
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 57 (Tuesday, March 25, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 16218-16235]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-06481]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 272

[Docket No. FRA-2008-0131, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AC00


Critical Incident Stress Plans

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: FRA issues this final rule in accordance with a statutory 
mandate that the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) require 
certain major railroads to develop, and submit to the Secretary for 
approval, critical incident stress plans that provide for appropriate 
support services to be offered to their employees who are affected by a 
``critical incident'' as defined by the Secretary. The final rule 
contains a definition of the term ``critical incident,'' the elements 
appropriate for the rail environment to be included in a railroad's 
critical incident stress plan, the type of employees to be covered by 
the plan, a requirement that a covered railroad submit its plan to FRA 
for approval, and a requirement that a railroad adopt and comply with 
its FRA-approved plan.

DATES: This final rule is effective on June 23, 2014. Petitions for 
reconsideration must be received by May 27, 2014.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration and comments on petitions for 
reconsideration: Any petitions for reconsideration or comments on 
petitions for reconsideration related to this Docket No. FRA-2008-0131, 
Notice No. 2 may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to www.Regulations.gov. 
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 
DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, West Building, Ground floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. Please note that all comments received will be posted 
without change to www.Regulations.gov, including any personal 
information provided. Please see the discussion under the Privacy Act 
heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to www.Regulations.gov at any time or visit the 
Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, West 
Building, Ground floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For program issues: Dr. Bernard J. 
Arseneau, Medical Director, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: (202) 493-6232), 
Bernard.Arseneau@dot.gov; or Ronald Hynes, Director, Office of Safety 
Assurance and Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: (202) 493-6404), 
Ronald.Hynes@dot.gov. For legal issues: Veronica Chittim, Trial 
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC 20950 (telephone: (202) 493-0273), 
Veronica.Chittim@dot.gov; or Gahan Christenson, Trial Attorney, Office 
of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20950 
(telephone: (202) 493-1381), Gahan.Christenson@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Overview of Critical Incidents and Critical Incident Stress 
Plans
    A. Statutory Mandate and Authority To Conduct This Rulemaking
    B. Factual Background
III. Overview of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC)
IV. RSAC Critical Incident Working Group
V. FRA's Approach to Critical Incident Stress Plans
VI. Discussion of Public Comments and Conclusions Regarding the 
Final Rule
    A. Section 272.9, Definitions
    B. Section 272.101, Content of a Critical Incident Stress Plan
    C. Section 272.103, Submission of a Critical Incident Stress 
Plan
    D. Section 272.105, Option To File Critical Incident Stress Plan 
Electronically
    E. Comments on the Economic Analysis
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
VIII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

[[Page 16219]]

    C. Executive Order 13175
    D. Paperwork Reduction Act
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Executive Order 13132, Federalism Implications
    G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    H. Energy Impact
    I. Privacy Act Statement

I. Executive Summary

    This final rule requires each Class I railroad, intercity passenger 
railroad, and commuter railroad to establish and implement a critical 
incident stress plan for certain employees of the railroad who are 
directly involved in, witness, or respond to, a critical incident.
    Although FRA has never regulated critical incident stress plans, 
many railroads have had some form of critical incident stress plan in 
place for many years. This rulemaking responds to the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-432, Div. A) (RSIA) mandate that 
the Secretary of Transportation establish regulations to define 
``critical incident'' and to require certain railroads to develop and 
implement critical incident stress plans.
    FRA received several public comments in response to FRA's June 28, 
2013, notice of proposed rulemaking on Critical Incident Stress Plans 
(NPRM), see 78 FR 38878. Comments include remarks on FRA's proposals 
related to the definition of critical incident, the content of critical 
incident stress plans, the proposed process for submitting critical 
incident stress plans to FRA for approval and assuring all relevant 
railroad personnel are aware of the relief available pursuant to a 
railroad's plan. After careful consideration of each comment received, 
in this final rule FRA is adopting the rule text substantially as 
proposed in the NPRM, except for clarifying changes to 49 CFR 
272.101(a) and (f), and making electronic submission mandatory in 49 
CFR 272.105.
    As discussed in detail below, FRA reviewed the applicable science 
and information received through the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee 
(RSAC), and as required by Congress, in this final rule, FRA defines 
``critical incident'' and requires a set of minimum standards for 
critical incident stress plans. This approach provides covered 
employees with options for relief following a critical incident, yet 
allows for substantial flexibility within the regulatory framework so 
that railroads may adapt their plans commensurate with their needs. The 
final rule defines a ``critical incident'' as either--(1) An accident/
incident reportable to FRA under 49 CFR part 225 that results in a 
fatality, loss of limb, or a similarly serious bodily injury; or (2) A 
catastrophic accident/incident reportable to FRA under part 225 that 
could be reasonably expected to impair a directly-involved employee's 
ability to perform his or her job duties safely. The required set of 
minimum standards for critical incident stress plans include allowing a 
directly-involved employee to obtain relief from the remainder of the 
tour of duty, providing for the directly-involved employee's 
transportation to the home terminal (if applicable), and offering a 
directly-involved employee appropriate support services following a 
critical incident. This final rule requires that each railroad subject 
to this rule submit its plan to FRA for approval.
    FRA has analyzed the economic impacts of this final rule against a 
``status quo'' baseline that reflects present conditions (i.e., 
primarily what applicable railroads are already doing with respect to 
critical incident policy). As done when preparing the NPRM and based on 
both RSAC meetings and discussions with the rail industry, FRA's 
analysis assumes that all railroads affected by the final rule 
currently have policies that include a critical incident stress plan, 
thereby reducing the costs of compliance associated with this final 
rule. In estimating these compliance costs, FRA included costs 
associated with training supervisors on how to interact with railroad 
employees who have been affected by a critical incident, employee 
training, counseling, and other support services, and costs associated 
with the submission of critical incident stress plans to FRA for 
approval. FRA estimates that the costs of the final rule for a 20-year 
period would total $1,943,565. Using a 7 percent and a 3 percent 
discount rate, the total discounted costs will be $1,337,830 and 
$1,615,519, respectively.
    The final rule contains minimum standards for leave, counseling, 
and other support services. These standards would help create benefits 
by providing employees with knowledge, coping skills, and services that 
would help them: (1) Recognize and cope with symptoms of normal stress 
reactions that commonly occur as a result of a critical incident; (2) 
reduce their chance of developing a disorder such as depression, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), or Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) as a 
result of a critical incident; and (3) recognize symptoms of 
psychological disorders that sometimes occur as a result of a critical 
incident and know how to obtain prompt evaluation and treatment of any 
such disorder, if necessary. FRA anticipates that implementation of 
this final rule would yield benefits by reducing long-term healthcare 
costs associated with treating PTSD, ASD, and other stress reactions; 
and costs that accrue either when an employee is unable to return to 
work for a significant period of time or might leave railroad 
employment due to being affected by PTSD, ASD, or other stress 
reactions. In addition, safety risk posed by having a person who has 
just been involved in a critical incident performing safety critical 
functions is also reduced. The majority of the quantifiable benefits 
identified by FRA's analysis are associated with railroad employee 
retention and a reduction of long-term healthcare costs associated with 
PTSD cases that were not treated appropriately after a critical 
incident. FRA expects that this final rule would decrease the number of 
employees who leave the railroad industry due to PTSD, ASD, or other 
stress reactions, as early treatment for such conditions following 
exposure to a critical incident would reduce the likelihood of 
developing the conditions. In addition, if a railroad employee involved 
in a critical incident did develop PTSD, ASD, or other stress reaction 
despite the initial relief afforded by a railroad's critical incident 
stress plan, FRA expects that this final rule would decrease the 
duration of the condition as the chances for early identification of 
the condition would be increased and more immediate healthcare would be 
provided to the affected individuals. FRA estimates that the present 
value of the quantifiable benefits for a 20-year period would total 
$2,630,000. Using a 7 percent and a 3 percent discount rate, the total 
discounted benefits would be $1,505,622 and $2,023,548, respectively. 
Overall, FRA finds that the value of the anticipated benefits would 
justify the cost of implementing the final rule.

II. Overview of Critical Incidents and Critical Incident Stress Plans

A. Statutory Mandate and Authority To Conduct This Rulemaking

    On October 16, 2008, Congress enacted the RSIA. Section 410 of the 
RSIA (Section 410) mandates that the Secretary of Transportation 
(Secretary) require ``each Class I railroad carrier, each intercity 
passenger railroad carrier, and each commuter railroad carrier to 
develop and submit for approval to the Secretary a critical incident 
stress plan that provides for debriefing, counseling, guidance, and 
other appropriate support services to be offered to an employee 
affected by a critical incident.'' See Section 410(a). Section 410 
mandates that the plans include provisions for relieving employees who 
are involved

[[Page 16220]]

in, or who witness, critical incidents from their tours of duty, and 
for providing leave for such employees from their normal duties as may 
be necessary and reasonable to receive preventive services and 
treatment related to the critical incident. See Section 410(b). Section 
410 specifically requires the Secretary to define the term ``critical 
incident'' for purposes of this rulemaking. See Section 410(c). The 
Secretary has delegated his responsibilities under the RSIA to the 
Administrator of FRA. See 49 CFR 1.89(b). In the Section-by-Section 
Analysis below, FRA discusses how the regulatory text addresses each 
portion of the Section 410 mandates. This final rule is also issued 
pursuant to FRA's general rulemaking authority at 49 U.S.C. 20103.
    As required by Section 410(a), FRA consulted with the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Labor (DOL) in 
preparing this final rule. Specifically, in addition to consulting with 
representatives of HHS and DOL, FRA provided those departments with an 
advance copy of the proposed regulation and requested input on FRA's 
approach. FRA has incorporated the suggestions provided by both HHS's 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) and 
DOL's Wage and Hour Division.

