
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 238 (Wednesday, December 11, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75442-75445]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-29574]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Emergency Order No. 29, Notice No. 1]


Emergency Order Under 49 U.S.C. 20104 Establishing Requirements 
for Controlling Passenger Train Speeds and Staffing Locomotive Cabs at 
Certain Locations on the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this emergency order (EO or Order) to require 
that the New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority's Metro-
North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North) take certain actions to 
control passenger train speed at any location on main track where there 
is a reduction of more than 20 miles per hour (mph) in the maximum 
authorized passenger train speed. Under the EO, Metro-North must create 
and comply with an FRA-approved action plan that institutes 
modifications to its existing Automatic Train Control System or other 
signal systems. Until Metro-North completes the necessary 
modifications, the EO requires that two qualified railroad employees be 
present in the control compartment of Metro-North's passenger trains 
when those trains operate over locations on main track where there is a 
required reduction of more than 20-mph in the maximum authorized 
passenger train speed.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Herrmann, Acting Director, 
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety, 
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 
493-6036; Joseph St. Peter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, 
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 
493-6047, joseph.st.peter@dot.gov; or Stephen Gordon, Trial Attorney, 
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 
DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6001, stephen.n.gordon@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

    FRA has determined that public safety compels issuance of this EO. 
This determination is made in light of the Metro-North train derailment 
that occurred in New York on December 1, 2013, which killed four people 
and injured over 60 others. The preliminary investigation into this 
derailment indicates that the subject train was traveling approximately 
82 mph as it entered a sharp curve where the maximum authorized 
passenger train speed was 30 mph. This is a serious overspeed event, 
and when considered in the context of three other accidents that 
occurred on Metro-North earlier this year, FRA has significant concerns 
with regard to the railroad's compliance with Federal railroad safety 
regulations and the railroad's own operating rules. These factors lead 
FRA to the conclusion that additional action is necessary in the form 
of this EO to eliminate an emergency situation

[[Page 75443]]

involving a hazard of death, personal injury, or significant harm to 
the environment.

Authority

    Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been 
delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Administrator of 
FRA. 49 CFR 1.89. Railroads are subject to FRA's safety jurisdiction 
under the Federal railroad safety laws. 49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103. FRA is 
authorized to issue emergency orders where an unsafe condition or 
practice ``causes an emergency situation involving a hazard of death, 
personal injury, or significant harm to the environment.'' 49 U.S.C. 
20104. These orders may immediately impose ``restrictions and 
prohibitions . . . that may be necessary to abate the situation.'' Id.

Metro-North Spuyten Duyvil Derailment

    On Sunday, December 1, 2013, Metro-North passenger train 8808 
(Train 8808) was traveling south from Poughkeepsie, New York, to Grand 
Central Terminal in New York City. The train's crew included a 
locomotive engineer, a conductor, and two assistant conductors. The 
exact number of passengers aboard the train is not presently known. At 
approximately 7:20 a.m., the train derailed as it approached the 
Spuyten Duyvil Station in Spuyten Duyvil, Bronx, New York.\1\ The train 
consisted of seven passenger coach cars, including a control cab 
locomotive in the lead position, and a conventional locomotive at the 
rear of the train, operating in a push-pull configuration (a control 
cab locomotive is both a passenger car, in that it has seats for 
passengers, and a locomotive, in that it has a control cab from which 
the engineer can operate the train). All seven cars and the trailing 
locomotive derailed. As of December 6, the derailment has resulted in 
four fatalities and over 60 reported injuries.
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    \1\ The train was not scheduled to stop at the Spuyten Duyvil 
Station.
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    As is customary, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
has taken the lead role in conducting the investigation of this 
accident pursuant to its legal authority. 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 
CFR 800.3(a), 831.2(b). FRA is also investigating the accident. As 
Train 8808 approached the Spuyten Duyvil Station from the north, it 
traveled over a straightaway with a maximum authorized passenger train 
speed of 70 mph before reaching a sharp curve in the track where, by 
the railroad's own rules, the maximum authorized speed was reduced to 
30 mph. A preliminary review of the information on the locomotive event 
recorders by NTSB indicates that the train was traveling approximately 
82 mph as it entered the curve's 30-mph speed restriction, exceeding 
the maximum authorized speed on the straightaway by 12 mph, while also 
traveling nearly three times the railroad's maximum authorized speed 
for the curve.\2\ Additionally, NTSB indicates that information 
obtained from the train's event recorders reveals that approximately 
six seconds before the locomotive came to a stop, the locomotive 
throttle was placed in idle and an application of the train's brake 
system was made. Prior to the derailment, Train 8808 received a pre-
trip brake inspection and made nine stops. The NTSB reviewed the brake 
inspection records for December 1 and, to date, has found no anomalies 
with the train's brake system. Further, to date, no evidence has been 
discovered that any track-related or signal-related deficiencies 
contributed to the derailment.
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    \2\ FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is unlawful to 
``[o]perate a train or locomotive at a speed which exceeds the 
maximum authorized limit by at least 10 miles per hour.'' 49 CFR 
240.305(a)(2).
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Safety Concerns Arising Out of 2013 Metro-North Incidents

