
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 146 (Thursday, July 30, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45578-45585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-18672]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration


Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.

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SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a 
petition, DP14-004, submitted by the Center for Auto Safety (the 
petitioner) to the Administrator of NHTSA by a letter dated August 21, 
2014, under 49 CFR part 552. The petition requests the agency to 
initiate a safety defect investigation into alleged failures of Totally 
Integrated Power Modules (TIPMs) installed in sport utility vehicles, 
trucks, and vans built by Chrysler FCA (Chrysler) beginning in the 2007 
model year. The petitioner alleges that TIPM defects may result in the 
following safety defect conditions: Engine stall, airbag non-
deployment, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in unintended 
acceleration, and fire.
    After conducting a technical review of: (1) Consumer complaints and 
other material submitted by the petitioner; (2) information provided by 
Chrysler in response to information requests regarding TIPM design, 
TIPM implementation and the complaints submitted by the petitioner; and 
(3) Chrysler safety recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 addressing a fuel pump 
relay defect condition that may result in engine stall while driving in 
certain vehicles equipped with TIPM body control modules; and the 
likelihood that additional investigations would result in a finding 
that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists, NHTSA has 
concluded that further investigation of the issues raised by the 
petition is not warranted. The agency, accordingly, has denied the 
petition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Kareem Habib, Vehicle Control 
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-8703. Email 
Kareem.Habib@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency 
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item 
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor 
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor 
vehicle safety. 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed 
petition, the agency conducts a technical review of the petition, 
material submitted with the petition, and any additional information. 
Sec.  552.6. After considering the technical review and taking into 
account appropriate factors, which may include, among others, 
allocation of agency resources, agency priorities, and

[[Page 45579]]

the likelihood of success in litigation that might arise from a 
determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to motor vehicle 
safety, the agency will grant or deny the petition. Sec.  552.8.

II. Defect Petition Background Information

    By a letter dated August 21, 2014, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) 
submitted a petition to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. 30162 requesting ``a 
safety defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally 
Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and 
vans beginning in the 2007 model year.'' On August 27, 2014, CAS sent 
NHTSA a supplemental letter identifying 24 fatal crashes from Chrysler 
Early Warning Reporting (EWR) submissions that CAS alleged may be 
related to TIPM failures (Supplement I). On September 8, 2014, CAS sent 
another supplemental letter to NHTSA with 35 additional complaints 
allegedly related to TIPM failures (Supplement II). On September 25, 
2014, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP14-004 to 
evaluate the petition for a grant or deny decision. In a September 29, 
2014 letter to CAS, ODI acknowledged receipt of the petition and 
requested additional information from CAS in support of its allegations 
that TIPM malfunctions may result in airbag non-deployment or 
unintended acceleration caused by the fuel pump failing to shutoff. 
After opening DP14-004, ODI received four additional CAS complaint 
supplements on September 30, 2014 (Supplement III), November 13, 2014 
(Supplement IV), January 14, 2015 (Supplement V), and April 1, 2015 
(Supplement VI).
    The CAS petition provided the following broad allegation of defect 
conditions in TIPM modules:

    Chrysler TIPM failures result in a variety of safety-related 
issues in multiple vehicle components, many of which have the 
potential for destructive results. Not only do Chrysler's faulty 
TIPMs result in vehicle stalling, they have also been implicated in 
airbag non-deployment, random horn, headlight, taillight, door lock, 
instrument panel and windshield wiper activity, power windows going 
up and down on their own, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in 
unintended acceleration, and fires. In the interim, these owners 
remain at the mercy of a defect which many have likened to the 
vehicle being possessed and uncontrollable. A look at consumer 
complaints filed with CAS suggests a better name for the TIPM--
Totally Inept Power Module.

    Additionally, CAS referenced a recent filing of a class action 
lawsuit in the United States District Court, Central District of 
California, Velasco et al vs. Chrysler LLC, Case No. CV13-08080-DDP-
VBKx affecting fifteen different Chrysler models and cited recalls 07V-
291 and 13V-282. According to CAS, ``neither of these recalls was 
sufficient to address the TIPM problem throughout Chrysler's fleet, 
instead focusing on a highly limited set of vehicles and circumstances. 
Given the number and range of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs, it 
is time for NHTSA to formally investigate TIPM failures across the 
board in 2007 and later models''.

III. Summary of the Petition

    The petitioner requests that NHTSA formally investigate TIPM 
failures across the board in 2007 and later models and cites the 
following allegations:

1. Vehicle Stall

    CAS stated in the defect petition letter and complaint Supplements 
III and IV that:

    TIPM failure contributes to a range of problems in vehicle 
electric components, the safety issue which continues to present 
itself in complaints is stalling, often in traffic where the dangers 
are obvious. The most often cited TIPM failure is a loss of vehicle 
power that can create a dangerous stall condition at any speed. 
Additionally, a survey of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs 
suggests that a stall/no-start condition is most reported outcome of 
TIPM failure, leaving drivers without power in traffic and stranded 
for unknown periods of time before the vehicle regains the capacity 
to be started.