B. Factual Background 1
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    \1\ Much of this background information and review of the 
literature is derived from the independent final report prepared by 
FRA grantee, Dr. Richard Gist, in support of Grant FR-RRD-0024-11-
01, titled, ``Proposed Key Elements of Critical Incident 
Intervention Program For Reducing the Effects of Potentially 
Traumatic Exposure On Train Crews to Grade Crossing and Trespasser 
Incidents.'' See Docket No. FRA-2008-0131. Articles cited in this 
final rule are available for viewing at FRA upon request.
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    As discussed thoroughly in the NPRM, highway-rail grade crossing 
accidents and trespasser incidents along the railroad right-of-way are 
an unfortunate reality for employees in the railroad industry. Railroad 
work carries the risk that certain employees will be directly involved 
in a critical incident, often outside the control of the employees, 
which can lead to severe emotional and psychological distress, 
including PTSD and the more immediate ASD.\2\ There are concerns about 
the impact of exposure to traumatic incidents on employees in safety-
sensitive jobs, most notably engineers and conductors.
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    \2\ ASD is ``a mental disorder that can occur in the first month 
following a trauma. The symptoms that define ASD overlap with those 
for PTSD.'' ASD can lead to PTSD, but does not always. A ``PTSD 
diagnosis cannot be given until symptoms have lasted for one 
month.'' U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, National Center for 
PTSD, available at http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/acute-stress-disorder.asp (last accessed September 18, 2013).
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    Until this rulemaking proceeding, a national, uniform approach to 
critical incident response in the railroad industry did not exist, with 
only a handful of States taking action through statutes or regulations 
to aid critical incident response in the railroad industry. With this 
final rule, FRA defines the term ``critical incident'' in the railroad 
setting, which if met, would trigger the requirement that appropriate 
support services be offered to railroad employees affected by such 
incidents.
    PTSD and ASD can develop following any traumatic event that 
threatens one's personal safety or the safety of others, or causes 
serious physical, cognitive or emotional harm. While such disorders are 
most often initiated by a threat to one's life or the witnessing of 
brutal injury or traumatic death--in combat situations, for example, or 
during violent accidents or disasters--any overwhelming life experience 
can trigger the disorders, especially if the event is perceived as 
unpredictable and uncontrollable. Individuals exposed to traumatic 
events may experience alterations in their neurologic, endocrine, and 
immune systems, which have been linked to adverse changes in overall 
health.\3\ These changes and symptoms can be ameliorated if treated 
appropriately, usually with psychotherapy and/or medications. However, 
PTSD and ASD often go undiagnosed, as few primary care providers 
routinely assess for it and more often than not, attribute the symptoms 
to less serious forms of depression, anxiety, and general emotional 
distress.\4\
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    \3\ In a study of 830 train drivers in Norway, the 48 percent of 
participants who had experienced at least one on-the-track accident 
reported considerably more health problems than those who reported 
no such exposure. Their symptoms included musculoskeletal, 
gastrointestinal, and sleep pattern issues and continued from the 
incident to the time of the study (for some participants up to ten 
years). This study also revealed that the more pronounced initial 
reactions to on-the-track accidents, the more severe and persistent 
were the health complaints post-exposure. Vatshelle, A. & Moen, B. 
E. (1996). Serious on-the-track accidents experienced by train 
drivers: Psychological reactions and long-term health effects. 
Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 42(1), 43-52. See also Wignall, 
E. L., Dickson, J. M., Vaughan, P., Farrow, T. F. D., Wilkinson, I. 
D., Hunter, M. D., & Woodruff, P. W. R. (2004). Smaller hippocampal 
volume in patients with recent-onset posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Biological Psychiatry, 56(11), 832-836.
    \4\ Gerrity M. S., Corson, K., & Dobscha S. K. (2007). Screening 
for posttraumatic stress disorder in Veterans' Affairs primary care 
patients with depression symptoms. Journal of General Internal 
Medicine, 22(9), 1321-1324.
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    In 2011, there were approximately 2,000 highway-rail grade crossing 
accidents, and almost 800 casualties to persons trespassing on railroad 
property (trespassers). These incidents resulted in approximately 660 
fatalities and over 1,400 non-fatal injuries. Each of these incidents, 
as well as other traumatic events such as railroad accidents or 
incidents resulting in serious injury or death to railroad employees, 
hold potential for causing ASD, PTSD, or other health and safety-
related problems, in any railroad employee who is present. Some 
locomotive engineers and conductors have had the misfortune of 
experiencing multiple potential PTSD/ASD-invoking events over the 
course of their careers.\5\
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    \5\ The Associated Press, Fatal Collisions Traumatize Nation's 
Train Engineers, August 14, 2009. Saed Hindash, The Star-Ledger. 
Death by Train. June 18, 2009. http://www.nj.com/insidejersey/index.ssf/2009/06/death_by_train.html (``Over a 40-year career, 
the average engineer will be involved in five to seven incidents, 
says Darcy, who has had seven fatalities.'').
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    Exposure of railroad employees, particularly locomotive engineers 
and conductors, to prototypical potentially traumatic exposures is well 
established. Incursion events, such as vehicular accidents at highway-
rail grade crossings and pedestrian incursions onto the railroad right-
of-way (frequently as a method of suicide) often involve fatalities and 
the injuries sustained may be gruesome. Locomotive engineers and 
conductors, because of their proximity to the accident scene, must 
often tend to the injured and secure the scene, compounding the extent 
and the duration of exposure. In particular, locomotive engineers may 
be alone in the cab when an on-the-track accident occurs. Further, 
train crews are required to report the incident, secure the train, and 
often leave the train and examine the victims. Crew members may even 
provide first aid if victims are alive, and wait, sometimes for long 
periods, for assistance or instructions.
    Systematic empirical studies of the health impact on railroad 
personnel of this kind of experience are limited. The best designed 
studies have been European and show clinically diagnosed PTSD in 7 to 
14 percent of those exposed. FRA has found no empirical studies of 
treatment efficacy and impact within the U.S. railroad population, 
presumably due to the relatively small population annually treated and 
the different locations and systems involved in railroad employees' 
identification and care.
    If left untreated, mental health conditions carry significant costs 
for employers in the form of

[[Page 16221]]

``presenteeism,'' when employees come to work, but have lowered 
productivity.\6\ Presenteeism can have catastrophic safety consequences 
for railroads. Symptoms such as sleep difficulties, trouble 
concentrating, hypervigilance and exaggerated sensory reactions--often 
leading sufferers to misuse alcohol to reduce the stress--compromise 
workers' safety at work and the safety of others, and lower employees' 
productivity on the job. One study revealed that employees are more 
likely to engage in workplace presenteeism than calling in sick 
(absenteeism).\7\
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    \6\ Kessler, R.C. (2000). Posttraumatic stress disorder: The 
burden to the individual and society. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 61(suppl. 5), 4-12. Kessler, R.C., & Greenberg, P.E. 
(2002). The economic burden of anxiety and stress disorders. In K.L. 
Davis, D. Charney, J.T. Coyle, & C. Nemeroff (Eds.), 
Neuropsychopharmacology: The Fifth Generation of Progress. 
Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. Pilette, P. C. (2005). 
Presenteeism and productivity: Two reasons employee assistance 
programs make good business cents. Annals of the American 
Psychotherapy Association, 8(1), 12-14.
    \7\ Caverley, N., Cunningham, J. B., & MacGregor, J. M. (2007). 
Sickness presenteeism, sickness absenteeism, and health following 
restructuring in a public service organization. Journal of 
Management Studies, 44(2), 304-319.
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    All major railroads have plans to provide their employees with 
assistance and intervention following traumatic events. Most of these 
programs have been in existence for a number of years, usually as part 
of a railroad's ``Employee Assistance Program'' (EAP). The descriptions 
of interventions, timing, and delivery in these programs are often 
``transplanted'' from programs created for fire, rescue, and emergency 
services personnel in the 1980s and 1990s. These approaches, 
particularly those built around ``critical incident stress debriefing'' 
and related interventions, have come under increasing scrutiny as 
independent research has reported such interventions to not be helpful 
in certain situations and even to paradoxically inhibit the natural 
recovery of certain vulnerable participants. Accordingly, most 
authoritative guidelines now caution against the routine application of 
these approaches, particularly those built around ``critical incident 
stress debriefing,'' and some now list them as directly 
contraindicated.
    While there are variations among railroads' existing programs, 
there are also substantial similarities reflected with respect to 
critical elements mandated by statute.\8\ For example, many railroads 
provide assistance and intervention following critical incidents, often 
through the use of the railroad's EAP. The majority of existing plans 
allow for immediate relief from duty upon request for the remainder of 
the tour of duty, as well as transportation to the home terminal for 
affected employees. Finally, many plans allow for additional leave 
following the tour of duty upon request, often involving contact with 
occupational medicine or EAP representatives.\9\ Therefore, several of 
these common elements are incorporated into this final rule.
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    \8\ The Association of American Railroads (AAR) provided a 
matrix to the RSAC Critical Incident Working Group (CIWG) 
summarizing key characteristics of programs as submitted by nine 
member railroads. Several railroads also submitted their current 
policies regarding critical incidents in the workplace.
    \9\ Unpaid, job-protected leave under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) may be available to an employee involved in a 
critical incident. FMLA leave may be considered where an eligible 
employee of a covered employer suffers a serious health condition as 
a result of the incident. For additional guidance on the FMLA, 
please contact the United States Department of Labor or visit 
www.dol.gov.
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III. Overview of the RSAC

    In March 1996, FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations to the Administrator of FRA on 
rulemakings and other safety program issues. 61 FR 9740 (Mar. 11, 
1996). RSAC's charter under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public 
Law 92-463) was most recently renewed in 2012. 77 FR 28421 (May 14, 
2012).
    RSAC includes representation from all of FRA's major stakeholders, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
and other interested parties. An alphabetical list of RSAC members 
includes the following:

AAR;
American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO);
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO);
American Chemistry Council (ACC);
American Petroleum Institute (API);
American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA);
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
Association of Railway Museums (ARM);
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
The Chlorine Institute, Inc.;
Federal Transit Administration (FTA);*
The Fertilizer Institute;
High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
Institute of Makers of Explosives;
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement;*
League of Railway Industry Women;*
National Association of Railroad Passengers;
National Association of Railway Business Women;*
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association (NRCMA);
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);*
Railway Passenger Car Alliance;
Railway Supply Institute;
Safe Travel America;
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte;*
Sheet Metal Workers International Association;
Tourist Railway Association Inc.;
Transport Canada;*
Transport Workers Union of America;
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU);
Transportation Security Administration (TSA); and
United Transportation Union (UTU).

    * Indicates associate, non-voting membership.

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The task force then provides that information to the 
working group for consideration.
    If a working group comes to a unanimous consensus on 
recommendations for action, the proposal is presented to the full RSAC 
for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of RSAC, 
the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then determines what 
action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff members play an 
active role at the working group level in discussing the issues and 
options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA is 
often favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation.
    However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the RSAC recommendation, 
and the agency exercises its independent judgment on whether the 
recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly 
supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal requirements. 
Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC

[[Page 16222]]

recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final 
rule. Any such variations are noted and explained in the rulemaking 
document issued by FRA. If the working group or RSAC is unable to reach 
consensus on recommendations for action, FRA will proceed to resolve 
the issue through traditional rulemaking proceedings.

IV. RSAC Critical Incident Working Group

    The Critical Incident Task Force (Task Force) was formed as part of 
the Medical Standards Working Group, and its task statement (Task No. 
09-02) was accepted by RSAC on September 10, 2009. On July 2, 2010, FRA 
solicited bids for a grant to assess the current knowledge of post-
traumatic stress interventions and to advance evidence-based 
recommendations for controlling the risks associated with traumatic 
exposures in the railroad setting. On March 11, 2011, FRA awarded the 
grant to the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation. On May 20, 2011, 
the Task Force was reformulated into an independent working group, the 
Critical Incident Working Group (CIWG). Task No. 09-02 (amended to 
reflect the new independent working group) specified that the purpose 
of the CIWG is to provide advice regarding the development of 
implementing regulations for Critical Incident Stress Plans as required 
by the RSIA. The Task Force further assigned the CIWG to do the 
following: (1) Define what a ``critical incident'' is that requires a 
response; (2) review available data, literature, and standards of 
practice concerning critical incident programs to determine appropriate 
action when a railroad employee is involved in, or directly witnesses, 
a critical incident; (3) review any evaluation studies available for 
existing railroad critical incident programs; (4) describe program 
elements appropriate for the rail environment, including those 
requirements set forth in the RSIA; (5) provide an example of a 
suitable plan (template); and (6) assist in the preparation of a NPRM.
    Throughout 2011, the CIWG met four times. At the conclusion of the 
last meeting, an informal task force was formed to consider the 
substantive agreements made by the CIWG and to draft regulatory 
language around those agreements for the CIWG's consideration and vote. 
The small task force presented the language to the full CIWG for an 
electronic vote on August 6, 2012. The CIWG reached a consensus on all 
but one item \10\ and forwarded a proposal to the full RSAC on August 
21, 2012. RSAC voted to approve the CIWG's recommended text on 
September 27, 2012 and that recommended text provided the basis for 
this final rule. While the CIWG did discuss developing a general 
template flow chart of a suitable critical incident stress plan, as 
recommended by the Grantee's Final Report, a specific model plan that 
could be adapted and adopted by railroads was not developed by the 
CIWG. Instead, the CIWG focused its efforts on the definition of 
critical incident and the program elements essential for the regulatory 
text.
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    \10\ Consensus was not reached on the issue of whether a 
railroad should be required to provide labor organizations' general 
chairpersons (in addition to the international/national president of 
the labor organization) with a copy of a railroad's critical 
incident stress plan.
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    In addition to FRA staff, the members of the CIWG include the 
following:
    AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), Canadian 
National Railway (CN), Canadian Pacific Railway (CP), CSX 
Transportation, Inc. (CSX), The Kansas City Southern Railway Company 
(KCS), Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS), Northeast Illinois 
Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), and Union Pacific 
Railroad Company (UP);

Amtrak;
APTA, including members from Greater Cleveland Regional Transit 
Authority; Long Island Rail Road (LIRR); MTA--Metro-North Railroad; 
and Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA);
ASLRRA (representing short line and regional railroads);
ATDA;
BLET;
BMWED;
BRC/TCIU;
BRS;
NRCMA; and
UTU.

    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center attended all of the meetings of the CIWG and contributed to the 
technical discussions.
    FRA has greatly benefited from the open, informed exchange of 
information during the meetings. In developing this final rule, FRA 
relied heavily upon the work of the CIWG.

