................               0          61,064               0         483,500       1,339,464         402,594       2,286,622
9.......................................               0          61,539               0         483,500       1,344,205         405,725       2,294,969
10......................................         620,193          62,019           1,523         483,500       2,539,517         408,894       4,115,646
                                         ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................       1,795,818         599,227           4,409       4,835,000      16,727,990       4,645,065      28,607,509
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 14 provides a summary of the total and annualized costs by 
railroad class discounted at a 3 and 7 percent rate.

                                       Table 14--Summary of Undiscounted and Discounted Total and Annualized Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Undiscounted                  3% Discount rate                7% Discount rate
                    Class of railroad                    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              10 Year       Annualized        10 Year       Annualized        10 Year       Annualized
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          OSRPs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class I.................................................      $5,528,716        $552,872      $4,861,419        $569,907      $4,169,222        $593,603
Class II................................................       3,838,553         383,855       3,374,946         395,647       2,894,820         412,157
Class III...............................................      14,595,175       1,459,518      12,825,770       1,503,572      10,987,301       1,564,344
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Information Sharing
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Railroads...........................................       4,645,065         464,506       4,159,026         487,565       3,650,832         519,796
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................................      28,607,509       2,860,751      25,221,160       2,956,689      21,702,175       3,089,901
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on this cost analysis, PHMSA believes that the primary costs 
drivers for this proposed rule are the annual fees associated with the 
OSRO contracts, the annual training and drill requirements, and the 
information sharing provisions.
    PHMSA solicits comment on the approach and estimated costs used in 
this analysis, as well as the assumptions and estimates used in these 
particular costs categories.
Benefits
    The proposed response plan requirements are designed to reduce the 
magnitude and severity of spills, thereby reducing the environmental 
damages and potential human health impacts that spills may cause. PHMSA 
faced data uncertainties that limited our ability to estimate the 
benefits of this proposed rule. Instead, PHMSA performed a breakeven 
analysis by identifying the number of gallons of oil that the NPRM 
would need to prevent from being spilled in order for its benefits to 
at least equal its estimated costs. The analysis estimates that each 
prevented gallon of oil spilled yields social benefits of $211. 
Additional benefits may also be incurred due to ecological and human 
health improvements that may not be captured in the value of the 
avoided cost of spilled oil. These issues are discussed in more detail 
in the accompanying draft RIA, and the reader is referred to that 
document for more detail. PHMSA specifically solicits comment on both 
the monetized and non-monetized benefits assessed in this analysis.
    In order to assess the baseline conditions that would be affected 
by the proposed rule, PHMSA evaluated data provided in the Hazardous 
Material Incident Reports Database.\57\ Specifically, PHMSA evaluated 
reported incidents from 2004-2015 involving liquid petroleum 
transported by rail. Most of the incidents are relatively minor non-
accident releases on which an OSRP would have no effect. Railroads 
would only be required to develop comprehensive OSRPs along routes 
where the potential for a worst-case discharge of oil is possible. 
These are routes on which HHFTs operate, because an accidental release 
involving a derailment, train collision, or other accident involving 
trains hauling large quantities of petroleum oil are the only incidents 
that have the potential to result in a large quantity release of 
material. Above we presented the significant crude oil derailments 
graphed against carloads of product shipped by rail for 2000-2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/IncrSearch.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A comprehensive OSRP would be required to cover those routes/
railroads that haul petroleum oil HHFTs, so the benefits analysis is 
limited to those derailments involving petroleum oil HHFTs. The Agency 
has identified 12 such derailments between 2012 and 2015. Specifically, 
there were 3 events in 2013; 4 in 2014; and 5 in 2015, for a total of 
12 incidents.
    2015 volumes are still roughly twice the volumes seen in 2012, and 
EIA predicts U.S. crude oil production volumes to remain high for the 
next decade and beyond. As a result, we expect volumes going forward to 
remain relatively high by historic (pre-2012) standards, although we 
examine a modest decline in production and rail

[[Page 50114]]

shipment volume in the sensitivity analysis of the draft RIA.
    One simple way to predict the number of future events based on the 
HHFT period is as follows: The period of high volume crude shipments 
starts in 2012 through 2015, providing a 4-year period. We consider a 
10-year analysis period going forward, so the analysis period is 2.5 
times longer than the observed period. There were 12 incidents in the 
observed period, so the predicted number of events over the analysis 
period would be 12 x 2.5 = 30 incidents. We note that 2012 volumes were 
much lower than subsequent years, so treating it as a full year results 
in a conservative estimate of the number of events. Evidence for this 
can be seen in the data, as all 12 events occurred in 2013-2015, with 4 
occurring in 2014 and 5 occurring in 2015. 2013 had 3 HHFT derailments, 
meeting the 4 year average. 2012 is the only year in the analysis 
period with fewer than 3 derailments.
    To monetize the damages associated with these incidents, PHMSA 
assumes an equal chance of an incident occurring in any year of the 10 
year analysis period. Given 30 events, this assumption means the 
expected number of events in any given year is 3. Based on the 12 
events for which data reporting is reasonably complete, PHMSA estimated 
that, on average, 140,173 gallons of product are released per crude oil 
HHFT derailment. In final rule HM-251, the Agency used $200 per gallon 
to monetize the damages of an incident that results in a spill.\58\ 
That figure is based on the cost per gallon from recent pipeline events 
and a literature review and data analysis conducted for both crude and 
ethanol. Since this rule focuses on petroleum oil only (and not 
ethanol), a slightly different value is applied. We use a value of $211 
to estimate baseline damages associated with train derailment releases. 
(See the draft RIA for this proposed rulemaking, in section 3.1.4, for 
further discussion of how this cost per gallon figure was derived.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ For detail on how this value was derived from PHMSA 
pipeline data, the reader is referred to pages 85-90 of the HM-251 
RIA located in Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 15 below presents the estimated societal damages associated 
with HHFT incidents involving crude oil over the 10-year analysis 
period. The monetary value is obtained by multiplying the expected 
number of events in a year (3) by the cost per gallon released ($211) 
and the average release quantity (140,173). In addition, we adjust this 
baseline for the implementation of final rule HM-251, which codified 
new tank car standards for HHFTs and is expected to reduce the societal 
damages imposed by these incidents by 40 percent once fully 
implemented. Since this proposed rule will be finalized before 
implementation of final rule HM-251 is complete (i.e. full phase in of 
retrofitted tank cars and Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Braking), 
we apply the final rule HM-251 effectiveness rates for the years 2017-
2026 to adjust for the impact of that rule on baseline damages. 
Societal damage values discounted at 3 and 7 percent are also 
presented.

                  Table 15--Summary of Estimated Societal Damages From Crude Oil HHFT Incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      HHFT
                    Year                      Events per year  Monetized value   effectiveness       Adjusted
                                                                     \1\           (percent)     monetized value
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1...........................................                3      $88,729,245               22      $69,030,780
2...........................................                3       88,729,245               28       63,774,491
3...........................................                3       88,729,245               34       58,717,940
4...........................................                3       88,729,245               36       56,486,231
5...........................................                3       88,729,245               38       54,802,306
6...........................................                3       88,729,245               38       55,154,097
7...........................................                3       88,729,245               38       55,196,048
8...........................................                3       88,729,245               38       55,288,413
9...........................................                3       88,729,245               38       55,211,463
10..........................................                3       88,729,245               38       55,211,463
                                                                                                ----------------
                                                                                                     578,873,232
                                                                               ---------------------------------
                                                                                    7% discount      440,537,002
                                                                                    3% discount      511,335,291
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Calculated by multiplying 140,173 (estimate of gallons released per event) times $211 (estimate of societal
  cost per gallon released) times 3 (estimate of events per year).

    Although the Agency cannot estimate the degree to which 
comprehensive OSRP requirements would reduce the consequences of these 
events, it is clear by comparing the monetized damages with the total 
costs of the proposed rule that even a minor reduction in damages would 
result in a rule with positive net benefits. For example, estimated 
costs as presented in Table 3 above are approximately 4.9 percent of 
total societal damages, indicating that if this proposed rule reduced 
the consequences of these events by 5 percent, the rule would have 
positive net benefits.
    Comprehensive plans require training and exercises, staging of 
equipment, analysis of routes and access points along routes as part of 
the development of response zone appendices, and pre-establishing of a 
chain of command and communication protocols, which would likely result 
in much faster and more effective response to derailments involving 
large quantities of petroleum oil. As a result, we expect the spilled 
product would be contained and recaptured more effectively, a smaller 
area would be contaminated, fewer environmental consequences would 
result, and less property would be damaged. For example, a better 
executed response to an incident that contaminates a river might ensure 
quicker deployment of downriver booms, thereby reducing the amount of 
shoreline oiling, damage to riparian environments, and impairment of 
downstream sources of drinking water. The Agency believes that 
training, better coordinated resource deployment, more clearly 
delineated communication protocols and command structure, and

[[Page 50115]]

pre-event contracting of response resources will substantially reduce 
the impacts of these incidents, and as a result the rule is likely to 
be cost-justified.

B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) 
governs the issuance of Federal regulations that require unfunded 
mandates. This NPRM does not impose unfunded mandates under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of 
$155 million or more, adjusted for inflation, to either State, local, 
or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or to the private sector in 
any one year, and is the least burdensome alternative that achieves the 
objective of the rule. As such, PHMSA has concluded that the NPRM does 
not require an Unfunded Mandates Act analysis.