    In addition to the December 1, 2013, accident discussed above, 
three other notable accidents occurred on Metro-North earlier this 
year. Two of the accidents occurred in May, and NTSB and FRA continue 
to investigate these accidents, and NTSB recently held a public hearing 
on both accidents in November 2013.\3\ A third accident that occurred 
in July 2013 is also under investigation by NTSB and FRA.
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    \3\ See NTSB Dockets DCA-13-MR-003 and DCA-13-MR-003; available 
online at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/dms.html.
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May 17--Bridgeport, Connecticut Derailment

    The first accident occurred on May 17, 2013, in Bridgeport, 
Connecticut, on Metro-North's New Haven line.\4\ An eastbound Metro-
North passenger train was traveling 74 mph on track number 4 when it 
derailed near milepost 53.3 and came to rest in the foul of an adjacent 
track. According to information obtained from locomotive event 
recorders, about 20 seconds later a westbound Metro-North passenger 
train on that adjacent track then struck the derailed train. As a 
result of the accident, over 50 people were transported to hospitals, 
and several million dollars in property damage occurred.
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    \4\ See NTSB Preliminary Report, Accident Number DCA-13-MR-003 
(June 4, 2013); available online at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/bridgeport_ct/Bridgeport_CT_10_day_Preliminary_Report06042013.pdf.
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    At the accident scene, broken compromise joint bars were found. The 
location where the accident had occurred was last inspected on May 15, 
2013, two days prior to the accident. Metro-North's record of that 
inspection noted that near milepost 53.3 on track number 4 an insulated 
rail joint had inadequate supporting ballast and displayed indications 
of vertical movement of the track system under load. In April 2013, the 
joint bars at this location were found to have been broken and were 
replaced by Metro-North.\5\ This accident was one of two that was the 
subject of FRA's Safety Advisory 2013-05, regarding joint failures on 
continuous welded rail track. 78 FR 47486 (Aug. 5, 2013). Safety 
Advisory 2013-05 made several recommendations to railroads regarding 
the special attention and maintenance that rail joints in continuous 
welded rail require, including reminding railroads of applicable 
Federal Track Safety Standards for such joints at 49 CFR 213.119, and 
the importance of proper maintenance practices to ensure that joints 
are adequately supported to support train loads.
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    \5\ See NTSB Accident Reconstruction Animation, Derailment and 
Collision of Metro-North Railroad Passenger Trains 1548 and 1581; 
available online at: http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2013/bridgeport_ct_hearing/animation.html.
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May 28--West Haven, Connecticut Employee Fatality

