U.S. Department of Labor	Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center

 tc \l2 "Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 

61 Forsyth St., SW, Room 6T50

 tc \l1 "61 Forsyth St., SW, Room 6T50 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Phone:	404/562-2300

 tc \l3 "Phone:	404/562-2300 

	Approved for Issuance________

	A/S Initials ________

MEMORANDUM FOR:        JOHN H. HENSHAW

	ASSISTANT SECRETARY

THROUGH:			R. DAVIS LAYNE

	DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

	

	RICHARD FAIRFAX, DIRECTOR

DIRECTORATE OF COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

FROM:	CINDY COE LASETER

	REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR

SUBJECT:	Notification of Significant Enforcement Action --

	Rouse Polymerics International Inc., Vicksburg, MS

	Inspection #304314172

Total Penalty: $210,600

ISSUE(S):

This memorandum is to notify you of Region IV’s intention to issue
citations to Rouse Polymerics International, Inc. with a proposed
penalty of $210,600.  The six-month statute of limitations for issuing
these citations expires on November 15, 2002. The Jackson area office
plans to issue the citations after receiving approval from the National
Office.

COMPANY BACKGROUND:

Rouse Polymerics International, Inc. is a non-union company located at
1000 Rubber Way, Vicksburg, Mississippi.  This is a fabricated rubber
products company with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code of
3069.  There are 98 total employees at this facility.  Rubber
Industries, Inc. (RII) was formed as a Mississippi business corporation
on June 20, 1988.  On November 29, 1988, the corporate name was changed
to Rouse Rubber Industries, Inc. (RRII), and then on May 9, 2002, the
corporate name was changed to Rouse Polymerics International, Inc.
(RPII).  Michael W. Rouse has always been listed as Director and
President for each corporation.  RPII grinds customer supplied rubber
scrap tire shreds, tire peels, or tire buffings to a -80 to -200 mesh
particle size.  The size reduction is accomplished in a four-step
process of shredding, cracking, grinding, and fine grinding. This
vulcanized material is sold packaged in 17, 21, and 50 pound bags or in
approximately 1700 pound totes to major tire and tire peel
manufacturers, asphalt formulators, and other rubber manufacturers.   

 

OSHA INSPECTION HISTORY:

RPII has had no prior inspections; however the Jackson Area Office
inspected RRII on March 19, 1997, as the result of a formal complaint of
four unsafe working conditions.  Serious and other violations were
documented and citations issued for housekeeping and electrical
violations.  

REASON FOR INSPECTION:

This inspection was initiated as the result of a fire and explosion that
occurred on May 16, 2002, at approximately 6:00 PM.  Eleven RPII
employees were taken to area hospitals for serious burn injuries. 
During the course of the two weeks following the incident, five
employees died as a result of their injuries.

On May 16, 2002, between 4:00 PM and 4:30 PM, a fire started on the roof
area atop the bagging bin near the base of the bag house as a result of
hot or smoldering rubber dust which had previously been vented onto the
roof through the #2 dryer system exhaust stack.  Due to the negative
pressure created inside the top of the bagging bin by the bag house
blower/vacuum system, it is concluded that the hot, or smoldering,
embers were sucked into the bin causing the violent dust deflagration. 
At approximately 6:02 PM, an explosion occurred in the bagging bin above
the mezzanine in the southwest corner of the production area.  The
explosion caused the bagging bin and the reversible screw conveyor to
rupture, and ignited dust that had accumulated on building surfaces. 
They in turn fueled secondary explosions that traveled at subsonic rates
through the plant in search of more fuel.  Surviving victims described
dusty work conditions just prior to the explosion and detailed how the
fire moved quickly into their work areas hampering their escape. 

CITATION/PENALTY SUMMARY:

Citations will be issued for 22 serious violations with a penalty of
$84,600, and 2 willful violations with a penalty of $126,000.  In order
to achieve the appropriate deterrent effect, the Area Director
determined that a gravity base penalty of $7,000 [See FIRM, Chapter
IV-11, C.2.g.(3)] for the serious and $70,000 for the willful are
necessary for those violations related to the fatalities.  Per the FIRM,
Chapter IV-7, C.1.c., the Area Director determined that no penalty
reductions will be given for size due to the number of employees who
were fatally injured as a result of the unsafe working conditions.  A
10% reduction was given on all violations for history, as the company
has had no serious violations within the last 3 years.  No penalty
reduction was given for good faith as there are willful violations and
serious violations with high gravity.   

The total proposed penalty to be issued to this employer is $210,600.

