
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 161 (Thursday, August 20, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50652-50662]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-20571]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2014-0011]


Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture; Grant of a Permanent 
Variance

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to Impregilo 
Healy Parsons Joint Venture from the provisions of OSHA standards that 
regulate work in compressed-air environments at 29 CFR 1926.803.

DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice becomes 
effective on August 20, 2015, and shall remain in effect until the 
completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel Project, but no later than 
December 31, 2016.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is 
available from the following sources:
    Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office 
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue 
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999; 
email: Meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
    General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson, 
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, 
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; phone: 
(202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Copies of this Federal Register notice. 
Electronic copies of this Federal Register notice are available at 
http://www.regulations.gov. This Federal Register notice and other 
relevant information are also available at OSHA's Web page at http://www.osha.gov.

I. Notice of Application

    On April 3, 2014, Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture, (``IHP 
JV'' or ``the applicant''), 2600 Independence Avenue SE., Washington, 
DC 20003, submitted an application for a permanent variance and interim 
order under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (``OSH Act''; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and 
other relief under section 6(d)'') from several provisions of the OSHA 
standard that regulates work in compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. IHP 
JV also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the 
application for a variance (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0001, Request for 
Variance). Specifically, the applicant seeks a variance from the 
provisions of the standard that: (1) Prohibit compressed-air worker 
exposure to pressures exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) 
except in an emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \1\ (2) require the use 
of the decompression values specified in decompression tables in 
Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR 
1926.803(f)(1)); and (3) require the use of automated operational 
controls and a special decompression chamber (29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), respectively).
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    \1\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express 
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge 
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g. 
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i. 
value specified by Sec.  1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent 
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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    According to its application, IHP JV is currently the general 
contractor for the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority's 
(``DC Water'') project to construct the Anacostia River Tunnel. The 
Anacostia River Tunnel project design requires the ability to safely 
perform hyperbaric interventions in compressed air at pressures higher 
than allowed in the existing OSHA standard 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5) which 
states: ``No employee shall be subjected to pressure exceeding 50 
p.s.i.g. except in emergency'' (see footnote 1).
    The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects 
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground 
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of 
subaqueous tunnels below the water table through soft soils consisting 
of clay, silt, and sand using advanced shielded mechanical excavation 
techniques in conjunction with an Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring 
Machine (EPBTBM).
    IHP JV employs specially trained personnel for the construction of 
the tunnel, and states that this construction project uses shielded 
mechanical-excavation techniques. IHP JV asserts that its workers 
perform hyperbaric interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. 
in the excavation chamber of the EPBTBM. The hyperbaric interventions 
consist of conducting inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-
head structure and cutting tools of the EPBTBM.
    OSHA considered IHP JV's application for a permanent variance and 
interim order. On February 11, 2015, OSHA published a preliminary 
Federal Register notice announcing IHP JV's application for a permanent 
variance and interim order, grant of an interim order, and request for 
comments (80 FR 7636) for the Anacostia River Tunnel project.

II. The Variance Application

A. Background

    IHP JV asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation, specifically 
with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to pressurize 
the entire tunnel. These advances in technology modified substantially 
the methods used by the construction industry to excavate subaqueous 
tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the current OSHA 
compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR 1926.803. Such 
advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the total duration 
of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel construction.
    Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction 
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide 
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized 
tunnel

[[Page 50653]]

face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the 
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in 
the working chamber take place only after halting tunnel excavation and 
preparing the machine and crew for an intervention. Interventions occur 
to inspect or maintain the mechanical-excavation components located in 
the working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the working chamber 
includes changing replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars, 
and, in rare cases, repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
    In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research 
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for 
construction in 1971, resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In 
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression 
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer 
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29 
CFR 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According to the 
applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose employees performing 
interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to hyperbaric pressures 
up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than maximum pressure specified 
by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)). The 
applicant asserts that these hyperbaric exposures are possible because 
of advances in hyperbaric technology, a better understanding of 
hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a project-specific HOM 
(Hyperbaric Operations Manual) that requires specialized medical 
support and hyperbaric supervision to provide assistance to a team of 
specially trained man-lock attendants and hyperbaric workers.
    The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures 
included in its application provide its workers with a place of 
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain 
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for 
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee 
representatives of affected workers with a copy of the variance 
application.\2\ The applicant also certifies that it notified its 
workers of the variance application by posting, at prominent locations 
where it normally posts workplace notices, a summary of the application 
and information specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the 
application. In addition, the applicant informed its workers and their 
representatives of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance 
application.
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    \2\ See the definition of ``Affected employee or worker'' in 
section VI. D.
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B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of 
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (See Footnote 1)