    A second accident occurred on May 28, 2013, when a Metro-North 
passenger train in West Haven, Connecticut was traveling 70 mph when it 
struck and killed a Metro-North maintenance-of-way employee who was 
part of a roadway work group conducting a railroad maintenance and 
construction project. According to NTSB's preliminary investigation, 
the roadway work group had established exclusive track occupancy 
working limits, in accordance with 49 CFR 214.321, on a controlled main 
track in order to conduct their work.\6\ A Metro-North rail traffic 
controller (RTC) trainee who was training under the mentorship of a 
qualified RTC placed blocking devices on the computer console for the 
signal system to prevent trains from entering the roadway work group's 
exclusive track occupancy working limits. Later, the Metro-North RTC 
trainee apparently

[[Page 75444]]

removed the blocking devices without notifying the roadway work 
group.\7\ After the blocking devices were removed, a train then entered 
the exclusive track occupancy working limits at 70 mph and struck and 
killed the maintenance-of-way employee. Under FRA's applicable 
regulations, train movements through exclusive track occupancy working 
limits may only be made under the direction of the roadway worker in 
charge of the working limits, and such movements are required to be 
made at restricted speed, unless a higher speed has been specifically 
authorized by the roadway worker in charge. 49 CFR 214.321(d). Further, 
FRA's regulations prohibit the release of working limits until all 
affected roadway workers have been notified of such release, and until 
all affected roadway workers have either left the track or have been 
afforded on-track safety through train approach warning.\8\ 49 CFR 
214.329(c).
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    \6\ See NTSB Recommendation R-13-17 (June 17, 2013); available 
online at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2013/R-13-17.pdf.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ The applicable FRA regulation governing train approach 
warning requires that warning must be given to enable an affected 
roadway worker to occupy a place of safety not less than 15 seconds 
before a train moving at maximum authorized speed can pass the 
roadway worker's location. 49 CFR 214.329(a).
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    The NTSB has also stated that in an unrelated incident, 
approximately three weeks prior to the May 28 accident in West Haven, 
blocking devices that were protecting an occupied track were similarly 
removed in error by a Metro-North RTC.\9\ In response, Metro-North 
adopted additional procedures to prevent blocking devices from being 
removed in error. Despite the adoption of these additional procedures, 
the accident occurred in West Haven on May 28.
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    \9\ NTSB Recommendation R-13-17 (June 17, 2013); available 
online at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2013/R-13-17.pdf.
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July 18--CSX Transportation, Inc., Freight Train Derailment

    A third accident occurred on July 18, 2013, when a CSX 
Transportation, Inc. freight train derailed while traveling over Metro-
North's system. Ten of the train's cars derailed near the Spuyten 
Duyvil station, and blocked tracks on Metro-North's Hudson line. No 
persons were injured as a result of this accident, and the NTSB is 
investigating to determine the accident's probable cause.
    The May 17 and May 28 accidents are still under investigation, and 
the NTSB has not established their probable causes, and the July 18 CSX 
accident also remains under investigation by FRA. However, together 
with the December 1, 2013, accident discussed above, these accidents 
lead FRA to believe that a potential lack of compliance with Federal 
railroad safety regulations and applicable Metro-North operating rules 
and procedures in recent months may have caused or contributed to these 
serious accidents, which have resulted in five deaths and well over 100 
injuries to Metro-North's passengers and employees since May. While the 
specific causes of these recent accidents may vary, these events are 
extremely concerning, and require immediate corrective actions.

