[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 204 (Wednesday, October 21, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66972-66981]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-23289]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. PL21-1-000]


Oil Pipeline Affiliate Contracts

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Proposed Policy Statement.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In this proposed policy statement, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission proposes guidance for oil pipeline carriers 
proposing rates and terms pursuant to affiliate contracts.

DATES: Initial Comments are due on or before December 14, 2020, and 
Reply Comments are due on or before January 28, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed 
electronically at http://www.ferc.gov in acceptable native applications 
and print-to-PDF, but not in scanned or picture format. For those 
unable to file electronically, comments may be filed by mail or hand-
delivery to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the 
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. The Comment 
Procedures section of this document contains more detailed filing 
procedures.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Glenna Riley (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 888 
First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8620, 
Glenna.Riley@ferc.gov
Adrianne Cook (Technical Information), Office of Energy Markets 
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8849, Adrianne.Cook@ferc.gov
    1. We are proposing guidance for oil pipeline carriers proposing 
rates and terms pursuant to Affiliate Contracts \1\ in tariff filings 
and petitions for declaratory order. We seek comment on the information 
outlined in this proposed policy statement that could be used to 
demonstrate that proposed terms pursuant to Affiliate Contracts are 
just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory under the Interstate 
Commerce Act (ICA).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ ``Affiliate Contract'' as used in this proposed policy 
statement means a contract that is executed by the carrier's 
affiliate(s) and not by any nonaffiliated entity. For clarification, 
a contract that is executed by the carrier's affiliate along with 
one or more nonaffiliated entities is not an ``Affiliate Contract.'' 
``Contract'' as used in this proposed policy statement includes 
transportation service agreements (TSA), throughput and deficiency 
agreements (T&D Agreement), ship-or-pay agreements, and any contract 
offered by a carrier under which an entity must make a term 
commitment associated with interstate oil pipeline transportation 
service subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Saddlehorn Pipeline Co., LLC, 169 FERC ] 61,118 (2019) (TSA); 
BridgeTex Pipeline Co., LLC, 156 FERC ] 61,121 (2016) (TSA); EnLink 
Del. Crude Pipeline, LLC, 166 FERC ] 61,226 (2019) (EnLink Del) (T&D 
Agreement); NuStar Crude Oil Pipeline L.P., 146 FERC ] 61,146 (2014) 
(T&D Agreement); Kinder Morgan Pony Express Pipeline LLC, 141 FERC ] 
61,180 (2012) (T&D Agreement). The commitment to the pipeline can 
take various forms such as a commitment to nominate or pay a 
deficiency for a certain volume or an acreage or plant dedication. 
See, e.g., EnLink Del., 166 FERC ] 61,226 (monthly volume 
commitments); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ] 61,091 (2018) 
(acreage dedication commitment); Alpha Crude Connector, LLC, 149 
FERC ] 61,001 (2014) (acreage dedication and volume commitments); 
Panola Pipeline Co., 151 FERC ] 61,140 (2015) (plant dedication).
    \2\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Introduction

    2. The proposed guidance outlines information carriers may provide 
to demonstrate that proposed rates and terms of service pursuant to 
Affiliate Contracts comply with the ICA. The proposed guidance is based 
on the Commission's obligation under the ICA to ensure that oil 
pipeline rates and terms of service are just, reasonable, and not 
unduly discriminatory.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1, 2, 3(1), 5, 7, 15(1); see also ICC v. 
Baltimore & O. R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 276 (1892) (The principle 
objects of the ICA include ``to secure just and reasonable charges 
for transportation'' and ``to prohibit unjust discriminations in the 
rendition of like services under similar circumstances and 
conditions''); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 233 (1896) 
(The ICA ``make[s] charges for transportation just and reasonable'' 
and ``forbid[s] undue and unreasonable preferences or 
discriminations.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. The Commission has provided little guidance on what information 
is sufficient to support proposed rates and terms pursuant to Affiliate 
Contracts, and as a result, the information provided by carriers in 
their filings varies greatly. In response to this lack of uniformity, 
we are considering adopting a policy statement outlining information 
that can support a finding that proposed rates and terms pursuant to 
Affiliate Contracts are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory 
under the ICA. We believe that issuing guidance on this topic will help 
clarify our processes and enable the Commission to gather information 
relevant to fulfilling our obligations under the ICA. This additional 
clarity also will promote regulatory certainty through greater 
transparency with industry on what information is relevant to support 
proposals related to Affiliate Contracts.
    4. We emphasize that the proposed guidance is not designed either 
to prohibit Affiliate Contracts or to address any specific incidents of 
undue discrimination by carriers towards nonaffiliated shippers but 
rather to aid carriers in determining what information to consider 
including in their filings before the Commission to support a finding. 
Under the proposed guidance, affiliates may continue to participate in 
oil pipeline open seasons and become committed shippers on their 
affiliated pipelines. A lack of nonaffiliated shipper agreements is 
not, in and of itself, evidence that a carrier afforded an undue 
preference to its affiliated shipper. While the proposed guidance 
suggests some means for carriers to support a finding that proposed 
rates and terms pursuant to an Affiliate Contract are just, reasonable, 
and not unduly discriminatory, carriers would not be precluded from 
making this showing in other ways. We will continue to evaluate 
contract proposals, including those involving Affiliate Contracts, on a 
case-by-case basis based on all the facts and circumstances presented.

II. Background

A. Oil Pipeline Contracting Arrangements

    5. Under the ICA, an oil pipeline is a common carrier that must 
provide transportation to shippers upon reasonable request.\4\ A 
pipeline's rates and practices must be just, reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory.\5\ Historically, interstate oil pipelines offered 
transportation service on a walk-up or month-to-month basis. Beginning 
in the mid-1990s, the Commission has also approved oil pipeline 
transportation rates and terms of service pursuant to long-term 
contracts, which

[[Page 66973]]

has facilitated significant infrastructure development.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1(4) (``It shall be the duty of every common 
carrier subject to this chapter to provide and furnish 
transportation upon reasonable request therefor.''); Magellan 
Midstream Partners, L.P., 161 FERC ] 61,219, at P 12 (2017) 
(Magellan) (``By definition, a pipeline is a common carrier, and is 
bound by the ICA to ship product as long as a reasonable request for 
service is made by a shipper.'').
    \5\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1, 2, 3(1), 5, 7, 15(1).
    \6\ See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co., 146 FERC ] 61,206, at P 35 
(2014) (Colonial) (``The Commission recognizes that due to increased 
oil production in the U.S. and Canada, changing market dynamics for 
crude oil and refined products, and the large financial commitments 
necessary to increase infrastructure, oil pipelines have proposed 
and the Commission has approved various types of committed or 
contract rate structures.''); see also Express Pipeline P'ship, 76 
FERC ] 61,245 (1996) (Express).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. In general, under Commission policy, an oil pipeline carrier can 
offer a contract pursuant to which any shipper can make a commitment to 
the pipeline for a specified term and receive rates and/or service 
terms different from those available to shippers that do not enter the 
contract. The same contract must be offered to any interested shippers 
in a public process, typically an open season.\7\ Shippers that enter 
the contract are commonly referred to as ``committed shippers,'' 
``contract shippers,'' or ``term shippers'' because they are making a 
contractual commitment to the pipeline over the term of the agreement. 
Shippers that do not enter the contract are typically referred to as 
``uncommitted'' or ``walk-up'' shippers because they have no obligation 
to the pipeline and can decide to ship or not on a month-to-month 
basis.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See Express, 76 FERC at 62,254 (``Although one normally 
regards contract relationships as highly individualized, contract 
rates can still be accommodated to the principle of 
nondiscrimination by requiring a carrier offering such rates to make 
them available to any shipper willing and able to meet the 
contract's terms.'') (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. I.C.C., 738 
F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Sea-Land)).
    \8\ See id. (``Term shippers are not similarly situated with 
uncommitted shippers because in any given month, uncommitted 
shippers may choose to ship on [the pipeline] or not. Uncommitted 
shippers have the maximum flexibility to react to changes in their 
own circumstances or in market conditions. Uncommitted shippers do 
not provide the revenue assurances, planning assurances, and a basis 
for constructing the pipeline that term shippers provide.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Ensuring Contract Rates Are Not Unduly Discriminatory