2. Airbag Non-Deployment

    According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement 
IV, ``Not only do Chrysler's faulty TIPMs result in vehicle stalling, 
they have also been implicated in airbag non-deployment. As NHTSA knows 
from the GM ignition switch mass defect, it is virtually impossible to 
be sure that an airbag will deploy until there is a crash. Complaints 
directly citing airbag system warnings can be found in the complaints 
received by CAS''.

3. Unintended Acceleration

    CAS uses the term ``unintended acceleration'' in complaint letter 
Supplement IV dated November 13, 2014, ``to indicate reports where the 
vehicle continued to move or accelerate when the operator did not want 
this to happen. TIPM issues related to acceleration appear to arise 
from lack of fuel pump shut-off as well as problems with gear shift, 
throttle, and cruise control. Consumer problems related to 
acceleration, gear and/or throttle control may be found in CAS 
complaints.''

4. Fire and Other Symptoms

    According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement 
IV, ``Chrysler's faulty TIPMs have also been implicated in fires. 
Additionally, there are numerous complaints alleging bizarre and 
unexplained headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity, 
instrument panel failure, and door lock problems.''

5. EWR Fatalities

    CAS included as Attachment A to Supplement I what it believes to be 
EWR information for all fatal crashes involving TIPM failure. CAS 
claims that ``[s]ince the TIPM functions as the central gateway for all 
vehicle electronics, there are multiple EWR component codes that could 
point to the defect. There are 24 such crashes involving 28 deaths that 
the agency must consider in reviewing our petition, at least twelve of 
which have been the subject of DI requests. There are also a large 
number of injury crashes reported to EWR that involve these 
components.''

6. Class Action Lawsuit

    The petition references a class action lawsuit as evidence of the 
breadth and scope of ``the actual TIPM problem.'' \1\ The class action 
cited by the petition was originally filed on November 1, 2013. The 
plaintiffs in the original complaint, which were not limited to TIPM 
equipped vehicles, included 2 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners, a MY 
2011 Dodge Grand Caravan owner and a MY 2008 Chrysler 300 owner.\2\ The 
lawsuit provided the following description of the alleged defect and 
affected vehicles:
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    \1\ The petition references Velasco et al vs Chrysler LLC, Case 
No. 13-cv-08080-DDP-VBK, in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California as ``incorporated herein by 
reference, covering fifteen different Chrysler models over a number 
of model years.''
    \2\ The MY 2008 Chrysler 300 is not equipped with a TIPM body 
control module.

    Plaintiffs and the Class members they propose to represent 
purchased or leased 2008 model year Chrysler 300 and 2011-2012 model 
year Jeep Grand Cherokees, Dodge Durangos, and Dodge Grand Caravans 
equipped with defective Totally Integrated Power Modules, also known 
as TIPMs. The TIPM controls and distributes power to all of the 
electrical functions of the vehicle, including the vehicle safety 
and ignition systems. Vehicles equipped with defective TIPMs 
progress through a succession of symptoms that begin with an 
inability to reliably start the vehicle and lead to, among other 
things, the vehicle not starting, the fuel pump not turning off and 
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the engine stalling while driving.

    A second amended complaint for the class action was filed on May 5, 
2014,

[[Page 45580]]

listing seven plaintiffs and redefining the scope of vehicles as all 
Chrysler vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 modules. The plaintiffs in the 
amended complaint consist of 6 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners and 1 
MY 2011 Dodge Durango owner. The plaintiffs all alleged experiencing 
``no-start'' concerns, with one also alleging a fuel pump run-on 
condition and another reporting a single incident of engine stall while 
driving. The amended complaint continued to focus on problems with 
starting, engine stall while driving and fuel pumps that do not turn 
off, while adding ``headlights and taillights shutting off'' and 
``random and uncontrollable activity of the horn, windshield wipers, 
and alarm system'' to the claimed TIPM deficiencies. The class action 
does not include airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or fire 
among the alleged consequences of the claimed TIPM defect.