V. FRA's Approach to Critical Incident Stress Plans

    In this final rule, FRA defines the term ``critical incident'' and 
lists minimum criteria that must be addressed by each railroad's 
critical incident stress plan. The regulatory text would allow a 
railroad to utilize its existing critical incident stress plan as a 
base, making modifications as necessary to ensure compliance with the 
minimum standards contained in this final rule. The final rule would 
provide each railroad with the opportunity to conform its critical 
incident stress plan's screening and intervention components to current 
best practices and standards for evidence-based care. This flexible, 
standards-based approach allows for innovation and plan modification in 
response to new scientific developments in this field.

VI. Discussion of Public Comments and Conclusions Regarding the Final 
Rule

    FRA notified the public of its options to submit written comments 
on the NPRM and to request a public, oral hearing on the NPRM as well. 
No request for a public hearing was received. However, a number of 
interested parties submitted written comments to the docket, and FRA 
has considered all of these comments in preparing this final rule. 
Specifically, written comments were received from AAR; APTA; ATDA, 
BLET, BMWED, BRS, TCU, UTU-SMART (Labor); New York State Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North 
Railroad) (NYS MTA); the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (SEPTA); and a private citizen. FRA reviewed and analyzed 
each issue mentioned in the comments. The major points of the comments 
are addressed below, and individual points made are covered in more 
depth in the Section-by-Section Analysis.

A. Section 272.9, Definitions

    As FRA requested in the NPRM, Labor, AAR, APTA, and NYS MTA 
submitted comments addressing whether FRA should include explicit 
language in the definition of ``critical incident'' to exclude ``near 
miss'' scenarios. The commenters agree that ``near miss'' scenarios did 
not need to be included in the definition of ``critical incident.'' 
Labor, NYS MTA, and APTA emphasize that while the definition need not 
include a single ``near miss'' scenario, railroads should retain the 
discretion to apply critical incident procedures to what might be 
classified as a ``near miss'' or other situations that are not required 
by the regulation to be considered critical incidents. As such, in this 
final rule, FRA has kept the definition of ``critical incident'' the 
same as that proposed in the NPRM, and notes in the Section-by-Section 
Analysis of the definition of critical incident below that ``near 
miss'' scenarios are not required to be addressed in a railroad's 
critical incident stress plan. FRA emphasizes, however, that railroads

[[Page 16223]]

have the flexibility to determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
individual or multiple ``near miss'' scenarios should be considered a 
critical incident.
    SEPTA recommends several changes to the definitions of ``critical 
incident'' and ``directly-involved employee'' which are discussed in 
detail in the Section-by-Section Analysis below. Specifically, SEPTA 
recommends clarifying the definition of ``critical incident'' to 
include ``severe burns and readily visible gross trauma'' as a type of 
``similarly serious bodily injury.'' In the definition of ``directly-
involved employee,'' SEPTA recommends adding language clarifying what 
is meant by the terms ``closely connected'' and ``in person.'' SEPTA 
also expresses the view that railroad police and accident investigators 
should not be excluded from the definition of ``directly-involved 
employee.''
    While FRA agrees in principal with the general substance of SEPTA's 
comments, the agency does not believe that modifying the RSAC 
recommended language is necessary to address the comments. Instead, in 
response to SEPTA's comments FRA has included a discussion clarifying 
these issues in the Section-by-Section Analysis.

B. Section 272.101, Content of a Critical Incident Stress Plan

    As proposed, this section would require that a railroad's critical 
incident stress plan (CISP) contain at least provisions for carrying 
out the objectives described in paragraphs (a)-(g) of the section. FRA 
received comments in response to proposed paragraphs (a), (e), and (f) 
of this section, and regarding FRA's preamble discussion of what would 
constitute ``appropriate support services'' in accordance with proposed 
paragraph (d). After careful consideration of the comments received, 
FRA is adopting the regulatory language of this section as proposed, 
with the exception of clarifying amendments to paragraphs (a) and (f). 
A more detailed discussion of FRA's analysis of the comments received 
is found in the Section-by-Section Analysis below.

C. Section 272.103, Submission of a Critical Incident Stress Plan

    As proposed, Sec.  272.103(b) requires, in part, that each railroad 
serve a copy of its proposed CISP (or a material modification to an 
existing CISP) on the international president/national president of any 
non-profit employee labor organization representing a class or craft of 
the railroad's employees covered by its CISP. As FRA requested in the 
NPRM, several commenters discuss this service list requirement. 
Consistent with the views expressed by Labor representatives during 
CIWG meetings, Labor disagrees with FRA's proposal to limit service of 
a proposed CISP to only the international/national president of the 
relevant Labor organizations, while AAR supports the proposed service 
list requirement. For the reasons discussed in more detail in the 
Section-by-Section Analysis below, in this final rule FRA is 
maintaining the proposed regulatory language requiring railroads to 
provide copies of proposed CISPs to the international/national 
president of any relevant labor organization representing a class or 
craft of the railroad's employees covered by its CISP.

D. Section 272.105, Option To File Critical Incident Stress Plan 
Electronically

    As proposed, Sec.  272.105 provided for optional electronic 
submission of CISPs to FRA for approval. Responding to FRA's request 
for comments on whether the option to file critical incident stress 
plans electronically should be mandatory, Labor and AAR express support 
for electronic submission. FRA received no comments opposing mandatory 
electronic submission of CISPs. Accordingly, as discussed in the 
Section-by-Section Analysis below, in this final rule FRA has modified 
the regulatory language of proposed Sec.  272.105 to require railroads 
to electronically submit CISPs to FRA for approval.

E. Comments on the Economic Analysis

    AAR believes that FRA may have overstated the potential benefit of 
the proposed rule, because much of the estimated potential benefit is 
attributable to reduced employee healthcare costs, and such benefit is 
speculative. AAR reminds FRA that railroads already have critical 
incident stress programs that include some or all of the elements that 
would be required by the proposed rule. Despite this noted concern, AAR 
emphasizes that it generally supports the proposed rule. APTA suggests 
that FRA relied on insufficient data in structuring the proposed rule. 
APTA notes that the rule did not use data on the U.S. railroad worker 
experience with PTSD or acute stress. Because FRA referred to a 
Norwegian railroad study and used an exposure rate that does not cover 
all possible incidents that would be covered by the rule in its 
economic estimates, APTA questions how FRA's cost analysis can be 
valid. APTA also expresses concern with FRA's use of sources from 
veterans and military institutions, as these are not comparable to the 
railroad business environment.
    FRA noted in the preamble to the NPRM that systematic empirical 
studies of the impact of these events on the health of exposed railroad 
personnel are limited.\11\ However, FRA emphasizes that the data used 
in its economic analysis is the best available research data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Some factors that hinder FRA's ability to determine the 
rates of ASD and PTSD in exposed railroad employees are: (1) Some 
exposed employees may be seeking care from their private mental 
health care practitioners and not through a railroad EAP; (2) some 
exposed employees who need evaluation and treatment for ASD and PTSD 
are not seeking it; and (3) Labor and EAP concerns about medical 
confidentiality may limit access to the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Section-by-Section Analysis

    Unless noted otherwise, please refer to the extensive discussion in 
the NPRM, as FRA has generally adopted the rule text as proposed in the 
NPRM.

Subpart A--General

    Subpart A of the final rule contains the general provisions of the 
rule, including a statement of the rule's purpose, an application 
section, a statement of general duty, the critical incident stress plan 
coverage section, a definitions section that includes the central 
definition of a ``critical incident,'' and a statement pertaining to 
penalties. As discussed further in the definitions section, Sec.  
272.9, this final rule defines a ``critical incident'' as either--(1) 
An accident/incident reportable to FRA under 49 CFR part 225 that 
results in a fatality, loss of limb, or a similarly serious bodily 
injury; or (2) A catastrophic accident/incident reportable to FRA under 
part 225 that could be reasonably expected to impair a directly-
involved employee's ability to perform his or her job duties safely.
    As no comments were received in response to Sec. Sec.  272.1 
through 272.7 and 272.11, FRA is adopting the regulatory language for 
these sections as proposed in the NPRM.
Section 272.9 Definitions
    Section 272.9 defines a number of terms used in this part. FRA 
received comments regarding the proposed definitions of ``critical 
incident'' and ``directly-involved employee.'' After careful 
consideration of the comments received and for the reasons discussed 
generally in section VI.A above and in this Section-by-Section 
Analysis, in this final rule FRA is adopting both definitions as 
proposed in the NPRM.
    In the NPRM, FRA proposed to define critical incident as (1) An 
accident/

[[Page 16224]]

incident reportable to FRA under 49 CFR part 225 that results in a 
fatality, loss of limb, or a similarly serious bodily injury; or (2) A 
catastrophic accident/incident reportable to FRA under part 225 that 
could be reasonably expected to impair a directly-involved employee's 
ability to perform his or her job duties safely. As noted in the NPRM, 
this definition reflects the recommendations made by the CIWG and by 
further limiting the definition of ``critical incident'' to accidents/
incidents that are reportable under part 225, all accidents and 
incidents not arising from railroad operations are excluded from the 
definition.
    While a reportable accident/incident could cover many incidents 
that relate to railroad operations, as proposed and as adopted in this 
final rule, the definition of ``critical incident'' includes only an 
accident/incident that results in a fatality, loss of limb, or a 
similarly serious bodily injury or a catastrophic accident/incident 
reportable to FRA under part 225 of this chapter that could be 
reasonably expected to impair a directly-involved employee's ability to 
perform his or her job duties safely. Accordingly, minimal injuries in 
the railroad workplace are not included in the scope of this 
definition. Similarly, as explained in the analysis of the proposed 
definition of ``critical incident'' in the NPRM, ``near miss'' 
scenarios (i.e., situations which when seen in hindsight could have 
resulted in an accident, but did not) are not included.
    In its comments related to the proposed definition of ``critical 
incident,'' SEPTA recommends that the definition be modified to include 
``severe burns and readily visible gross trauma'' as an example of a 
``similarly serious bodily injury.'' Although FRA agrees with SEPTA 
that severe burns and readily visible gross trauma could be a 
``similarly serious bodily injury,'' FRA does not believe it is 
necessary to revise the definition to include that specific phrase.
    In the NPRM, FRA specifically requested comment as to whether the 
proposed definition of ``critical incident'' should contain explicit 
language excluding ``near miss'' scenarios. A ``near miss'' is an 
event, seen in hindsight, in which an accident could have occurred, but 
was narrowly avoided. For example, an automobile is rendered inoperable 
on the railroad tracks at a highway-rail grade crossing, but the 
automobile is able to get out of the way of the oncoming train, so that 
a collision is averted. In response to this request, FRA received 
comments from Labor, AAR, APTA, and NYS MTA.
    Labor states that it ``do[es] not believe there is any need to 
cover a single `near miss' scenario, like a close call at a grade 
crossing that did not result in a collision, since the FRA chose to 
point to 49 CFR part 225 to clarify what would be considered an 
accident/incident.'' But, Labor suggests that the rule should ``allow 
for consideration of multiple `near miss' scenarios as a `critical 
incident.' '' AAR comments that ``[t]he RSAC working group discussed 
near misses at length and concluded that the regulations should not 
encompass near misses.'' AAR notes that there is no evidence that 
individuals generally suffer significant trauma from near misses. AAR 
raises the issue that ``including near misses would present significant 
compliance and enforcement issues,'' as it would be difficult to define 
a ``near miss'' and it would be difficult for a railroad to know when a 
``near miss'' occurs. AAR suggests that ``[w]hether in the rule text or 
in the preamble, FRA needs to be clear that near misses are not 
critical incidents.'' NYS MTA states that it ``support[s] FRA's 
position that the applicable science does not appear to support 
including `near miss' scenarios in the rule and that `near miss' issues 
should be handled by each railroad on an individual basis.'' APTA 
agrees, saying that it ``strongly supports FRA's intention to not 
include Near Miss incidents in the regulatory definition.'' At the same 
time, however, APTA notes that ``passenger railroads need to have the 
discretionary authority within their critical incident plans to apply 
critical incident procedures to what might be classified a near miss or 
otherwise fall outside of the definitions proposed in the regulation.''
    As discussed thoroughly in the NPRM, while a ``near miss'' event 
could cause a negative stress-reaction in a train crew, research 
demonstrates that such reaction would typically only occur in 
situations where, for example, an individual had been involved in a 
prior similar incident which had catastrophic consequences or there 
were other issues at play. FRA believes that such ``near miss'' 
scenarios should be handled by each railroad on an individual basis, as 
the applicable science does not appear to support including ``near 
miss'' scenarios in the rule generally. Additionally, FRA agrees with 
AAR's comment that it would be difficult for railroads to comply with 
and for FRA to enforce the regulation regarding a ``near miss,'' as a 
railroad would not necessarily have evidence of such an occurrence. 
Accordingly, although FRA is not revising the definition of ``critical 
incident'' to specifically exclude ``near miss'' events, FRA notes that 
the reference to part 225 in the definition makes clear that a single 
``near miss'' event would not be considered a ``critical incident'' in 
accordance with this rule. FRA further notes that this final rule does 
not prohibit a railroad from implementing a critical incident stress 
plan that provides flexibility for a railroad to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether individual or multiple ``near miss'' scenarios 
should be considered a critical incident.
    In the NPRM, FRA proposed to define ``directly-involved employee'' 
to mean a railroad employee covered under proposed Sec.  272.7 who 
falls into any of three stated subcategories: (1) Whose actions are 
closely connected to the critical incident; (2) who witnesses the 
critical incident in person as it occurs or who witnesses the immediate 
effects of the critical incident in person; or (3) who is charged to 
directly intervene in, or respond to, the critical incident (excluding 
railroad police officers or investigators who routinely respond to and 
are specially trained to handle emergencies).
    SEPTA comments that the phrase ``closely connected'' in 
subparagraph (1) of the definition is ``vague'' and ``risks subjective 
interpretations.'' SEPTA recommends replacing the term ``closely 
connected'' with ``include an immediate presence at the covered 
critical incident or whose contemporaneous, co-incidental participation 
contributed to the incident--limited to train and engine personnel; 
control and dispatch personnel; and employees who inspect, install, 
repair, or maintain the involved right-of-way, structures, rolling-
stock, and communications and signals apparatus.''
    FRA finds that SEPTA's proposed modification would be unwieldy if 
included in the regulatory text. Additionally, the language that SEPTA 
recommends (``limited to train and engine personnel; control and 
dispatch personnel; and employees who inspect, install, repair, or 
maintain the involved right-of-way, structures, rolling-stock, and 
communications and signals apparatus'') is unnecessary. This 
recommended limitation encompasses the ``covered'' employees listed 
under Sec.  272.7, and such persons are already the types of railroad 
employees included in the definition of ``directly-involved employee.'' 
In response to SEPTA's comment, FRA notes that an employee ``closely 
connected'' to a critical incident is intended to mean an employee 
whose actions directly contribute to the incident (those actions