C. Executive Order 13132

    This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 (``Federalism'') and 
the President's memorandum on ``Preemption'' published in the Federal 
Register on May 22, 2009 (74 FR 24693). Executive Order 13132 requires 
PHMSA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful and 
timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' ``Policies 
that have federalism implications'' are defined in the executive order 
to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency 
may not issue a regulation with federalism implications that imposes 
substantial direct compliance costs and that is not required by 
statute, unless the Federal Government provides the funds necessary to 
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by state and local governments 
or the agency consults with state and local government officials early 
in the process of developing the regulation. Where a regulation has 
federalism implications and preempts state law, the agency, where 
practicable, seeks to consult with state and local officials in the 
process of developing the regulation.
    This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. PHMSA has 
determined that the proposed rule will not have substantial direct 
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. This rule 
proposes to update the existing 49 CFR part 130 by lowering the 
applicability threshold and providing more detailed guidelines for 
comprehensive oil spill response planning. It further proposes to 
require railroads to share additional information with state and tribal 
emergency response organizations, and proposes to incorporate by 
reference an initial boiling point test for flammable liquids as an 
acceptable testing alternative. The proposed rule does not impose any 
new requirements with effects on the States, on the relationship 
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among government entities. In addition, 
PHMSA has determined that this proposed rule will not impose 
substantial direct compliance costs on State and local governments. 
Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order 
13132 do not apply.
    The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) provides that a 
state law or Indian tribe requirement is preempted where compliance 
with both the state law or Indian tribe requirement and the federal 
requirement is not possible, the state law or Indian tribe requirement 
creates an obstacle to accomplishing or executing the federal 
requirement, or where a federal requirement has covered the subject and 
the state law or Indian requirement is not substantively the same. 
Covered subjects under the HMTA include: (1) The designation, 
description, and classification of hazardous material; (2) the packing, 
repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and placarding of hazardous 
material; (3) the preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents 
related to hazardous material and requirements related to the number, 
contents, and placement of those documents; (4) the written 
notification, recording, and reporting of the unintentional release in 
transportation of hazardous material and other written hazardous 
materials transportation incident reporting involving state or local 
emergency responders in the initial response to the incident; and (5) 
the designing, manufacturing, fabricating, inspecting, marking, 
maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, or testing a package, 
container, or packaging component that is represented, marked, 
certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous 
material in commerce. Under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, ``[l]aws, 
regulations, and orders related to railroad safety and laws, 
regulations, and orders related to railroad security shall be 
nationally uniform to the extent practicable.'' With narrow exceptions 
for essentially local safety or security hazards, states may not 
``adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to 
railroad safety'' once the ``Secretary of Transportation . . . 
prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter 
of the State requirement.'' 33 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2). This standard 
applies to federal regulations governing the transportation of 
hazardous materials by railroad, even where PHMSA or another agency 
promulgates those regulations.
    Comments to the ANPRM from the concerned public and departments 
within city and State governments highlight state legislation related 
to oil spill response plans and request that PHMSA discuss the 
preemptive effects of the changes to part 130 in this proposed rule. 
Part 130 is issued under authority of 33 U.S.C. 1321(o)(1)(C) and 
1321(j)(5).
    Regarding the proposed changes to 49 CFR part 130, federal 
regulation under 33 U.S.C. 1321 accommodates regulation by states and 
political subdivisions concerning oil spill response plans. See 33 
U.S.C. 1321(o)(2). However, the preemption language of 33 U.S.C. 1321 
preserves only the ability for states to impose oil spill planning 
requirements. Elements of state oil spill response plan legislation may 
be preempted under the preemption standard established by the FRSA and 
the HMTA. Accordingly, the preemption provision of the FRSA and the 
HMTA may apply to any state-imposed requirements on railroad safety or 
hazardous materials containment. Nonetheless, PHMSA has determined that 
this proposed rule will not impose substantial direct compliance costs 
on State and local governments.
    PHMSA solicits comment on this Federalism discussion.

D. Executive Order 13175

    Executive Order 13175 (``Consultation and Coordination with Indian 
Tribal Governments'') requires agencies to assure meaningful and timely 
input from Indian tribal government representatives in the development 
of rules that have tribal implications. Thus, in complying with this 
Executive Order, agencies must determine whether a proposed rulemaking 
has tribal implications, which include any rulemaking that imposes 
``substantial direct effects'' on one or more Indian

[[Page 50116]]

communities, on the relationship between the Federal Government and 
Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power between the Federal 
Government and Indian tribes. Further, to the extent practicable and 
permitted by law, agencies cannot promulgate two types of rules unless 
they meet certain conditions. The two types of rules are: (1) Rules 
that have tribal implications that impose substantial direct compliance 
costs on Indian tribal governments and that are not required by 
statute; and (2) rules that have tribal implications and that preempt 
tribal law.
    PHMSA is committed to tribal outreach and engaging tribal 
governments in dialogue. Among other outreach efforts, PHMSA 
representatives attended the National Joint Tribal Emergency Management 
Conference on August 11-14, 2015 and the Northwest Tribal Emergency 
Management Conference in May 4-6, 2016. In the spirit of Executive 
Order 13175 and consistent with DOT Order 5301.1, PHMSA will be 
continuing outreach to tribal officials independent of our assessment 
of the direct tribal implications.

E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies 
and Procedures

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et 
seq.), PHMSA must consider whether a rulemaking would have a 
``significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities,'' which include small businesses, not-for-profit 
organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not 
dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with 
populations under 50,000.
    To ensure potential impacts of rules on small entities are properly 
considered, PHMSA in coordination with the FRA, developed this NPRM in 
accordance with Executive Order 13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small 
Entities in Agency Rulemaking'') and DOT's procedures and policies to 
promote compliance with the RFA.
    The RFA and Executive Order 13272 (67 FR 53461; August 16, 2002) 
require agency review of proposed and final rules to assess their 
impacts on small entities. An agency must prepare an initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis (IRFA) unless it determines and certifies that a 
rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
    PHMSA is publishing this IRFA to aid the public in commenting on 
the potential small business impacts of the requirements in this NPRM. 
PHMSA invites all interested parties to submit data and information 
regarding the potential economic impact on small entities that would 
result from the adoption of the proposals in this NPRM. PHMSA will 
consider all information and comments received in the public comment 
process when making a determination regarding the economic impact on 
small entities in the final rule.
    Under the RFA at 5 U.S.C. 603(b), each initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis is required to address the following topics:
    (1) The reasons why the agency is considering the action.
    (2) The objectives and legal basis for the proposed rule.
    (3) The kind and number of small entities to which the proposed 
rule will apply.
    (4) The projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance 
requirements of the proposed rule.
    (5) All Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with 
the proposed rule.
    The RFA at 5 U.S.C. 603(c) requires that each initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis contains a description of any significant 
alternatives to the proposal that accomplish the statutory objectives 
and minimize the significant economic impact of the proposal on small 
entities. In this instance, none of the alternatives accomplish the 
statutory objectives and minimize the significant economic impact of 
the proposal on small entities.
(1) Reasons Why the Agency Is Considering the Action
    PHMSA, in coordination with the FRA, is issuing this NPRM in order 
to improve response readiness and mitigate effects of rail incidents 
involving petroleum oil and certain HHFTs. This is necessary due to the 
expansion in U.S. energy production, which has led to significant 
challenges for the country's transportation system. This NPRM has 
requirements in two areas as shown below: Section I, Subsection A 
(``Oil Spill Response Plans'') and Subsection B (``Information 
Sharing'').\59\ The first requirement proposes to modernize the 
Comprehensive Spill Plan requirements (49 CFR part 130). Additionally, 
this NPRM proposes to require railroads to share additional information 
with state and tribal emergency response organizations (i.e., SERCs and 
TERCs) to improve community preparedness. The proposals in this NPRM 
work in conjunction with the requirements adopted in the HHFT Final 
Rule in order to continue the comprehensive approach toward ensuring 
the safe transportation of energy products and mitigating the 
consequences of such accidents should they occur. PHMSA is addressing 
below the potential impacts on small entities with the proposed rule 
requirements for response plans and information sharing.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ This rulemaking also proposes incorporation and the 
voluntary use of the initial boiling point (IBP) test (ASTM D7900) 
to determine classification and packing group for Class 3 Flammable 
liquids. We note that the incorporation of API RP 3000 and 
consequently ASTM D7900 will not replace the currently authorized 
testing methods, rather serve as a testing alternative if one 
chooses to use that method. PHMSA believes this provides flexibility 
and promotes enhanced safety in transport through accurate PG 
assignment. This provision would not pose any impacts on small 
entities.
    \60\ We note that the incorporation of API RP 3000, which 
contains the ASTM D7900 test will not replace the currently 
authorized initial boiling point testing methods, but rather serve 
as a testing alternative if one chooses to use that method. PHMSA 
believes this provides flexibility and promotes enhanced safety in 
transport through accurate packing group assignment. This 
requirement will impose no new costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(A) Oil Spill Response Plans
    PHMSA is promulgating this NPRM in response to recent train 
accidents involving the derailment of HHFTs. Shipments of large volumes 
of liquid petroleum oil pose a significant risk to life, property, and 
the environment. PHMSA has identified several recent derailments to 
illustrate the circumstances and consequences of derailments involving 
petroleum oil transported in higher-risk train configurations: Heimdal, 
ND (May 2015); Galena, IL (March 2015); Mt. Carbon, WV (February 2015); 
La Salle, CO (May 2014); Lynchburg, VA (April 2014); Vandergrift, PA 
(February 2014); New Augusta, MS (January 2014); Casselton, ND 
(December 2013); Aliceville, AL (November 2013); and Parkers Prairie, 
MN (March 2013).
    For example, on December 30, 2013, a train carrying crude oil 
derailed and ignited near Casselton, North Dakota, prompting 
authorities to issue a voluntary evacuation of the city and surrounding 
area. On November 7, 2013, a train carrying crude oil to the Gulf Coast 
from North Dakota derailed in Aliceville, Alabama, spilling crude oil 
in a nearby wetland and igniting into flames. These train accidents 
involving derailments of HHFTs transporting crude oil resulted in 
discharges of petroleum oil that harmed or posed a threat of harm to 
the nation's waterways.
    Of note here is the NTSB's Safety Recommendation R-14-5,\61\ which

[[Page 50117]]

