
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 102 (Thursday, May 28, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30534-30536]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-12774]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Emergency Order No. 31, Notice No. 1]


Emergency Order Under 49 U.S.C. 20104 Establishing Requirements 
for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation To Control Passenger 
Train Speeds at Certain Locations Along the Northeast Corridor

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this emergency order (EO or Order) to require 
that the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) take actions 
to control passenger train speed at certain locations on main line 
track in the Northeast Corridor (as described by 49 U.S.C. 
24905(c)(1)(A)). Amtrak must immediately implement code changes to its 
Automatic Train Control (ATC) System to enforce the passenger train 
speed limit ahead of the curve at Frankford Junction in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, where a fatal accident occurred on May 12, 2015. Amtrak 
must also identify each main track curve on the Northeast Corridor 
where there is a significant reduction (more than 20 miles per hour 
(mph)) from the maximum authorized approach speed to those curves for 
passenger trains. Amtrak must then develop and comply with an FRA-
approved action plan to modify its existing ATC System or other signal 
systems (or take alternative operational actions) to enable enforcement 
of passenger train speed limits at the identified curves. Amtrak must 
also install additional wayside passenger train speed limit signage at 
appropriate locations on its Northeast Corridor right-of-way.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron Hynes, Director, Office of Safety 
Assurance and Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6404; 
Joseph St. Peter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6047, 
joseph.st.peter@dot.gov; or Matthew Navarrete, Trial Attorney, Office 
of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 
20590, telephone (202) 493-0138, matthew.navarrete@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Introduction

    FRA has determined that public safety compels issuance of this EO. 
This determination is made in light of the Amtrak train derailment that 
occurred in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on May 12, 2015, in which eight 
persons were killed and a significant number of others were seriously 
injured. While the cause of the accident has not yet been determined, 
preliminary investigation into this derailment indicates the train was 
traveling approximately 106 mph on a curve where the maximum authorized 
passenger train speed is 50 mph. This was a serious overspeed event and 
FRA has concluded that additional action is necessary in the form of 
this EO to eliminate an immediate hazard of death, personal injury, or 
significant harm to the environment.

Authority

    Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been 
delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Administrator of 
FRA. 49 CFR 1.89 and internal delegations. Railroads are subject to 
FRA's safety jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws. 49 
U.S.C. 20101, 20103. FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where 
an unsafe condition or practice ``causes an emergency situation 
involving a hazard of death, personal injury, or significant harm to 
the environment.'' 49 U.S.C. 20104. These orders may immediately impose 
``restrictions and prohibitions . . . that may be necessary to abate 
the situation.'' Id.

Amtrak Derailment

    On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, Amtrak passenger train 188 (Train 188) 
was traveling timetable east (northbound) from Washington, DC, to New 
York City. Aboard the train were five crew members and approximately 
238 passengers. Train 188 consisted of a conventional set-up with a 
locomotive in the lead and seven passenger cars trailing. Shortly after 
9:20 p.m., the train derailed while traveling through a curve in the 
track at Frankford Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As a result 
of the accident, eight people were killed, and a significant number of 
people were seriously injured.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken the lead 
role conducting the investigation of this accident under its legal 
authority. 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 800.3(a) and 831.2(b). As is 
customary, FRA is participating in the NTSB's investigation and also 
investigating the accident under its own authority. While NTSB has not 
yet issued any formal findings, the information it has released makes 
it obvious that train speed was a likely factor in the derailment. As 
Train 188 approached the curve from the west, it traveled over a 
straightaway with a maximum authorized passenger train speed of 80 mph. 
The maximum authorized passenger train speed for the curve was 50 mph. 
NTSB determined that the train was traveling approximately 106 mph 
within the curve's 50-mph speed restriction, exceeding the maximum 
authorized speed on the straightaway by 26 mph, and 56 mph over 
railroad's maximum authorized speed for the curve.\1\ NTSB also 
determined the locomotive engineer operating the train made an 
emergency application of Train 188's air brake system, and the train 
slowed to approximately 102 mph before derailing in the curve.
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    \1\ FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is unlawful to 
``[o]perate a train or locomotive at a speed which exceeds the 
maximum authorized limit by at least 10 miles per hour.'' 49 CFR 
240.305(a)(2).
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2013 Metro-North Derailment

