[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 225 (Wednesday, November 21, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 59182-59230]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-25020]



[[Page 59181]]

Vol. 83

Wednesday,

No. 225

November 21, 2018

Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration





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49 CFR Parts 229, 231, 236, et al.





 Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative 
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 83 , No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 59182]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, 236, and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2013-0060, Notice No. 3]
RIN 2130-AC46


Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative 
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule amends FRA's passenger equipment safety 
standards using a performance-based approach to adopt new and modified 
requirements governing the construction of conventional- and high-speed 
passenger rail equipment. This final rule adds a new tier of passenger 
equipment safety standards (Tier III) to facilitate the safe 
implementation of nation-wide, interoperable high-speed passenger rail 
service at speeds up to 220 mph. While Tier III trainsets must operate 
in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds above 
125 mph, these trainsets can share the right-of-way with freight trains 
and other tiers of passenger equipment at speeds not exceeding 125 mph. 
This final rule also establishes crashworthiness and occupant 
protection performance requirements in the alternative to those 
currently specified for Tier I passenger trainsets. Together, the Tier 
III requirements and Tier I alternative crashworthiness and occupant 
protection requirements remove regulatory barriers and enable use of 
new technological designs, allowing a more open U.S. rail market. 
Additionally, the final rule increases from 150 mph to 160 mph the 
maximum speed for passenger equipment that complies with FRA's Tier II 
requirements.

DATES: Effective date. This final rule is effective January 22, 2019.
    Incorporation by reference. The incorporation by reference of 
certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the Director of 
the Federal Register as of January 22, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Docket: For access to the docket to read background 
documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any 
time or visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140 on the Ground 
level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Devin Rouse, Staff Director, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office 
of Railroad Safety, Passenger Rail Division, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6185); or Michael Hunter, 
Attorney Adviser, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad 
Administration, Office of Chief Counsel, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-0368).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Common Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads
APTA American Public Transportation Association
AW0 ready-to-run weight, empty
CEM crash energy management
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CG center of gravity
EN EuroNorm
ETF Engineering Task Force
FE finite element
FEA finite element analysis
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
g gravitational acceleration (32.2 feet/second/second)
HSR high-speed rail
in inch(es)
kip kilopound(s)
kN kilo-Newton(s)
kph kilometer(s) per hour
lbf pound(s)-force
mph mile(s) per hour
ms millisecond(s)
MU multiple-unit
OVI occupied volume integrity
PTC positive train control
RIA regulatory impact analysis
ROW right-of-way
RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
ITM inspection, testing, and maintenance
PTEP Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
PESS Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
U.S.C. United States Code
UIC International Union of Railways

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    A. Statutory Background
    B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking 
Mandate
III. Development of the Final Rule
IV. Discussion of Comments and Conclusions
    A. General Comments
    B. Proposed Subpart I and the Inspection, Testing, and 
Maintenance Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
    C. Proposed Subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III 
Passenger Equipment
    D. Comments From the NTSB
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771, and DOT Regulatory 
Policies and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. International Trade Impact Assessment
    F. Environmental Impact
    G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
    H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)
    I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    J. Energy Impact
    K. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

I. Executive Summary

    Having considered the public comments in response to FRA's December 
6, 2016, proposed rule on standards for alternative compliance and 
high-speed trainsets, see 81 FR 88006, FRA issues this final rule 
amending the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 49 CFR part 238. 
This final rule is the product of consensus reached by FRA's Railroad 
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which accepted the task of reviewing 
passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending specific 
actions that could be useful to advance the safety of passenger 
service, including the development of regulatory requirements for the 
next generation of high-speed trainsets. The RSAC established the 
Passenger Safety Working Group (``PSWG'' or ``Working Group'') to 
handle this task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to 
consider. In September 2009, the Working Group in turn established the 
Engineering Task Force (``ETF'' or ``Task Force'') for the purpose of 
producing a set of technical criteria and procedures to evaluate 
passenger rail equipment based on alternative designs. This work led to 
the development of the report entitled ``Technical Criteria and 
Procedures for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection 
Performance of Alternatively Designed Passenger Rail Equipment for Use 
in Tier I Service'' (``Technical Criteria and Procedures Report'' or 
``Report'').\1\ The guidance in the Technical Criteria and Procedures 
Report has assisted railroads and rolling stock manufacturers who have 
petitioned FRA for waivers from strict compliance with FRA's Tier I 
passenger equipment crashworthiness standards, and has been useful to 
FRA in

[[Page 59183]]

evaluating such petitions. In addition to developing the criteria in 
the Report, the ETF's task was expanded to develop formal 
recommendations to the full RSAC for adopting these alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection criteria into FRA's regulations 
and to establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of 
high-speed trainsets, capable of operating at speeds of up to 220 mph, 
classified as Tier III passenger equipment. The ETF reached consensus 
on recommending the adoption of these alternative crashworthiness 
criteria in 49 CFR part 238 for Tier I passenger equipment. The ETF 
also reached consensus on criteria for Tier III passenger equipment, 
specifically trainset structure, side-window glazing, brake systems, 
interior fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems and cab 
equipment, and cab glazing (with the exception of ballistic penetration 
resistance). The ETF further reached consensus on the definition of 
Tier III, including when Tier III equipment can operate on shared 
infrastructure and when the equipment must operate in an exclusive 
right-of-way. On June 14, 2013, the full RSAC voted to recommend the 
consensus items to FRA's Administrator, as the basis for a formal 
rulemaking. This final rule is based on these RSAC recommendations.
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    \1\ U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-ORD-11/
22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of 
Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available at 
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
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    This final rule establishes requirements in three main subject 
areas: (1) Tier III trainset safety standards; (2) alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for 
Tier I passenger equipment; and (3) the maximum authorized speed for 
Tier II passenger equipment. The following is a brief overview of the 
rule organized by subject area and a summary of its economic impact.

Tier III Trainset Safety Standards

    This final rule defines Tier III passenger train operations and 
outlines the minimum safety standards for the use of such trainsets in 
the United States, focusing on core structural and critical system 
design criteria. FRA intends for this final rule to facilitate the safe 
implementation of interoperable high-speed rail service, and enable the 
use of common infrastructure and promote other efficiencies. The Tier 
III operating environment is unique by design. Tier III passenger 
trains are permitted to operate in a shared right-of-way (one shared 
with freight trains and other tiers of passenger equipment) at speeds 
up to 125 mph, but must operate in an exclusive right-of-way without 
grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph, up to 220 mph. The 
requirements provide for the sharing of rail infrastructure among 
various types of rail equipment, especially in more urban areas, while 
providing for dedicated passenger rail service at maximum speeds up to 
220 mph.
    This final rule also establishes requirements for Tier III trainset 
structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and 
surfaces, certain emergency systems (including window egress and rescue 
access requirements), and certain cab equipment. To support operational 
compatibility, the Tier III trainset crashworthiness and occupant 
protection requirements are predominantly based on the alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements for Tier I 
passenger equipment and are intended to safely apply to operations at 
speeds up to 220 mph in a dedicated environment as approved by FRA. 
Specialized RSAC task groups developed the requirements for braking 
systems and cab glazing by focusing on the development of performance-
based requirements that could be implemented in a technology-neutral 
manner, wherever possible.
    To develop their recommendations, the ETF and full RSAC considered 
the latest trainset designs and technology available globally, and 
adapted their recommendations in a manner consistent with the North 
American operating environment. The intent of these requirements is to 
ensure that safety and reliability are paramount, while incorporating 
elements from the most advanced, service-proven technology available 
throughout the world.

Alternative Crashworthiness Requirements for Tier I Passenger Trainsets

    As noted above, FRA is codifying a set of technical evaluation 
criteria the ETF developed as guidance for those seeking to demonstrate 
that alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance 
requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets provide a level of safety 
equivalent to the existing requirements in part 238. FRA intends for 
the alternative technical criteria to allow the industry greater 
flexibility to use more contemporary design techniques and more fully 
apply emerging technology, including crash energy management (CEM) 
technology, without requiring a waiver of compliance for operating the 
equipment. The technical criteria are based on established 
international standards and significant research and testing conducted 
by the industry and DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center) over the past 25 years. Codifying the technical 
criteria dovetails with alternative crashworthiness performance 
requirements FRA earlier established in part 238 for the front-end 
structures of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives (75 FR 1180), 
thereby broadening application of such requirements to other main 
structures.

Tier II Maximum Authorized Speed

    On March 13, 2013, FRA issued a final rule (78 FR 16052) to amend 
the Federal Track Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of 
rail vehicles and the tracks they operate on at speeds up to 220 mph. 
That final rule revised the track geometry and safety limits for 
various track classes, extended the limits for the highest track speeds 
from 200 to 220 mph (Class 9 track), and affirmed that the maximum 
authorized speed for Class 8 track is 160 mph. This final rule 
establishes the maximum authorized operating speed for Tier II 
passenger equipment consistent with the limits for Class 8 track. 
However, it is important to note that existing Tier II operations FRA 
has approved to operate at speeds up to 150 mph are still required to 
provide sufficient testing and vehicle/track interaction performance 
data required under 49 CFR 213.329 and 238.111, and obtain FRA approval 
before any operations occur at the new maximum authorized speed of 160 
mph.

Economic Analysis

    This final rule expands and makes more flexible FRA's Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards. FRA believes this final rule will have a 
net cost savings effect on the passenger rail industry and society as a 
whole, along with safety benefits.
    Specifically, the final rule will generate cost savings benefits by 
enabling high-speed rail operators to avoid new right-of-way 
acquisition and infrastructure construction for dedicated rail lines in 
dense urban areas. This is possible because the final rule allows such 
trains to travel on existing, non-dedicated rail lines, although at 
slower speeds than permissible for travel on dedicated rail lines.
    For traditional passenger rail operations, there are both 
operational and safety benefits resulting from this final rule. Not 
issuing the rule would increase costs associated with the acquisition 
of new passenger trains and could delay new U.S. passenger rail 
infrastructure projects. The final rule ensures existing and future 
alternative trainset designs can operate in the U.S.

[[Page 59184]]

railroad environment on a widespread basis, beyond the constraints that 
have been imposed by FRA regulations. This helps avert perpetuating a 
patchwork of waivers in the U.S. passenger rail market that would, in 
turn, perpetuate the current unattractiveness of the U.S. passenger 
equipment market to manufacturers. The final rule allows U.S. trainsets 
to use technological advances for safety compliance purposes in a way 
that was previously restricted under the former regulations.
    There will also be safety benefits associated with improvement of 
the existing rail infrastructure to accommodate the operation of new 
high-speed rail equipment in shared rights-of-way.\2\ Additionally, as 
the requirements herein are largely performance-based standards and not 
prescriptive requirements, equipment benefits will be generated by 
passenger rail operators being able to adopt service-proven, safety-
equivalent technology and practices and apply future technological 
advancements.
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    \2\ For example, the shared rail infrastructure is presumed to 
be better maintained to accommodate the new Tier III equipment, and 
thus all rail traffic operating over that shared infrastructure will 
benefit from track maintained to tighter tolerances for higher 
speeds under FRA's track safety standards at 49 CFR part 213. Track 
that was once maintained to Class 4 or 5 tolerances, may now be 
maintained to Class 6 or 7 tolerances.
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    Over a 30-year period, FRA estimates quantifiable cost savings 
range from a present value of between $512.5 million to $1.1 billion 
(when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or between $790.1 million to $1.6 
billion (when discounted at a 3-percent rate).\3\ Annualized cost 
savings of this rule are expected to be between $41.3 million and $85.8 
million when discounted at a 7-percent rate and between $40.3 million 
and $84.0 million when discounted at a 3-percent rate.
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    \3\ Tier III costs and cost savings are uncertain because they 
are based on assumptions regarding the future growth of high-speed 
rail operations and how those operations will be incorporated into 
the U.S. rail network. It is possible that all costs, cost savings, 
and benefits relating to Tier III systems, including equipment and 
infrastructure, will be zero. This could occur if no high-speed rail 
projects come to fruition over the forecasted horizon. Further, the 
estimated infrastructure cost savings depend on the assumption of 
not having to build dedicated HSR track for the whole system (i.e., 
they represent savings from being able to operate HSR using shared 
infrastructure). Tier I cost savings from adopting performance-based 
standards are challenging to quantify, as estimates are based on 
projecting future changes. However, given that the new regulation's 
performance standards provide an alternative to more design-based 
standards, operators would voluntarily comply only if they found it 
beneficial to do so. The estimated figures in the Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA) are provided for expository purposes. For both Tier 
III and Tier I, if the actions that trigger cost savings are not 
taken, the costs would not be incurred, as the costs and cost 
savings are two sides of the same actions.
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    Over the same 30-year period, FRA estimates the industry will incur 
costs ranging between $227.7 to $523.3 million (when discounted at a 7-
percent rate) or between $351.3 to $808.8 million (when discounted at a 
3-percent rate). Annualized costs of this rule are expected to be 
between $18.4 million and $42.2 million when discounted at a 7-percent 
rate and between $17.9 million and $41.3 million when discounted at a 
3-percent rate. All quantified costs would be for testing and analysis 
to demonstrate compliance with either the Tier I alternative or Tier 
III standards.
    Over the 30-year period of the analysis, FRA estimates discounted 
net regulatory cost savings will be between $438.8 million (low range) 
and $837.8 million (high range) discounted at 3 percent; net regulatory 
cost savings will be between $284.8 million (low range) and $541.9 
million (high range), discounted at 7 percent. Annualized net 
regulatory cost savings total between $22.4 million and $42.7 million 
when discounted at a 3-percent rate and between $22.9 million and $43.7 
million when discounted at a 7-percent rate.

                                           Net Regulatory Cost Savings
                          [Quantified estimates using a 30-year period; $ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Description                                    Discounted 3%    Discounted 7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   High Range
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs...................................................................           $808.8           $523.3
Total Cost Savings............................................................          1,646.7          1,065.2
Total Net Cost Savings........................................................            837.8            541.9
Annualized Net Cost Savings...................................................             42.7             43.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Low Range
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs...................................................................            351.3            227.7
Total Cost Savings............................................................            790.1            512.5
Total Net Cost Savings........................................................            438.8            284.8
Annualized Net Cost Savings...................................................             22.4             22.9
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    The rulemaking will provide an optional alternative, not a mandate, 
for railroads to use a different type or design of passenger equipment 
in Tier I service and will not impose any burden on existing rolling 
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. 
Similarly, the rulemaking will provide a framework for railroads to 
operate equipment in new Tier III service--it will not impose any 
burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under 
existing regulations.

Alternatives Considered

    One of the main purposes of the final rule is to provide a set of 
minimum Federal safety requirements for safe operation in the U.S. rail 
environment of passenger equipment platforms designed to contemporary 
engineering standards outside of the U.S. Traditionally, U.S. railroad 
safety regulations evolved as a consequence of specific accidents 
scenarios, which have led to the identification of specific risks in 
the operating environment.\4\ As FRA stated in its 1999 Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards (PESS) final rule, the railroad operating 
environment in the United States generally requires passenger equipment 
to operate commingled with very heavy and long freight trains, often 
over track with frequent grade crossings used by heavy highway 
equipment. See 64 FR 25540, 25541 (May 12, 1999). European passenger 
operations, on the other hand,

[[Page 59185]]

are intermingled with freight equipment of lesser weight than in North 
America. In many cases, highway-rail grade crossings also pose lesser 
hazards to passenger trains in Europe due to lower highway vehicle 
weight.
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    \4\ Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 62 FR 49728, 49729-49731 (Sep. 23, 1997) (discussing 
differences between the European and U.S. rail operating 
environments, and describing a range of passenger rail accidents 
demonstrating the need for comprehensive, passenger equipment safety 
standards).
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    While FRA seeks to continue ensuring the safety risks are 
adequately addressed for the operating environment, the final rule 
places special emphasis on measures to avoid those risks rather than 
simply mitigating them. Importantly, this final rule allows the use of 
additional types of rolling stock design, which will enable innovation 
and provide railroads the flexibility to purchase equipment designed to 
more performance-based and modern requirements. The rule also permits 
carriers to move forward with a new tier of higher speed rail.
    The alternatives FRA considered in establishing the safety 
requirements for Tier III trainsets are based on European and Japanese 
industry standards. These options provide a continuum of safety 
requirements for a range of aspects such as: Varying levels of 
regulation, market accessibility, benefits and costs, and operational 
efficiency and safety. FRA prepared a high-level cost comparison of 
those options based on the key attributes of the alternatives and the 
effect of those attributes on societal welfare and the regulatory 
purpose. FRA compared the technical requirements of other established 
high-speed rail standards to illustrate the primary differences, not 
make a direct comparison between comparable requirements or standards.
    In Europe, passenger rail equipment crashworthiness and occupant 
protection design standards have been largely standardized by 
EuroNorms.\5\ FRA concluded that there are no significant differences 
between trains built to the design standards contained in EuroNorms and 
trains built to meet the crashworthiness and occupant protection 
requirements in the final rule. FRA estimates that on average trainset 
prices will increase $310,250 (0.62 percent) per trainset to meet the 
Tier III requirements in this final rule.
    In Japan, railroad safety regulation is governed by the Railway 
Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and is codified 
in the Technical Regulatory Standards on Railways.\6\ These technical 
standards are primarily performance-based and railways have the 
obligation to conform their operations, equipment, and infrastructure 
to these standards. In the case of its high-speed rail system, the 
Tokaido Shinkansen, the railway transports only passengers; the rail 
line is entirely dedicated to high-speed rail with no conventional 
trains operating and has full grade separation. These are the 
significant differences underlying the design of Tokaido Shinkansen 
trainsets operating in Japan when compared to passenger trainsets 
currently operating in the U.S. The key to the Japanese high-speed rail 
network's ongoing safety performance and reliability is the principle 
of crash avoidance. Modifying this advanced Japanese high-speed 
trainset to comply with the new Tier III requirements would result in 
significant additional costs to be interoperable in the U.S. rail 
system; FRA estimates $4.7 million per trainset. European trains 
generally would not need carbody, truck, suspension, or brake 
modifications to comply with the Tier III requirements. However, either 
the analysis used to demonstrate compliance of the train safety 
features or components would require modification, or minor design 
modification(s) would likely be needed, or both.\7\ These differences 
are illustrated in the following:
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    \5\ EuroNorms title derived: ``Standard'' is ``norme'' in French 
and ``norm'' in German. https://www.cen.eu/work/ENdev/whatisEN/Pages/default.aspx.
    \6\ http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/2006/h_railway_bureau/Laws_concerning/14.pdf.
    \7\ A discussion of the rationale supporting each of the 
structural requirements under the ``Minor modifications required'' 
column in the ``Summary of potential changes for equipment designed 
to European standards to comply with final rule in the U.S.'' table 
is available under the section-by-section analysis contained in the 
NPRM. See 81 FR 88006, 88027-88028, 88034-88038 (Dec. 6, 2016). As 
discussed in the NPRM, each requirement was determined as necessary 
to achieve an equivalent level of safety as provided by conventional 
Tier I equipment under 49 CFR part 238, subpart C.

     Summary of Potential Changes for Equipment Designed to European
             Standards To Comply With Final Rule in the U.S.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Engineering analysis difference        Minor modifications required
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Quasi static compression......   Structural integrity
                                          of non-cab end.
 Dynamic collision scenario....   Interior fixture
                                          attachment.
 Override protection...........   Seat crashworthiness.
 Fluid entry inhibition........   Luggage racks.
 Roof and side structure          Emergency window
 integrity.                               egress & rescue access
                                          windows.
 Glazing.......................   Emergency lighting.
                                          Alerters.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The RIA that accompanies this final rule contains an analysis of 
regulatory alternatives FRA considered. Specifically, the analysis 
compares at a general level the costs and benefits of the Tier III 
requirements to both European and Japanese standards for high-speed 
trains. The analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million European 
high-speed trainset could be modified to comply with the Tier III 
requirements with only minor structural modifications and, as indicated 
above, at little additional cost--about $310,000 per trainset. 
Modifications are expected to ensure such trainsets safely operate in a 
U.S. setting. Due to the lack of historical safety information for 
operations at Tier III speeds in the U.S., FRA was unable to estimate 
the incremental safety benefit that would be provided by the Tier III 
requirements as compared to the European technical standards. However, 
these new requirements are supported by the recommendation of the full 
RSAC and FRA is confident about the cost-beneficial nature of the final 
rule. Additionally, the analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 
million Tokaido Shinkansen Japanese high-speed trainset would need 
significant structural modifications, including those to the carbody, 
trucks, and suspension, to comply with the Tier III requirements, and, 
as indicated above, would incur significant additional costs--about 
$4.7 million per trainset.
    FRA is unable to provide an estimate of the expected incremental 
benefit of the Tier III requirements over the alternatives, but FRA 
believes these additional costs are justified by the nature of the 
risks within the U.S. rail operating environment and RSAC's 
recommendations. Tier III trains in the U.S. will share track with 
other rail operations, including heavy and long

[[Page 59186]]

freight trains, and operate on track with highway-rail grade crossings 
and the accompanying risks of colliding with trucks and other highway 
vehicles.
    FRA conducted a qualitative analysis comparing the final rule's 
Tier I alternative requirements to two alternatives: Not taking any 
regulatory action or adopting existing international design standards. 
As discussed in the RIA, trainsets compliant with international design 
standards (such as European or Japanese) would require extensive 
modifications to meet Tier I requirements if FRA elected to take no 
regulatory action. However, under the new Tier I alternative 
requirements, FRA believes the costs associated with compliance will be 
similar to those discussed for Tier III equipment.
    A second alternative would be to codify EuroNorms as Federal 
regulations, instead of the new Tier I alternative requirements. This 
option opens the possibility for manufacturers to accrue savings from 
fewer modifications; however, such an option would require 
manufacturers to expend resources that favor a particular technology or 
approach to equipment design. Additionally, codifying EuroNorms in lieu 
of the final rule would potentially have required equipment designed to 
a different standard to incur certain costs related to modifying the 
equipment to bring it into compliance.
    Consequently, regardless of the requirements codified, 
manufacturers would likely have to modify trainsets to meet the 
regulatory requirements specified. Importantly, trainsets meeting only 
a European standard (or Japanese or other international standard) would 
not be interoperable with existing U.S. passenger or freight equipment. 
Therefore, this equipment could only operate on an exclusive right-of-
way, unable to take advantage of existing infrastructure.
    FRA requested and received no public comment on the alternatives 
presented and discussed. For further discussion, please also see the 
RIA's ``Alternatives Considered'' section, in which FRA presents more 
detailed discussion of the impact of the alternatives considered.
    FRA did consider the alternative of standalone HSR systems (not 
physically connected to the general railroad system) operating on an 
exclusive right-of-way, which would use passenger equipment that 
complies with European or other international standards but not 
necessarily with FRA's new requirements. For the reasons discussed 
below, FRA declined to pursue this alternative. A major tenet of this 
final rule is to safely facilitate the implementation of nationwide, 
interoperable HSR service. Standalone systems operating equipment not 
compliant with FRA's passenger equipment safety standards would 
significantly limit the interoperability of HSR service. When 
developing these requirements, FRA did not envision a network of 
standalone, non-interoperable HSR systems comprising the nationwide 
network.
    Additionally, it would be very costly for a standalone system to 
attempt to connect with major metropolitan areas because those 
standalone systems could not take advantage of a major regulatory 
savings--operating over existing infrastructure. FRA determined that 
two-thirds to four-fifths of the regulatory cost savings are due to 
infrastructure cost avoidance for operations electing to use Tier I 
alternative or Tier III equipment. In particular, interoperability will 
allow HSR operators to reach into major metropolitan areas where 
building new, exclusive rights-of-way may not be feasible due to land 
density, environmental, and other considerations.
    An advantage of the standalone alternative is that an individual 
railroad system could optimize its operations to high levels of 
performance without necessarily having to adhere to requirements 
generally applicable to railroad systems in the U.S. However, for such 
a project to attain that level of performance, it would have to 
optimize the design of the entire system, not only the passenger 
equipment. Basically, a standalone system would have to bring together 
all the other aspects of railroad safety (such as operating practices, 
signal and train control, and track) that must be applied to the 
individual system. Given that such an approach covers more than 
passenger equipment, and would likely necessitate particular right-of-
way intrusion protection and other safety requirements not adequately 
addressed in FRA's regulations, FRA continues to believe that 
addressing proposals for standalone HSR systems on a case-by-case basis 
and comprehensively (such as through a rule of particular applicability 
or other specific regulatory action(s)) is prudent because of the small 
number of potential operations and the potential for significant 
differences in their design. Entities considering such operations 
voluntarily assume the higher costs of building new infrastructure, 
knowing they cannot take advantage of the cost savings from sharing 
existing infrastructure.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. Statutory Background

    In September 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) 
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail 
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one initiative of 
this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin 
developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-
year period. In November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's 
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations 
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 
1994 (the Act), Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 
2, 1994). In the Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult 
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for 
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations and to issue 
orders under it. See section 215 of the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
20133).

B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate

    On May 4, 1998, under section 215 of the Act, FRA published the 
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule (PTEP). See 63 FR 
24629. The PTEP contained minimum Federal safety standards for the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains, 
including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail 
service. The rule also established specific requirements for passenger 
train emergency systems and contained specific requirements for 
participation in debrief and critique sessions following emergency 
situations and full-scale simulations.
    On May 12, 1999, FRA published the PESS final rule. See 64 FR 
25540. The PESS established comprehensive safety standards for railroad 
passenger equipment including requirements for carbody structure and 
fire safety. FRA subsequently amended the PESS to address petitions 
seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the 
rule. In response to the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and 
published three sets of amendments to the final rule. See 65 FR 41284, 
Jul. 3, 2000; 67 FR 19970, Apr. 23, 2002; and 67 FR 42892, June 25, 
2002.
    Since then, FRA has engaged in a number of rulemakings to amend and 
enhance its passenger safety requirements. On October 19, 2006, FRA

[[Page 59187]]

published a final rule addressing various requirements on the 
inspection, testing, and operation of passenger equipment, and the 
attachment of safety appliances. See 71 FR 61835. On February 1, 2008, 
FRA published the Passenger Train Emergency Systems final rule 
promoting passenger occupant safety by addressing emergency 
communication, emergency egress, and rescue access requirements. See 73 
FR 6370. FRA also established additional requirements for passenger 
train emergency systems on November 29, 2013, see 78 FR 71785, revised 
and clarified its PTEP regulations on March 31, 2014, see 79 FR 18128, 
and established new standards to improve the integrity of passenger 
train exterior side door safety systems on December 7, 2015, see 80 FR 
76118.
    On January 8, 2010, FRA published a final rule enhancing 
requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars 
and MU locomotives. See 75 FR 1180. FRA included energy-absorption 
requirements in the 2010 rulemaking to address traditional cab car and 
MU locomotive designs, with very strong underframes and relatively 
weaker superstructures, because it is vitally important to provide 
protection to crewmembers and passengers if the superstructure is 
impacted. In that rulemaking, FRA applied mature technology and design 
practice to extend requirements from linear-elastic to elastic-plastic 
and provided descriptions of allowable deformations without complete 
failure of the system. Although FRA believed at the time of the 
rulemaking that the alternative performance requirements would 
principally apply to shaped-nose equipment designs or CEM designs, or 
both, FRA also intended for them to apply to any conventional equipment 
design, as an alternative to the linear-elastic approach. In 
particular, the alternative performance requirements allow innovative 
designs that protect the occupied volume for its full height, even 
without traditional full-height collision and corner post structures, 
and the rule has been applied to such innovative end frame designs and 
traditional end frame designs.

III. Development of the Final Rule

    This final rule is primarily based on consensus recommendations 
from the RSAC.\8\ See 81 FR 88006, 88013. Those recommendations were 
developed over many years, and began in 2009 when FRA elected to 
develop, in consultation with the RSAC, alternative criteria and 
procedures to assess the crashworthiness and occupant protection 
performance of rail passenger equipment applicable to a wide range of 
equipment designs to be used in Tier I service. Accordingly, the ETF 
\9\ was established in September 2009, charged with the mission of 
producing a set of technical criteria and procedures for evaluating 
petitions for waivers from (or, as appropriate under Sec.  238.201(b), 
approval of alternative compliance with) one or more of the Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards. This work led to the development of the 
Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, published in 2011. The 
technical evaluation criteria and procedures in the Report provided a 
means of establishing whether equipment of an alternative design would 
result in at least equivalent performance to that of equipment designed 
in accordance with the structural standards in 49 CFR part 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The RSAC member groups are: American Association of Private 
Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO); American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American Chemistry Council; 
American Petroleum Institute; American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA); American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association (ASLRRA); American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA); 
Association of American Railroads (AAR); Association of State Rail 
Safety Managers (ASRSM); Association of Tourist Railroads and 
Railway Museums; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen 
(BLET); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division 
(BMWED); Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); Chlorine 
Institute; Federal Transit Administration (FTA);* Fertilizer 
Institute; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International 
Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers 
(SMART), including the Sheet Metal Workers' International 
Association (SMWIA) and United Transportation Union (UTU); 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW); Labor 
Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA);* League of Railway 
Industry Women;* National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP); 
National Association of Railway Business Women;* National Conference 
of Firemen & Oilers; National Railroad Construction and Maintenance 
Association (NRCMA); National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
(Amtrak); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);* Railway 
Supply Institute (RSI); Safe Travel America (STA); Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Transporte (Mexico);* Transport Canada;* Transport 
Workers Union of America (TWU); Transportation Communications 
International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); and Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA).* *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
    \9\ The ETF member groups are: AAR; AAPRCO; AASHTO, including 
California Department of Transportation, and Interfleet; APTA, 
including Alstom, Ansaldo Breda, Bombardier, Central Japan Railway 
Company (JRC), China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation 
(CSR), Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD), East Japan 
Railway Company, Faiveley Transport, GE Transportation, Japan 
International Transport Institute, Japan's Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Kawasaki, Keolis, KPS N.A., 
LIRR, LTK Engineering Services, Marsh, Metro-North, Nippon Sharyo, 
Parsons Brinckerhoff, PS Consulting, Safetran Systems, SEPTA, Sharma 
& Associates, Siemens, Southern California Regional Rail Authority 
(SCRRA), Stadler, STV, Talgo, Texas Central Railway, Veolia, Voith 
Turbo, and Wabtec; Amtrak; ASLRRA; BLET; European Railway Agency 
(ERA); NTSB; RSI, including Battelle Memorial Institute, and ENSCO; 
SMART, including SMWIA and UTU; TCIU/BRC; and Transport Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After the ETF developed the Report, the task of the ETF was 
expanded to: (1) Develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC to 
adopt the alternative crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations; 
and (2) establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation 
of high-speed trainsets able to operate at speeds up to 220 mph,\10\ 
classified as Tier III passenger equipment. The work of the ETF and 
full RSAC culminated with the publication of the NPRM on December 6, 
2016. Please see the Technical Background and Overview section of the 
NPRM, section III, for a more comprehensive discussion on the 
development of these requirements at 81 FR 88006, 88013-88017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ FRA elected 220 mph as the maximum operating speed for Tier 
III equipment to remain harmonious with FRA's track safety standards 
(49 CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013 (discussing the 
reasoning and research behind the 220-mph maximum track speed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The comment period was initially scheduled to close on February 6, 
2017. However, in a December 12, 2016 letter, APTA requested a 30-day 
extension of the NPRM's comment period. APTA stated it needed 
additional time to thoroughly review the NPRM, and review and 
consolidate comments on the NPRM from its members and affiliates. On 
February 13, 2017, FRA published a notice in the Federal Register 
reopening the comment period until March 21, 2017. See 82 FR 10449. A 
description and summary of the comments received on the NPRM is 
discussed below under section IV, Discussion of Comments and 
Conclusions.
    To further benefit from the input of the ETF, FRA convened a 
meeting of the ETF on May 16-18, 2017, in Washington, DC.\11\ During 
this meeting, FRA discussed proposed responses to the comments 
received, which was helpful to FRA in crafting the fuller responses to 
the comments contained in this final rule. Accordingly, FRA did not 
believe it necessary to bring any issues back to the full RSAC for a 
formal recommendation. The only issues for which there was no consensus 
either did not have consensus agreement initially (cab glazing 
ballistic requirements, which were deferred to FRA to develop) or were 
generally non-

[[Page 59188]]

substantive in nature (the archival of AAR-RP-5104 for incorporation-
by-reference). Please see the fuller discussion of each of these topics 
under the section-by-section analysis of the respective sections (Sec.  
238.721, Glazing, and Sec.  238.735, Seat crashworthiness (passenger 
and cab crew)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Minutes of this meeting is part of the docket in this 
proceeding and is available for public inspection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Please note that the RSAC did not expressly consider FRA's removal 
of the requirement for a rule of particular applicability to conduct 
operations at speeds above 150 mph, as specified in subpart I of part 
236 of this chapter. See the discussion of changes to Sec.  236.1007 of 
this chapter in the section-by-section analysis, below. The RSAC also 
did not consider FRA's changes to Sec. Sec.  229.3, 229.5, and 231.0 of 
this chapter. These changes, harmonizing references to the maximum 
authorized operating speed for Tier II equipment, were not expressly 
proposed in the NPRM as they were inadvertently omitted. See the 
discussion of changes to Sec. Sec.  229.3, 229.5, and 231.0 of this 
chapter in the section-by-section analysis, below. FRA nonetheless 
believes the removal of language from part 236 and the harmonization of 
parts 229 and 231 are consistent with the RSAC recommended approach in 
this rulemaking.

