
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 113 (Friday, June 12, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33585-33587]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-14394]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Safety Advisory 2015-03]


Operational and Signal Modifications for Compliance With Maximum 
Authorized Passenger Train Speeds and Other Speed Restrictions

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2015-03 to stress to passenger 
railroads and railroads that host passenger service and their employees 
the importance of compliance with Federal regulations and applicable 
railroad rules governing applicable passenger train speed limits. This 
safety advisory makes recommendations to these railroads to ensure that 
compliance with applicable passenger train speed limits is addressed by 
appropriate railroad operating policies and procedures and signal 
systems.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron Hynes, Director, Office of Safety 
Assurance and Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New 
Jersey

[[Page 33586]]

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6404.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The overall safety of railroad operations 
has improved in recent years. However, two fatal passenger train 
accidents in the last 18 months in which serious overspeed events 
occurred highlight the need to ensure train speed limit compliance, as 
mandated by existing Federal railroad safety regulations and railroad 
operating rules.

Amtrak Derailment

    On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, Amtrak passenger train 188 (Train 188) 
was traveling timetable east (northbound) from Washington, DC, to New 
York City. Aboard the train were five Amtrak crew members, three Amtrak 
employees, and 250 passengers. Train 188 consisted of a locomotive in 
the lead and seven passenger cars trailing. Shortly after 9:20 p.m., 
the train derailed while traveling through a curve at Frankford 
Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As a result of the accident, 
eight persons were killed, and a significant number of persons were 
seriously injured.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken the lead 
role conducting the investigation of this accident under its legal 
authority. 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b). As is customary, 
FRA is participating in the NTSB's investigation and also investigating 
the accident under its own authority. While NTSB has not yet issued any 
formal findings, the information released to date indicates that train 
speed was a factor in the derailment. As Train 188 approached the curve 
from the west, it traveled over a straightaway with a maximum 
authorized passenger train speed of 80 mph. The maximum authorized 
passenger train speed for the curve was 50 mph. NTSB determined that 
the train was traveling approximately 106 mph within the curve's 50-mph 
speed restriction, exceeding the maximum authorized speed on the 
straightaway by 26 mph, and 56 mph over railroad's maximum authorized 
speed for the curve.\1\
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    \1\ FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is unlawful to 
``[o]perate a train or locomotive at a speed which exceeds the 
maximum authorized limit by at least 10 miles per hour.'' 49 CFR 
240.305(a)(2).
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    In response to the derailment, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 31 
(EO 31; 80 FR 30534, May 28, 2015). EO 31 requires Amtrak to take the 
following actions to ensure the safe operation of passenger trains on 
the Northeast Corridor: \2\
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    \2\ EO 31's requirements will not apply where Amtrak's Positive 
Train Control System (Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System 
(ACSES)) is already in use on the Northeast Corridor. Among other 
features, ACSES enforces civil speed restrictions that are in place 
at locations such as curves and bridges.
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     Immediately implement code changes to Amtrak's Automatic 
Train Control (ATC) System to enforce the passenger train speed limit 
ahead of the curve at Frankford Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
where the fatal derailment occurred.
     Survey its Northeast Corridor system and identify each 
main track curve where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from 
the maximum authorized approach speed to that curve for passenger 
trains, and provide a list of each curve location to FRA within 5 days 
after EO 31 was issued.
     Submit an action plan for FRA approval within 20 days 
identifying modifications to its ATC System (or other signal systems) 
that Amtrak will make to enable warning and enforcement of applicable 
passenger train speeds at the identified curves. If such modifications 
would interfere with the timely implementation of a Positive Train 
Control (PTC) system or are not otherwise feasible, Amtrak's plan must 
describe alternative procedures that it will adopt at the identified 
curves to ensure compliance with applicable passenger train speed 
limits. Amtrak's plan must contain milestones and target dates for 
completion of action plan items.
     Within 30 days of issuance of the Order, Amtrak must begin 
to install additional wayside signage alerting engineers and conductors 
of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout its 
Northeast Corridor system, with particular emphasis on additional 
signage at the curve locations where significant speed reductions 
occur. Amtrak must identify the locations where it intends to install 
the additional wayside speed limit signs in its action plan, and must 
notify FRA when installation of the signs is completed.