VIOLATION SUMMARY:

The serious violations include a Section 5(a)(1) for a forklift not
provided with a seatbelt, and a Section 5(a)(1) for exposing employees
to fire and explosion hazards due to overheating of rubber product,
which is directly related to the fatalities; missing guardrails on
platforms; low overhead obstructions, fall arrest equipment not used
when working in a genie lift; lack of specific Lockout/Tagout
procedures; lack of fire fighting training; LPG powered industrial
trucks were not approved for Class II, Division 1 locations; unguarded
screw conveyors; unguarded pedestal grinder; unguarded mechanical power
transmission equipment; compressed air used for personal cleaning not
reduced to 30 p.s.i.; uncapped oxygen, acetylene and argon cylinders;
oxygen and acetylene cylinders not separated; unidentified electrical
circuits, unguarded live electrical parts, ungrounded electric pump atop
a diesel fuel storage tank, and  improper use of flexible electric
cords. 

The willful violations, which are directly related to the fatalities,
include failure to keep the facility free from the hazardous
accumulation of rubber dust; and electrical equipment which was not
approved for a Class II, Division 1 hazardous location was installed and
in use in the facility at the time of the May 16, 2002 explosion.

For a detailed description of the violation items and associated
penalties, please refer to the attached Violation Summary. 

Section 5(a)(1) JUSTIFICATION:

Citation 1, Item 1:

(a)       The employer failed to keep the workplace free of a hazard to
which employees  were exposed:

There was no seat belt on the operator’s seat of the 1979-1980 model
Clark LPG powered industrial truck used by the maintenance personnel at
the facility.  There were seatbelt-mounting lugs on either side of the
operator’s seat.  

(b)	The hazard was recognized:

Charles White, Maintenance Supervisor, drove and operated the powered
industrial truck in the maintenance department.  The powered industrial
truck was manufactured in 1979. The forklift was purchased without seat
belts. Burke Handling Systems, Jackson, MS, reviewed their records and
provided documentation that in 1985, Clark began a retro fit program to
install seatbelts on forklifts at the request of the owner of the
forklift.  According to Clark’s records, this lift truck had been
retrofitted with a seat belt.  All other forklifts at the facility were
equipped with seatbelts.

(c)        The hazard was causing or was likely to cause death or
serious physical harm:

Employees have been crushed to death by being pinned under overturned
powered industrial trucks.  The more current version – ASME B56.1-2000
– Safety Standard for Low Lift and High Lift Trucks, recognizes the
possibility of trucks tipping over, and the need for the use of an
operator restraint system in the event that a powered industrial truck
overturns or tips over. 

(d)        There was a feasible and useful method to correct the hazard:

Clark manufacturers a seat belt retrofit kit for this model lift truck. 
Burke Handling Systems, Inc. has the ability to install a retrofit
package.

Citation 1, Item 2:

The employer failed to keep the workplace free of a hazard to which
employees were exposed:

Employees were exposed to the hazard of fire and explosion where rubber
dust was being overheated during processing and no explosion suppression
system was in place to prevent a dust explosion from occurring inside
the work area.  The use of cyclone separators immediately downstream of
a flash dryer, whose drying medium was air that could easily be heated
to a temperature in excess of the rubber product’s auto-ignition
temperature (770 degrees F.), virtually assured that some rubber
material would be heated to ignition.  The thermocouple used to control
process temperatures in the line #2 dryer circuit was routinely covered
with rubber product.  This would indicate artificially low temperatures
for the process gases exiting the cyclones, particularly after a
re-start of the plant.  These artificially low temperatures would then
contribute to the overheating mechanism associated with the interaction
between the flash dryer and cyclones.

(b)	The hazard was recognized:

The Rouse facility in Vicksburg, MS was incapable of safely processing
material with the particle size distribution, auto-ignition temperature
and the low ignition energy characteristics of the 80-mesh product.  The
experiences of “backfires” in the dryer exhaust duct and fires on
the roof are evidence to management that the system was not operating
properly.  The fact that a combustible dust heated to its ignition
temperature would cause combustion should have been obvious.  It was an
expectation that the operator check the roof during processing to make
sure “no coals or fire or dust” were coming out of the stack.  The
Material Safety Data Sheet for all of RPII’s products address the NFPA
fire hazard ratings and fire and explosion hazard data in Sections I and
IV.