[[Page 16225]]

could be merely the actions of carrying out the individual's job 
functions, e.g., by operating a train), or whose contemporaneous 
actions (or inaction) directly contribute to the incident. An example 
of when an employee may be ``closely connected'' to a critical 
incident, even though he or she is not at the incident scene and 
witnessing the incident in person, is a situation where an act or 
omission by that employee (such as a train dispatcher) causes or 
contributes to a critical incident (e.g., a dispatcher authorizes a 
movement in error which results in a collision).
    The second subcategory is an employee covered under Sec.  272.7 who 
``witnesses the critical incident in person as it occurs or who 
witnesses the immediate effects of the critical incident in person.'' 
As noted in the preamble to the NPRM, this could include an employee 
who is working alongside the track when a highway-rail grade crossing 
collision occurs, and either sees the incident happen or comes upon the 
casualties of the incident. SEPTA comments that ``the term `in person' 
is too vague and could include a witness who views the occurrence from 
afar or remotely via a live video feed.'' SEPTA recommends that FRA 
modify the text to say: ``who was present on-site or immediately 
proximal to the critical incident locale and observed the immediate 
prelude, actual incident, and/or immediate effects therefrom.'' SEPTA 
asserts that its suggested revision ``may also minimize possible 
exploitation of the regulation's provision[s]'' for relief from duty 
for directly-involved employees.
    FRA does not intend the term ``in person'' to mean a witness who 
views the occurrence from afar or remotely via a live video feed. As 
explicitly explained in the NPRM preamble, the phrase ``witnesses . . . 
in person'' is intended to exclude employees who only hear about the 
accident/incident (such as over the radio) and are not otherwise 
directly involved in the accident/incident. See 78 FR 38885. The phrase 
``in person'' was recommended by the CIWG small task force. FRA 
believes that the task force's language is clear and that as a matter 
of plain English, the term ``in person'' is commonly understood to mean 
that an individual is ``actually present.'' Accordingly, FRA declines 
to adopt SEPTA's proposed modification in the regulatory text. However, 
FRA reiterates that ``in person'' is intended to encompass persons who 
were present on-site or immediately proximal to the critical incident 
locale and observed the immediate prelude, actual incident, and/or 
immediate effects therefrom.
    The third subcategory would include an employee covered under Sec.  
272.7 who is charged to directly intervene in, or respond to, the 
highway-rail grade crossing accident/incident, such as craft and 
supervisory employees who are called out to the scene. Consistent with 
the intent of the CIWG, the proposed language specifically excluded 
``railroad police officers or investigators who routinely respond to 
and are specially trained to handle emergencies.'' During the RSAC 
process, members of the CIWG specifically indicated that the rule 
should not cover railroad police officers and railroad investigators 
who routinely respond to such incidents and are specially trained to 
handle such emergency matters.
    As discussed above, SEPTA comments that ``[t]he term `specially 
trained' excludes railroad police and accident investigators from the 
provisions set forth in the critical stress regulation based on an 
assumption that this population is immune to the subject stressors.'' 
SEPTA recommends that FRA ``include both railroad police as well as 
accident investigators.'' Contrary to SEPTA's statement, however, FRA 
did not assume that railroad police and accident investigators were 
``immune to the subject stressors.'' Rather, this exclusion was based 
on a practical concern. It would be unworkable if specially-trained 
personnel were to respond to a critical incident, but then seek 
immediate relief while on the job responding to the type of accident 
for which they are trained and required to respond. Consistent with the 
recommendations of the CIWG, FRA believes that such specially-trained 
response personnel should receive assistance and resources to help them 
cope with and handle such stressors, specifically tailored to their 
unique positions. FRA finds that this rule would not necessarily apply 
to such persons appropriately. However, FRA notes that nothing in this 
rule prohibits a railroad from applying its critical incident stress 
plan more broadly than what is required in this regulation to include 
railroad police and accident investigators as it sees fit.

Subpart B--Plan Components and Approval Process

    This subpart contains the basic components of the critical incident 
stress plan required by this rule and the elements of the approval 
process. This rule affords railroads considerable discretion in the 
administration of their critical incident stress plans.
Section 272.101 Content of a Critical Incident Stress Plan
    As discussed in section VI.B above, FRA is adopting the regulatory 
text for this section as proposed, with the exception of clarifying 
amendments to Sec.  272.101(a) and (f).
    As noted in the preamble to the NPRM, the objective of this 
regulation is to allow each railroad to utilize its existing critical 
incident stress plan as a base, making modifications as necessary to 
ensure compliance with minimum standards, and to enhance conformity of 
the plan's screening and intervention components to current best 
practices and standards for evidence-based care. A railroad's CISP 
should document that the railroad has taken sufficient steps to 
establish how each element of the plan can be satisfactorily executed 
in covered critical incidents.
    Section 272.101 requires that a railroad's critical incident stress 
plan contain at least provisions for carrying out the objectives 
described in paragraphs (a)-(g) of the section. Among these designated 
objectives are allowing a directly-involved employee to obtain relief 
from the remainder of the tour of duty, providing for the directly-
involved employee's transportation to the home terminal (if 
applicable), and offering a directly-involved employee appropriate 
support services following a critical incident. The specific details of 
each plan may vary, but the plans must be consistent with this section.
    As proposed by paragraph (a) of the section, a railroad's CISP must 
provide for ``[i]nforming each directly-involved employee as soon as 
practicable of the stress relief options that he or she may 
request[.]'' AAR comments that it prefers the RSAC text (``an employee 
must be informed as soon as practicable that the employee may request 
relief''), asserting that it ``does not understand what FRA means by 
the reference to ``stress relief options.'' FRA declines to revert to 
the exact RSAC text in the final rule, but FRA does note that this 
provision means that a directly-involved employee needs to be reminded 
of the relief options available to him or her after a critical incident 
(i.e., that the employee may request relief from the remainder of the 
duty tour, may be provided transportation to the employee's home 
terminal, may receive relief from the duty tour(s) subsequent to the 
critical incident, and may seek additional relief as necessary and 
reasonable to receive preventive services or treatment) as soon as 
practicable following a critical incident. Although all employees 
covered under Sec.  272.7 should already be cognizant of

[[Page 16226]]

the opportunity to request relief following a critical incident, 
directly-involved employees must be reminded of their options for 
relief as soon as it is practicable after the occurrence of a critical 
incident. FRA's intent with this provision is to emphasize that an 
employee's opportunity for relief from service must be effectively 
communicated to covered employees. Of course, if a covered employee has 
been seriously injured and has already been relieved from duty for the 
remainder of the tour, it is not necessary to notify the employee of 
the opportunity to be relieved.
    FRA intended that the meaning of this provision, as modified, was 
to remain the same as the RSAC recommended text (that an employee must 
be informed as soon as practicable that the employee may request relief 
from the remainder of the duty tour, may be provided transportation to 
the employee's home terminal, may receive relief from the duty tour(s) 
subsequent to the critical incident, and may seek additional relief as 
necessary and reasonable to receive preventive services or treatment). 
However, FRA was concerned that the language as recommended by RSAC, 
``informing each directly-involved employee as soon as practicable that 
he or she may request relief,'' was too vague. As a result, in the 
NPRM, FRA proposed the regulatory text to state ``informing each 
directly-involved employee as soon as practical of the stress relief 
options that he or she may request.'' To further clarify the intention 
of this provision and in response to AAR's request for clarification, 
FRA is modifying the rule text in Sec.  272.101(a) to require that a 
railroad's CISP contain a provision ``informing each directly-involved 
employee as soon as practicable of the relief options available in 
accordance with the railroad's critical incident stress plan.''
    FRA recommends that a typical plan specify an appropriate time to 
notify affected employees of the option to seek relief, such as, 
``employees must be notified at the incident site of their opportunity 
to be relieved.'' This reminder of the option to seek relief must be 
made during the early communications between the employee and the 
dispatcher and/or railroad management, before the employee has already 
continued on with his or her tour of duty or much time has elapsed.
    As proposed, paragraph (d) of the section would require that a 
railroad's CISP must provide for ``offering counseling, guidance, and 
other appropriate support services to each directly-involved 
employee.'' FRA received several general comments with respect to the 
NPRM's preamble discussion of ``appropriate support services'' in this 
context. A private citizen, Ms. Jill Simons, comments that ``EAP 
availability should be mandatory in light of [traumatic] events, not 
just in the railroad industry but across all industries.'' She believes 
that ``[s]upervisors should receive training to recognize when an 
employee is suffering from [PTSD] and be able to recommend or refer 
that employee to a company sponsored [sic] EAP.''
    FRA appreciates Ms. Simons' comments. First, FRA notes that it does 
not regulate other industries, thus it cannot mandate EAP availability 
across all industries. This regulation puts into place requirements 
that help to prevent ASD, PTSD, and other psychiatric disorders (e.g., 
depression) following a critical incident related to railroad 
operations. FRA requires that a railroad's CISP include provision of 
counseling, guidance, and other appropriate support services be offered 
to each directly-involved employee. A railroad may utilize an EAP to 
satisfy that requirement. FRA agrees with Ms. Simons' comments about 
training. As FRA noted in the NPRM, to implement a CISP, all relevant 
railroad employees, from managers at headquarters to employees at the 
local level, must be made aware of the railroad's plan and the specific 
requirements of the plan and must be trained on how to implement the 
requirements of the plan relevant to the employee. See 78 FR 38878, 
38888. FRA intends that any training requirements, including the 
training of supervisors and other management officials responsible for 
implementing the plans, will be covered by FRA's proposed new training 
regulation. See 77 FR 6412 (Feb. 7, 2012). FRA expects all railroad 
plans to provide for training on how a supervisor or other railroad 
employee should interact with an employee who is directly-involved in a 
critical incident, and training about what every directly-involved 
employee should do following a critical incident.
    To clarify, FRA does not expect a railroad supervisor or manager to 
be trained in diagnosing PTSD. PTSD is a clinical diagnosis. As such, 
the presence or absence of signs and symptoms of PTSD should be 
assessed and diagnosed only by licensed clinical mental health 
practitioners (i.e., psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and 
licensed clinical social workers). FRA notes that supervisors and other 
non-mental health professionals responsible for implementing a 
railroad's CISP may benefit from training in ``Psychological First 
Aid.'' Psychological First Aid is a recommended non-clinical technique 
that railroads and trained lay people can utilize to provide directly-
involved employees ``situational knowledge'' that would help these 
employees gain ready access to counseling, guidance, and other required 
support services, and reduce the initial psychological distress that 
employees involved in a critical incident may experience. In addition, 
FRA understands that providing ``pre-incident'' education and training 
to employees who may become directly-involved in a critical incident is 
an essential element of a CISP because it helps to protect the employee 
from psychological and emotional harm should a critical incident occur. 
Pre-incident education and training for employees should be structured 
to provide employees information about normal reactions to stress, ways 
to cope with stress, and options for leave, counseling, and other 
support services.
    Both SEPTA and APTA express concern with FRA's discussion in the 
NPRM preamble regarding the specific intervention element of ``critical 
stress debriefing.'' As a point of clarification, FRA understands that 
the term ``debriefing'' is sometimes used to mean different things. For 
example, the term ``debriefing'' may be used within the railroad 
community to mean a process of non-confrontational dialogue that is 
initiated after a railroad accident/incident by the railroad or 
investigators to elicit facts or statements from employees directly-
involved in an accident/incident. The purpose of such fact-finding 
debriefings is to identify and analyze factors that may have 
contributed to the occurrence of an accident/incident and determine 
potential remedies that can be implemented to prevent the same 
accident/incident from happening again. Nothing in this part should be 
construed to prohibit such fact-finding debriefings. FRA also 
understands that the term ``debriefing'' is sometimes used in a very 
different way, to mean ``critical incident stress debriefing'' (CISD). 
CISD is a facilitator-led group process intended to support normal 
recovery processes and the restoration of adaptive functions in 
psychologically healthy people who are distressed after experiencing a 
traumatic event such as a critical incident. In addition, participants 
can be screened during the process to identify participants who need 
additional support services or referral for treatment. Generally, each 
participant is encouraged to describe what he or she experienced at the 
time of the accident/incident and in its aftermath. In addition to 
describing

