[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 42 (Friday, March 3, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13494-13497]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04415]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Safety Advisory 2023-01; Evaluation of Policies and Procedures 
Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Preliminary investigation of recent train derailments 
indicates the cause of, or contributing factor to, the incidents was a 
mechanical failure, specifically burnt journal bearings. Accordingly, 
FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory to make recommendations to enhance 
the mechanical reliability of rolling stock and the safety of railroad 
operations. This Safety Advisory recommends that railroads: evaluate 
the thresholds for inspections based on hot bearing detector (HBD) 
data; consider the use of real-time trend analyses of HBD data as a 
criterion for inspection; ensure the proper training and qualification 
of personnel responsible for the calibration, inspection, and 
maintenance of HBDs; ensure proper inspection of rolling stock with HBD 
alerts; and improve the safety culture of their organization, 
particularly as it pertains to operational decisions based on HBD data.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Alexy, Associate Administrator 
for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Office of Railroad 
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, (202)-
493-6282.
    Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to 
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws, 
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety 
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to 
bind the public in any way. This document does not revise or replace 
any previously issued guidance.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Federal rail safety and hazardous materials transportation 
regulations (HMR) set minimum safety standards for the rail 
transportation of hazardous materials.\1\ Among other things, those 
regulations include packaging, hazard communication, and operational 
requirements applicable to the rail transportation of all materials 
designated as hazardous materials. The HMR additionally include 
provisions specifically applicable to trains transporting large 
quantities of certain hazardous materials known as ``high-hazard 
flammable trains'' (HHFTs) and ``high-hazard flammable unit trains'' 
(HHFUTs).\2\ These additional regulations applicable to HHFTs and 
HHFUTs include certain safety and security planning requirements, 
operational restrictions, and requirements related to ensuring State 
and local governments are notified of the types and quantities of 
hazardous materials transported through their jurisdictions.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 49 CFR parts 200 through 299 and 49 CFR parts 171 through 
185.
    \2\ An HHFT is ``a single train transporting 20 or more loaded 
tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a 
single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 
flammable liquid throughout the train consist.'' An HHFUT is ``a 
single train transporting 70 or more loaded tank cars containing 
Class 3 flammable liquid.'' 49 CFR 171.8.
    \3\ See 49 CFR part 172, subpart I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although compliance with all applicable Federal regulations is a 
critical part of ensuring the safety of rail transportation of 
hazardous materials, the use of certain technologies (e.g., wayside 
detectors), as FRA has previously acknowledged, has enabled railroads 
to develop new methods and processes for identifying defects in rail 
equipment and infrastructure as compared to those methods contemplated 
under applicable Federal regulations. For example, railroads have 
installed wayside detectors to assess the health of rail equipment and 
infrastructure to enable the early identification of mechanical or 
other defects.
    Recognizing the value of wayside detection systems, if they are 
appropriately installed, maintained, and utilized, in 2015, FRA issued 
Safety Advisory 2015-01 addressing the use of wheel impact load 
detectors (WILDs) as

[[Page 13495]]