(c)	The hazard was causing or was likely to cause death or serious
physical harm:

As a result of the May 16, 2002 explosion, eleven Rouse Polymerics
employees suffered burns. Five of the eleven died due to burns-induced
pneumonia.  The degree to which they were burned was the result of the
finely ground, air-borne rubber dust having settled on their skin and on
their clothing.  The fatality victims all suffered 2nd & 3rd degree
burns over >50% of their bodies.

(d)	There was a feasible and useful method to correct the hazard:

Two feasible methods of abatement would be to utilize either an
explosion suppression system in accordance with NFPA 69, or deflagration
vents in accordance with NFPA 68.  This equipment, which can eliminate
or reduce the effects of a deflagration represents the “last line of
defense” between a primary explosion confined to a piece of equipment
and one that evolves into a series of disastrous secondary explosions. 
It is worth noting that it is often the secondary explosions that
produce the greatest damage in an industrial dust explosion. 

Citation 1, Item 5 [Section 5(a)(1) in the alternative]: 

The employer failed to keep the workplace free of a hazard to which
employees were exposed:

All maintenance employees including the Maintenance Supervisor, Charles
White, used the Genie self-propelled extensible boom-supported aerial
work platform while performing maintenance and lubrication of equipment
at elevated heights up to approximately 25 feet above floor level. 
Other maintenance work included changing motors and performing cutting
and welding operations.  Employees also used the lift while spraying
water during incipient stage fire fighting activities.

(b)	The hazard was recognized:

The maintenance supervisor and employees said they had a harness
available in the tool room but one was not kept on the lift available
for use at all times.  Employees were not required to wear the fall
arrest equipment.  ANSI A92.5-1992, Boom Supported Elevating Work
Platforms, recognizes the need for fall protection when utilizing work
platforms of this type.

(c)	The hazard was causing or was likely to cause death or serious
physical harm:

Falls of approximately 25 feet from the work platform to the concrete
floor would result in death or serious physical harm.

 

(d)	There was a feasible and useful method to correct the hazard:

Follow ANSI A92.5-1992, Boom Supported Elevating Work Platforms, Section
8.8g. Ensure that employees utilize the fall arrest equipment when
performing work from the Genie self-propelled extensible boom-supported
aerial work platform.

WILLFUL JUSTIFICATION:

(2-1) 29 CFR 1910.22(a)(1)

The employer committed a willful violation of 1910.22(a)(1) by
displaying plain indifference to employee safety by continuing to expose
employees to fire and explosion hazards where finely ground rubber dust
was allowed to accumulate on walls, ledges, and in the rafters of the
facility without properly maintaining the housekeeping of the facility.

Following the fire on May 16, 2002, thick dust accumulations were found
throughout the plant, even in areas not disturbed by fire.  Dust was
found on conduit, on horizontal support beams, on ceiling light
fixtures, on top of motor control panels, inside electrical control
panels and switch boxes, piled up against I-beams at floor level, 1-2
inches deep at roof level on top of bar joists, and under bagging
equipment.

Rouse management is aware of the requirements of the OSHA standard on
housekeeping as the company was issued a citation on April 7, 1997, for
a violation of 1910.22(a)(1) which addressed the hazard of rubber dust
accumulation.  The owner, Mike Rouse, was aware of the April, 1997,
violation and of the hazardous build up of rubber dust that coated the
floor and electrical boxes.

Rouse management is also aware of the hazards of reprocessed ground
rubber as they have knowledge of the material safety data sheet (MSDS),
which states, “(this product will ignite when exposed to heat or
flame.”  “A dust explosion hazard exists with hard rubber in the
powder form.  Extreme precautions should be taken to prevent
accumulations of rubber dust in the air surrounding work
environments.”   In 2001, Rouse changed the flowability additive for
rubber dust from talc to silica-based, which management said was to get
more material through the safety screens, thereby achieving better
production.  However, according to Peter Schmidt, P.E. and consultant,
changing to a silica-based additive also increased the likelihood of a
secondary explosion.  This can be attributed to layers of rubber dust
becoming airborne and forming a dust cloud following a primary
explosion.  

Rouse management is aware of several fires that have occurred at this
facility as a result of rubber dust accumulation.  During the period
from 1989 to the present, there were a total of 89 fire/alarm incidents
reported to the local fire department.  Employees reported that they had
been burned multiple times as a result of these fires during their
employment at RPII, and the OSHA 200 log confirmed those injuries. 
Management has been made aware of the occurrence of fires through daily
logs that were turned in each day.  Both the owner and the operations
manager each made reference to specific fires that had occurred in 1992,
and on February 13, 2002, respectively, where a major contributory
factor in the spread of both fires was the large accumulation of rubber
dust in the facility, which resulted in extensive property damage. A
maintenance supervisor was made aware of dust accumulation hazards prior
to the May 16, 2002, fire, as he was told by his maintenance employees
that there was going to be a fire if the production operators are not
prevented from blowing down and creating dust clouds, thereby allowing
rubber dust to accumulate on equipment and building structure surfaces. 
The maintenance supervisor related this information to his superior
managers.