Metro-North Derailment

    In addition to the recent Amtrak passenger train derailment 
discussed above, in December 2013 a New York State Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-
North) train derailed as it approached the Spuyten Duyvil Station in 
Bronx, New York. The train traveled over a straightaway with a maximum 
authorized passenger train speed of 70 mph before reaching a sharp 
curve in the track with a maximum authorized speed of 30 mph. NTSB's 
investigation of the Metro-North accident determined the train was 
traveling approximately 82 mph as it entered the curve's 30-mph speed 
restriction before derailing. That derailment resulted in four 
fatalities and at least 61 persons being injured. The Metro-North 
accident is similar to the recent Amtrak accident in that it involved a 
serious overspeed event in a sharp curve in the track. As a result of 
the derailment, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 29 (78 FR 75442, Dec. 
11, 2013) requiring Metro-North to take certain actions to control 
passenger train speeds. FRA also issued Safety Advisory 2013-08, which 
recommended that all railroads in the United States:
    (1) Review the circumstances of the December 1, 2013, Spuyten 
Duyvil derailment with each of their operating employees.
    (2) Provide instruction to their employees during training classes 
and safety briefings on the importance of compliance with maximum 
authorized train speed limits and other speed restrictions. This 
training should include discussion of the railroad's absolute speed 
limits, speed restrictions based on physical characteristics, temporary 
speed restrictions, and any other restrictions commonly encountered.
    (3) Remind their employees that Federal railroad safety regulation, 
at 49 CFR 240.305(a)(2) and 242.403(e)(2), prohibits the operation of a 
locomotive or train at a speed which exceeds the maximum authorized 
speed by at least 10 mph.
    (4) Evaluate quarterly and 6-month reviews of operational testing 
data as required by 49 CFR 217.9. A railroad should consider increasing 
the frequency of operational testing where its reviews show any non-
compliance with maximum authorized train speeds. A significant number 
of operational tests should be conducted on trains that are required to 
reduce speed by more than 20 mph from the maximum authorized train 
speed. Operational tests should use the reliable methods available, 
such as reviewing locomotive event recorder data and testing by radar 
to verify compliance with maximum authorized speeds.
    (5) Reinforce the importance of communication between train 
crewmembers located in the controlling locomotive, particularly during 
safety critical periods when multiple tasks are occurring (e.g., 
copying mandatory directives, closely approaching or passing fixed 
signals and/or cab signals at a reduced speed, approaching locations 
where the train's movement authority is being restricted, during radio 
conversations with other

[[Page 33587]]

employees or job briefings about track characteristics) and during 
extended periods of inactivity.