    7. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (D.C. Circuit) has found that contract rates are not 
inconsistent with the ICA's common carriage and non-discrimination 
requirements, provided the same rates and terms are offered to all 
interested shippers.\9\ To comply with these principles, a pipeline may 
offer a contract in a public open season in which any interested 
shipper has an equal opportunity to enter the contract.\10\ The open 
season process must be ``open, transparent, and free of the traditional 
contract nullifiers such as fraud.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Sea-Land, 738 F.2d at 1317 (``[C]ontract rates can . . . be 
accommodated to the principle of nondiscrimination by requiring a 
carrier offering such rates to make them available to any shipper 
willing and able to meet the contract's terms'').
    \10\ See Express Pipeline P'ship, 77 FERC ] 61,188, at 61,756 
(1996) (``The proposed term rate structure of Express does not 
violate the antidiscrimination or undue preference provisions of the 
[ICA] because such term rates were made available to all interested 
shippers.''); CenterPoint Energy Bakken Crude Servs., LLC, 144 FERC 
] 61,130, at P 19 (2013) (the pipeline ``offered its committed rates 
through a widely publicized Open Season that gave interested 
shippers notice and opportunity to sign TSA's accepting the proposed 
committed rates''); CCPS Transp., LLC, 121 FERC ] 61,253, at P 19 
(2007) (CCPS) (the pipeline satisfied the principles of Sea-Land 
because the ``open season afforded all prospective shippers an equal 
non-discriminatory opportunity to sign a TSA''); White Cliffs 
Pipeline, L.L.C., 148 FERC ] 61,037, at P 47 (2014) (White Cliffs) 
(the open season must ``afford all potentially interested shippers . 
. . a fair and equal opportunity to acquire the surplus Expansion 
capacity'') (emphasis in original); Enterprise TE Products Pipeline 
Co. LLC, 144 FERC ] 61,092, at P 22 (2013) (Enterprise TE II) (``All 
prospective shippers must have an equal, non-discriminatory 
opportunity to review and enter into contracts for committed 
service.'').
    \11\ Seaway Crude Pipeline Co. LLC, 146 FERC ] 61,151, at P 37 
(2014) (Seaway).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. The requirement to offer the contract in a valid public process 
where all interested shippers have an equal opportunity to obtain the 
rates and terms is fundamental to meeting the ICA's nondiscrimination 
requirements.\12\ The Commission honors a contract rate that was agreed 
to in a transparent open season process that involved arm's-length 
negotiations among sophisticated business entities, finding such rates 
just and reasonable.\13\ In such cases, the presence of one or more 
nonaffiliated contracting shippers supports a presumption of 
reasonableness and a finding that the contract terms do not violate the 
ICA's prohibition against pipelines giving unreasonable preference to 
one shipper over others. The Commission assumes that nonaffiliated 
shippers can be relied upon to protect their own interests from those 
of the pipeline, ensuring the agreement responds to competitive 
conditions.\14\ However, commercial circumstances can lead to 
situations in which only affiliated shipper(s) agree to the contract. 
In these cases, the inference of fairness is not immediately apparent, 
and the Commission must evaluate whether the carrier gave an undue 
preference to its affiliate.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Enterprise Crude Pipeline LLC, 166 FERC ] 61,224, at P 11 
(2019) (Enterprise Crude) (``The vital element of the contracting 
arrangements . . . has been an open season that provided all 
shippers equal opportunity to avail themselves of the offered 
capacity''); Enterprise TE II, 144 FERC ] 61,092 at P 22 (``The 
availability of discount rates to all interested shippers is the 
fundamental requirement upon which rulings approving such rate 
structures have been based. Contract rates can only satisfy the 
principle of nondiscrimination when the carrier offering such rates 
is required to make them available to `any shipper willing and able 
to meet the contract's terms.' All prospective shippers must have an 
equal, non-discriminatory opportunity to review and enter into 
contracts for committed service.'') (quoting Sea-Land, 738 F.2d at 
1317) (emphasis in original)); see also Nexen Mkt. U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Belle Fourche Pipeline Co., 121 FERC ] 61,235, at PP 1, 46-49 (2007) 
(Nexen) (``The allocation of expansion capacity during the open 
season was inconsistent with the principles of common carriage 
because all shippers were not given an equal opportunity to obtain 
the expansion capacity.''); White Cliffs, 148 FERC ] 61,037 at PP 
47-51 (pipeline failed to meet ``basic common carrier and anti-
discrimination obligations'' when it ``afforded an undue preference 
to the shippers that contracted for [ ] capacity outside of a valid 
open season process'').
    \13\ Tesoro High Plains Pipeline Co. LLC, 148 FERC ] 61,129, at 
P 23 (2014) (``The Commission honors the contract terms entered into 
by sophisticated parties that engage in an arms-length 
negotiation.''); Seaway Crude Pipeline Co. LLC, Opinion No. 546, 154 
FERC ] 61,070, at PP 40-42 (2016) (a proper review of the committed 
rates includes investigation of whether the open season involved 
arm's-length negotiations); Seaway, 146 FERC ] 61,151 at P 25 
(``Absent a compelling reason, it would be improper to second guess 
the business and economic decisions made between sophisticated 
businesses when entering negotiated rate contracts.'').
    \14\ Express, 76 FERC at 62,254 (``If [contract] terms result in 
lower costs or respond to unique competitive conditions, then 
shippers who agree to enter into the contract are not similarly 
situated with other shippers who are unwilling or unable to do 
so.'') (quoting Sea-Land, 738 F.2d at 1316); Sea-Land, 738 F.2d at 
1316 (``The core concern in the nondiscrimination area has been to 
maintain equality of pricing for shipments subject to substantially 
similar costs and competitive conditions, while permitting carriers 
to introduce differential pricing where dissimilarities in those key 
variables exist.''); Seaway, 146 FERC ] 61,151 at P 28 (``When 
reviewing the justness and reasonableness of a contract rate, it is 
not primarily to relieve one party or another of what they deem an 
improvident bargain, especially in negotiations involving 
sophisticated business entities. However, contract negotiations must 
be held in good faith and not involve fraud or improper conduct.'').
    \15\ New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 296 (1947) (``The 
principal evil at which the Interstate Commerce Act was aimed was 
discrimination in its various manifestations'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. We acknowledge that the Commission previously approved contract 
rates and terms of service where the only committed shipper was the 
carrier's affiliate without addressing whether additional informational 
support would alleviate these concerns.\16\ We note that, in other 
contexts, the Commission has found that affiliate transactions require 
additional scrutiny.\17\ The Commission

[[Page 66974]]