applied to HHFTs.\4\ WILDs are designed to identify wheels on a railcar 
that may have flat spots or other defects. Specifically, FRA 
recommended that railroads continue to install and maintain WILDs along 
HHFT routes and that railroads lower the impact thresholds of the 
detectors that determine when corrective actions are to be taken. FRA 
also recommended that railroads use highly qualified individuals to 
conduct brake and mechanical inspections on those trains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/mechanical-inspections-and-wheel-impact-load-detector-standards-trains-transporting-large.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In Safety Advisory 2015-01, FRA referenced the July 6, 2013, 
catastrophic rail accident in Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada, and 
its tragic consequences. The Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident made clear 
the risk of transporting large amounts of hazardous materials, 
including large amounts of flammable liquids. FRA also referenced the 
March 5, 2015, derailment of a BNSF Railway Co. train that resulted in 
a release of petroleum crude oil, as well as a series of other 
derailments involving crude oil and ethanol, both designated as Class 3 
flammable liquid hazardous materials under the HMR.
    Each of the accidents referenced in Safety Advisory 2015-01 
demonstrates the potential consequences of train derailments involving 
hazardous materials, even if a train does not meet the definition of a 
HHFT or HHFUT.
    Since 2021, at least five derailments occurred that were suspected 
of being caused by burnt journal bearings.\5\ Three of those five 
derailments, all occurring on the Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) are 
discussed below. Two other derailments, reported to FRA by the Kansas 
City Southern Railway (KCS), occurred on August 2, 2021, and December 
3, 2021, and in both cases, wayside detectors, known as HBDs,\6\ 
flagged a suspect bearing, but the crews were either unable to act in 
time to prevent a derailment or were directed to continue the train 
move resulting in a derailment. These investigate into each of these 
accidents is ongoing, but they demonstrate not only the potential 
catastrophic consequences of a train derailment involving hazardous 
materials, but also the importance of implementing appropriate 
standards, processes, and procedures governing the use of HBDs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ The four derailments include two derailments reported to FRA 
by the Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS) in 2021 and the Warner 
Robins, Georgia, and Sandusky, Ohio, accidents discussed below. The 
2021 KCS derailments occurred on August 2, 2021, and December 3, 
2021, respectively, and in both cases, an HBD flagged a suspect 
bearing, but the crews were either unable to act in time to prevent 
a derailment or were directed to continue the train move resulting 
in a derailment.
    \6\ HBDs are devices used to assess the health of railcar 
bearings by monitoring their temperatures. The system consists of 
the following: wheel sensors to detect an approaching train and to 
turn on the scanning equipment; an axle counter; thermal sensors for 
reading axle bearing temperatures (i.e., one sensor on each side of 
the train); and thermal sensors for reading bearing temperatures on 
each side of the train. HBD systems detect and record infrared 
energy (heat) from each roller bearing. The heat signal from each 
roller bearing is stored digitally and measured against pre-
established thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Warner Robins, GA--July 12, 2022

    On July 10, 2022, at 6 a.m. EDT, Train 175, consisting of 2 
locomotives and 123 cars, departed Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Macon, 
Georgia. During the trip, a series of warnings from HBDs of an 
overheated journal bearing on one car in the consist (car PPTX 3293) 
were logged into NS's wayside desk system. The dispatcher transmitted 
the third alert to the crew. The crew stopped the train and inspected 
the journal bearing of concern, reporting that the car behind PPTX 3293 
had been sprayed with lubricating grease, which is an indication that 
the journal bearing in question was leaking and defective. The crew was 
instructed to continue the train movement and to ``keep an eye [on] the 
axle over the next couple of detectors.'' The train arrived at Macon, 
Georgia, traveling about 75 track miles and passing additional 
detectors that did not record any alerts. In Macon, Train 175 was 
terminated and a block of cars including PPTX 3293 was added to a 
different train, Train 151. PPTX 3293 was not inspected by mechanical 
personnel or set out for repair before it was added to Train 151. In 
addition, during the same time, the NS system sent an email to all area 
dispatchers informing them of a condemnable bearing on PPTX 3293 with a 
conflicting message that if the journal bearing is deemed to be safe 
for continued movement it is required to be repaired at the next switch 
event. A similar message was also sent to mechanical personnel.
    Subsequently, Train 151, consisting of 3 locomotives and 139 cars, 
departed Macon, Georgia, on July 12, 2022. At 5:11 p.m., after 
traveling approximately 15 track miles, Train 151 passed the first HBD 
in Warner Robins, GA. The HBD reported a bearing temperature on PPTX 
3293 to be 263 [deg]F above the ambient temperature. After a few 
minutes, the HBD emitted a warning ``talker message'' \7\ to the crew 
of Train 151. The crew acknowledged that they received the message but 
claimed they did not have time to react. At 5:13 p.m., the lead 
locomotive of Train 151 reached a grade crossing at MP 15.98G in Warner 
Robins. A dash camera from a police car at the crossing captured the 
train as it approached the crossing, showing PPTX 3293 being dragged 
over the crossing with one of the trucks on the ground. Train 151 then 
derailed seconds after PPTX 3293 cleared the crossing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ A prerecorded auditory alert that is meant to inform train 
crews of imminent hazards pertaining to equipment in their train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sandusky, OH--October 8, 2022