    Upon evaluating the Amtrak accident described above, FRA found 
similarities to an accident that occurred in December 2013, on the New 
York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority's Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad Company (Metro-North) track. The Metro-North accident was the 
subject of FRA's Emergency Order No. 29. 78 FR 75442, Dec. 11, 2013. 
That accident occurred when a Metro-North passenger train was traveling 
south toward Grand Central Terminal in New York City. The train 
traveled over a straightaway with a maximum authorized passenger train 
speed of 70 mph before reaching a sharp curve in the track with a 
maximum authorized speed of 30 mph. NTSB's investigation of the Metro-
North accident determined the train was traveling approximately 82 mph 
as it entered the curve's 30-mph speed

[[Page 30535]]

restriction before derailing. That derailment resulted in four 
fatalities and at least 61 persons being injured.

Overspeed Protections

    Amtrak's passenger trains are normally operated with only one 
crewmember in the cab of a passenger train's locomotive. Amtrak's 
controlling locomotives are typically equipped with an alerter to help 
ensure the attentiveness of the locomotive engineer operating the 
train. Amtrak's locomotive controls and its signal systems also 
incorporate an ATC System, which is a train speed control system where 
trains are automatically slowed or stopped if a locomotive engineer 
fails to comply with signal indication or is otherwise unable to take 
action to slow a train. The ATC system is used to enforce compliance 
with certain signal indications in a particular territory, but it is 
not typically used to enforce civil passenger train speed restrictions 
that are below the maximum authorized operating speed for the broader 
territory. However, Amtrak's ATC System is capable of being used in a 
manner to enforce civil speed restrictions that are below the maximum 
authorized operating speed in some situations. This is accomplished by 
installing a code change point at or near the location where the speed 
restriction is to be enforced. As mentioned above, Amtrak's existing 
ATC System is not currently coded to slow trains to comply with 
applicable speed limits in all circumstances, and such coding may not 
be operationally feasible in all instances.\2\ As demonstrated by the 
May 12, 2015, accident, if a locomotive engineer fails to take action 
to slow a train when approaching such a speed restriction, currently, 
Amtrak's ATC System will not slow the train to comply with the required 
speed reduction.
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    \2\ FRA understands that on the date of the accident the ATC 
system enforced the curve's speed restriction for the timetable west 
(southbound) trains at this curve but not for the timetable east 
(northbound) trains.
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    In light of the May 12 derailment that is the subject of this 
Order, and in an effort to immediately prevent similar incidents from 
occurring that could result in an emergency situation involving a 
hazard of death, personal injury, or significant harm to the 
environment, in this Order FRA is requiring Amtrak take certain 
immediate actions. First, FRA is ordering Amtrak to implement code 
changes to its ATC System near the Frankford Junction curve in 
Philadelphia where the May 12 accident occurred in the timetable east 
(northbound) direction. The changes implemented must provide 
enforcement of the relevant passenger train speed limit of 50 mph for 
passenger trains approaching that curve. Amtrak has already completed 
actions to implement such changes.
    Next, Amtrak must identify all other main track curves on the 
Northeast Corridor where there is a significant reduction (more than 20 
mph) in the authorized passenger train approach speed upon the approach 
to those curves. After identifying such curves, Amtrak must develop and 
submit to FRA for review and approval an action plan to make 
appropriate code modifications to its existing ATC System or other 
signal systems to enable warning and enforcement of relevant passenger 
train speed restrictions. This requirement does not apply to portions 
of the Northeast Corridor where Amtrak's operations are governed by a 