    The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions 
at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the 
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g. 
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The 
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments. 
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for 
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man 
locks if required in an emergency.
    EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and 
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use 
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads 
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that 
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier, 
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this 
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the 
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: The staging 
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the 
section of the working chamber between the man-lock door and the entry 
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is 
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
    The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level 
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging 
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure), to a maximum 
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant 
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be at or near 
atmospheric pressure. However, the applicant maintains that they may 
have to perform interventions at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
    During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one 
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the 
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a 
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working 
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber 
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression 
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew 
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or 
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working 
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
    The applicant developed a project-specific HOM for the Anacostia 
River Tunnel project (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0003, IHP JV Project-
Specific HOM) that describes in detail the hyperbaric procedures and 
required medical examinations used during the tunnel-construction 
project. The HOM is project-specific, and discusses standard operating 
procedures and emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures 
include using experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who 
have the training and experience necessary to recognize and treat 
decompression illnesses and injuries. The attendants are under the 
direct supervision of the hyperbaric supervisor and attending 
physician. In addition, procedures include medical screening and review 
of prospective compressed-air workers (CAWs). The purpose of this 
screening procedure is to vet prospective CAWs with medical conditions 
(e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular circulation, and muscle 
cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting in a cramped space (e.g., 
a man lock) for extended periods or by exposure to elevated pressures 
and compressed gas mixtures. A transportable recompression chamber 
(shuttle) is available to extract workers from the hyperbaric working 
chamber for emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle 
attaches to the topside medical lock, which is a large recompression 
chamber. The applicant believes that the procedures included in the HOM 
provide safe work conditions when interventions are necessary, 
including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.

C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To 
Use OSHA Decompression Tables

    OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires 
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A 
of 29 CFR part 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an 
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to 
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used 
during decompression with pure oxygen. The applicant asserts that these 
decompression protocols are safer for tunnel workers than the 
decompression

[[Page 50654]]

protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR part 1926, subpart S. 
Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric 
conditions in the working chamber.
    Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times, the 
1992 French Decompression Tables provide for air decompression with or 
without oxygen. IHP JV asserts that oxygen decompression has many 
benefits, including (1) keeping the partial pressure of nitrogen in the 
lungs as low as possible; (2) keeping external pressure as low as 
possible to reduce the formation of bubbles in the blood; (3) removing 
nitrogen from the lungs and arterial blood and increasing the rate of 
elimination of nitrogen; (4) improving the quality of breathing during 
decompression stops so that workers are less tired and to prevent bone 
necrosis; (5) reducing decompression time by about 33 percent as 
compared to air decompression; and (6) reducing inflammation.
    In addition, the HOM requires a physician certified in hyperbaric 
medicine to manage the medical condition of CAWs during hyperbaric 
exposures and decompression. A trained and experienced man-lock 
attendant also will be present during hyperbaric exposures and 
decompression. This man-lock attendant will operate the hyperbaric 
system to ensure compliance with the specified decompression table. A 
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric 
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly oversee all 
hyperbaric interventions, and ensure that staff follow the procedures 
delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.
    The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures, 
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The HOM establishes protocols 
and procedures that provide the basis for alternate means of protection 
for CAWs under these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols 
and procedures, the applicant requests to use the 1992 French 
Decompression Tables for hyperbaric interventions up to 52 p.s.i.g. for 
the Anacostia River Tunnel project. The applicant is committed to 
follow the decompression procedures described in the project-specific 
HOM during these interventions.

D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, 
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression

    According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric 
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's 
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions, 
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the 
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure 
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen 
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the 
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure 
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles 
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly 
referred to as ``the bends.'' This description of the etiology of DCI 
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue 
(see footnote 12 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
    The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the 
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged 
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into 
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in 
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the 
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the 
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes 
10 through 14 in this notice for references to these studies).\3\ In 
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least 
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression 
process because:
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    \3\ In the study cited in footnote 10 of this notice, starting 
at page 338, Dr. Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically 
regulated continuous decompression in the Washington State safety 
standards for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its 
decompression tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the 
union, and against the advice of the expert who calculated the 
decompression table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr. 
Kindwall then states, ``Continuous decompression is inefficient and 
wasteful. For example, if the last stage from 4 p.s.i.g. . . . to 
the surface took 1 h, at least half the time is spent at pressures 
less than 2 p.s.i.g. . . ., which provides less and less meaningful 
bubble suppression. . . .'' In addition, the report referenced in 
footnote 5 under the section titled, ``Background on the Need for 
Interim Decompression Tables'' addresses the continuous-
decompression protocol in the OSHA compressed-air standard for 
construction, noting that ``[a]side from the tables for saturation 
diving to deep depths, no other widely used or officially approved 
diving decompression tables use straight line, continuous 
decompressions at varying rates. Stage decompression is usually the 
rule, since it is simpler to control.''
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    1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and 
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly 
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock 
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of 
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression 
tables, including stops; and
    2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged 
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control 
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results 
in lower occurrences of DCI.
    Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance 
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires 
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the 
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to 
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the 
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric 
supervisor.