    On October 8, 2022, at approximately 4:20 p.m. EDT, NS Train 310-
08, consisting of 3 headend locomotives with 98 freight cars and 3 
locomotives in tow (dead-in-tow), derailed 1 of the dead-in-tow 
locomotives and 20 freight cars. The train was traveling east from 
Elkhart, Indiana to Cleveland, Ohio when the train derailed near MP 
240.
    Prior to the derailment location, the train crew did not receive 
any HBD alarms for an overheated journal bearing, but instead the crew 
was contacted by the dispatcher to ensure they were aware of the 
suspect bearing in their train. Upon notification from the dispatcher, 
the crew stopped the train and noticed smoke coming from the journal 
bearing. The crew requested permission to set out the subject car 
multiple times and requested support from mechanical inspectors. After 
two hours, while the train remained stopped on the mainline, NS sent an 
electrician to investigate the crew's report. The electrician reported 
the smoke had stopped and the bearing had cooled. The crew was then 
directed to move the train. After the train travelled another 7 miles, 
it derailed due to a burnt journal bearing. One axle on a ``dead-in-
tow'' locomotive failed catastrophically, causing the derailment. 
Initial reports state one tank car placarded UN 3257 ``HOT'' was 
punctured and leaked molten paraffin wax into the surroundings. This 
derailment caused power outages to approximately 1,200 residents.

East Palestine, OH--February 3, 2023

    Most recently, on February 3, 2023, a NS general merchandise train 
(i.e., a train not meeting the definition of an HHFT or HHFUT) derailed 
in East Palestine, Ohio. The derailment resulted in a release of 
hazardous materials, which subsequently fueled extensive fires, 
damaging additional rail cars, and resulting in an evacuation that 
affected up to approximately 2,000 residents. Although the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is the lead agency for the 
investigation into this accident and has not yet reached final 
conclusions as to probable cause,

[[Page 13496]]