Overspeed Protections

    Metro-North passenger trains are normally operated with only one 
crewmember, a locomotive engineer, located in the cab of the passenger 
train's locomotive. In the case of push-pull operations, this 
crewmember occupies the control compartment of the passenger car (cab 
car) at the leading end of a train. Metro-North's conventional 
controlling locomotives are typically equipped with an alerter in order 
to help ensure the attentiveness of the locomotive engineer operating 
the train, while the control cab of passenger cars are typically 
equipped with either an alerter or a ``dead man pedal'' for the same 
purpose. Metro-North's locomotive controls and its signal systems also 
incorporate an Automatic Train Control System (ATC system), which is a 
train speed control system where trains may be automatically slowed or 
stopped if a locomotive engineer fails to comply with a signal 
indication.
    However, at locations where there are large reductions in the 
maximum authorized speed that a passenger train may travel (e.g., at 
locations such as the sharp curve in the track where the December 1 
derailment occurred) and the signal system is not implicated, Metro-
North's ATC system is not currently coded to slow trains to comply with 
applicable speed limits. If a locomotive engineer fails to take action 
in accordance with applicable railroad rules to slow a train when 
approaching such a speed limit, Metro-North's ATC system will not slow 
the train to comply with the speed reduction. As a result, extreme 
overspeed events like the December 1 derailment can occur if the lone 
crewmember controlling the train fails to comply with railroad rules, 
and, as demonstrated, these overspeed events can have catastrophic 
results.
    In light of the December 1 derailment that is the subject of this 
Order, and the other serious accidents that have occurred on Metro-
North in 2013, and in an effort to immediately prevent similar 
incidents from occurring that could result in an emergency situation 
involving a hazard of death, personal injury, or significant harm to 
the environment, in this Order FRA is requiring that at main track 
locations where reductions in maximum authorized passenger train speed 
of greater than 20 mph occur, that Metro-North must immediately have an 
additional qualified employee in each train's control compartment when 
a train traverses each such location. A qualified employee is an 
individual who is qualified on the physical characteristics of the 
territory over which the train is operating, who is qualified on the 
signal systems on the territory, and who has been trained to apply the 
emergency brake if necessary to stop a train (e.g., a conductor, an 
additional locomotive engineer, or a Metro-North transportation 
supervisor). A qualified crewmember assigned to the train may serve as 
the additional qualified employee in a train's control compartment when 
a train traverses such locations. On trains where the control cab 
locomotive configuration does not permit a second qualified person to 
occupy the control compartment, the additional qualified person shall 
occupy the space immediately adjacent to the control compartment and 
maintain constant communication with the train's locomotive engineer. 
The additional qualified employee must be in (or adjacent to, where 
necessary) the control compartment well in advance of reaching the 
location where the speed reduction occurs in order to provide 
sufficient time to take action to control train speeds if necessary.
    FRA is requiring this action as the December 1 accident 
demonstrates that Metro-North's existing ATC system and other existing 
overspeed protections are not sufficient to prevent dangerous overspeed 
events. The additional qualified employee located in the control 
compartment of Metro-North's passenger trains can take immediate 
actions to slow or stop passenger trains where necessary when the 
train's locomotive engineer or the existing ATC system fails to do so.
    Metro-North must comply with this provision of the EO until it has 
developed and complied with an action plan to make appropriate 
modifications to its existing ATC system or other signal systems to 
enable warning and enforcement of relevant passenger train speed 
restrictions. FRA notes that other railroads have coded their ATC 
systems to prevent overspeed events from occurring at locations where 
civil or other speed restrictions occur. FRA is ordering Metro-North to 
take similar steps to prevent accidents similar to the

[[Page 75445]]

December 1 accident from occurring in the future if a locomotive 
engineer fails to take actions to appropriately slow or stop a 
passenger train.