7. Petition Issues

    ODI identified several issues with the scope and supporting 
evidence for defect allegations in the petition submitted by CAS. The 
petition was unnecessarily broad in scope and included several alleged 
defects that had no factual basis. After failing to identify any clear 
basis for several of the petition allegations, ODI included a request 
for supporting information for claims regarding airbag non-deployment 
and unintended acceleration in its September 29, 2014 petition 
acknowledgement letter. The CAS response, provided in a November 13, 
2014 letter, did not provide any technical basis for claims of airbag 
non-deployment and appeared to equate any illumination of the airbag 
warning lamp with TIPM failure, even when the complaint clearly cited 
other causes for the airbag system fault (e.g, ``faulty wiring in 
passenger front seat causing airbag failure warning to illuminate'' \3\ 
and ``open circuit in drivers [sic] seat airbag'' \4\). Several other 
complaints cited by CAS do not allege any airbag failures but, in 
apparent reference to CAS petition claims, state that TIPM failure 
``can cause the airbags to not deploy.''
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    \3\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 62.
    \4\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 146.
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    With regard to the basis for its claims that TIPM failures can 
result in unintended acceleration, CAS repeated its allegation that 
such failures are associated with fuel pump shut-off failures,\5\ even 
while acknowledging that none of the reports that it provided actually 
involved instances where fuel pumps failing to shut off resulted in 
unintended acceleration.\6\ ODI notes that claims that unintended 
acceleration is caused by, or related to, a ``lack of fuel pump shut-
off'' are not supported by any known incidents. Moreover, any 
allegation that a running fuel pump can, absent extremely idiosyncratic 
failures of many other systems, cause a vehicle to accelerate on its 
own demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of basic automotive 
engineering.
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    \5\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``TIPM issues 
related to acceleration appear to arise from lack of fuel pump shut-
off as well as problems with gear shift, throttle, and cruise 
control.''
    \6\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``There are 
quite a few consumer complaints in both CAS and NHTSA databases 
citing lack of fuel pump shutoff that result in stalling and/or 
nonstart condition but do not produce uncontrolled acceleration.'' 
This statement, which also misstates the effects of fuel pump 
shutoff failure, acknowledges the absence of any related complaints 
of unintended acceleration.
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IV. ODI Analysis

A. Scope Analysis

    The CAS petition requests investigation of alleged failures of TIPM 
modules in Chrysler light vehicles, with no reference to the automotive 
industry body control technology implementations or architecture 
functionality distinctions: ``The CAS hereby petitions the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to initiate a safety 
defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally 
Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and 
vans beginning in the 2007 model year''. Interpreted broadly, the CAS 
petition potentially affects approximately 10 million \7\ vehicles 
equipped with TIPM-6 or TIPM-7 modules. The petition scope does not 
appear to recognize the functional distinctions between TIPM-6 and 
TIPM-7. The petition also does not distinguish between the significant 
electronics technology differences between the relay based TIPM-7 and 
an all solid-state Field Effect Transistors (FET) TIPM-6.
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    \7\ Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and vans equipped with TIMP-7 and 
TIPM-6 beginning MY 2007.
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    TIPM-7 vehicle function outputs (such as fuel pump control, wiper/
washer control. . .etc.) are a mix of electro-mechanical relays and 
solid state FET devices equipped with digital Serial Peripheral 
Interface (SPI) communication ports while TIPM-6 vehicle function 
outputs are strictly solid state SPI-based FET devices with no electro-
mechanical relays. Relays are electro-mechanical devices with specific 
inherent break down mechanisms including, but not limited to, the 
degradation of the mechanically coupled moving contact spring arm and 
contact resistance; \8\ both are design elements that do not exist in 
silicon only devices associated with TIPM-6. Similarly, TIPM-7 
implementations include a fuse for overcurrent protection while the 
TIPM-6 system design uses an integrated silicon overcurrent protection 
feature specific to solid state devices.
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    \8\ Fuel pump relays were tested in simulated vehicle 
environments incorporating variable factors such as relay type; 
relay manufacture, simulated fuel pump current and inductance levels 
of representative TIPM-7 vehicles.
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    ODI is interpreting the petition as a request for investigation of 
only vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 (subject vehicles) for the 
following reasons: (1) The petition refers to TIPM installed in 
Chrysler vehicles ``beginning in the 2007 model year'' and TIPM-7 was 
introduced in the 2007 model year; (2) the affected models listed in 
the petition and in the class action lawsuit referenced by the petition 
are all TIPM-7 vehicles; \9\ (3) approximately 93 percent \10\ of the 
complaints submitted by CAS involve vehicles equipped with TIPM-7; (4) 
only 3 percent of CAS complaints are related to vehicles equipped with 
TIPM-6 and ODI's review of these complaints did not identify any safety 
defect trends; \11\ and (5) the significant technical differences 
between the TIPM-6 and TIPM-7 modules as described above.
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    \9\ The CAS petition references a recent filing of a class 
action lawsuit in US District Court, Velasco et al. vs. Chrysler LLC 
affecting fifteen different Chrysler models in which CAS cited the 
same fifteen vehicle models in the defect petition dated August 21, 
2014. The Court order referenced by CAS specifically cited TIPM-7 in 
Case No. CV 13-08080 DDP, Dkt. No. 42, ``Plaintiffs allege that the 
TIPM with which the Class Vehicles are equipped, referred to as TIPM 
7.''
    \10\ Percentage based on CAS complaints through Supplement V.
    \11\ The remaining CAS complaints are associated with vehicles 
equipped with Front Control Module and Body Control Modules.
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    The TIPM-7 population includes approximately 4.7 million Chrysler 
sport utility vehicles, trucks, and vans across 11 vehicle platforms 
beginning in model year 2007 (Table 1). ODI conducted a detailed review 
of complaint narratives submitted by CAS and consumers including 
careful analysis of vehicle repair histories, warranty claims obtained 
from the manufacturer and any available Customer Assistance Inquiry 
reports (CAIR). In total, there were 296 complaints submitted by the 
petitioner in the original petition and five supplements, including 271 
complaints related to the subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7. ODI's 
complaint analysis focused on vehicles equipped with TIPM-7.