E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement 
of Special Decompression Chamber

    The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires 
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total 
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR 
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Use of the special decompression chamber enables 
CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent neuromuscular 
problems during decompression.
    As an alternative to using a special decompression chamber, the 
applicant notes that since only the working chamber of the EPBTBM is 
under pressure, and only a few workers out of the entire crew are 
exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks (which, as noted earlier, 
connect directly to the working chamber) and the staging chamber are of 
sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition, 
available space in the EPBTBM does not allow for an additional special 
decompression lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of 
which adequately accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose 
when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds 
75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in 
each man lock during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move 
into the staging chamber where additional space is available. This

[[Page 50655]]

alternative enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent 
neuromuscular problems during decompression.

F. Previous Tunnel Construction Variances

    OSHA notes that on May 23, 2014, it granted a sub-aqueous tunnel 
construction permanent variance to Tully/OHL USA Joint Venture (79 FR 
29809) from the same provisions of the standard that regulate work in 
compressed air (at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and 
(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application. On March 
27, 2015, OSHA also granted another sub-aqueous tunnel construction 
permanent variance to Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture (80 FR 
16440) from the same provisions of the standard that are the subject of 
the present application. Generally, the alternate conditions in this 
notice are based on and very similar to the alternate conditions of the 
previous permanent variances.

G. Multi-State Variance

    As stated earlier in this notice, IHP JV applied for a permanent 
variance and interim order for its Anacostia River Tunnel project only. 
The Anacostia River Tunnel project is located entirely in the District 
of Columbia and thus under Federal OSHA's exclusive jurisdiction. 
Therefore, any variance OSHA grants IHP JV will have effect only in the 
District of Columbia.
    Twenty-eight state safety and health plans have been approved by 
OSHA under section 18 of the (OSH) Act.\4\ As part of the permanent 
variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs 
will notify the State Plans of IHP JV's variance application and grant 
of the Anacostia River Tunnel project permanent variance.
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    \4\ Six State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
York, Maine and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety 
and health authority to state and local government employers only. 
State Plans that exercise their occupational safety and health 
authority over both public- and private-sector employers are: 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
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    Additionally, in considering IHP JV's application for a permanent 
variance and interim order, OSHA noted that four State Plans have 
previously granted sub-aqueous tunnel construction variances and 
imposed different or additional requirements and conditions 
(California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). California also 
promulgated new standards \5\ for similar sub-aqueous tunnel 
construction work.
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    \5\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7, 
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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III. Description of the Conditions Specified for the Permanent Variance

    This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29 
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides 
additional detail regarding the conditions that form the basis of IHP 
JV's permanent variance.

Condition A: Scope

    The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the work 
situations specified under this condition. Clearly defining the scope 
of the permanent variance provides IHP JV, IHP JV's employees, other 
stakeholders, the public, and OSHA with necessary information regarding 
the work situations in which the permanent variance applies.
    According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of 
employers \6\) may request a permanent variance for a specific 
workplace or workplaces (multiple sites). If granted, the variance 
applies to the specific employer(s) that submitted the application. In 
this instance, the permanent variance applies to the applicant, IHP JV, 
for its Anacostia River Tunnel project, and does not apply to any other 
employers.
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    \6\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade 
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided 
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application 
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Condition B: Application

    This condition specifies the circumstances under which the 
permanent variance is in effect, notably only for hyperbaric work 
performed during interventions. The condition places clear limits on 
the circumstances under which the applicant can expose its employees to 
hyperbaric pressure.

Condition C: List of Abbreviations

    This condition defines a number of abbreviations used in the 
permanent variance. OSHA believes that defining these abbreviations 
serves to clarify and standardize their usage, thereby enhancing the 
applicant's and its employees' understanding of the conditions 
specified by the permanent variance.

Condition D: Definitions

    The condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical terms, 
used in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their 
meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and its 
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent 
variance.

Condition E: Safety and Health Practices

    This condition requires the applicant to develop and submit to OSHA 
an HOM specific to the Anacostia River Tunnel project at least six 
months before using the EPBTBM for tunneling operations. Additionally, 
the condition includes a series of related hazard prevention and 
control requirements and methods (e.g., decompression tables, job 
hazard analysis (JHA), operations and inspections checklists, incident 
investigation, recording and notification to OSHA of recordable 
hyperbaric injuries and illnesses, etc.) designed to ensure the 
continued effective functioning of the hyperbaric equipment and 
operating system.
    Review of the HOM enables OSHA to: (1) Determine that the safety 
and health instructions and measures it specifies are appropriate and 
do adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs and that it 
conforms to the conditions of the variance; and (2) request the 
applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds that the hyperbaric 
safety and health procedures are not suitable for the specific project 
and do not adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs. Once 
approved, the project-specific HOM becomes part of the variance, thus 
enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health procedures and 
measures.\7\
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    \7\ Publication of the preliminary Federal Register notice (80 
FR 7636) announcing IHP JV's application for a permanent variance 
and grant of a project-specific interim order constituted 
acknowledgement by OSHA of the acceptability of the HOM provided by 
IHP JV for the Anacostia River Tunnel project. Further, publication 
of this Federal Register notice announcing grant of a project-
specific permanent variance constitutes acknowledgement by OSHA of 
the acceptability of IHP JV's revised HOM (Rev 1) (Ex. OSHA-2014-
0011-0009).
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Condition F: Communication