IV. Discussion of Comments and Conclusions

    As noted above, on February 13, 2017, FRA reopened the comment 
period for the NPRM that closed on February 6, 2017, in response to a 
request received from APTA. See 82 FR 10449 (Feb. 13, 2017). During the 
entire comment period, FRA received comments from two individuals and 
the following seven entities: Alstom Transportation, Inc. (Alstom); 
APTA; East Japan Railway Company (JR East); Italcertifier, SPA; LTK 
Engineering Services (LTK); Siemens; and Texas Central Railroad, LLC 
(TCRR). The comments were all supportive of the rulemaking, and FRA 
appreciates the commenters for the time and effort put into each of the 
comments received. FRA will first discuss the comments that are 
applicable to the rulemaking, generally. Responses to comments on 
specific sections of the rule are discussed in the section-by-section 
analysis, or in the Regulatory Impact and Notices portion of this final 
rule, with the provisions and statements to which they specifically 
relate. FRA makes clear that the order of the discussion is not meant 
to imply that FRA is prioritizing one commenter over another.
    As noted above, following the submission of these written comments, 
FRA convened the Engineering Task Force to consider and discuss the 
comments and to help achieve a fuller understanding of the comments 
received and recommendations for this final rule. As a result, certain 
of these comments have been superseded by changes made in the rule text 
from the NPRM to this final rule, and they should not necessarily be 
understood to reflect the positions of the commenters with respect to 
the requirements of the final rule. Nevertheless, FRA is setting out 
all the comments received and is responding to each of them, either 
here, or in the pertinent section-by-section analysis or Regulatory 
Impact Notice provision, so that FRA's positions are clearly 
understood. In addressing these comments and developing this final 
rule, FRA has relied on information contained in comments, RSAC meeting 
minutes, memoranda, and other materials in the docket for this 
rulemaking.

A. General Comments

    APTA, in its comment, stated that it is very supportive of the 
``Tier III approach.'' APTA further stated that the Tier III 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements permit Tier III 
trainsets to operate in a shared right of way with conventional 
passenger and freight rail equipment at speeds below 125 mph (Tier I 
environment). This type of interoperability has the potential to have a 
safe and cost-effective approach to implementing high-speed rail as it 
permits the use of internationally service-proven high-speed rail 
equipment and also the use of existing infrastructure for lower speed 
operation. FRA appreciates APTA's support on FRA's approach to permit 
Tier III equipment to be interoperable at speeds not exceeding 125 mph. 
APTA further noted that FRA described very well an advantage of a 
standalone system to be the system's potential to optimize its 
operations to a high level of performance.
    In both their comments, APTA and TCRR recommended that FRA adopt a 
definition for ``Tier IV system.'' For the reasons discussed in the 
section-by-section analysis for Sec.  238.5, below, FRA is not 
including a definition for ``Tier IV system'' in this final rule. 
However, APTA's and TCRR's comments on this topic went beyond the 
definition of a Tier IV system and touched on FRA's discussion in the 
NPRM of Alternatives Considered under the Executive Summary. 81 FR 
88006, 88009.
    Additionally, APTA, as part of its comment, noted that the 
regulation references several APTA standards by a ``date certain'' for 
incorporation by reference. APTA further noted that many of those 
standards will be updated ``in the near future'' and recommended that 
the latest versions of the standards be referenced. APTA also 
recommended, more generally, that all existing references to APTA 
standards within part 238 be updated in the final rule. FRA must 
incorporate by reference updated technical standards according to 1 CFR 
part 51. To the extent possible, FRA has included for incorporation by 
reference the most up-to-date APTA standards that were under 
consideration in this rulemaking. Under the section-by-section 
analysis, FRA has indicated where it has revised references from the 
initial versions of APTA standards to refer to the most recent editions 
instead. With respect to updating references to APTA standards in part 
238, generally, FRA will address this issue in another rulemaking 
effort in which FRA reviews and updates, as necessary, all references 
to relevant technical standards in part 238, because part 238 
incorporates by reference technical standards from a number of 
different industry consensus organizations.
    Alstom commented on Sec.  238.15, Movement of passenger equipment 
with power brake defects, asking FRA if a reference for Tier III 
equipment will be added where there is currently a reference to Tier 
II. Alstom also commented more generally whether Tier II requirements 
will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and extended to apply to Tier 
III equipment. Alstom comments on Sec.  238.15 are outside the intended 
scope of this rulemaking. Due to the unique nature of Tier III 
equipment and operations, FRA believes that more consideration and 
analysis are necessary in developing appropriate regulatory 
requirements addressing the specific safety concerns implicated. 
Accordingly, FRA believes it appropriate to seek public comment on any 
proposal on this topic as part of a future rulemaking. In the interim, 
FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure proper 
safeguards and procedures are in place to protect the movement of 
defective Tier III equipment.
    Italcertifier, SPA submitted a presentation to the docket in which 
it outlined six comments. None of those six comments proposed any 
changes to regulatory text or to FRA's approach to Tier I alternative 
or Tier III requirements. Among its comments, Italcertifier stated that 
collision risk is mitigated ``by the presence and efficiency of the 
train protection systems'' and the crash-avoidance philosophy, and 
added that trains in Europe must be equipped with an onboard train 
control system that is integrated with the wayside signal

[[Page 59189]]

system. Italcertifier stated, though, that the proposed rule did not 
account for PTC or such other technology. However, FRA notes that PTC 
technology is not intended as a replacement for crashworthiness and 
occupant protection requirements. PTC is a performance-based system 
requirement that provides collision avoidance and overspeed protection 
technology for certain accident scenarios that complement, but do not 
replace, crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. 
Additionally, not all accidents are PTC-preventable.
    Italcertifier also commented that in Italy ``level crossings'' 
(highway-rail grade crossings) are not permitted at speeds exceeding 
200 km/h (approximately 124 mph) but there is a movement to eliminate 
such crossings from track with speeds exceeding 160 km/h (approximately 
100 mph). Although this has no impact on the regulatory text, FRA notes 
that such an approach appears consistent with FRA's treatment of grade 
crossings (permitted on Class 6 track, or at speeds up to 110 mph; 
permitted subject to FRA approval on Class 7 track, or at speeds up to 
125 mph; and prohibited on Class 8 track and above, or at speeds 
exceeding 125 mph). See 49 CFR 213.347. Further, Italcertifier 
commented that the European standards bodies (e.g., CEN or CENELEC) 
create technology-neutral standards, which is consistent with FRA's 
approach under this rule. Italcertifier also expressed its support for 
creating an interoperable passenger rail network, stating that the 
decision to have an interoperable high-speed rail system, and not a 
standalone system except on a case-by-case basis, is completely in line 
with the European position. Finally, Italcertifier commented that 
qualifying equipment in Italy requires a series of tests to demonstrate 
compliance with various European technical standards. This, too, is 
consistent with FRA's approach.
    JR East's comment focused on the economic impacts of the proposed 
rule. In its comment, JR East articulated that when FRA calculates the 
costs of modifying Japanese equipment to meet Tier III requirements, 
FRA should consider not only the initial cost (which FRA estimated at 
$4.7 million per trainset), but also ``the total cost including 
operation cost, maintenance cost and the expenses for the suspension of 
transportation due to accidents.'' FRA has addressed this comment in 
section 2.1.1 of the regulatory impact analysis, which is included in 
the docket, and in the economic analysis discussion contained in this 
final rule. For purposes of the economic analysis, FRA chose to only 
consider the initial cost of modifying Japanese equipment to meet Tier 
III requirements. FRA considers that the operation, maintenance, and 
other related expenses would be unique to each railroad potentially 
operating the equipment, and therefore the differential cost would only 
be the expense to modify the equipment.
    LTK was very supportive of the rule and the effort put forth by all 
involved in the ETF. LTK also expressed that the publication of the 
proposed rule was timely in that industry ``requires clarity'' with 
respect to applicable safety standards for Tier I alternative and Tier 
III high-speed trainsets, noting both of which must be capable of 
operating in mixed service with conventional passenger and freight 
operations at speeds below 125 mph as a result of a number of ongoing 
trainset procurements. LTK went on to say that the crashworthiness and 
occupant protection requirements contained in the proposed rule will 
facilitate the introduction of international passenger and high-speed 
trainset designs with minor modifications to enable operation in the 
North American rail environment. LTK also commented that it agrees with 
the comments APTA submitted to the docket, stating that the recommended 
edits in the APTA comments provide additional clarity and are 
consistent with the basis for consensus reached within the ETF. LTK 
further commented that APTA is currently in the process of reviewing 
and renewing its Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards and that, as 
FRA finalizes the rule, FRA should update the incorporation dates of 
APTA standards to the most recent dates if the standards are updated 
and approved through APTA prior to final rule publication. FRA makes 
clear it supports incorporating updated APTA standards and has 
incorporated by reference the most up-to-date APTA standards in this 
final rule consistent with the requirements of 1 CFR part 51.
    Siemens' comment was very supportive of the rule and of the ETF's 
work on it. Siemens expressed the belief that the rule's defining of 
the new equipment tier, Tier III, was timely and is needed to clarify 
to the industry what types of trainset designs ``can get approved by 
the FRA.'' Siemens noted this significantly reduces risk for the 
industry and has its full support. Siemens also expressed its support 
for the comments submitted by APTA to the docket. Siemens stated it 
participated in the reviews leading to the submission of the APTA 
comments and believed they improve the NPRM.
    TCRR also voiced support of the rulemaking and of the industry-
developed comments submitted by APTA, noting they provide clarification 
on various requirements proposed in the NPRM and are consistent with 
the basis for consensus reached within the RSAC ETF. TCRR also 
submitted substantive comments on specific sections that are addressed 
in the section-by-section analysis, below.
    In addition, FRA received comments on the rulemaking from 
individuals. One individual stated that he ``strongly support[s] 
modifying the regulations that make American trains much more expensive 
and slower than train across much of the rest of the world.'' The 
commenter urged, to the extent possible, that FRA align its regulations 
with other major standards (especially European standards) to enable 
railroads to buy ``off-the-shelf'' trainsets at much lower cost. The 
commenter stated that this was an easy way to start to reduce 
regulatory burdens and suggested that FRA's regulations be amended to 
grant a categorical safe harbor for any trainset that complies with the 
European safety requirements. FRA has long considered whether adopting 
European safety requirements would be practical in advancing passenger 
rail safety in the U.S., given the unique nature of the risks within 
the U.S. rail operating environment in which passenger trains share 
track with other rail operations, including heavy and long freight 
trains, and frequently operate on track with highway-rail grade 
crossings and the accompanying risks of colliding with trucks and other 
highway vehicles. 62 FR 49728, 49729-49731 (Sep. 23, 1997). In 
addressing the safety concerns that are present in the U.S., FRA has 
instead focused on developing regulations in this rulemaking that are 
performance-based and technology-neutral to further open the U.S. 
market to international experience and contemporary design techniques 
and to harmonize the crashworthiness and occupant protection 
requirements with those that are established internationally. Further, 
if a car builder can show that its equipment meets or exceeds the 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements as established by 
this rule without structural modification through proper modeling and 
documentation, FRA would not exclude that equipment from operating in 
the U.S. Specifically, FRA noted in the NPRM that it is important to 
recognize that differences between the FRA requirements and 
international technical standards do not mean that in all cases 
structural modifications are

[[Page 59190]]

necessary. Equipment designed to international standards can meet these 
requirements; the equipment manufacturer must only validate and provide 
supporting documentation that it does. See 81 FR 88006, 88014. Further, 
FRA notes that in response to its solicitation for comments on the 
topic of alternative approaches to regulating Tier III equipment (i.e., 
fully adopting European standards), no international equipment 
manufacturer (some of whom are members of the ETF) stated that it would 
be better to simply adopt European crashworthiness standards or offered 
any other regulatory alternative to the ETF's recommended approach. 
Accordingly, this supports FRA's approach to addressing crashworthiness 
and occupant protection requirements in this rule. Further, FRA notes 
that the commenter's reference to a so-called ``off-the-shelf'' product 
is misleading, as all common product platforms are modified to fit the 
specific needs of the customer's specifications, which often reflects 
varying regulatory standards for the country or service intended.
    FRA received a comment from another individual who expressed 
overall support for the proposed rule and wanted to accommodate NTSB 
recommendations to the extent possible without excluding the adoption 
of ``EuroNorm-like trains.'' FRA addresses NTSB's recommendations and 
comments, below.

B. Proposed Subpart I and the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance 
Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment

    FRA is not adopting the proposed ITM requirements under proposed 
subpart I in the NPRM. FRA worked with the ETF to develop a more 
comprehensive set of ITM requirements for Tier III equipment. Indeed, 
in their comments on the NPRM, both APTA and TCRR cited the likelihood 
that the requirements in the subpart as proposed would be subject to 
change based on the ETF's then-ongoing discussion of ITM requirements, 
and they recommended against including the requirements of proposed 
subpart I in this final rule.
    FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation so that ITM 
processes and procedures for an operation's equipment are sufficient to 
address all safety-critical features. FRA will be guided by the ITM 
program elements the ETF developed, which may be codified in a future 
rulemaking.

C. Proposed Subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III 
Passenger Equipment

    In the NPRM, FRA proposed to add and reserve a subpart J to contain 
the requirements for a Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment (or Tier III Safe Operation Plan). As noted below, APTA 
commented that this subpart is unnecessary as the information requested 
by FRA for inclusion in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan would be 
available to FRA through other regulatory means. Specifically, APTA 
prepared a matrix recommending changes to various proposed requirements 
in the NPRM where it believed the desired information should be 
provided, including the addition of a Sec.  238.110 (Pre-revenue 
qualification plan) to review specific design review elements. FRA has 
adopted APTA's recommendations, in whole or in part, in various 
sections of this final rule (see the specific section-by-section 
analysis, below), and has not adopted subpart J, as proposed. However, 
FRA intended the Tier III Safe Operation Plan to be a mechanism 
allowing flexibility for both the Tier III equipment manufacturer and 
operator to address, and FRA to review and approve, certain aspects of 
Tier III equipment or operations not prescriptively defined in the 
regulation so they can be appropriately tailored. To do so, the Tier 
III Safe Operation Plan would provide FRA a broad level of oversight 
during the equipment design period to ensure that safety issues are 
addressed. FRA therefore remains concerned that APTA's comments do not 
offer an alternative that provides FRA the same approval oversight for 
all Tier III equipment or operations matters initially identified for 
the Tier III Safe Operation Plan. For instance, FRA does not approve 
railroad operating rules, so referencing a railroad's operating rules 
to address various matters is not a suitable alternative. Without a 
Tier III Safe Operation Plan requirement in the rule, some other 
mechanism for FRA review and approval is necessary.
    As noted below, APTA has suggested the addition of a new Sec.  
238.110 to handle this review and approval oversight function. However, 
FRA believes that further work is necessary to develop this alternate 
approach. The process for how FRA would provide approval is not fully 
addressed in APTA's proposal, including when that approval must be 
sought, and what, specifically, needs to be approved, including how 
certain Tier III operational aspects would be reviewed and approved by 
FRA. In the interim, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation 
on a case-by-case basis to address safety-critical matters that would 
otherwise have been identified for inclusion in the proposed Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan.

D. Comments From the NTSB

    The NTSB submitted a letter to the docket asking FRA to include in 
the final rule provisions to address safety recommendations the NTSB 
has issued. Specifically, the NTSB asked FRA to add language addressing 
safety recommendations R-12-41, R-14-74, R-15-01, and R-15-02.
    Recommendation R-12-41 arose from a grade crossing accident that 
occurred in Miriam, NV, in 2011, where a tractor-trailer truck struck 
the side of an Amtrak train that was passing through the crossing. The 
NTSB recommended FRA ``[r]equire that passenger railcar doors be 
designed to prevent fire and smoke from traveling between railcars.'' 
FRA notes that adding weight or tighter seals to the doors to prevent 
fire and smoke from traveling between railcars could cause unintended 
harm. Both sliding and swinging doors interact closely with the 
surrounding car body structure, at the hinge, track, jamb, pocket, and/
or latch. Even minor distortion of that structure due to the forces of 
collision or derailment, or simply a change in the orientation of the 
door due to a car being significantly displaced from its upright 
position, could cause the door to fail to operate as intended. Thus, 
during an emergency, additional time and effort would be needed to 
operate the doors, delaying egress and access through those doors.
    Recommendation R-14-74 arose from the overspeed derailment of a 
Metro-North commuter train in Spuyten Duyvil, NY, in 2013. The 
derailment occurred in a 6-degree left-hand curve where the maximum 
authorized speed was 30 mph. The train was traveling at 82 mph when it 
derailed. As a result of the derailment, four people died and at least 
61 persons were injured. Metro-North estimated about 115 passengers 
were on the train at the time of the derailment. Contributing to the 
severity of the accident was the loss of the window glazing that 
resulted in the fatal ejection of four passengers from the train. The 
NTSB recommended FRA ``[d]evelop a performance standard to ensure that 
windows (e.g., glazing, gaskets, and any retention hardware) are 
retained in the window opening structure during an accident and 
incorporate the standard into [49 CFR 238.221 and 238.421] to require 
that passenger railcars meet this standard.'' As discussed in its 
responses to the

[[Page 59191]]

NTSB,\12\ FRA is taking steps to address this recommendation. However, 
the Metro-North accident was the result of overspeed.\13\ 
Implementation of positive train control should eliminate such 
overspeed occurrences in passenger service, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of rollover accidents and fatalities due to ejection through 
window openings similar to the events involved in the Metro-North 
accident. At this time, though, FRA is not amending Sec.  238.221 or 
Sec.  238.421, as the NTSB's recommendations are outside the intended 
scope of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-14-074.
    \13\ http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RAB1412.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Recommendations R-15-01 and R-15-02 arose from a train-to-train 
collision between two Metro-North commuter trains in Bridgeport, CT, in 
2013. An eastbound train was struck by a westbound train after the 
eastbound had derailed. As a result of the collision, at least 65 
persons were injured. Metro-North estimated about 250 passengers were 
on each train at the time of the accident. In R-15-01, the NTSB 
recommended FRA ``[r]evise [49 CFR 238.213] to require the existing 
forward-end corner post strength requirements for the back-end corner 
posts of passenger railcars.'' In R-15-02, the NTSB recommended FRA 
``[r]evise [49 CFR part 238] to incorporate a certificate of 
construction, similar to the one found at [49 CFR 179.5], and require 
that the certificate be furnished prior to the in-service date of the 
railcar.'' FRA recognizes the importance of structurally sound 
passenger cars and believes it has achieved the intent of these 
recommendations. After fully analyzing FRA's current safety data, 
evaluating FRA's existing safety regulations, and reviewing the NTSB's 
findings, FRA determined that its current regulations do address the 
NTSB's underlying safety concerns.\14\ FRA continues to use RSAC to 
identify and analyze potential safety issues and the need for further 
rulemaking. At this time, RSAC (and by extension, FRA) is not 
considering any changes to the strength requirements for passenger car 
corner posts.
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    \14\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-15-001 https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-15-002.
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V. Section-by-Section Analysis

Part 229--Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 229.3 Applicability
    FRA is revising Sec.  229.3(c) to conform the reference to Tier II 
maximum authorized speed with this final rule's revision to the 
definition of ``Tier II.'' FRA is simply changing the reference to 
``150 mph'' to ``160 mph,'' reflecting the changes to the maximum 
authorized speed of Tier II equipment under this rule. This was not 
expressly discussed in the proposed rule; however, this is merely a 
conforming technical revision and will not impose any additional 
regulatory requirements or burdens on the regulated industry.
Section 229.5 Definitions
    FRA is revising the definition of ``Tier II'' to conform the 
maximum authorized operating speed of Tier II passenger equipment in 
this section (150 mph) with the maximum authorized operating speed of 
Tier II equipment as specified under Sec.  238.5 of this chapter (160 
mph). As a result, the definition of ``Tier II'' under part 229 is 
revised to mean operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 
160 mph. This was not expressly discussed in the proposed rule; 
however, this is merely a conforming technical revision and will not 
impose any additional regulatory requirements or burdens on the 
regulated industry.
Part 231--Railroad Safety Appliance Standards
Section 231.0 Applicability and Penalties
    FRA is revising Sec.  231.0(c) to conform the reference to Tier II 
maximum authorized speed with the revisions in this final rule. FRA is 
simply changing the reference to ``150 mph'' to ``160 mph,'' reflecting 
the changes to the maximum authorized speed of Tier II equipment under 
this rule. This was not expressly discussed in the proposed rule; 
however, this is merely a conforming technical revision and will not 
impose any additional regulatory requirements or burdens on the 
regulated industry.

Part 236--Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the 
Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train 
Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances

Subpart I--Positive Train Control Systems
Section 236.1007 Additional Requirements for High-Speed Service
    FRA is removing paragraph (d) of this section as it is no longer 
relevant, and redesignating paragraph (e) as paragraph (d) of this 
section. FRA described the reasons for removing paragraph (d) of this 
section in the NPRM, see 81 FR 88006, 88017, and did not receive any 
comments on or objections to the paragraph's removal. As this portion 
of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis 
provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, and FRA is adopting 
this change as proposed.

Part 238--Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 238.5 Definitions
    In this section, FRA is revising the definitions of ``glazing, end-
facing'' and ``glazing, side-facing,'' and making technical revisions 
to the definitions of ``Tier II'' and ``train, Tier II passenger'' to 
reflect the change in the maximum authorized speed of Tier II passenger 
equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA is also adding new definitions 
for ``Associate Administrator,'' ``Tier III,'' ``trainset, Tier I 
alternative passenger,'' ``trainset, Tier III,'' and ``trainset unit.'' 
For the reasons discussed below, FRA is placing the definition of 
``cab'' in new Sec.  238.702, and not under this section as proposed in 
the NPRM.
    FRA did not receive any comments on or objections to FRA's proposed 
revisions or additions to the definitions of ``glazing, end-facing,'' 
``glazing, side-facing,'' ``Tier II,'' ``train, Tier II passenger,'' 
``Associate Administrator,'' ``Tier III,'' ``trainset, Tier I 
alternative passenger,'' and ``trainset, Tier III'' and those 
definitions in this final rule are identical to the proposed versions. 
81 FR 88006, 88018-88019. Accordingly, the analysis provided for these 
definitions in the NPRM is not being repeated here, and FRA is adopting 
these definitions as proposed.
    FRA did receive comments, however, on the proposed new definitions 
of ``cab'' and ``trainset unit.'' APTA submitted comments suggesting 
revisions to the proposed definitions of ``cab'' and ``trainset unit,'' 
and to FRA's existing definition of ``trainset, passenger.'' 
Additionally, APTA, along

[[Page 59192]]

with Alstom, suggested adding a definition for ``conventional 
locomotive.'' Further, APTA, along with TCRR, suggested adding a 
definition for ``Tier IV system.'' However, as discussed more fully 
under new Sec.  238.702, below, FRA is placing the definition of 
``cab'' under subpart H to clarify the definition's application. 
Accordingly, FRA's discussion of APTA's comment on the term ``cab'' is 
in the section-by-section analysis of new Sec.  238.702, below.
    In its comment, APTA suggested that FRA amend its existing 
definition of ``trainset, passenger'' to provide a more robust 
definition to clarify when the term is used in other sections of the 
rule (e.g., Sec.  238.705, Dynamic collision scenario). APTA suggested 
that the term ``trainset'' means: ``a passenger train where all units 
within the trainset are semi-permanently coupled to operate as a single 
consist. A Tier I alternative trainset may be equipped with a 
conventional locomotive at either end that may not be semi-permanently 
coupled to the adjacent unit of the trainset.'' APTA reasoned that the 
specific requirements proposed by the ETF for a Tier III trainset are 
based on the assumption that all units within the trainset are semi-
permanently coupled together, such that units of the trainset can only 
be coupled or uncoupled at a maintenance facility or other location 
where personnel can safely get under or between units. Additionally, 
APTA commented that, because revenue operations can only be conducted 
using a complete trainset, the collision scenario defined in Sec.  
238.705 is based on the operation of a complete trainset, and mentioned 
that the specific requirements pertaining to safety appliances for Tier 
III trainsets are also based on the assumption that all units within a 
trainset are semi-permanently coupled. Further, APTA proposed allowing 
a passenger trainset, as it would define the term, to be equipped with 
an automatic coupler in the middle of the trainset configuration so it 
could be more easily disconnected in a maintenance facility, noting 
that for such configurations, the requirements of Sec.  238.705(a) 
would apply to the complete trainset as operated in revenue service. At 
this time, FRA is not inclined to amend its current definitions of 
``trainset, passenger'' or ``train, passenger,'' and is declining to 
adopt APTA's proposed definition of ``trainset.'' The definition of 
passenger trainset in Sec.  238.5 applies to all tiers of passenger 
equipment under part 238. Specifying that trainsets, generally, are all 
semi-permanently coupled together places too broad a restriction on the 
method or manner for connecting individual trainset units. However, in 
this final rule, new Sec.  238.705(a)(6) does include a reference to an 
``integrated trainset'' as defined in new Sec.  238.702, to clarify 
which initial velocity applies to a given trainset. Moreover, FRA 
recognizes APTA's concern about allowing for an automatic coupler in 
the middle of a semi-permanently coupled trainset, but believes no 
change is needed. FRA makes clear that the rule does not preclude the 
use of automatic coupler arrangements within the consist of a semi-
permanently coupled Tier III trainset to facilitate maintenance within 
a shop facility, provided the coupler arrangements are not used for 
switching or other operational purposes outside of the protected 
maintenance environment envisioned by the rule. Of course, if a 
coupling between Tier III vehicles is not intended to be semi-permanent 
in nature, then other requirements apply, such as those governing 
safety appliances.
    APTA also recommended clarifying the definition of ``trainset 
unit,'' which FRA proposed to mean a trainset segment located between 
connecting arrangements (articulations). In the NPRM, FRA explained 
this definition would clarify that the proposed requirements may apply 
to individual vehicles within a trainset consist, but not necessarily 
to the trainset as a whole. However, in its comment, APTA suggested 
restating the definition to mean ``any car within a trainset that is 
semi-permanently coupled to an adjacent car within the trainset.'' FRA 
is adopting its proposed definition of ``trainset unit'' in the final 
rule, not APTA's. APTA's suggested definition would be too narrow 
because, to be considered a trainset unit, a vehicle would require 
semi-permanent coupling to an adjacent unit. Yet, FRA intends the 
definition to apply to all tiers of passenger equipment, and therefore 
not require all configurations of trainsets to be semi-permanently 
coupled. FRA believes the definition addresses the essential elements 
constituting a trainset unit without being too specific.
    In their comments, both APTA and Alstom requested FRA add a 
definition of ``conventional locomotive.'' APTA recommended the rule 
define ``conventional locomotive'' to mean ``a piece of on-track rail 
equipment with one or more control stands designed to transport a Tier 
I alternative compliant passenger trainset and which meets the 
crashworthiness requirements defined in Sec.  229.205 [of this chapter] 
and the design requirements contained in Sec.  229.206 [of this 
chapter].'' APTA stated that inclusion of such a definition would 
provide greater clarity with respect to application of the dynamic 
collision scenarios under Sec.  238.705. As discussed below under Sec.  
238.705, APTA raised concern that because a conventional locomotive 
will not be used in Tier III service, requiring use of a conventional 
locomotive for a collision scenario under Tier III requirements would 
introduce confusion as to which is the correct collision scenario to 
apply. Alstom, in its comment, indicated that such a definition of 
``conventional locomotive'' would clarify it is Tier I equipment 
governed by 49 CFR part 229 and that the front vehicle of a Tier III 
Trainset could therefore not be a conventional locomotive. However, FRA 
is not adding a definition of ``conventional locomotive'' to this Sec.  
238.5 of the final rule. APTA's proposed definition would be too 
narrowly limited to a locomotive used to move Tier I alternative 
equipment under appendix G to this part. Instead, FRA believes it is 
more appropriate to more fully explain under Sec.  238.705, below, 
FRA's intent on how the two dynamic collision scenarios should be 
applied. As noted above, FRA is adding the term ``integrated trainset'' 
to Sec.  238.705 to address any confusion about which initial velocity 
applies to a given trainset.
    As mentioned above in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, 
section IV, APTA and TCRR recommended that FRA include in the final 
rule a definition of ``Tier IV system.'' According to both APTA and 
TCRR, a ``Tier IV system would mean ``any passenger rail or ground 
transportation system that operates on an exclusive right-of-way 
without grade crossings and is governed by a technology-specific rule 
of particular applicability, or other regulatory means.'' Although 
amenable to undertaking the development of such a definition, FRA is 
not accepting APTA's and TCRR's recommendations to include a definition 
of a Tier IV system in this final rule. Adding such a broad-ranging 
definition is beyond the intended scope of this rulemaking at this 
final rule stage.
Section 238.21 Special Approval Procedure
    In commenting on this section in the NPRM, Alstom suggested that a 
reference to Tier III equipment be added in paragraph (a) where there 
is currently a reference to Tier II. Alstom noted that paragraph (a) 
includes a cross-reference to Sec.  238.505, which governs approvals 
for Tier II ITM programs. While FRA agrees that a change to this 
paragraph will be warranted in the future, doing so