[[Page 16227]]

what happened during a critical incident from his or her own 
perspective, each participant is encouraged to describe his or her 
personal thoughts and reactions to the incident; and any cognitive, 
physical, emotional, or behavioral symptoms the participant has 
experienced since the event. CISD participants are then presented 
information to help them understand normal stress reactions, their 
symptoms, things that they can do to cope with stress, and follow-
up.\12\ FRA noted in the preamble to the NPRM that the ``specific 
intervention element of `critical stress debriefing' in the scientific 
literature is contraindicated, as it has not been shown to be effective 
and may actually be harmful in some instances.'' 78 FR 38886-38887. 
Examples of hypothetical explanations for findings that ``critical 
incident stress debriefings'' may cause harm in some instances include: 
(1) group participants have different levels of distress, symptoms, and 
vulnerability to ASD and PTSD, and may be further distressed by hearing 
each of the other participants describe their experience; (2) some 
participants may feel stigmatized by having more severe psychological 
and emotional reactions and symptoms than their peers; (3) some 
participants may, in certain instances, be rejected by certain 
participants in the group for expressing their feelings; and (4) some 
participants who were not traumatized by the incident may react 
negatively to ``critical incident stress debriefing.'' \13\ FRA 
concluded that a specific element of ``critical [incident] stress 
debriefing'' would not be an ``appropriate support service.'' 
Accordingly, FRA indicated that the agency would not approve a CISP 
containing a specific program element of ``critical [incident] stress 
debriefing.'' Id. at 38887. ``Psychological First Aid'' (PFA), in 
contrast to ``critical incident stress debriefing,'' is a flexible, 
evidence-informed intervention which is tailored to the individual who 
has experienced a traumatic event. PFA emphasizes a nonintrusive and 
compassionate approach to providing an individual who has experienced a 
critical incident practical assistance with immediate needs, safety and 
comfort, and assistance in establishing connections with primary 
support networks and social resources, as well as information about 
common reactions to trauma, ways to cope with stress, follow-up, and 
how to access additional support services, including treatment (if 
needed). PFA does not encourage or require individuals to express their 
experience, including their emotional reactions and symptoms, to peers 
in a group setting. The goals of PFA are to decrease the initial 
distress associated with exposure to a traumatic event and to improve 
adaptive functioning.\14\ FRA notes that, in contrast to CISD, research 
has shown PFA to be effective in reducing the initial psychological 
distress that may normally occur in individuals who have experienced a 
traumatic event. It has not been shown to cause harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See Mitchell, J. T., Critical incident stress debriefing 
(CISD) (2008) (Retrieved from http://www.info-trauma.org/flash/media-e/mitchellCriticalIncidentStressDebriefing.pdf on January 23, 
2014); Mitchell J.T., Everly G.S. Jr., Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing: An Operations Manual for CISD, Defusing and Other Group 
Crisis Intervention Services, 3rd ed., Chevron Publishing 
Corporation (2001); Mitchell J.T., Everly G.S., Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing: (CISD)., Chevron Publishing Co (1993); Mitchell, 
J. T., When disaster strikes: the critical incident stress 
debriefing process. Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 8, 36-39 
(1983).
    \13\ See Briere J., Can you give our staff some guidance on the 
appropriate use of critical incident stress debriefing and 
psychological first aid?, Psychiatric Times, (2006) (Retrieved from 
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/printpdf/162160).
    \14\ See National Child Traumatic Stress Network and National 
Center for PTSD. Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide, 
2nd ed. Los Angeles, CA: National Child Traumatic Stress Network; 
2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Both SEPTA and APTA express concern with FRA's expressed position 
in the NPRM pertaining to CISD. SEPTA states that the CISD technique 
``was never intended to be standalone treatment, but does have efficacy 
as a form of `psychological first aid.''' Further, SEPTA explains that 
``the [CISD] technique may be effective when applied to the correct 
population by a properly trained practitioner'' and that it is a 
technique ``best applied to police, firefighters, and emergency medical 
personnel.'' While SEPTA agrees that CISD can be less effective and 
potentially harmful under certain circumstances, SEPTA argues that the 
technique ``should not be banned as a component of a railroad's plan.'' 
APTA states that ``[s]everal passenger railroads currently use CISD 
with positive results'' and consistent with SEPTA's comment, asserts 
that FRA should not ``summarily dismiss this treatment option without a 
more thorough review of its application in the railroad environment.''
    Additionally, in response to FRA's request for input on the NPRM, 
SAMHSA expressed agreement with FRA's proposal to limit or phase out 
``debriefings'' and instead utilize ``psychological first aid and other 
evidence informed approaches for assisting survivors of disasters or 
tragic incidences.'' SAMHSA further commented, however, that the agency 
``has learned that there are recent findings where the debriefing model 
is evolving and appears to be headed in the right direction'' and that 
``the debriefing model is still regarded as relevant among both the law 
enforcement and fire fighter cultures.''
    FRA acknowledges that CISD has been used as an intervention for law 
enforcement, firefighter, and emergency medical personnel who have 
experienced traumatic events. However, as noted in the preamble to the 
NPRM, research studies have not clearly demonstrated that CISD is 
effective in preventing ASD or PTSD, and studies have shown that it may 
be harmful in certain instances. See 78 FR at 38886-87. Accordingly, 
because CISD has not been demonstrated as effective in preventing ASD 
or PTSD and may actually cause harm in certain instances, FRA cannot 
conclude that CISD is an ``appropriate support service'' to be included 
as a specific element of a railroad's CISP. Further, in contrast to 
CISD, PFA does not encourage or require individuals to express their 
experience, including their emotional reactions and symptoms, to peers 
in a group setting. As such, FRA does not believe that ``psychological 
first aid'' has the same meaning as either ``debriefing'' or ``critical 
incident stress debriefing.'' For these reasons, if a railroad's plan 
proposes to utilize CISD as a specific intervention element for the 
purposes of this part, FRA will not approve the plan.
    FRA notes that ``psychological first aid'' has been shown to be 
effective in reducing the initial psychological distress that may 
normally occur in individuals who have experienced a traumatic event. 
It has not been shown to cause harm. The provision of PFA as a specific 
intervention element of a critical incident stress plan is strongly 
recommended. FRA recommends PFA be utilized by trained supervisors and 
EAP counselors and other mental health providers when responding to a 
critical incident to provide directly-involved employees information 
that is specified in a railroad's FRA-approved CISP, including: 
information about the availability of timely options for relief and 
transportation to the employee's home terminal; the availability of 
counseling, guidance, and other appropriate support services; options 
for relief from the duty tour(s) subsequent to the critical incident; 
and options for additional leave from normal duty.
    Under proposed paragraph (e) of the section and as adopted in this 
final rule, a railroad's CISP would be required to ``permit[ ] relief 
from the duty tour(s)

[[Page 16228]]