Positive Train Control (PTC) system that is in use. To the extent that 
other railroads operate passenger trains at the same maximum authorized 
speeds as Amtrak in the curves affected by this Order, the 
modifications Amtrak makes to its ATC System or signal systems must 
also enforce the relevant speed restrictions for those trains.
    If such code changes at identified curves will interfere with the 
timely implementation of PTC or are otherwise not viable, Amtrak must 
identify other actions it will take to ensure compliance with speed 
reductions (e.g., a procedure whereby a locomotive engineer and a 
second qualified employee communicate via radio ahead of relevant speed 
reductions, and where the second qualified employee may make an 
emergency brake application to slow the train if the locomotive 
engineer fails to do so). These alternative operational actions must be 
described in Amtrak's action plan submitted to FRA for approval. In 
addition, any alternative operational actions Amtrak adopts to ensure 
compliance with speed restrictions at identified curve locations on the 
Northeast Corridor also apply to passenger trains operated by other 
railroads at those curve locations.
    FRA notes that other railroads have coded their ATC systems to 
prevent overspeed events from occurring at locations where there are 
civil or other speed restrictions. FRA's Emergency Order No. 29, issued 
after the December 2013 accident discussed above, required Metro-North 
to take similar actions in response to that accident. FRA is ordering 
Amtrak to take similar steps to prevent accidents similar to the May 
12, 2015, accident from occurring in the future if a locomotive 
engineer fails (or is otherwise unable) to take action to appropriately 
slow or stop a passenger train.
    In addition to the above requirements, Amtrak must also enhance 
speed restriction signage along its rights-of-way on the Northeast 
Corridor. Amtrak must identify in the action plan it submits to FRA the 
locations at which it intends to install such additional signage, and 
provide notice to FRA when such additional signage has been installed. 
Increasing the amount and frequency of signage provides a redundant 
means to remind engineers and conductors of the authorized speed, in 
addition to information they receive from the ATC System and 
operational documents such as timetable or bulletin.
    FRA recognizes that Amtrak has been diligent in implementing PTC on 
the Northeast Corridor by December 31, 2015, as required by section 104 
of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008. (Pub. L. 110-432, Division 
A, 122 Stat. 4848, 4856 (49 U.S.C. 20157)). Amtrak has indicated that 
it intends to meet the RSIA's statutory deadline to install PTC on the 
Northeast Corridor. Once in use, the PTC system will enforce the speed 
restriction at the curve where the May 12, 2015, accident occurred, but 
the interim action of implementing the code change in the ATC System, 
as required by this EO, will provide overspeed derailment protection 
until the PTC system is in use. As discussed above, Amtrak has already 
taken action to enforce appropriate passenger train speed limits near 
the curve where the May 12, 2015, accident occurred prior to its 
resumption of passenger train service, and plans to take similar 
actions at certain other locations on the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak 
also has stated it intends to increase radar checks, locomotive event 
recorder downloads, and efficiency tests aimed at ensuring compliance 
with relevant speed restrictions. Finally, Amtrak intends to hold 
listening sessions with its employees to learn about, and address, any 
additional safety concerns.
    Nonetheless, due to the significant safety concerns presented by 
the May 12, 2015, accident, FRA believes immediate enforceable action 
is necessary to address the emergency situation that contributed to 
that derailment. FRA will continue to review additional actions to 
address safety concerns on the Nation's passenger rail systems as its 
investigation into the May 12, 2015, derailment continues. FRA will 
revisit the necessity of the requirements in this Order upon reviewing 
Amtrak's actions taken to comply with the EO, or upon PTC systems 
governing Amtrak's operations