[[Page 45581]]



                       Table 1--TIPM-7 Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Models (platforms)               Model years     Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chrysler Town and Country/Dodge Grand            2008-14       1,632,250
 Caravan (RT)...........................
Jeep Wrangler (JK)......................         2007-14         962,098
Ram 1500/2500/3500/4500and5500 (DS/DJ/DD/        2009-12         929,036
 DP)....................................
Jeep Grand Cherokee/Dodge Durango (WK/           2011-13         526,939
 WD)....................................
Jeep Liberty (KK).......................         2008-12         331,717
Dodge Nitro (KA)........................         2007-11         198,581
Dodge Journey (JC)......................         2009-10         156,537
                                         -------------------------------
    Total TIPM-7........................         2007-14       4,737,158
------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. TIPM Function

    TIPM-7 is a controller area network (CAN) based body controller 
integrated with an electrical power distribution center; and is 
designed to support centralized and distributed vehicle control 
functions. The TIPM-7 electrical architecture features three levels of 
functional interactions with other vehicle systems: (1) Power only 
interaction- circuits that only pass through the integrated fuse box 
(e.g. occupant restraint controller); (2) power and data transfer 
interaction for circuits that pass through the power distribution 
center with no TIPM control function (e.g. powertrain controller and 
transmission controller); and (3) power and control interaction for 
circuits that pass through the power distribution center and are 
directly controlled by the TIPM. The latter include power and control 
logic for exterior lighting, windshield wiper/washer, door lock, and 
horn. A distinguishing feature of the TIPM-7 from other Chrysler body 
controllers is the integration of the fuel pump relay.

C. Fuel Pump Relay Defect

    In a September 3, 2014 letter to NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect 
Information Report (DIR) identifying a defect in the fuel pump relay 
(FPR) within the TIPM-7 which can result in a no start or stall 
condition in approximately 188,723 model year (MY) 2011 Jeep Grand 
Cherokee (WK) and Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles manufactured from January 
5, 2010 through July 20, 2011 (14V-530). In a February 24, 2015 letter, 
Chrysler submitted a second DIR expanding the scope of the FPR defect 
condition to include an additional 338,216 MY 2012 through 2013 Jeep 
Grand Cherokee vehicles manufactured from September 17, 2010 through 
August 19, 2013 and MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango vehicles 
manufactured from January 18, 2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V-115). 
Chrysler identified the root cause as deformation of the relay contact 
spring due to the heat caused by contact power, ambient temperature 
around the fuel pump relay, and battery voltage. These factors, present 
in combination and in high amounts, led to premature fuel pump relay 
failures, which usually resulted in a no-start concern. When the fuel 
pump relay fails while driving, the fuel pump will cease to function 
and the engine will shut off or ``stall.'' In the case of a stall, the 
vehicle maintains power and functionality for certain features, such as 
hazard indicators, seat belt pre-tensioners and airbags. Chrysler's 
recall remedy involved installing a new, more robust fuel pump relay, 
external to the TIPM.
    Detailed analysis of relay material composition, lab reports and 
fuel pump system design reviews performed by Chrysler and Continental 
that ODI reviewed in examining the petition identified the root cause 
of the premature relay failure to be contact erosion and the 
deformation of the contact spring due to under-hood temperatures around 
the fuel pump relay, current draws, and fuel pump inductance levels 
specific to Delphi fuel pumps installed on MY 2011-2013 Jeep Grand 
Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles. Vehicle fuel pump system 
measurements indicated that WK/WD vehicles have the highest current 
draw and inductance while RT minivans have the lowest current draw 
coupled with lower fuel pump inductance. Relay durability test data 
provided by Chrysler indicated that other TIPM-7 vehicle platform 
relays substantially outlasted relays tested in a simulated WK/WD 
environment. NHTSA believes that because the current draw is lower for 
other vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 than for the WK/WD vehicles, 
the risk of fuel pump relay deformation for these other vehicles is 
lower than for the WK/WD vehicles.
    On October 20, 2014, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to 
Chrysler requesting production, complaint, and warranty claim data 
related to the complaints provided by CAS and ODI complaints involving 
stall while driving allegations potentially related to TIPM faults. The 
IR letter also requested information related to the fuel pump relay 
root cause analysis and technical data regarding TIPM design and 
construction. Analysis of the field data submitted indicated that the 
WK/WD vehicles exhibited significantly higher complaint rates related 
to FPR failures than other subject vehicles (Table 2). The data show 
that the primary failure mode of the fuel pump relay is a no-start 
condition, with no-starts and starts followed immediately by stall 
accounting for approximately 68% of the complaints for both the 
recalled WK/WD vehicles and the non-recalled subject vehicles.