requested that PHMSA revise the spill response planning thresholds 
prescribed in 49 CFR part 130 to require comprehensive OSRPs that 
effectively provide for the carriers' ability to respond to worst-case 
discharges resulting from accidents involving unit trains or blocks of 
tank cars transporting oil and petroleum products. In this 
recommendation, the NTSB raised a concern that, ``[b]ecause there is no 
mandate for railroads to develop comprehensive plans or ensure the 
availability of necessary response resources, carriers have effectively 
placed the burden of remediating the environmental consequences of an 
accident on local communities along their routes.'' In light of these 
accidents and NTSB Recommendation R-14-5, PHMSA is now re-examining 
whether it is more appropriate to consider the train in its entirety 
when setting the threshold for comprehensive OSRPs. The revisions 
included in the NPRM were developed to expand the applicability of the 
comprehensive OSRP requirement. PHMSA holds that improved oil spill 
response planning will in turn improve the actual response to future 
derailments involving petroleum oil and lessen the negative impacts to 
the environment and communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/R-14-004-006.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 17, 1996, RSPA published a final rule issuing requirements 
that meet the intent of the Clean Water Act. This rule adopted 
requirements for packaging, communication, spill response planning, and 
response plan implementation intended to prevent and contain spills of 
oil during transportation. Under these current requirements, railroads 
are required to complete a basic OSRP for oil shipments in a package 
with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more, and a comprehensive OSRP is 
required for oil shipments in a package containing more than 42,000 
gallons (1,000 barrels).
    Currently, most, if not all, of the rail community transporting 
oil, including crude oil transported as a hazardous material, is 
subject to the basic OSRP requirement of 49 CFR 130.31(a) since most, 
if not all, rail tank cars being used to transport crude oil have a 
capacity greater than 3,500 gallons. However, a comprehensive OSRP for 
shipment of oil is only required when the quantity of oil is greater 
than 42,000 gallons per tank car. Accordingly, the number of railroads 
required to have a comprehensive OSRP is much lower, or possibly non-
existent, because a very limited number of rail tank cars in use would 
be able to transport a volume of 42,000 gallons in a car.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ The 2014 AAR's Universal Machine Language Equipment 
Register numbers showed five tank cars listed with a capacity equal 
to or greater than 42,000 gallons, and none of these cars were being 
used to transport oil or petroleum products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule expands the applicability of comprehensive OSRPs 
based on thresholds of crude oil that apply to an entire train consist. 
Specifically, the proposed rule would expand the applicability for 
OSRPs so that no person may transport a HHFT quantity of liquid 
petroleum oil unless that person has implemented a comprehensive OSRP.
    Each railroad subject to the proposed rule must prepare and submit 
a comprehensive OSRP that includes a plan for responding, to the 
maximum extent practicable, to a worst-case discharge and to a 
substantial threat of such a discharge of oil. The OSRP must also be 
submitted to the FRA, where it will be reviewed and approved by FRA 
personnel.
(B) Information Sharing
    On May 7, 2014, DOT issued Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order 
in Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067,\63\ which required each railroad 
transporting 1,000,000 gallons or more of Bakken crude oil in a single 
train in commerce within the U.S. to provide certain information in 
writing to the SERC for each state in which it operates such a train. 
In the HM-251 (RIN 2137-AE91) NPRM published last year (79 FR 45015; 
Aug. 1, 2014), PHMSA proposed to codify and clarify the requirements of 
the Order in the HMR and requested public comment on the various facets 
of that proposal. Unlike many other requirements in the August 1, 2014 
NPRM, the notification requirements were specific to a single train 
that contains one million gallons or more of UN 1267, Petroleum crude 
oil, Class 3, sourced from the Bakken shale. In the HHFT Final Rule, 
PHMSA did not adopt the separate notification requirements proposed in 
the NPRM and instead relied on the expansion of the existing route 
analysis and consultation requirements of Sec.  172.820 to include 
HHFTs to satisfy information sharing needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/emergency-order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on all the intense interests and issues revolving around 
information sharing, we are proposing in this HM-251B NPRM to add Sec.  
174.312 to add a new information sharing provisions to the additional 
safety and security planning requirements for transportation by rail. 
This proposed addition will create a tiered approach to information 
sharing, whereas fusion centers will continue to act as the focal point 
for risk analysis information deemed SSI and SERCs and TERCs will 
actively be provided with non-sensitive security information that can 
aid in emergency preparedness and community awareness. The proposed 
requirements provide emergency responders with an integrated approach 
to receiving information about HHFTs.
(2) The Objectives and Legal Basis for the Proposed Rule
    PHMSA is addressing below the two requirement areas in this 
proposed rule, Oil Spill Response Plans and Information Sharing.
(A) Oil Spill Response Plans
    PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, is issuing this NPRM in order to 
improve response readiness and mitigate effects of rail incidents 
involving petroleum crude oil transported in HHFTs. The proposed rule 
is necessary due to the expansion in U.S. energy production, which has 
led to significant challenges for the country's transportation system. 
This rule proposes to modernize the OSRP requirements in 49 CFR part 
130. This NPRM adjusts the applicability for comprehensive oil spill 
response plans and clarifies the comprehensive plan requirements. 
Additionally, this rulemaking proposes to restructure and clarify the 
requirements of the comprehensive oil spill response plan. The proposed 
changes respond to commenter requests for requirements for more 
detailed guidance and provide a better parallel to other federal oil 
spill response plan regulations promulgated under the OPA 90 authority. 
A full summary of the changes to the plan requirements are described in 
the NPRM. Each comprehensive plan must include: \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ The following text is provided as an overview of the rule 
and does not replace regulatory text included in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I. Core Plan: A core plan includes an information summary, as 
proposed in 49 CFR 130.104(a)(2), and any components which do not 
change between response zones. Each plan must:
     Describe the railroad's response management system, 
including the functional areas of finance, logistics, operations, 
planning, and command.
     Demonstrate that the railroad's response management system 
uses common terminology (e.g., the National Incident Management System) 
and has a manageable span of control, a clearly defined chain of 
command, and

[[Page 50118]]

sufficiently trained personnel to fill each position.
     Include an information summary as required by Sec.  
130.104.
     Certify that the railroad reviewed the National 
Contingency Plan (NCP) and each applicable Area Contingency Plan (ACP) 
and that its response plan is consistent with the NCP and each 
applicable ACP and follows Immediate Notification procedures, as 
required by Sec.  130.103.
     Include notification procedures and a list of contacts as 
required in Sec.  130.105.
     Include spill detection and mitigation procedures as 
required in Sec.  130.106.
     Include response activities and resources as required in 
Sec.  130.106.
     Certify that applicable employees were trained per Sec.  
130.107.
     Describe procedures to ensure equipment testing and a 
description of the drill program per Sec.  130.108.
     Describe plan review and update procedures per Sec.  
130.109.
     Submit the plan as required by Sec.  130.111.
    II. Response Zone Appendix: For reach response zone, a railroad 
must include a response zone appendix to provide the information 
summary, as proposed in 49 CFR 130.107(b), and any additional 
components of the plan specific to the response zones. Each response 
zone appendix must identify:
     A description of the response zone, including county(s) 
and state(s);
     A list of route sections contained in the response zone, 
identified by railroad milepost or other designation determined by the 
railroad;
     Identification of any environmentally sensitive areas per 
route section; and
     Identification of the location where the response 
organization will deploy and the location and description of equipment 
required by Sec.  130.106(c)(6).
    In addition, the proposed rule would require plan holders to 
identify an OSRO, provided through a contract or other approved means, 
to respond to a worst-case discharge to the maximum extent practicable 
within 12 hours.
(B) Information Sharing
    In HM-251B NPRM, we are proposing to add to Sec.  174.312 to add 
new information sharing provisions to the additional safety and 
security planning requirements for transportation by rail. The proposed 
requirements provide emergency responders with an integrated approach 
to receiving information about HHFTs. As proposed, Sec.  174.312 will 
require a rail carrier of an HHFT to provide a monthly notification to 
the SERC, TERC, or other appropriate state delegated entities in which 
it operates. As proposed the notification must meet the following 
requirements:
     A reasonable estimate of the number of HHFT that the 
railroad expects to operate each week, through each county within the 
State or through each tribal jurisdiction;
     The routes over which the HHFTs will operate;
     A description of the hazardous material being transported 
and all applicable emergency response information required by subparts 
C and G of part 172 of this subchapter;
     An HHFT point of contact: at least one point of contact at 
the railroad (including name, title, phone number and address) related 
to the railroad's transportation of affected trains;
     If a route is additionally subject to the comprehensive 
spill plan requirements, the notification must include a description of 
the response zones (including counties and states) and contact 
information for the qualified individual and alternate, as specified 
under Sec.  130.104(a);
     On a monthly basis railroads must update the 
notifications. If there are no changes, the railroad may provide a 
certification of no change.
     Notifications and updates may be transmitted 
electronically or by hard copy.
     Each point of contact must be clearly identified by name 
or title and role (e.g. qualified individual, HHFT point of contact) in 
association with the telephone number. One point of contact may fulfill 
multiple roles.
     Copies of HHFT notifications made must be made available 
to the Department of Transportation upon request.
    The proposed changes build upon the requirements adopted in HHFT 
Final Rule to continue to the comprehensive approach to ensuring the 
safe transportation of energy products.
    The Secretary has the authority to prescribe regulations for the 
safe transportation, including the security, of hazardous materials in 
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce (49 U.S.C. 5103(b)) and 
has delegated this authority to PHMSA via 49 CFR 1.97(b).
(3) A Description of and, Where Feasible, an Estimate of the Number of 
Small Entities to Which the Proposed Rule Will Apply
    The universe of the entities considered in an IRFA generally 
includes only those small entities that can reasonably expect to be 
directly regulated by the regulatory action. Small railroads are the 
types of small entities potentially affected by this proposed rule.
    A ``small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the same 
meaning as ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small 
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is 
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of 
operation. Title 49 U.S.C. 601(4) likewise includes within the 
definition of small entities non-profit enterprises that are 
independently owned and operated, and are not dominant in their field 
of operation.
    The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates in its size 
standards that the largest a ``for-profit'' railroad business firm may 
be, and still be classified as a small entity, is 1,500 employees for 
``line haul operating railroads'' and 500 employees for ``switching and 
terminal establishments.'' Additionally, 5 U.S.C. 601(5) defines as 
small entities governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, 
villages, school districts, or special districts with populations less 
than 50,000.
    Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small 
entities in consultation with SBA and in conjunction with public 
comment. Pursuant to that authority, FRA has published a final 
Statement of Agency Policy that formally establishes small entities or 
small businesses as being railroads, contractors, and hazardous 
materials offerors that meet the revenue requirements of a Class III 
railroad as set forth in 49 CFR 1201.1-1, which is $20 million or less 
in inflation-adjusted annual revenues,\65\ and commuter railroads or 
small governmental jurisdictions that serve populations of 50,000 or 
less. See 68 FR 24891 (May 9, 2003) (codified as appendix C to 49 CFR 
part 209). The $20 million limit is based on the Surface Transportation 
Board's revenue threshold for a Class III railroad. Railroad revenue is 
adjusted for inflation by applying a revenue deflator formula in 
accordance with 49 CFR 1201.1-1. PHMSA is using this definition for the 
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ For 2012 the Surface Transportation Board (STB) adjusted 
this amount to $36.2 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Railroads
    Not all small railroads would be required to comply with the 
provisions of this rule. Most of the approximately 738 small railroads 
that operate in the United States do not transport hazardous materials. 
Based on the requirements of this proposed rule, the entities 
potentially affected by requirement are as described below:

[[Page 50119]]