    This condition requires the applicant to develop and implement an 
effective system of information sharing and communication. Effective 
information sharing and communication ensures that affected workers 
receive updated information regarding any safety-related hazards and 
incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each 
shift. The condition also requires the applicant to ensure that 
reliable means of emergency communications are available and maintained 
for affected

[[Page 50656]]

workers and support personnel during hyperbaric operations. 
Availability of such reliable means of communication enable affected 
workers and support personnel to respond quickly and effectively to 
hazardous conditions or emergencies that may develop during EPBTBM 
operations.

Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training

    This condition requires the applicant to develop and implement an 
effective qualification and training program for affected workers. The 
condition specifies the factors that an affected worker must know to 
perform safely during hyperbaric operations, including how to enter, 
work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions under both normal and 
emergency conditions. Having well-trained and qualified workers 
performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that they recognize, 
and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and health hazards. 
These qualification and training requirements enable affected workers 
to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the discomfort and 
physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing 
injury, illness, and fatalities among workers.
    As part of the qualification and training program, paragraph 
(G)(2)(e) of this condition also requires the applicant to provide 
affected workers with information they can use to contact the 
appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe that they are 
developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement provides 
for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health effects 
resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the potential 
severity of these effects.

Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    This condition requires the applicant to develop, implement, and 
operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's 
hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated work areas. 
This condition helps to ensure the safe operation and physical 
integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct 
hyperbaric operations. The condition also enhances worker safety by 
reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
    Paragraph (H)(3) of this condition requires the applicant to 
document tests, inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving 
the EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job site for the 
duration of the job. This requirement provides the applicant with 
information needed to schedule tests and inspections to ensure the 
continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and to determine 
that the actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric equipment and 
systems were appropriate, prior to returning them to service.

Condition I: Compression and Decompression

    This condition requires the applicant to consult with its 
designated medical advisor regarding special compression or 
decompression procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW. This 
provision ensures that the applicant consults with the medical advisor, 
and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation, development, and 
implementation of compression or decompression protocols appropriate 
for any CAW requiring acclimation to the hyperbaric conditions 
encountered during EPBTBM operations. Accordingly, CAWs requiring 
acclimation have an opportunity to acclimate prior to exposure to these 
hyperbaric conditions. OSHA believes this condition will prevent or 
reduce adverse reactions among CAWs to the effects of compression or 
decompression associated with the intervention work they perform in the 
EPBTBM.

Condition J: Recordkeeping

    This condition requires the applicant to maintain records of 
specific factors associated with each hyperbaric intervention. The 
information gathered and recorded under this provision, in concert with 
the information provided under Condition K (using OSHA 301 Incident 
Report form to investigate and record hyperbaric recordable injuries as 
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), enables the 
applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent 
variance in preventing decompression illness (DCI) and other 
hyperbaric-related effects.\8\
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    \8\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping 
forms and instructions (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook 
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html); and updates 
to OSHA's recordkeeping rule Web page ((79 FR 56130); http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html)).
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Condition K: Notifications

    Under this condition, the applicant must, within specified periods: 
(1) Notify OSHA of any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient 
hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality that occur 
as a result of hyperbaric exposures during EPBTBM operations; (2) 
provide OSHA with a copy of the incident investigation report (using 
OSHA 301 form) of these events; (3) include on the 301 form information 
on the hyperbaric conditions associated with the recordable injury or 
illness, the root-cause determination, and preventive and corrective 
actions identified and implemented by the applicant; and (4) its 
certification that it informed affected workers of the incident and the 
results of the incident investigation.
    This condition also requires the applicant to: Notify the Office of 
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and the 
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office within 15 working days should the 
applicant need to revise its HOM to accommodate changes in its 
compressed-air operations that affect its ability to comply with the 
conditions of the permanent variance; and provide OSHA's OTPCA and the 
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office, at the end of the project, with a 
report evaluating the effectiveness of the decompression tables.
    These notification requirements enable the applicant, its 
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent 
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's 
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke 
the conditions of the permanent variance. Timely notification permits 
OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and appropriate to 
prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to 
employees informs them of the precautions taken by the applicant to 
prevent similar incidents in the future.
    This condition also requires the applicant to notify OSHA if it 
ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its main 
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance 
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that OSHA 
must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a successor 
company. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate effectively with 
the applicant regarding the status of the permanent variance, and 
expedite the Agency's administration and enforcement of the permanent 
variance. Stipulating that an applicant must have OSHA's approval to 
transfer a variance to a successor company provides assurance that the 
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the 
conditions specified by the permanent variance, thereby ensuring the 
safety of workers involved in

[[Page 50657]]

performing the operations covered by the permanent variance.