                                         Table 2--Fuel Pump Relay Complaint Analysis, by Total Failure Rate \12\
                                                   [All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles]
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                        TIPM-7 vehicles                                                       Fuel pump relay failure mode
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                                                                   Stall while       Start with         No-start         Pump run-on          Total
                                                                     driving       immediate stall -----------------------------------------------------
       Fuel pump relay recalls                Platforms        ------------------------------------
                                                                  No.      Rate     No.      Rate     No.      Rate     No.      Rate     No.      Rate
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Recalled.............................  WK/WD..................       37      7.0        4      0.8       82     15.6        3      0.6      126     23.9
Non-recalled.........................  JC.....................        2      1.3        0      0.0        3      1.9        0      0.0        5      3.2

[[Page 45582]]

 
                                       KA.....................        1      0.5        0      0.0        2      1.0        0      0.0        3      1.5
                                       RT.....................        1      0.1        1      0.1        4      0.2        1      0.1        7      0.4
                                       JK.....................        1      0.1        0      0.0        3      0.3        0      0.0        4      0.4
                                       Ram....................        0      0.0        0      0.0        0      0.0        0      0.0        0      0.0
                                       KK.....................        0      0.0        0      0.0        0      0.0        0      0.0        0      0.0
                                          Total...............        5      0.1        1      0.0       12      0.3        1      0.0       19      0.5
                                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Grand Total TIPM-7...............  .......................       42      0.9        5      0.1       94      2.0        4      0.1      145      3.1
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    ODI's analysis of all confirmed FPR failures identified a total of 
145 complaints, including 42 resulting in at least one incident of 
stall while driving. The recalled WK/WD vehicles, which comprise only 
11 percent of the subject vehicle population, account for 126 of the 
total FPR related complaints (87 percent) and 37 of those involving 
stall while driving (88 percent). This analysis combined with overall 
warranty claim data analysis and vehicle test data related to FPR root 
cause analysis indicate that, based on currently available information, 
the scope of recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 adequately address the FPR 
defect condition.
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    \12\ Complaint data in Table 2 is limited to CAS complaints and 
ODI VOQ's potentially related to stall while driving that were 
identified prior to ODI's information request letter to Chrysler for 
DP14-004.
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D. Other Stall While Driving Defects

    In addition to the analysis of complaints related to confirmed FPR 
failures to assess the scope of Chrysler recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115, 
ODI also examined all stall while driving complaints allegedly related 
to TIPM failures in the subject vehicles to assess whether any other 
engine stall related defect conditions may exist in the subject 
vehicles that are not already addressed by a safety recall. ODI's 
analysis did not identify any specific TIPM faults resulting in 
incidents of stall while driving that are not already addressed by 
safety recalls \13\ and analysis of complaints did not identify any 
additional defect trends associated with potentially TIPM-related stall 
while driving that warrant additional investigation.
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    \13\ In addition to FPR recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115, Chrysler 
previously initiated recall 07V-291 to address a defect condition in 
approximately 81,000 MY 2007 JK and KA vehicles associated with the 
PCM momentarily shutting the engine down due to a prolonged (75ms) 
TIPM microprocessor reset triggered by a vehicle-wide CAN bus error 
event.
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    ODI's analysis identified a total of 131 complaints alleging TIPM 
related stall while driving incidents. Fifty-five (55) of the 
complaints were found to be unrelated to TIPM failures, including 10 
associated with a defect condition addressed by alternator replacement 
recall 14V-634.\14\ A total of 76 complaints were identified that were 
either confirmed to be related to a TIPM fault condition (49) or where 
either the FPR or other, unspecified, TIPM fault condition may have 
been the cause (27).\15\ Table 3 shows the failure rates for 
potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents for the recalled 
WK/WD vehicles and for each of the non-recalled platforms. These data 
do not indicate a stall while driving defect trend outside of the 
recall population.
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    \14\ For recall 14V-634, vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine 
and 160 Amp Alternator may experience a rapid alternator failure 
having limited or no detection, which can result in vehicle 
shutdown/shut off and/or fire.
    \15\ Unknown/possible TIPM's include several for which the 
condition could not be duplicated by the servicing dealer.