(A) Oil Spill Response Plans
    For determining the entities that would be affected by the 
requirements proposed in this rulemaking, PHMSA used the definition of 
``HHFT'' established in the HHFT Final Rule.\66\ Based on an evaluation 
of the 2013 Waybill Sample data and consultation with FRA, PHMSA 
estimated that 55 small railroads could potentially be affected by this 
proposed rule as they transport crude oil in HHFTs. Therefore, this 
proposed rule would impact 7.5 percent of the universe of 738 small 
railroads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ 80 FR 26643, pp 26643-26750. May 8, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(B) Information Sharing
    The applicability of this requirement is derived from the 
information published in the HHFT Final Rule. Specifically, the 
definition of a High-Hazard Flammable Train and the information sharing 
portion of the routing requirements are related to this NPRM. The HHFT 
Final Rule defined ``High-Hazard Flammable Train'' as a continuous 
block of 20 or more tank cars in a single train or 35 or more cars 
dispersed through a train loaded with a flammable liquid.
    This definition also served as the applicable threshold of many of 
the requirements in the HHFT rulemaking, including routing 
requirements. Section 172.820 prescribes additional safety and security 
planning requirements for transportation by rail. In the HHFT Final 
Rule, the applicability for routing requirements in Sec.  172.820 were 
revised to require that any rail carrier transporting an HHFT comply 
with the additional safety and security planning requirements for 
transportation by rail. The routing requirements adopted in the HHFT 
Final Rule are related to this NPRM, as the proposed requirements will 
create a tiered approach to information sharing; whereas fusion centers 
will continue to act as the focal point for risk analysis information 
deemed SSI in Sec.  172.820, SERCs and TERCs will actively be provided 
with non-sensitive security information in a monthly HHFT notification 
that can aid in emergency preparedness and community awareness in Sec.  
174.312.
    The universe of affected entities for the information sharing 
requirements is different than the number of entities affected under 
the comprehensive response plan requirement. The applicability of this 
requirement is derived from the information published in the HHFT Final 
Rule. Specifically, the definition of an HHFT and the information 
sharing portion of the routing requirements are related to this NPRM. 
The number of small entities impacted under this requirement is 
different from the number of entities impacted under the comprehensive 
OSRP requirement due to the different applicability of these two 
requirements. In particular, the comprehensive OSRP requirement applies 
to HHFTs transporting crude oil (and potentially other petroleum oils), 
while the information sharing requirement applies to HHFTs transporting 
both crude oil and ethanol (and potentially other Class 3 flammable 
liquids). As described under the impact on the small entities section 
with the routing requirements in the HHFT Final Rule, there are 160 
affected small entities under the routing requirements. Thus, the 
proposed requirement in this NPRM could potentially affect 160 small 
railroads transporting flammable liquids in HHFTs. Therefore, this 
proposed rule would impact 22 percent of the universe of 738 small 
railroads.
(4) A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other 
Compliance Requirements of the Proposed Rule
    For a thorough presentation of cost estimates, please refer to the 
draft RIA, which has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking. 
PHMSA is addressing below the two requirements areas in this proposed 
rule, Oil Spill Response Plans and Information Sharing.
(A) Oil Spill Response Plans
    This rule proposes to modernize the requirements by changing the 
applicability for comprehensive oil spill response plans and clarifying 
the comprehensive plan requirements. The proposed rule expands the 
applicability of comprehensive OSRPs to railroads transporting a single 
train of 20 or more loaded tank cars of liquid petroleum oil in a 
continuous block or a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars 
of liquid petroleum oil throughout the train consist. These railroads, 
that are currently required to develop a basic plan, would now be 
required to develop a comprehensive plan.
    PHMSA describes below the impact on the small railroads that would 
be required under the proposed alternative which any railroad carrying 
20 or more tank cars of liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block or 
35 such cars on a single train to submit a comprehensive OSRP. The 
total cost estimate with the proposed requirements for small railroads 
in the proposed alternative is conservative, when compared to the cost 
estimates of the other several alternatives evaluated by PHMSA. PHMSA 
evaluated several alternatives related to the threshold values for the 
universe of affected entities that would be required to submit a 
comprehensive response plan.\67\ For additional information about the 
development of these cost estimates, the specific differences between a 
basic and comprehensive OSRP including the estimated cost per railroad 
by railroad class please refer to the draft RIA, which has been placed 
in the docket for this rulemaking. For determining the entities that 
would be affected by the proposed threshold, PHMSA used the definition 
HHFT from the HHFT Final Rule.\68\ PHMSA narrowed the affected entities 
to only include railroads that transported crude oil and, in 
consultation with FRA, revised the estimated number of Class III 
carriers that would be subject to the rulemaking. Based on this 
assessment, PHMSA estimates there are 73 railroads (7 Class I, 11 Class 
II, and 55 Class III) that would be subject to this proposed 
rulemaking. PHMSA specifically requests comment on the approach and 
estimated values used in this analysis. Each comprehensive plan must 
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Under each of these alternatives, the number of Class I and 
Class II railroads affected by the proposed thresholds does not 
change. However, the number of Class III railroads that would be 
subject to the proposed rule ranges from 55 to 20 railroads. Based 
on evaluation of the 2013 Waybill Sample data and in consultation 
with the FRA, PHMSA determined that 55 small railroads is the 
largest number of small railroads that is subject to the proposed 
option requirements. Please, refer to the draft RIA for additional 
information regarding the number of impacted entities under the 
other several alternatives.
    \68\ 80 FR 26643, pp 26643-26750. May 8, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I. Core Plan: A core plan includes an information summary, as 
proposed in 49 CFR 130.104(a)(1), and any components which do not 
change between response zones.
    II. Response Zone Appendix: For reach response zone, a railroad 
must include a response zone appendix to provide the information 
summary, as proposed in Sec.  130.107(a)(2), and any additional 
components of the plan specific to the response zones.
    In addition, the proposed rule would require plan holders to 
identify an OSRO, provided through a contract or other approved means, 
to respond to a worst-case discharge to the maximum extent practicable 
within 12 hours.
    PHMSA has identified several categories of costs related to the 
development and implementation of a comprehensive response plan. Those 
costs include the following: plan development, submission, and 
maintenance; contract fees for designating an OSRO; training and

[[Page 50120]]

drills; and plan review and approval. For additional information about 
the development of these cost estimates, please refer to the draft RIA, 
which has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
    As noted in section 3 of this IRFA, approximately 55 small 
railroads carry crude oil in train consists large enough that they 
would potentially be affected by this rule.
    PHMSA considers the average annual cost per railroad relevant for 
the purposes of this analysis instead of presenting first year and 
subsequent year cost per railroad due to the nature of frequency of 
requirements with the development of a comprehensive plan, which varies 
between annual and every five years. The total undiscounted cost with 
the plan for the small railroads is $14,595,175 over the ten year 
period of the analysis. PHMSA estimates the total cost to each small 
railroad to be $37,613 in the first year and an annual average cost of 
$25,306 in subsequent years taking into account the costs growing with 
increases in real wages.\69\ Small railroads have annual operating 
revenues that range from $3 million to $20 million. Previously, FRA 
sampled small railroads and found that revenue averaged approximately 
$4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One percent of average annual 
revenue per small railroad is $47,000. Thus, the costs associated with 
this requirement amount to less than one percent of the railroad's 
annual operating revenue. PHMSA realizes that some small railroads will 
have lower annual revenue than $4.7 million. However, PHMSA is 
confident that this estimate of total cost per small railroad provides 
a good representation of the cost applicable to small railroads, in 
general.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Costs per railroad are derived in the draft RIA, with costs 
for all Class III railroads divided by the 55 impacted railroads. 
The Year 1 total costs are calculated at $2,068,728. The estimated 
Year 1 cost per railroad is then calculated at $37,613 = $2,068,728/
55 small railroads. The average annual cost for the subsequent years 
is calculated at $1,391,827.4 = $12,526,448/9 years. The estimated 
average annual cost per small railroad for the subsequent years is 
then calculated at $25,306 = $1,391,827.4/55 small railroads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In conclusion, PHMSA believes that although some small railroads 
will be directly impacted, the impact will amount to less than one 
percent of an average small railroad's annual operating revenue.
(B) Information Sharing
    Based on all industry interests and issues revolving around 
information sharing, in this NPRM we are proposing to add new 
information sharing provisions to the additional safety and security 
planning requirements for transportation by rail in a new Sec.  
174.312. As discussed previously, Sec.  172.820(g) provides the 
requirements for rail carrier point of contact on routing issues for 
SSI. In this NPRM, we are proposing to add Sec.  174.312 to add 
additional information sharing requirements. As proposed, a rail 
carrier of a HHFT as defined in Sec.  171.8 of this subchapter must 
provide the following notification to SERC, TERC, or other appropriate 
state delegated entities in which it operates. As proposed, information 
required to be shared must consist of the following:
     A reasonable estimate of the number of affected HHFTs that 
are expected to travel, per week, through each county within the state.
     The routes over which the affected trains will be 
transported.
     A description of the materials shipped and applicable 
emergency response information required by subparts C and G of part 172 
of this subchapter.
     At least one point of contact at the railroad (including 
name, title, phone number and address) responsible for serving as the 
point of contact for the SERC, TERC, and relevant emergency responders 
related to the railroad's transportation of affected trains.
     The information summary elements (e.g. response zone 
description and contact information for qualified individuals) for the 
comprehensive oil spill response plan required by Sec.  130.104(a), 
when applicable.
     Railroads must update notifications made under section 
174.312 on a monthly basis.
     Copies of railroad notifications made under section 
174.312 of this section must be made available to DOT upon request.
    Approximately 160 small railroads carry crude oil and ethanol in 
train consists large enough that they would potentially be affected by 
this rule.
    PHMSA estimates the total cost of information sharing to each small 
railroad to be $7,589 in the first year and $2,319 for subsequent 
years, with costs growing with increases in real wages.\70\ Small 
railroads' annual operating revenues range from $3 million to $20 
million. Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue 
averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One 
percent of average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. Thus, 
the costs associated with this rule amount to less than one percent of 
the railroad's annual operating revenue. PHMSA realizes that some small 
railroads will have lower annual revenue than $4.7 million. However, 
PHMSA is confident that this estimate of total cost per small railroad 
provides a good representation of the cost applicable to small 
railroads, in general.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ Please refer to the draft RIA for full description on how 
these costs per railroad are derived.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total Burden on Small Entities
    Table 16 provides the total burden on small railroads with the 
comprehensive OSRP and information sharing requirements:

                       Table 16--Summary Undiscounted Annual Burden on Class III Railroads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Average
                                                                                                   annual  cost
                                                                     Number of      Year 1 cost   in  subsequent
                        Requirement area                             impacted        per small       years per
                                                                       small        railroad--         small
                                                                     railroads     undiscounted     railroad--
                                                                                                   undiscounted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil Spill Response Plans........................................              55         $37,613         $25,306
Information Sharing.............................................             160           7,589           2,319
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
    Total burden per small railroad ($).........................  ..............          45,202          27,625
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 50121]]

    In conclusion, PHMSA believes that although some small railroads 
will be directly impacted, the impact will amount to less than one 
percent of an average small railroad's annual operating revenue.
    This proposed rule will not have a noticeable impact on the 
competitive position of the affected small railroads or on the small 
entity segment of the railroad industry as a whole. The small entity 
segment of the railroad industry faces little in the way of intramodal 
competition. Small railroads generally serve as ``feeders'' to the 
larger railroads, collecting carloads in smaller numbers and at lower 
densities than would be economical for the larger railroads. They 
transport those cars over relatively short distances and then turn them 
over to the larger systems, which transport them relatively long 
distances to their ultimate destination, or for handoff back to a 
smaller railroad for final delivery. Although their relative interests 
do not always coincide, the relationship between the large and small 
entity segments of the railroad industry is more supportive and co-
dependent than competitive.
    It is also rare for small railroads to compete with each other. As 
mentioned above, small railroads generally serve smaller, lower density 
markets and customers. They tend to operate in markets where there is 
not enough traffic to attract or sustain rail competition, large or 
small. Given the significant capital investment required (to acquire 
right-of-way, build track, purchase fleet, etc.), new entry in the 
railroad industry is not a common occurrence. Thus, even to the extent 
the proposed rule may have an economic impact, it should have no impact 
on the intramodal competitive position of small railroads.
    In the NPRM, PHMSA seeks information and comments from the industry 
that might assist in quantifying the number of small offerors who may 
be economically impacted by the requirements set forth in the proposed 
rule.
(5) An Identification, to the Extent Practicable, of All Federal Rules 
That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed Rule
    PHMSA is not aware of any relevant Federal rules that may 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule. PHMSA will 
collaborate and coordinate with FRA to ensure that our actions are 
aligned to the greatest extent practicable. This proposed rule would 
support most other safety regulations for railroad operations. The 
proposals in this NPRM work in conjunction with the requirements 
adopted in the HHFT Final Rule to continue the comprehensive approach 
to ensuring the safe transportation of energy products, mitigate the 
consequences of such accidents should they occur.
    PHMSA is publishing this IRFA to aid the public in commenting on 
the potential small business impacts of the proposals in this NPRM. 
PHMSA invites all interested parties to submit data and information 
regarding the potential economic impact that would result from adoption 
of the proposals in this NPRM. PHMSA will consider all comments 
received in the public comment process when making a determination in 
the final RFA.