subsequent to the critical incident, for an amount of time to be 
determined by each railroad.'' As noted in the preamble to the NPRM, 
the language proposed was modified from the RSAC-approved language to 
include the qualifying phrase ``for an amount of time to be determined 
by each railroad . . . as may be necessary and reasonable'' in order to 
add context and clarity to the requirement. A few commenters express 
disagreement with the proposed language, while others support the 
modified language as proposed. First, Labor disagrees with FRA's 
contention that the modification ``adds clarity,'' and suggests that 
``FRA should follow the example of the plans that are out there today 
and stipulate `three days.' '' Labor argues that ``railroads should not 
be allowed to continue to make a unilateral decision to deny any time 
off for an employee involved with a critical incident.'' NYS MTA 
recommends that the language be revised back to the RSAC language. 
SEPTA recommends adding additional qualifying language to the paragraph 
requiring that the employee requesting relief be availing him or 
herself to the ``pro-offered EAP counseling, guidance, and support 
services.'' APTA, on the other hand, expresses support for the language 
proposed by FRA because it ``strengthens the intent of the coping 
period as caring for the employee in each situation is different and 
tasks the railroad to make the determination rather than trying to make 
it a regulatory requirement.''
    FRA intends this provision to require that railroads' CISPs address 
how much additional time off an employee affected by a critical 
incident may receive and as Labor comments, FRA is attempting to guide 
the railroads to select an appropriate amount of time in their 
individual plans that an employee can request additional time off in 
order to cope with the critical incident. As FRA noted in the preamble 
to the NPRM, many railroads currently offer employees involved in 
critical incidents relief from the immediate tour of duty along with 
transportation to the employee's home terminal, then provide up to 
three days off along with consultation with an EAP, if any, and/or 
occupational medicine staff. This provides directly-involved employees 
with an opportunity, away from the railroad environment, to cope with 
having experienced a critical incident. This is an amount of time to be 
determined by each railroad to allow for a reasonable amount of rest 
and time following a critical incident (without necessitating a 
clinical diagnosis). Because the particular amount of time off in this 
context is not necessarily tied to any particular scientific evidence, 
FRA believes the regulatory requirement should be neutral on the amount 
of additional time a railroad should permit beyond the tour of duty 
during which the critical incident occurred. FRA believes the specific 
time period for this coping period is an issue better resolved by each 
railroad on a case-by-case basis and should not be mandated by FRA. 
Accordingly, FRA has not modified the regulatory text in Sec.  
272.101(e) from the NPRM. FRA notes, however, that it expects that most 
railroads would simply use the three-day period that has been common 
practice in the industry. The three-day period may comport well with 
duty schedules and provide a sufficient coping period for many 
employees involved in a critical incident.
    FRA also appreciates SEPTA's recommendation that FRA add the phrase 
to Sec.  272.101(e), ``so long as the requestor is availing themselves 
of pro-offered EAP counseling, guidance, and support services.'' FRA 
expects that all employees who are relieved from a tour of duty 
following a critical incident are put into contact with an EAP. Thus, 
while FRA does not agree that a clinical diagnosis should be required 
for additional leave to be granted for time to ``cope'' with what 
happened, EAP counseling, guidance, and support services should be 
employed during this process to ensure that an employee's needs are 
addressed appropriately.
    As proposed, paragraph (f) of this section would require a 
railroad's CISP to provide for permitting employees directly-involved 
in a critical incident additional leave from duty ``as may be necessary 
and reasonable to receive preventative services or treatment related to 
the incident, or both.'' Commenters generally express support for this 
provision, noting that most existing railroad CISPs provide for such 
additional time off. However, noting that many passenger railroads' 
existing CISPs permit leave in addition to the duty tour(s) subsequent 
to the critical incident (covered by paragraph (e) of the section) if a 
clinical diagnosis supports the need for additional time off, both NYS 
MTA and APTA recommend that FRA modify this paragraph to make clear 
that an employee's request for additional time off must be supported by 
a clinical diagnosis. Specifically, APTA recommends that the paragraph 
be revised to reflect industry practice by requiring a clinical 
diagnosis and treatment plan be established as a basis for an 
employee's continued leave from duty tours subsequent to the critical 
incident (i.e., subsequent to the ``coping period''). Further, NYS MTA 
notes that ``FRA's analysis of the economic impact [of the rule] may be 
underestimating the costs if the regulation allows additional time off 
beyond the `coping period' without a clinical diagnosis.'' The proposed 
language is consistent with the language of Section 410, as well as the 
RSAC recommended language. However, in light of commenters concerns and 
to clarify the intention of this provision, FRA is modifying paragraph 
(f) to require a railroad's CISP to include a provision ``[p]ermitting 
each directly-involved employee such additional leave from normal duty 
as may be necessary and reasonable to receive preventive services or 
treatment related to the incident or both, provided the employee is in 
consultation with a health care professional.'' In this manner, FRA 
expects that additional leave requested, beyond the coping period 
specified in Sec.  272.101(e), would be supported by a clinical 
diagnosis, or would be granted in consultation with a health care 
professional (e.g., in instances where affected individuals are seeking 
care from a health care professional, but for practical reasons do not 
yet have a clinical diagnosis or are receiving preventive services from 
a health care professional).
Section 272.103 Submission of Critical Incident Stress Plan for 
Approval by FRA
    As proposed, Sec.  272.103 requires a railroad to submit its CISP 
to FRA for approval, and in accordance with paragraph (b) provide a 
copy of its CISP and any material modifications to the international/
national president of any non-profit employee labor organization 
representing a class or craft of the railroad's employees subject to 
this rule. As FRA requested in the NPRM, several commenters discuss the 
service list requirement of paragraph (b). Consistent with the views 
expressed by Labor representatives during CIWG meetings, Labor 
disagrees with FRA's proposal to limit service of a proposed CISP to 
only the international/national president of the relevant Labor 
organizations. Instead, Labor reiterates the views it expressed during 
the RSAC working group meetings, stating that because ``general 
chairpersons are the designated collective bargaining representatives 
with day-to-day responsibility for direct interaction with railroad 
management and the union membership'' and because each CISP is an ``on-
property program unique to each railroad,'' railroads should be 
required to provide a copy of a proposed CISP (or material modification 
to a CISP) to each general

[[Page 16229]]

chairperson. Moreover, Labor asserts that such a requirement would not 
be burdensome on the railroads as they already communicate with those 
individuals nearly daily.
    In contrast, noting that there are well over 40 general 
chairpersons on some railroads, AAR supports FRA's proposed rule text 
because ``labor presidents are perfectly capable of circulating 
proposed plans to those in their organizations.'' AAR asserts that 
``[r]equiring service on general chairs would result in service lists 
with large numbers of people, which might lead to a railroad 
inadvertently not serving a general chair.'' NYS MTA notes that the 
process outlined in proposed Sec.  272.103(b) is ``consistent with 
notification requirements used for FRA's conductor certification and 
minimum training standards regulations.'' APTA similarly comments that 
it ``sees no advantage in providing wide circulation of the plan and 
supports only involving the labor organization representatives 
maintained on the service lists used by each railroad.''
    While FRA understands Labor's position, FRA's requirement in Sec.  
272.103(b) was intended to be consistent with other proposed and final 
FRA regulations, such as the NPRM on training standards (77 FR 6412, 
Feb. 7, 2012) and the final rule on conductor certification (76 FR 
69802, Nov. 9, 2011). If FRA required service to general chairpersons 
as well, such a large mandatory service list could pose a potential 
compliance problem for the railroads. FRA notes that the designated 
points of contact on the service lists in existence for collective 
bargaining purposes may be used so long as that service list conforms 
to the requirement in the rule that requires the railroad to serve the 
``international/national president of any non-profit employee labor 
organization representing a class or craft of the railroad's employees 
subject to this part.'' Of course, FRA would not take exception if a 
railroad and labor organization agreed to include additional persons on 
this service list.
    AAR, NYS MTA, and APTA also note that FRA requested comment on 
whether FRA should require that railroad management consult with 
railroad employees on the formation of critical incident programs, as 
is required for system safety plans by the RSIA. Noting that railroads 
already have critical incident stress plans in place with which Labor 
is already familiar, all three commenters express the view that adding 
such a consultation requirement would be unnecessary and undesirable. 
Although FRA appreciates these comments, FRA notes that in the NPRM the 
agency was seeking comments on the issue of the service list, not on a 
consultation requirement. FRA was attempting to explain that while the 
System Safety Program NPRM required a service list that included 
general chairpersons, that regulation also required consultation (as 
mandated by the RSIA). The RSIA did not require consultation for the 
critical incident regulation nor is FRA including such a requirement in 
this final rule.
    The final rule contemplates that railroads may submit existing 
critical incident stress plans to FRA for approval that have previously 
been established through any applicable collective bargaining 
agreement. However, in order to satisfy the eventual final rule, any 
preexisting critical incident stress plan would have to contain all 
prescribed elements of the plan as set forth in the regulation, and 
such a plan would have to be submitted to FRA pursuant to this section 
for review. Thus, FRA would approve critical incident stress plans 
previously vetted through the collective bargaining agreement process, 
provided that those plans meet the criteria specified in the final 
regulation. FRA's regulation constitutes a minimum standard and would 
not negate any higher standards set by a collective bargaining 
agreement.
    As no comments were received regarding Sec.  272.103(a), (c), (d), 
(e), (f), or (g), FRA has adopted the regulatory language for each of 
those paragraphs as proposed.
Section 272.105 Requirement To File Critical Incident Stress Plan 
Electronically
    As proposed, Sec.  272.105 provided for optional electronic 
submission of CISPs to FRA for approval. Responding to FRA's request 
for comments on whether the option to file CISPs electronically should 
be mandatory, both Labor and AAR express support for electronic 
submission. AAR further comments that because critical incident stress 
plans would not contain confidential information, FRA's proposed 
electronic submission process is ``overly complicat[ed].'' In response 
to these comments, in this final rule, FRA is mandating that railroads 
submit CISPs electronically to the agency. FRA is also simplifying the 
requirements for electronic submission, as AAR recommends, because the 
agency agrees that the electronic submission process proposed in the 
NPRM was unnecessarily complex.
    Paragraph (a) of Sec.  272.105 as adopted in this final rule 
requires railroads to submit CISPs to FRA electronically using a Web 
link on FRA's Safety Data Web site (http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/CISP ). The Web link is easily accessible by all 
railroads and will not require railroads to maintain a username and 
password, which would have been necessary under the secure document Web 
site proposed in the NPRM. When submitting a CISP or a material 
modification of a CISP through the Web link, a railroad will be 
prompted to complete certain required fields containing the information 
outlined in Sec.  272.105(b) (including email addresses for two points 
of contact at the railroad) and to upload its CISP (or the 
corresponding document reflecting any material modification(s) to an 
existing approved CISP). FRA expects that railroads will upload the 
necessary documents in commercial off-the-shelf software formats (e.g., 
Microsoft Word or Adobe PDF). The Web link will allow for easy 
submission and validation that key information is provided. FRA will 
notify the railroad's point of contacts via the email addresses 
provided of the agency's approval of a CISP (or material modification 
of an existing approved CISP) or the need to resubmit the document in 
the event FRA cannot approve the document as initially submitted.
    FRA received no comments in opposition to mandatory electronic 
submission. Accordingly, in this final rule, FRA is making electronic 
submission of CISPs to FRA mandatory. FRA believes that electronic 
submission will allow FRA to review submissions more efficiently and 
eliminate the need to store hardcopies of the numerous submissions.

Appendix A to Part 272--Schedule of Civil Penalties

    As no comments were received regarding this section, FRA has 
adopted the regulatory language as proposed.

VIII. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures

    This rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing policies 
and procedures and determined to be non-significant under both 
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT policies and procedures. See 
44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979. FRA has prepared and placed in the 
docket a Regulatory Evaluation addressing the economic impact of this 
rule. As part of the Regulatory Evaluation, FRA has assessed the 
quantitative costs and benefits from the implementation of this rule.

[[Page 16230]]

    The purpose of the rule is to enhance safety by mandating that 
certain railroads (each Class I railroad, intercity passenger railroad, 
and commuter railroad) have a critical incident stress plan intended to 
mitigate the long-term negative effects of critical incidents upon 
railroad employees. Specifically the rule would help ensure that every 
railroad employee covered by the rule who works for these railroads and 
who is affected by a critical incident can receive the support services 
needed.
    The Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) formed a working 
group to provide advice and recommendations on the regulatory matters 
involving critical incident stress plans.\15\ Based on both RSAC 
meetings and discussions with the rail industry, FRA's analysis in the 
Regulatory Evaluation assumes that all railroads affected by the rule 
currently have policies that include a critical incident stress plan, 
thereby reducing the costs of compliance associated with the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ This RSAC working group reached consensus on all items but 
one: whether a railroad should be required to provide its critical 
incident stress plan to the general chairperson of a labor 
organization, in addition to the organization's international/
national president.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA's analysis follows DOT's revised ``Guidance on the Economic 
Value of a Statistical Life in US Department of Transportation 
Analyses,'' published in March 2013. Based on real wage growth 
forecasts from the Congressional Budget Office, DOT's guidance 
estimates that there will be an expected 1.07 percent annual growth 
rate in median real wages over the next 20 years (2014-2034) and 
assuming an income elasticity of 1.0 adjusts the Value of Statistical 
Life (VSL) in future years in the same way. Real wages represent the 
purchasing power of nominal wages. VSL is the basis for valuing avoided 
casualties. FRA's analysis further accounts for expected wage growth by 
adjusting the taxable wage component of labor costs. Other non-labor 
hour based costs and benefits are not impacted. FRA estimates that the 
costs of the rule for a 20-year period would total $1.9 million, with a 
present value (PV, 7%) of $1.3 million and (PV, 3%) of $1.6 million. In 
estimating these compliance costs, FRA included costs associated with 
training supervisors on how to interact with railroad employees who 
have been affected by a critical incident, additional costs associated 
with greater use of Employee Assistance Programs, and costs associated 
with the submission of critical incident stress plans to FRA. FRA also 
estimates that the quantifiable benefits of the rule for a 20-year 
period would total $2.6 million, with a present value (PV, 7%) of $1.5 
million and (PV, 3%) of $2.0 million. FRA is confident that potential 
benefits of the rule would exceed the total costs.