preliminary information \8\ indicates that a burnt journal bearing \9\ 
may have played a role in the derailment. Preliminary information also 
indicates that the train that derailed in East Palestine (Train 32N) 
passed at least three wayside detectors before derailing. That 
information indicates that, over the course of approximately 30 miles, 
the HBDs recorded an increase of over 200 degrees in the temperature of 
a car's journal bearing.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/RRD23MR005.aspx.
    \9\ A journal bearing is the mechanical subassembly on each end 
of the axles of a wheel set of railroad rolling stock. The journal 
bearing transfers the weight of freight car, coach or locomotive to 
the wheels and rails while allowing the axle to spin; the bearing 
design is typically roller bearings on newer rolling stock.
    \10\ NTSB Preliminary Report, Norfolk Southern Railway Train 
Derailment with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires, 
East Palestine, Ohio, February 3, 2023 (issued Feb. 23, 2023, and 
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On February 3, 2023, at about 8:54 p.m. EST, eastbound NS Train 32N 
(comprised of 2 headend locomotives, 149 freight cars, and 1 
distributed power locomotive between the 109th and 110th freight cars 
in the consist) derailed 38 railcars in East Palestine, Ohio. The 
derailed equipment included 11 tank cars carrying hazardous materials 
that subsequently ignited, fueling fires that damaged additional 
railcars and resulted in the evacuation of up to 2,000 residents. There 
were no reported fatalities or injuries. Preliminary information 
indicates that the cause of the derailment may have been a burnt 
journal bearing, as noted above.
    As further noted above, prior to derailing, Train 32N passed HBDs. 
First, at milepost (MP) 79.9 in Sebring, Ohio, an HBD recorded a 
temperature of 38 [deg]F above ambient temperature for one bearing on 
the 23rd car in the consist. Approximately ten miles later, Train 32N 
passed a second HBD (at MP 69.01 in Salem, Ohio), which recorded a 
temperature of 103 [deg]F above ambient for the same bearing on the 
23rd car. Finally, approximately twenty miles later (at MP 49.81 in 
East Palestine), the train passed a third HBD, which recorded the 
suspect bearing's temperature at 253 [deg]F above ambient.
    NS has established the following HBD temperature thresholds (above 
ambient) and procedures:
     Between 170 [deg]F and 200 [deg]F, warm bearing (non-
critical); stop and inspect.
     A difference between bearings on the same axle greater 
than or equal to 115 [deg]F (non-critical); stop and inspect.
     Greater than 200 [deg]F (critical); set out railcar.
    At milepost 49.81, as Train 32N passed the third HBD, which 
measured the suspect bearing's temperature as 253 [deg]F above ambient, 
the HBD transmitted a critical audible alarm message instructing the 
crew to slow and stop the train to inspect a hot axle. The train 
engineer attempted to slow and stop the train. During this 
deceleration, an automatic emergency brake application initiated, and 
Train 32N came to a stop. After the train stopped, the crew observed 
fire and smoke and notified authorities.
Journal Bearings and Detecting Journal Bearing Defects
    Journal bearings are critical components of freight cars that serve 
to transfer the weight of the car and its cargo to the axle while 
allowing the axle, and its wheels to rotate. If a journal bearing is 
defective (or becomes defective while in use), the temperature of the 
bearing may increase and become overheated, to the point where the 
bearing ceases to effectively perform its function. In some cases, 
journal bearings with relatively large defects can run at normal 
operating temperatures for tens of thousands of miles before any 
abnormality in their operating temperature is observed. In other cases, 
a bearing's raceway (i.e., the path or groove that the bearing moves 
along) may deteriorate rapidly and cause excessive roller misalignment. 
The misaligned rollers generate frictional heating, which can weaken an 
axle in just a few minutes and may lead to a catastrophic derailment 
depending on the traveling speed of the train and the weight of the 
load the car with the defective bearing is carrying.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Defect detection in freight railcar tapered-roller bearings 
using vibration techniques [bond] SpringerLink.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Detecting overheated journal bearings before they fail is critical 
to accident prevention. Journal bearings are sealed components, and, as 
such, often do not display ``tell-tale signs'' of overheating (e.g., 
leaking lubrication), making defects in journal bearings difficult to 
identify through visual inspections. HBDs can serve an important role 
in early detection of bearing defects, but the effectiveness of any HBD 
system depends on numerous factors, including: (1) the establishment 
and adherence to adequate maintenance standards and procedures; (2) the 
establishment of safe thresholds at which to act on HBD alerts; and (3) 
strict adherence to procedures that prescribe actions to be taken.
    Although there are no Federal regulations requiring the use of HBDs 
for freight trains, or any regulations related to the inspection, 
calibration, and maintenance of this equipment, there are existing 
industry standards and manufacturer recommendations that railroads 
should incorporate into existing inspection and maintenance practices. 
Because defects in journal bearings are difficult to identify visually, 
personnel charged with inspecting equipment subject to an HBD alert 
should be properly trained and qualified. FRA encourages using 
personnel trained and experienced in identifying critically hot 
bearings, and with the demonstrated ability to properly evaluate the 
condition of a suspect bearing. Further, FRA encourages railroads to 
ensure these individuals are available at all hours of operations 
across a railroad's network.
    Data is critical to identifying effective HBD temperature 
thresholds for action (e.g., appropriate thresholds for a stop-and-
inspect requirement, or a mandatory remove-from-service requirement). 
Additionally, as the East Palestine accident demonstrates, thresholds 
for temperatures measured by HBDs requiring action should be 
established for both single measurement and multiple measurements in a 
temperature trend analysis.
    The procedures governing the use of HBD systems should be 
sufficient to ensure all employees understand the meaning of any HBD 
alert and are empowered to take appropriate action in response to those 
alerts. The response procedures governing any HBD system should be 
commensurate with the risk (specifically consequences) of a derailment. 
For trains containing hazardous materials, the potential consequence of 
a derailment is catastrophic, and allowing a train transporting a 
hazardous material to continue to operate, without restriction, after 
an HBD alert is likely not appropriate.
    FRA recommends that railroads consider expanding application of 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) Circular OT-55 (Recommended 
Railroad Operating Practices for the Transportation of Hazardous 
Materials).\12\ According to Circular OT-55, if a defect in a ``Key 
Train'' \13\