[[Page 59193]]

in this rulemaking is premature as there is no equivalent section to 
reference for Tier III equipment. However, in the interim, FRA will 
work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the specific 
ITM program sufficiently addresses the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of all safety-critical features of a Tier III trainset.
    FRA is revising paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section, as 
proposed in the NPRM. FRA did not receive any comments on these 
technical changes. As these paragraphs are identical to those FRA 
proposed in the NPRM, please see the NPRM for an analysis of the 
changes, 81 FR 88006, 88050, as it is not being repeated here.
Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements
Section 238.111 Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
    This section contains requirements for pre-revenue service testing 
of passenger equipment. As proposed in the NPRM, FRA is amending 
paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), (7), and (c) of this section to require 
railroads to obtain FRA approval before using Tier III passenger 
equipment that either has not been used in revenue service in the U.S., 
or has been used in revenue service in the U.S. and is scheduled for a 
major upgrade or introduction of new technology that affects a safety 
system on such equipment. The explicit inclusion of a Tier III 
notification and approval process is consistent with FRA's approach to 
the implementation of high-speed rail technology. It also provides a 
formal mechanism for FRA to ensure all required elements of this part 
are satisfactorily addressed and documented.
    In commenting on the NPRM, APTA stated that FRA should separate out 
from this section issues related to FRA approval of the design of Tier 
III equipment. APTA therefore suggested that FRA add a new Sec.  
238.110, titled ``Pre-revenue qualification plan,'' to require a plan 
addressing all documents required by subpart H to be submitted for 
review and approval for Tier III equipment.'' According to APTA, new 
Sec.  238.110 would contain the requirements of Tier III equipment 
design that FRA would need to review and approve before Tier III 
equipment could operate in revenue service. As discussed above under 
proposed subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment, the creation of this new section ties into APTA's comment 
recommending excluding from this final rule the proposed references to 
a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. (Please see the discussion above, under 
proposed subpart J, for FRA's response concerning removal of the Tier 
III Safe Operation Plan.)
    FRA recognizes that Sec.  238.111 will need some further revision 
as new Tier III equipment requirements are established. However, APTA's 
request to adopt a new Sec.  238.110 exceeds the intended scope of this 
current rulemaking proceeding.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
Section 238.201 Scope/Alternative Compliance
    This section sets out the scope of subpart C, which contains 
specific requirements for Tier I passenger equipment, and also provides 
compliance alternatives for the use of Tier I passenger equipment. In 
its comments on the NPRM, APTA agreed with FRA's proposal to amend this 
section to allow Tier I equipment to comply with alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to 
this part, instead of certain requirements under subpart C (Sec. Sec.  
238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219). 
APTA also urged that efforts be undertaken to complete and reach 
consensus on a separate guidance document for demonstrating the 
crashworthiness of passenger rail equipment, to assist with the 
implementation of this rule. FRA is working on generating such a 
document, as FRA recognizes the importance of providing guidance on the 
proper application of the alternative crashworthiness and occupant 
protection requirements of appendix G to this part.
    FRA did not receive any additional comments on the proposed 
revisions to this section as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88019-
88020, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as 
this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, 
the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.
Sections 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209, 238.211, 238.213, and 
238.219
    These sections contain structural and equipment protection 
requirements for Tier I passenger equipment. FRA did not receive any 
comments on the proposed revisions to these sections as described in 
the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88020, to reflect the addition of alternative 
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. As these 
sections of the final rule are identical to the proposed versions, FRA 
is adopting them as proposed and the analysis provided in the NPRM for 
each section is not being repeated here.
Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.401 Scope
    As discussed in the NPRM, FRA is revising this section to increase 
the maximum allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 
mph to 160 mph. This change is consistent with FRA's March 13, 2013, 
final rule amending and clarifying the Track Safety Standards, which 
affirmed that the maximum allowable speed on Class 8 track is 160 mph. 
See 78 FR 16052. Further, this change makes the speed range for Tier II 
passenger equipment consistent with that for Class 8 track in the Track 
Safety Standards. As specified in Sec.  213.307 of this chapter, Class 
8 track encompasses the speed range above 125 mph up to 160 mph--now 
the same speed range for Tier II passenger equipment. Nonetheless, FRA 
makes clear this change only increases the maximum operating speed to 
160 mph. FRA approval to operate at 160 mph is still needed as this 
part and other FRA safety regulations require.
    In commenting on the NPRM, APTA expressed its support for this 
change and harmonizing the Track Safety Standards and Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards. Separately, APTA stated that it might be 
appropriate to reexamine Tier II requirements in the future because 
they were developed prior to the congressional mandate to implement 
PTC. APTA added that such a reexamination should take into 
consideration the incident and accident data since the introduction of 
Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets, along with the corresponding risks 
associated with future operations and anticipated Northeast Corridor 
upgrades.
    FRA agrees with APTA that if it becomes necessary to reexamine Tier 
II requirements, it would be appropriate, as always, to consider all 
relevant safety data available. However, FRA makes clear that the 
mandate to implement PTC should not be viewed as a replacement for 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements but as a 
complementary safety measure. Indeed, around the time part 238 was 
originally published, FRA issued an order of particular applicability 
for use of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, a type of PTC 
system, on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor to support safe train operations 
at higher speeds. See 63 FR 39343 (Jul. 22, 1998)

[[Page 59194]]

and subsequent amendments thereto. Moreover, as discussed in the NPRM 
and in this final rule under Sec.  238.705, not all accidents are PTC-
preventable, such as collisions with trespassing highway equipment at 
grade crossings or with other rolling stock (freight or passenger 
equipment) during manual operations at speeds 20 mph or below. 
Accordingly, FRA does not intend to amend the Tier II occupant 
protection and crashworthiness requirements simply because PTC is 
installed on the equipment.
    FRA did not receive any comments objecting to the revision to this 
section as described in the NPRM. 81 FR 88006, 88020. As this portion 
of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the complete 
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.
Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier 
II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.501 Scope
    FRA is revising this section to increase the maximum allowable 
speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA did 
not receive any comments on the proposed revision to this section as 
described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88021, and FRA is adopting it as 
proposed. Please see the discussion of Sec.  238.401 for further 
information on this speed change.
Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
    This subpart contains specific requirements for Tier III passenger 
equipment. Many of the requirements under this subpart consider Tier 
III passenger equipment in terms of an integrated trainset, as that 
term is now defined under Sec.  238.702, particularly for purposes of 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. This rule 
presumes that Tier III trainsets will consist of semi-permanently 
coupled, articulated, or otherwise ``fixed'' configurations, that are 
not intended to operate normally as individual vehicles, or in mixed 
consists (with equipment of another design or operational tier).
    The requirements in this subpart are organized into subject areas 
based on their general applicability: Trainset structure, window 
glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, emergency 
systems, and cab equipment. FRA intends that the requirements be 
applied in a manner that is performance-based and technology-neutral, 
where possible. FRA notes that it intends for certain sections of this 
subpart to be applied as an integrated set of alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for 
Tier I passenger equipment as delineated in appendix G to this part. 
FRA considers this set of requirements to provide an equivalent level 
of safety to its counterpart set of Tier I requirements in subpart C of 
this part. As explained in greater detail in the discussion of appendix 
G below, the rule clarifies which specific Tier III crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance requirement should be applied as an 
alternative set of Tier I counterpart requirements. Specifically, FRA 
makes clear that if alternative Tier I compliance is sought under 
appendix G, then all the requirements in appendix G must be met so the 
integrity of the alternative requirements is maintained.
Section 238.701 Scope
    This section sets out the scope of new subpart H. Subpart H 
contains specific requirements for railroad passenger equipment 
operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph, and 
in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds 
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. FRA did not receive any 
comments on the exclusion of grade crossings or the 125-mph speed limit 
when grade crossings are present within the right-of-way, or on whether 
FRA should explicitly apply the 125-mph speed limit only to track 
located at or near each grade crossing within an exclusive right-of-
way. As stated in the NPRM, FRA believes that in most cases new, 
exclusive rights-of-way designed for Tier III operations will be 
constructed without highway grade crossings, see 81 FR 88006, 88021. 
However, in the situation where exclusive rights-of-way include highway 
grade crossings, but may have long stretches of track without a grade 
crossing, FRA would expect appropriate operational safeguards to be in 
place to prevent trainsets from traversing highway grade crossings at 
speeds exceeding 125 mph. In fact, FRA would expect those operations 
that include grade crossings in their exclusive rights-of-way to also 
comply with the requirements of Sec.  213.347 of this chapter.
    Section 213.347(a) of this chapter prohibits any grade crossings on 
Class 8 or 9 track. Whereas Class 8 track is track with an operational 
speed range from above 125 mph not exceeding 160 mph, Class 9 track is 
track with an operational speed range from above 160 mph not exceeding 
220 mph. Further, Sec.  213.347(b) of this chapter requires a track 
owner of Class 7 track (track with an operational speed range from 
above 110 mph not exceeding 125 mph) to submit for FRA's approval a 
complete description of the proposed warning/barrier system to address 
the protection of highway traffic and high-speed trains if the track 
will include highway grade crossings. Section 213.347(b) of this 
chapter prohibits operations on Class 7 track unless such an FRA-
approved warning barrier system is in place and functioning as 
intended.
    Separately, FRA received comments on its proposal to allow 
passenger seating in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset provided 
safety issues associated with passengers occupying the leading unit are 
addressed and mitigated through a comprehensive Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan. (See the discussion of proposed subpart J and the Safe Operation 
Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment, under Discussion of Comments and 
Conclusions, section IV, above.) APTA stated that addressing safety 
concerns in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is unnecessary because those 
safety concerns are already addressed through other regulatory means. 
APTA maintained that when Tier III equipment is operating at speeds not 
exceeding 125 mph, the crashworthiness and occupant protection 
requirements provide an equivalent level of safety to that of Tier I 
equipment and sufficient protection is already afforded passengers 
occupying leading units of Tier III trainsets. Additionally, APTA 
suggested that when operating above 125 mph, the right-of-way barrier 
plan required under Sec.  213.361 of this chapter and the HSR-125 plan 
required under Sec.  236.1007 of this chapter address any additional 
safety concerns for passengers occupying the leading units of Tier III 
trainsets, as these two sections guard against unauthorized intrusions 
into the right-of-way. Accordingly, APTA believed that conducting an 
additional, comprehensive analysis for the Tier III Safe Operation Plan 
would be redundant.
    Alstom's comment on this section mirrored APTA's comment in 
substance. Alstom also suggested that the safety considerations that 
FRA initially sought to address in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan are 
adequately addressed just as APTA outlined in its comment.
    As explained under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section 
IV, above, this section does not refer to a Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan. This final rule does not require railroads to complete a 
comprehensive safety analysis specifically addressing and mitigating 
all safety conditions

[[Page 59195]]

associated with passengers occupying the lead unit of a Tier III 
trainset. Instead, FRA's regulations continue to require, before 
passengers can occupy the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, that 
railroads seeking to do so namely have an approved right-of-way plan 
that complies with the requirements of Sec.  213.361 of this chapter, 
have an approved PTC Safety Plan that complies with Sec.  236.1007(c) 
of this chapter, and, as appropriate, comply with Sec.  213.347 of this 
chapter. These requirements should not place any additional regulatory 
burden on a Tier III operation as these are all existing regulatory 
requirements. However, FRA does make clear that prior to any train 
operation in which passengers other than assigned crew members (i.e., 
engineers and conductors) occupy the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, 
the above requirements must be met, regardless of whether operating in 
revenue service (i.e., whether or not the passengers have paid a fare 
to ride). Additionally, if a railroad does identify safety concerns 
involving passengers occupying the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, 
FRA expects the railroad to properly and adequately address the 
concerns. Similarly, FRA reserves the right to ensure that the railroad 
properly and adequately addresses safety concerns involving passengers 
occupying the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, if FRA's inspection of 
a Tier III railroad operation identifies such safety concerns.
    Finally, as noted earlier, APTA suggested that FRA create a new 
section, Sec.  238.110, to address compliance review and approval with 
the requirements of this subpart H. See FRA's discussion of this 
suggestion under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, 
above.
Section 238.702 Definitions
    FRA has added this new section to contain definitions applying 
specifically to subpart H of this part. This section defines the terms 
``cab,'' which was proposed in the NPRM under Sec.  238.5, and 
``integrated trainset,'' which is a new term not expressly proposed in 
the NPRM. FRA determined it will be clearer and more useful to place 
definitions that are tailored to the application of subpart H in this 
section, rather than in this part's general definitions section, Sec.  
238.5.
    In its comments on the proposed definition of ``cab,'' APTA 
recommended FRA remove the proposed statement that the term ``cab'' 
includes a locomotive cab for the purposes of subpart H. According to 
APTA, the Tier III trainsets subpart H addresses do not have locomotive 
cabs. APTA also commented that any analysis for a Tier I alternatively 
compliant trainset as governed by appendix G cannot include an analysis 
of the cab of a conventional locomotive because the collision model 
used for that analysis is insufficient. APTA suggested instead to 
revise the proposed definition of ``cab'' to mean ``for the purposes of 
subpart H of this part, a compartment or space in a trainset designed 
to be occupied by the engineer and contain an operating console from 
which the engineer exercises control over the trainset.'' When 
discussed at the May 2017 ETF meeting, APTA expanded on its comment 
saying that if the definition were to remain as proposed, there would 
need to be a way to differentiate between when the term ``cab'' applies 
to a Tier III trainset versus a conventional locomotive cab. APTA 
stated this is crucial when applying the dynamic collision scenario 
under Sec.  238.705 because (as discussed more comprehensively below) a 
Tier III trainset cannot be led by a conventional North American 
locomotive in its intended service.
    FRA recognizes APTA's underlying concern with the proposed 
definition of ``cab.'' FRA has therefore defined the term in this 
section of the final rule to better clarify how the term is applied to 
Tier III equipment, and by extension of appendix G to this part, Tier I 
alternative equipment. Accordingly, the term ``cab'' means a 
compartment or space within a trainset that is designed to be occupied 
by an engineer and contain an operating console for exercising control 
over the trainset. As the definition is contained in this new section, 
which applies specifically to subpart H, there is no need to add 
language to the definition expressly limiting its application.
    In addition, as fully discussed below, FRA has included the term 
``integrated trainset'' in Sec.  238.705 and is defining that term in 
this Sec.  238.702. FRA believes that any confusion over which initial 
velocity applies to a given trainset undergoing evaluation in the 
dynamic collision scenario in Sec.  238.705 is reconciled with the new 
term ``integrated trainset.'' The term ``integrated trainset'' is 
defined as a passenger trainset in which all units of the trainset are 
designed to operate as an integrated consist to achieve its structural 
crashworthiness performance. FRA intends the term ``integrated 
trainset'' to mean that each individual vehicle comprising the trainset 
is interdependent structurally with each other, specifically with 
respect to the collision load path and how the collision loads are 
designed to be resolved.
Trainset Structure
Section 238.703 Quasi-Static Compression Load Requirements
    This section contains the quasi-static compression load 
requirements for Tier III equipment. This section also requires 
compliance with Sec.  238.705 to demonstrate sufficient occupied volume 
integrity (OVI). The purpose of applying both requirements is to ensure 
the integrity of the occupied volume during a collision or other 
accident. Integrity of the occupied volume is a fundamental requirement 
of crashworthiness--the primary goal of which is preservation of space 
to protect occupants during an accident. Additionally, a strong 
occupied volume serves as the foundation for other crashworthiness 
features such as CEM components. And although the language of this 
section references only Tier III trainsets, the requirements of this 
section may also be applied to Tier I trainsets through the application 
of appendix G, in the alternative to the requirements of 49 CFR 
238.203, Static end strength. Tier I passenger equipment designed to 
alternative crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an appropriate 
level of crashworthiness by complying with the quasi-static compression 
load requirements proposed in Sec.  238.703(b).
    FRA received one comment on this section. The commenter, Alstom, 
stated that the methodology necessary to properly apply the collision 
load along the collision load path was not included in the proposal, 
and suggested FRA supply that methodology in some form of compliance 
manual or document. FRA does agree with Alstom that providing guidance 
on how to properly apply the requirements of this section would be 
beneficial to the regulated community. However, to remain technology 
neutral, FRA did not propose a specific methodology in the rule text. 
FRA understands there may be different methodologies that are 
equivalent, and thus putting one in the regulation over another could 
unintentionally limit the technology employed. FRA intends to address 
this issue in developing a guidance document, as discussed above.
    FRA did not receive any other comments on the requirements in this 
section as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88021-88023, and FRA is 
adopting this section as proposed. Because this portion of the final 
rule is identical to the proposed version, the complete analysis 
provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.

[[Page 59196]]

Section 238.705 Dynamic Collision Scenario
    As discussed in the NPRM, this section contains the dynamic 
collision scenario analysis requirements as the second part of the OVI 
evaluation of a Tier III passenger trainset, in conjunction with Sec.  
238.703. Because PTC technology does not protect against all possible 
collision scenarios, such as collisions with trespassing highway 
equipment at grade crossings or with other rolling stock (freight or 
passenger equipment) during manual operations at 20 mph or below, 
compliance with this requirement is necessary to preserve the occupied 
volume, to protect all occupants on the trainset.
    As mentioned in the discussion of Sec.  238.703, each vehicle in 
the trainset needs to demonstrate it meets both the OVI requirements in 
paragraph (b) of that section and the dynamic collision scenario 
requirements in paragraph (b) of this section. Further, as provided in 
Sec.  238.703, and as outlined in appendix G, a Tier I passenger 
trainset designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may comply 
with this section instead of the requirements applicable to Tier I 
passenger trainsets in Sec.  238.203.
    In combination with the quasi-static compression load requirements 
in Sec.  238.703, the purpose of this dynamic collision scenario 
requirement is to ensure that survivable space for the passengers and 
crew is preserved in up to moderately severe accident conditions (i.e., 
conditions comparable to a head-on collision at speeds of 20 to 25 mph, 
depending on the type of equipment, into a stationary train). This 
requirement also provides a baseline level of protection for scenarios 
that may be more severe, but less predictable with respect to loading 
conditions and historical accident data. Although the dynamic collision 
scenario is conducted at the trainset level, the requirements described 
in this section are evaluated at the level of the trainset's individual 
vehicles so no vehicle in the trainset may exceed the parameters 
outlined in paragraph (b) as a result of the dynamic collision 
scenario.
    Paragraph (a) outlines the required conditions under which a 
dynamic collision scenario is performed. Generally, the collision 
scenario requires a dynamic impact to be simulated between an 
initially-moving trainset and an initially-standing train. The 
initially-moving trainset is the trainset undergoing evaluation, either 
Tier III equipment or, as provided in appendix G, Tier I equipment 
designed to alternative crashworthiness standards. The initially-
standing train is a locomotive-led consist of five conventionally-
designed passenger cars. The conventionally-designed passenger cars 
have a prescribed weight and force-versus-displacement 
characteristic.\15\ The pass/fail criteria for the scenario determine 
whether there is sufficient preservation of occupied volume for 
passengers and crew in the trainset undergoing evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Appropriate weights and force-versus-displacement 
characteristics for the conventionally-designed passenger cars can 
be found in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA expects the collision scenario simulation to be executed for an 
impact duration sufficient to capture the most severe portion of the 
collision event. The actual amount of impact time required to simulate 
the collision sufficiently will vary based upon the characteristics of 
the trainset undergoing evaluation. Typically, the collision scenario 
will be executed until all the equipment, including the initially-
standing train and initially-moving trainset, is moving in the same 
direction at approximately the same velocity. If all the equipment is 
moving together at approximately the same speed, no further vehicle-to-
vehicle impacts will occur, and the simulation will then have been 
executed for a sufficient duration to capture the most severe 
decelerations.
    There are various types of analyses that may be used to evaluate 
the collision scenario requirements. These analyses include fully-
detailed FE models, lumped-parameter analyses, or a hybrid approach 
where a combination of detailed FE modeling and lumped-parameter 
techniques are used within the same simulation. An FEA of the scenario 
is generally a highly-detailed simulation of the actual trainset 
geometry. The parts making up the trainset are meshed into a large 
number of elements, with each element having its own mass, stiffness, 
and connection properties to the adjacent elements. A lumped parameter 
analysis represents each car or section of a car within a trainset 
using a small number of masses and a small number of non-linear 
springs. At its extreme, each vehicle consists of a single mass and a 
single spring characteristic. A hybrid approach may utilize an FE mesh 
to represent some structures (e.g., CEM structures that undergo large 
deformations) and lumped-parameter representations of other structures 
(e.g., vehicles far from the impacting interface that experience little 
deformation). Any of the three types of analyses is capable of 
developing the information needed to verify a trainset's ability to 
meet the requirements of the collision scenario. Additionally, because 
the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and initially-standing 
train are aligned with one another during this scenario, a half-
symmetric model may be used to represent the colliding vehicles, as 
appropriate.
    FRA received comments from APTA recommending revisions to several 
paragraphs of this section in the NPRM. In its comments on the NPRM, 
APTA recommended that FRA replace the references made to ``train'' in 
paragraphs (a)(1)-(3), (6), and (8), and replace them with the term 
``trainset,'' to clarify the application of the collision scenario 
under paragraph (a) of this section. APTA proposed that the term 
trainset be defined to mean a passenger train where all units within 
the trainset are semi-permanently coupled to operate as a single 
consist. As stated under the discussion of Sec.  238.5, FRA has not 
adopted APTA's proposal definition of ``trainset.'' However, FRA does 
agree that reference to a trainset is more appropriate than to a 
``train'' in this section. Accordingly, the above-referenced paragraphs 
of paragraph (a) use the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' and 
FRA intends the term ``trainset'' to mean either a Tier I alternative 
or Tier III trainset, as those terms are defined in Sec.  238.5. 
However, with reference to the initially-standing train, as FRA 
envisions it being reflective of a conventional Tier I passenger train, 
FRA is using the term ``train'' for clarity. Although not specifically 
requested by APTA, paragraphs (a)(4) and (9) use the term ``trainset'' 
in conformance with these changes.
    In commenting on the NPRM, APTA recommended that paragraph (a)(3) 
be placed in appendix G to part 238, consistent with its other comments 
that requirements for conventional locomotive led equipment are not 
appropriate in subpart H because Tier III equipment will not utilize 
conventional locomotive power. APTA also suggested that the text adopt 
APTA's proposed definition of ``trainset'' instead of ``train,'' as 
proposed. Paragraph (a)(3) of this section, as proposed in the NPRM, 
stated that if the trainset is intended for use in push-pull service, 
then both the locomotive-led and cab-car-led configurations would 
require separate evaluation. This proposal was intended to ensure 
sufficient OVI for all occupied spaces in the trainset regardless of 
whether led by a cab car or a conventional locomotive.
    FRA's discussion of the use of the term ``conventional locomotive'' 
in paragraph (a)(6) of this section applies

[[Page 59197]]

here, in response to APTA's concern, as discussed below. In the final 
rule, this paragraph (a)(3) omits specific references to ``locomotive'' 
or ``cab car'' and requires that if the initially-moving trainset is 
intended for use in push-pull service, then, as applicable, each 
configuration of leading vehicle shall be evaluated separately. By 
requiring that each lead vehicle be evaluated separately, FRA intends 
to capture situations where the lead vehicles of a push-pull operation 
could be two different styles of vehicle that could potentially have 
different designs and structural characteristics, and thus have 
different crashworthiness and occupant protection capabilities. This 
paragraph eliminates any reference to a specific technology and only 
requires separate evaluation if the lead vehicles are different. FRA 
recognizes that some push-pull operations do not necessarily require a 
locomotive-like vehicle on one end with a cab car-like vehicle on the 
other. But when the two vehicles are different, in design or structural 
make-up, then the crashworthiness and occupant protection capabilities 
of each vehicle must be evaluated.
    In its comments on this section, Alstom also raised concern about 
how to implement the force-versus-crush requirements in proposed 
paragraph (a)(4)(ii) and Table 1 to this section. Proposed paragraph 
(a)(4)(ii) stated that the rigid locomotive and each passenger coach in 
the initially-standing train crush in response to applied force as 
specified in Table 1, which in turn provided the non-linear, force-
versus-crush relationships for the passenger cars and locomotive 
comprising the initially-standing train. In particular, Alstom found it 
unclear whether the paragraph made it necessary to combine 
characteristics at ``inter-trailers,'' and, if so, how to do so. Alstom 
therefore suggested that the force-crush characteristics to be used at 
each interface between vehicles be included in this paragraph instead 
of Table 1.
    FRA makes clear that the force-crush characteristics described in 
Table 1 are intended for use as inputs to a lumped-parameter simulation 
model of a train-to-train collision. The data in Table 1 describe the 
resulting force when the equipment moves into a rigid fixed barrier. In 
the initial position, when the crush is 0 inches, the passenger coach 
is just touching the barrier and the force is also 0 lbf. The length of 
the coach is reduced as the coach moves towards the barrier and 
crushes. When the coach has crushed by 3 inches, the force has 
increased linearly to 80,000 lbf. When the coach has crushed by 6 
inches, the force again increases linearly to 250,000 lbf, from 80,000 
lbf. For the rigid locomotive, the force is 0 lbf when the crush is 0 
inches and the rigid locomotive is just touching the barrier. After 2.5 
inches of crush, the force increases linearly to 100,000 lbf. When the 
rigid locomotive has crushed by 5 inches, the force again increases 
linearly to 2,500,000 lbf, from 100,000 lbf.
    Depending on the details of the software used to implement the 
lumped-parameter model, the data in Table 1 may need to be re-
formatted. Some software may allow the data to be input simply as it is 
presented in Table 1. Other software may require coach-to-coach force 
crush characteristics for input. For coach-to-coach crush, the crush 
distances simply double for the corresponding force. Accordingly, 6 
inches of crush between coaches are required to reach 80,000 lbf, and 
12 inches of crush are required to reach 2,500,000 lbf. For rigid 
locomotive-to-coach crush, some calculations are required. At 80,000 
lbf between the rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has 
crushed by 2 inches, while the coach has crushed by 3 inches. The rigid 
locomotive-to-coach crush is then 5 inches when there is 80,000 lbf 
between the rigid locomotive and coach. At 100,000 lbf between the 
rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has crushed by 2.5 
inches and the coach has crushed by 3.35 inches. The rigid locomotive-
to-coach crush is 5.85 inches at 100,000 lbf. At 2,500,000 lbf between 
the rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has crushed by 5 
inches and the coach has crushed by 6 inches. The rigid locomotive-to-
coach crush is 11 inches at 2,500,000 lbf.
    Calculations may be necessary to determine the force-crush 
characteristic between the rigid locomotive described in Table 1 and 
the new equipment under evaluation. The details of such calculations 
will likely depend on the software modeling choices. One possibility, 
of many, is to calculate the force-crush response of the new equipment 
with a rigid fixed barrier, and use those results in combination with 
the rigid locomotive data in Table 1. The force-crush characteristic 
for the rigid locomotive to the new equipment may then be calculated in 
a manner similar to the force crush characteristic for the rigid 
locomotive to the coaches.
    Most notably, APTA recommended revising paragraph (a)(6), which 
specifically describes the initial velocities to be assigned to the 
initially-moving trainset in the dynamic collision scenario. FRA makes 
clear that, although the collision scenario in paragraph (a)(6) 
references ``initial velocities'' for the scenario, FRA expects that 
the actual velocity at the colliding interface be the same as the 
initial velocity, as generally models do not account for loss of 
velocity. However, if a model includes loss of velocity due to 
friction, or other velocity-reducing forces, FRA would expect the 
initial velocity to be increased so that the collision velocity remains 
either 20 mph or 25 mph, depending on the equipment undergoing 
evaluation. As proposed in the NPRM, if the initially-moving trainset 
were led by a cab car or an MU locomotive, its initial velocity would 
be 20 mph; if the initially-moving trainset were led by a conventional 
locomotive, its initial velocity would be 25 mph. These speeds were 
chosen based upon estimates of the upper limit of the ability of 
conventionally-designed Tier I equipment to maintain its occupied 
volume in a similar collision scenario.
    APTA commented that, although it is probable for a Tier I 
alternative trainset, it is not possible for a Tier III trainset to be 
led by a conventional North American locomotive. APTA stated that a 
Tier III trainset could never meet its performance capabilities with a 
conventional locomotive on the leading and trailing ends, because the 
end units must be low-profile, aerodynamic designs that are an integral 
part of the trainset design. APTA therefore suggested that the portion 
of the rule text involving an initially-moving consist led by a 
conventional locomotive be placed in appendix G to this part and not 
contained in this section.
    Alstom also provided comments on paragraph (a)(6) of this section. 
Specifically, Alstom sought clarification of the application of the 20-
mph and 25-mph initial velocities. Alstom did not believe having two 
initial velocities makes sense and suggested there should instead be 
only one initial velocity applicable to all equipment--an initial 
velocity for all Tier III trainsets.
    FRA carefully considered both APTA's and Alstom's comments on this 
paragraph. FRA recognizes the importance of ensuring that the intent of 
the section's application is clearly understood so that equipment 
designed to the Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection 
requirements, or the Tier I alternative requirements, properly 
preserves the occupied volume in the event of a collision. As discussed 
above, the collision scenario speeds were chosen based upon estimates 
of the upper limit of the ability of conventionally-designed Tier I 
equipment to maintain its occupied volume in a similar collision 
scenario. FRA did not intend inclusion of two