has recognized that there is an inherent incentive for a regulated 
entity to unduly discriminate in favor of an affiliate and that 
affiliate transactions may not be the result of arm's-length 
negotiations.\18\ The Commission has adopted policies in these other 
contexts to mitigate concerns that affiliates may coordinate in ways 
that involve self-dealing and anti-competitive behavior to the 
detriment of other customers.\19\ In contrast, arm's-length 
transactions between nonaffiliated entities do not raise these 
concerns.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See, e.g., Medallion Pipeline Co., LLC, 170 FERC ] 61,192 
(2020) (Medallion); Medallion Del. Express, LLC, 163 FERC ] 61,170, 
at P 8 (2018); Stakeholder Midstream Crude Oil Pipeline, LLC, 160 
FERC ] 61,010, at P 4 (2017) (Stakeholder); Medallion Pipeline Co., 
LLC, 157 FERC ] 61,075, at P 11 (2016); EnLink Crude Pipeline, 157 
FERC ] 61,120, at P 4 (2016).
    \17\ E.g., Bidding by Affiliates in Open Season Bids for 
Pipeline Capacity, Order No. 894, 137 FERC ] 61,126 (2011) (rule to 
prevent affiliated entities from coordinating their open season bids 
to obtain a disproportionate share of natural gas pipeline capacity 
at the expense of single bidders); Mkt.-Based Rates for Wholesale 
Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity & Ancillary Servs. by Pub. 
Utils., Order No. 697, 119 FERC ] 61,295, at PP 540-543 (2007) (rule 
adopting guidelines and restrictions for power sale transactions of 
utilities with market-based rates to mitigate affiliate abuse 
concerns); Allocation of Capacity on New Merchant Transmission 
Projects and New Cost-Based, Participant-Funded Transmission 
Projects, Final Policy Statement, 142 FERC ] 61,038, at P 34 (2013) 
(developer allocating capacity for new merchant transmission project 
has a ``high burden to demonstrate that the assignment of capacity 
to its affiliate and the corresponding treatment of non-affiliated 
potential customers is just, reasonable, and not unduly preferential 
or discriminatory''); Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ] 61,332, at 
62,089 (1994) (Ne. Util. Serv.) (``The Commission long has 
recognized, and the courts have agreed, that transactions between 
affiliated companies require close scrutiny.''); Iowa S. Utils. Co., 
58 FERC ] 61,317, at 62,014 (1992) (Iowa S. Utils) (``[I]n looking 
at dealings between affiliates, the Commission is presented with a 
different set of concerns . . . because affiliates share common 
corporate goals profits for stockholders that own both entities--and 
therefore have an incentive to engage in preferential 
transactions.''), reh'g denied, 59 FERC ] 61,193 (1992); Ind. Mun. 
Power Agency v. FERC, 56 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (``[T]he 
Commission gives `special scrutiny' to fuel supply contracts between 
a utility and its subsidiary or an affiliated company'').
    \18\ Tapstone Midstream, LLC, 150 FERC ] 61,016, at P 15 (2015) 
(``Because the shipper is an affiliate, there is no assurance that 
there was an arms-length negotiation between the entities agreeing 
to the rate.''); Sw. Power Pool, 149 FERC ] 61,048 at P 100 (2014) 
(finding that a contract between affiliates ``cannot be 
characterized as one in which each party has sought to promote its 
individual economic interest, a central feature of arm's-length 
bargaining''); Opinion No. 546, 154 FERC ] 61,070 at PP 92-96 (sales 
between affiliates are not arm's-length because ``arm's length 
negotiations or transactions are characterized as adversarial 
negotiations between parties that are each pursuing independent 
interests''); Ne. Utils. Serv., 66 FERC at 62,090 (``In arm's-length 
transactions, assuming relatively equal bargaining strength between 
the parties, the buyer will be able to protect itself against 
excessive charges or unreasonable contract provisions. . . . In the 
case of affiliate transactions, however, the buyer has less 
incentive to bargain for the lowest possible rates and most 
reasonable contract provisions, because ultimately all provisions 
will benefit the common parent.''); Iowa S. Utils., 58 FERC at 
62,014 n.10 (``Self-dealing may arise in transactions between 
affiliates because such affiliates may have incentives to offer 
terms to one another which are more favorable than those available 
to other market participants.''); see also Ass'n Gas Distributors v. 
FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discounts in favor of a 
pipeline's gas trading affiliate ``may carry more than the usual 
risk of undue discrimination''); Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (``A parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are 
common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or 
determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but 
one.''); Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (arm's-length is 
defined as ``involving dealings between two parties who are not 
related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly 
equal bargaining power'').
    \19\ See, e.g., Bos. Edison Co. Re: Edgar Electric Co., 55 FERC 
] 61,382, at 62, 167-68 n.56 (1991) (Edgar Electric) (``The 
Commission's concern with the potential for affiliate abuse is that 
a utility with a monopoly franchise may have an economic incentive 
to exercise market power through its affiliate dealings.''); Order 
No. 894, 137 FERC ] 61,126 at P 11 (multiple affiliate bidding in 
natural gas pipeline open seasons harms other entities and their 
customers and has a ``chilling effect on competition''); Chinook 
Power Transmission, LLC, 126 FERC ] 61,134, at P 49 (2009) 
(heightened scrutiny applies where a merchant transmission 
developer's affiliates are anchor customers due to ``concerns that a 
utility affiliate contract could shift costs to captive ratepayers 
of the affiliate and subsidize the merchant project 
inappropriately'').
    \20\ See, e.g., Edgar Electric, 55 FERC at 62,168 (``In an 
arm's-length (unaffiliated) transaction, the buyer has no economic 
incentive to favor anyone but the least-cost supplier (considering 
price and nonprice factors).'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    10. A similar potential exists for an oil pipeline carrier to 
afford its affiliate an undue preference.\21\ An affiliated shipper may 
be indifferent to any rate paid to its affiliated pipeline because the 
expenditures and earnings of the affiliates are combined at the parent 
company level under integrated company economics.\22\ Thus, one way for 
a carrier to provide its affiliate unduly preferential access to 
capacity is to offer a contract rate in the open season that is 
excessively burdensome or uneconomic for any nonaffiliated market 
participant. Similarly, an affiliate may not be meaningfully bound to 
any onerous terms in the contract such as deficiency or shortfall 
penalties because deficiency payments and penalties may be transfer 
payments within an integrated economic entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regs. Pursuant to the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, Order No. 561, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,985, at 
30,960 (1993) (cross-referenced at 65 FERC ] 61,109) (recognizing 
``a concern . . . with allowing a pipeline that may possess market 
power to control prices in a market to establish an initial rate 
through negotiations'' and requiring at least one nonaffiliated 
shipper to agree to a rate to ``provide some measure of protection 
against a pipeline exercising market power to dictate the rate it 
will charge''), order on reh'g, Order No. 561-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 
] 31,090, at 31,106 (1994) cross-referenced at 68 FERC ] 61,138) 
(``The purpose of requiring the one shipper who must agree to the 
initial rate to be unaffiliated with the pipeline is to ensure that 
the agreement is based upon arms-length negotiations.''), aff'd sub 
nom. AOPL v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Seaway, 146 FERC ] 
61,151 at P 30 (oil pipelines must show that a nonaffiliated entity 
agrees to a negotiated rate due to the ``concern that potential 
market power could be exercised against shippers who did not agree 
to the negotiated rate''); Magellan, 161 FERC ] 61,219 at P 21 
(finding an oil pipeline's proposed affiliate transactions would 
``violate the ICA's anti-discrimination provisions by offering 
pipeline transportation pursuant to customized terms, conditions, 
and rates unavailable to shippers who utilize [the] pipeline 
directly through nominating volumes under the pipeline's published 
tariff'').
    \22\ See Magellan, 161 FERC ] 61,219 at P 14 (while the 
marketing affiliate ``would facially pay its pipeline's filed tariff 
rate, and the [m]arketing [a]ffiliate would sell that capacity for 
less than that rate, the entire transaction could nevertheless yield 
a net profit to the integrated company''); see also Williams Pipe 
Line Co., Opinion No. 154, 21 FERC ] 61,260, at 61,660 (1982) (``If 
the X Oil Company charges itself a lot of money for shipping its own 
oil over its own line, that is just bookkeeping. But suppose that X 
also charges Y, an unaffiliated shipper, that same high rate for the 
use of its line. For Y, that high rate is very real. So we now have 
something that some will undoubtedly view as undue discrimination of 
a perniciously anticompetitive type.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    11. In light of the above, we are concerned that our practice of 
evaluating proposed rates and terms pursuant to Affiliate Contracts 
under the same framework as contracts supported by commitments from 
nonaffiliated shippers may not be sufficient to ensure such terms are 
not unduly discriminatory under the ICA.\23\ To ensure that the 
Commission has the information it needs in its decision making, we are 
considering adopting a policy statement explaining how we will evaluate 
proposed rates and terms that are pursuant to Affiliate Contracts 
consistent with our obligations under the ICA and seek comment on the 
proposed guidance. In proposing the guidance below, we emphasize that 
affiliates may continue to participate in oil pipeline open seasons and 
become committed shippers on their affiliated pipelines. Where one or 
more nonaffiliated shippers execute a contract offered in an open 
season along with any affiliates of the carrier, the concern that the 
carrier unduly discriminated in favor of its affiliate is not present. 
Further, as stated above, the proposed guidance would not preclude oil

[[Page 66975]]

pipeline carriers from implementing contract rates and terms of service 
pursuant to Affiliate Contracts. The fact that no nonaffiliated shipper 
agrees to a contract does not, in and of itself, provide a basis for 
finding that the carrier unduly discriminated in favor of an 
affiliate.\24\ There are many reasons that nonaffiliated shippers may 
choose not to make a term commitment under a contract offered by a 
carrier. As stated above, the proposed guidance is not intended to 
reflect any view of the Commission that pipelines are currently 
engaging in practices that afford their affiliates an undue preference 
and unduly discriminating against nonaffiliated shippers in open 
seasons,\25\ or that Affiliate Contracts are inherently discriminatory. 
Instead, the proposed guidance is intended to provide clarity regarding 
the type of information that is relevant to the Commission's evaluation 
of a carrier's filing to encourage the submission of a complete record 
on which the Commission can conclude that the proposed terms are just, 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory under the ICA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ We note that Congress brought oil pipelines under the ICA 
to address concerns regarding affiliate collusion and competitive 
imbalances caused by integrated ownership of transportation 
facilities. See United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 
290, 297-298 (1951) (``There is little doubt, from the legislative 
history, that the Act was passed to eliminate the competitive 
advantage which existing or future integrated companies might 
possess from exclusive ownership of a pipe line.''); The Pipeline 
Cases (United States v. Ohio Oil Co.), 234 U.S. 548, 559 (1914) 
(``Availing itself of its monopoly of the means of transportation 
the Standard Oil Company refused, through its subordinates, to carry 
any oil unless the same was sold to it or to them, and through them 
to it, on terms more or less dictated by itself.''); Opinion No. 
154, 21 FERC at 61,582 (Standard Oil ``kept its crude pipeline rates 
high, thus enabling the railroads to hold on to business that they 
would have lost had Standard [Oil] passed the lower costs of 
pipeline transit on to unaffiliated shippers'' in exchange for 
preferential rates from the railroads).
    \24\ See Magellan, 161 FERC ] 61,219 at P 19 (The ICA does not 
impose ``a blanket restriction on integrated company financing,'' 
but ``[t]he issue of integrated company finances is instead a 
ratemaking and accounting matter concerning the justness and 
reasonableness of a carrier's rates and rate structures'').
    \25\ We recognize that in many circumstances, a carrier has an 
incentive to obtain commitments from nonaffiliated shippers. 
Securing term commitments from nonaffiliated shippers can mitigate a 
pipeline's financial risk and provide the pipeline with a stable 
assured revenue stream supporting the pipeline. E.g., TransCan. 
Keystone Pipeline, LP, 125 FERC ] 61,025, at P 21 (2008) (committed 
rates ``support pipelines' efforts to attract shippers that will 
make long-term volume commitments to support the construction of new 
facilities.''); Enbridge Pipelines (S. Lights) LLC, 141 FERC ] 
61,244, at P 4 (2012) (Enbridge Pipelines (S. Lights)) (``[I]t was 
necessary to obtain financial support through long-term volume 
commitments without which the project could not move forward.''); 
Express, 76 FERC at 62,254 (``longer term commitments provide 
greater assurances . . . and hence more long-term revenue 
stability'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    12. In proposing this guidance, we emphasize that an oil pipeline 
carrier has a burden to support its proposed rates and terms of 
service.\26\ Further, ``the fact that contract rates are not inherently 
discriminatory does not mean they must always be approved or that such 
rates are appropriate under all circumstances.'' \27\ In seeking 
approval of any rates or terms pursuant to a contract solely with an 
affiliate, the carrier must demonstrate that its affiliate did not 
receive an undue preference contrary to the ICA.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ E.g., Laurel Pipe Line Co., 167 FERC ] 61,210, at P 24 n. 
37 (2019) (``Oil pipelines have the burden to demonstrate that 
proposed rates are just and reasonable.''); ONEOK Elk Creek 
Pipeline, L.L.C., 167 FERC ] 61,277, at P 4 (2019) (``An oil 
pipeline bears the burden of demonstrating that proposed rates and 
changes to its tariff are just and reasonable'').
    \27\ Colonial, 146 FERC ] 61,206 at P 34.
    \28\ See 49 U.S.C. app. 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 10, 15(1), 15(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Discussion