[[Page 13497]]

bearing is reported by a wayside detector, but a visual inspection 
fails to confirm evidence of the defect, OT-55 prohibits the train from 
exceeding 30 MPH until it has passed over the next wayside detector or 
it is delivered to a terminal for a mechanical inspection. If the same 
car again sets off the next detector or is found to be defective, it 
must be set out from the train. This also provides the railroads the 
opportunity to define a defect based on new/lower thresholds for HBD 
alerts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ AAR Circular No. OT-55 (CPC-1348) (available at https://public.railinc.com/documents/ot-55pdf).
    \13\ AAR Circular OT-55 defines a ``Key Train'' as a train with:
    (1) one tank car load of a Poison Inhalation Hazard, anhydrous 
ammonia, or ammonia solutions; or
    (2) 20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of any 
combination of hazardous material; or
    (3) One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel or High Level 
Radioactive Waste.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, FRA encourages the industry to continue to utilize 
wayside detection technologies such as HBDs, but notes that to realize 
the benefits of these technologies, railroads should identify 
appropriate HBD impact thresholds for action, and implement and adhere 
to appropriate procedures for action in the event of an HBD alert, 
particularly on trains transporting hazardous materials.

Recommended Railroad Actions

    In light of the above discussion, FRA recommends that railroads 
take the following actions:
    1. Review existing HBD system inspection and maintenance policies 
and procedures for compliance with existing industry standards and 
manufacturer recommendations for HBDs.
    2. Review existing procedures to train and qualify personnel 
responsible for installing, inspecting, and maintaining HBDs to ensure 
they have the appropriate knowledge and skills. Railroads should also 
develop and implement appropriate training on the inspection and 
maintenance requirements for HBDs and provide that training at 
appropriate intervals to ensure the required knowledge and skill of 
inspection and maintenance personnel. Further, railroads should 
evaluate their training content and training frequency to ensure any 
employee who may be called upon to evaluate a suspect bearing has the 
necessary training, experience, and qualifications. FRA also encourages 
railroads to ensure these individuals are available at all hours of 
operations across a railroad's network.
    3. Review current HBD detector thresholds in light of recent 
derailments, and all other relevant available data (including data from 
any close calls or near misses), to determine the adequacy of the 
railroad's current thresholds. Thresholds should be established for 
single measurement as well as multiple measurements of individual 
bearings to enable temperature trend analysis.
    4. Review current procedures governing actions responding to HBD 
alerts to ensure required actions are commensurate with the risk of the 
operation involved. With regard to trains transporting any quantity of 
hazardous materials, FRA recommends railroads adopt the procedures 
outlined in AAR's OT-55 for key trains as an initial measure.

Conclusion

    In general, the issues identified in this Safety Advisory are 
indicators of a railroad's safety culture. Implementing procedures that 
ensure safety, and training personnel so those procedures become second 
nature, is vital. Equally important is the commitment, throughout the 
organization, to safety and empowerment of personnel to live up to that 
commitment. Specifically, personnel should be encouraged and empowered 
to develop procedures that may temporarily impact operations, but 
maximize safety, just as those executing the procedures should be 
empowered to strictly adhere to those procedures, even if it delays a 
train. The railroads should evaluate their safety culture not only as 
it relates to the issues indicated in this Safety Advisory, but to all 
aspects of their operations.
    FRA encourages railroads to take actions consistent with the 
preceding recommendations, and any other complementary actions, to 
ensure the safety of rail transportation. FRA may modify this Safety 
Advisory, issue additional safety advisories, or take other actions 
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's 
railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under its 
authority.

    Issued in Washington, DC.
Amitabha Bose,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-04415 Filed 3-2-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