Rouse management failed to institute controls to help eliminate and/or
reduce the dust accumulation as evidenced through failed attempts to
shutdown the plant in order to clean up the accumulated dust.  The
operations manager was aware that rubber dust could escape from the
enclosed drying system, yet failed to utilize any fixed dust collection
systems such as explosion proof vacuum cleaners to assist with
housekeeping efforts.  

(2-2) 29 CFR 1910.307(b)

The employer committed a willful violation by displaying plain
indifference to employee safety by exposing employees to fire and
explosion hazards where electrical equipment was not approved for Class
II, Division 1 hazardous locations was used, where finely ground rubber
dust with a dust cloud minimum ignition energy of five (5) millijoules
was likely to be entrained in the air during normal operation.  Michael
W. Rouse has a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering and is a pioneer in
the production of finely ground crumb rubber.  While answering an
interview question about what caused the 1992 fire in the #7 and #8
special grind area, he said,  “my understanding was it started in the
electrical switchgear and it jumped up and got in the storage bins in
that part of the plant and that is what was destroyed...” Yet after
the 1992, the 1995, and the February 2002 fires, which destroyed
portions of the plant, no electrical upgrades to Class II, Division 1
and 2 were made to the electrical equipment at the facility.  The
company paid for its senior electrician to attend a college electrical
certification where he obtained a copy of the National Electric Code,
which is maintained at the Rouse facility.  

RRII wrote a response letter to the Mississippi Department of
Environmental Quality, Office of Pollution Control, dated September 21,
1995, following an in-house investigation of a fire that occurred on
Monday, September 18, 1995.  The fire destroyed roll grinders inside the
plant and flames traveled up conveying systems and through the roof. 
The RRII letter said “an internal investigation into the cause of the
fire revealed that an electrical function (sic) box developed a loose
connection creating a sparking action.  These sparks ignited the rubber
dust that was being processed.”  The letter goes on to say, “RRII is
also committed to a long-term upgrade of their electrical switchgear,
motor controls center and electrical wiring system which will eliminate
electrical sparking that creates fire potential such as occurred on
September 18, 1995.”

Early into the investigation the OSHA compliance officers observed the
presence of explosion-proof light fixtures in the ceilings, but without
any threaded seals present at the junction boxes to prevent the entry of
airborne combustible dusts or vapors.  Three instances were documented
in the area near the Bagging Bin Mezzanine.  Hazards such as burned
extension cords; NEMA 1 receptacle boxes and non-explosion proof switch
boxes were found throughout the facility.  The investigation also
revealed open holes in electrical control panels and switch boxes as
well as rubber dust buildup in the bottom of these boxes.

Operations Manager Eugene Payne knew that dust entered electrical
control boxes. He was aware that it was necessary for electricians to
vacuum the dust from those boxes.  Walter Doss, Sr. confirmed that he
would have his assistant vacuum the boxes when time permitted, rather
than install the proper seals or upgrade to Class II equipment.  Mr.
Doss also confirmed that much of the electrical equipment was old and
had not been replaced or upgraded since the buildings were purchased by
RPII.  

OSHA/SOL PRE-CITATION REVIEW PROCESS: 

The Regional OSHA Office and Regional Solicitor’s Office have reviewed
the case file and are in concurrence with the proposed citations and
penalties.

CONCERNED PARTIES:

Senator Thad Cochran (R)

Senator Trent Lott (R)	

U.S. Congressman Bennie G. Thompson (D)	         		

PRESS:

We propose that a press release be issued at the Regional level.

VIOLATION SUMMARY

 tc \l5 "VIOLATION SUMMARY 

ROUSE POLYMERICS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

INSPECTION NO. 304314172

ITEM	

STANDARD	

DESCRIPTION	

GBP/ADJ

FACTORS	

PENALTY



SERIOUS:



1-1	

Section 5(a)(1)	

Employees were exposed to crushing hazards where the seatbelt had been
removed from the Clark forklift (model #C500-S80, S/N 685-0040-4451).	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-2	

Section 5(a)(1)	

Employees were exposed to fire and explosion hazards due to overheating
of rubber product that were the result of processing combustible
particulate solids in an inadequately maintained and operated facility. 
	