                                                 Table 3--Stall While Driving Analysis, All Causes \17\
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                       TIPM-7 vehicles                                  Not related to TIPM                        Potentially TIPM related
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Alternator
       Fuel pump relay recalls               Platforms         recall  14V-  Other non-     Total      Fuel pump     Possible      Total      Total rate
                                                                   634       TIPM \16\                   relay         TIPM                    (C/100k)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recalled............................  WK/WD..................           10           17           27           40           14           54         10.2
Non-recalled........................  KA.....................            0            5            5            1            3            4          2.0
                                      JC.....................            0            1            1            2            1            3          1.9
                                      RT.....................            0            9            9            4            6           10          0.6
                                      Ram....................            0            5            5            1            2            3          0.3
                                      JK.....................            0            6            6            1            1            2          0.2
                                      KK.....................            0            2            2            0            0            0          0.0
                                         Total...............            0           28           28            9           13           22          0.5
                                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Grand Total TIPM-7..............  .......................           10           45           55           49           27           76          1.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 45583]]

    Additionally, the recalled WK/WD vehicles and other TIPM-7 
platforms differ significantly when age and exposure are considered. 
The subject vehicles range from less than 1 year to up to 9 years of 
service exposure, while the recalled WK/WD vehicles range in age from 2 
to 5 years of service. Most of the WK/WD complaints involved the MY 
2011 vehicles recalled under 14V-530, which account for 98 (78%) of the 
total WK/WD FPR complaints shown in Table 2 and 48 (89%) of the 
potentially TIPM related WK/WD stall complaints shown in Table 3. Table 
4 shows complaint data related to FPR failures resulting in stall while 
driving for the subject vehicles for just MY 2011 vehicles. The 
recalled MY 2011 WK/WD vehicles account for 25 percent of production, 
88 percent of confirmed FPR stall while driving incidents and 81 
percent of all potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents 
in MY 2011 subject vehicles.
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    \16\ Faults reported in repair histories included WIN control 
module faults, PCM faults, engine misfire and other engine 
compartment components and harness issues.
    \17\ Table 3 includes all CAS (through Supplement VI) and ODI 
complaints related to allegations of SWD.

                                      Table 4--Stall While Driving Analysis, Potentially TIPM Related, MY 2011 Only
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                                 MY 2011 TIPM-7 vehicles                                                     Potentially TIPM related
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Verified TIPM                                  Total rate (C/
          Fuel pump relay recalls                     Platforms             Population         (FPR)       Possible TIPM       Total           100k)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recalled..................................  WK/WD.......................         188,723              36              12              48            25.4
Non-recalled..............................  JC..........................               0               0               0               0             0.0
                                            KA..........................          35,609               0               0               0             0.0
                                            RT..........................         137,740               4               4               8             5.8
                                            JK..........................         103,881               0               0               0             0.0
                                            Ram.........................         242,676               1               2               3             1.2
                                            KK..........................          56,939               0               0               0             0.0
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.................................  ............................         576,845               5               6              11             1.9
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Grand Total MY 2011...................  ............................         765,568              41              18              59             7.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Airbag Non-Deployment