[[Page 59198]]

collision scenario speeds to create ambiguity but rather to clarify and 
refine the application of this paragraph depending on the type of 
equipment used. Nonetheless, FRA recognizes that use of the term 
``conventional locomotive'' for purposes of applying the dynamic 
collision scenario requirements could cause confusion. FRA did not 
intend for the reference to a ``conventional locomotive'' to 
necessarily mean a conventional North American locomotive. Instead, FRA 
intended the reference to refer more generally to the use of a rigid 
locomotive, especially a surrogate model of a rigid locomotive when the 
leading unit is unknown. This is why FRA included in the proposed rule 
text a rigid locomotive model, as described and depicted in appendix H 
to this part, Rigid locomotive design computer model input data and 
geometrical depiction. Accordingly, FRA has holistically revised this 
section from that proposed in the NPRM to remove the term 
``conventional locomotive'' and replace it with the term ``rigid 
locomotive,'' referencing the rigid locomotive model in appendix H.
    FRA notes that it also considered drafting the regulatory text so 
that the 20-mph initial velocity would apply to a trainset led by a 
vehicle designed to be occupied by passengers, and the 25-mph initial 
velocity would apply to a trainset led by equipment not designed to be 
occupied by passengers. When this issue was discussed at the May 2017 
ETF meeting, the ETF members rejected this approach. Simply referencing 
a locomotive not designed to be occupied by passengers instead of a 
conventional locomotive did not fully resolve the issue, because of 
concern that a Tier III trainset may not be powered by a stand-alone 
power unit but rather through an integrated system in which powered 
axles are distributed throughout the trainset. Additionally, a question 
arose whether a control cab in the lead unit of such an integrated and 
powered trainset design made that lead unit an MU, further clouding 
which initial velocity would apply. Moreover, to the extent passengers 
do not occupy the lead unit in such a trainset, there would be a large 
mass in front of passenger-occupied units that allows for more 
absorption of energy not being transferred to the passenger-occupied 
units, and the ETF raised concern that the lead unit in such a trainset 
not be subjected to more stringent requirements.
    In discussing how best to clarify the application of the 
requirements of this paragraph, ETF industry representatives mentioned 
that the requirements, when developed for the Technical Criteria and 
Procedures Report, were intended to apply to integrated trainsets, not 
trainsets led by conventional North American locomotives. Consistent 
with the comments APTA and Alstom submitted, ETF industry 
representatives suggested applying the 20-mph initial velocity to Tier 
III trainsets in this section, and applying the 25-mph initial velocity 
to Tier I alternative trainsets in appendix G to this part. ETF labor 
representatives noted the original consensus product of the ETF and 
cautioned against re-drafting consensus language. After a healthy 
discussion and to remain technology neutral, FRA proposed to the ETF 
the concept of using the term ``integrated trainset'' for determining 
which initial velocity applies. If the design of the trainset was 
integrated from a structural and crashworthiness perspective, with all 
vehicles inclusive of the leading unit designed to work together in a 
collision scenario, then the 20-mph initial velocity would apply. For 
all other configurations not considered ``integrated,'' regardless of 
the equipment's tier and what type of unit leads the trainset, the 25-
mph initial velocity would apply. Such an approach would take into 
account instances when the lead unit of a Tier III trainset and its 
passenger coaches would be manufactured by different companies. 
Further, because properly testing the crashworthiness and occupant 
protection capabilities of the passenger coaches must involve some 
known characteristics of the vehicle leading the trainset, this section 
would consider such a trainset a non-integrated trainset led by a 
surrogate for the lead unit, and reflect that the collision load paths 
of the lead unit and the coach cars are not structurally 
interdependent.
    Accordingly, in the final rule, FRA has not adopted the proposed 
references to cab cars, or MU or conventional locomotives. Rather, 
paragraph (a)(6) of this section requires the initially-moving trainset 
to have an initial velocity of 20 mph if it is an integrated trainset, 
as that term is now defined under Sec.  238.702, or an initial velocity 
of 25 mph when the lead vehicle is not part of the integrated design. 
By using the term ``integrated trainset,'' FRA intends to remain 
technology-neutral and not restrict the type of equipment that could 
potentially lead a Tier III trainset. As long as the entire trainset is 
designed and built as an integrated trainset, the 20-mph initial 
velocity applies.
    FRA also received comments from APTA concerning paragraph (b) of 
this section, which contains the crashworthiness and occupant 
protection performance requirements the individual vehicles in the 
initially-moving trainset involved in the dynamic collision scenario 
must meet as described in paragraph (a). Specifically, FRA proposed in 
paragraph (b)(2) that if the option to use GM/RT2100 is exercised to 
demonstrate compliance with any of the requirements in Sec. Sec.  
238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then the average longitudinal 
deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of each vehicle during the 
dynamic collision scenario shall not exceed 5g in any 100-millisecond 
(ms) time period. FRA explained that a plot of the 100-ms average 
longitudinal deceleration versus time, in which the curve never exceeds 
5g, would suffice to demonstrate compliance with paragraph (b)(2). 
APTA, in its comment, noted that proposed paragraph differed slightly 
from the consensus agreement. However, APTA expressed its agreement 
with the proposal if FRA intends the rule to allow the use of a moving 
window of a 5g average deceleration within 100 ms.
    FRA makes clear that the differences between the consensus rule 
text and the proposed rule text were merely editorial in nature and in 
no way changed the substantive intent that the average longitudinal 
deceleration of the CG of each vehicle of the initially-moving trainset 
during the dynamic collision scenario not exceed 5g in any 100-ms time 
period. Additionally, FRA disagrees with APTA's characterization of the 
intent of this section. The average deceleration in any 100-ms period 
was never intended to be comprised of the most favorable data points 
during the time period, e.g., selecting only those decelerations that 
are at or below 5g, to demonstrate compliance. It has always been FRA's 
intent that a representative data set be used to calculate the average 
deceleration. However, because FRA recognizes the possibility that this 
intent may be overlooked, or otherwise not followed, FRA is including 
text in paragraph (b)(2) specifying that the maximum interval between 
the data points averaged in the 100-ms time period shall be no greater 
than 1 ms. This means that each deceleration experienced during each 
millisecond of the 100-ms period must now be used to calculate the 
average deceleration under paragraph (b)(2) of this section. FRA 
believes this provision will help assure that the average taken during 
the 100-ms time period is based on a sufficient data set, so that there 
is a high degree of confidence and accuracy supporting the calculated 
average deceleration.

[[Page 59199]]

    FRA has otherwise adopted this section as proposed in the NPRM, and 
the complete analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.
Section 238.707 Override Protection
    This section contains the requirements for analyzing the ability of 
a Tier III passenger trainset to resist vertical climbing or override 
at its collision interface locations during a dynamic collision 
scenario. This section examines the vertical displacement behavior of 
colliding equipment under an ideal impact scenario where an initially-
moving Tier III trainset and an initially-standing train are aligned. 
This section also prescribes an impact scenario where the interface of 
the colliding equipment is translated both laterally and vertically by 
3 inches to ensure that override is resisted during an impact when the 
two trains are not perfectly aligned. Evaluating the colliding 
equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition 
helps to demonstrate that the override features are robust. As 
proposed, Tier III passenger trainsets must comply with both paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of this section.
    FRA received comments from Alstom on this section on proposed 
paragraphs (a)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(ii). Alstom stated that the direction 
of the vertical perturbation required in each paragraph was not defined 
(i.e., whether the perturbation is upwards or downwards). Alstom 
recommended that the rule specify which direction the initially-moving 
trainset is to be perturbed, to remove any confusion on how the dynamic 
collision scenario under Sec.  238.705(a) is applied to properly 
evaluate the equipment's resistance to override.
    FRA agrees with Alstom's comment, and for the reasons discussed 
below, paragraph (a)(1) in the final rule contains three sets of 
initial conditions for analyzing the ability of the evaluated trainset 
to resist vertical climbing or override during a dynamic collision 
scenario. Paragraph (a)(1) also states these conditions must be applied 
using the dynamic collision scenario in Sec.  238.705(a). The criteria 
for evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of initial 
conditions are provided in paragraph (a)(2), and remain unchanged from 
the NPRM. Because the same model may be used both to demonstrate 
compliance with the requirements of Sec.  238.705 and the requirements 
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, the model must be validated 
with test data in such a way as to provide confidence in the validity 
of the results of the collision analyses. In this regard, if the 
components that experience large deflection or permanent deformation in 
the analysis described in Sec.  238.705 also experience large 
deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, then the same test results may be 
used to validate the model. If the performance of the components that 
undergo large deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2) 
of this section is not validated with test data as part of the 
validation of the model used in Sec.  238.705, then additional 
validation testing must be performed to validate the model being used 
to demonstrate performance under paragraph (a)(2).
    Paragraph (a)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used in the 
collision simulation to demonstrate anti-climbing performance, and 
remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph still provides that all 
vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the initially-
standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal running 
heights with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and 
initially-standing train aligned. Because the centerlines of the 
colliding vehicles are aligned with one another, a longitudinally half-
symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, as 
appropriate. FRA intends for this initial condition to represent an 
ideal collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially 
aligned with one another.
    As proposed, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) described the second condition to 
be used in the collision simulation as a 3-inch lateral and 3-inch 
vertical offset of the interface of the colliding equipment, without 
defining the direction of the perturbance. It is here where Alstom's 
comment was focused. FRA notes that implicit in the proposed regulatory 
text for this paragraph was an assumption that, to demonstrate 
compliance with this section, a railroad or manufacturer would choose 
the more unfavorable arrangement (upwards or downwards perturbance) 
with respect to override (the arrangement most likely to lead to 
override) to be evaluated. However, FRA recognizes that this assumption 
was not made clear. Therefore, in the final rule, FRA has provided more 
detail in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) and included new paragraph (a)(1)(iii). 
Although FRA is being more prescriptive with respect to the 
requirements of this section to remove ambiguity on its application, 
FRA still expects that when a scenario arises where there are multiple 
arrangements that can be evaluated, the most severe scenario (the 
scenario most likely to lead to override) will be evaluated and the 
results used to determine whether compliance with the requirements of 
this section has been achieved.
    Accordingly, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) specifies that the initially-
moving trainset must be perturbed 3-inches laterally and 3-inches 
vertically upwards relative to the initially-standing train. Further, 
paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires that the initially-moving trainset must 
be perturbed 3-inches laterally and 3-inches vertically downwards 
relative to the initially-standing train. The lateral and vertical 
offsets still must be applied simultaneously in the same simulation. 
Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner will demonstrate that 
the anti-climb features are of a robust design, capable of preventing 
climbing when the colliding vehicles are not perfectly aligned. Because 
these simulations require a lateral offset between the initially-
standing train and initially-moving trainset, a symmetric boundary 
condition may not be employed (i.e., the full width of each consist 
must be modeled).
    Paragraph (a)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of 
the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' to remain consistent with 
use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph 
explains the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to 
demonstrate a trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features for its 
colliding interface. The criteria must be met for each set of initial 
conditions in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)-(iii) for demonstrating appropriate 
resistance to override between colliding equipment.
    Paragraph (b) contains the evaluation methodology for demonstrating 
the appropriate level of override protection for connected equipment in 
a Tier III trainset. This paragraph requires examination of the 
vertical displacement behavior of coupled equipment under an ideal 
impact scenario where the vehicles within the initially-moving trainset 
are aligned. It also prescribes an impact scenario where the first 
coupled interface of the initially-moving trainset is translated both 
laterally and vertically by 2 inches. Evaluating the connected 
equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition is 
necessary to demonstrate the override features are robust and can 
resist override during an impact where the coupled vehicles are not 
perfectly aligned.
    Paragraph (b)(1) explains the conditions for analyzing the ability 
of connected equipment to resist vertical climbing or override at the 
coupled interfaces during a dynamic collision

[[Page 59200]]

scenario, using the scenario described in Sec.  238.705(a). Like 
paragraph (a) of this section, each set of conditions in paragraphs 
(b)(1)(i)-(iii) must be evaluated independently. Criteria for 
evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of conditions 
are in paragraph (b)(2). As noted in the discussion of paragraph (a), 
because the same model may be used to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements of Sec.  238.705 and the requirements of this section, the 
model must be validated with test data in a way that provides 
confidence in the validity of the results of the collision analyses. 
The discussion of model validation in paragraph (a) applies equally to 
model validation for purposes of paragraph (b).
    Paragraph (b)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used for 
collision simulation to demonstrate override protection for connected 
equipment, and remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph provides 
that all vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the 
initially-standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal 
running heights, with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset 
and initially-standing train aligned. Because the centerlines of the 
colliding vehicles will be aligned with one another, a longitudinally 
half-symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, 
as appropriate. This initial condition is meant to represent an ideal 
collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially aligned 
with one another.
    As proposed, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) described the second condition to 
be used in the collision simulation as a 2-inch lateral and 2-inch 
vertical offset of the first connected interface between vehicles in 
the initially-moving train. As discussed above, Alstom raised concern 
that the proposed paragraph did not define the direction of the 
vertical offset. Accordingly, FRA is employing the same approach here 
as under paragraph (a)(1)(ii) to clarify the direction of the vertical 
offset and is also including a new paragraph (b)(1)(iii).
    In the final rule, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) specifies that the first 
connected vehicle behind the lead unit of the initially-moving trainset 
must be perturbed 2-inches laterally and 2-inches vertically upwards, 
relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface. 
Further, paragraph (b)(1)(iii) requires that the first connected 
vehicle behind the lead unit of the initially-moving trainset must be 
perturbed 2-inches laterally and 2-inches vertically downwards, 
relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface. The 
lateral and vertical offsets must still be applied simultaneously in 
the same simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner 
will demonstrate that the anti-climb features are of a robust design, 
capable of preventing climbing when the vehicles in the initially-
moving trainset are not perfectly aligned. Because these simulations 
require a lateral offset between the vehicles of the initially-moving 
consist, a symmetric boundary condition may not be used (i.e., the full 
width of each consist must be modeled).
    Paragraph (b)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of 
the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' to remain consistent with 
use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph 
sets out the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to 
demonstrate a Tier III trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features 
to protect the vehicles connected in the trainset from overriding each 
other. The criteria must be met for each set of initial conditions 
provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)-(iii) to demonstrate appropriate 
resistance to override between connected equipment.
    Under appendix G to this part, a Tier I alternative passenger 
trainset may demonstrate an appropriate level of override protection by 
complying with the requirements of this section instead of the 
requirements applicable to Tier I passenger train in Sec.  238.205, 
Anti-climbing mechanism, and Sec.  238.207, Link between coupling 
mechanism and car body, as proposed. In general, the requirements in 
this section were developed as an alternative to demonstrating anti-
climbing capabilities in Sec.  238.205 and the capability of the link 
between the coupling mechanism and carbody to resist the loads in 
current Sec.  238.207. While compliance with both Sec. Sec.  238.205 
and 238.207 requires meeting a set of quasi-static, vertical load 
cases, the requirements in this section were developed as a dynamic 
performance standard.
Section 238.709 Fluid Entry Inhibition
    This section contains the requirements for fluid entry inhibition 
for the skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset. 
FRA received one comment on this section from APTA which agreed with 
the language of this section, noting that compliance with this section 
can be demonstrated during a design review of the equipment. As this 
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the 
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 
88006, 88026, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed.
Section 238.711 End Structure Integrity of Cab End
    This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of cab 
ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to 
alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a 
minimum level of protection for the engineer and other cab occupants, 
equivalent to the collision post and corner post requirements for Tier 
I equipment in subpart C. FRA did not receive any comments on these 
requirements and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, 
as this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, 
the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 
88006, 88027.
Section 238.713 End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End
    This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of the 
non-cab ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to 
alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a 
minimum level of protection for occupants equivalent to that required 
for Tier I equipment in subpart C. These requirements help ensure the 
integrity of the components that make up any non-cab end of a passenger 
trainset unit. FRA did not receive any comments on these requirements 
and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this 
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the 
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 
88006, 88027.
Section 238.715 Roof and Side Structure Integrity
    To demonstrate sufficient roof and side structure integrity, Tier 
III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to alternative 
crashworthiness standards under appendix G) must comply with the 
requirements in Sec.  238.215, ``Rollover strength,'' and Sec.  
238.217, ``Side structure.'' These Tier I requirements in Sec. Sec.  
238.215 and 238.217 are thereby broadly applicable to both new trainset 
classifications in this final rule. FRA did not receive any comments on 
this section and FRA is adopting it as proposed. Accordingly, as this 
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the 
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 
88006, 88029.
Section 238.717 Truck-to-Carbody Attachment
    This section contains requirements to demonstrate the integrity of 
truck-to-carbody attachments on a Tier III trainset (or a Tier I 
trainset designed to

[[Page 59201]]

alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) during a 
dynamic impact. In commenting on the NPRM, Alstom recommended FRA 
clarify that the performance metric in paragraph (c) of this section is 
the ultimate strength of the truck materials. Paragraph (c) provides an 
alternative to demonstrating compliance with the quasi-static load 
requirements applied on the mass of the truck at its CG in paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section. Instead, paragraph (c) requires demonstrating 
the truck remains attached after a dynamic impact under the nominal 
conditions in the dynamic collision scenario described in Sec.  
238.705(a). Because paragraph (b)(3) limits demonstrating compliance to 
a truck and carbody meeting deceleration requirements specified in 
paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii), respectively, paragraph (c) may 
alternatively be used to demonstrate truck-to-carbody attachment when 
the requirements in paragraph (b)(3) are exceeded. To comply with 
paragraph (c), it must be demonstrated that the truck undergoing 
evaluation has remained attached to the carbody after the trainset has 
been subjected to a dynamic collision scenario as described in Sec.  
238.705(a). FRA recognizes that the collision scenario in Sec.  
238.705(a) results in deformation of the carbody structure, and 
allowance for such deformation is consistent with an evaluation of the 
truck-to-carbody attachment that is based on ultimate strength, as FRA 
intended for paragraph (c). Accordingly, in response to Alstom's 
comment, FRA makes clear that the required performance metric in 
paragraph (c) is based on ultimate strength.
    As a separate comment, Alstom requested that FRA make clear this 
section ``supersedes'' the requirements contained in Sec.  
229.141(a)(5) of this chapter, which applies to MU locomotives built 
new after April 1, 1956, that are operated in trains having a total 
empty weight of 600,000 pounds or more. Section 229.141(a)(5) of this 
chapter provides that the strength of the means of locking the truck to 
the body shall be at least the equivalent of an ultimate shear value of 
250,000 pounds. However, FRA notes that the required truck attachment 
strength in Sec.  238.717 is intended to be equivalent to an ultimate 
shear value of 250,000 pounds. Consequently, the requirements of Sec.  
238.717 are harmonious with the requirements of Sec.  229.141(a)(5) of 
this chapter. Nonetheless, in response to Alstom's comment, FRA makes 
clear that the requirements of Sec.  229.141(a)(5) of this chapter are 
inapplicable to Tier III and Tier I alternative trainsets subject to 
Sec.  238.717.
    FRA did not receive any other comments on this section and FRA is 
adopting it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical 
to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being 
repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88029-88030.
Glazing
Section 238.721 Glazing
    This section contains the requirements for exterior glazing (i.e., 
side- and end-facing exterior windows and windshields) to be installed 
on Tier III trainsets. APTA and TCRR both commented on this section as 
proposed in the NPRM. The comments focused on three discrete areas: 
Conduct of a comprehensive analysis, ballistic impact resistance 
requirements, and certification of the glazing material. Having 
considered the comments received, this section of the final rule 
reflects several changes from the NPRM, as explained below. Otherwise, 
FRA has adopted the requirements as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is 
not repeating the analysis in the NPRM supporting and explaining those 
provisions remaining the same, see 81 FR 88006, 88030-88032.
Comprehensive Analysis
    Both APTA and TCRR recommended deleting as unnecessary the 
requirement in proposed paragraph (a) of this section to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis identifying and addressing glazing safety issues 
associated with operating in a Tier III environment as part of the 
railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment. APTA 
stated that specific requirements for Tier III glazing were adequately 
defined in the other paragraphs of this section, and were based on the 
operating environment for Tier I passenger equipment and the protected 
ROW required by FRA regulations under 49 CFR parts 213 and 236 for the 
dedicated high-speed portions. APTA also commented that compliance with 
the other paragraphs of this section will permit Tier III trainsets to 
be interoperable on the national rail network. Similarly, TCRR believed 
that compliance with the performance requirements contained in the 
other paragraphs proposed in this section should be the only regulatory 
requirements necessary to demonstrate suitability for Tier III trainset 
glazing and will assure interoperability throughout the national rail 
network. TCRR added that even if proposed paragraph (a) was intended to 
ensure that the ROW is adequately protected against potential hazards 
to the glazing there is no need to specify such a requirement here as 
other provisions of FRA's regulations adequately cover the topic, 
citing FRA's requirement for a ROW barrier plan, under 49 CFR 213.361, 
and the HSR-125 plan, under 49 CFR 236.1007.
    In the final rule, FRA has not adopted the requirement proposed in 
paragraph (a) for railroads to conduct a comprehensive analysis of 
their systems to identify and address glazing safety issues their 
systems present for Tier III operations. Moreover, as explained further 
in the discussion under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section 
IV, neither this section nor any section in the final rule text refers 
to analyses required under a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. However, 
this section does require railroads to properly support and document 
glazing safety determinations, notably for the ballistic-resistance 
properties of the glazing material and for use of alternative 
requirements in a non-cab, side-facing window intended to be a 
breakable emergency window exit, for which specific FRA approval is 
required. FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards 
developing procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval, as 
discussed under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, 
above. FRA will of course also work with any proposed Tier III 
operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly 
implemented.
    Separately, because FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (a), the 
paragraph ordering in this final rule begins with proposed paragraph 
(b), which is designated paragraph (a). Subsequent paragraphs proposed 
in the NPRM are designated accordingly in conformance, with the 
exception of the certification requirements in paragraph (e) in this 
final rule, discussed below.
Ballistic Penetration Resistance Requirements
    In its comments on this section, APTA disagreed with FRA's proposal 
under paragraph (b)(5) of the NPRM that ballistic penetration 
resistance be sufficient to protect cab occupants from the risks and 
hazards identified by the railroad as part of its Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan, at a minimum meeting the protection requirements in 
appendix A to part 223 of this chapter. Instead, APTA suggested the 
regulation should require compliance with the ballistic impact 
protection requirement in appendix A to part 223, specifically in 
paragraphs (b)(10)(i) or (11)(i) of that

[[Page 59202]]

appendix, as appropriate. APTA stated that due to the interoperability 
requirements for Tier III equipment, the ballistic impact requirements 
must be standardized rather than vary for each railroad. APTA also 
stated that FRA has previously indicated the current 22 caliber bullet 
requirement in appendix A to part 223 has proven effective, and 
therefore APTA recommended retaining the current requirement for Tier 
III equipment. Further, in line with its comments on proposed paragraph 
(a), and noting that the existing requirement has shown through a long 
history to be adequate for conventional equipment, APTA suggested that 
no reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is necessary. In 
addition, APTA expressed concern that changing the ballistic 
requirement has implications not just for Tier III equipment but for 
everything that is currently operating in North America and needs to be 
evaluated in another forum that involves all affected stakeholders.
    In its comments, TCRR agreed with APTA and stated it did not see 
the merits of requiring each railroad to perform a risk assessment to 
form the basis for any performance requirements for glazing as 
suggested in proposed Sec.  238.721(b)(5). Instead, TCRR recommended 
that the regulation include specific ballistic impact requirements that 
are applicable to glazing on all Tier III trainsets, to assure 
compatibility and interoperability of Tier III trainsets over the 
general railroad network. Additionally, TCRR stated that the current 22 
caliber bullet requirement should apply to both end-facing and side-
face exterior glazing in the cab, as well as in non-cab areas, to 
assure that both the passengers and crew in a Tier III trainset are 
afforded the same protection.
    FRA notes that ballistic protection for cab glazing was discussed 
in detail during the RSAC glazing task group meetings, as stated in the 
NPRM. In particular, during those meetings, labor representatives 
asserted that ballistic protection from a larger diameter projectile, 
differing from the size required for Type I glazing by part 223, would 
enhance the overall safety of the cab occupants. Much discussion was 
focused on this point, but a review of the available information on the 
impact characteristics of reasonable ballistic scenarios (projectile 
size and terminal velocity), and a review of the statistics related to 
glazing failure due to ballistic impact, proved inconclusive. This is 
one area where the task group could not agree on a consensus approach. 
Therefore, the decision on ballistic requirements for cab glazing was 
referred to FRA.
    At this time, FRA does not have sufficient evidence to suggest a 
particular risk or hazard exists facing all potential Tier III systems 
to warrant a change from current ballistic requirements in part 223. 
However, even without such a risk or hazard facing all Tier III systems 
in common, the circumstances of a specific Tier III operation may 
warrant additional consideration and protection for that operation. To 
be consistent with the approach to Tier III safety in this rule, 
railroad safety elements subject to elements present within a specific 
Tier III operation need to be addressed in a manner appropriate to that 
operation, reflecting the level of service, operating environment, 
operational conditions, etc. Accordingly, while the ballistic 
penetration resistance requirement in paragraphs (b)(10)(i) and (11)(i) 
of appendix A to part 223 remains the minimum requirement in this final 
rule--namely, protection from a 22 caliber long rifle lead bullet of 40 
grains in weight impacting at a minimum velocity of 960 feet per 
second, this final rule allows for the use of a ballistic penetration 
resistance standard that provides greater protection. Nor would use of 
a more stringent standard necessarily affect equipment interoperability 
any more than in any situation where a particular operation uses a 
standard more stringent than the minimum standard specified in the 
regulation. Consequently, even though FRA has not adopted the reference 
to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan in proposed paragraph (b)(5), a Tier 
III operation is in no way restricted from protecting against only a 22 
caliber long-rifle bullet if circumstances known to the railroad 
warrant additional protection--whether for end-facing glazing in 
paragraph (a)(5) of this final rule or for side-face glazing in 
paragraph (b)(2) of this final rule (proposed paragraph (c)(2)).
    FRA has continued to examine the appropriateness of the ballistic 
impact requirement with the ETF, but no consensus within the ETF was 
reached on this topic. FRA has also engaged in additional research. At 
the behest of ETF industry members, FRA has subjected representative 
samples of forward- and side-facing glazing to 22 caliber long rifle 
and 9 mm ballistic impact tests. The use of a 9 mm bullet for ballistic 
impact testing reflects the alternative ballistic penetration 
resistance requirement in 49 CFR 238.421(c)(3)(i) for Tier II equipment 
ordered prior to May 12, 1999, which FRA believes provides an 
equivalent level of ballistic protection. However, the results of the 
testing were not sufficient to confirm whether use of the different 
caliber bullets results in a different level of test severity or 
whether the tests are indeed equivalent.
Glazing Certification
    Commenters APTA and TCRR also raised concern over the NPRM's 
approach to the certification of glazing material in proposed Sec.  
238.721(b)(6). As a threshold matter, APTA requested that the rule make 
clear the glazing manufacturer is responsible for certification of each 
type of glazing material supplied. APTA then stated that the rule, in 
turn, require testing to be done either by an independent laboratory or 
the manufacturer with allowance for FRA to witness the testing. 
Similarly, TCRR believed that the proposal would create unnecessary 
confusion regarding glazing certification and instead recommended FRA 
continue with the current approach to glazing certification in part 
223. TCRR stated that the current requirements under appendix A to part 
223 have worked very well and provide the railroads and carbuilders 
assurance that all glazing materials they receive are produced from a 
lot that has been properly tested. TCRR cautioned that before taking a 
new approach to glazing certification, discussions are needed involving 
the glazing manufacturers and possible testing agencies to better 
understand both how any proposed changes would be addressed and the 
practical realities and consequences of the proposed changes.
    FRA recognizes that the proposed regulatory language created 
confusion regarding who is ultimately responsible for certifying that 
the glazing material is compliant with FRA's requirements. As such, the 
final rule text makes clear that the glazing manufacturer is ultimately 
responsible for this certification. In the NPRM, FRA had intended to 
convey that the glazing manufacturer can certify the glazing material 
based on tests performed by an independent third party (e.g., a 
laboratory, facility, or underwriter), or tests performed by the 
glazing manufacturer itself. FRA did not intend to imply that another 
party was ultimately responsible for certifying the glazing materials. 
Further, for clarity, the glazing certification requirements are 
contained in their own paragraph (paragraph (e)) in this section of the 
final rule, rather than combined with other glazing requirements. These 
glazing certification requirements apply to all glazing material used 
on Tier III trainsets.