$7,000

10% reduction for history	

$6,300



1-3	

1910.23(c)(1)	

Employees exposed to falling more than 7 feet where sections of
guardrail were missing from open sided floor(s) or platform(s).	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-4	

1910.37(l)(1)	

Motor storage rack 5.45 feet above the floor placed at the entrance to
electrical shop, obstructed egress.	

$2,000

10% reduction for history	

$1,800



1-5	

1910.67(c)(2)(v) or

In the alternative, Section 5(a)(1)	

A body belt was not worn with a lanyard attached to boom or basket when
working from an aerial lift.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-6	

1910.147(c)(4)(ii)	

Specific procedural steps were not developed for the control of
hazardous energy for equipment such as, shredders, blowers, roll mills,
grinders. 	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-7	

1910.157(g)(4)	

Training was not provided to employees expected to fight incipient stage
fires.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500 



1-8	

1910.178(c)(2)(vi)(A)	

Type LPG powered industrial trucks were used in areas where finely
ground rubber dust would normally be suspended in the air (Class II,
Division 1 or 2 locations).	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-9	

1910.212(a)(3)(ii)	

Points of operation of machinery were not guarded: no cover over 34.75
inches of screw conveyor	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-10	

1910.215(b)(9)	

Abrasive wheel did not have a top peripheral member (no tongue guard)	

$2,500

10% reduction for history	

$2,250



1-11	

1910.219(c)(2)(i)	

Stationary casings did not protect exposed parts of horizontal shafting.


$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-12	

1910.219(c)(4)(i)	

An unguarded 1.5-1.75 inch diameter shaft end with a keyway projected
3.75 inches beyond the bearing block collar.	

$2,500

10% reduction for history	

$2,250



1-13 	

1910.219(e)(3)(i)	

Vertical or inclined belts were not enclosed by guards.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-14	

1910.219(f)(1)	

Gears were not guarded.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-15

	

1910.219(f)(3)	

Sprocket wheels and chains which were seven feet or less above floors or
platforms were not enclosed.	

$2,500

10% reduction for history	

$2,250



1-16	

1910.219(i)(2)	

Revolving surfaces of shaft coupling(s) were not covered by a safety
sleeve.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-17	

1910.242(b)	

Compressed air at 100-120 p.s.i. from 1-inch rubber hoses and pipe
nozzles was used for personal cleaning purposes and was not reduced to
less than 30 p.s.i.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-18 (a)	

1910.253(b)(2)(iv)	

Valve protection caps were not in place on five compressed gas cylinders
(1  Acetylene, 1 Argon, 3 Oxygen).	

$2,500

10% reduction for history	

$2,250



1-18 (b)	

1910.253(b)(4)(iii)	

Oxygen cylinders in storage were not separated from fuel gas cylinders 	

Grouped	

Grouped



1-19	

1910.303(f)	

Each service, feeder, and branch circuit, at its disconnecting means was
not legibly marked to indicate its purpose.	

$2,500

10% reduction for history	

$2,250



1-20

	

1910.303(g)(2)(i)	

Live parts of electric equipment were not guarded against accidental
contact by cabinets or other form of approved enclosure.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



1-21

	

1910.304(f)(5)(v)	

Exposed non-current-carrying metal parts of cord and plug connected
equipment which may become energized were not grounded.	

$2,500

10% reduction for history	

$2,250



1-22	

1910.305(g)(1)(iii)(A)	

Flexible cords and cables were used for purposes prohibited by
subparagraphs (A) through (E) of this paragraph.	

$5,000

10% reduction for history	

$4,500



WILLFUL:





2-1	

1910.22(a)(1)	

Employees were exposed to fire and explosion hazards resulting from the
accumulation and dispersion of finely ground rubber dust which had a
minimum ignition energy value of 5 millijoules at 0.8% moisture content
throughout the Special Grind area, Fine Grind area, Line #1 & #2
processing areas, and the Packaging/Bagging areas.	

$70,000

10% reduction for history	

$63,000



2-2	

1910.307(b)	

Employees were exposed to fire and explosion hazards where electrical
equipment, which was not approved for a Class II, Division 1 Hazardous
Location, was used where finely ground rubber dust was likely to be
entrained in the air during normal operations.	

$70,000

10% reduction for history	

$63,000



TOTAL SERIOUS VIOLATIONS (22):	

$  84,600



TOTAL WILLFUL SERIOUS (2):	

$126,000



TOTAL PROPOSED PENALTIES:	

$210,600