    13. In this proposed policy statement, we provide guidance for a 
carrier seeking approval in a petition for declaratory order or tariff 
filing for contract rates or terms pursuant to an Affiliate Contract. 
We note that a carrier is not required to file a petition for 
declaratory order before proposing to implement contract rates and 
terms in a tariff filing.\29\ The purpose of a declaratory order is 
``to terminate controversy or remove uncertainty.'' \30\ In evaluating 
the first proposal by an oil pipeline for long-term contract rates in 
1996, the Commission found that the ratemaking issues raised by the 
pipeline were appropriately addressed in a declaratory order 
proceeding.\31\ Since then, certain proposed rate structures and terms 
have repeatedly been found to be consistent with the ICA and Commission 
policy in numerous declaratory orders and have become industry 
standards. Therefore, for some proposals there is no controversy or 
uncertainty for the Commission to resolve, and it may not be beneficial 
for the carrier to file a petition for declaratory order in advance of 
a tariff filing to implement the proposed contract rates and terms. We 
expect that in such instances, a carrier will fully explain and support 
the proposed rates and terms in its tariff filing.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Seaway Crude Pipeline Co., LLC, 139 FERC ] 61,109, at P 25 
(2012) (``The Commission, of course, cannot require the filing of a 
petition for declaratory order nor prevent the filing of a tariff 
proposing to implement service under section 15(7) of the ICA.'').
    \30\ 5 U.S.C. 554(e) (2018).
    \31\ Express Pipeline P'ship, 75 FERC ] 61,303, at 61,967 
(1996), aff'd, 76 FERC at 62,253.
    \32\ See, e.g., Laure Pipe Line Co., L.P., 167 FERC ] 61,210, at 
P 24 n.37 (2019) (Laurel) (Oil pipelines ``must provide sufficient 
explanatory information to meet [their] burden of proof in their 
transmittal letters rather than their answers.''); Chaparral 
Pipeline Co., LLC, 152 FERC ] 61,068, at P 7 (2015) (failure to 
provide sufficient explanation and support for tariff changes in the 
transmittal letter ``may result in the Commission rejecting such 
filings as patently deficient''); Mars Oil Pipeline Co., 150 FERC ] 
61,148, at P 7 n.7 (2015) (oil pipelines must provide ``adequate 
explanation in their transmittal letters as opposed to waiting to 
justify a filing in an answer''); Plains Pipeline, L.P., 168 FERC ] 
61,201, at P 10 (2019) (``[P]ipelines must explain their tariff 
changes in their transmittal letters, not subsequent responses.''); 
see also, Seaway, 146 FERC ] 61,151 at P 15 (``By not first seeking 
a declaratory order approving its general rate structure prior to 
filing its tariff, [the pipeline] left the question of rate 
structure issues, including the open season process for committed 
shippers, open to litigation.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    14. The proposed guidance suggests some means for a carrier to 
support a finding that its proposed terms are not unduly 
discriminatory, and carriers would not be precluded from making this 
showing in other ways. The Commission will continue its practice of 
evaluating contract proposals on a case-by-case basis based on all the 
facts and circumstances presented.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See Colonial, 146 FERC ] 61,206 at P 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    15. The proposed guidance falls into four categories: (1) Proposed 
guidance that oil pipeline carriers identify Affiliate Contracts when 
making filings with the Commission, (2) proposed information that could 
demonstrate that an open season process was not unduly discriminatory, 
(3) methods for showing that rates and terms pursuant to an Affiliate 
Contract are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory, and (4) 
ensuring that sufficient access to pipeline capacity is reserved for 
uncommitted shippers. We seek comment on these and any other methods 
for a carrier to demonstrate that proposed terms pursuant to an 
Affiliate Contract are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.

A. Identifying Affiliate Contracts in Commission Filings

    16. When a carrier seeks approval for contract rates or terms in a 
petition for declaratory order or tariff filing, we propose that the 
carrier disclose whether or not those terms are pursuant to an 
Affiliate Contract. Given that Affiliate Contracts require additional 
safeguards to ensure compliance with the ICA, this information is 
necessary for the Commission to evaluate the carrier's proposal.
    17. We propose to define an ``affiliate'' of a specified carrier 
for purposes of this proposed policy statement as any entity that, 
directly or indirectly, controls, is controlled by or is under common 
control with, the carrier.\34\ We seek comment on how to define control 
and any standards or thresholds for establishing a rebuttable 
presumption of control or lack of control.\35\ As explained above, if 
one or

[[Page 66976]]

more nonaffiliated entities execute the contract to become committed 
shippers along with any affiliates of the carrier, the contract is not 
an Affiliate Contract. This proposed guidance only applies to rates and 
terms pursuant to contracts exclusively executed by the carrier's 
affiliate(s) and not by any nonaffiliated entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ This definition is based upon the Commission's Standards of 
Conduct regulations for electric utilities and natural gas 
pipelines. See 18 CFR 358.3 (2020). However, we welcome comments 
proposing an alternative definition of ``affiliate'' for the limited 
purpose contemplated by this proposed policy statement.
    \35\ Although commenters should address whether a different 
standard may be appropriate here, the Commission's Standards of 
Conduct define ``control'' as ``the direct or indirect authority, 
whether acting alone or in conjunction with others, to direct or 
cause to direct the management policies of an entity'' and specify 
that ``[a] voting interest of 10 percent or more creates a 
rebuttable presumption of control.'' 18 CFR 358.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    18. We recognize that a carrier may choose to file a petition for 
declaratory order requesting that the Commission approve proposed 
contract rates and terms before the open season has closed and where it 
is not definitively known whether an unaffiliated entity will execute 
the proposed contract. In such circumstances, we propose that a carrier 
could request the Commission's approval of the proposed rates and terms 
conditioned on at least one nonaffiliated shipper executing the 
contract.\36\ If a nonaffiliate eventually executes a proposed 
contract, the carrier could confirm in its transmittal letter when it 
files its tariff implementing the proposed rates and terms that a 
nonaffiliated entity has agreed to such rates and terms. In the event 
that only an affiliated entity executes the contract, the carrier could 
file an amended petition to support the proposed rates and terms as an 
Affiliate Contract consistent with the below proposed guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Of course, where a carrier believes it unlikely that any 
nonaffiliated entity will be interested in its proposal, a carrier 
could provide support for the proposed rates and terms as an 
Affiliate Contract in a petition for declaratory order, 
notwithstanding the possibility that a nonaffiliated entity could 
agree to the contract prior to the close of the open season.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Information Regarding an Open Season Process