[[Page 59203]]

Demonstrating Alternative Safety for Breakable, Emergency Window Exits
    Finally, consistent with APTA's comments concerning the NPRM's 
proposal for a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, APTA commented that 
proposed paragraph (d)(2)'s alternative requirements for non-cab, side-
facing exterior window glazing should not reference a Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan. APTA stated that during the design review process 
information would be available that is necessary to demonstrate an 
equivalent level of glazing safety for a side-facing exterior window 
intended to be breakable and serve as an emergency window exit, and 
that its proposal for a new Sec.  238.110 would specifically reference 
this design review requirement to be included in the pre-revenue 
qualification plan.
    As discussed above, this Sec.  238.721 does require railroads to 
properly support and document glazing safety determinations. 
Specifically, paragraph (c)(2) of this section requires such support 
and documentation for use of alternative glazing requirements in a non-
cab, side-facing exterior window intended to be a breakable emergency 
window exit. FRA approval is also required. Nonetheless, as noted above 
and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of Comments 
and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, 
is working towards developing procedures and processes to provide such 
FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III 
operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly 
implemented.
Brake System
Section 238.731 Brake System
    This section introduces brake system requirements for Tier III 
passenger trainsets. As articulated in the NPRM, development of these 
requirements was identified as one of the goals for this first Tier III 
rulemaking to facilitate planned equipment acquisitions. These 
requirements represent a balance between maintaining compatibility with 
existing Tier I equipment and the adoption of service-proven techniques 
to protect against potential risks encountered with high-speed 
operations. A concerted effort was made to develop technology-neutral 
requirements, and the NPRM identified various requirements to be 
determined by a railroad and included in the railroad's Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan or ITM Plan.
    In response to the comments received, FRA is making changes to this 
section from the NPRM's proposal, as explained below. Additionally, FRA 
is making a minor editorial change to reference an ITM ``program'' 
rather than ITM ``plan.'' Otherwise, FRA has adopted the requirements 
as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is not repeating the analysis in the 
NPRM supporting and explaining those provisions remaining the same, see 
81 FR 88006, 88032-88034.
    In its comment on this section, APTA recommended that the 
determinations identified in the NPRM to be included in a Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan be left to the railroad to address at various stages of 
equipment design reviews. APTA offered in support of this position that 
certain determinations to be included in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan 
are already required under other FRA regulations. As discussed earlier, 
the requirements of this final rule do not reference a Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan, and this section contains no such references as 
proposed in the NPRM. However, this section does provide for FRA 
approval of various determinations made by the railroad, consistent 
with FRA's closer oversight of high-speed train operations.
    Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires the railroad to define the 
worst-case adhesion conditions under which each Tier III trainset's 
brake system must stop the passenger trainset from its maximum 
operating speed within the prevailing signal spacing, as approved by 
FRA. The paragraph is intended to ensure that the railroad formally 
establish the worst case-adhesion conditions for use in procuring 
individual trainsets. Similarly, paragraph (c)(2) requires the railroad 
to specify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a 
crewmember can initiate an irretrievable emergency brake application, 
as approved by FRA.
    FRA approval of railroad determinations is required in several 
provisions under paragraph (d). Paragraph (d)(1) requires the railroad 
to identify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a 
mechanism to initiate the passenger brake alarm is installed. Paragraph 
(d)(4) requires the railroad to define the timeframe in which engineers 
must acknowledge a passenger brake alarm after the trainsets have 
safely cleared the boarding platform, for the engineer to retain full 
control of the trainset, and to define the method used to confirm that 
the trainsets did in fact safely clear the boarding platform. In 
addition, paragraph (d)(6) requires the railroad to specify the 
procedures for engineers to retrieve full service brake application if 
the timeframe to acknowledge a passenger brake alarm has passed and a 
brake application has been automatically initiated.
    FRA approval of railroad determinations is also required under 
paragraph (e), which addresses how trainsets without fully functional 
electric braking are to be safely operated, particularly to ensure 
thermal-related brake system damage does not occur. Paragraph (e)(1) 
requires that the railroad specify the allowable stopping distance not 
to be exceeded in the event of a power loss or failure of the dynamic 
or regenerative brake. FRA expects the railroad to provide a means for 
automatically reducing the maximum allowable train speed, based on 
feedback from the on-board monitoring and diagnostic system specified 
in Sec.  238.731(n), so the trainset can safely stop using friction 
braking alone within the allowable stopping distance. Additionally, 
paragraph (e)(2) requires the railroad to define the operating 
conditions under which the available friction braking effort alone can 
safely stop the trainset. For discussion of paragraph (e)(4), please 
see below.
    FRA approval of railroad determinations is required under paragraph 
(f)'s main reservoir system requirements. Paragraph (f)(1) requires 
that main reservoirs be designed and tested using a recognized industry 
standard specified by the railroad and approved by FRA. This paragraph 
also provides that the railroad shall define the working pressure and 
rated temperature for main reservoirs in accordance with the designated 
standard, if different from the pressure and temperature otherwise 
specified in this paragraph. Further, paragraph (f)(2) requires the 
railroad to identify a recognized industry standard governing the 
drilling of steel main reservoirs.
    FRA approval is required under paragraph (j)'s brake application/
release requirements. Specifically, paragraph (j)(2) requires that the 
railroad establish the minimum brake cylinder pressure necessary to 
adjust from minimum service to full service brake application for 
proper train operation.
    FRA approval is required under paragraph (m)'s slide protection and 
alarm requirements. Paragraph (m)(3) requires the railroad to specify 
the operational restrictions that apply when the wheel slide protection 
system fails to function as intended within pre-established, allowable 
parameters.
    As noted above, the railroad determinations specified under 
paragraphs (b), (c)(2), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(6), (e)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-(2), 
(j)(2), and (m)(3) do not reference a Tier III Safe Operation Plan but 
do require FRA approval. However, as discussed under Discussion of 
Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, FRA

[[Page 59204]]

approval oversight was a major tenet of the proposed Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan requirement, and those requirements identified for 
inclusion in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan were selected to allow 
FRA to have some specific approval oversight of the railroad's 
determinations. Accordingly, those plan elements the NPRM identified in 
this section as needing specific FRA approval do require FRA approval 
in this final rule. Nonetheless, FRA will work with any proposed Tier 
III operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are 
properly implemented.
    FRA notes that proposed paragraph (l), Leakage, did refer to the 
Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (l) of the final rule contains 
no such reference. Specifically, the Air Consumption Analysis required 
under this paragraph shall be developed as part of the railroad's ITM 
program.
    Based on APTA's comments, FRA is taking a somewhat different 
approach regarding the proposed reference in paragraph (n) to a Tier 
III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (n) requires each Tier III trainset 
to be equipped with a brake system health monitoring and diagnostic 
system to automatically assesses the functionality of the brake system 
for the entire trainset, both before the trainset departs and while it 
is en route. As proposed, the railroad must document the details of the 
monitoring system and diagnostic system, and the means for 
communicating trainset brake system functionality to the engineer. In 
its comment, APTA recommended that rather than include this information 
in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, a railroad should include this 
information in its ITM program. FRA agrees with and is adopting APTA's 
recommendation. It accomplishes the goals of this paragraph, and 
trainset monitoring and diagnostics relate to inspection, testing, and 
maintenance. It will also provide FRA approval oversight through the 
ITM program approval process.
    In other comments on this section, APTA recommended that FRA 
include in paragraph (e)(4) a requirement that railroads conduct 
additional analysis and testing to determine the maximum safe operating 
speed for various percentages of operative friction brakes.
    As proposed, paragraph (e)(4) requires railroads to determine 
through analysis and testing the maximum speed for safely operating and 
stopping their Tier III trainsets using the friction brake system alone 
without causing thermal-related damage to the equipment or 
infrastructure. APTA recommended the additional analysis and testing to 
adequately quantify the braking performance for movement of defective 
equipment. TCRR's comments on the NPRM were in agreement with APTA's on 
this paragraph. TCRR cautioned that the movement of defective equipment 
requirements must refer to paragraph (e) of this section and require 
railroads to conduct appropriate analysis and testing to determine the 
maximum safe operating speed for various percentages of operative 
friction brakes. FRA agrees with APTA's and TCRR's comments.
    Accordingly, FRA is adopting the recommendation in paragraph (e) to 
make clear further testing and analysis is required to determine the 
safe maximum operating speed for various percentages of friction brakes 
less than 100-percent operative. FRA expects the railroad to include 
these determination in its ITM program.
    FRA also received comments on paragraph (o) of this section from 
APTA and Alstom. As proposed, this paragraph requires Tier III 
equipment to be equipped with a means to secure unattended equipment 
against unintentional movement. Because the securement technique may be 
technology-specific to a particular trainset, FRA proposed that the 
procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment based 
on the grade conditions be included in the Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan, which in turn could be used to help demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the securement method(s). FRA further proposed to define the term 
``unattended equipment'' to have the same meaning as in Sec.  
238.231(h)(4), which provides that unattended equipment is equipment 
left standing and unmanned in such a manner that a qualified person 
cannot readily control the brake system of the equipment. FRA intended 
the cross reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4) to be limited specifically 
to the definition of ``unattended equipment,'' for consistency and to 
remove any ambiguity as to the meaning of the term, because FRA has 
already defined the term in this part 238.
    In APTA's comment on paragraph (o), APTA objected to the cross 
reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4). APTA raised concern that its 
inclusion in the regulatory text could sweep in the Tier I requirement 
that Tier III trainsets be equipped with a parking or handbrake. APTA 
stated that was not part of the consensus agreement on the proposed 
rule text presented to FRA in which wheel chocks could be used to 
secure unattended equipment under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, 
APTA did agree to FRA's use of the modifier ``unattended'' in this 
paragraph to describe the type of equipment to be secured, noting that 
technical specifications normally state that the equipment can be left 
for an indefinite time period, which corresponds to unattended. 
Further, consistent with its other comments, APTA stated that this 
paragraph's reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary 
because the physical means for securing the trainset will be addressed 
during the design review and the procedures for securing the trainset 
will be defined in the railroad's operating rules. In its comments on 
this paragraph, Alstom similarly objected to the addition of the cross 
reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4), stating it was not consistent with 
the consensus agreement on the proposed regulatory text to permit the 
use of wheel chocks to secure unattended equipment under certain 
conditions.
    FRA makes clear that the reference to Sec.  238.231(h)(4) was not 
intended to mean that Sec.  238.231(h)(4)'s requirements for parking or 
hand brakes apply to this Sec.  238.731(o). As explained above, the 
reference was intended to capture only the definition of ``unattended'' 
and not sweep into this paragraph requirements concerning parking or 
hand brakes. However, to guard against ambiguity and for consistent 
application of the term, in this paragraph of the final rule FRA has 
incorporated Sec.  238.231(h)(4)'s definition of ``unattended.'' 
Further, FRA agrees with APTA's recommendation not to include the 
reference to the Tier III Safe Operation Plan, and it is not included 
in this paragraph. Yet, FRA believes it necessary to approve the 
procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment on the 
grade conditions identified, and this paragraph requires such approval. 
Inclusion in the railroad's operating rules alone is not sufficient as 
FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part 217 of this 
chapter. Further, issues surrounding how equipment will be properly 
secured while unattended are operational in nature and thus capturing 
those issues in a design review is not sufficient. In the interim, FRA 
will of course work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that 
the specific procedures and means of securing unattended equipment as 
required under this paragraph are properly addressed and documented. In 
this regard, and as FRA made clear in the NPRM, certain brake system 
requirements are imposed by Federal statute, 49 U.S.C. ch. 203. 
Specifically, 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B) requires ``efficient 
handbrakes.'' Railroads must

[[Page 59205]]

ensure that those statutory requirements are addressed.
Interior Fittings and Surfaces
Section 238.733 Interior Fixture Attachment
    This section contains requirements for interior fixture attachment 
strength for Tier III trainsets. This section relates to strength 
requirements for seats and luggage racks in Sec. Sec.  238.735 and 
238.737, respectively, to help prevent and mitigate hazards associated 
with occupants impacting interior objects and surfaces during a 
collision.
    In its comments on this section and Sec. Sec.  238.735 and 238.737, 
APTA recommended that FRA not reference the attachment strength 
requirements in Sec.  238.233, Interior fittings and surface, for Tier 
I equipment. The NPRM proposed to allow compliance with those strength 
requirements, specifically, 8g longitudinal, 4g vertical, and 4g 
lateral, as an option instead of using Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100 
and 5g longitudinal, 3g vertical, and 3g lateral attachment strength 
requirements. As discussed in the ETF's May 2017 meeting, APTA believes 
the 5g, 3g, and 3g attachment strength requirements are sufficient to 
serve as the minimum safety requirements and are consistent with the 
dynamic collision requirements in Sec.  238.705(b)(2), which provides 
that, if GM/RT2100 is used, the average deceleration experienced by 
each vehicle in a Tier III trainset may not exceed 5g during any 100-ms 
period. APTA added that, in developing the NPRM, the ETF consensus for 
use of the strength requirements in Sec.  238.233 was for Tier I 
alternative trainsets, as reflected in proposed paragraphs (i) though 
(k) of appendix G to this part. According to APTA, the ETF's consensus 
was for Tier III trainsets to comply with the relevant strength 
requirements in Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, with the 
additional requirement to apply a 3g vertical load rather than a 1g 
vertical load. As noted above, APTA contends that the 5g, 3g, and 3g 
attachment strength requirements are more harmonious with the Tier III 
requirements because they are tied to a maximum crash pulse 
requirement, unlike the 8g, 4g, and 4g requirements in Sec.  238.223.
    FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation. FRA always intended to 
provide the two options for compliance, as discussed in the NPRM. The 
first option, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, allows compliance 
with the requirements of Sec.  238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, 
``Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger 
Railroad Equipment,'' Authorized September 2005. The second option, in 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, allows compliance with section 6.1.4, 
``Security of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group 
Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle 
Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, 
provided: The test conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met; interior 
fixture attachment strength is based on a minimum of 5g longitudinal, 
3g vertical, and 3g lateral acceleration resistance; and use of the GM/
RT standard is carried out in accordance with any conditions identified 
by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (This last condition has been 
modified from the NPRM consistent with FRA's discussion regarding 
proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, 
section IV, above.)
    The acceleration-based performance standards in Sec.  238.233 and 
APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, were established after years of 
industry practice designing interior fittings to withstand the forces 
due to accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g vertically, and 3g 
laterally, which FRA specifically found to be inadequate to protect 
against occupant injury (see 64 FR 25540, 25614).\16\ The accident 
performance of interior fixtures designed to comply with Sec.  238.233 
and the APTA standard support their continued use for interior 
attachment strength. However, FRA continues to recognize that some Tier 
III passenger equipment may not experience accelerations of 8g 
longitudinally, 4g vertically, or 4g laterally during the dynamic 
collision scenario in Sec.  238.705, or at higher-speed collisions 
resulting in collapse of the occupied volume. FRA acknowledges that 
equipment that does not experience large decelerations during 
collisions does not need to be designed to these standards in Sec.  
238.233 and APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1. Accordingly, FRA 
developed an alternative attachment strength option consistent with 
international design standards, in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. 
FRA views the alternative as providing an equivalent level of safety to 
the now longstanding acceleration resistance requirements in Sec.  
238.233 and the APTA standard, with the qualification that no 
acceleration-based load higher than 5g is experienced as provided in 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section. FRA finds no additional burden is 
imposed by providing two options to demonstrate compliance with this 
section, and therefore declines to adopt APTA's suggestion to remove 
the first option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ When developing the requirements of the 1999 final rule, 
FRA concluded that due to the injuries caused by broken seats and 
other loose fixtures, which were designed to withstand the forces 
due to accelerations of 6g in the longitudinal direction, 3g in the 
vertical direction, and 3g in the lateral direction, as revealed in 
FRA and NTSB investigations of passenger train accidents, the design 
practice was inadequate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, paragraph (a)(2)(iii) provides for use of the GM/RT 
standard in accordance with any conditions identified by the railroad 
and approved by FRA. According to APTA, in its comments on this NPRM, 
the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation plan in this 
paragraph was unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration 
pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be met as provided in 
Sec.  238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to 
a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA 
approval of the conditions involving the option to comply with 
paragraph (a)(2) rather than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary. FRA seeks 
to ensure that compliance with paragraph (a)(2) provides an equivalent 
level of safety to the existing requirements in Sec.  238.233 and the 
APTA standard, and that no acceleration-based load higher than 5g is 
experienced. Nonetheless, as noted above and discussed under proposed 
subpart J in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, 
FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing 
procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA 
will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the 
requirements of this section are properly implemented. Because FRA has 
otherwise adopted the substantive requirements of this section as 
proposed in the NPRM, FRA is not repeating the full analysis in the 
NPRM supporting and explaining the requirements of this section, see 81 
FR 88006, 88034-88036.
    FRA does note it is incorporating by reference APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, 
Rev. 1 (previously designated as SS-C&S-006), ``Standard for Attachment 
Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,'' 
Authorized September 2005, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in 
paragraph (i) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.1.4, ``Security 
of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/
RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail 
Safety and Standards

[[Page 59206]]

Board Ltd., December 2010 in paragraph (a)(2) of this section and Sec.  
238.741(b)(2).
    APTA PR-CS-S-006-98 addresses fittings used in commuter and 
intercity railcar and locomotive cab interiors. It specifies the 
minimum strength and attachment strength for interior sub-systems, 
including overhead luggage racks, stanchions and handholds, windscreen 
and partitions, food service equipment, and miscellaneous interior 
fittings. This standard also contains recommendations for design 
requirements and design practices for such interior sub-systems. APTA 
PR-CS-S-006-98 is available to all interested parties online at 
www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for 
review.
    Section 6.1.4 of GM/RT2100 contains requirements for securement of 
furniture, on-board equipment, and other trainset features to help 
mitigate against injuries to passengers and crew from secondary impacts 
within the occupied volume. GM/RT2100 is available to all interested 
parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. 
Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review.
Section 238.735 Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Cab Crew)
    This section contains the seat strength requirements for Tier III 
trainsets and relates to the strength requirements for interior 
fixtures and luggage racks in Sec. Sec.  238.733 and 238.737, 
respectively, as noted above. APTA and Alstom both commented on this 
section. Specifically, APTA commented on the proposed passenger seating 
requirements in paragraph (a) based on the same premise as its comment 
on Sec.  238.733(a), as discussed above. APTA recommended that the 
option in proposed paragraph (a)(1) to comply with Sec.  238.233 and 
APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested 
that the sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on 
section 6.2, ``Seats for passengers, personnel, or train crew,'' of 
Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail 
Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 
2010, under the same acceleration resistance conditions APTA 
recommended for Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA 
raises applies equally for both sections, FRA is not repeating the full 
discussion here. For the reasons discussed under Sec.  238.733(a), 
above, FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation and is therefore 
retaining both compliance options under paragraph (a).
    Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a 
Tier III Safe Operation Plan under paragraph (a)(2)(iii) was 
unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier 
III collision scenario must be met as provided in Sec.  238.705(b)(2). 
Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the 
conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (a)(2) rather 
than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph 
(a)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier 
III Safe Operation Plan. Please see Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(iii), above, 
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, 
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this 
requirement. FRA notes that Alstom, in commenting on this section in 
the NPRM, stated that paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are not fully 
equivalent in terms of scope of application. Although the requirements 
of the paragraph are different, FRA has always intended these 
requirements to provide an equivalent level of safety, given the 
different circumstances surrounding their application. FRA will work 
with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of 
paragraph (a) are properly implemented.
    FRA notes it is incorporating by reference APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, 
Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,'' 
Authorized October 2010, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in 
paragraph (j) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.2, ``Seats for 
passengers, personnel, or train crew,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/
RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail 
Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (a)(2) of 
this section.
    APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 addresses row-to-row passenger seating in 
commuter and intercity railcars. APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 is available to 
all interested parties online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will 
maintain a copy available for review. However, FRA makes clear the rule 
does not require compliance with section 6.0, ``Seat durability 
testing,'' of this APTA standard. Seat durability testing is beyond the 
scope of this regulation because the testing focuses on the optimal 
life of the seats--not their safety performance.
    Section 6.2 of GM/RT2100 contains design specifications and 
tolerances for passenger and crew seating. GM/RT2100 is available to 
all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy 
available for review.
    Paragraph (b) contains requirements for the crashworthiness of 
seats provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III trainset. 
Unlike passenger seating, FRA proposed in paragraph (b)(1) that cab 
seats must comply with the requirements in Sec.  [thinsp]238.233(e), 
(f), and (g), and the performance, design, and test criteria of AAR-RP-
5104, ``Locomotive Cab Seats,'' April 2008, which FRA proposed to 
incorporate by reference in paragraph (b)(2) and paragraph (k)(2) of 
appendix G to this part. Although not submitted as a comment, AAR made 
FRA aware that it is archiving AAR-RP-5104. FRA therefore requested 
assistance from the ETF during the May 2017 meeting, and a small work 
group was convened to address the problem. The group recommended back 
to the ETF to excerpt language from section 3 of AAR-RP-5104 that 
prescribes minimum loading requirements for the seat itself, and place 
that language into the final rule. When the recommendation was 
presented to the ETF, industry members were adamantly opposed, stating 
that the requirements in section 3 of AAR-RP-5104 were durability 
standards and not safety-related. In fact, APTA, in a comment submitted 
after the close of the comment period, recommended deleting the 
reference to AAR-RP-5104 and its proposed paragraph (b)(2) entirely, 
stating that proposed paragraph (b)(1) adequately defines the 
requirements for Tier III cab seating.
    Resultantly, FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (b)(2) and FRA 
is not including a requirement to comply with any portion of AAR-RP-
5104. In turn, proposed paragraph (b)(1) is designated as (b) of this 
section. As proposed, paragraph (b) requires compliance with Sec.  
238.233(e), (f), and (g). However, with respect to the acceleration-
based loading requirements specified in Sec.  238.233(f), FRA makes 
clear in paragraph (b) that it expects for Tier III (and Tier I 
alternative) trainsets the cab seat to remain attached to the trainset 
structure when subjected to an 8g longitudinal acceleration-based load 
applied to the combined mass of the seat and a 95th-percentile male. 
FRA recognizes that this constitutes the more severe scenario to be 
tested. It is more severe than an 8g acceleration-based load applied 
solely to the mass of the cab seat. It is also more severe than testing 
under AAR-RP-5104, which provides for testing the seat with 250 pounds 
impacting the seatback at 3g. FRA concludes that if the cab seat can 
remain attached when subjected to an 8g acceleration-based load applied 
to the combined mass of the cab seat and

[[Page 59207]]

a 95th-percentile male, then the seat should remain attached under 
foreseeable collision scenarios.
Section 238.737 Luggage Racks
    This section contains requirements to constrain the longitudinal 
and lateral motion of articles stowed in luggage racks, and relates to 
the strength requirements for interior fixtures and seats in Sec. Sec.  
238.733 and 238.735, respectively, as noted above.
    FRA received no comments on paragraph (a) and has adopted it as 
proposed. Please see the discussion of paragraph (a) in the NPRM (81 FR 
88006, 88036). Nonetheless, APTA commented on the proposed luggage rack 
strength requirements in paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its 
comments on Sec. Sec.  238.733(a) and 238.735(a), as discussed above. 
APTA recommended that the option in proposed paragraph (b)(1) to comply 
with Sec.  238.233 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested that the 
sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on section 6.8, 
``Luggage stowage,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, 
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards 
Board Ltd., December 2010, specifically under the same acceleration 
resistance conditions APTA recommended for Sec. Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(ii) 
and 238.735(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises applies 
equally here, FRA is not repeating the full discussion. For the reasons 
discussed under Sec. Sec.  238.733(a) and 238.735(a), above, FRA is not 
adopting APTA's recommendation and is therefore retaining both 
compliance options under paragraph (b).
    Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a 
Tier III Safe Operation plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was 
unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier 
III collision scenario must be met as provided in Sec.  238.705(b)(2). 
Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the 
conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (b)(2) is 
necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for 
such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. 
Please see Sec. Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(iii) and 238.735(a)(2)(iii), above, 
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, 
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this 
requirement. Further, FRA expects that in demonstrating compliance with 
this requirement, the railroad must address how the mass of the luggage 
was considered when applied to the loading conditions defined in 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii).
    FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.8, ``Luggage 
stowage,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, 
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards 
Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section 
6.8 contains requirements for luggage stowage, either on the floor or 
in overhead racks. As noted above, GM/RT2100 is available to all 
interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy 
available for review.
Emergency Systems
Section 238.741 Emergency Window Egress and Rescue Access
    This section establishes requirements for emergency egress and 
rescue access through windows or alternative openings in passenger cars 
as part of an emergency window egress and rescue access plan for Tier 
III trainsets. The ETF recognized that any regulation would need to 
allow multiple approaches to facilitate the adoption of service-proven, 
high-speed trainset technology. Specifically, the methods used to 
manufacture high-speed trainsets are often governed by consideration of 
the effects of aerodynamics and noise; together with the potential need 
to pressurize occupied compartments, these can affect the way window 
glazing is installed and mounted in some trainset designs. Therefore, 
the ETF recommended performance-oriented requirements to allow 
necessary flexibility where an appropriate safety case can be made.
    FRA did not receive any comments on the requirements of this 
section as described in the NPRM. However, FRA is clarifying in 
paragraph (b) the reference to a Tier III ITM program, rather than to a 
Tier III ITM plan, as proposed in the NPRM. Otherwise, FRA is adopting 
this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this section of the final 
rule is virtually identical to the proposed version, the full analysis 
and discussion of this section provided in the NPRM is not repeated 
here (see 81 FR 88006, 88019-88020).
Section 238.743 Emergency Lighting
    This section contains the emergency lighting requirements for Tier 
III trainsets. As proposed, paragraph (a) provides that the 
requirements are the same as the emergency lighting requirements in 
Sec.  238.115, except for those specific to emergency lighting back-up 
power systems in paragraph (b). Paragraph (b), in turn, permits 
compliance with alternative, crash loading resistance requirements, to 
demonstrate the capability of back-up power systems to function after 
the initial shock caused by a collision or derailment.
    APTA commented on the proposed back-up power requirements in 
paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its comments on Sec. Sec.  
238.733, 238. 735, and 238.737, above. APTA recommended that the option 
in proposed paragraph (b)(1) of this section to comply with the 
acceleration resistance requirements in Sec.  238.115 not be included. 
Instead, APTA suggested that the sole option to demonstrate compliance 
be based on section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and 
features,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, 
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards 
Board Ltd., December 2010, under the same conditions APTA recommended 
for Sec. Sec.  238.733(a)(2)(ii), 238.735(a)(2)(ii), and 
238.737(b)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises generally 
applies equally for all sections, FRA is not repeating the full 
discussion here, and generally for the reasons discussed under these 
sections, above, FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation. This 
paragraph retains both compliance options. Further, FRA makes clear 
that Sec.  238.115 is contained in subpart B of part 238, and the scope 
of subpart B applies to all passenger equipment, regardless of 
operating speed. Consequently, FRA could have included specific back-up 
power requirements for Tier III trainsets in subpart B's Sec.  238.115 
but chose instead to place them here in subpart H for ease of 
reference.
    FRA notes Sec.  238.743(b)(1) in the final rule references the 
acceleration-based loads in Sec.  238.115(a)(4)(ii), which are 8g, 
longitudinally, and 4g, laterally and vertically. In the NPRM, FRA 
inadvertently referenced Sec.  238.115(b)(4)(ii), which was clear error 
because there is no such paragraph in Sec.  238.115. FRA has corrected 
the reference.
    Paragraph (b)(2) provides the second option for demonstrating the 
crashworthiness of emergency lighting back-up power systems. A railroad 
may use the loading requirements defined in section 6.1.4, ``Security 
of furniture, equipment and features,'' of GM/RT2100, under specified 
conditions. In the NPRM, FRA proposed that back-up power systems have 
an attachment strength sufficient to resist minimum loads of 5g 
longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically. However, FRA's

[[Page 59208]]

proposal was inadvertently overbroad. FRA intended for the back-up 
power supply to remain functional after being subjected to the initial 
shock of a collision or derailment, whether or not remaining attached 
in place.
    Consistent with its comments on similar proposed provisions, APTA 
also commented that the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation 
plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was unnecessary because the criteria 
for the acceleration pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be 
met as provided in Sec.  238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to 
include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to 
believe that FRA approval of the conditions involving the option to 
comply with paragraph (b)(2) is necessary for safety. Accordingly, 
paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer 
to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Please see Sec. Sec.  
238.733(a)(2)(iii), 238.735(a)(2)(iii), and 238.737(b)(2)(iii), above, 
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, 
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this 
requirement.
    FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.1.4, 
``Security of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group 
Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle 
Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, into 
paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section 6.1.4 contains requirements 
for the securement of furniture, equipment, and other features. As 
noted above, GM/RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at 
www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will 
maintain a copy available for review.
Cab Equipment
Section 238.751 Alerters
    This section contains requirements for alerters on Tier III 
passenger trainsets. In commenting on this section in the NPRM, APTA 
recommended removal of the proposed references to a Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan, consistent with its comments on proposed subpart J. As 
discussed below, this section does not include references to a Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan but does ensure FRA oversight. Otherwise, FRA has 
adopted this section as proposed and has therefore not repeated the 
full analysis of this section in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88037-
88038).
    As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (b) would have required the 
railroad to determine the appropriate time period within which the 
engineer must acknowledge the alerter and include that determination in 
the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan for review and approval by 
FRA. In its comment, APTA stated that inclusion in the Safe Operation 
Plan was unnecessary because the basis for setting the alerter control 
timing would be addressed during the design review process and FRA 
could review the railroad's alerter timing determination then. Although 
FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the periodicity of 
the alerter alarm, as well as the time period within which the engineer 
must react to that alarm, is necessary for safety. Nonetheless, as 
noted above and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of 
Comments and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by 
the ETF, is working towards developing procedures and processes to 
provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed 
Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this paragraph 
and this section are properly implemented. In this regard, FRA makes 
clear it intends alerter control timing to be set by the railroad 
taking into consideration maximum train speed and capabilities of the 
signal system.
    As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (d) would have required 
specifying in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan the necessary 
actions of the engineer responding to a full-service brake application 
initiated after the engineer failed to properly acknowledge the 
alerter. APTA, in its comment, stated that this was also unnecessary as 
these required actions would be contained in the railroad's operating 
rules and the ``engineer's training program.'' Again, although FRA 
agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, 
FRA continues to believe that FRA approval is necessary, namely, of the 
actions specified for the engineer to recover the full-service brake 
application. Inclusion in the railroad's operating rules is not 
sufficient as FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part 
217 of this chapter. Additionally, these procedures are not intended to 
be specified in the locomotive engineer certification program required 
under part 240 of this chapter. Thus, simple inclusion in a training 
program does not provide the necessary review and approval mechanism 
FRA desires. Nonetheless, as FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, 
is working towards developing specific procedures and processes for 
obtaining such approval, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III 
operation to ensure the requirements of this paragraph are properly 
implemented.
    Finally, as proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (e) would have required 
a railroad electing to use alternate technology to an alerter, to 
provide the function(s) of an alerter, to conduct a hazard analysis as 
part of its Tier III Safe Operation Plan. The intent behind the 
analysis was to demonstrate that the alternate alerter technology 
provided an equivalent level of safety. APTA, in its comment, stated 
that inclusion in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary 
because the demonstration of an equivalent level of safety would be 
performed during the design review process, with the results of the 
safety analysis being used to support the determination. Although FRA 
agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, 
FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the equivalency 
determination is necessary for safety, and FRA will work with any 
proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this 
paragraph are properly implemented, as discussed above. In this regard, 
FRA has clarified that the required analysis is not limited to a 
``hazard analysis,'' as proposed in the NPRM, but provides for a 
broader evaluation.
Section 238.753 Sanders
    This section introduces requirements for sanders on Tier III 
trainsets. In their comments on the NPRM, APTA and TCRR objected to 
inclusion of this section in the final rule. According to APTA and 
TCRR, in the international market, sanders are not considered a safety 
critical component but rather only performance enhancing and not 
critical to the safe operation of the trainset. Both APTA and TCRR 
further stated that if a railroad were to determine that sanders were 
critical to the safe operation of the trainset, then the sanders would 
be defined and addressed in the railroad's ITM program; under these 
circumstances, a trainset with defective sanders could move only under 
the regulatory provisions dealing with movement of defective equipment. 
Thus, APTA and TCRR believed that providing specific requirements for 
sanders in this section is unnecessary.
    FRA disagrees with this recommendation. As explained in the NPRM, 
this section does not require Tier III trainsets to be equipped with 
sanders; this section applies only if the railroad determines sanders 
are a required trainset component. Some railroads may determine that 
sanders

[[Page 59209]]

are necessary for the safe operation of Tier III trainsets, whereas 
other railroads may not. Nonetheless, FRA agrees that if the railroad 
deems the sanders safety critical, they would be so identified in the 
railroad's ITM program. No reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan 
is necessary. Accordingly, trainsets equipped with such sanders that 
are defective could move only in compliance with the requirements 
covering movement of defective equipment. Please also see the 
discussion of this proposed section in the NPRM (81 FR 88006, 88038). 
As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure 
the requirements of this section are properly implemented.
Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties
    The final rule includes an amended schedule of civil penalties 
under appendix A to this part. Specifically, the schedule includes 
civil penalty amounts for violations of the requirements of subpart H 
of this part. Because the penalty schedule is a statement of policy, 
notice and comment was not required prior to its revision. See 5 U.S.C. 
553(b)(3)(A). Accordingly, FRA has amended the penalty schedule to 
reflect the addition of subpart H.
Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the 
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in 
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs
    FRA is revising this appendix to clarify the application of the 
floor fire test in the table of ``Test Procedures and Performance 
Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of 
Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs'' in paragraph (c) 
to Tier III passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this 
clarification and has adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the 
final rule is identical to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating 
the analysis provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039).
Appendix F to Part 238--Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements 
for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    FRA is revising this appendix so that it applies to Tier III 
passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this change and has 
adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical 
to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating the analysis of this 
change provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039).
Appendix G to Part 238--Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the 
Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of a Tier I 
Passenger Trainset
    As proposed, FRA is adding appendix G to this part to provide 
alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance 
requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets instead of the conventional 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 
238.211, 238.213, and 238.219 in subpart C of this part. The technical 
contents of appendix G remain materially unchanged from those developed 
for the original Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
    FRA intends for these alternative requirements to be applied to a 
Tier I trainset as a whole. Accordingly, compliance must be 
demonstrated either through application of the conventional 
requirements in subpart C, or through application of the requirements 
in this appendix G, not a combination of both. They also apply in 
addition to the requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.209(b), 238.215, 
238.217, and 238.233, and APTA standards for occupant protection, as 
specified in this appendix. Although the appendix may refer to specific 
units of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in 
this appendix apply only to a Tier I trainset as a whole, as noted 
above. Further, use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance for Tier I 
passenger trainsets is subject to FRA review and approval under Sec.  
238.201.
    In general, where alternatives to the conventional Tier I 
requirements are given in this appendix G, those requirements are also 
identified in the Tier III requirements in subpart H--Specific 
Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment. See the discussion in 
the section-by-section analysis for subpart H, which applies to Tier I 
trainsets seeking qualification under this appendix. As FRA did not 
receive any comments on this appendix, FRA is not repeating the full 
analysis of this appendix provided in the NPRM, see 81 FR 88006, 88039-
88040.
    However, FRA does highlight that in paragraph (i) of this appendix, 
FRA is incorporating by reference APTA standard PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2, 
``Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad 
Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June 2006, for interior fixtures. The 
standard is intended to address forces applied to the carbody and truck 
structures during collisions, derailments, and other accident 
conditions. APTA PR-CS-S-034-99 is available to all interested parties 
online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy 
available for review.
    Further, in paragraph (j) of this appendix, FRA is incorporating by 
reference APTA standard PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for 
Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 2010, with 
the exception of Section 6 of the standard, which relates to the 
durability testing of seats. FRA considers the durability testing of 
seats to be beyond the scope of this final rule for the same reasons 
discussed under Sec.  238.735, above.
Appendix H to Part 238--Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input 
Data and Geometrical Depiction
    FRA is adding this appendix to part 238 to formally provide input 
data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a computer model 
of the rigid locomotive design in Sec.  238.705(a)(4) for use in 
evaluating the occupied volume integrity of a Tier III trainset (and a 
Tier I alternative passenger trainset under appendix G) in a dynamic 
collision scenario. Section 238.705(a) outlines the required conditions 
for performing a dynamic collision scenario involving an initially-
moving trainset impacting an initially-standing train having the rigid 
locomotive leading its consist. As explained in Sec.  238.705(a)(4), 
the initially-standing train is made up of a rigid locomotive and five 
identical passenger coaches having the following characteristics: The 
locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach weighs 95,000 pounds; 
the locomotive and each coach crush in response to applied force as 
specified in Table 1 to Sec.  238.705; and the locomotive has a 
geometric design as depicted in Figure 1 to this appendix H.
    This appendix is intended to establish a consistent definition for 
locomotive geometry for use in conducting dynamic computer simulations. 
The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the geometry for 
approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive design. Because 
this input file is for a half-symmetric model, a locomotive mass 
corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is provided for modeling 
purposes--half the 260,000 pounds of weight specified for the 
locomotive in Sec.  238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to this appendix provides 
two views of the locomotive's geometric depiction. The input data is 
contained in Appendix C to FRA's Technical Criteria and Procedures 
Report, available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.