F. Paperwork Reduction Act

    PHMSA will request a revision to the information collection from 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under OMB Control No. 2137-
0682, entitled ``Flammable Hazardous Materials by Rail 
Transportation.'' This NPRM may result in an increase in annual burden 
and costs under OMB Control No. 2137-0682 due to proposed requirements 
pertaining to the creation of oil spill response plans and notification 
requirements for the movement of flammable liquids by rail.
    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no person is required to 
respond to an information collection unless it has been approved by OMB 
and displays a valid OMB control number. Section 1320.8(d) of Title 5 
of the CFR requires that PHMSA provide interested members of the public 
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information and 
recordkeeping requests.
    This document identifies a revised information collection request 
that PHMSA will submit to OMB for approval based on the requirements in 
this proposed rule. PHMSA has developed burden estimates to reflect 
changes in this proposed rule and specifically requests comments on the 
information collection and recordkeeping burdens associated with this 
NPRM.
Oil Spill Response Plans
    PHMSA estimates that there will be approximately 73 respondents, 
based on a review of the number of railroad operators in existence that 
transport trains with 20 or more tank cars loaded with liquid petroleum 
oil in a continuous block or 35 or more tank cars loaded with liquid 
petroleum oil throughout the train. PHMSA estimates that it will take a 
rail operator 80 hours to produce a comprehensive oil spill response 
plan as proposed in this NPRM. In addition, the oil spill response plan 
will have an addendum for each response zone that the applicable trains 
pass through. It is estimated this addendum will take 15 hours per 
response zone. In addition, the oil comprehensive response plans will 
require annual maintenance as well. This annual maintenance is expected 
to take 20 hours for Class I railroads, 11 hours for Class II 
railroads, and 9.5 hours for Class III railroads. The hourly labor rate 
used to estimate the cost of initial plan development and its 
maintenance is $73.89. This labor rate is based on the median wage 
estimate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational 
Employment and Wages, May 2014 for the wage series ``11-1021 General 
and Operational Managers.''
Initial Oil Spill Response Plan--Developed and Then Reviewed by the 
Railroad in Full Every 5 Years
    There are 7 Class I railroads in existence that will be required to 
create a comprehensive oil spill response plan at 80 hours per plan 
resulting in 560 burden hours. Each Class I railroad is expected to 
have 8 response zones at 15 hours per response zone resulting in 840 
burden hours. Combined this will result in a total of 1,400 burden 
hours Class I railroad oil spill response plans. This task will be 
performed by an operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 
resulting in a burden cost of $103,446.00.
    There are 11 Class II railroads in existence that will be required 
to create a comprehensive oil spill response plan at 80 hours per 
response plan resulting in 880 burden hours. Each Class II railroad is 
expected to have 2 response zones at 15 hours per zone resulting in 330 
burden hours. Combined this will result in a total of 1,210 burden 
Class II railroad oil spill response plans. This task will be performed 
by an operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 resulting in a 
burden cost of $89,406.90.
    There are 55 Class III railroads in existence that will be required 
to create a comprehensive oil spill response plan at 80 hours per 
response plan resulting in 4,400 burden hours. Each class III railroad 
is expected to pass through 1 response zones at 15 hours per zone 
resulting in 825 burden hours. Combined this will result in a total of 
5,225 burden hours for Class III railroads oil spill response plans. 
This task will be performed by an operations manager at an hourly wage 
of $73.89 resulting in a burden cost of $386,075.25.
    The total annual burden hours for all oil spill response plans is 
8,795 burden hours. The total burden cost is

[[Page 50122]]

$649,862.55. The review of a comprehensive plan is required every 5 
years resulting in an annual burden of 1,567 hours per year and a total 
annual cost of $115,785.63.
    Presented below is a summary of the numbers describe above:
Initial Oil Spill Response Plan--Developed and Then Reviewed By the 
Railroad in Full Every 5 Years
    Class I--(7 Responses x 80 Hours per plan) + (7 responses x 8 
Response Zones x 15 hours per zone) = 1,400 burden hours x $73.89 
hourly rate = $103,446.00.
    Class II--(11 Response x 80 Hours per plan) + (11 response x 2 
Response Zones x 15 hours per zone) = 1,210 burden hours x $73.89 
hourly rate = $89,406.90.
    Class III--(55 Response x 80 Hours per plan) + (55 responses x 1 
Response Zone x 15 hours per zone) = 5,225 burden hours x $73.89 hourly 
rate = $386,075.25.
    Total Hours = 7,835/5 years = 1,567 Annual Burden Hours x $73.89 = 
$115,785.63 in Annual Cost.
Oil Spill Response Plan Maintenance--Done Annually
    There are 7 Class I railroads in existence that will be required to 
annually maintain their oil spill response plan at 20 hours per plan 
resulting in 140 annual burden hours. This task will be performed by an 
operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 resulting in an annual 
burden cost of $10,344.60.
    There are 11 Class II railroads in existence that will be required 
to annually maintain their oil spill response plan at 11 hours per plan 
resulting in 121 annual burden hours. This task will be performed by an 
operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 resulting in an annual 
burden cost of $8,940.69.
    There are 55 Class III railroads in existence that will be required 
to annually maintain their oil spill response plan at 9.5 hours per 
plan resulting in 525.5 annual burden hours. This task will be 
performed by an operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 
resulting in an annual burden cost of $38,829.20
    The sum of the total annual burden hours presented above is 783.5 
burden hours.
    Presented below is a summary of the numbers describe above:
    Class I--7 Responses x 20 Hours per response = 140 annual burden 
hours x $73.89 = $10,344.60 annual burden cost.
    Class II--11 Response x 11 Hours per response = 121 annual burden 
hours x $73.89 = $8,940.69 annual burden cost.
    Class III--55 response x 9.5 hours per response = 522.5 annual 
burden hours x $73.89 = $386,075.25 annual burden cost.
    Total Hours for Plan Maintenance = 783.5 Annual Burden Hours x 
$73.89 per hour = $57,892.81 annual burden cost.
Notifications to Emergency Response Commissions
    For the creation of the initial HHFT information sharing 
notification PHMSA estimates that there will be approximately 178 
respondents based on a review of the number of railroad operators 
shipping class 3 flammable liquids. PHMSA estimates that it will take a 
rail operator 30 hours to create initial notification plan for the 
State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), 30 hours to create 
initial notification plan for the Tribal Emergency Response Commissions 
(TERCs), and 15 hours to create the initial plan for other state 
delegated agencies.
Class I Railroads
    PHMSA expects 7 responses (30 hours per response) resulting in 210 
burden hours for SERC plans. PHMSA expects 7 responses (30 hours per 
response) resulting in 210 burden hours for TEPC plans. PHMSA expects 7 
responses (15 hours per response) resulting in 105 burden hours for 
other state delegated agency plans. This will result in an initial one 
year total burden of 525 hours for Class I railroads. This task will be 
performed by an operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 
resulting in an annual burden cost of $38,792.25.
Class II Railroads
    PHMSA expects 11 responses (30 hours per response) resulting in 330 
burden hours for SERC plans. PHMSA expects 11 responses (30 hours per 
response) resulting in 330 burden hours for TERC plans. PHMSA expects 
11 responses (15 hours per response) resulting in 115 burden hours for 
other state delegated agency plans. This will result in an initial one 
year total burden of 775 hours for Class II railroads. This task will 
be performed by an operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 
resulting in an annual burden cost of $57,264.75.
Class III Railroads
    PHMSA expects 160 responses (30 hours per response) resulting in 
4,800 burden hours for SERC plans. PHMSA expects 160 responses (30 
hours per response) resulting in 4,800 burden hours for TERC plans. 
PHMSA expects 160 responses (15 hours per response) resulting in 2,400 
burden hours for other state delegated agency plans. This will result 
in an initial one year total burden of 12,000 hours for Class III 
railroads. This task will be performed by an operations manager at an 
hourly wage of $73.89 resulting in an annual burden cost of 
$886,680.00.
Initial plan creation (year one--one time)
Class I--7 responses x 30 hours for SERC plan = 210 burden hours
    7 responses x 30 hours for TERC plan = 210 burden hours
    7 responses x 15 hours for other state delegated agency plan = 105 
burden hours
Class II--11 responses x 30 hours for SERC plan = 330 burden hours
    11 responses x 30 hours for TERC plan = 330 burden hours
    11 responses x 15 hours for other state delegated agency plan = 115 
burden hours
Class III--160 responses x 30 hours for SERC plan = 4,800 burden hours
    160 responses x 30 hours for TERC plan = 4,800 burden hours
    160 responses x 15 hours for other state delegated agency plan = 
2,400 burden hours
    Total initial year burden = 13,300 burden hours/$982,737.00 burden 
cost.
    For the maintenance of the notification plan PHMSA estimates that 
there will be approximately 178 respondents based on a review of the 
number of railroad operators shipping class 3 flammable liquids. PHMSA 
estimates that it will take a rail operator 12 hours to maintain 
notification plan for the SERCs, 12 hours to maintain notification plan 
for TERCs, and 6 hours to maintain the plan for other state delegated 
agencies.
Class I Railroads
    PHMSA expects 7 responses (12 hours per response) resulting in 84 
burden hours for SERC plans. PHMSA expects 7 responses (12 hours per 
response) resulting in 84 burden hours for TERC plans. PHMSA expects 7 
responses (6 hours per response) resulting in 42 burden hours for other 
state delegated agency plans. This will result in an annual total 
burden of 210 hours for Class I railroads. This task will be performed 
by an operations manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 resulting in an 
annual burden cost of $15,516.90.
Class II Railroads
    PHMSA expects 11 responses (12 hours per response) resulting in 132 
burden hours for SERC plans. PHMSA expects 11 responses (12 hours per 
response) resulting in 132 burden hours

[[Page 50123]]

for TERC plans. PHMSA expects 11 responses (6 hours per response) 
resulting in 66 burden hours for other state delegated agency plans. 
This will result in an initial one year total burden of 775 hours for 
Class II railroads. This task will be performed by an operations 
manager at an hourly wage of $73.89 resulting in an annual burden cost 
of $57,264.75.
Class III Railroads
    PHMSA expects 160 responses (12 hours per response) resulting in 
1,920 burden hours for SERC plans. PHMSA expects 160 responses (12 
hours per response) resulting in 1,920 burden hours for TERC plans. 
PHMSA expects 160 responses (6 hours per response) resulting in 960 
burden hours for other state delegated agency plans. This will result 
in an initial one year total burden of 4,800 hours for Class III 
railroads. This task will be performed by an operations manager at an 
hourly wage of $73.89 resulting in an annual burden cost of $35,240.00.
Annual Maintenance
Class I--7 responses x 12 hours for SERC plan = 84 burden hours
    7 responses x 12 hours for TERC plan = 84 burden hours
    7 responses x 6 hours for other state delegated agency plan = 42 
burden hours
Class II--11 responses x 12 hours for SERC plan = 132 burden hours
    11 responses x 12 hours for TERC plan = 132 burden hours
    11 responses x 6 hours for other state delegated agency plan = 66 
burden hours
Class III--160 responses x 12 hours for SERC plan = 1,920 burden hours
    160 responses x 12 hours for TERC plan = 1,920 burden hours
    160 responses x 6 hours for other state delegated agency plan = 960 
burden hours
Total annual maintenance burden 5,785/$427,021.65
Total Additional Burden
    OMB No. 2137-0682: Flammable Hazardous Materials by Rail 
Transportation.
    Additional One Year Annual Burden:
    Additional Annual Number of Respondents: 178.
    Additional Annual Responses: 1,127.
    Additional Annual Burden Hours: 21,435.5.
    Additional Annual Burden Cost: $1,583,437.09.
    Additional Subsequent Year Burden:
    Additional Annual Number of Respondents: 593.
    Additional Annual Responses: 593.
    Additional Annual Burden Hours: 8,135.5.
    Additional Annual Burden Cost: $595,700.09.
    Please direct your requests for a copy of the information 
collection to T. Glenn Foster or Steven Andrews, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA), East Building, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards (PHH-
12), 1200 New Jersey Avenue Southeast, Washington DC, 20590, Telephone 
(202) 366-8553.