                  Table 1--20-Year Costs for Rulemaking
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Present value     Present value
                                         (7 percent)       (3 percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training............................        $1,135,685        $1,342,391
Submission of Critical Incident                114,266           153,415
 Stress Plans for approval by FRA...
EAP Specialist......................            87,879           119,713
                                     -----------------------------------
    Total...........................         1,337,830         1,615,519
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Regulatory Evaluation also explains the likely benefits of this 
rule, providing quantified estimates of the benefits where feasible. 
The rule contains minimum standards for leave, counseling, and other 
support services. These standards would help create benefits by 
providing employees with knowledge, coping skills, and services that 
would help them: (1) Recognize and cope with symptoms of normal stress 
reactions that commonly occur as a result of a critical incident; (2) 
reduce their chance of developing a disorder such as depression, PTSD, 
or ASD as a result of a critical incident; and (3) recognize symptoms 
of psychological disorders that sometimes occur as a result of a 
critical incident and know how to obtain prompt evaluation and 
treatment of any such disorder, if necessary.
    Specifically, FRA anticipates that implementation of the rule would 
yield benefits by reducing long-term healthcare costs associated with 
treating PTSD, ASD, and other stress reactions; and costs that accrue 
either when an employee is unable to return to work for a significant 
period of time or might leave railroad employment due to being affected 
by PTSD, ASD, or other stress reactions.
    The majority of the quantifiable benefits identified are associated 
with railroad employee retention and a reduction of long-term 
healthcare costs associated with PTSD cases that were not treated 
appropriately after a critical incident. FRA estimates that one-half of 
one percent of railroad employees who develop PTSD exit the railroad 
industry. According to this estimate, one railroad employee would leave 
the railroad industry due to PTSD every ten years. If an employee is 
unable to return to work, the railroad not only loses an experienced 
employee, but also must train a new employee. FRA expects that the rule 
would decrease the number of new employees that have to be trained to 
backfill for those who leave the railroad industry due to PTSD, ASD, or 
other stress reactions, as early treatment for potential PTSD cases 
following exposure to a critical incident by reducing both the 
likelihood of developing and the duration of PTSD or other stress 
reactions. The rule would also increase the early identification and 
treatment of PTSD thus reducing long-term healthcare costs. Overall, 
FRA finds that the value of the anticipated benefits would justify the 
cost of implementing the rule.

                Table 2--20-Year Benefits for Rulemaking
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Present value (7  Present value (3
                                          percent)          percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction in Long-term Healthcare           $1,445,288        $1,953,784
 Costs..............................
Retention of Employees (reduced                 60,334            69,764
 backfilling costs).................
                                     -----------------------------------

[[Page 16231]]

 
    Total...........................         1,505,622         2,023,548
------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

    To ensure potential impacts of rules on small entities are properly 
considered, FRA has developed this final rule in accordance with 
Executive Order 13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in 
Agency Rulemaking'') and DOT's procedures and policies to promote 
compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et 
seq.).
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires an agency to review 
regulations to assess their impact on small entities. An agency must 
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis (RFA) unless it determines 
and certifies that a rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    This final rule will enhance safety by mandating that railroads 
have a critical incident stress plan that may help mitigate the long-
term negative effects of critical incidents upon covered railroad 
employees. One of the most important assets to the railroad industry is 
its labor force. The railroads spend significant resources training 
their workforces. Although all of the railroads potentially affected by 
the rule have policies that include critical incident stress plans, the 
rule will promote implementation as intended to every applicable 
employee covered by critical incident stress plan and also ensure that 
all such plans meet certain minimum Federal requirements.
    (1) Description of Regulated Entities and Impacts: The ``universe'' 
of the entities to be considered generally includes only those small 
entities that are reasonably expected to be directly regulated by this 
action. This final rule directly affects Class I, intercity passenger, 
and commuter railroads as defined in the final rule.
    ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601. Section 601(3) defines 
a ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as ``small business 
concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act. This includes any 
small business concern that is independently owned and operated, and is 
not dominant in its field of operation. Section 601(4) likewise 
includes within the definition of this term not-for-profit enterprises 
that are independently owned and operated, and are not dominant in 
their field of operation. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) 
stipulates in its size standards that the largest a railroad business 
firm that is ``for profit'' may be and still be classified as a ``small 
entity'' is 1,500 employees for ``Line Haul Operating Railroads'' and 
500 employees for ``Switching and Terminal Establishments.'' 
Additionally, 5 U.S.C. 601(5) defines as ``small entities'' governments 
of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or 
special districts with populations less than 50,000.
    Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small 
entities in consultation with SBA and in conjunction with public 
comment. Pursuant to that authority, FRA has published a final 
statement of agency policy that formally establishes ``small entities'' 
or ``small businesses'' as being railroads, contractors, and hazardous 
materials shippers that meet the revenue requirements of a Class III 
railroad as set forth in 49 CFR 1201.1-1, which is $20 million or less 
in inflation-adjusted annual revenues; and commuter railroads or small 
governmental jurisdictions that serve populations of 50,000 or less. 
See 68 FR 24891, May 9, 2003, codified at appendix C to 49 CFR part 
209. The $20 million-limit is based on the Surface Transportation 
Board's revenue threshold for a Class III railroad. Railroad revenue is 
adjusted for inflation by applying a revenue deflator formula in 
accordance with 49 CFR 1201.1-1. FRA is using this definition for this 
rulemaking.
    Railroads: Based on the railroad reporting data from 2011, there 
are 719 Class III railroads. Due to the applicability of the rule, 
however, none of these railroads would be impacted. The railroad 
reporting data also shows that there are 30 intercity passenger and 
commuter railroads.\16\ Although two of these railroads are considered 
small entities, they do not fall within the rule's definition of a 
``commuter railroad,'' which means a railroad, as described by 49 
U.S.C. 20102(2), including public authorities operating passenger train 
service, that provides regularly-scheduled passenger service in a 
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was 
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979. 
Therefore FRA finds that there are 28 intercity passenger and commuter 
railroads that will incur additional costs by the rule. However, the 
affected commuter railroads are part of larger public transportation 
agencies that receive Federal funds and serve major jurisdictions with 
populations greater than 50,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ This total includes the Alaska Railroad, which is 
categorized as a Class II railroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As FRA believes that no small entities will be affected by this 
rule, there would also be no cost impacts on small businesses. 
Railroads operated entirely by contract operators such that the 
contractor organization itself meets the definition of a commuter 
railroad, class I, or inter-city passenger railroad, would be subject 
to this rule. In these circumstances, FRA assumes that the contract 
operator would utilize the critical incident stress plan developed by 
the reporting railroad. FRA will hold the reporting railroads 
responsible for defects or deficiency, not the contracted operators. 
Therefore, FRA does not expect that the rule will directly impact any 
contractors that are considered to be large or small entities.
    During the public comment period following the NPRM, FRA did not 
receive any comments discussing the initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis or Executive Order 13272. FRA certifies that the final rule 
will not have any significant economic impact on the competitive 
position of small entities, or on the small entity segment of the 
railroad industry as a whole.
    (2) Certification: Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 
U.S.C. 605(b)), FRA certifies that this final rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
As all of the affected commuter railroads are part of larger public 
transportation agencies that receive Federal funds and serve major 
jurisdictions with populations greater than 50,000; based on the 
definition, therefore, they are not considered small entities.

C. Executive Order 13175

    FRA analyzed this final rule in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 13175 (``Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments'').

[[Page 16232]]

    Because this rule does not significantly or uniquely affect tribes 
and does not impose substantial and direct compliance costs on Indian 
tribal governments, the funding and consultation requirements of 
Executive Order 13175 do not apply, and a tribal summary impact 
statement is not required.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this final rule have 
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. 
The sections that contain the new information collection requirements 
and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Total annual       Average time per     Total annual
           CFR Section            Respondent universe       responses             response         burden hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
272.103
    --RR Submission of Updated/   34 Railroads.......  34 modified plans..  16 hours............             544
     Modified Existing Critical
     Incident Stress Plan.
    --RR Copies of Updated        34 Railroads.......  170 plan copies....  5 minutes...........              14
     Critical Incident Stress
     Plans to 5 Employee Labor
     Organizations.
    --Rail Labor Organization     5 Labor              65 comments........  3 hours.............             195
     Comments to FRA on RR         Organizations.
     Critical Incident Stress
     Plan.
    --Rail Labor Organization     5 Labor              65 certifications..  15 minutes..........              16
     Affirmative Statement to      Organizations.
     FRA that Comment Copy has
     been served on Railroad.
    --Copy to RR Employees of     169,500 Employees..  169,500 copies.....  5 minutes...........          14,125
     Updated/Modified Critical
     Incident Stress Plans.
    --Copy to FRA Inspector Upon  34 Railroads.......  136 plan copies....  5 minutes...........              11
     Request of Critical
     Incident Stress Plan.
272.105--Electronic Filing/       34 Railroads.......  34 requests........  5 minutes...........               3
 Submission of Critical Incident
 Stress Plan to FRA.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions; 
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed 
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these 
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of FRA, including whether the information 
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of 
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and 
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of 
collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of 
the paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Mr. Robert Brogan, 
Information Clearance Officer, at 202-493-6292, or Ms. Kimberly Toone 
at 202-493-6137.
    Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the 
collection of information requirements should direct them to Mr. Robert 
Brogan or Ms. Kimberly Toone, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also 
be submitted via email to Mr. Brogan or Ms. Toone at the following 
address: Robert.Brogan@dot.gov; Kim.Toone@dot.gov.
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of 
information requirements contained in this final rule between 30 and 60 
days after publication of this document in the Federal Register. 
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect 
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication.
    FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating 
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB 
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control 
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from 
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of the final rule. 
The OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate 
notice in the Federal Register.

E. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with its 
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures) 
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National Environmental 
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes, 
Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA has 
determined that this action is not a major FRA action (requiring the 
preparation of an environmental impact statement or environmental 
assessment) because it is categorically excluded from detailed 
environmental review pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA's Procedures. 
64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of 
FRA's Procedures, the agency has further concluded that no 
extraordinary circumstances exist with respect to this final rule that 
might trigger the need for a more detailed environmental review. As a 
result, FRA finds that this final rule is not a major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.

F. Federalism Implications

    Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), 
requires FRA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful 
and timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' ``Policies 
that have federalism implications'' are defined in the Executive Order 
to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency 
may not issue a regulation with federalism implications that imposes 
substantial direct compliance costs and that is not required by 
statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to 
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local governments 
or the agency consults with State and local government officials early 
in the process of developing the regulation. Where a regulation has 
federalism implications and preempts State law, the agency seeks to 
consult with State and local

[[Page 16233]]

officials in the process of developing the regulation.
    FRA has analyzed this final rule in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. If adopted, this final 
rule would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the Federal government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. FRA has also determined that this final rule would not 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on State and local 
governments. Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of 
Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
    Moreover, FRA notes that RSAC, which endorsed and recommended the 
majority of this final rule, has as permanent members, two 
organizations representing State and local interests: AASHTO and ASRSM. 
Both of these State organizations concurred with the RSAC 
recommendation made in this rulemaking. RSAC regularly provides 
recommendations to the Administrator of FRA for solutions to regulatory 
issues that reflect significant input from its State members. To date, 
FRA has received no indication of concerns about the federalism 
implications of this rulemaking from these representatives or from any 
other representatives of State government.
    However, this final rule could have preemptive effect by operation 
of law under 49 U.S.C. 20106 (Section 20106). Section 20106 provides 
that States may not adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or 
order related to railroad safety or security that covers the subject 
matter of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security 
matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies 
under the ``local safety or security hazard'' exception to Section 
20106.
    In sum, FRA has analyzed this final rule in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. As 
explained above, FRA has determined that this final rule has no 
federalism implications, other than the possible preemption of State 
laws under Section 20106. Accordingly, FRA has determined that 
preparation of a federalism summary impact statement for this final 
rule is not required.

G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Pursuant to Section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless 
otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory 
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector 
(other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate 
requirements specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act 
(2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general 
notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the 
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may 
result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in 
the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation) [currently $151,000,000] in any 1 
year, and before promulgating any final rule for which a general notice 
of proposed rulemaking was published, the agency shall prepare a 
written statement'' detailing the effect on State, local, and tribal 
governments and the private sector. This final rule will not result in 
the expenditure, in the aggregate, of $151,000,000 or more in any one 
year, and thus preparation of such a statement is not required.