[[Page 59210]]

VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771, and DOT Regulatory 
Policies and Procedures

    This final rule is an economically significant regulatory action 
within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and 
procedures. See 44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26, 1979).
    FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA) addressing the economic impacts of this final rule. The 
RIA estimates the costs of this final rule that are likely to be 
incurred over a 30-year period. FRA estimated the costs of this final 
rule using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent, respectively. For the 30-
year period analyzed, the present value of the estimated high-range 
quantified net cost savings for this final rule is $837.8 million when 
discounted at 3 percent and $541.9 million when discounted at 7 
percent. Annualized net cost savings total approximately $42.7 million 
when discounted at 3 percent and $43.7 million when discounted at 7 
percent.
    This final rule addresses several limitations in the Code of 
Federal Regulations pertaining to passenger equipment. Prior to 
publication of this final rule, the PESS in 49 CFR part 238 did not 
comprehensively address safety requirements for passenger rail 
equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the regulatory framework 
established Tier I safety compliance through equipment requirements 
that were more design-based, and therefore limited the application of 
contemporary design techniques and innovative technology.
    This final rule amends FRA's PESS and adds a new equipment tier 
(Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of high-speed rail at 
speeds up to 220 mph. The final rule also establishes alternative 
crashworthiness performance standards to qualify passenger rail 
equipment for Tier I operations (Tier I alternative). In addition, FRA 
is increasing the maximum allowable speed for Tier II operations from 
150 mph to 160 mph, making it consistent with prior changes in 49 CFR 
parts 213 and 238 for Vehicle/Track Interaction (VTI) Safety Standards.
    There are several HSR projects in development, such as Amtrak's 
next-generation Acela, Texas High-Speed Rail, and California's high-
speed rail project, which are all expected to benefit from 
implementation of the rule. Additionally, FRA believes that other HSR 
operations may be initiated due to the publication of this final rule. 
The costs, cost savings, and benefits associated with the Tier III 
requirements of this rule were developed looking at all possible 
operations in the United States. FRA researched HSR projects that were 
most viable, focusing on all publicly available business models for HSR 
projects. FRA developed an economic analysis that could be applied to 
any individual Tier III operation in the United States, including 
Amtrak's next-generation Acela. The main costs savings result from 
minimizing the costs of right-of-way acquisition, especially in high 
population urban areas, such as New York, Washington, Miami, and other 
large metropolitan areas. The provisions of the final rule's Tier III 
passenger equipment safety standards allow the service to use existing 
rights-of-way, permitting the use of track shared with other rail 
service (i.e., blended track).
    FRA estimates that between $227.7 million and $523.3 million (when 
discounted at a 7-percent rate) or between $351.3 million and $808.8 
million (when discounted at a 3-percent rate) in quantifiable costs 
will be borne by the industry over a future 30-year period in availing 
itself of the rule's new regulatory framework. Note that industry will 
only incur these costs if it chooses to test to demonstrate compliance 
with either the Tier I alternative, or decides to implement Tier III 
operations. The added alternative Tier I standards provide an option 
for railroads to use different types or designs of passenger equipment 
in Tier I service and will not impose any cost on existing rolling 
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. The new 
Tier III requirements will not impose any cost on existing rolling 
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations (existing 
passenger rolling stock is Tier I and II; there is no Tier III rolling 
stock in operation in the U.S.).

                    Table 1--Regulatory Cost Summary
                             [$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                      3%              7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range: \17\
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs..           $59.6           $39.1
    Tier III Infrastructure Costs.......           749.2           484.2
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           808.8           523.3
            Annualized Costs............            41.3            42.2
Low Range: \18\
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs..            51.6            34.1
    Tier III Infrastructure Costs.......           299.7           193.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           351.3           227.7
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Costs............            17.9            18.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule will result in significant cost savings for the 
industry. Estimated infrastructure-related cost savings comprise the 
most significant driver of cost savings compared to other quantified 
cost savings (i.e., equipment design and engineering, manufacturing 
benefits, etc.). Infrastructure cost savings will be generated by the 
ability of railroad operators to take advantage of a blended operating 
environment--avoiding costly new construction, maintenance of dedicated 
track, and acquisition of new rights-of-way. This

[[Page 59211]]

cost savings is especially attractive to railroad operators that 
provide service in areas with high population density, where right-of-
way acquisition and new railroad construction are significantly more 
expensive and complex. This rule will increase the probability that new 
services are introduced and reduce the need for new construction in 
densely populated areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ High-range costs represent costs at a high funding level 
with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust for the upper bound 
confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more 
detailed description of the high-range costs, please refer to 
Section 3 of the RIA.
    \18\ Low-range costs represent costs at a low funding level with 
a 10-percent multiplier to adjust for the lower bound confidence 
level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more detailed 
description of the low-range costs, please refer to Section 3 of the 
RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The U.S. passenger rail industry will experience cost savings from 
this regulatory action because it permits manufacturers to adapt 
existing designs of rolling stock to meet the new standards and will 
allow operators to take advantage of a wider variety of trainset 
designs. Further, the rule will allow Tier I and Tier III operations to 
use service-proven platforms with the latest technology available. 
These cost savings will be achieved by adapting technology that exists 
on the international market to meet FRA's safety requirements and 
ensuring that all equipment suppliers comply with the same safety 
standards.
    Table 2 provides the estimated industry equipment and 
infrastructure cost savings and their discounted values at the 3- and 
7-percent levels, respectively. High-range cost savings represent cost 
savings at a high funding level with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust 
for the confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. Low-
range cost savings represent cost savings at a low funding level with a 
10-percent multiplier to adjust for the confidence level of an HSR 
system becoming operational. For a more detailed description of the 
low- and high-range cost savings, please refer to the RIA.

             Table 2--Regulatory Cost Savings Range Summary
                             [$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                      3%              7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range:
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost             $315.4          $205.8
     Savings............................
    Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings         1,331.3           859.4
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............         1,646.7         1,065.2
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Cost Savings.....            84.0            85.8
Low Range:
    Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost              257.5           168.8
     Savings............................
    Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings           532.5           343.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............           790.1           512.5
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Cost Savings.....            40.3            41.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 3 below displays the net cost savings of this final rule, 
categorized by either Tier I alternative or Tier III costs and cost 
savings. Discounted net regulatory cost savings will be between $438.8 
million (low range) and $837.8 million (high range) at the 3-percent 
level, and between $284.8 million (low range) and $541.9 million (high 
range) at the 7-percent level. Annualized net regulatory cost savings 
are between $22.4 million and $42.7 million when discounted at 3 
percent and between $22.9 million and $43.7 million when discounted at 
7 percent.

                  Table 3--Net Regulatory Cost Savings
                             [$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Description                      3%              7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range:
    Tier I Alternative Costs............           $59.6           $39.1
    Tier III Costs......................           749.2           484.2
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           808.8           523.3
    Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.....           315.4           205.8
    Cost Savings Tier III...............         1,331.3           859.4
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............         1,646.7         1,065.2
    Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.           255.8           166.7
    Net Cost Savings Tier III...........           582.1           375.2
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Net Cost Savings..........           837.8           541.9
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Net Cost Savings.            42.7            43.7
Low Range:
    Tier I Alternative Costs............            51.6            34.1
    Tier III Costs......................           299.7           193.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Costs.....................           351.3           227.7
    Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.....           257.5           168.8
    Cost Savings Tier III...............           532.5           343.7
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Cost Savings..............           790.1           512.5
    Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative.           205.9           134.7

[[Page 59212]]

 
    Net Cost Savings Tier III...........           232.8           150.1
                                         -------------------------------
        Total Net Cost Savings..........           438.8           284.8
                                         -------------------------------
            Annualized Net Cost Savings.            22.4            22.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule is considered an Executive Order 13771 deregulatory 
action. Details on the estimated cost savings of this final rule can be 
found in the RIA.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), as amended 
by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA), generally requires an agency to prepare a regulatory 
flexibility analysis describing the impact of the regulatory action on 
small entities as part of the rulemaking. Small entities include small 
businesses, small organizations, and governmental jurisdictions. An 
agency must conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis unless it 
determines and certifies that the rule is not expected to have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
FRA developed this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13272, 
``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking,'' and 
DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance with the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act to ensure potential impacts of rules on small entities 
are properly considered.
    Prior to this final rule, the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
in part 238 did not comprehensively address safety requirements for 
passenger rail equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the former 
regulatory framework generally set Tier I safety compliance through 
equipment design requirements, which limited the application of new 
technology. This final rule changes the passenger rail equipment safety 
regulatory framework by introducing a new tier of equipment safety 
standards (Tier III) and also establishes more performance-based 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the alternative 
to those specified for Tier I equipment. Additionally, the final rule 
increases the maximum allowable speed for Tier II equipment to make it 
consistent the corresponding speed range in FRA's Track Safety 
Standards for the track over which the equipment operates. This Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is presented to comply with Executive 
Order 13272 and with the Regulatory Flexibility Act as part of the 
rulemaking process required by law.
    FRA initiated the rulemaking using recommendations made by FRA's 
RSAC. In general, the rulemaking amends 49 CFR part 238, to reflect new 
or modified safety requirements for Tier I and Tier III equipment, and 
to increase the authorized speed limit for Tier II equipment.
1. Description of Regulated Entities and Impacts
    The ``universe'' of the entities under consideration includes only 
those small entities that can reasonably be expected to be directly 
affected by the provisions of this final rule. For the rule, there is 
only one type of small entity that will be affected: Small passenger 
railroads. ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the 
same meaning as ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small 
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is 
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of 
operation. Under 5 U.S.C. 601(5) ``small entities'' is defined as 
governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school 
districts, or special districts with populations less than 50,000.
    The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates ``size 
standards'' for small entities. It provides that industry sectors 
relevant for the rulemaking must not exceed the limits listed below 
(and still classify as a ``small entity''): \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ U.S. Small Business Administration, ``Table of Small 
Business Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification 
System Codes,'' effective January 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     1,500 employees for railroad rolling stock manufacturing.
     1,500 employees for line haul operating railroads.
     1,250 employees for motor and generator manufacturing.
     1,250 employees for switchgear and switchboard apparatus 
manufacturing.
    Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small 
entities in consultation with SBA, and in conjunction with public 
comment. Under the authority provided to it by SBA, FRA published a 
final policy, which formally establishes small entities as railroads 
that meet the line haulage revenue requirements of a Class III 
railroad.\20\ Currently, the revenue requirements are $20 million or 
less in annual operating revenue, adjusted annually for inflation. The 
$20 million limit (adjusted annually for inflation) is based on the 
Surface Transportation Board's threshold of a Class III railroad, which 
is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue deflator adjustment.\21\ 
FRA uses this definition for the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See 68 FR 24891, May 9, 2003.
    \21\ For further information on the calculation of the specific 
dollar limit, please see 49 CFR part 1201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Railroads
    For purposes of this analysis, there are only two intercity 
passenger railroads, Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad. Neither is 
considered a small entity. Amtrak is a Class I railroad and the Alaska 
Railroad is a Class II railroad. The Alaska Railroad is owned by the 
State of Alaska, which has a population well in excess of 50,000. There 
are currently 30 commuter or other short-haul passenger railroad 
operations in the U.S., most of which are part of larger transportation 
organizations that receive Federal funds and serve major metropolitan 
areas with populations greater than 50,000. However, one of these 
railroads does not fall in this category and is considered a small 
entity: The Hawkeye Express. The Hawkeye Express provides service to 
Iowa City, Iowa, and is owned by a Class III railroad, a small entity. 
FRA notes that it has not analyzed the Saratoga & North Creek Railway 
as a small entity under this final rule. Because of operational changes 
subsequent to the NPRM's publication, FRA considers the Saratoga & 
North Creek Railway a tourist railroad, not subject to this rule.

[[Page 59213]]

    It is important to note that the small railroad being considered in 
this analysis uses passenger rolling stock that is different from the 
equipment covered by the rulemaking. Further, the Hawkeye Express would 
be able to find their current type of train equipment in the market if 
they decide to acquire new rolling stock over the next 30 years. This 
final rule does not increase costs for this small passenger railroad. 
FRA expects the cost to acquire passenger rail equipment will drop as a 
result of the rulemaking. There will be more variety in trainset models 
available for passenger operations and options in companies supplying 
equipment in the U.S. market. Additionally, the railroad may enjoy 
lower prices as the U.S. passenger rail market is enlarged as a result 
of the rulemaking, enhancing economies of scale and increasing 
predictability for equipment orders.
Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
    The passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment manufacturing 
sector in the United States has a fairly small number of firms with no 
more than 15 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and a few hundred 
component and subcomponent suppliers.\22\ However, for this flexibility 
analysis, FRA is taking a broader approach by assessing the effect of 
the regulation on the railroad rolling stock manufacturing sector as 
defined by the North American Classification System (NAICS), which 
includes the passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment 
manufacturing industry but goes beyond by also covering freight and 
maintenance-of-way vehicles. This approach includes firms that 
currently do not manufacture passenger rail equipment but can 
potentially enter the market. Based on data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, employment in these industries is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Lowe, M., Tokuoka, S., Dubay, K., and Gereffi, G., ``U.S. 
Manufacture of Rail Vehicles for Intercity Passenger Rail and Urban 
Transit: A Value Chain Analysis,'' Center on Globalization, 
Governance & Competitiveness, June 24, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     NAICS code 336510, Railroad rolling stock manufacturing, 
159 firms in the industry, and 137 firms with less than 500 employees.
     NAICS code 335312, Motor and generator manufacturing, 428 
firms in the industry, and 384 firms with less than 500 employees.
    The main impact of the rule affecting these industries is the 
qualification costs for Tier I alternative and Tier III trainsets. FRA 
worked with the industry to develop new safety criteria to evaluate 
passenger equipment designed to standards differing from those 
historically used for procurements in the U.S. As noted in the RIA, 
companies supplying new trainsets covered by the rulemaking will be 
required to submit test and analysis results to demonstrate compliance 
with these new safety standards. However, in the case of rolling stock 
manufacturing, this cost will only be incurred by the OEM when 
submitting a qualification package, which would include details 
regarding the performance of the trainset model under the required 
tests and analyses. Therefore, small and very small firms supplying 
OEMs are not expected to be required to submit that information. Small 
firms could be expected to benefit from existing requirements for 
minimum domestic content as more trainsets are purchased by U.S. 
railroad operators. Small businesses have the opportunity to supply 
OEMs with domestic inputs and to partner with larger firms to allow 
small domestic producers to meet the needs of the market being created 
by this final rule. Consequently, FRA expects the rulemaking to have 
only a positive impact on these small entities as more of them are 
provided with the opportunity to enter the passenger railroad equipment 
manufacturing industry.
Significant Economic Impact Criteria
    Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue 
averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One 
percent of average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. FRA 
realizes that some railroads will have revenue lower than $4.7 million. 
However, FRA estimates that small railroads will not have any 
additional expenses over the next ten years to comply with the 
requirements in this rule. Based on this, FRA concludes that the 
expected burden of this rule will not have a significant impact on the 
competitive position of small entities, or on the small entity segment 
of the railroad industry as a whole.
Substantial Number Criteria
    This final rule will likely affect any small railroad that is not 
exempt from its scope or application (see 49 CFR 238.3). Thus, as noted 
above, this final rule will impact a substantial number of small 
railroads.
2. Certification
    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 
Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration certifies that 
this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. In the NPRM, FRA requested comments on its 
certification made as a result of its Regulatory Flexibility Act 
analysis, see 81 FR 88006, 88044. FRA received no comments. FRA 
therefore stands with its previous Regulatory Flexibility Act 
certification.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this final rule are 
being submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review 
and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The sections that contain the new, revised, and 
current information collection requirements and the estimated time to 
fulfill each requirement are as follows:

 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Total
                                                                Total annual       Average time per     annual
            CFR section              Respondent universe         responses             response         burden
                                                                                                        hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.47--Emergency Brake Valve--     32 railroads.........  32 markings..........  1 minute.........            1
 Marking brake pipe valve as such.
238.7--Waivers....................  32 railroads.........  5 waivers............  2 hours..........           10
238.15--Movement of passenger       32 railroads.........  1,000 tags...........  3 minutes........           50
 equipment with power brake defect.
    --Movement of passenger         32 railroads.........  288 tags.............  3 minutes........           14
     equipment--defective en route.
    --Conditional requirement--     32 railroads.........  144 notices..........  3 minutes........            7
     Notice.
238.17--Limitations on movement of  32 railroads.........  200 tags.............  3 minutes........           10
 passenger equipment--defects
 found at calendar day insp. & on
 movement of passenger equipment--
 develops defects en route.
    --Special requirements--        32 railroads.........  76 tags..............  3 minutes........            4
     movement of passenger equip.
     with safety appliance defect.
    --Crew member notifications...  32 railroads.........  38 radio               30 secs..........          .32
                                                            notifications.
238.21--Petitions for special       32 railroads.........  1 petition...........  16 hours.........           16
 approval of alternative standards.

[[Page 59214]]

 
    --Petitions for special         32 railroads.........  1 petition...........  40 hours.........           40
     approval of pre-revenue
     service acceptance testing
     plan.
    --Comments on petitions.......  Public/RR Industry...  4 comments...........  1 hour...........            4
238.103--Fire Safety:
    --Procuring new pass.           2 new railroads......  1 analysis...........  150 hours........          150
     equipment--Fire Safety
     Analysis.
    --Transferring existing         32 railroads/APTA....  3 analyses...........  20 hours.........           60
     equipment--Revised Fire
     Safety Analysis.
238.107--Inspection/testing/        32 railroads.........  32 reviews...........  60 hours.........        1,920
 maintenance plans--RR review.
238.109--Employee/Contractor Tr.:
    --Training employees--Mech.     7,500 employees/100    2,500 empl./100        1.33 hours.......        3,458
     insp.                           trainers.              trainers.
    --Recordkeeping--Employee/      32 railroads.........  2,500 records........  3 minutes........          125
     Contractor current
     qualifications.
238.111--Pre-revenue service        9 equipment            1 plan...............  16 hours.........           16
 acceptance testing plan:            manufacturers.
 Passenger equipment that has
 previously been used in service
 in the U.S.
    --Passenger equipment that has  9 equipment            1 plan...............  192 hours........          192
     not been previously used in     manufacturers.
     revenue service in the U.S.
    --Subsequent equipment orders.  9 equipment            1 plan...............  60 hours.........           60
                                     manufacturers.
    --Tier II & Tier III Passenger  32 railroads.........  1 report.............  60 hours.........           60
     Equipment: Report of test
     results to FRA (Revised
     Requirement).
    --Plan submitted to FRA for     32 railroads.........  1 plan...............  20 hours.........           20
     Tier II or Tier III equipment
     before being placed in
     service (Revised Requirement).
238.131--Exterior side door safety  6 passenger car        2 analyses...........  4 hours..........            8
 systems--new passenger cars/        builders.
 locomotives used in passenger
 service: Failure Modes, Effects,
 Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
238.133--Exterior side door safety  32 railroads.........  32 plan updates......  4 hours..........          128
 systems--passenger cars/
 locomotives used in passenger
 service: Functional test plans.
    --Notification to designated    32 railroads.........  9,994 radio            30 secs..........           84
     RR authority by train                                  notifications.
     crewmember of unsealed door
     by-pass device.
    --Safety briefing by train      32 railroads.........  320 safety briefings.  2 minutes........           11
     crew when door by-pass device
     is activated.
    --Notification to designated    32 railroads.........  320 radio              30 secs..........            3
     RR authority by train                                  notifications.
     crewmember that door by-pass
     device has been activated.
    --On-site qualified person      32 railroads.........  320 QP descriptions..  5 minutes........           27
     (QP) description to a
     qualified maintenance person
     (QMP) off-site that equipment
     is safe to move for repairs.
    --QP/QMP notification to        32 railroads.........  320 notices + 320      30 seconds + 10             56
     crewmember in charge that                              safety briefings.      min..
     door by-pass has been
     activated + safety briefing
     by train crew.
    --RR record of each door by-    32 railroads.........  320 records..........  2 minutes........           11
     pass activation.
    --RR record of unintended       32 railroads.........  20 records...........  2 hours..........           40
     power door openings.
    --RR record of by-pass          32 railroads.........  20 records...........  4 hours..........           80
     activations found unsealed.
238.135--RR request to FRA for      32 railroads.........  2 requests...........  25 hours.........           50
 special consideration to operate
 passenger trains with exterior
 side doors or trap doors, or
 both, open between stations.
    --FRA request to RR for         32 railroads.........  1 additional document  12 hours.........           12
     additional information
     concerning special
     consideration request.
    --RR Operating rule to          32 railroads.........  10 operating rules...  42 hours.........          420
     override a door summary
     circuit or no motion system,
     or both, in the event of an
     en route exterior side door
     failure or malfunction on a
     passenger train.
    --RR copy of written operating  32 railroads.........  10,000 op. rule        1 minute.........          167
     rules to train crew members                            copies.
     and control center personnel.
    --RR training of train crew     32 railroads.........  3,383 RR trained       30 mins..........        1,692
     members on requirements of                             employees.
     this section.
    --RR training of new employees  32 railroads.........  150 workers..........  30 mins..........           75
    --RR operational/efficiency     32 railroads.........  3,383 tests..........  2 minutes........          113
     tests of train crew members &
     control center employees.
238.201--New Requirements--         32 railroads.........  1 plan...............  40 hours.........           40
 Alternative Compliance: Tier I
 Passenger equipment--Test plans +
 supporting documentation
 demonstrating compliance.
    --Notice of tests sent to FRA   32 railroads.........  1 notice.............  30 mins..........            1
     30 days prior to commencement
     of operations.
238.229--Safety Appliances:
    --Welded safety appliances:     32 railroads.........  32 lists.............  1 hour...........           32
     Lists.
    --Defective welded safety       32 railroads.........  4 tags...............  3 minutes........          .20
     appliance--Tags.
    --Notification to crewmembers   32 railroads.........  2 notices............  1 minute.........        .0333
     about non-compliant equipment.
    --Inspection plans
    --Inspection personnel--        32 railroads.........  1 plan...............  16 hours.........           16
     Training.
    --Remedial action: Defect/      32 railroads.........  60 workers...........  4 hours..........          240
     crack in weld--record.         32 railroads.........  1 record.............  2.25 hours.......            2
    --Petitions for special         32 railroads.........  1 petition...........  4 hours..........            4
     approval of alternative
     compliance--impractical
     equipment design.
    --Records of inspection/repair  32 railroads.........  3,264 records........  12 mins..........          653
     of welded safety appliance
     brackets/supports/training.
238.230--Safety Appliances--New     32 railroads.........  100 records..........  6 minutes........           10
 Equipment--Inspection record of
 welded equipment by qualified
 Employee.
    --Welded safety appliances:     32 railroads.........  1 document...........  4 hours..........            4
     Documentation for equipment
     impractically designed to
     mechanically fasten safety
     appliance support.
238.231--Brake System--Inspection   32 railroads.........  2,500 forms..........  21 mins..........          875
 and repair of hand/parking brake:
 Records.
    --Procedures verifying hold of  32 railroads.........  1 procedure..........  2 hours..........            2
     hand/parking brakes.
238.237--Automated monitoring:
    --Documentation for alerter/    32 railroads.........  1 document...........  2 hours..........            2
     deadman control timing.
    --Defective alerter/deadman     32 railroads.........  25 tags..............  3 minutes........            1
     control: Tagging.
238.303--Exterior calendar day      32 railroads.........  32 notices...........  1 minute.........            1
 mechanical inspection of
 passenger equipment: Notice of
 previous inspection.
    --Dynamic brakes not in         32 railroads.........  50 tags..............  3 minutes........            3
     operating mode: Tag.
    --Conventional locomotives      32 railroads.........  50 tags..............  3 minutes........            3
     equipped with inoperative
     dynamic brakes: Tagging.
    --MU passenger equipment found  32 railroads.........  4 documents..........  2 hours..........            8
     with inoperative/ineffective
     air compressors at exterior
     calendar day inspection:
     Documents.
    --Written notice to train crew  32 railroads.........  100 notices..........  3 minutes........            5
     about inoperative/ineffective
     air compressors.

[[Page 59215]]

 
    --Records of inoperative air    32 railroads.........  100 records..........  2 minutes........            3
     compressors.
    --Record of exterior calendar   32 railroads.........  1,959,620 records....  10 minutes + 1         359,264
     day mechanical inspection.                                                    minute.
238.305--Interior calendar day      32 railroads.........  540 tags.............  1 minute.........            9
 mechanical inspection of
 passenger cars--Tagging of
 defective end/side doors.
    --Records of interior calendar  32 railroads.........  1,959,620 records....  5 minutes + 1          359,264
     day inspection.                                                               minute.
238.307--Periodic mechanical        32 railroads.........  2 notices/             5 hours..........           10
 inspection of passenger cars and                           notifications.
 unpowered vehicles--Alternative
 inspection intervals:
 Notifications.
    --Notice of seats/seat          32 railroads.........  200 notices..........  2 minutes........            7
     attachments broken or loose.
    --Records of each periodic      32 railroads.........  19,284 insp./records.  200 hours/2          3,857,443
     mechanical inspection.                                                        minutes.
    --Detailed documentation of     32 railroads.........  5 documents..........  100 hours........          500
     reliability assessments as
     basis for alternative
     inspection interval.
238.311--Single car test:
    --Tagging to indicate need for  32 railroads.........  50 tags..............  3 minutes........            3
     single car test.
238.313--Class I Brake Test:
    --Record for additional         32 railroads.........  15,600 insp./records.  30 minutes.......        7,800
     inspection for passenger
     equipment that does not
     comply with Sec.
     238.231(b)(1).
238.315--Class IA brake test:
    --Notice to train crew that     32 railroads.........  18,250 notices.......  5 seconds........           25
     test has been performed
     (verbal notice).
    --Communicating signal tested   32 railroads.........  365,000 op.            15 seconds.......        1,521
     and operating as intended.                             sufficiency tests.
238.317--Class II brake test:
    --Communicating signal tested   32 railroads.........  365,000 op.            15 seconds.......        1,521
     and operating as intended.                             sufficiency tests.
238.321--Out-of-service credit--    32 railroads.........  1,250 notes..........  2 minutes........           42
 Passenger car: Out-of-use
 notation.
238.445--Automated Monitoring:
    --Performance monitoring:       1 railroad...........  10,000 alerts/alarms.  10 secs..........           28
     Alerters/alarms.
    --Monitoring system: Self-test  1 railroad...........  21,900 notices.......  20 secs..........          122
     feature: Notifications.
238.703--Quasi-static Load          2 railroads..........  1 analysis...........  40 hours.........           40
 Requirements--Document/analysis
 for Tier III Trainsets showing
 compliance with this section (New
 Requirement).
238.705--Dynamic Collision          2 railroads..........  1 model validation/    40 hours.........           40
 Scenario--Demonstration of                                 analysis.
 Occupied Volume Integrity for
 Tier III Trainsets--Model
 validation document (New
 Requirement).
238.707--Override Protection--Anti- 2 railroads..........  1 test/analysis......  40 hours.........           40
 climbing performance test/
 analysis for Tier III Trainsets
 (New Requirement).
238.709--Fluid Entry Inhibition--   2 railroads..........  1 compliance document/ 20 hours.........           20
 Information to demonstrate                                 analysis.
 compliance with this section--
 Tier III Trainsets (New
 Requirement).
238.721--New Requirements--Tier     5 glass manufacturers  1 data document/       60 hours.........           60
 III Trainsets--End-facing                                  analysis.
 document/analysis for exterior
 windows of Tier III Trainsets.
    --Marking of End-facing         5 glass manuf........  60 markings..........  2 minutes........            2
     exterior windows Tier III
     Trainsets.
    --Cab Glazing; Side-facing      5 glass manuf........  1 document analysis..  10 hours.........           10
     exterior windows in Tier III
     cab--document showing
     compliance with Type II
     glazing.
    --Marking of side-facing        5 glass manuf........  120 window markings..  2 minutes........            4
     exterior windows in Tier III
     Trainsets.
    --Non-Cab Glazing; Side-facing  5 glass manuf........  1 data document/       20 hours.........           20
     exterior windows--Tier III--                           analysis.
     compliance document for Type
     II glazing.
    --Marking of side-facing        5 glass manuf........  1, 200 glass markings  2 minutes........           40
     exterior windows--Tier III
     Trainsets--non-cab cars.
    --Alternative standard to FRA   5 glass manuf........  1 alternative          5 hours..........            5
     for side-facing exterior                               standard.
     window intended to be
     breakable and serve as an
     emergency window exit (option
     to comply with an alternative
     standard).
238.731--New Requirements--Brake    2 railroads..........  1 analysis/test......  480 hours........          480
 Systems--RR analysis and testing
 Tier III trainsets' maximum safe
 operating speed.
    --Tier III trainsets'           2 railroads..........  240 stencils/markings  20 minutes.......           80
     passenger brake alarm--
     legible stenciling/marking of
     devices with words
     ``Passenger Brake Alarm''.
    --Main reservoir test/          2 railroads..........  1 test/cert..........  6 hours..........            6
     certification.
    --Inspection, testing and       2 railroads..........  1 ITM plan...........  480 hours........          480
     maintenance plan (ITM)--
     Periodic inspection for main
     reservoirs.
    --Brake actuator design with    2 railroads..........  1 design.............  40 hours.........           40
     approved brake cylinder
     pressure as part of design
     review process.
    --Tier III equipment:           2 railroads..........  1 procedure..........  8 hours..........            8
     Demonstrated securement
     procedure.
238.733--Tier III Interior fixture  2 railroads..........  1 analysis/document..  20 hours.........           20
 attachment standard--analysis for
 FRA approval (New Requirement).
238.735--Tier III seat              2 railroads..........  1 analysis/document..  40 hours.........           40
 crashworthiness standard
 (passenger & cab crew)--analysis
 for FRA approval (New
 Requirement).
238.737--Tier III luggage racks     2 railroads..........  1 analysis/document..  20 hours.........           20
 standard--analysis for FRA
 approval (New Requirement).
238.741--New Requirement--          2 railroads..........  1 plan...............  60 hours.........           60
 Emergency window egress/rescue
 plan to FRA for passenger cars in
 Tier III trainsets not in
 compliance with sections 238.113
 or 238.114.
238.743--New Requirement--          2 railroads..........  1 analysis/test......  60 hours.........           60
 Emergency Lighting Std.--Tier III
 trainsets--analysis/test.
238.751--New Requirements--         2 railroads..........  1 analysis/test......  40 hours.........           40
 Alerters--alternate technology-
 Tier III trainsets--analysis/test.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 59216]]

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions; 
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed 
data; and reviewing the information. For information or a copy of the 
information collection submission sent to OMB, please contact FRA 
Information Collection Clearance Officers Mr. Robert Brogan at (202) 
493-6292 or Ms. Kimberly Toone at (202) 493-6132, or via email at the 
following addresses: [email protected]; [email protected].
    Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the 
collection of information requirements should direct them to the Office 
of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
725 17th St. NW, Washington, DC 20503, attn: FRA Desk Officer. Comments 
may also be sent via email to the Office of Management and Budget at 
the following address: [email protected].
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of 
information requirements contained in this final rule between 30 and 60 
days after publication of this document in the Federal Register. 
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect 
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication.
    FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information 
collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control 
number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control numbers 
for any new information collection requirements resulting from this 
rulemaking action prior to the effective date of this final rule. The 
OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate notice 
in the Federal Register.