G. Environmental Assessment

    PHMSA has analyzed this rule in accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.), as 
amended; the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations (CEQ) 
regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508); the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) Order 5610.C (September 18, 1979, as 
amended on July 13, 1982 and July 30, 1985), entitled Procedures for 
Considering Environmental Impacts; and other pertinent environmental 
regulations, Executive Orders, statutes, and laws for consideration of 
environmental impacts of PHMSA actions. The agency relies on all 
authorities noted above to ensure that it actively incorporates 
environmental considerations into informed decision-making on all of 
its actions, including rulemaking. A ``Draft Environmental Assessment'' 
(Draft EA) and a draft ``Finding of No Significant Impact'' (FONSI) are 
available in the docket PHMSA-2014-0105 (HM-251B). PHMSA has concluded 
that this action would have a positive effect on the human and natural 
environments since these response plan and information requirements 
would mitigate environmental consequences of spills related to rail 
transport of certain hazardous materials by reducing the severity of 
incidents as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil Spill Response Planning............   Improved Response
                                          Times.
                                          Improved Communication/
                                          Defined Command Structure.
                                          Better Access to
                                          Equipment.
                                          Trained Responders.
Information Sharing....................   Improved
                                          Communication.
                                          Enhanced Preparedness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A NEPA Environmental Checklist is available in the docket PHMSA-
2014-0105 (HM-251B).

H. Privacy Act

    In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comment from the 
public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these 
comments, without edit, including any personal information the 
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system 
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 
www.dot.gov/privacy. The electronic form of these written 
communications and comments can be searched by the name of the 
individual submitting the document (or signing the document, if 
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
The DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement is available at http://www.dot.gov/privacy.

I. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking

    This NPRM is published under the authority of 33 U.S.C. 1321, The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), which directs the 
President to issue regulations requiring owners and operators of 
certain vessels and onshore and offshore oil facilities to develop, 
submit, update, and in some cases obtain approval of oil spill response 
plans. Executive Order 12777 delegated responsibility to the Secretary 
of Transportation for certain transportation-related facilities. The 
Secretary of Transportation delegated the authority to promulgate 
regulations to PHMSA and provides the FRA with approval authority for 
railroad ORSPs. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the DOT and 
EPA further establishes jurisdictional guidelines for implementing OPA 
(36 FR 24080). The proposed changes to part 130 in this rule address 
minimizing the impact of a discharge of oils into the navigable waters 
or adjoining shorelines.
    This NPRM is also published under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
5103(b), The Federal hazardous materials transportation law, which 
authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to ``prescribe regulations 
for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous materials 
in intrastate,

[[Page 50124]]

interstate, and foreign commerce.'' The proposed changes in this rule 
to Sec. Sec.  171.7, 173.121, and 174.312 address safety and security 
vulnerabilities regarding the transportation of hazardous materials in 
commerce. The requirements proposed in Sec.  174.312 are also mandated 
by Public Law 114-94, commonly known as the Fixing America's Surface 
Transportation Act, or the ``FAST'' Act.
    The Federal railroad safety laws, at 49 U.S.C. 20103, provide the 
Secretary of Transportation with authority over all areas of railroad 
transportation safety and the Secretary has delegated this authority to 
the FRA. See 49 CFR 1.89. Pursuant to its statutory authority, FRA 
promulgates and enforces a comprehensive regulatory program (49 CFR 
parts 200-244) addressing issues such as railroad track, signal 
systems, railroad communications, and rolling stock. The FRA inspects 
railroads and shippers for compliance with both FRA and PHMSA 
regulations.

J. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory 
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The 
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in 
April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of 
this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the 
Unified Agenda.

K. Executive Order 13211

    Executive Order 13211 (``Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use''), published 
May 22, 2001 [66 FR 28355], requires Federal agencies to prepare a 
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' 
Under the Executive Order, a ``significant energy action'' is defined 
as any action by an agency (normally published in the Federal Register) 
that promulgates, or is expected to lead to the promulgation of, a 
final rule or regulation (including a notice of inquiry, advance NPRM, 
and NPRM) that (1)(i) is a significant regulatory action under 
Executive Order 12866 or any successor order and (ii) is likely to have 
a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of 
energy; or (2) is designated by the Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action.
    PHMSA has evaluated this action in accordance with Executive Order 
13211. See Section VIII, Subsection G (``Environmental Assessment'') 
for a more thorough discussion of environmental impacts and the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy. PHMSA has determined that this action 
will not have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, 
or use of energy. Consequently, PHMSA has determined that this 
regulatory action is not a ``significant energy action'' within the 
meaning of Executive Order 13211.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 130

    Oil spill prevention and response.

49 CFR Part 171

    Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, 
Imports, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

49 CFR Part 173

    Hazardous materials transportation, Packaging and containers, 
Radioactive materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Uranium.

49 CFR Part 174

    Hazardous materials transportation, Rail carriers, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

    In consideration of the foregoing, we propose to amend title 49, 
chapter I, as follows:

PART 130--OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLANS

0
1. In part 130, revise the Table of Contents to read as follows:
Subpart A--Applicability and General Requirements
130.1 Purpose.
130.2 Scope.
130.3 General requirements.
130.5 Definitions.
130.11 Communication requirements.
130.21 Packaging requirements.
Subpart B--Basic Spill Response Plans
130.31 Basic spill response plans.
130.33 Basic response plan implementation.
Subpart C--Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans
130.101 Applicability for comprehensive plans.
130.102 General requirements for comprehensive plans.
130.103 National Contingency Plan (NCP) and Area Contingency Plan 
(ACP) compliance for comprehensive plans.
130.104 Information summary for comprehensive plans.
130.105 Notification procedures and contacts for comprehensive 
plans.
130.106 Response and mitigation activities for comprehensive plans.
130.107 Training procedures for comprehensive plans.
130.108 Equipment testing and drill procedures for comprehensive 
plans.
130.109 Recordkeeping and plan update procedures for comprehensive 
plans.
130.111 Submission and approval procedures for comprehensive plans.
130.112 Response plan implementation for comprehensive plans.
0
2. The authority citation for part 130 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C 1321; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
3. Add a heading for subpart A immediately before Sec.  130.1 to read 
as follows:

Subpart A--Applicability and General Requirements


Sec.  130.2  [Amended]

0
4. In Sec.  130.2 amend paragraph (d) to remove ``Sec.  130.31(b)'' and 
add in its place ``subpart C''.
0
5. In Sec.  130.5:
0
a. The introductory text is amended to redesignate the definition for 
``animal fat'' in alphabetical order.
0
b. The definitions for ``Adverse Weather,'' ``Environmentally Sensitive 
or Significant Areas,'' ``Maximum Potential Discharge,'' ``Oil Spill 
Response Organization,'' ``On-scene Coordinator (OSC),'' ``Response 
activities,'' ``Response Plan,'' and ``Response Zone'' are added in 
alphabetical order.
0
c. The definitions for ``Liquid,'' ``Person,'' ``Petroleum Oil,'' and 
``Worst-case discharge'' are revised.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  130.5  Definitions.

    In this subchapter:
    Adverse weather means the weather conditions (e.g., ice conditions, 
temperature ranges, flooding, strong winds) that will be considered 
when identifying response systems and equipment to be deployed in 
accordance with a response plan.
    Animal fat means a non-petroleum oil, fat, or grease derived from 
animals, not specifically identified elsewhere in this part.
* * * * *
    Environmentally sensitive or significant areas means areas that may 
be identified by their legal designation or by evaluations of Area 
Committees (for planning) or members of the Federal On-Scene 
Coordinator's spill response structure (during responses). These areas 
may include wetlands, National and State parks, critical habitats for 
endangered or threatened species, wilderness and natural resource 
areas, marine sanctuaries and estuarine reserves, conservation areas, 
preserves,

[[Page 50125]]

wildlife areas, wildlife refuges, wild and scenic rivers, recreational 
areas, national forests, Federal and State lands that are research 
national areas, heritage program areas, land trust areas, and 
historical and archaeological sites and parks. These areas may also 
include unique habitats such as aquaculture sites and agricultural 
surface water intakes, bird nesting areas, critical biological resource 
areas, designated migratory routes, and designated seasonal habitats.
* * * * *
    Liquid means a material that has a vertical flow of over two inches 
(50 mm) within a three-minute period, or a material having one gram or 
more liquid separation, when determined in accordance with the 
procedures specified in ASTM D 4359-84, ``Standard Test Method for 
Determining Whether a Material is a Liquid or a Solid,'' 1990 edition, 
which is incorporated by reference.