Overspeed Prevention

    FRA recognizes that passenger rail transportation is generally 
extremely safe. However, these two recent accidents, which both 
involved overspeed events and resulted in numerous passenger 
fatalities, highlight the need to remain vigilant in ensuring employee 
compliance with operational speed limits and restrictions for passenger 
trains. As required by 49 U.S.C. 20157, railroads operating scheduled 
intercity and commuter passenger service in this country are required 
to implement PTC Systems by December 31, 2015. By statute a PTC system 
must be designed to prevent the type of overspeed events that occurred 
in the derailments discussed above, as well as train-to-train 
collisions, incursions into roadway work zone limits, and the movement 
of a train over a switch left in the wrong position. Amtrak has 
indicated that it intends to meet the statutory deadline to install PTC 
on the Northeast Corridor. FRA understands that other passenger 
railroads in this country have concerns about their ability to meet the 
December 31, 2015 deadline to install PTC. FRA intends to enforce the 
December 31, 2015 deadline to ensure that PTC is in use as quickly, 
safely, and efficiently as possible.
    Until PTC is in use across the passenger railroad systems in this 
country, and due to the significant safety concerns presented by the 
two accidents described above, FRA believes all passenger railroads and 
railroads that host passenger service need to evaluate their systems 
and take immediate actions to prevent future catastrophic overspeed 
events from occurring.
    Some railroads have ATC or cab signal systems \3\ that may be 
modified to prevent overspeed events at critical locations such as 
curves, bridges, and stations, similar to what FRA required of Amtrak 
at the May 12, 2015 derailment location in EO 31. Where such signal 
system modifications are appropriate and would not interfere with the 
timely implementation of PTC,\4\ FRA recommends that railroads make 
such modifications after identifying critical main track locations. 
Where such modifications to the signal system to slow trains at 
critical locations are not viable or would interfere with PTC 
implementation (or on railroads where no cab signal or ATC system is 
installed or operative), FRA encourages railroads to take other 
operational actions to prevent overspeed events, such as requiring 
additional qualified employees to occupy the controlling locomotive of 
a train to identify and communicate the applicable passenger train 
speed limits and restrictions, or by requiring additional crew 
communications regarding applicable passenger train speed limits and 
restrictions.
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    \3\ FRA regulations require that ``[p]rior to December 31, 2015, 
where any train is permitted to operate at a speed of 80 or more 
miles per hour, an automatic cab signal, automatic train stop, or 
automatic train control system complying with the provisions of this 
part [part 236] shall be installed, unless an FRA approved PTC 
system meeting the requirements of this part [part 236] for the 
subject speed and other operating conditions, is installed.'' 49 CFR 
236.0(d)(1).
    \4\ FRA recommends that railroads consult with FRA if they 
believe a modification would interfere with PTC implementation.
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    FRA will continue to focus on ensuring passenger railroad 
compliance with maximum authorized train speeds and relevant temporary 
and permanent speed restrictions in the coming months, including 
stepped up enforcement actions. These actions will include, but will 
not be limited to, on-board inspections, radar speed monitoring at 
locations of significant permanent or temporary speed restrictions, 
monitoring of railroad officers who conduct operational tests, and 
comprehensive reviews of a railroad's implementation of their 
operational tests and inspection program.
    FRA strongly encourages railroads and other industry members to re-
emphasize the importance of compliance with maximum authorized train 
speeds and any applicable speed restrictions, and to conduct 
operational testing at a level that will ensure compliance with all 
posted speed restrictions.
    Recommended Railroad Action: In light of the accidents discussed 
above, and in an effort to ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, 
their employees, and the general public, FRA recommends that passenger 
railroads and railroads that host passenger service \5\ do each of the 
following:
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    \5\ This Safety Advisory only applies to the portions of the 
railroad's system over which passenger service is operated.
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    (1) Review and implement the recommendations made in FRA Safety 
Advisory 2013-08, which are discussed above.
    (2) Review the circumstances of the fatal May 12, 2015, 
Philadelphia derailment with their operating employees.
    (3) Survey their entire systems, or the portions on which passenger 
service is operated, and identify main track locations where there is a 
reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or 
bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains 
at that curve or bridge (identified locations).
    (4) If the railroad utilizes an ATC, cab signal, or other signal 
system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable 
passenger train speed limits, make modifications to those systems where 
appropriate to ensure compliance with applicable speed limits at the 
identified locations. If the railroad is required to implement PTC at 
the identified locations, implement these recommended signal system 
changes in the interim.
    (5) If the railroad does not utilize an ATC, cab signal, or other 
signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of 
applicable passenger train speed limits (or if a signal system 
modification would interfere with the implementation of PTC or is 
otherwise not viable) all passenger train movements at the identified 
locations be made with a second qualified crew member in the cab of the 
controlling locomotive, or with constant communication between the 
locomotive engineer and an additional qualified and designated 
crewmember in the body of the train. If the railroad is required to 
implement PTC at the identified locations, implement these recommended 
changes in the interim.
    (6) Install additional wayside signage alerting engineers and 
conductors of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout 
the passenger railroad's system or the portions of its system in which 
passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional 
signage at the identified locations.
    FRA encourages all railroad industry members to take actions 
consistent with the preceding recommendations. FRA may modify this 
Safety Advisory 2015-03, issue additional safety advisories, or take 
other appropriate action necessary to ensure the highest level of 
safety on the Nation's railroads, including pursing other corrective 
measures under its rail safety authority.

    Issued in Washington, DC on June 9, 2015.
Sarah Feinberg
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015-14394 Filed 6-11-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