    The CAS petition alleges that TIPM failures are responsible for 
airbag non-deployments. ODI examined this contention and finds it has 
no merit. First, ODI's analysis of the airbag system architecture in 
the subject vehicles indicates that airbag control is performed by the 
Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module in the Chrysler vehicles and 
the TIPM-7 functions only to provide power to the ORC and does not 
contain any logic for airbag deployment control or crash event 
discrimination. Second, the TIPM supplies power to the ORC through two 
independent fused power feeds providing an extra level of redundancy 
and safety to the airbag system in the subject vehicles.\18\ Third, ODI 
did not identify any mechanisms for TIPM failure or power disruptions 
in a crash event. Fourth, any interruption in power resulting from such 
a failure would not interfere with the ORC deployment decision or 
prevent it from operating on reserve power.\19\ Lastly, the complaint 
data offered by the petitioner, analysis of ODI complaint data, and 
analysis of EWR death and injury claims cited by the petitioner that 
were related to airbag deployment also failed to support a finding that 
TIPM failures have caused any incidents of airbag non-deployment (see 
Section F. EWR Fatalities). ODI's review of CAS and ODI complaints 
related to airbags and TIPM did not identify any incidents where a TIPM 
failure was followed by a crash event or any non-deployment incidents 
in which the airbags would have been expected to deploy or were 
associated with evidence of TIPM malfunction.
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    \18\ The use of independent power feeds is a level of functional 
safety that makes the power delivery for the ORC module in the 
subject vehicles fairly robust in comparison to the airbag ECU's in 
many peer designs reviewed by ODI.
    \19\ There is a minimum of 150ms of back-up power internal to 
the ORC that is available as reserve power in the event of power 
interruption during a crash event.
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    The Run-Start and Run-Only relays are integral to the TIPM and 
provide power to multiple circuits including the ORC. The Run-Start 
relay is powered during engine crank and both the Run-Start and Run-
Only relays are powered when the ignition is in RUN mode. Examination 
of the airbag system architecture for the subject vehicles shows that 
power flows in the Run-Only and Run-Start condition through the TIPM-7 
to the ORC through two independent and redundant fused power feeds. The 
ORC dual feed safety strategy is designed so that each power feed alone 
is capable of providing the necessary power to deploy all required 
restraints. According to Chrysler's IR response, the loss of power from 
one ORC power feed will result in an Airbag Warning Lamp (ABWL), but 
will not affect deployment capability. The ORC is still able to 
evaluate sensor inputs, determine if a deployment is required, and 
deploy airbags as needed. In the event of a loss of a single power 
feed, whether the IGN_RS or the IGN_RO feed, the ORC will set a 
specific fault code and turn on the ABWL.
    If for any reason the ORC loses both power feeds while the vehicle 
remains powered, the instrument cluster will set a fault and activate 
the ABWL. None of the CAS or ODI complaints reviewed by ODI contained 
evidence that either a single or dual power loss to the ORC occurred. 
Simultaneous power loss on both ORC feeds could result from a complete 
TIPM failure. However, in the event of a complete TIPM failure, the 
vehicle will lose power to multiple other systems with instrument 
cluster lights indicating faults in systems powered through the TIPM. 
None of the repair history records provided by Chrysler included any 
evidence of faults indicating a loss of power to the ORC or other 
vehicle systems resulting from a failure of the power feed from the 
TIPM. Complaints reporting active ABWL were either related to internal 
ORC malfunctions or other SRS (Supplemental Restraint System) component 
failures such as seat harness or clock spring shorting conditions.
    The petitioner identified complaints citing airbag system warnings 
as evidence of TIPM failures resulting in possible airbag non-
deployments. These

[[Page 45584]]

complaints, once analyzed, were found to be either related to specific 
airbag system component malfunctions (such as seat harness, clock 
spring failures . . . etc.), or occurred in vehicles subject to 
previous TIPM-7 recalls, ORC recalls (13V-282),\20\ or inadvertent 
ignition key (WIN/FOBIK) displacement recalls (11V-139 and 14V-373). 
None of the incidents reported by the petitioner, ODI complaints or EWR 
claims cited by the petitioner can be traced to a TIPM fault that 
resulted in a loss of power to the ORC.
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    \20\ For recall 13V-282, Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module 
resistor may fail from electrical overstress (EOS), resulting in 
airbag light and loss of head restraint function.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Unintended Acceleration

    ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted 
in incidents of unintended acceleration, either based on a technical 
review of the vehicle powertrain control function area or analysis of 
complaints. The Powertrain Control Module (PCM) performs all engine and 
transmission management control functions in the Chrysler vehicles and 
the TIPM functions only to provide power to the PCM and does not 
contain any torque management control logic. ODI reviewed each 
complaint submitted by CAS and consumers and did not identify any 
evidence of TIPM, or any other vehicle component, failures resulting in 
unintended acceleration.
    The petitioner's allegations of UA resulting from the fuel pump 
failing to shut-off after ``key-off'' vehicle shutdown are premised on 
an incorrect belief that continued fuel pump operation and presence of 
fuel line pressure would somehow translate into un-commanded 
acceleration. The fuel pump only makes fuel available to the engine; 
actual use of that fuel is controlled by the PCM through the fuel 
injectors, not the pump. Moreover, once fuel is fed to the engine 
cylinders by the fuel injectors, it must have both a stoichiometric air 
mass from the throttle and be ignited by a spark, which are also 
controlled by the PCM. When the ignition has been turned ``Off'', power 
is removed from the PCM, the electronic throttle is disabled and the 
ignition system no longer provides a spark. If a TIPM failure resulted 
in the fuel pump continuing to run after the key is turned off, the 
most likely harmful result would be a dead battery.
    Analyses of the UA incidents alleged to have occurred by the 
petitioner do not support a finding of any TIPM failure or any other 
vehicle malfunction. For example, CAS cited an incident involving a MY 
2013 Dodge Challenger. According to CAS Supplement IV, ``You will find 
attached to this letter an accident report from a May 2014 crash 
involving unintended acceleration in Vancouver, WA. The vehicle 
involved, a 2013 Dodge Challenger, is not a model included in the CAS 
petition, but does contain a TIPM that is the alleged source of the 
acceleration event''. The referenced attachment provided a 42-page 
police report and photographs. According to the police report, the 
Challenger passed directly in front of a patrol car within 
approximately 20-30 feet. The report specifically indicates that the 
operator's head position appeared to be downward with chin resting 
against the chest. The crash occurred when the operator did not make 
any attempts to slow or steer the vehicle to negotiate a roundabout. 
The PAR report made no reference to unintended acceleration or any 
attempts by the driver to slow down the vehicle or avoid property 
damage. Finally, ODI notes that the 2013 Challenger is not equipped 
with a TIPM.