D. Federalism Implications

    Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), 
requires FRA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful 
and timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' ``Policies 
that have federalism implications'' are defined in the Executive Order 
to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency 
may not issue a regulation with federalism implications that imposes 
substantial direct compliance costs and that is not required by 
statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to 
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local 
governments, or the agency consults with State and local government 
officials early in the process of developing the regulation. Where a 
regulation has federalism implications and preempts State law, the 
agency seeks to consult with State and local officials in the process 
of developing the regulation.
    This final rule has been analyzed under the principles and criteria 
contained in Executive Order 13132. This final rule will not have a 
substantial effect on the States or their political subdivisions, and 
it will not affect the relationships between the Federal government and 
the States or their political subdivisions, or the distribution of 
power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. In 
addition, FRA has determined that this regulatory action will not 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on the States or their 
political subdivisions. Therefore, the consultation and funding 
requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
    However, this final rule could have preemptive effect by operation 
of law under certain provisions of the Federal railroad safety 
statutes, specifically the former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 
repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106, and the former Locomotive 
Boiler Inspection Act (LIA) at 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and re-
codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703. Section 20106 provides that States 
may not adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or order 
related to railroad safety or security that covers the subject matter 
of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security 
matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies 
under the ``essentially local safety or security hazard'' exception to 
section 20106. Moreover, the former LIA has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court as preempting the field concerning locomotive safety. See 
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).

E. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 et 
seq.) prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or 
related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 
safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    FRA has assessed the potential effect of this rulemaking on foreign 
commerce and believes that its requirements are consistent with the 
Trade Agreements Act. The requirements are safety standards, which, as 
noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to trade. Moreover, FRA 
has sought, to the extent practicable, to state the requirements in 
terms of the performance desired, rather than in more narrow terms 
restricted to a particular design or system.

F. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other 
environmental statutes, related regulatory requirements, and its 
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures) 
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999). FRA has determined that this final rule is 
categorically excluded from detailed environmental review pursuant to 
section 4(c)(20) of FRA's Procedures, which concerns the promulgation 
of railroad safety rules and policy statements that do not result in 
significantly increased emissions of air or water pollutants or noise 
or increased traffic congestion in any mode of transportation. See 64 
FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Categorical exclusions (CEs) are actions 
identified in an agency's NEPA implementing procedures that do not 
normally have a significant impact on the environment and therefore do 
not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental 
impact statement (EIS). See 40 CFR 1508.4.
    In analyzing the applicability of a CE, the agency must also 
consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would 
warrant a more detailed environmental review through the preparation of 
an EA or EIS. Id. In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's 
Procedures, the agency has further concluded that no extraordinary 
circumstances exist with respect to this regulation that might trigger 
the need for a more detailed environmental review. The purpose of this 
rulemaking is to amend FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. This 
rulemaking adds safety standards to facilitate the safe implementation 
of high-speed rail at

[[Page 59217]]

speeds up to 220 mph (Tier III). The rule also establishes 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements in the 
alternative to those specified for passenger trainsets operated at 
speeds up to 125 mph (Tier I). In addition, the rule increases from 150 
mph to 160 mph the maximum speed allowable for the tier of railroad 
passenger equipment currently operated at the Nation's highest train 
speeds (Tier II). FRA does not anticipate any environmental impacts 
from the requirements and finds that there are no extraordinary 
circumstances present in connection with this final rule.

G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)

    Executive Order 12898, ``Federal Actions to Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,'' and DOT 
Order 5610.2(a) (91 FR 27534, May 10, 2012) require DOT agencies to 
achieve environmental justice as part of their mission by identifying 
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects, including interrelated social 
and economic effects, of their programs, policies, and activities on 
minority populations and low-income populations. The DOT Order 
instructs DOT agencies to address compliance with Executive Order 12898 
and requirements within the DOT Order in rulemaking activities, as 
appropriate. FRA has evaluated this rule under Executive Order 12898 
and the DOT Order and has determined that it will not cause 
disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental 
effects on minority populations or low-income populations.

H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)

    FRA has evaluated this rule in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 13175, ``Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,'' dated November 6, 2000. 
This rule will not have a substantial direct effect on one or more 
Indian tribes, will not impose substantial direct compliance costs on 
Indian tribal governments, and will not preempt tribal laws. Therefore, 
the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 13175 do 
not apply, and a tribal summary impact statement is not required.

I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Under section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. 
L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless otherwise 
prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory actions on 
State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector (other 
than to the extent that such regulations incorporate requirements 
specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C. 
1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general notice of 
proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the promulgation of any 
rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result in expenditure 
by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for 
inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any final rule for 
which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was published, the agency 
shall prepare a written statement'' detailing the effect on State, 
local, and tribal governments and the private sector. This final rule 
will not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of $100,000,000 
or more (as adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year, and thus 
preparation of such a statement is not required.

J. Energy Impact

    Executive Order 13211, ``Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use,'' requires 
Federal agencies to prepare a Statement of Energy Effects for any 
``significant energy action.'' See 66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001. FRA has 
evaluated this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13211 and 
determined that this regulatory action is not a ``significant energy 
action'' within the meaning of the Executive Order.
    Executive Order 13783, ``Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth,'' requires Federal agencies to review regulations to determine 
whether they potentially burden the development or use of domestically 
produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural 
gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources. See 82 FR 16093, March 31, 
2017. FRA has determined this regulatory action will not burden the 
development or use of domestically produced energy resources.

K. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

    As required by 1 CFR 51.5, FRA has summarized the standards it is 
incorporating by reference and shown the reasonable availability of 
those standards in the section-by-section analysis of Sec. Sec.  
238.733, 238.735, 238.737, 238.743, and Appendix G, paragraphs (i) and 
(j) of this rulemaking document.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 236

    Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 238

    Incorporation by reference, Passenger equipment, Railroad safety, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Rule

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA amends parts 229, 
231, 236, and 238 of chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of 
Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 229--[AMENDED]

0
 1. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 103, 322(a), 20103, 20107, 20901-02, 21301, 
21302, 21311; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89.

Subpart A--General

0
 2. Revise Sec.  229.3(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  229.3  Applicability.

* * * * *
    (c) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec.  229.125 do not apply to Tier II 
passenger equipment as defined in Sec.  238.5 of this chapter (i.e., 
passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not 
exceeding 160 mph).
* * * * *

0
 3. Section 229.5 is amended by revising the definition of ``Tier II'' 
to read as follows:


Sec.  229.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not 
exceeding 160 mph.
* * * * *

PART 231--[AMENDED]

0
 4. The authority citation for part 231 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20131, 20301-20303, 
21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89.


0
 5. Revise Sec.  231.0(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  231.0  Applicability and penalties.

* * * * *
    (c) Except for the provisions governing uncoupling devices, this 
part does not apply to Tier II passenger equipment as defined in Sec.  
238.5 of this chapter (i.e., passenger equipment operating at speeds 
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph).
* * * * *

[[Page 59218]]

PART 236--[AMENDED]

0
6. The authority citation for part 236 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20157, 
20301-20303, 20306, 20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, 
note; and 49 CFR 1.89.

Subpart I--Positive Train Control Systems


Sec.  236.1007  [Amended]

0
7. In Sec.  236.1007, remove paragraph (d), and redesignate paragraph 
(e) as new paragraph (d).

PART 238--[AMENDED]

0
8. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-20303, 
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 
CFR 1.89.

Subpart A--General

0
 9. Section 238.5 is amended by:
0
a. Adding in alphabetical order a definition of ``Associate 
Administrator'';
0
b. Revising the definitions of ``glazing, end-facing'', ``glazing, 
side-facing'', and ``Tier II'';
0
c. Adding in alphabetical order a definition of ``Tier III'';
0
d. Revising the definition of ``Train, Tier II passenger''; and
0
e. Adding in alphabetical order definitions of ``Trainset, Tier I 
alternative passenger'', ``Trainset, Tier III'', and ``Trainset unit''.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  238.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Associate Administrator means Associate Administrator for Railroad 
Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Associate Administrator for Railroad 
Safety, Associate Administrator for Safety.
* * * * *
    Glazing, end-facing means any exterior glazing located where a line 
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal 
angle of 50 degrees or less with the centerline of the vehicle in which 
the glazing material is installed, except for: The coupled ends of 
multiple-unit (MU) locomotives or other equipment semi-permanently 
connected to each other in a train consist; and end doors of passenger 
cars at locations other than the cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. 
Any location which, due to curvature of the glazing material, can meet 
the criteria for either an end-facing glazing location or a side-facing 
glazing location shall be considered an end-facing glazing location.
* * * * *
    Glazing, side-facing means any glazing located where a line 
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal 
angle of more than 50 degrees with the centerline of the vehicle in 
which the glazing material is installed. Side-facing glazing also means 
glazing located at the coupled ends of MU locomotives or other 
equipment semi-permanently connected to each other in a train consist 
and glazing located at end doors other than at the cab end of a cab car 
or MU locomotive.
* * * * *
    Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not 
exceeding 160 mph.
    Tier III means operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not 
exceeding 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade 
crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph.
* * * * *
    Train, Tier II passenger means a short-distance or long-distance 
intercity passenger train providing service at speeds exceeding 125 mph 
but not exceeding 160 mph.
* * * * *
    Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger means a trainset consisting 
of Tier I passenger equipment demonstrating alternative crashworthiness 
and occupant protection performance under the requirements of appendix 
G to this part.
    Trainset, Tier III means an intercity passenger train that provides 
service in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph and in 
an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 
125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph.
    Trainset unit means a trainset segment located between connecting 
arrangements (articulations).
* * * * *

0
10. In Sec.  238.21 revise paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  238.21  Special approval procedure.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) The elements prescribed in Sec. Sec.  238.201(b)(1), 
238.229(j)(2), and 238.230(d); and
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Each petition for special approval of the pre-revenue service 
acceptance testing plan shall be submitted to the Associate 
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE, Washington, DC 20590.
* * * * *

Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements

0
 11. In Sec.  238.111 revise paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), and (7), and 
(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.111  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) Submit a copy of the plan to FRA at least 30 days before 
testing the equipment and include with that submission notification of 
the times and places of the pre-revenue service tests to permit FRA 
observation of such tests. For Tier II and Tier III passenger 
equipment, the railroad shall obtain FRA approval of the plan under the 
procedures specified in Sec.  238.21.
* * * * *
    (4) Document in writing the results of the tests. For Tier II and 
Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall report the results of 
the tests to the Associate Administrator at least 90 days prior to its 
intended operation of the equipment in revenue service.
    (5) Correct any safety deficiencies identified in the design of the 
equipment or in the ITM procedures uncovered during testing. If safety 
deficiencies cannot be corrected by design changes, the railroad shall 
impose operational limitations on the revenue service operation of the 
equipment designed to ensure the equipment can operate safely. For Tier 
II and Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall comply with any 
operational limitations the Associate Administrator imposes on the 
revenue service operation of the equipment for cause stated following 
FRA review of the results of the test program. This section does not 
restrict a railroad from petitioning FRA for a waiver of a safety 
regulation under the procedures specified in part 211 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    (7) For Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment, obtain approval 
from the Associate Administrator before placing the equipment in 
revenue service. The Associate Administrator will grant such approval 
if the railroad demonstrates compliance with the applicable 
requirements of this part.
    (c) If a railroad plans a major upgrade or introduction of new 
technology to Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment that has been 
used in revenue service in

[[Page 59219]]

the United States and that affects a safety system on such equipment, 
the railroad shall follow the procedures in paragraph (b) of this 
section before placing the equipment in revenue service with the major 
upgrade or introduction of new technology.

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

0
 12. In Sec.  238.201, redesignate the text after the heading of 
paragraph (b) as paragraph (b)(1), revise the first sentence of newly 
redesignated paragraph (b)(1), and add paragraph (b)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  238.201  Scope/alternative compliance.

* * * * *
    (b) * * * (1) Passenger equipment of special design shall be deemed 
to comply with this subpart, other than Sec.  238.203, for the service 
environment the petitioner proposes to operate the equipment in if the 
Associate Administrator determines under paragraph (c) of this section 
that the equipment provides at least an equivalent level of safety in 
such environment for the protection of its occupants from serious 
injury in the case of a derailment or collision. * * *
    (2)(i) Tier I passenger trainsets may comply with the alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to 
this part instead of the requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.203, 238.205, 
238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219.
    (ii) To assess compliance with the alternative requirements, the 
railroad shall submit the following documents to the Associate 
Administrator, for review:
    (A) Test plans, and supporting documentation for all tests intended 
to demonstrate compliance with the alternative requirements and to 
validate any computer modeling and analysis used, including notice of 
such tests, 30 days before commencing the tests; and
    (B) A carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance 
report based on the analysis, calculations, and test data necessary to 
demonstrate compliance.
    (iii) The carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection 
compliance report shall be deemed acceptable unless the Associate 
Administrator stays action by written notice to the railroad within 60 
days after receipt of the report.
    (A) If the Associate Administrator stays action, the railroad shall 
correct any deficiencies FRA identified and notify FRA it has corrected 
the deficiencies before placing the subject equipment into service.
    (B) FRA may also impose written conditions necessary for safely 
operating the equipment, for cause stated.
* * * * *

0
 13. Revise Sec.  238.203(a)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.203  Static end strength.

    (a)(1) Except as further specified in this paragraph (a), paragraph 
(d) of this section, and Sec.  238.201(b)(2), on or after November 8, 
1999, all passenger equipment shall resist a minimum static end load of 
800,000 pounds applied on the line of draft without permanent 
deformation of the body structure.
* * * * *

0
 14. Revise the first sentence of Sec.  238.205(a) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.205  Anti-climbing mechanism.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, and Sec.  
238.201(b), all passenger equipment placed in service for the first 
time on or after September 8, 2000, and prior to March 9, 2010, shall 
have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing mechanism 
capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 
pounds without failure. * * *
* * * * *

0
15. Revise Sec.  238.207 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.207  Link between coupling mechanism and carbody.

    Except as specified in Sec.  238.201(b), all passenger equipment 
placed in service for the first time on or after September 8, 2000, 
shall have a coupler carrier at each end designed to resist a vertical 
downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000 pounds for any normal 
horizontal position of the coupler, without permanent deformation. 
Passenger equipment connected by articulated joints that complies with 
the requirements of Sec.  238.205(a) also complies with the 
requirements of this section.

0
 16. Amend Sec.  238.209 by adding paragraph (a) introductory text to 
read as follows:


Sec.  238.209  Forward end structure of locomotives, including cab cars 
and MU locomotives.

    (a) Except as specified in Sec.  238.201(b)--
* * * * *

0
 17. Revise Sec.  238.211(a) introductory text to read as follows:


Sec.  238.211  Collision posts.

    (a) Except as further specified in this paragraph (a), paragraphs 
(b) through (d) of this section, Sec.  238.201(b), and Sec.  
238.209(b)--
* * * * *

0
 18. Revise Sec.  238.213(a)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.213  Corner posts.

    (a)(1) Except as further specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this section, Sec.  238.201(b), and Sec.  238.209(b), each passenger 
car shall have at each end of the car, placed ahead of the occupied 
volume, two full-height corner posts, each capable of resisting 
together with its supporting car body structure:
* * * * *

0
 19. Revise the first sentence of Sec.  238.219 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.219  Truck-to-car-body attachment.

    Except as provided in Sec.  238.201(b), passenger equipment shall 
have a truck-to-carbody attachment with an ultimate strength sufficient 
to resist without failure the following individually applied loads: 2g 
vertically on the mass of the truck; and 250,000 pounds in any 
horizontal direction on the truck, along with the resulting vertical 
reaction to this load. * * *

Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

0
 20. Revise the first sentence of Sec.  238.401 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.401  Scope.

    This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger 
equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 
mph. * * *

Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for 
Tier II Passenger Equipment

0
 21. Revise Sec.  238.501 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.501  Scope.

    This subpart contains inspection, testing, and maintenance 
requirements for railroad passenger equipment that operates at speeds 
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph.

0
 22. Add subpart H to part 238 to read as follows:
Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
Sec.
238.701 Scope.
238.702 Definitions.

Trainset Structure

238.703 Quasi-static compression load requirements.
238.705 Dynamic collision scenario.
238.707 Override protection.

[[Page 59220]]

238.709 Fluid entry inhibition.
238.711 End structure integrity of cab end.
238.713 End structure integrity of non-cab end.
238.715 Roof and side structure integrity.
238.717 Truck-to-carbody attachment.

Glazing

238.721 Glazing.

Brake System

238.731 Brake system.

Interior Fittings and Surfaces

238.733 Interior fixture attachment.
238.735 Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew).
238.737 Luggage racks.

Emergency Systems

238.741 Emergency window egress and rescue access.
238.743 Emergency lighting.

Cab Equipment

238.751 Alerters.
238.753 Sanders.
Figure 1 to Subpart H of Part 238--Cylindrical Projectile for Use in 
Sec.  238.721 End-Facing Cab-Glazing Testing

Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment


Sec.  238.701  Scope.

    This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger 
equipment operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 
125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at 
speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. Passenger seating 
is permitted in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset if the trainset 
complies with the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements 
of this subpart, and the railroad has an approved right-of-way plan 
under Sec.  213.361 of this chapter and an approved HSR-125 plan under 
Sec.  236.1007(c) of this chapter. Demonstration of compliance with the 
requirements of this subpart is subject to FRA review and approval 
under Sec.  238.111.


Sec.  238.702  Definitions.

    As used in this subpart--
    Cab means a compartment or space within a trainset that is designed 
to be occupied by an engineer and contain an operating console for 
exercising control over the trainset.
    Integrated trainset means a passenger train in which all units of 
the trainset are designed to operate together to achieve the trainset's 
structural crashworthiness performance.

Trainset Structure


Sec.  238.703  Quasi-static compression load requirements.

    (a) General. To demonstrate resistance to loss of occupied volume, 
Tier III trainsets shall comply with both the quasi-static compression 
load requirements in paragraph (b) of this section and the dynamic 
collision requirements in Sec.  238.705.
    (b) Quasi-static compression load requirements. (1) Each individual 
vehicle in a Tier III trainset shall resist a minimum quasi-static end 
load applied on the collision load path of:
    (i) 800,000 pounds without permanent deformation of the occupied 
volume; or
    (ii) 1,000,000 pounds without exceeding either of the following two 
conditions:
    (A) Local plastic strains no greater than 5 percent; and
    (B) Vehicle shortening no greater than 1 percent over any 15-foot 
length of the occupied volume; or
    (iii) 1,200,000 pounds without crippling the body structure. 
Crippling of the body structure is defined as reaching the maximum 
point on the load-versus-displacement characteristic.
    (2) To demonstrate compliance with this section, each type of 
vehicle shall be subjected to an end compression load (buff) test with 
an end load magnitude no less than 337,000 lbf (1500 kN).
    (3) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this 
section shall be documented and submitted to FRA for review and 
approval.


Sec.  238.705  Dynamic collision scenario.

    (a) General. In addition to the requirements of Sec.  238.703, 
occupied volume integrity (OVI) shall also be demonstrated for each 
individual vehicle in a Tier III trainset through an evaluation of a 
dynamic collision scenario in which a moving train impacts a standing 
train under the following conditions:
    (1) The initially-moving trainset is made up of the equipment 
undergoing evaluation at its AW0 ready-to-run weight;
    (2) If trainsets of varying consist lengths are intended for use in 
service, then the shortest and longest consist lengths shall be 
evaluated;
    (3) If the initially-moving trainset is intended for use in push-
pull service, then, as applicable, each configuration of leading 
vehicle shall be evaluated separately;
    (4) The initially-standing train is led by a rigid locomotive and 
also made up of five identical passenger coaches having the following 
characteristics:
    (i) The rigid locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach 
weighs 95,000 pounds;
    (ii) The rigid locomotive and each passenger coach crush in 
response to applied force as specified in Table 1 to this section; and
    (iii) The rigid locomotive shall be modeled using the data inputs 
listed in appendix H to this part so that it has a geometric design as 
depicted in Figure 1 to appendix H to this part;
    (5) The scenario shall be evaluated on tangent, level track;
    (6) The initially-moving trainset shall have an initial velocity of 
20 mph if it is an integrated trainset, or an initial velocity of 25 
mph if the lead vehicle of the trainset is not part of the integrated 
design;
    (7) The coupler knuckles on the colliding equipment shall be closed 
and centered;
    (8) The initially-moving trainset and initially-standing train 
consists are not braked;
    (9) The initially-standing train has only one degree-of-freedom 
(longitudinal displacement); and
    (10) The model used to demonstrate compliance with the dynamic 
collision requirements must be validated. Model validation shall be 
documented and submitted to FRA for review and approval.
    (b) Dynamic collision requirements. As a result of the impact 
described in paragraph (a) of this section--
    (1) One of the following two conditions must be met for the 
occupied volume of the initially-moving trainset:
    (i) There shall be no more than 10 inches of longitudinal permanent 
deformation; or
    (ii) Global vehicle shortening shall not exceed 1 percent over any 
15-foot length of occupied volume.
    (2) If Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
December 2010, is used to demonstrate compliance with any of the 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then 
the average longitudinal deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of 
each vehicle in the initially-moving trainset during the dynamic 
collision scenario shall not exceed 5g during any 100-millisecond (ms) 
time period. The maximum interval between data points so averaged in 
the 100-ms time period shall be no greater than 1-ms.
    (3) Compliance with each of the following conditions shall also be 
demonstrated for the cab of the initially-moving trainset after the 
impact:
    (i) For each seat provided for an employee in the cab, and any 
floor-

[[Page 59221]]

mounted seat in the cab, a survival space shall be maintained where 
there is no intrusion for a minimum of 12 inches from each edge of the 
seat. Walls or other items originally within this defined space, not 
including the operating console, shall not further intrude more than 
1.5 inches towards the seat under evaluation;
    (ii) There shall be a clear exit path for the occupants of the cab;
    (iii) The vertical height of the cab (floor to ceiling) shall not 
be reduced by more than 20 percent; and
    (iv) The operating console shall not have moved more than 2 inches 
closer to the engineer's seat; if the engineer's seat is part of a set 
of adjacent seats, the requirements of this paragraph (b)(3) apply to 
both seats.

    Table 1--Force-Versus-Crush Relationships for Passenger Coach and
                         Conventional Locomotive
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Crush     Force
                      Vehicle                          (in)      (lbf)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Coach....................................         0          0
                                                            3     80,000
                                                            6  2,500,000
Conventional Locomotive............................         0          0
                                                          2.5    100,000
                                                            5  2,500,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec.  238.707  Override protection.

    (a) Colliding equipment. (1) Using the dynamic collision scenario 
described in Sec.  238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall be 
evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions:
    (i) All vehicles in the initially-moving trainset and initially-
standing train consists are positioned at their nominal running 
heights;
    (ii) The lead vehicle of the initially-moving trainset shall be 
perturbed laterally and vertically upwards by 3 inches at the colliding 
interface; and
    (iii) The lead vehicle of the initially-moving trainset shall be 
perturbed laterally and vertically downwards by 3 inches at the 
colliding interface.
    (2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section, compliance with the following conditions shall 
be demonstrated after a dynamic impact:
    (i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of 
the colliding equipment in the initially-moving trainset and initially-
standing train consists shall not change by more than 4 inches; and
    (ii) The tread of any wheel of the first vehicle of the initially-
moving trainset shall not rise above the top of the rail by more than 4 
inches
    (b) Connected equipment override. (1) Using the dynamic collision 
scenario described in Sec.  238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall 
be evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions:
    (i) All vehicles in the initially-moving trainset and initially-
standing train consists are positioned at their nominal running 
heights;
    (ii) One vehicle is perturbed laterally and vertically upwards by 2 
inches, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first vehicle-to-
vehicle interface in the initially-moving trainset; and,
    (iii) One vehicle is perturbed laterally and vertically downwards 
by 2 inches, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first vehicle-to-
vehicle interface in the initially-moving trainset.
    (2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph 
(b)(1) of this section, compliance with the following conditions shall 
be demonstrated after a dynamic impact:
    (i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of 
the connected equipment in the initially-moving trainset shall not 
change by more than 4 inches; and
    (ii) The tread of any wheel of the initially-moving trainset shall 
not rise above the top of rail by more than 4 inches.


Sec.  238.709  Fluid entry inhibition.

    (a) The skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset 
shall be--
    (1) Equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with yield strength of 
25,000 pounds per square inch. Material of higher yield strength may be 
used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided at 
least an equivalent level of strength is maintained. The sum of the 
thicknesses of elements (e.g., skin and structural elements) from the 
structural leading edge of the trainset to a point, when projected onto 
a vertical plane, just forward of the engineer's normal operating 
position, may also be used to satisfy this requirement;
    (2) Designed to inhibit the entry of fluids into the cab; and
    (3) Affixed to the collision posts or other main structural members 
of the forward end structure so as to add to the strength of the end 
structure.
    (b) Information used to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements of this section shall at a minimum include a list and 
drawings of the structural elements considered in satisfying the 
thickness-strength requirement of this section, and calculations 
showing that the thickness-strength requirement is satisfied.


Sec.  238.711  End structure integrity of cab end.

    The cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the 
requirements of appendix F to this part to demonstrate the integrity of 
the end structure. For those units of Tier III trainsets without 
identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix F 
to this part apply to the end structure at each location specified, 
regardless of whether the structure is a post.


Sec.  238.713  End structure integrity of non-cab end.

    (a) General. Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements 
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section to demonstrate the integrity 
of the end structure for other than the cab ends.
    (b) Collision post requirements. (1) Each unit of a Tier III 
trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the unit either:
    (i) Two full-height collision posts, located at approximately the 
one-third points laterally. Each collision post shall have an ultimate 
longitudinal shear strength of not less than 300,000 pounds at a point 
even with the top of the underframe member to which it is attached. If 
reinforcement is used to provide the shear value, the reinforcement 
shall have full value for a distance of 18 inches up from the 
underframe connection and then taper to a point approximately 30 inches 
above the underframe connection; or
    (ii) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of 
forces that each collision post in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section 
is required to withstand. For analysis purposes, the required forces 
may be assumed to be evenly distributed at the locations where the 
equivalent structure attaches to the underframe.
    (2) Collision posts are not required for the non-cab ends of any 
unit with push-back couplers and interlocking anti-climbing mechanisms 
in a Tier III trainset, or the non-cab ends of a semi-permanently 
coupled consist of trainset units, if the inter-car connection is 
capable of preventing disengagement and telescoping to the same extent 
as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post 
requirements in subpart C of this part. For demonstrating that the 
inter-car connection is capable of preventing such disengagement (and 
telescoping), the criteria in Sec.  238.707(b) apply.
    (c) Corner post requirements. (1) Each passenger car in a Tier III 
trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the car, placed ahead of the 
occupied volume, two side structures capable of resisting a:

[[Page 59222]]

    (i) 150,000-pound horizontal force applied at floor height without 
failure;
    (ii) 20,000-pound horizontal force applied at roof height without 
failure; and
    (iii) 30,000-pound horizontal force applied at a point 18 inches 
above the top of the floor without permanent deformation.
    (2) For purposes of this paragraph (c), the orientation of the 
applied horizontal forces shall range from longitudinal inward to 
transverse inward.
    (3) For each evaluation load, the load shall be applied to an area 
of the structure sufficient to not locally cripple or punch through the 
material.
    (4) The load area shall be chosen to be appropriate for the 
particular car design and shall not exceed 10 inches by 10 inches.


Sec.  238.715  Roof and side structure integrity.

    To demonstrate roof and side structure integrity, Tier III 
trainsets shall comply with the requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.215 and 
238.217.


Sec.  238.717  Truck-to-carbody attachment.

    To demonstrate the integrity of truck-to-carbody attachments, each 
unit in a Tier III trainset shall:
    (a) Comply with the requirements in Sec.  238.219; or
    (b) Have a truck-to-carbody attachment with strength sufficient to 
resist, without yielding, the following individually applied, quasi-
static loads on the mass of the truck at its CG:
    (1) 3g vertically downward;
    (2) 1g laterally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to 
this load; and
    (3) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 5g 
longitudinally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to this 
load, provided that for the conditions in the dynamic collision 
scenario described in Sec.  238.705(a):
    (i) The average longitudinal deceleration at the CG of the 
equipment during the impact does not exceed 5g; and
    (ii) The peak longitudinal deceleration of the truck during the 
impact does not exceed 10g.
    (c) As an alternative to demonstrating compliance with paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section, the truck shall be shown to remain attached 
after a dynamic impact under the conditions in the collision scenario 
described in Sec.  238.705(a).
    (d) For purposes of paragraph (b) of this section, the mass of the 
truck includes axles, wheels, bearings, truck-mounted brake system, 
suspension system components, and any other component attached to the 
truck by design.
    (e) Truck attachment shall be demonstrated using a validated model.