IV. Comments on the Proposed Variance Application

    OSHA received one public comment on the proposed variance 
application. Mr. Barry Cole (safety specialist) representing Cole-
Preferred Safety Consulting, Inc., supported granting the permanent 
variance (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0008). In his comment, Mr. Cole made 
two suggestions. First, he proposed that OSHA should allow the 
applicant substantially more room to work beyond the anticipated 
hyperbaric pressure of 52 p.s.i.g., by changing the upper hyperbaric 
pressure limit of the variance from 52 p.s.i.g. to ``the level 
necessary to maintain safety on the face, and/up to the design/rating 
limits of the machinery described.'' Second, he recommended that OSHA 
should issue a letter of interpretation (LOI) that allows all tunnel 
construction companies working under hyperbaric conditions ``to be 
allowed to use the stepped method of depressurization, as per 
engineering/medical data and schedules (such as but not limited to the 
French scale), as it is the best/safest practice, and the original 
standard should have included it, even if the preference was for some 
reason to use auto/straight line [decompression]. Either may be 
allowed, under my proposed letter of interpretation.''
    The remainder of this section describes OSHA's response to Mr. 
Cole's comments.
    First, OSHA finds that the recommendation to increase the upper 
hyperbaric pressure limit of the variance from 52 p.s.i.g. to the level 
necessary to maintain safety at the face of the EPBTBM (up to 75 
p.s.i.g.), is well beyond the scope of the requested variance. 
Therefore, OSHA will not modify the permanent variance.
    Initially, IHP JV sought a permanent variance for work in 
hyperbaric environments up to 50 p.s.i.g., as indicated in its 
Anacostia River Tunnel project-specific HOM. The HOM stated that in the 
unlikely event that working pressures exceeding the anticipated maximum 
of 50 p.s.i.g. are required during interventions, an amendment will be 
prepared and added to the HOM. Following discussions with the 
applicant, and in response to the applicant's request, OSHA is granting 
an increase in the upper hyperbaric pressure limit of the variance from 
50 p.s.i.g. to 52 p.s.i.g. This increase will: (1) Provide greater 
flexibility and timeliness for responding to unanticipated conditions 
such as the need for increased face pressure (exceeding 50 p.s.i.g.) in 
the excavation chamber of the EPBTBM during interventions; and (2) 
maintain consistency with the upper hyperbaric pressure limit of 52 
p.s.i.g. included in the variance OSHA granted to Traylor Skanska Jay 
Dee Joint Venture (80 FR 16440) for completing the Blue Plains Tunnel, 
another phase of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority's 
(``DC Water'') Clean Rivers project. Subsequently, IHP JV submitted a 
revised Anacostia River Tunnel project-specific HOM (Rev. 1; see Ex. 
OSHA-2014-0011-0009) for work in hyperbaric environments up to 52 
p.s.i.g.
    Second, OSHA finds that the recommendation to publish a LOI on 
stepped decompression using the French or other tables is well beyond 
the scope of this variance. Therefore, OSHA will not undertake issuing 
an LOI that allows tunnel construction companies working under 
hyperbaric conditions to operate under the conditions of previously 
granted variances. Moreover, the grant of this variance is conditioned 
on OSHA's approval of the applicant's HOM, and such a procedure would 
not be possible under a LOI.
    Further, broader, industry-wide issues such as the setting of 
hyperbaric exposure and decompression limits for all tunneling work 
would be more appropriately resolved through the rulemaking process. In 
recognition of this, on December 6, 2012, OSHA published a Federal 
Register notice (77 FR 72781) announcing a request for information 
(RFI) for its continuing regulatory reviews named standards improvement 
projects (SIPs). The Agency is currently working on SIP-Phase IV (SIP-
IV). As part of SIP-IV, OSHA is considering updating the decompression 
tables in Appendix A (1926.803 (f)(1)). This proposed action would 
permit employers to use decompression procedures and updated 
decompression tables that take advantage of new hyperbaric technologies 
used widely in extreme hyperbaric exposures. If the planned SIP-IV 
revises Appendix A, IHP JV (and similar tunneling contractors 
previously granted a variance) will no longer need to obtain a variance 
from the use of decompression values specified in decompression tables 
in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR 
1926.803(f)(1)). However, they would still require hyperbaric tunneling 
variances to address portions of the standard not proposed to be 
covered by SIP-IV (i.e., 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5); .803(g)(1)(iii) and 
.803(g)(1)(xvii)).
    If SIP-IV is completed (including the planned update of the 
decompression tables in Appendix A (1926.803 (f)(1)), OSHA will modify 
IHP JV's and similar variances granted to other employers to include 
the applicable SIP-IV provisions as appropriate.