G. Fire and Other Symptoms

    ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted 
in vehicle fires or any other failure modes representing potential 
safety hazards. Vehicle inspection reports of the alleged fires in the 
petition letter and supplemental submissions lack any evidence of a 
safety related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject 
vehicles. Allegations reporting fire or smoke are either related to 
external aftermarket vehicle body builder up-fitter integration \21\ or 
thermal damage in the alternator diode with no damage beyond the 
alternator assembly, recall 14V-634.
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    \21\ Inspection and assessment confirmed that the cause of this 
incident was improper installation of aftermarket equipment. There 
are two aftermarket wire bundles extending from the B+ cable, which 
are secured using a non OEM aftermarket nut. There was significant 
aftermarket wiring throughout the vehicle that was not installed, or 
connected in accordance with the Chrysler provided Ram Body Builders 
Guide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, ODI carefully analyzed the petitioner data related to 
headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity, instrument 
panel failure, and door lock problems. Vehicle functions related to 
TIPM-7 EX-2 relays typically fail in an active state \22\ with no loss 
of system functionality. ODI's analysis of complaints provided by CAS 
and received by the agency did not identify any patterns or trends 
related to loss of headlights or taillights while driving or to driver 
distraction from unexpected activation of windshield wipers/washers, 
horn or car alarm while driving due to TIPM malfunction.\23\ No safety 
related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject vehicles is 
observed.
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    \22\ Active state typically involves a powered relay.
    \23\ Repair records indicated malfunctions outside of TIPM, e.g. 
wiper stalk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. EWR Fatalities

    ODI's analysis of 24 EWR death claims identified by CAS in 
Supplement I as potentially related to TIPM failures,\24\ did not 
identify any evidence that TIPM faults caused or contributed to any of 
the incidents. None of the reports cited by the petitioner alleged loss 
of control or airbag non-deployment due to loss of power from the TIPM 
module. The petitioner posits that there was a loss of power to the ORC 
and other vehicle systems in the referenced crash and non-deployment 
events that led to the death and injury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ According to CAS Supplement I: ``Since the TIPM functions 
as the central gateway for all vehicle electronics, there are 
multiple EWR component codes that could point to the defect. These 
codes include airbags, electrical system, engine and engine cooling, 
exterior lighting, fire related, powertrain, service brake, speed 
control, and unknown''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sixteen (16) of the reports cited by CAS are related to TIPM-7 
equipped vehicles and included 6 death and injury incidents in which a 
frontal airbag, side airbag, or pre-tensioner successfully deployed, 
demonstrating the integrity of power delivery from the TIPM was not 
compromised before or during the collision event. Of the remaining 
reports, two reports did not involve any claims relating to loss of 
control or airbag non-deployment, or any other vehicle defect.\25\ The 
remaining claims were related to an unpowered rollaway due to 
documented incorrect gear selection, an alleged sudden acceleration 
with no evidence of any throttle control or brake system faults, a 
brake failure claim, 3 airbag non-deployments with crash dynamics that 
did not warrant deployment, and 2 non-deployment where the non-
deployment may have involved inadvertent ignition key (WIN/FOBIK) 
displacement.\26\
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    \25\ The ``claims'' were simply requests for assistance with 
downloading EDR data for the crash event.
    \26\ Both vehicles were 2008 Chrysler Town and Country minivans 
that were in the scope of WIN/FOB recall 14V-373.
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V. Conclusion

    ODI's analysis of the CAS allegations of TIPM defects resulting in 
stall while driving, airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration, 
fire and other faults identified a single defect condition related to 1 
of over 60 different circuits in the TIPM assembly. The most common 
effect of this defect

[[Page 45585]]

condition, related to the fuel pump relay, was a no-start concern, but 
it could also result in stall while driving. This fuel pump relay 
defect was limited to approximately 11 percent of the 4.7 million 
subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 and has been addressed by safety 
recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115. No valid evidence was presented in support 
of claims related to airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or 
fire resulting from TIPM faults and these claims were found to be 
wholly without merit based on review of the field data and design of 
the relevant systems and components.
    Except insofar as the petitioner's contentions relate to the defect 
condition addressed by the Chrysler recalls, the factual bases of the 
petitioner's contentions that any further investigation is necessary 
are unsupported. In our view, additional investigation is unlikely to 
result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety 
exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-
related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the 
requested investigation. Therefore, the petition is denied. This action 
does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect 
does not exist. The agency will take further action if warranted by 
future circumstances.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at CFR 
1.95.

Frank S. Borris II,
Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement, National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2015-18672 Filed 7-29-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-59-P