    19. We propose that by providing information regarding an open 
season process that resulted in the execution of only an Affiliate 
Contract, a carrier can demonstrate that its affiliate(s) emerged as 
the only committed shipper(s) via a fair, transparent, and non-
discriminatory process. Below, we suggest some ways that carriers can 
help support such a finding by providing information regarding (1) open 
season advertising and participation, (2) open season timing, (3) open 
season negotiations and changes, and (4) additional facts. We seek 
comment on the items proposed below and whether such information could 
support a showing that a carrier did not unduly discriminate in favor 
of an affiliate, as well as any other information that could support 
such a finding.
    20. We emphasize that the proposed items below are neither 
prescriptive nor exhaustive. The items proposed below merely illustrate 
some potential ways that a carrier could demonstrate that an open 
season process was not unduly discriminatory. In proposing the 
suggested items below, we also do not intend to preclude carriers from 
providing any other information that could demonstrate the integrity of 
the open season process. Furthermore, a carrier would not necessarily 
need to provide all the information discussed below to support its 
proposed rates and terms pursuant to the Affiliate Contract. We 
recognize that some of the items below would not be applicable to every 
situation and there may be considerations that enable a carrier to 
support its filing without including all the information discussed 
below.
1. Open Season Advertising and Participation
    21. Information regarding a carrier's efforts to publicize its open 
season and nonaffiliated shipper participation in the open season may 
support a finding that a carrier did not afford an affiliate an undue 
preference. This could include:
    [ssquf] Describing the steps the carrier undertook to advertise the 
open season;
    [ssquf] Identifying how many (if any) nonaffiliated entities 
participated in the open season process;
    [ssquf] Describing any facts that could be relevant to explaining 
the lack of participation by nonaffiliated shippers, if no such 
nonaffiliated shippers expressed interest or participated in the open 
season;
    [ssquf] Showing that any confidentiality agreement that shippers 
were required to sign as a prerequisite for obtaining the proposed 
contract was narrowly tailored.
    22. The Commission's well-established policy considers whether a 
contract was offered in a widely publicized open season, regardless of 
whether nonaffiliated shippers enter the contract.\37\ However, the 
level of supporting information provided by carriers to support a 
finding that an open season was widely publicized varies. We propose 
that carriers proposing rates and terms pursuant to Affiliate Contracts 
provide detailed information showing compliance with this policy to 
alleviate concerns regarding affiliate favoritism. Evidence showing an 
open season was widely publicized may include copies of press releases 
and web-postings, data on how widely the open season notice was 
distributed, and descriptions of the carrier's marketing efforts and 
efforts to contact market participants that could have a potential 
interest in the offered service.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ E.g., Enterprise Crude, 166 FERC ] 61,224 at P 11 (``[A] 
carrier's open season must be widely publicized and structured in 
manner that provides all shippers access to the offered capacity''); 
Navigator BSG Transp. & Storage, LLC, 152 FERC ] 61,026, at P 18 
(2015); ETP Crude LLC, 153 FERC ] 61,261, at P 17 (2015); Wolverine 
Pipe Line Co., 153 FERC ] 61,109, at P 22 (2015); ONEOK Arbuckle II 
Pipeline, L.L.C., 170 FERC ] 61,010, at P 12 (2020) (ONEOK Arbuckle 
II); White Cliffs, 148 FERC ] 61,037 at P 52; Monarch Oil Pipeline, 
LLC, 151 FERC ] 61,150, at P 30 (2015) (Monarch).
    \38\ E.g., ONEOK Arbuckle II, 170 FERC ] 61,010 at P 4 (notice 
of the open season was provided ``on the company website, in S&P 
Global Platts Daily, and in the Oil Price Information Service 
Newsletter''); Palmetto Products Pipe Line LLC, 151 FERC ] 61,090, 
at P 6 (2015) (pipeline represented that ``[t]he open season was 
widely publicized through a press release reported through the trade 
press and extensive marketing efforts''); Monarch, 151 FERC ] 61,150 
at P 14 (pipeline represented that the open season was ``widely-
publicized through a press release that was distributed via Business 
Wire, posted on [the pipeline's] website, and through in-person 
meetings with potential shippers''); Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 141 FERC 
] 61,212, at P 5 (2012) (notice of the open season was ``distributed 
in press releases to more than 200 trade and general circulation 
print and online publications''); Saddlehorn Pipeline Co., LLC, 153 
FERC ] 61,067, at P 7 (2015) (``Notice of the open season was 
published on [the pipeline's] website, reported in the trade press, 
and [the pipeline] launched its own marketing efforts, which 
included direct contact to potential shippers.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    23. Information regarding the level of participation from 
nonaffiliated entities during an open season may also indicate that the 
process was truly open and inclusive, rather than designed to unduly 
favor a carrier's affiliate. Such information could include identifying 
how many, if any, nonaffiliated entities (1) responded to the open 
season notice, (2) received the open season materials, or (3) actively 
participated in the open season process by engaging in discussions or 
negotiations with the carrier. Where no nonaffiliated entity either 
expressed any interest or participated in the open season, a carrier 
could describe any pertinent facts that could explain why the carrier's 
affiliate was the only participant. For example, information regarding 
the market context, such as product liquidity, connectivity, and 
business operations of entities active in the region served by the 
pipeline, may help to explain the level of interest by nonaffiliated 
entities.\39\ Where a carrier can identify specific circumstances that

[[Page 66977]]

shed light on the lack of nonaffiliated shipper interest, such 
information could assist the Commission in its evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See, e.g., ONEOK Arbuckle II, 170 FERC ] 61,010 at P 3 
(noting that ``the Petition includes a description of the 
production, processing, and market for Demethanized Mix'' and 
``explains that the Pipeline is likely to be used by only one or a 
very small number of shippers, not because of the terms of service 
or open season, but as a result of the nature of the market for 
Demethanized Mix in which the Pipeline operates'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. The Commission's policy is that confidentiality agreements used 
in open seasons must be narrowly tailored, regardless of whether 
nonaffiliated shippers make commitments.\40\ However, the level of 
information provided by carriers in their filings regarding 
confidentiality agreements varies. We propose that carriers proposing 
rates and terms pursuant to Affiliate Contracts provide a showing that 
any confidentiality agreement that was a prerequisite to obtaining open 
season materials was narrowly tailored consistent with Commission 
policy. This information is particularly important in the context of 
Affiliate Contracts to ensure that any nonaffiliated shippers that 
participated in the open season were not prevented from raising 
concerns about the process or proposed terms with the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ The Commission has explained that while we ``recognize[] a 
pipeline's need for confidentiality agreements during an open season 
to protect the pipeline from competitive harm due to the release of 
potential rates, discounts, contract terms etc.,'' such 
``confidentiality agreements should be narrowly tailored and should 
not prevent potential shippers from bringing to the Commission's 
attention issues arising from the open season or proposed contract 
provisions that may conflict with applicable law, precedent or 
policy.'' Colonial, 146 FERC ] 61,206 at P 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Open Season Timing
    25. Information regarding the timing of the open season may support 
a finding that a carrier did not afford an affiliate an undue 
preference, such as:
    [ssquf] Showing that the open season process permitted any 
potential nonaffiliated committed shippers adequate time to 
meaningfully participate in the open season;
    [ssquf] Identifying whether a carrier conducted its open season 
before beginning construction of any pipeline facilities or 
infrastructure that would enable the service offerings, such that the 
scope could potentially be modified to accommodate requests from 
potential nonaffiliated committed shippers during the open season;
    [ssquf] Identifying whether discussions were ongoing with potential 
nonaffiliated committed shippers prior to the close of the open season, 
and whether the open season was extended to allow additional time for 
discussions with potential nonaffiliated committed shippers.
    26. The above information regarding open season timing may support 
a finding that an open season was not designed to afford an undue 
preference to a carrier's affiliate. In general, a carrier's open 
season process should allow for meaningful participation by interested 
shippers. Where no nonaffiliated shippers make a commitment, 
information regarding an open season's timing could be particularly 
useful to illustrate that the carrier made a good faith effort to allow 
participation by any interested nonaffiliated entities. The length of 
the open season should allow sufficient time for a potential shipper to 
evaluate the proposed rates and terms of service, engage in back-and-
forth discussions and negotiations with the carrier, and formulate a 
proposed commitment. While the amount of time permitted for potential 
shippers to submit commitments in carriers' initial open season notices 
varies, industry standards appear to allow at least 30 days (not 
including any extensions). We propose that filings regarding Affiliate 
Contracts include a representation that the initial open season notice 
permitted potential shippers 30 days or longer to submit commitments 
consistent with industry standards or explain why a shorter deadline 
was used.
    27. The relationship between the open season timing and the timing 
of any construction activities that will enable the new service 
offerings may also support a finding that the open season process 
allowed for meaningful participation from nonaffiliated shippers. Where 
a carrier conducts its open season before beginning construction on a 
project, the carrier may have the opportunity to modify the project's 
scope to respond to the business needs of potential nonaffiliated 
committed shippers. For example, a carrier may consider upsizing the 
design capacity of a planned new pipeline or expansion project in 
response to the level of shipper commitments received during the open 
season.\41\ Conversely, where a project's in-service date is coincident 
with the close of the open season, there may be less opportunity for 
the project's scope to be modified based on the interest shown in the 
open season. Information regarding the relationship between when the 
carrier conducted the open season process in relation to the timing of 
any construction activities may be useful in some cases to support a 
finding that a carrier did not unduly discriminate in favor of an 
affiliate. However, we emphasize that a carrier is not precluded from 
conducting an open season after construction on the project has 
commenced.\42\ We recognize that the circumstances may vary.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See, e.g., Enbridge Pipeline (Ill.) LLC, 144 FERC ] 61,085, 
at P 3 (2013) (explaining that the pipeline may increase the size of 
the pipeline depending on the results of the open season); Sunoco 
Pipeline L.P., 149 FERC ] 61,191, at P 7, n.5 (2014) (explaining 
that the TSA required shippers to make specific volume commitments 
for propane and/or butane so the pipeline could properly size the 
project and the receipt points). We recognize that this example 
would not be relevant in all circumstances, such as where a carrier 
undertakes an expansion and has only a finite amount of additional 
capacity it is able to create on its system.
    \42\ See SFPP, L.P., 169 FERC ] 61,001, at P 42 (2019) 
(dismissing challenge to the validity of an open season based on the 
fact that the pipeline conducted the open season when development of 
the expansion project was near completion); SFPP, L.P., 168 FERC ] 
61,058, at P 15 n.31 (2019).
    \43\ For example, market demand for a new service may be so 
strong that market participants request that the carrier begin the 
construction activities necessary to enable the new service 
offerings as early as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. If the open season was extended to allow for continued 
negotiations with potential nonaffiliated committed shippers, such 
information suggests that the carrier made genuine efforts to 
accommodate the participation of nonaffiliated potential shippers in 
the open season process. Accordingly, we believe it would be useful for 
carriers proposing terms pursuant to Affiliate Contracts to state 
whether discussions were ongoing with any nonaffiliated entities prior 
to the close of the open season and whether the open season was 
extended.\44\ Where discussions were ongoing, but the carrier declined 
to extend the open season, we propose that carriers include an 
explanation of why the open season was not extended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ E.g., Monarch, 151 FERC ] 61,150 at P 14 (open season was 
extended to respond to shipper interest); Shell Pipeline Co. LP, 141 
FERC ] 61,017, at P 4 (2012) (carrier clarified terms based on 
shipper feedback and extended the open season); ONEOK Arbuckle II, 
170 FERC ] 61,010 at PP 4, 12 (carrier was willing to extend the 
open season if shipper interest warranted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. As explained above, we recognize that these suggestions may not 
be feasible for every carrier seeking to implement contract rates and 
terms. We do not seek to inhibit a carrier's discretion to decide the 
optimal timing or length of an open season process but instead seek to 
illustrate what type of information regarding the open season timing 
could be useful to support proposed terms pursuant to Affiliate 
Contracts where such information is available.
3. Open Season Negotiations and Changes
    30. Information regarding the discussions and modifications that 
took place during the open season may support a finding that a carrier 
did not afford an affiliate an undue preference. This information could 
include:
    [ssquf] Providing the open season materials, including any pro 
forma