[[Page 30536]]

on the Northeast Corridor becoming operative.

Finding and Order

    FRA recognizes that passenger rail transportation is generally 
extremely safe. However, FRA finds that the recent May 12, 2015, 
accident on Amtrak, and the lack of overspeed protections in place at 
certain locations on Amtrak's system, create an emergency situation 
involving a hazard of death, personal injury, or significant harm to 
the environment. Accordingly, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104, 
delegated to the Administrator of FRA by the Secretary of 
Transportation, 49 CFR 1.89 and internal delegations, it is hereby 
ordered that:
    1. Amtrak must immediately implement code changes to its ATC System 
or other signal systems near the Frankford Junction curve in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where the fatal May 12, 2015, accident 
occurred. The changes must enforce the passenger train speed limit of 
50 mph for timetable east (northbound) trains approaching that curve.
    2. Amtrak must survey its main line track system located on the 
Northeast Corridor (as described by 49 U.S.C. 24905(c)(1)(A)) and 
identify each main track curve where there is a reduction of more than 
20 mph from the maximum authorized approach speed to that curve for 
passenger trains, and provide a list of each location to the FRA 
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer 
(Associate Administrator) within 5 days of the date of this Order. For 
purposes of compliance with this Order, the speed reductions of more 
than 20 mph that existed on the date of the issuance of this Order 
apply.
    3. After identifying the curves above, Amtrak shall develop and 
submit to FRA for approval an action plan that accomplishes each of the 
following:
    a. Identifies appropriate modifications to Amtrak's existing ATC 
System or other signal systems that Amtrak will make to enable warning 
and enforcement of applicable passenger train speeds at the identified 
curves. If such coding changes will interfere with the timely 
implementation of a PTC system or are not otherwise feasible, Amtrak's 
plan must describe why such changes are not feasible and may describe 
alternative operating procedures that it will adopt at the identified 
curves to ensure compliance with applicable speed reductions.
    b. Contains milestones and target dates for implementing each 
identified modification to Amtrak's existing ATC System or other signal 
systems (or alternative operational changes) to enable warning and 
enforcement of passenger train speeds at the identified curves.
    4. Amtrak must submit the action plan to the Associate 
Administrator within 20 days of the date of this Order. FRA will review 
and approve, approve with conditions, or disapprove Amtrak's action 
plan within 15 days of the plan's submission to FRA. Once FRA approves 
its action plan, Amtrak must make all identified modifications to the 
existing ATC System or other signal systems (or alternative operational 
changes) in the timeframes and manner that complies with all conditions 
FRA places on its approval of Amtrak's action plan.
    5. As soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the date 
of this Order, Amtrak must begin to install additional wayside signage 
alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger 
train speed throughout its Northeast Corridor system, with particular 
emphasis on additional signage at the curve locations where speed 
reductions implicated by this Order must occur. Amtrak must identify 
the locations where it intends to install the additional wayside speed 
limit signs in the action plan submitted under paragraphs 3 and 4 
above, and must notify the Associate Administrator upon the completion 
of the installation of those signs.
    Nothing in this Order precludes FRA from using any of the other 
enforcement tools available to the agency under its regulatory 
authority to address non-compliance with the Federal railroad safety 
laws, regulations, and orders by Amtrak. If necessary, FRA may issue 
additional emergency orders or compliance orders, impose civil 
penalties against Amtrak (including individuals who may be liable for 
civil penalties for willful violations of the Federal railroad safety 
laws and regulations), or disqualify individuals from performing 
safety-sensitive functions.

Relief

    Amtrak, or any other passenger railroad affected by this Order, may 
petition for special approval to take actions not in accordance with 
this EO. Petitions must be submitted to the Associate Administrator, 
who is authorized to act on those requests without amending this EO. In 
reviewing any petition for special review, the Associate Administrator 
shall grant petitions only if the petitioner has clearly articulated an 
alternative action that will provide, in the Associate Administrator's 
judgment, at least a level of safety equivalent to that provided by 
compliance with this EO.

Penalties

    Any violation of this EO shall subject the person committing the 
violation to a civil penalty of up to $105,000. 49 U.S.C. 21301. Any 
individual who willfully violates a provision stated in this order is 
subject to civil penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21301. In addition, any 
individual whose violation of this order demonstrates the individual's 
unfitness for safety-sensitive service may be removed from safety-
sensitive service on the railroad under 49 U.S.C. 20111. If 
appropriate, FRA may pursue criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C. 522(a) 
and 49 U.S.C. 21311(a), as well as 18 U.S.C. 1001, for the knowing and 
willful falsification of a report required by this Order. FRA may, 
through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to enforce 
this Order. 49 U.S.C. 20112.

Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons

    This EO is effective upon Amtrak's receipt of an electronic copy, 
and Amtrak shall immediately initiate steps to implement this Order to 
comply with the Order's deadlines.

Review

    Opportunity for formal review of this EO will be provided under 49 
U.S.C. 20104(b) and 5 U.S.C. 554. Administrative procedures governing 
such review are at 49 CFR part 211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 
211.75, and 211.77.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on May 21, 2015.
Sarah Feinberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015-12774 Filed 5-27-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