Glazing


Sec.  238.721  Glazing.

    (a) Cab glazing; end-facing. (1) Each end-facing exterior window in 
a cab of a Tier III trainset shall comply with the requirements for 
Type I glazing in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter, except as 
provided in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section.
    (2) Instead of the large object impact test specified in appendix A 
to part 223, each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall demonstrate 
compliance with the following requirements of this paragraph (a):
    (i) The glazing article shall be impacted with a cylindrical 
projectile that complies with the following design specifications as 
depicted in Figure 1 to this subpart:
    (A) The projectile shall be constructed of aluminum alloy such as 
ISO 6362-2:1990, grade 2017A, or its demonstrated equivalent;
    (B) The projectile end cap shall be made of steel;
    (C) The projectile assembly shall weigh 2.2 pounds (-0, +0.044 
pounds) or 1 kilogram (kg) (-0, +0.020 kg) and shall have a 
hemispherical tip. Material may be removed from the interior of the 
aluminum portion to adjust the projectile mass according to the 
prescribed tolerance. The hemispherical tip shall have a milled surface 
with 0.04 inch (1 mm) grooves; and
    (D) The projectile shall have an overall diameter of 3.7 inches (94 
mm) with a nominal internal diameter of 2.76 inches (70 mm).
    (ii) The test of the glazing article shall be deemed satisfactory 
if the test projectile does not penetrate the windscreen, the 
windscreen remains in its frame, and the witness plate is not marked by 
spall.
    (iii) A new projectile shall be used for each test.
    (iv) The glazing article to be tested shall be that which has the 
smallest area for each design type. For the test, the glazing article 
shall be fixed in a frame of the same construction as that mounted on 
the vehicle.
    (v) A minimum of four tests shall be conducted and all must be 
deemed satisfactory. Two tests shall be conducted with the complete 
glazing article at 32 [deg]F  9 [deg]F (0 [deg]C  5 [deg]C) and two tests shall be conducted with the complete 
glazing article at 68 [deg]F  9 [deg]F (20 [deg]C  5 [deg]C). For the tests to be valid they shall demonstrate that 
the core temperature of the complete glazing article during each test 
is within the required temperature range.
    (vi) The test glazing article shall be mounted at the same angle 
relative to the projectile path as it will be to the direction of 
travel when mounted on the vehicle.
    (vii) The projectile's impact velocity shall equal the maximum 
operating speed of the Tier III trainset plus 100 mph (160 km/h). The 
projectile velocity shall be measured within 13 feet (4 m) of the point 
of impact.
    (viii) The point of impact shall be at the geometrical center of 
the glazing article.
    (3) Representative samples for large object impact testing of large 
Tier III end-facing cab glazing articles may be used instead of the 
actual design size, provided that the following conditions are met:
    (i) Testing of glazing articles having dimensions greater than 39.4 
by 27.6 inches (1,000 mm by 700 mm), excluding framing, may be 
performed using a flat sample having the same composition as the 
glazing article for which compliance is to be demonstrated. The glazing 
manufacturer shall provide documentation containing its technical 
justification that testing a flat sample is sufficient to verify 
compliance of the glazing article with the requirements of this 
paragraph (a).
    (ii) Flat sample testing is permitted only when no surface of the 
full-size glazing article contains curvature with a radius less than 98 
inches (2,500 mm), and when a complete, finished glazing article is 
laid (convex side uppermost) on a flat horizontal surface, the distance 
(measured perpendicularly to the flat surface) between the flat surface 
and the inside face of the glazing article is not greater than 8 inches 
(200 mm).
    (4) End-facing glazing shall demonstrate sufficient resistance to 
spalling, as verified by the large impact projectile test under the 
following conditions:
    (i) An annealed aluminum witness plate of maximum thickness 0.006 
inch (0.15 mm) and of dimension 19.7 by 19.7 inches (500 mm by 500 mm) 
is placed vertically behind the sample under test, at a horizontal 
distance of 500 mm from the point of impact in the direction of travel 
of the projectile or the distance between the point of impact of the 
projectile and the location of the engineer's eyes in the engineer's 
normal operating position, whichever is less. The center of the witness 
plate is aligned with the point of impact.
    (ii) Spalling performance shall be deemed satisfactory if the 
aluminum witness plate is not marked.
    (iii) For the purposes of this subpart, materials used specifically 
to protect the cab occupants from spall (i.e., spall

[[Page 59223]]

shields) shall not be required to meet the flammability and smoke 
emission performance requirements of appendix B to this part.
    (5) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall, at a minimum, 
provide ballistic penetration resistance that meets the requirements of 
appendix A to part 223.
    (6) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall be permanently 
marked, before installation, in such a manner that the marking is 
clearly visible after the material has been installed. The marking 
shall include:
    (i) The words ``FRA TYPE IHS'' to indicate that the material has 
successfully passed the testing requirements specified in this 
paragraph (a);
    (ii) The name of the manufacturer; and
    (iii) The type or brand identification of the material.
    (b) Cab glazing; side-facing. Each side-facing exterior window in a 
cab of a Tier III trainset shall--
    (1) Comply with the requirements for Type II glazing contained in 
appendix A to part 223 of this chapter, for large-object impact; and
    (2) Maintain the minimum ballistics penetration resistance as 
required for end-facing glazing in paragraph (a)(5) of this section.
    (c) Non-cab glazing; side-facing. (1) Except as provided in 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section, each side-facing exterior window in 
other than a cab shall comply with the requirements for Type II glazing 
contained in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter.
    (2) Instead of the requirements specified in paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section, a side-facing exterior window intended to be breakable 
and serve as an emergency window exit may comply with an alternative 
standard that provides an equivalent level of safety and is approved 
for use by FRA.
    (d) Glazing securement. Each exterior window shall remain in place 
when subjected to:
    (1) The forces due to air pressure differences caused when two 
trains pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while 
traveling in opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum 
authorized speed; and
    (2) The impact forces that the exterior window is required to 
resist as specified in this section.
    (e) Glazing certification. (1) Each manufacturer that provides 
glazing materials, intended by the manufacturer for use in achieving 
compliance with the requirements of this section, shall certify that 
each type of glazing material being supplied for this purpose has been 
successfully tested. Tests performed on glazing materials for 
demonstration of compliance with this section, relied on by the glazing 
manufacturer in furtherance of certification, may be performed by 
either:
    (i) An independent third-party (laboratory, facility, underwriter); 
or
    (ii) The glazing manufacturer, by providing FRA the opportunity to 
witness all tests by written notice at least 30 days prior to testing.
    (2) Any glazing material certified to meet the requirements of this 
section shall be re-certified by the same means (as originally 
certified) if any changes are made to the glazing that may affect its 
mechanical properties or its mounting arrangement on the vehicle.
    (3) All certification/re-certification documentation shall be made 
available to FRA upon request.

Brake System


Sec.  238.731  Brake system.

    (a) General. Each railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and 
testing the maximum safe operating speed for its Tier III trainsets 
that results in no thermal damage to equipment or infrastructure during 
normal operation of the brake system.
    (b) Minimum performance requirement for brake system. Each Tier III 
trainset's brake system shall be capable of stopping the trainset from 
its maximum operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the 
track over which the trainset is operating under the worst-case 
adhesion conditions defined by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
    (c) Emergency brake system. A Tier III trainset shall be provided 
with an emergency brake application feature that produces an 
irretrievable stop. An emergency brake application shall be available 
at any time, and shall be initiated by either of the following:
    (1) An unintentional parting of the trainset; or
    (2) The train crew at locations within the trainset specified by 
the railroad, as approved by FRA.
    (d) Passenger brake alarm. (1) A means to initiate a passenger 
brake alarm shall be provided at two locations in each unit of a Tier 
III trainset that is over 45 feet in length. When a unit of the 
trainset is 45 feet or less in length, a means to initiate a passenger 
brake alarm need only be provided at one location in the unit. These 
locations shall be identified by the railroad as approved by FRA. The 
words ``Passenger Brake Alarm'' shall be legibly stenciled or marked on 
each device or on an adjacent badge plate.
    (2) All passenger brake alarms shall be installed so as to prevent 
accidental activation.
    (3) During departure from the boarding platform, activation of the 
passenger brake alarm shall result in an emergency brake application.
    (4) A passenger brake alarm activation that occurs after the 
trainset has safely cleared the boarding platform shall be acknowledged 
by the engineer within the time period specified by the railroad, as 
approved by FRA, for train operation to remain under the full control 
of the engineer. The method used to confirm that the trainset has 
safely cleared the boarding platform shall be defined by the railroad 
as approved by FRA.
    (5) If the engineer does not acknowledge the passenger brake alarm 
as specified in paragraph (d)(4) of this section, at a minimum, a 
retrievable full service brake application shall be automatically 
initiated until the trainset has stopped unless the engineer intervenes 
as described in paragraph (d)(6) of this section.
    (6) To retrieve the full service brake application described in 
paragraph (d)(5) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the 
passenger brake alarm and activate appropriate controls to issue a 
command for brake application as specified by the railroad, as approved 
by FRA.
    (e) Degraded performance of blended brake system. The following 
requirements of this paragraph (e) apply to operation of Tier III 
trainsets with blended braking systems, to address degraded brake 
system performance:
    (1) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic or regenerative brake 
shall not result in exceeding the allowable stopping distance defined 
by the railroad as approved by FRA;
    (2) The available friction braking shall be adequate to stop the 
trainset safely under the operating conditions defined by the railroad, 
as approved by FRA;
    (3) The operational status of the trainset brake system shall be 
displayed for the engineer in the operating cab; and
    (4) The railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and testing the 
maximum speed for safely operating its Tier III trainsets using only 
the friction brake portion of the blended brake with no thermal damage 
to equipment or infrastructure. The analysis and testing shall also be 
used to determine the maximum safe operating speed for various 
percentages of operative friction brakes and shall be included in the 
railroad's ITM program.
    (f) Main reservoir system. (1) The main reservoirs in a Tier III 
trainset

[[Page 59224]]

shall be designed and tested to meet the requirements of a recognized 
standard specified by the railroad as approved by FRA, such as the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Code for Unfired Pressure Vessel Section VIII, Division I (ASME 
Code). The working pressure shall be 150 psig (10.3 bar) and the 
corresponding rated temperature shall be 150 [deg]F (65 [deg]C) unless 
otherwise defined by the railroad as approved by FRA. Reservoirs shall 
be certified based on their size and volume requirements.
    (2) Each welded steel main reservoir shall be drilled in accordance 
with the requirements of a recognized standard specified by the 
railroad as approved by FRA, such as paragraph UG-25(e) of Section VIII 
of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. With the drain opening 
located at the low point of the reservoir, one row of holes shall be 
drilled lengthwise on the reservoir on a line intersecting the drain 
opening and sloped to the drain opening.
    (3) A breach of a welded steel main reservoir at any of the drilled 
holes described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section shall be cause for 
the reservoir to be condemned and withdrawn from service. Any type of 
welded repair to a steel main reservoir is prohibited.
    (g) Aluminum main reservoirs. (1) Aluminum main reservoirs used in 
a Tier III trainset shall conform to the requirements of Sec.  229.51 
of this chapter.
    (2) Any type of welded repair to an aluminum main reservoir is 
prohibited.
    (h) Main reservoir tests. Prior to initial installation, each main 
reservoir shall be subjected to a pneumatic or hydrostatic pressure 
test based on the maximum working pressure defined in paragraph (f) or 
(g) of this section, as appropriate, unless otherwise established by 
the railroad's ITM program. Records of the test date, location, and 
pressure shall be maintained by the railroad for the life of the 
equipment. Periodic inspection requirements for main reservoirs shall 
be defined in the railroad's ITM program.
    (i) Brake gauges. All mechanical gauges and all devices providing 
electronic indication of air pressure that are used by the engineer to 
aid in the control or braking of a Tier III trainset shall be located 
so they may be conveniently read from the engineer's normal position 
during operation of the trainset.
    (j) Brake application/release. (1) Brake actuators shall be 
designed to provide brake pad and shoe clearance when the brakes are 
released.
    (2) The minimum brake cylinder pressure shall be established by the 
railroad, as approved by FRA, to provide adequate adjustment from 
minimum service to full service for proper train operation.
    (k) Foundation brake gear. The railroad shall specify requirements 
in its ITM program for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the 
foundation brake gear.
    (l) Leakage. (1) If a Tier III trainset is equipped with a brake 
pipe, the leakage rates shall not exceed the limits defined in either 
paragraph (l)(2) of this section, or those defined in the Air 
Consumption Analysis included in the railroad ITM program, whichever is 
more restrictive. The method of inspection for main reservoir pipe 
leakage shall be prescribed in the railroad's ITM program.
    (2) Brake pipe leakage may not exceed 5 p.s.i. per minute; and with 
a full service application at maximum brake pipe pressure and with 
communication to the brake cylinders closed, the brakes shall remain 
applied for at least 5 minutes.
    (m) Slide protection and alarm. (1) A Tier III trainset shall be 
equipped with an adhesion control system designed to automatically 
adjust the braking force on each wheel to prevent sliding during 
braking.
    (2) A wheel-slide alarm that is visual or audible, or both, shall 
alert the engineer in the operating cab to wheel-slide conditions on 
any axle of the trainset.
    (3) The railroad shall specify operating restrictions for trainsets 
with slide protection devices for when they fail to prevent wheel slide 
within safety parameters preset by the railroad. Both the operating 
restrictions and safety parameters shall be approved by FRA.
    (n) Monitoring and diagnostics. Each Tier III trainset shall be 
equipped with a monitoring and diagnostic system that is designed to 
automatically assess the functionality of the brake system for the 
entire trainset. Details of the system operation and the method of 
communication of brake system functionality prior to the departure of 
the trainset and while en route shall be described in detail in the 
railroad's ITM program.
    (o) Train securement. Independent of the pneumatic brakes, Tier III 
equipment shall be equipped with a means of securing the equipment 
against unintentional movement when left standing and unmanned in such 
a manner that the brake system of the equipment cannot be readily 
controlled by a qualified person. The railroad shall develop the 
procedures used to secure the equipment and shall also demonstrate that 
those procedures effectively secure the equipment on all grade 
conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
    (p) Rescue operation; brake system. A Tier III trainset's brake 
system shall be designed to allow a rescue vehicle or trainset to 
control its brakes when the trainset is disabled.

Interior Fittings and Surfaces


Sec.  238.733  Interior fixture attachment.

    (a) Tier III trainsets shall comply with the interior fixture 
attachment strength requirements referenced in either of the following 
paragraphs:
    (1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98; or
    (2) Section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and 
features,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) Interior fixture attachment strength is sufficient to resist 
without failure individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g 
lateral, and 3g vertical when applied to the mass of the fixture; and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions 
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
    (b) The standards required in this section are incorporated by 
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the 
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved 
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad 
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 
and is available from the sources indicated below. It is also available 
for inspection at the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, 
call 202-741-6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
    (1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com.
    (i) APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, ``Standard for Attachment Strength 
of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,'' Authorized 
September 28, 2005.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (2) Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, RSSB, 
Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, 
www.rgsonline.co.uk.
    (i) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010.
    (ii) [Reserved]

[[Page 59225]]

Sec.  238.735  Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew).

    (a) Passenger seating in Tier III trainsets shall comply with the 
requirements referenced in either of the following paragraphs:
    (1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 excluding Section 6, 
``Seat durability testing;'' or
    (2) Section 6.2, ``Seats for passengers, personnel, or train 
crew,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) Seat attachment strength is sufficient to resist without 
failure individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 
3g applied to the mass of the seat; and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions 
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
    (b) Each seat provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III 
trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, shall comply with 
Sec.  238.233(e), (f), and (g).
    (c) The standards required in this section are incorporated by 
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the 
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved 
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad 
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 
and are available from the sources indicated below. They are also 
available for inspection at NARA. For information on the availability 
of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
    (1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com.
    (i) APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in 
Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 3, 2010.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (2) Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, RSSB, 
Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, 
www.rgsonline.co.uk.
    (i) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010.
    (ii) [Reserved]


Sec.  238.737  Luggage racks.

    (a) Overhead storage racks shall provide longitudinal and lateral 
restraint for stowed articles. These racks shall incorporate transverse 
dividers at a maximum spacing of 10 ft. (3 m) to restrain the 
longitudinal movement of luggage. To restrain the lateral movement of 
luggage, these racks shall also slope downward in the outboard 
direction at a minimum ratio of 1:8 with respect to a horizontal plane.
    (b) Luggage racks shall comply with the requirements in either of 
the following paragraphs:
    (1) Section 238.233; or
    (2) Section 6.8, ``Luggage stowage,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) Attachment strength is sufficient to resist without failure 
individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g 
vertical; and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions 
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. In particular, the 
railroad shall determine the maximum allowable weight of the luggage 
stowed for purposes of evaluating luggage rack attachment strength.
    (c) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010 is incorporated by 
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the 
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved 
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad 
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 
and is available from Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, 
England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for 
inspection at NARA. For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

Emergency Systems


Sec.  238.741  Emergency window egress and rescue access.

    (a) Emergency window egress and rescue access plan. If a passenger 
car in a Tier III trainset is not designed to comply with the 
requirements in Sec.  238.113 or Sec.  238.114, the railroad shall 
submit to FRA for approval an emergency window egress and rescue access 
plan during the design review stage. The plan must include, but is not 
limited to, the elements in this section.
    (b) Ease of operability. If an emergency window exit in a passenger 
car requires the use of a tool, other implement (e.g., hammer), or a 
mechanism to permit removal of the window panel from the inside of the 
car during an emergency situation, then the plan must demonstrate the 
use of the device provides a level of safety equivalent to that 
required by Sec.  238.113(b). In particular, the plan must address the 
location, design, and signage and instructions for the device. The 
railroad shall also include a provision in its Tier III ITM program to 
inspect for the presence of the device at least each day the car is in 
service.
    (c) Dimensions. If the dimensions of a window opening in a 
passenger car do not comply with the requirements in Sec.  238.113 or 
Sec.  238.114, then the plan must demonstrate that at least an 
equivalent level of safety is provided.
    (d) Alternative emergency evacuation openings. If a passenger car 
employs the use of emergency egress panels or additional door exits 
instead of emergency window exits or rescue access windows, then the 
plan must demonstrate that such alternative emergency evacuation 
openings provide a level of safety at least equivalent to that required 
by Sec.  238.113 or Sec.  238.114, or both as appropriate. The plan 
must address the location, design, and signage and instructions for the 
alternative emergency evacuation openings.


Sec.  238.743  Emergency lighting.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, Tier III 
trainsets shall comply with the emergency lighting requirements 
specified in Sec.  238.115.
    (b) Emergency lighting back-up power systems shall, at a minimum, 
be capable of operating after experiencing the individually applied 
accelerations defined in either of the following paragraphs:
    (1) Section 238.115(a)(4)(ii); or
    (2) Section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and 
features,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) The initial shock of a collision or derailment is based on a 
minimum load of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g vertical; and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions 
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
    (c) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010, is incorporated by 
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the 
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved 
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad 
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 
and is available from Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
Communications,

[[Page 59226]]

RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, 
www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for inspection at NARA. For 
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-
6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

Cab Equipment


Sec.  238.751  Alerters.

    (a) An alerter shall be provided in the operating cab of each Tier 
III trainset, unless in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section 
the trainset operates in a territory where an alternate technology 
providing equivalent safety is installed, such as redundant automatic 
train control or redundant automatic train stop system.
    (b) Upon initiation of the alerter, the engineer must acknowledge 
the alerter within the time period and according to the parameters 
specified by the railroad, as approved by FRA, in order for train 
operations to remain under the full control of the engineer.
    (c) If the engineer does not acknowledge the alerter as specified 
in paragraph (b) of this section, at a minimum a retrievable full 
service brake application shall occur until the train has stopped, 
unless the crew intervenes as described in paragraph (d) of this 
section.
    (d) To retrieve the full service brake application described in 
paragraph (c) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the 
alerter and activate appropriate controls to issue a command for brake 
application as specified by the railroad and approved by FRA.
    (e) If an alternate technology to the alerter is used, the railroad 
shall conduct an analysis that confirms the ability of the technology 
to provide an equivalent level of safety. This analysis shall be 
approved by FRA.


Sec.  238.753  Sanders.

    (a) A Tier III trainset shall be equipped with operative sanders, 
if required by the railroad and as approved by FRA.
    (b) Sanders required under this section shall comply with Sec.  
229.131(a), (b), and (d) of this chapter, except that instead of the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  229.9 and 229.23 of this chapter:
    (1) The requirements of Sec.  238.17 shall apply to the tagging and 
movement of a Tier III trainset with defective sanders; and
    (2) The requirements of the railroad's ITM program shall apply to 
the next periodic inspection of such a trainset.
    (c) In addition to the requirements in paragraph (b) of this 
section, the railroad's ITM program shall specify the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance requirements for Tier III trainsets equipped 
with sanders.

[[Page 59227]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21NO18.128


0
 23. Add and reserve subpart I to part 238 to read as follows:

Subpart I--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment--[Reserved]

0
 24. Appendix A to part 238 is amended by adding, in alphabetical 
order, the entry for new subpart H to read as follows:

       Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties \1\ \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Willful
                 Section                     Violation       violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                              * * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SUBPART H--SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER III PASSENGER EQUIPMENT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
238.703 Quasi-static compression load              2,500           5,000
 requirements...........................
238.705 Dynamic collision scenario......           2,500           5,000
238.707 Override protection.............           2,500           5,000

[[Page 59228]]

 
238.709 Fluid entry inhibition..........           2,500           5,000
238.711 End structure integrity of cab             2,500           5,000
 end....................................
238.713 End structure integrity of non-            2,500           5,000
 cab end................................
238.715 Roof and side structure                    2,500           5,000
 integrity..............................
238.717 Truck-to-car-body attachment....           2,500           5,000
238.721 Glazing.........................           2,500           5,000
238.731 Brake system....................           2,500           5,000
238.733 Interior fixture attachment.....           2,500           5,000
238.735 Seat crashworthiness............           2,500           5,000
238.737 Luggage racks...................           2,500           5,000
238.741 Emergency window egress and                2,500           5,000
 rescue access..........................
238.751 Alerters........................           2,500           5,000
238.753 Sanders.........................           1,000           2,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful
  violation. Generally, when two or more violations of these regulations
  are discovered with respect to a single unit of passenger equipment
  that is placed or continued in service by a railroad, the appropriate
  penalties set forth above are aggregated up to a maximum of $27,904
  per day. However, failure to perform, with respect to a particular
  unit of passenger equipment, any of the inspections and tests required
  under subparts D and F of this part will be treated as a violation
  separate and distinct from, and in addition to, any substantive
  violative conditions found on that unit of passenger equipment.
  Moreover, the Administrator reserves the right to assess a penalty of
  up to the statutory maximum amount for any violation where
  circumstances warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A.
Failure to observe any condition for movement of defective equipment set
  forth in Sec.   238.17 will deprive the railroad of the benefit of the
  movement-for-repair provision and make the railroad and any
  responsible individuals liable for penalty under the particular
  regulatory section(s) concerning the substantive defect(s) present on
  the unit of passenger equipment at the time of movement.
Failure to observe any condition for the movement of passenger equipment
  containing defective safety appliances, other than power brakes, set
  forth in Sec.   238.17(e) will deprive the railroad of the movement-
  for-repair provision and make the railroad and any responsible
  individuals liable for penalty under the particular regulatory
  section(s) contained in part 231 of this chapter or Sec.   238.429
  concerning the substantive defective condition.
The penalties listed for failure to perform the exterior and interior
  mechanical inspections and tests required under Sec.   238.303 and
  Sec.   238.305 may be assessed for each unit of passenger equipment
  contained in a train that is not properly inspected. Whereas, the
  penalties listed for failure to perform the brake inspections and
  tests under Sec.   238.313 through Sec.   238.319 may be assessed for
  each train that is not properly inspected.
\2\ The penalty schedule uses section numbers from 49 CFR part 238. If
  more than one item is listed as a type of violation of a given
  section, each item is also designated by a ``penalty code,'' which is
  used to facilitate assessment of civil penalties, and which may or may
  not correspond to any subsection designation(s). For convenience,
  penalty citations will cite the CFR section and the penalty code, if
  any. FRA reserves the right, should litigation become necessary, to
  substitute in its complaint the CFR citation in place of the combined
  CFR and penalty code citation, should they differ.


0
25. Amend paragraph (c) of Appendix B to part 238 by adding two 
sentences to the end of note 16 of the table of ``Test Procedures and 
Performance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission 
Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive 
Cabs'' to read as follows:

Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the 
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in 
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs

* * * * *
    (c) * * *

    \16\ * * * For purposes of this Note, the floor assembly of a 
vehicle in a Tier III trainset may be tested together with undercar 
design features that separate the vehicle from the fire source, 
i.e., skirts and bottom covers, to protect against a fire source 
under and external to the vehicle. To assess the safety associated 
with testing the floor assembly in this manner, and to protect 
against a fire source under the floor assembly but internal to the 
vehicle, safety must also be demonstrated by conducting a fire 
hazard analysis that includes the considerations in Note 17.
* * * * *

0
 26. Amend the introductory text of appendix F to part 238 by adding a 
third paragraph to read as follows:

Appendix F to Part 238--Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements 
for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

* * * * *
    Although the requirements of this appendix are stated in terms 
applicable to Tier I passenger equipment, they are also applicable 
to Tier III passenger trainsets under Sec.  238.711. Specifically, 
the cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the 
requirements of this appendix to demonstrate the integrity of the 
end structure.
* * * * *

0
27. Add appendix G to part 238 to read as follows:

Appendix G to Part 238--Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the 
Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of Tier I Passenger 
Trainsets

General

    This appendix applies to Tier I alternative passenger trainsets, 
as described below. While the appendix may refer to specific units 
of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in 
this appendix apply only to a trainset as a whole.
    This appendix specifies alternatives to the crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger 
equipment in Sec. Sec.  238.203, Static end strength; 238.205, Anti-
climbing mechanism; 238.207, Link between coupling mechanism and car 
body; 238.209(a), Forward end structure of locomotives, including 
cab cars and MU locomotives; 238.211, Collision posts; 238.213, 
Corner posts; and 238.219, Truck-to-carbody attachment. To maintain 
their integrity, these requirements apply as a whole. They also 
apply in addition to the requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.209(b); 
238.215, Rollover strength; 238.217, Side structure; and 238.233, 
Interior fittings and surfaces; and they apply with APTA standards 
for occupant protection, as specified in this appendix.
    For ease of comparison with the Tier I requirements in subpart C 
of this part, this appendix is arranged in order by the Tier I 
section referenced.
    Use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative crashworthiness 
and occupant protection performance for Tier I passenger equipment 
is subject to FRA review and approval under Sec.  238.201.

Occupied Volume Integrity

    (a) Instead of the requirements of Sec.  238.203, the units of a 
Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their occupied 
volume integrity by complying with both the quasi-static compression 
load and dynamic collision requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.703(b) and 
238.705, respectively.

Override Protection

    (b) Colliding equipment. Instead of the requirements of Sec.  
238.205, the units of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may

[[Page 59229]]

demonstrate their ability to resist vertical climbing and override 
at each colliding interface during a train-to-train collision by 
complying with the dynamic collision requirements in Sec.  
238.707(a).
    (c) Connected equipment. Instead of the requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  238.205 and 238.207, when connected, the units of a Tier 
I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their ability to 
resist vertical climbing and override by complying with the dynamic 
collision requirements in Sec.  238.707(b).

Fluid Entry Inhibition

    (d) Instead of the requirements of Sec.  238.209(a), each cab 
end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate its 
ability to inhibit fluid entry and provide other penetration 
resistance by complying with the requirements in Sec.  238.709.

End Structure Integrity of Cab End

    (e) Each cab end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset is 
subject to the requirements of appendix F to this part to 
demonstrate cab end structure integrity. For those cab ends without 
identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix 
F to this part apply to the end structure at the specified 
locations, regardless of whether the structure at the specified 
locations is a post.

End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End

    (f) Instead of the applicable requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.211 
and 238.213, the units of a Tier I alternative trainset may 
demonstrate end structure integrity for other than a cab end by 
complying with the requirements in Sec.  238.713(b) and (c).

Roof and Side Structure Integrity

    (g) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.215 and 238.217 to demonstrate roof 
and side structure integrity.

Truck Attachment

    (h) Instead of the requirements of Sec.  238.219, the units of a 
Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their truck-
to-carbody attachment integrity by complying with the requirements 
in Sec.  238.717 (b) through (e).

Interior Fixture Attachment

    (i)(1) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the 
interior fixture requirements in Sec.  238.233. Interior fixtures 
must also comply with APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, ``Standard for 
Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad 
Equipment,'' Authorized September 28, 2005, and those portions of 
APTA PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for the Design and 
Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June 
11, 2006, relating to interior fixtures.
    (2) The standards required in this paragraph (i) are 
incorporated by reference into this paragraph with the approval of 
the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 
part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at 
Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE, Washington, DC and available from the American Public 
Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, 
www.aptastandards.com. It is also available for inspection at the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information 
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or 
go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
    (i) APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, ``Standard for Attachment 
Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,'' 
Authorized September 28, 2005.
    (ii) APTA PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for the Design and 
Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June 
11, 2006.

Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Crew)

    (j) Passenger seating. (1) Passenger seating in a Tier I 
alternative passenger trainset is subject to the requirements for 
seats in Sec.  238.233 and must also comply with APTA PR-CS-S-016-
99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,'' 
Authorized October 3, 2010, with the exception of Section 6, ``Seat 
durability testing.''
    (2) APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats 
in Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 3, 2010, is 
incorporated by reference into this paragraph (j) with the approval 
of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 
CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at 
Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE, Washington, DC and is available from the American Public 
Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, 
www.aptastandards.com. It is also available for inspection at the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information 
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or 
go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
    (k) Crew seating. Each seat provided for an employee regularly 
assigned to occupy the cab of a Tier I alternative passenger 
trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, must comply with 
Sec.  238.233(e), (f), and (g).

0
28. Add appendix H to part 238 to read as follows:

Appendix H to Part 238--Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input 
Data and Geometrical Depiction

    (a) As specified in Sec.  238.705(a)(4), this appendix provides 
input data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a 
computer model of the rigid locomotive design for use in evaluating 
the occupied volume integrity of a Tier III trainset in a dynamic 
collision scenario. (This appendix may also be applied to a Tier I 
alternative passenger trainset to evaluate its occupied volume 
integrity, in accordance with appendix G to this part).
    (b) The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the 
geometry for approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive 
design. Because this input file is for a half-symmetric model, a 
locomotive mass corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is 
provided for modeling purposes--half the 260,000 pounds of weight 
specified for the locomotive in Sec.  238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to 
this appendix provides two views of the locomotive's geometric 
depiction. The input data is contained in Appendix C to FRA's 
Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.

[[Page 59230]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21NO18.129


    Issued in Washington, DC.
Ronald L. Batory,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-25020 Filed 11-20-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