[[Page 66978]]

contracts, the carrier offered in the open season;
    [ssquf] Describing any open season negotiations and any changes 
proposed or made to the offered terms;
    [ssquf] Explaining the carrier's basis for not accepting 
commitments submitted by any nonaffiliated entities during the open 
season or providing any facts relevant to why such nonaffiliated 
entities did not ultimately become committed shippers;
    [ssquf] Describing steps taken to ensure that any relevant 
information or data provided or communicated to an affiliate related to 
the proposed contract terms was also provided to all open season 
participants;
    [ssquf] Providing all offers and commitments submitted by the 
carrier's affiliates;
    [ssquf] Showing that a neutral, independent third-party monitored 
or administered the open season process.
    31. While some of the above information may be confidential, 
carriers have filed contracts and other sensitive information with a 
request for privileged treatment in the past.\45\ Information regarding 
the open season negotiations between the carrier and potential shippers 
could support a finding that the open season was not unduly 
discriminatory. For example, such information could demonstrate that 
the carrier was willing to consider potential modifications to a 
contract in response to requests or counter-proposals from 
nonaffiliated shippers. We emphasize that carriers have discretion to 
determine what services to offer.\46\ We are not suggesting that a 
carrier is obligated to accept any suggested modifications to contract 
rates and terms of service, but to the extent a carrier considered 
counter-proposals from nonaffiliated shippers and engaged in a back-
and-forth communication with nonaffiliated shippers, such information 
may support a finding that the carrier did not afford an undue 
preference to its affiliate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 18 CFR 388.112 (2020); see also Enbridge (S. Lights), 121 
FERC ] 61,244 at P 9, n.4 (pro forma TSA was attached to the 
petition); Enbridge Pipelines (N.D.) LLC, 133 FERC ] 61,167, at P 
19, n.30 (2010) (same); ONEOK Elk Creek Pipeline, L.L.C., 169 FERC ] 
61,105, at P 4, n.3 (2019) (same).
    \46\ Enterprise TE Products Pipeline Co. LLC, 143 FERC ] 61,191, 
at P 23 (2013) (Enterprise TE I) (``[I]t is the oil pipeline's 
choice what services it will offer.''); SFPP, L.P., 169 FERC ] 
61,001, at P 45 (``[A] pipeline possesses discretion to decide 
whether or not to offer a particular service.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. Similarly, information regarding any commitments, offers, or 
bids submitted by affiliated or nonaffiliated entities could be 
relevant to the Commission's evaluation of proposed rates and terms 
pursuant to an Affiliate Contract. If a nonaffiliated entity submitted 
a commitment that was not accepted by the carrier, we propose that the 
carrier explain its basis for rejecting the nonaffiliate's submission, 
including describing any method that was used to allocate requests, 
such as net present value.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See, e.g., Shell Pipeline Co. LP, 139 FERC ] 61,228, at P 
22 (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Finally, although we are not aware of any oil pipeline open 
season that was monitored or administered by a neutral, independent 
third party, in other contexts the Commission has recognized that 
``[a]n independent third party can ensure meaningful participation by 
non-affiliates and eliminate characteristics that improperly give an 
advantage to the affiliate.'' \48\ We seek comment on whether 
independent, third-party monitors could play a role in ensuring that 
oil pipeline open seasons afford meaningful participation by 
nonaffiliates and prevent undue discrimination in favor of pipeline 
affiliates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Allegheny Energy Supply Co., LLC, 108 FERC ] 61,082, at P 
25 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Additional Facts
    34. Under this proposal, a carrier could provide any other 
information to support a finding that the open season provided an equal 
opportunity for nonaffiliated shippers to enter a contract and did not 
unduly discriminate in favor of the carrier's affiliates. The above 
list is neither exclusive nor exhaustive, and we invite comments on any 
information pertinent to demonstrating the integrity of an open season 
that does not result in commitments from nonaffiliated shippers.

C. Information Regarding the Committed Terms

    35. We also seek comment on the below proposed guidance for a 
carrier seeking to implement rates and terms pursuant to an Affiliate 
Contract to demonstrate that it did not unduly discriminate in favor of 
an affiliate by offering excessively burdensome or uneconomic contract 
terms designed to prevent nonaffiliated shippers from becoming 
committed shippers. A contract rate or term that appears to impose 
excessive burdens and departs from industry standards could be an 
indication that the carrier was seeking to exclude any nonaffiliated 
shippers from entering the contract and unduly discriminating in favor 
of its affiliate.
    36. The following proposed guidance highlights key areas where 
carriers proposing rates and terms pursuant to Affiliate Contracts 
could demonstrate they closely adhered to industry standards and 
Commission policy: (1) Minimum commitment requirements, (2) rate 
requirements, (3) penalty and deficiency provisions, and (4) duty to 
support clauses. Some of the below guidance is based on Commission 
policies that are generally applicable, including to carriers 
implementing contracts supported by nonaffiliated shipper commitments. 
However, the level of information and support provided by carriers in 
their filings before the Commission varies. For the reasons discussed 
above, we propose that carriers seeking to implement rates and terms 
pursuant to Affiliate Contracts expressly address the below items and 
demonstrate in their filings that such terms are consistent with the 
Commission's policies and industry standards. We seek comment on the 
guidance as well as on any other information that could support a 
finding that a carrier did not unduly discriminate in favor of its 
affiliate.
1. Minimum Commitment Requirements
    37. The Commission has explained that a contract that requires an 
excessively high minimum commitment for a shipper to become a committed 
shipper may violate the anti-discrimination provisions of the ICA.\49\ 
In Enterprise Crude, the Commission found that a contract offered in an 
open season that included a large minimum volume requirement that was 
not justified by operational requirements and only allowed the carrier 
to accept one committed shipper ``had the effect of conferring an undue 
or unreasonable preference or advantage to large shippers.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Enterprise Crude, 166 FERC ] 61,224.
    \50\ Id. P 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. Where a carrier's affiliate is the only committed shipper, a 
high minimum volume commitment that is not operationally justified may 
be an indication that the carrier intended to unduly discriminate in 
favor of its affiliate. Likewise, a long minimum term commitment that 
departs from industry standards without any explanation raises similar 
concerns. For example, an affiliated shipper may incur no additional 
risk when agreeing to a 20-year contract with its affiliated pipeline, 
but a 20-year term could impose significant risk on a nonaffiliated 
shipper that would be required to pay the contract rate for its 
committed volumes (or incur significant

[[Page 66979]]