    Note: This incorporation by reference has been approved by the 
Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 
and 1 CFR part 51. A copy may be obtained from the American Society 
for Testing and Materials, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. 
Copies may be inspected at the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, 
Standards and Rulemaking Division, DOT headquarters East Building, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, or at the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the 
availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: 
http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

* * * * *
    Maximum potential discharge means a planning volume for a discharge 
from a motor vehicle or rail car equal to the capacity of the cargo 
container.
* * * * *
    Oil spill response organization (OSRO) means an entity that 
provides response resources.
    On-scene Coordinator (OSC) means the Federal official pre-
designated by the Administrator of the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) or by the Commandant of the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG) to coordinate and direct federal response under subpart D 
of the National Contingency Plan (40 CFR part 300).
* * * * *
    Person: means an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, 
association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision 
of a State, or any interstate body, as well as a department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the 
Federal Government. This definition includes railroads.
    Petroleum oil means any oil extracted or derived from geological 
hydrocarbon deposits, including oils produced by distillation or their 
refined products.
* * * * *
    Response activities means the containment and removal of oil from 
navigable waters and adjoining shorelines, the temporary storage and 
disposal of recovered oil, or the taking of other actions as necessary 
to minimize or mitigate damage to the environment.
    Response plan means a basic plan meeting requirements of subpart B 
or a comprehensive plan meeting requirements of subpart C. For 
comprehensive plans this definition includes both the railroad's core 
plan and the response zone appendices for responding, to the maximum 
extent practicable, to a worst case discharge of oil or the substantial 
threat of such a discharge.
    Response zone means one or more route segments identified by the 
railroad utilizing the response resources which are available to 
respond within 12 hours after the discovery of a worst-case discharge 
or to mitigate the substantial threat of such a discharge for a 
comprehensive plan meeting requirements of subpart C.
* * * * *
    Worst-case discharge means ``the largest foreseeable discharge in 
adverse weather conditions,'' as defined at 33 U.S.C. 1321(a)(24). The 
largest foreseeable discharge includes discharges resulting from fire 
or explosion. The worst-case discharge from a train consist is the 
greater of: (1) 300,000 gallons of liquid petroleum oil; or (2) 15% of 
the total lading of liquid petroleum oil transported within the largest 
train consist reasonably expected to transport liquid petroleum oil in 
a given response zone.
* * * * *
0
6. Add a new subpart B heading immediately before Sec.  130.31 to read 
as follows:

Subpart B--Basic Spill Response Plans

0
7. In Sec.  130.31:
0
a. Revise the section heading.
0
b. Revise paragraph (a) introductory text and paragraph (b).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  130.31  Basic spill response plans.

    (a) No person may transport liquid petroleum oil in a packaging 
having a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more unless that person has a 
current basic written plan that:
* * * * *
    (b) A person with a comprehensive plan in conformance with the 
requirements of subpart C of this part 130 is not required to also have 
a basic spill prevention plan.
0
7. Revise Sec.  130.33 heading to read as follows:


Sec.  130.33  Basic response plan implementation.

* * * * *
0
8. Add subpart C to read as follows:

Subpart C--Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans


Sec.  130.101  Applicability for comprehensive plans.

    (a) Any railroad which transports any liquid petroleum or other 
non-petroleum oil subject to this part in a quantity greater than 
42,000 gallons (1,000 barrels) per packaging must have a current 
comprehensive written plan meeting the requirements of this subpart; or
    (b) Any railroad which transports a single train transporting 20 or 
more loaded tank cars of liquid petroleum oil in a continuous block or 
a single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of liquid petroleum 
oil throughout the train consist must have a current comprehensive 
written plan meeting the requirements of this subpart. Tank cars 
carrying mixtures or solutions of petroleum oil not meeting the 
criteria for Class 3 flammable or combustible material in Sec.  173.120 
of this chapter, or containing residue, are not required to be included 
when determining the number of tank cars transporting liquid petroleum 
oil in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (c) The requirements of this subpart do not apply if the oil being 
transported is otherwise excepted per Sec.  130.2(c).
    (d) A railroad required to develop a response plan in accordance 
with this section may not transport oil (including handling and storage 
incidental to transport) unless--
    (1) The response plan is submitted, reviewed, and approved as 
required by Sec.  130.111 of this part or in conformance with paragraph 
(e) of this section; and
    (2) The railroad is operating in compliance with the response plan.
    (e) A railroad required to develop a response plan in accordance 
with this section may continue to transport oil without an approval 
from FRA provided all of the following criteria are met:
    (1) The railroad submitted a plan in accordance with the 
requirements of Sec.  130.111(a);

[[Page 50126]]

    (2) The submitted plan includes the certification in Sec.  
130.106(a)(1);
    (3) The railroad is operating in compliance with the submitted 
plan; and
    (4) FRA has not issued a final decision that all or part of the 
plan does not meet the requirements of this subpart.


Sec.  130.102  General requirements for comprehensive plans.

    (a) Each railroad subject to this subpart must prepare and submit a 
plan including resources and procedures for responding, to the maximum 
extent practicable, to a worst-case discharge, and to a substantial 
threat of such a discharge, of oil. The plan must use the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS):
    (b) Response plan format. Each response plan must be formatted to 
include:
    (1) Core plan: The response plan must include a core plan 
containing an information summary required by Sec.  130.104(a)(1) of 
this part and information which does not change between different 
response zones; and
    (2) Response Zone Appendix or Appendices: For each response zone 
included in the response plan, the response plan must include a 
response zone appendix that provides the information summary required 
by Sec.  130.104(a)(2) of this part and any additional information 
which differs between response zones. In addition, each response zone 
appendix must identify all of the following:
    (i) A description of the response zone, including county(s) and 
state(s);
    (ii) A list of route sections contained in the response zone, 
identified by railroad milepost or other identifier;
    (iii) Identification of environmentally sensitive or significant 
areas per route section as determined by Sec.  130.103 of this part; 
and
    (iv) The location where the response organization will deploy, and 
the location and description of the response equipment required by 
Sec.  130.106(c)(6) of this part.
    (c) Instead of submitting a response plan, a railroad may submit an 
Annex of an Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP) if the Annex provides 
equivalent or greater spill protection than a response plan required 
under this part. Guidance on the ICP is available in the Federal 
Register or electronically from the National Service Center for 
Environmental Publications (NSCEP) (https://www.epa.gov/nscep).


Sec.  130.103  National contingency plan (NCP) and area contingency 
plan (ACP) compliance for comprehensive plans.

    (a) A railroad must certify in the response plan that it reviewed 
the NCP (40 CFR part 300) and each applicable ACP and that its response 
plan is consistent with the NCP and each applicable ACP as follows:
    (1) At a minimum, for consistency with the NCP, a comprehensive 
response plan must:
    (i) Demonstrate a railroad's clear understanding of the function of 
the federal response structure, reflecting the relationship between the 
response organization's role and the Federal-On-Scene Coordinator's 
role in pollution response (e.g. inclusion of the OSC in a Unified 
Command, and a statement that the OSC has highest authority on-scene).
    (ii) Include procedures to immediately notify the National Response 
Center; and
    (iii) Establish provisions to ensure the protection of safety at 
the response site.
    (2) At a minimum, for consistency with the applicable ACP (or 
Regional Contingency Plan (RCP) for areas lacking an ACP), the 
comprehensive response plan must:
    (i) Address the removal of a worst-case discharge, and the 
mitigation or prevention of the substantial threat of a worst-case 
discharge, of oil;
    (ii) Identify environmentally sensitive or significant areas as 
defined in section 130.5 of this part, along the route, which could be 
adversely affected by a worst-case discharge and incorporate 
appropriate deflection and protection response strategies to protect 
these areas;
    (iii) Describe the responsibilities of the persons involved and of 
Federal, State, and local agencies in removing a discharge and in 
mitigating or preventing a substantial threat of a discharge; and
    (iv) Identify the procedures to obtain any required federal and 
state authorization for using alternative response strategies such as 
in-situ burning and/or chemical agents as provided for in the 
applicable ACP and subpart J of 40 CFR part 300.
    (b) Reserved.


Sec.  130.104  Information summary for comprehensive plans.

    (a) Each person preparing a comprehensive response plan is subject 
to the following content requirements of the plan:
    (1) The information summary for the core plan must include all of 
the following:
    (i) The name and mailing address of the railroad;
    (ii) A listing and description of each response zone, including 
county(s) and state(s); and
    (iii) The name or title of the qualified individual(s) and 
alternate(s) for each response zone, with telephone numbers at which 
they can be contacted on a 24-hour basis.
    (2) The information summary for each response zone appendix must 
include all of the following:
    (i) The name and mailing address of the railroad;
    (ii) A listing and description of the response zone, including 
county(s) and state(s);
    (iii) The name or title of the qualified individual(s) and 
alternate(s) for the response zone, with telephone numbers at which 
they can be contacted on a 24-hour basis;
    (iv) The quantity and type of oil carried; and
    (v) Determination of the worst-case discharge and supporting 
calculations.
    (b) Form of information: The information summary should be listed 
first before other information in the plan or clearly identified 
through the use of tabs or other visual aids.


Sec.  130.105  Notification procedures and contacts for comprehensive 
plans.

    (a) The railroad must develop and implement notification procedures 
which include all of the following:
    (1) Procedures for immediate notification of the qualified 
individual or alternate;
    (2) A checklist of the notifications required under the response 
plan, listed in the order of priority;
    (3) The primary and secondary communication methods by which 
notifications can be made;
    (4) The circumstances and necessary time frames under which the 
notifications must be made; and
    (5) The information to be provided in the initial and each follow-
up notification.
    (b) The notification procedures must include the names and 
addresses of the following individuals or organizations, with the ten-
digit telephone numbers at which they can be contacted on a 24-hour 
basis:
    (1) The oil spill response organization(s);
    (2) Applicable insurance representatives or surveyors for each 
response zone;
    (3) The National Response Center (NRC);
    (4) Federal, state, and local agencies which the railroad expects 
to have pollution control responsibilities or support; and
    (5) Personnel or organizations to notify for the activation of 
equipment

[[Page 50127]]

and personnel resources identified in Sec.  130.106.


Sec.  130.106  Response and mitigation activities for comprehensive 
plans.

    (a) Each railroad must certify that they have identified and 
ensured by contract or other means the private response resources in 
each response zone necessary to remove, to the maximum extent 
practicable, a worst-case discharge. The certification must be signed 
by the qualified individual or an appropriate corporate officer.
    (b) Each railroad must identify and describe in the plan the 
response resources which are available to arrive onsite within 12 hours 
after the discovery of a worst-case discharge or the substantial threat 
of such a discharge. It is assumed that response resources can travel 
according to a land speed of 35 miles per hour, unless the railroad can 
demonstrate otherwise.
    (c) Each plan must identify all of the following information for 
response and mitigation activities:
    (1) Methods of initial discharge detection;
    (2) Responsibilities of and actions to be taken by personnel to 
initiate and supervise response activities pending the arrival of the 
qualified individual or other response resources identified in the 
response plan that are necessary to ensure the protection of safety at 
the response site and to mitigate or prevent any discharge from the 
tank cars;
    (3) The qualified individual's responsibilities and authority;
    (4) Procedures for coordinating the actions of the railroad or 
qualified individual with the actions of the U.S. EPA or U.S. Coast 
Guard On-Scene Coordinator responsible for monitoring or directing 
response and mitigation activities;
    (5) The oil spill response organization's responsibilities and 
authority; and
    (6) For each oil spill response organization identified under this 
section, a listing of:
    (i) Equipment, supplies, and personnel available and location 
thereof, including equipment suitable for adverse weather conditions 
and the personnel necessary to continue operation of the equipment and 
staff the oil spill response organization during the response; or
    (ii) In lieu of the listing of equipment, supplies, and personnel, 
a statement that the response organization is an Oil Spill Removal 
Organization that has been approved by the United States Coast Guard 
under 33 CFR 154.1035 or 155.1035.


Sec.  130.107  Training procedures for comprehensive plans.