H. Energy Impact

    Executive Order 13211 requires Federal agencies to prepare a 
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' See 
66 FR 28355 (May 22, 2001). Under the Executive Order a ``significant 
energy action'' is defined as any action by an agency that promulgates 
or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or 
regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed 
rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a 
significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866 or any 
successor order, and (ii) is likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy; or (2) that is 
designated by the Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action. FRA has evaluated 
this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13211. FRA has 
determined that this final rule is not likely to have a significant 
adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. 
Consequently, FRA has determined that this final rule is not a 
``significant energy action'' within the meaning of the Executive 
Order.

I. Privacy Act Statement

    FRA wishes to inform all interested parties that anyone is able to 
search the electronic form of any written communications and comments 
received into any agency docket by the name of the individual 
submitting the document (or signing the document, if submitted on 
behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). See http://www/
regulations.gov/#!privacyNotice for the privacy notice of 
regulations.gov or interested parties may review DOT's complete Privacy 
Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 
FR 19477).

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 272

    Accidents, Critical incident, Penalties, Railroads, Railroad 
employees, Railroad safety, Safety, and Transportation.

The Final Rule

0
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA amends chapter II, 
subtitle B of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations by adding a 
new part 272 to read as follows:

PART 272--CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS PLANS

Subpart A--General
Sec.
272.1 Purpose.
272.3 Application.
272.5 General duty.
272.7 Coverage of a critical incident stress plan.
272.9 Definitions.
272.11 Penalties.
Subpart B--Plan Components and Approval Process
272.101 Content of a critical incident stress plan.
272.103 Submission of critical incident stress plan for approval by 
the Federal Railroad Administration.
272.105 Requirement to file critical incident stress plan 
electronically.
Appendix A to Part 272--Schedule of Civil Penalties

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20109, note; 28 U.S.C. 2461, 
note; 49 CFR 1.89; and sec. 410, Div. A, Pub. L. 110-432, 122 Stat. 
4888.

Subpart A--General


Sec.  272.1  Purpose.

    (a) The purpose of this part is to promote the safety of railroad 
operations and the health and safety of railroad employees, especially 
those who are directly involved in a critical incident by requiring 
that the employing railroad offers and provides appropriate support 
services, including appropriate relief, to the directly-involved 
employees following that critical incident.
    (b) Nothing in this part constrains a railroad from implementing a 
critical incident stress plan that contains additional provisions 
beyond those specified in this part (including provisions covering 
additional incidents

[[Page 16234]]

or persons), provided that such additional provisions are not 
inconsistent with this part.


Sec.  272.3  Application.

    This part applies to each
    (a) Class I railroad, including the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation;
    (b) Intercity passenger railroad; or
    (c) Commuter railroad.


Sec.  272.5  General duty.

    A railroad subject to this part shall adopt a written critical 
incident stress plan approved by the Federal Railroad Administration 
under Sec.  272.103 and shall comply with that plan. Should a railroad 
subject to this part make a material modification to the approved plan, 
the railroad shall adopt the modified plan approved by the Federal 
Railroad Administration under Sec.  272.103 and shall comply with that 
plan, as revised.


Sec.  272.7  Coverage of a critical incident stress plan.

    The critical incident stress plan of a railroad subject to this 
part shall state that it covers, and shall cover, the following 
individuals employed by the railroad if they are directly involved (as 
defined in Sec.  272.9) in a critical incident:
    (a) Railroad employees who are subject to the hours of service laws 
at--
    (1) 49 U.S.C. 21103 (that is, train employees not subject to 
subpart F of part 228 of this chapter regarding the hours of service of 
train employees engaged in commuter or intercity rail passenger 
transportation);
    (2) 49 U.S.C. 21104 (signal employees); or
    (3) 49 U.S.C. 21105 (dispatching service employees);
    (b) Railroad employees who are subject to the hours of service 
regulations at subpart F of part 228 of this chapter (regarding the 
hours of service of train employees engaged in commuter or intercity 
rail passenger transportation);
    (c) Railroad employees who inspect, install, repair, or maintain 
railroad right-of-way or structures; and
    (d) Railroad employees who inspect, repair, or maintain 
locomotives, passenger cars, or freight cars.


Sec.  272.9  Definitions.

    As used in this part--
    Accident/incident has the meaning assigned to that term by part 225 
of this chapter.
    Administrator means the Administrator of the Federal Railroad 
Administration or the Administrator's delegate.
    Associate Administrator means the Associate Administrator for 
Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer of the Federal Railroad 
Administration or that person's delegate.
    Class I has the meaning assigned to that term by the regulations of 
the Surface Transportation Board (49 CFR part 1201; General 
Instructions 1-1).
    Commuter railroad means a railroad, as described by 49 U.S.C. 
20102(2), including public authorities operating passenger train 
service, that provides regularly-scheduled passenger service in a 
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was 
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979.
    Critical incident means either--
    (1) An accident/incident reportable to FRA under part 225 of this 
chapter that results in a fatality, loss of limb, or a similarly 
serious bodily injury; or
    (2) A catastrophic accident/incident reportable to FRA under part 
225 of this chapter that could be reasonably expected to impair a 
directly-involved employee's ability to perform his or her job duties 
safely.
    Directly-involved employee means a railroad employee covered under 
Sec.  272.7--
    (1) Whose actions are closely connected to the critical incident;
    (2) Who witnesses the critical incident in person as it occurs or 
who witnesses the immediate effects of the critical incident in person; 
or
    (3) Who is charged to directly intervene in, or respond to, the 
critical incident (excluding railroad police officers or investigators 
who routinely respond to and are specially trained to handle 
emergencies).
    FRA means the Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Ave. 
SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    Home terminal means an employee's regular reporting point at the 
beginning of the tour of duty.
    Intercity passenger railroad means a railroad, as described by 49 
U.S.C. 20102(2), including public authorities operating passenger train 
service, which provides regularly-scheduled passenger service between 
large cities.


Sec.  272.11  Penalties.

    (a) Civil penalties. A person who violates any requirement of this 
part, or causes the violation of any such requirement, is subject to a 
civil penalty of at least $650 and not more than $25,000 per violation, 
except that: Penalties may be assessed against individuals only for 
willful violations, and, where a grossly negligent violation or a 
pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death 
or injury to persons, or has caused death or injury, a penalty not to 
exceed $105,000 per violation may be assessed. Each day that a 
violation continues is a separate offense. See Appendix A to part 209 
of this chapter for a statement of agency civil penalty policy.
    (b) Criminal penalties. A person who knowingly and willfully 
falsifies a record or report required by this part may be subject to 
criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21311.

Subpart B--Plan Components and Approval Process


Sec.  272.101  Content of a critical incident stress plan.

    Each critical incident stress plan under this part shall include, 
at a minimum, provisions for--
    (a) Informing each directly-involved employee as soon as 
practicable of the relief options available in accordance with the 
railroad's critical incident stress plan;
    (b) Offering timely relief from the balance of the duty tour for 
each directly-involved employee, after the employee has performed any 
actions necessary for the safety of persons and contemporaneous 
documentation of the incident;
    (c) Offering timely transportation to each directly-involved 
employee's home terminal, if necessary;
    (d) Offering counseling, guidance, and other appropriate support 
services to each directly-involved employee;
    (e) Permitting relief from the duty tour(s) subsequent to the 
critical incident, for an amount of time to be determined by each 
railroad, if requested by a directly-involved employee as may be 
necessary and reasonable;
    (f) Permitting each directly-involved employee such additional 
leave from normal duty as may be necessary and reasonable to receive 
preventive services or treatment related to the incident or both, 
provided the employee's clinical diagnosis supports the need for 
additional time off or the employee is in consultation with a health 
care professional related to the incident and such health care 
professional supports the need for additional time off in order for the 
employee to receive preventive services or treatment related to the 
incident, or both; and
    (g) Addressing how the railroad's employees operating or otherwise 
working on track owned by or operated over by a different railroad will 
be afforded the protections of the plan.

[[Page 16235]]

Sec.  272.103  Submission of critical incident stress plan for approval 
by the Federal Railroad Administration.

    (a) Each railroad subject to this part shall submit to the Federal 
Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Safety, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, for approval, the railroad's critical 
incident stress plan no later than 12 months after June 23, 2014.
    (b) Each railroad subject to this part shall--
    (1) Simultaneously with its filing with FRA, serve, either by hard 
copy or electronically, a copy of the submission filed pursuant to 
paragraph (a) of this section or a material modification filed pursuant 
to paragraph (e) of this section on the international/national 
president of any non-profit employee labor organization representing a 
class or craft of the railroad's employees subject to this part; and
    (2) Include in its submission filed pursuant to paragraph (a) of 
this section or a material modification filed pursuant to paragraph (e) 
of this section a statement affirming that the railroad has complied 
with the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, together 
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
    (c) Not later than 90 days after the date of filing a submission 
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section or a material modification 
pursuant to paragraph (e) of this section, a labor organization 
representing a class or craft of the railroad's employees subject to 
this part, may file a comment on the submission or material 
modification.
    (1) Each comment shall be submitted to the Associate Administrator 
for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, FRA, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590; and
    (2) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was 
served on the railroad.
    (d) A critical incident stress plan is considered approved for 
purposes of this part if and when FRA notifies the railroad in writing 
that the critical incident stress plan is approved, or 120 days after 
FRA has received the railroad's critical incident stress plan, 
whichever occurs first.
    (e) After FRA's initial approval of a railroad's critical incident 
stress plan, if the railroad makes a material modification of the 
critical incident stress plan, the railroad shall submit to FRA for 
approval a copy of the critical incident stress plan as it has been 
revised to reflect the material modification within 30 days of making 
the material modification.
    (f) Upon FRA approval of a railroad's critical incident stress plan 
and any material modification of the critical incident stress plan, the 
railroad must make a copy of the railroad's plan and the material 
modification available to the railroad's employees identified in Sec.  
272.7.
    (g) Each railroad subject to this part must make a copy of the 
railroad's plan available for inspection and reproduction by the FRA.


Sec.  272.105  Requirement to file critical incident stress plan 
electronically.

    (a) Each railroad subject to this part must submit its critical 
incident stress plan and any material modifications to that plan 
electronically through FRA's Web site at http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/CISP.
    (b) The railroad's electronic submission shall provide the 
Associate Administrator with the following:
    (1) The name of the railroad;
    (2) The names of two individuals, including job titles, who will be 
the railroad's points of contact;
    (3) The mailing addresses for the railroad's points of contact;
    (4) The railroad's system or main headquarters address located in 
the United States;
    (5) The email addresses for the railroad's points of contact;
    (6) The daytime telephone numbers for the railroad's points of 
contact; and
    (7) An electronic copy of the railroad's critical incident stress 
plan or any material modifications to that plan being submitted for FRA 
approval.
    (c) FRA may electronically store any materials required by this 
part.

Appendix A to Part 272--Schedule of Civil Penalties \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ A civil penalty may be assessed against an individual only 
for a willful violation. The Administrator reserves the right to 
assess a penalty of up to $105,000 for any violation where 
circumstances warrant. See 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21304 and 49 CFR part 
209, Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUBPART B--PLAN COMPONENTS AND APPROVAL PROCESS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Willful
               Section                    Violation       violation \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
272.101 Content of a critical
 incident stress plan:
    (a) Failure to inform about                  5,000             6,000
     relief options.................
    (b) Failure to offer timely                  5,000            10,000
     relief from duty tour..........
    (c) Failure to offer timely                  5,000            10,000
     transportation to home terminal
    (d) Failure to offer counseling,             5,000            10,000
     guidance, support services.....
    (e) Failure to permit relief                 5,000            10,000
     from duty tour(s) subsequent to
     incident.......................
    (f) Failure to permit additional             5,000            10,000
     leave to receive preventive
     services or treatment related
     to the incident................
272.103 Submission of critical
 incident stress plan for approval
 by the Federal Railroad
 Administration.
    (a) Failure to submit a plan to              9,000            18,000
     FRA............................
    (b) Failure to simultaneously                5,000            10,000
     file a copy....................
    (e) Failure to submit a material             7,500            15,000
     modification to the plan.......
    (f) Failure to make a copy of                3,000             6,000
     the plan available to covered
     employees......................
    (g) Failure to make a copy of                3,000             6,000
     the plan available to FRA......
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 17, 2014.
Karen J. Hedlund,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2014-06481 Filed 3-24-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P