V. Decision

    As noted earlier, on February 11, 2015, OSHA published a 
preliminary Federal Register notice announcing IHP JV's application for 
a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an interim order, and 
request for comments (80 FR 7636).
    During the period starting with the February 11, 2015, publication 
of the preliminary Federal Register notice announcing grant of the 
interim order, until completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel or the 
Agency modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on its 
application for a permanent variance, the applicant was required to 
comply fully with the conditions of the interim order as an alternative 
to complying with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803 (hereafter, ``the 
standard'') that:
    A. Prohibit employers using compressed air under hyperbaric 
conditions from subjecting workers to pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g., 
except in emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5));
    B. Require the use of decompression values specified by the 
decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard (29 
CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
    C. Require the use of automated operational controls and a special 
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), 
respectively).
    After reviewing the proposed alternative measures, OSHA determined 
that:
    A. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, effective 
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under 
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The alternative measures 
include use of engineering and administrative controls of the hazards 
associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions exceeding 
50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous tunnel 
using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in conjunction 
with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the EPBTBM's 
pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel excavation and 
prepares the machine and crew to conduct the interventions. 
Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair of the 
mechanical-excavation

[[Page 50658]]

components located in the working chamber.
    B. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric 
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical 
examinations for the project's CAWs. The applicant compiled these 
standard operating procedures into a project-specific HOM. The HOM 
discusses the procedures and personnel qualifications for performing 
work safely during the compression and decompression phases of 
interventions. The HOM also specifies the decompression tables the 
applicant proposes to use. Depending on the maximum working pressure 
and exposure times during the interventions, the tables provide for 
decompression using air, pure oxygen, or a combination of air and 
oxygen. The decompression tables also include delays or stops for 
various time intervals at different pressure levels during the 
transition to atmospheric pressure (i.e., staged decompression). In all 
cases, a physician certified in hyperbaric medicine will manage the 
medical condition of CAWs during decompression. In addition, a trained 
and experienced man-lock attendant, experienced in recognizing 
decompression sickness or illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of 
key importance, a hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in 
hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise 
all hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures 
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
    C. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, a training program 
to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with conducting 
hyperbaric operations.
    D. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective 
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously 
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the 
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the 
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to 
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent 
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit 
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor, and 
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all 
hyperbaric operations.
    E. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective 
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by 
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be 
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the 
working chamber) at elevated pressure. The applicant limits 
interventions conducted in the working chamber to performing required 
inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting tools on the face of 
the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber provide 
sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to stand up and 
move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up to 360 
minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the EPBTBM's man 
lock and working chamber function as effectively as the special 
decompression chamber required by the standard.
    OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding 
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method 
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) proposed by the applicant 
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the 
standard. Based on this review, OSHA preliminarily determined that 
decompressions conducted in tunneling operations performed with tables 
\9\ result in a lower occurrence of DCI than the decompression tables 
specified by the standard.10 11 12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974 
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A 
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear) 
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and 
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times 
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
    \10\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed-air tunneling and caisson 
work decompression procedures: Development, problems, and solutions. 
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article 
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19 
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence 
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA 
standard.
    \11\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric 
environment: Medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations. 
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article 
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures 
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence 
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington 
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to 
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51 
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g., 
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
    \12\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled ``Criteria for Interim 
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers;'' this report 
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries 
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on 
NIOSH's Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies 
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables 
result in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified 
by the standard. For example, H. L. Anderson studied the occurrence of 
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43 
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \13\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to 
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson 
observed 6 DCI cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported 
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI 
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H.L. Andersen is 
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the 
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in 
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression 
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA 
decompression tables, nor did OSHA find any studies indicating that the 
1992 French Decompression Tables were more hazardous to employees than 
the OSHA decompression tables.\14\ Therefore, OSHA concludes that use 
of the 1992 French Decompression Tables protect workers at least as 
effectively as the OSHA decompression tables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during 
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and 
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
    \14\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F 
(September 1996). Compressed-air work--French tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical 
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp. 
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2014-0011-0004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State 
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) 
\15\ or promulgated a new standard (California)\16\ for hyperbaric 
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work, 
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application, 
OSHA is granting the permanent variance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs. 
OSHA-2014-0011-0005 (Nevada), OSHA-2014-0011-0006 (Oregon), and 
OSHA-2014-0011-0007 (Washington).
    \16\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7, 
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on the record discussed above, the 
Agency finds that when the employer complies

[[Page 50659]]

with the conditions of the following order, the working conditions of 
the employer's workers are at least as safe and healthful as if the 
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraphs 
(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803. Under 
the terms of this variance, IHP JV must: (1) Comply with the conditions 
listed below under ``Specific Conditions of the Permanent Variance'' 
for the period between the date of this notice and completion of the 
Anacostia River Tunnel project, but no later than December 31, 2016; 
(2) comply fully with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 
1926; and (3) provide a copy of this Federal Register notice to all 
employees affected by the conditions, including the affected employees 
of other employers, using the same means it used to inform these 
employees of its application for a permanent variance. This order will 
remain in effect until one of the following conditions occurs: (1) 
Completion of the IHP JV Anacostia River Tunnel project but no later 
than December 31, 2016; or (2) OSHA modifies or revokes this final 
order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.