Finding and Order

    FRA recognizes that passenger rail transportation is generally 
extremely safe. However, FRA finds that the recent December 1, 2013, 
accident on Metro-North and the lack of overspeed protections in place 
on Metro-North's system create an emergency situation involving a 
hazard of death, personal injury, or significant harm to the 
environment. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104, 
delegated to the FRA Administrator by the Secretary of Transportation, 
49 CFR 1.89, it is hereby ordered:
    1. Metro-North shall survey its entire system and identify each 
main track location where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from 
the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains (identified 
locations), and provide a list of each location to the FRA Associate 
Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer (Associate 
Administrator) by December 10, 2013.
    2. Metro-North shall develop an action plan that accomplishes each 
of the following:
    a. Identifies appropriate modifications to Metro-North's existing 
ATC system or other signal systems to enable warning and enforcement of 
passenger train speeds at the identified locations.
    b. Contains milestones and target dates for implementing each 
identified modification to Metro-North's existing ATC system or other 
signal systems to enable warning and enforcement of passenger train 
speeds at the identified locations.
    3. The action plan must be submitted to the Associate Administrator 
not later than December 31, 2013. FRA will review and approve, approve 
with conditions, or disapprove Metro-North's action plan within 30 days 
of the plan's submission to FRA.
    4. Once FRA approves its action plan, Metro-North must make all 
identified modifications to the existing ATC system or other signal 
systems in the timeframes and manner that comply with all conditions 
that FRA places on its approval of Metro-North's action plan.
    5. As soon as possible, but not later than December 10, 2013, all 
passenger train movements at the identified locations shall be made 
with at least two qualified persons in the cab of the train's 
controlling locomotive \10\ until all modifications to Metro-North's 
existing ATC system or other signal systems have been completed to 
enable warning and enforcement of passenger train speed. On trains 
where the control cab locomotive configuration does not permit a second 
qualified person to occupy the control compartment, the additional 
qualified person shall occupy the space immediately adjacent to the 
control compartment and maintain constant communication with the 
train's locomotive engineer. The additional qualified employee must be 
present well in advance of reaching each identified location in order 
to take action to control train speed if necessary. For purposes of 
this requirement, ``qualified'' means that that an employee is 
qualified on the physical characteristics of the territory, is 
qualified on the signal systems of the territory, and has been trained 
to apply the train's emergency brake to stop or slow the train as 
necessary to comply with relevant railroad operating rules or 
applicable Federal railroad safety regulations.
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    \10\ Whether the cab of a conventional locomotive or control 
compartment of a control cab locomotive when the train is being 
operated in a push-pull configuration.
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    Nothing in this Order precludes FRA from using any of the other 
enforcement tools available to the agency under its regulatory 
authority to address non-compliance with the Federal railroad safety 
laws and regulations by Metro-North. FRA is planning to conduct an 
extensive investigation of Metro-North's safety compliance. If 
necessary, FRA may issue additional emergency orders or compliance 
orders, impose civil penalties against Metro-North (individuals may be 
liable for civil penalties for willful violations of the Federal 
railroad safety laws and regulations), or disqualify individuals from 
performing safety-sensitive functions. In addition, FRA reemphasizes 
the discussion in the agency's December 3, 2013, letter to the New York 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, directing Metro-North to update 
FRA on the progress of the pending safety stand-down that will be 
conducted by the railroad, and also to immediately implement a 
confidential close call reporting system.

Relief

    Metro-North may petition for special approval to take actions not 
in accordance with this EO. Such petitions shall be submitted to the 
Associate Administrator, who shall be authorized to dispose of those 
requests without the necessity of amending this EO. In reviewing any 
petition for special review, the Associate Administrator shall grant 
petitions only in which Metro-North has clearly articulated an 
alternative action that will provide, in the Associate Administrator's 
judgment, at least a level of safety equivalent to that provided by 
compliance with this EO.

Penalties

    Any violation of this EO shall subject the person committing the 
violation to a civil penalty of up to $105,000. 49 U.S.C. 21301. Any 
individual who willfully violates a prohibition stated in this order is 
subject to civil penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21301. In addition, such an 
individual whose violation of this order demonstrates the individual's 
unfitness for safety-sensitive service may be removed from safety-
sensitive service on the railroad under 49 U.S.C. 20111. If 
appropriate, FRA may pursue criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C. 522(a) 
and 49 U.S.C. 21311(a), as well as 18 U.S.C. 1001, for the knowing and 
willful falsification of a report required by this order. FRA may, 
through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to enforce 
this order. 49 U.S.C. 20112.

Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons

    This EO is effective upon receipt of an electronic copy of it by 
Metro-North, and Metro-North shall immediately initiate steps to 
implement this Order in order to comply with the Order's deadlines. 
Metro-North must complete and submit its action plan to FRA no later 
than December 31, 2013. Notice of this EO will be given by providing 
Metro-North with a copy of the Order, and by publishing it in the 
Federal Register.

Review

    Opportunity for formal review of this EO will be provided in 
accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and 5 U.S.C. 554. Administrative 
procedures governing such review are found at 49 CFR part 211. See 49 
CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 6, 2013.
Joseph C. Szabo,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2013-29574 Filed 12-10-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