shortfall penalties) throughout the term.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ We estimate that less than five percent of oil pipeline 
contract terms filed with the Commission include initial term 
lengths of 20 years or more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    39. Accordingly, we propose that carrier filings proposing terms 
pursuant to an Affiliate Contract (1) describe the minimum commitment 
(volume and term length) required to enter the contract in their 
filings, (2) state the maximum number of committed shippers the minimum 
requirements would allow the carrier to accept (e.g., if multiple 
interested shippers submitted a minimum bid), and (3) explain whether 
the minimum commitment requirements are consistent with Commission 
policy and industry standards or, where not consistent with industry 
standards, any operational or other considerations or circumstances 
that would justify the requirements.\52\ We seek comment on whether 
this proposal will provide sufficient assurance that minimum commitment 
requirements in Affiliate Contracts do not unduly discriminate against 
potential nonaffiliated shippers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See ONEOK Arbuckle II, 170 FERC ] 61,010 at P 6 n.7 
(pipeline represented that ``the minimum volume commitment is a 
small percentage of the initial capacity of the Pipeline and roughly 
corresponds to the average output of a typical natural gas 
processing plant in Oklahoma'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rates
a. Standards Applicable To Affiliate Contract Rate Terms
    40. To fulfill its obligations under the ICA, the Commission must 
look at (1) the rate information provided by the carrier during the 
open season and (2) the burden the contract imposes over the life of 
the contract, not just on the first day of service. Potential committed 
shippers must decide whether to agree to the contract rate based on the 
information provided during the open season process, not when the 
tariff is ultimately filed with the Commission.\53\ During the open 
season process, a shipper is faced with the decision whether to commit 
to pay the contract rate, including any rate increases permitted by the 
contract over the entire term of the agreement, not merely on the first 
day of service. Therefore, to ensure that a contract rate is just, 
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory under the ICA, the Commission 
must evaluate the full obligation that a potential contracting shipper 
would incur by agreeing to the rate terms offered by the carrier in the 
open season over the life of the agreement, including the burden 
imposed by any rate escalation provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ As discussed above, the process of offering the contract 
rates to all interested shippers is essential to meeting the common 
carrier duty of nondiscrimination. Sea-Land, 738 F.2d at 1317 
(``Although one normally regards contract relationships as highly 
individualized, contract rates can still be accommodated to the 
principle of nondiscrimination by requiring a carrier offering such 
rates to make them available to any shipper willing and able to meet 
the contract's terms.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    41. As discussed above, where a nonaffiliated shipper agrees to a 
contract, the Commission can generally presume that the open season 
process afforded shippers sufficient information to evaluate the 
contract rate and that the agreed-to rate terms, including any 
escalation provisions, respond to competitive conditions because the 
contract reflects arm's-length bargaining.\54\ In contrast, an 
affiliated shipper may evaluate any rate paid to its affiliated 
pipeline differently than an arm's-length third party because the 
expenditures and earnings of the affiliates are combined at the parent 
company level. Thus, where a carrier seeks to provide an affiliated 
shipper preferential access to capacity, the carrier may offer a 
contract rate, including escalation terms over the life of the 
contract, that do not reflect market factors and would be excessively 
burdensome or uneconomic for any nonaffiliated market participants.\55\ 
This is one means for the carrier to provide an undue preference to an 
affiliate over a non-affiliate through its open season rate offerings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See, e.g., Seaway, 146 FERC ] 61,151 at PP 13, 25, 28; 
Tesoro, 148 FERC ] 61,129 at P 23.
    \55\ See Magellan, 161 FERC ] 61,219 at P 14 (while the 
marketing affiliate ``would facially pay its pipeline's filed tariff 
rate, and the [m]arketing [a]ffiliate would sell that capacity for 
less than that rate, the entire transaction could nevertheless yield 
a net profit to the integrated company''); Opinion No. 154, 21 FERC 
at 61,660.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. Thus, in the absence of an arm's-length transaction, the 
Commission must have some means for evaluating the Affiliate Contract 
rate and rate escalation provisions that will apply over the term of 
the agreement as offered by the carrier in the open season to ensure 
that they are just and reasonable under the ICA and were not structured 
to unduly discriminate against nonaffiliates.
b. Proposed Method for Demonstrating Affiliate Contract Rate Terms are 
Consistent With ICA Principles
    43. We propose that offering a cost-of-service rate over the term 
of the agreement to any interested shippers in an open season would 
support a finding that such rate offering is just, reasonable, and not 
unduly discriminatory under the ICA. The Commission has long recognized 
that cost-of-service ratemaking provides one mechanism for protecting 
against an exercise of market power.\56\ A cost-of-service rate can 
serve as a substitute for a competitive market rate where the indicia 
of fair dealing that accompanies arm's-length, non-affiliate 
transactions is absent.\57\ Therefore, where a carrier chooses to offer 
a cost-of-service rate over the term of the agreement to any interested 
shippers in an open season, such rate offering is entitled to a 
presumption that it is just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory 
under the ICA.\58\ Although we are proposing that offering a cost-of-
service rate over the term of the contract as described further below 
provides a safe harbor method of supporting an Affiliate Contract rate 
for purposes of applying a presumption that the rate complies with the 
ICA, we recognize that there can be other ways to justify Affiliate 
Contract rates where the Commission cannot rely on the presence of 
arm's-length bargaining. The proposed guidance is

[[Page 66980]]

not intended to require a carrier to offer a cost-of-service rate as 
outlined below in order to demonstrate the rate is just, reasonable and 
not unduly discriminatory or to preclude a carrier from supporting an 
Affiliate Contract rate on different grounds consistent with Commission 
precedent and regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. FERC, 487 F.3d 945, 961 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (``[T]he purpose of a cost-of-service rate . . . is to 
simulate what a pipeline's economic behavior would be in a 
competitive market.''); SFPP, L.P., 121 FERC ] 61,240, at P 14 
(2007) (``cost-of-service rate making seeks to replicate a 
competitive rate'').
    \57\ See Phila. Elec. Co., 58 FERC ] 61,060, at 61,134 (1992) 
(The concern ``for the potential for self-dealing or other forms of 
abuse arising from an affiliated relationship between the buyer and 
seller of electric power . . . is particularly acute where the 
seller seeks to charge rates for service that are based on 
negotiation in the marketplace rather than the traditional measure 
of the seller's costs of providing service.'').
    \58\ We note that a carrier must provide cost-of-service support 
to justify an Affiliate Contract rate in order to comply with 
section 342.2(a) when it files its tariff implementing the new 
service. 18 CFR 342.2(a) (2020); see also Targa NGL Pipeline Co. 
LLC, 166 FERC ] 61,179, at P 21 (2019) (explaining that because the 
pipeline's ``only committed shipper is an affiliate,'' the pipeline 
would be ``required to file its initial rates as cost-of-service 
rates''); Medallion Midland Gathering, LLC, 170 FERC ] 61,048, at P 
33 n.58 (2020) (Because ``the only committed shipper is an affiliate 
of [the pipeline],'' the pipeline is ``required to file the data 
required under section 342.2(a).''); Medallion Del. Express, LLC, 
170 FERC ] 61,047, at P 30 n.57 (2020); Medallion, 170 FERC ] 61,192 
at P 15 n.25. In adopting these regulations, the Commission 
recognized ``a concern . . . with allowing a pipeline that may 
possess market power to control prices in a market to establish an 
initial rate through negotiations'' and required at least one 
nonaffiliated shipper to agree to a rate to ``provide some measure 
of protection against a pipeline exercising market power to dictate 
the rate it will charge.'' See Order No. 561, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 
30,960, order on reh'g, Order No. 561-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 
31,090, at 31,106 (``The purpose of requiring the one shipper who 
must agree to the initial rate to be unaffiliated with the pipeline 
is to ensure that the agreement is based upon arms-length 
negotiations.''), aff'd sub nom. AOPL v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); see also Seaway, 146 FERC ] 61,151 at P 30 (oil 
pipelines must show that a nonaffiliated entity agrees to a 
negotiated rate due to the ``concern that potential market power 
could be exercised against shippers who did not agree to the 
negotiated rate'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. We propose that a carrier can demonstrate that it offered a 
cost-of-service rate over the term of the contract as follows: (1) 
Provide cost-of-service support for the contract rate in the materials 
provided to potential shippers during the open season, (2) stipulate in 
the contract that adjustments to the rate over the term of the contract 
by the carrier would be pursuant to the Commission's cost-of-service 
and indexing regulations,\59\ (3) stipulate in the contract that the 
committed shipper has the right to directly challenge the committed 
rate on a cost-of-service basis under 18 CFR 343.2, and (4) provide 
that whenever the rate is changed during the contract term on a cost-
of-service basis, the new cost-of-service rate will be set at a 100% 
load factor (or some other reasonable limit) so the committed shipper 
is not at risk for future reductions in the pipeline's throughput.\60\ 
We seek comment on the above proposed criteria for offering a cost-of-
service rate over the life of the contract for purposes of applying a 
presumption of compliance with the ICA. In particular, regarding the 
first criteria (providing cost-of-service support for the rate in the 
open season), we recognize that a carrier may not be able to precisely 
calculate its cost of service for pipeline projects that are not yet 
constructed. We seek comment on how, in such instances, the open season 
documents could contain sufficient cost-of-service information for a 
potential shipper to evaluate the proposed rate. For example, a carrier 
could potentially include a reasonable estimated rate range based on 
construction cost projections determined using methods consistent with 
Commission policy. The contract could also provide a committed shipper 
an option to terminate the contract if the actual cost-of-service 
committed rate determined when construction is completed was not within 
the estimated range. The Commission could also consider evidence that 
the carrier's proposed rate is reasonably in line with the estimates 
provided in the open season, or whether the carrier provided adequate 
explanation where the proposed rate materially diverges from the open 
season estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ 18 CFR 342.3, 342.4(a).
    \60\ Without setting the rate at a 100% load factor or something 
similar, a cost-of-service contract rate would place all of the risk 
for reductions in the pipeline's throughout on the committed 
shipper, which could deter participation by nonaffiliated entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. Although we propose a safe harbor method for supporting 
Affiliate Contract rates on a cost-of-service basis, we invite comments 
on any other methods that would warrant a presumption of compliance 
with the ICA in the absence of arm's-length negotiations. Comments 
proposing alternative methods should address (1) the criteria for 
justifying Affiliate Contract rate terms using the proposed method, (2) 
the information a carrier would need to provide in order to support the 
proposed rate terms under the proposed method, (3) how such a showing 
would support a finding that the rate terms offered in the open season 
mitigate the potential for undue discrimination towards potential 
nonaffiliated shippers, (4) why the proposed method is necessary given 
the availability of the cost-of-service safe harbor, and (5) whether 
such method is consistent with the Commission's regulations or, if not, 
changes that would be necessary to permit such method.
3. Penalties and Deficiency Provisions
    46. Surcharges, additional fees, deficiency provisions, or other 
penalties could potentially be designed to impose unreasonable 
financial burden or risk on the contracting shipper, thus ensuring that 
a carrier's affiliate (who may not be affected by such provisions in 
the same manner as unaffiliated entities) emerges from the open season 
process as the only committed shipper. We propose that carrier filings 
regarding Affiliate Contracts include a showing that any such terms are 
consistent with Commission policy and industry standards, and are 
reasonably tailored to meet legitimate objectives, so as to demonstrate 
that they do not impose an excessive or disproportionate burden on 
potential nonaffiliate-committed shippers. For example, the Commission 
has explained that penalties must be reasonably tailored to deter 
conduct that is detrimental to shippers or pipeline operations.\61\ 
Similarly, the Commission's prior precedents describe when costs can be 
appropriately recovered through a surcharge.\62\ We seek comment on 
this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See Bridger Pipeline LLC, 135 FERC ] 61,188, at P 16 
(2011); Enbridge Pipelines (North Dakota) LLC, 118 FERC ] 61,162, at 
PP 15-16 (2007); Platte Pipe Line Co., 80 FERC ] 61,036, at 61,082 
(1997); Colonial Pipeline Co., 92 FERC ] 61,289, at 62,022 (2000); 
Mars Oil Pipeline Co., 150 FERC ] 61,148, at P 8 (2015); Williams 
Pipe Line Co., 76 FERC ] 61,023, at 61,160 (1996).
    \62\ See, e.g., Chevron Pipe Line Co., 163 FERC ] 61,238 (2018), 
reh'g denied, 165 FERC ] 61,069 (2018); Tesoro Logistics Nw. 
Pipelines LLC, 153 FERC ] 61,118 (2015); Magellan Pipeline Co., 
L.P., 115 FERC ] 61,276 (2006); Chevron Pipe Line Co., 115 FERC ] 
61,117, at P 31 (2006); SFPP, L.P., 121 FERC ] 61,162 (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Duty To Support
    47. The Commission has explained that it ``will . . . look with 
disfavor upon duty to support clauses that require too broad a waiver 
of a shipper's statutory rights to seek redress before the 
Commission.'' \63\ In particular, ``[w]hile it appears to be reasonable 
for contract shippers to support the specific rates to which they 
agreed, requiring those shippers to also waive their statutory rights 
as to past rates or other rates of the pipeline to which they have not 
specifically agreed is likely too broad.'' \64\ Although this policy 
applies to all contract proposals as a general matter, the level of 
information carriers provide to the Commission regarding duty to 
support clauses varies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See Colonial, 146 FERC ] 61,206 at P 32; Nexen, 121 FERC ] 
61,235 at PP 51-52.
    \64\ Colonial, 146 FERC ] 61,206 at P 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. We propose that carrier filings proposing terms pursuant to an 
Affiliate Contract provide a showing that any duty to support clause 
included in the contract was narrowly tailored consistent with 
Commission policy. In the context of Affiliate Contracts, such showing 
could be particularly useful to the Commission to support a finding 
that no nonaffiliated entities were unreasonably deterred from entering 
the contract on the basis that the contract required an overbroad 
waiver of a shipper's statutory rights to seek redress before the 
Commission. We seek comment on this proposal.