VI. Order

    As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the 
interim order granted to the employer on February 11, 2015 (80 FR 
7636).
    OSHA issues this final order authorizing Impregilo Healy Parsons 
Joint Venture, (``IHP JV'' or ``the applicant''), to comply with the 
following conditions instead of complying with the requirements of 
paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and 
(g)(1)(xvii). This final order applies to Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint 
Venture at the Anacostia River Tunnel project in Washington, DC. These 
conditions are:

A. Scope

    The permanent variance applies only to work:
    1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Anacostia 
River Tunnel project, a subaqueous tunnel constructed using advanced 
shielded mechanical-excavation techniques and involving operation of an 
EPBTBM;
    2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to 
52 p.s.i.g. at the Anacostia River Tunnel project;
    3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and 
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress 
employees entering and exiting the working chamber;
    4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), 
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), IHP JV must comply fully with 
all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and
    5. This order will remain in effect until one of the following 
conditions occurs: (1) Completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel 
project, but no later than December 31, 2016; or (2) OSHA modifies or 
revokes this final order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.

B. Application

    The permanent variance applies only when IHP JV stops the tunnel-
boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs either enter 
the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e., inspect, maintain, 
or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or exit the working 
chamber after performing interventions.

C. List of Abbreviations

    Abbreviations used throughout this permanent variance include the 
following:

1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
3. DCI--Decompression Illness
4. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
5. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
6. JHA--Job hazard analysis
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities

D. Definitions

    The following definitions apply to this permanent variance. These 
definitions supplement the definitions in IHP JV's project-specific 
HOM.
    1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is 
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of 
his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has the 
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
    2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea-level, 
generally, 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
    3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained 
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment 
while breathing air at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
    4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying 
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working 
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, 
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to 
eliminate them.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Decompression illness--an illness (also called decompression 
sickness (DCS) or the bends) caused by gas bubbles appearing in body 
compartments due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of 
symptoms of decompression illness include (but are not limited to): 
joint pain (also known as the `bends' for agonizing pain or the 
`niggles' for slight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric 
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a 
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as 
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction); 
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial 
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See Appendix 10 of ``A Guide to the Work in Compressed-Air 
Regulations 1996,'' published by the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention but 
not considered symptoms of DCI can include: barotrauma (direct damage 
to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses and 
lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in consciousness that 
may occur in hyperbaric environments and is caused by the anesthetic 
effect of certain gases at high pressure); and oxygen toxicity (a 
central nervous system condition resulting from the harmful effects of 
breathing molecular oxygen (O2) at elevated partial 
pressures).
    6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery 
used to excavate the tunnel.
    7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that 
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable 
atmosphere.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
    9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of 
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric 
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting, 
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
    10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific 
health and safety plan developed and implemented by IHP JV for working 
in compressed air

[[Page 50660]]

during the construction of the Anacostia River Tunnel.
    11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to 
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
    12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used 
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either 
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
    13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as 
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
    14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of 
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
    15. p.s.i.a--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute pressure, 
is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At sea-
level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding 14.7 to 
a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute 
pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
    16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of 
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure 
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is 
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in 
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
    17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a 
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by 
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully 
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the 
subject matter, the work, or the project.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs 
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.

E. Safety and Health Practices

    1. IHP JV must develop and implement a project-specific HOM, and 
submit the HOM to OSHA for approval at least six months before using 
the EPBTBM. IHP JV must receive a written acknowledgement from OSHA 
regarding the acceptability of the HOM.\21\ The HOM shall provide the 
governing safety and health requirements regarding hyperbaric exposures 
during the tunnel-construction project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See footnote 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. IHP JV must implement the safety and health instructions 
included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the EPBTBM, and 
the safety and health instructions provided by the manufacturer for the 
operation of decompression equipment.
    3. IHP JV must use air as the only breathing gas in the working 
chamber.
    4. IHP JV must use the 1992 French Decompression Tables for air, 
air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the HOM, 
specifically, the tables titled, ``French Regulation Air Standard 
Tables.''
    5. IHP JV must equip man locks used by its employees with an 
oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. IHP JV must not store 
oxygen or other compressed gases used in conjunction with hyperbaric 
work in the tunnel.
    6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions must use 
flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
    7. In hyperbaric work areas, IHP JV must maintain an adequate fire-
suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
    8. IHP JV must develop and implement one or more JHAs for work in 
the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically, and as necessary 
(e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that affects its 
operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected employees. The JHAs 
must include all the job functions that the risk assessment \22\ 
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for 
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. IHP JV must develop a set of checklists to guide compressed-air 
work and ensure that employees follow the procedures required by this 
permanent variance (including all procedures required by the HOM, which 
this permanent variance incorporates by reference). The checklists must 
include all steps and equipment functions that the risk assessment 
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness during compressed-
air work.
    10. IHP JV must ensure that the safety and health provisions of the 
HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors and 
subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for 
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program 
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Communication

    1. Prior to beginning a shift, IHP JV must implement a system that 
informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any hazardous 
occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety, including 
hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth or rock 
slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
    2. IHP JV must provide a power-assisted means of communication 
among affected workers and support personnel in hyperbaric conditions 
where unassisted voice communication is inadequate.
    (a) IHP JV must use an independent power supply for powered 
communication systems, and these systems must operate such that use or 
disruption of any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the 
operation of the system from any other location.
    (b) IHP JV must test communication systems at the start of each 
shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.