    (a) A railroad must certify in the response plan that it conducted 
training to ensure that:
    (1) All railroad employees subject to the plan know--
    (i) Their responsibilities under the comprehensive oil spill 
response plan; and
    (ii) The name of, and procedures for contacting, the qualified 
individual or alternate on a 24-hour basis;
    (2) Reporting personnel also know--
    (i) The content of the information summary of the response plan;
    (ii) The toll-free telephone number of the National Response 
Center; and
    (iii) The notification process required by Sec.  130.105 of this 
subpart.
    (b) Recurrent training. Employees subject to this section must be 
trained at least once every five years or, if the plan is revised 
during the five-year recurrent training cycle, within 90 days of 
implementation of the revised plan. New employees must be trained 
within 90 days of employment or change in job function.
    (c) Recordkeeping. Each railroad must create and retain a record of 
current training of all railroad personnel engaged in oil spill 
response, inclusive of the preceding five years, in accordance with 
this section for as long as that employee is employed and for 90 days 
thereafter. A railroad must make the employee's record of training 
available upon request, at a reasonable time and location, to an 
authorized official of the Department of Transportation. The record 
must include all of the following:
    (1) The employee's name;
    (2) The most recent training completion date of the employee's 
training;
    (3) The name and address of the person providing the training; and
    (4) Certification statement that the designated employee has been 
trained, as required by this subpart.
    (d) Nothing in this section relieves a person from the 
responsibility to ensure that all personnel are trained in accordance 
with other regulations. Response personnel may be subject to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for 
emergency response operations in 29 CFR 1910.120, including volunteers 
or casual laborers employed during a response who are subject to those 
standards pursuant to 40 CFR part 311. Hazmat employees, as defined in 
Sec.  171.8, are subject to the training requirements in subpart H of 
part 172 of this chapter, including safety training.


Sec.  130.108  Equipment testing and drill procedures for comprehensive 
plans.

    (a) The plan must include a description of the methods used to 
ensure equipment testing meets the manufacturer's minimum 
recommendations or equivalent.
    (b) A railroad must implement and describe a drill program 
following the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program 
(PREP) guidelines, which can be found using the search function on the 
USCG's Web page, http://www.uscg.mil. These guidelines are also 
available from the TASC DEPT Warehouse, 33141Q 75th Avenue, Landover, 
MD 20875 (fax: 301-386-5394, stock number USCG-X0241). A railroad 
choosing not to follow PREP guidelines must have a drill program that 
is equivalent to PREP. The plan must include a description of the drill 
procedures and programs the railroad uses to assess whether its 
response plan will function as planned, including the types of drills 
and their frequencies.
    (c) Recordkeeping. Railroads must keep records showing the exercise 
dates and times, and the after action reports that accompany the 
response plan exercises, and provide copies to Department of 
Transportation representatives upon request.


Sec.  130.109  Recordkeeping and plan update procedures for 
comprehensive plans.

    (a) Recordkeeping. For purposes of this part, copy means a hardcopy 
or an electronic version. Each railroad must:
    (1) Maintain a copy of the complete plan at the railroad's 
principal place of business;
    (2) Provide a copy of the core plan and the appropriate response 
zone appendix to each qualified individual and alternate; and
    (3) Provide a copy of the information summary to each dispatcher in 
response zones identified in the plan.
    (b) Each railroad must include procedures to review the plan after 
a discharge requiring the activation of the plan in order to evaluate 
and record the plan's effectiveness.
    (c) Each railroad must update its plan to address new or different 
conditions or information. In addition, each railroad must review its 
plan in full at least every 5 years from the date of the last approval.
    (d) If changes to the plans are made, updated copies of the plan 
must be provided to every individual referenced under paragraph (a) of 
this section.
    (e) If new or different operating conditions or information would 
substantially affect the implementation of the response plan, the 
railroad must immediately modify its plan to address

[[Page 50128]]

such a change and must submit the change to FRA within 90 days in 
accordance with Sec.  130.111. Examples of changes in operating 
conditions or information that would substantially affect a railroad's 
response plan are:
    (1) Establishment of a new railroad route, including an extension 
of an existing railroad route, construction of a new track, or 
obtaining trackage rights over a route not covered by the previously 
approved plan;
    (2) The name of the oil spill response organization;
    (3) Emergency response procedures;
    (4) The qualified individual;
    (5) A change in the NCP or an ACP that has significant impact on 
the equipment appropriate for response activities; or
    (6) Any other information relating to circumstances that may affect 
full implementation of the plan.
    (f) If FRA determines that a change to a response plan does not 
meet the requirements of this part, FRA will notify the operator of any 
alleged deficiencies, and provide the railroad with an opportunity to 
respond, including an opportunity for an informal conference, to any 
proposed plan revisions, as well as an opportunity to correct any 
deficiencies.
    (g) A railroad who disagrees with a determination that proposed 
revisions to a plan are deficient may petition FRA for reconsideration, 
within 30 days from the date of receipt of FRA's notice. After 
considering all relevant material presented in writing or at an 
informal conference, FRA will notify the railroad of its final 
decision. The railroad must comply with the final decision within 30 
days of issuance unless FRA allows additional time.


Sec.  130.111  Submission and approval procedures for comprehensive 
plans.

    (a) Each railroad must submit a copy of the response plan required 
by this part. Copies of the response plan must be submitted to: 
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Federal Railroad 
Administrator (FRA), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-
0001. Note: Submission of plans contained in an electronic format is 
preferred.
    (b) If FRA determines that a response plan requiring approval does 
not meet all the requirements of this part, FRA will notify the 
railroad of any alleged deficiencies and provide the railroad an 
opportunity to respond, including the opportunity for an informal 
conference, to any proposed plan revisions, as well as an opportunity 
to correct any deficiencies.
    (c) A railroad who disagrees with the FRA determination that a plan 
contains alleged deficiencies may petition FRA for reconsideration 
within 30 days from the date of receipt of FRA's notice. After 
considering all relevant material presented in writing or at an 
informal conference, FRA will notify the operator of its final 
decision. The railroad must comply with the final decision within 30 
days of issuance unless FRA allows additional time.
    (d) FRA will approve the response plan if FRA determines that the 
response plan meets all requirements of this part. FRA may consult with 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG) allowing an On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) to identify concerns 
about the railroad's ability to respond to a worst-case discharge or 
implement the plan as written. EPA or the USCG would not be responsible 
for plan approval.
    (e) If FRA receives a request from an OSC to review a response 
plan, FRA may require a railroad to give a copy of the response plan to 
the OSC. FRA may consider OSC comments on response techniques, 
protecting fish, wildlife and environmentally sensitive environments, 
and on consistency with the ACP. FRA remains the approving authority 
for the response plan.
    (f) A railroad may ask for confidential treatment in accordance 
with the procedures in 49 CFR 209.11.


Sec.  130.112  Response plan implementation for comprehensive plans.

    If, during transportation of oil subject to this part, a discharge 
of oil occurs--into or on the navigable waters; on the adjoining 
shorelines to the navigable waters; or that may affect natural 
resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive 
management authority of, the United States--the person transporting the 
oil must implement the plan required by Sec.  130.101, and in a manner 
consistent with the National Contingency Plan, 40 CFR part 300, or as 
otherwise directed by the On-Scene Coordinator.

PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

0
9. The authority citation for part 171 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; Pub. L. 101-410 section 4 
(28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Pub. L. 104-121, sections 212-213; Pub. L. 
104-134, section 31001; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
10. In 171.7, redesignate paragraphs (h)(45) through (h)(51) as (h)(46) 
through (h)(52) and add new paragraph (h)(45) to read as follows:


Sec.  171.7  Reference material.

* * * * *
    (h) * * *
    (45) ASTM D7900-13 Standard Test Method for Determination of Light 
Hydrocarbons in Stabilized Crude Oils by Gas Chromatography, 2013, into 
Sec.  173.121.
* * * * *

PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND 
PACKAGINGS

0
11. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.

0
12. In Sec.  173.121 add paragraph (a)(2)(vi) to read as follows:


Sec.  173.121  Class 3--Assignment of packing group.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (vi) Petroleum products containing known flammable gases--Standard 
Test Method for Determination of Light Hydrocarbons in Stabilized Crude 
Oils by Gas Chromatography (ASTM D7900). The initial boiling point is 
the temperature at which 0.5 weight percent is eluted when determining 
the boiling range distribution.
* * * * *

PART 174--CARRIAGE BY RAIL

0
13. The authority citation for part 174 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 33 U.S.C. 1321; 49 CFR 1.81 and 
1.97.

0
14. In Sec.  174.310 add paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows:


Sec.  174.310  Requirements for the operation of high-hazard flammable 
trains.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (6) Oil Spill Prevention and Response Plans. The additional 
requirements for petroleum oil transported by rail in accordance with 
part 130 of subchapter B.
* * * * *
0
15. Add section Sec.  174.312 to read as follows:


Sec.  174.312  HHFT information sharing notification for emergency 
responders.

    (a) Prior to transporting a high-hazard flammable train (HHFT) as 
defined in Sec.  171.8 of this subchapter, a railroad must provide each 
State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), Tribal Emergency Response 
Commission (TERC), or other appropriate state delegated agency for 
further distribution

[[Page 50129]]

to appropriate local authorities, upon request, in each state through 
which it operates a HHFT the information as described in paragraphs 
(a)(1) and (2) of this section.
    (1) At a minimum, the information railroads are required to provide 
to the relevant state or tribal agencies must include the following:
    (i) A reasonable estimate of the number of HHFTs that the railroad 
expects to operate each week, through each county within the state or 
through each tribal jurisdiction;
    (ii) The routes over which the HHFTs will operate;
    (iii) A description of the hazardous material being transported and 
all applicable emergency response information required by subparts C 
and G of part 172 of this subchapter;
    (iv) A HHFT point of contact: at least one point of contact at the 
railroad (including name, title, phone number and address) with 
knowledge of the railroad's transportation of affected trains and 
responsible for serving as the point of contact for the SERC, TERC, or 
other state or tribal agency responsible for receiving the information; 
and
    (v) If a route identified in paragraph (a)1)(ii) of this section is 
additionally subject to the comprehensive spill plan requirements in 
subpart C of part 130 of this chapter, the information must include a 
description of the response zones (including counties and states) and 
the contact information for the qualified individual and alternate, as 
specified under Sec.  130.104(a);
    (2) Recordkeeping and transmission. The HHFT notification must be 
maintained and transmitted in accordance with all of the following 
requirements:
    (i) On a monthly basis, railroads must update the notifications. If 
there are no changes, the railroad may provide a certification of no 
change.
    (ii) Notifications and updates may be transmitted electronically or 
by hard copy.
    (iii) If the disclosure includes information that railroads believe 
is security sensitive or proprietary and exempt from public disclosure, 
the railroads should indicate that in the notification.
    (iv) Each point of contact must be clearly identified by name or 
title and role (e.g., qualified individual, HHFT point of contact) in 
association with the telephone number. One point of contact may fulfill 
multiple roles.
    (v) Copies of the railroad's notifications made under this section 
must be made available to the Department of Transportation upon 
request.
    (b) Reserved.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on July 13, 2016, under the authority 
of 49 U.S.C. 5103(b), 33 U.S.C. 1321, and the authority delegated in 
49 CFR 1.97.
William Schoonover,
Acting Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016-16938 Filed 7-28-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-60-P