D. Prorationing Rules

    49. When the only committed shipper is the carrier's affiliate, we 
are concerned about prorationing rules that may unduly hinder an 
uncommitted shipper's (i.e., unaffiliated shipper's) access to pipeline 
capacity. When a carrier proposes rates and terms pursuant to an 
Affiliate Contract, the only way for nonaffiliates to access the 
pipeline is through the capacity reserved for uncommitted shippers. 
Accordingly, when a carrier proposes rates and terms pursuant to an 
Affiliate Contract, the carrier should ensure that it has included a 
full explanation for how the Affiliate Contract is integrated into the 
pipeline's prorationing rules.
    50. The Commission has approved various proposals to provide 
committed shippers preferential prorationing terms,

[[Page 66981]]

such as firm or priority service,\65\ or deemed regular shipper 
status.\66\ The Commission's policies require that sufficient capacity 
be reserved for uncommitted shippers. This addresses the concern that 
the carrier is exercising market power by ensuring that shippers have 
an alternative to the terms the carrier is offering in a committed 
contract. Although each proposal is addressed based on the facts and 
circumstances presented,\67\ Commission precedent and industry 
standards generally support a carrier reserving at least 10% of 
capacity for uncommitted shippers.\68\ In particular, the Commission 
rejected a proposed prorationing policy where committed shippers would 
have access to 95% of the capacity as of the in-service date of the 
project, finding that such proposal ``undermines the Commission's 
committed rate policy, which allocates a minimum 10 percent reservation 
of the pipeline's total capacity to uncommitted shippers to ensure 
reasonable access to the pipeline consistent with its common carrier 
obligation.'' \69\ As with several of the other proposals discussed 
herein, these policies apply to all committed shipper contracts, not 
just Affiliate Contracts. However, carriers seeking to implement 
contract rates and terms do not always discuss the prorationing policy 
in detail in their filings, such as where there is already a 
prorationing policy in the pipeline's tariff that applies to committed 
shipper contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ E.g., CCPS, 121 FERC ] 61,253 at P 19; EnLink NGL Pipeline, 
LP, 167 FERC ] 61,024, at PP 19, 22 (2019); Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 
169 FERC ] 61,088, at P 13 (2019); Plantation Pipe Line Co., 167 
FERC ] 61,025, at P 17 (2019).
    \66\ E.g., Kinder Morgan Pony Express, 141 FERC ] 61,180 at PP 
33-41; Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC, 153 FERC ] 61,322, at P 30 
(2015); Permian Express Terminal LLC, 162 FERC ] 61,112, at P 17 
(2018).
    \67\ CCPS Transp., LLC, 122 FERC ] 61,123, at PP 14-15 (2008) 
(``Each proposal presented to the Commission is appraised on its own 
merits regarding the amount of set-aside capacity planned to be 
reserved for spot volumes.'').
    \68\ See, e.g., CenterPoint, 144 FERC ] 61,130 at P 24 (``The 
Commission previously found that a reservation of at least 10 
percent of the pipeline's capacity for uncommitted shippers is 
sufficient to provide reasonable access to the pipeline.''); CCPS, 
121 FERC ] 61,253 at P 17 n.33 (requiring 10% of the expansion 
volumes to be reserved for uncommitted shippers in order ``to 
preserve the common carrier obligation''); EnLink, 157 FERC 
 61,120 at P 15 (approving ``proposal to allow committed 
shippers priority access for up to 90 percent of the Project's 
capacity, with at least 10 percent of the capacity reserved for 
uncommitted shippers''); Stakeholder, 160 FERC ] 61,010 at P 16 
(same); Enterprise Liquids Pipeline LLC, 142 FERC ] 61,087, at P 27 
(2013) (approving a rate structure guaranteeing a reservation of 10% 
of capacity for uncommitted shippers); Kinder Morgan Cochin LLC, 141 
FERC ] 61,056, at P 18 (2012) (stating that ``Cochin provides an 
appropriate amount of capacity for Uncommitted Shippers, at least 
[10%], while affording benefits to Committed Shippers who enter into 
long-term TSAs.''); EnLink NGL Pipeline, LP, 167 FERC ] 61,024, at P 
22 (2019) (finding ``[t]he policy is consistent with Commission 
precedent and ensures that uncommitted shippers moving crude oil in 
interstate commerce will continue to have access to at least 10 
percent of the Expansion Project's capacity during times of 
prorationing'').
    \69\ White Cliffs Pipeline, L.L.C., 168 FERC ] 61,087, at P 36 
(2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    51. Accordingly, we propose that carriers proposing rates and terms 
pursuant to Affiliate Contracts fully explain any prorationing terms 
applicable to committed shippers and the committed volume levels to 
which these terms apply. We also propose that carriers explain how the 
prorationing terms are consistent with Commission policy and the 
pipeline's common carrier obligations and will ensure that any 
unaffiliated shippers that request transportation will have reasonable 
access to the pipeline as uncommitted shippers.

IV. Conclusion

    52. We seek input on the above proposals or any other approaches 
for oil pipeline carriers to demonstrate that Affiliate Contracts are 
not the result of undue discrimination to exclude potential 
nonaffiliated committed shippers. We welcome comments on any other 
issues or factors related to these issues that the Commission should 
consider for inclusion in the policy statement.

V. Comment Procedures

    53. The Commission invites comments on this proposed policy 
statement by December 14, 2020 and Reply Comments by January 28, 2020. 
Comments must refer to Docket No. PL21-1-000 and must include the 
commenter's name, the organization they represent, if applicable, and 
their address in their comments.
    54. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically 
via the eFiling link on the Commission's website at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing 
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing 
software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format 
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not 
need to make a paper filing.
    55. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically 
must send an original of their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20426.
    56. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files 
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the 
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are 
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.

VI. Document Availability

    57. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov). At 
this time, the Commission has suspended access to the Commission's 
Public Reference Room, due to the President's March 13, 2020 
proclamation declaring a National Emergency concerning the Novel 
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19).
    58. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this 
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is 
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, 
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type 
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in 
the docket number field.
    59. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's 
website during normal business hours from the Commission's Online 
Support at 202-502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at 
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

    By the Commission.

    Issued: October 15, 2020.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-23289 Filed 10-20-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