G. Worker Qualifications and Training

    IHP JV must:
    1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on 
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency 
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this 
training.
    2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric 
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure 
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The 
instruction must include topics such as:
    (a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
    (b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
    (c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and 
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric 
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen 
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity);
    (d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression; 
and
    (e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate 
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may 
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
    3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (2) of this 
condition periodically, and as necessary (e.g., after making changes to 
its hyperbaric operations).
    4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers, make this 
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's 
national office and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office before the 
training takes place.

[[Page 50661]]

H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

    1. IHP JV must initiate and maintain a program of frequent and 
regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support 
systems (such as temperature control, illumination, ventilation, and 
fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and hyperbaric work 
areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
    (a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person 
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work 
areas; and
    (b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks 
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
    2. If the competent person determines that the equipment 
constitutes a safety hazard, IHP JV must remove the equipment from 
service until it corrects the hazardous condition and has the 
correction approved by a qualified person.
    3. IHP JV must maintain records of all tests and inspections of the 
EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and repairs, at the 
job site for the duration of the job.

I. Compression and Decompression

    IHP JV must consult with its attending physician concerning the 
need for special compression or decompression exposures appropriate for 
CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.

J. Recordkeeping

    IHP JV must maintain a record of any recordable injuries, 
illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or 
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from exposure of an 
employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA 301 Incident 
Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses.
    Note: Examples of important information to include on the OSHA 301 
Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on the 
form) must address the following: the task performed (Question (Q) 14); 
an estimate of the CAW's workload (Q 14); the composition of the gas 
mixture (e.g., air or oxygen); the pressure worked at (Q 14); 
temperature in the work and decompression environments (Q 14); did 
something unusual occur during the task or decompression (Q 14); time 
of symptom onset (Q 15); duration of time between decompression and 
onset of symptoms (Q 15); nature and duration of symptoms (Q 16); a 
medical summary of the illness or injury (Q 16); duration of the 
hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); any possible contributing factors (Q 
17); the number of prior interventions completed by injured or ill CAW 
(Q 17); the number of prior interventions completed by injured or ill 
CAW at that pressure (Q 17); the contact information for the treating 
healthcare provider (Q 17); and the date and time of last hyperbaric 
exposure for this CAW.
    In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and 
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, IHP JV must 
maintain records of:
    1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent 
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing), 
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
    2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric 
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
    3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric 
work time at each pressure.
    4. The post-intervention physical assessment of each individual CAW 
for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma, nitrogen 
narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated with work 
in compressed air or mixed gasses for each hyperbaric intervention.

K. Notifications

    1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein, 
IHP JV must:
    (a) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office of 
any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, 
amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed 
OSHA 301 Incident Report form \24\) resulting from exposure of an 
employee to hyperbaric conditions including those that do not require 
recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity, 
barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria 
(of 29 CFR 1904). The employer shall provide the notification within 8 
hours of the incident, or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable 
injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an 
eye, or fatality, and submit a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA 
form 301) within 24 hours of the incident, or 24 hours after becoming 
aware of a recordable injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization, 
amputation, loss of an eye, or fatality. In addition to the information 
required by the OSHA form 301, the incident-investigation report must 
include a root-cause determination, and the preventive and corrective 
actions identified and implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See footnote 8.
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    (b) Provide certification within 15 days of the incident that the 
employer informed affected workers of the incident and the results of 
the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and 
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
    (c) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office 
within 15 working days in writing of any change in the compressed-air 
operations that affects IHP JV's ability to comply with the conditions 
specified herein.
    (d) Upon completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel project, evaluate 
the effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the 
project, and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA 
and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office.

    Note:  The evaluation report is to contain summaries of: (1) The 
number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric 
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented 
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the 
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the 
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or 
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded 
on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant medical diagnoses and 
treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root-causes, and preventive 
and corrective actions identified and implemented.

    (e) To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified 
herein, inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office as 
soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
    (i) Cease to do business;
    (ii) Change the location and address of the main office for 
managing the tunneling operations specified by the project-specific 
HOM; or
    (iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor 
company.
    (f) Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the 
same means required to inform them of its application for a variance.
    2. OSHA must approve the transfer of this permanent variance to a 
successor company.

Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of

[[Page 50662]]

this notice. Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to 
29 U.S.C. 655(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912, 
Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.

    Signed at Washington, DC, August 14, 2015.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-20571 Filed 8-19-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P


