[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 30 (Thursday, February 13, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8155-8161]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-02170]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM19-10-000]


Transmission Planning Reliability Standard TPL-001-5

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves 
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 (Transmission System Planning 
Performance Requirements), submitted by the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric 
Reliability Organization.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule will become effective April 13, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Eugene Blick (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, 
DC 20426, (301) 665-1759, eugene.blick@ferc.gov
Leigh Anne Faugust (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, 
DC 20426, (202) 502-6396, leigh.faugust@ferc.gov


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    1. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 
the Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 (Transmission 
System Planning Performance

[[Page 8156]]

Requirements).\1\ The North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization 
(ERO), submitted Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 for Commission approval 
in response to directives in Order No. 786.\2\ As discussed in this 
final rule, we determine that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 improves 
upon currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 by addressing: 
(1) The study of single points of failure of protection systems; and 
(2) planned maintenance outages and stability analysis for spare 
equipment strategies.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
    \2\ Transmission Planning Reliability Standards, Order No. 786, 
145 FERC ] 61,051 (2013).
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    2. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 are 
responsive to the directives in Order No. 786 regarding planned 
maintenance outages and stability analysis for spare equipment 
strategies.\3\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is responsive in that it 
requires each planning coordinator and transmission planner to perform 
an annual planning assessment of its portion of the bulk electric 
system considering a number of system conditions and contingencies with 
a risk-based approach. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 are also responsive to the concerns identified in Order No. 754 
regarding the study of a single point of failure on protection 
systems.\4\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 contains revisions to the 
planning events (Category P5) and extreme events (Stability 2.a-h) 
identified in Table 1 (Steady State and Stability Performance Planning 
Events and Steady State and Stability Performance Extreme Events), as 
well as the associated footnote 13, to provide for a more comprehensive 
study of the potential impacts of protection system single points of 
failure.
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    \3\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051, at PP 40, 89.
    \4\ Interpretation of Transmission Planning Reliability 
Standard, Order No. 754, 136 FERC ] 61,186, at P 19 (2011).
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    3. For more common scenarios (i.e., planning events), the planning 
entity must develop a corrective action plan if it determines through 
studies that its system would experience performance issues.\5\ For 
less common scenarios that could result in potentially severe impacts 
such as cascading (i.e., extreme events), the planning entity must 
conduct a comprehensive analysis to understand both the potential 
impacts on its system and the types of actions that could reduce or 
mitigate those impacts.\6\
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    \5\ NERC defines ``Corrective Action Plan'' as, ``A list of 
actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a 
specific problem.'' Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability 
Standards (May 13, 2019) (NERC Glossary).
    \6\ NERC defines ``Cascading'' as, ``The uncontrolled successive 
loss of System Elements triggered by an incident at any location. 
Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption that 
cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area 
predetermined by studies.'' NERC Glossary.
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    4. Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is also responsive to Order No. 
786 by modifying the requirements for stability analysis to require an 
entity to assess the impact of the possible unavailability of long lead 
time equipment, consistent with the entity's spare equipment strategy. 
Accordingly, pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission 
approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as just, reasonable, not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.
    5. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), the Commission 
proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to 
modify the Reliability Standard to require corrective action plans for 
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault if planning studies indicate potential cascading.\7\ As 
discussed below, we determine not to adopt the proposed directive.
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    \7\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5); Transmission Planning Reliability 
Standard TPL-001-5, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 FR 30,639 
(Jun. 27, 2019), 167 FERC ] 61,249, at P 5 (2019) (NOPR).
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I. Background

A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards

    6. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO 
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to 
Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability 
Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to 
Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\8\ Pursuant 
to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a process to 
select and certify an ERO,\9\ and subsequently certified NERC.\10\
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    \8\ Id. 824o(e).
    \9\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability 
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and 
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, 114 
FERC ] 61,104, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, 114 FERC ] 61,328 
(2006).
    \10\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 
61,062, order on reh'g and compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), 
aff'd sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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B. Industry Advisory

    7. On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an advisory report notifying 
industry that failure of a single component of a protection system 
caused three significant system disturbances in the previous five 
years.\11\ In the Industry Advisory, NERC stated that ``[p]rotection 
system component failures may render a protective scheme inoperative, 
which could result in N-1 transmission system contingencies evolving 
into more severe or even extreme events.'' \12\ NERC advised registered 
transmission owners, generator owners, and distribution providers ``to 
address single points of failure on their protection systems, when 
identified in routine system evaluations, to prevent N-1 transmission 
system contingencies from evolving into more severe events or even 
extreme events.'' \13\ NERC also advised industry to begin preparing an 
estimate of the resource commitment required to review, re-engineer, 
and develop a workable outage and construction schedule to address 
single points of failure.
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    \11\ Industry Advisory, Protection System Single Point of 
Failure (March 30, 2009), https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/2009%20Advisories/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf (Industry 
Advisory).
    \12\ Id. at 2.
    \13\ Id. at 1.
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C. Order No. 754

    8. On November 17, 2009, NERC submitted a petition requesting 
approval of NERC's interpretation of Reliability Standard TPL-002-2, 
Requirement R1.3.10. In the resulting Order No. 754, the Commission 
determined that ``there may be a system protection issue that merits 
further exploration by technical experts'' and that there is ``an issue 
concerning the study of the non[hyphen]operation of 
non[hyphen]redundant primary protection systems; e.g., the study of a 
single point of failure on protection systems.'' \14\ To address this 
concern, the Commission directed ``Commission staff to meet with NERC 
and its appropriate subject matter experts to explore the reliability 
concern, including where it can best be addressed, and identify any 
additional actions necessary to address the matter.'' \15\ The 
Commission also directed NERC ``to make an informational filing . . . 
explaining whether there is a further system protection issue that 
needs to be addressed and, if so, what forum and process should be used 
to address that issue and what priority it should be accorded relative 
to other reliability initiatives planned by NERC.'' \16\
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    \14\ Order No. 754, 136 FERC ] 61,186, at P 19 (2011).
    \15\ Id. P 20.
    \16\ Id.

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[[Page 8157]]

    9. Commission staff then hosted a technical conference in October 
2011 on single points of failure, which resulted in four consensus 
points and the following problem statement: ``[t]he group perceives a 
reliability concern regarding the comprehensive assessment of potential 
protection system failures by registered entities. The group agrees on 
the need to study if a [reliability] gap exists regarding the study and 
resolution of a single point of failure on protection systems.'' \17\ 
One outcome of the 2011 technical conference, as described in the 2012 
Informational Filing, was that the NERC Board of Trustees approved the 
issuance of a data request to aid in assessing whether single points of 
failure in protection systems pose a reliability concern.\18\
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    \17\ NERC, Order No. 754 Single Point of Failure Technical 
Meeting Notes at 8 (October 24-25, 2011).
    \18\ 2012 NERC Informational Filing at 7 (stating that the data 
request ``is based on an approach that utilizes . . . a three-phase 
(3[Oslash]) fault and assesses simulated system performance against 
performance measures'').
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    10. Over the next two years, NERC collected data from transmission 
planners that it used to assess protection system single points of 
failure. This assessment examined in detail the protection systems 
related to nearly 4,000 buses. The findings were presented in a 
September 2015 report that concluded that single points of failure on 
protection systems posed a reliability risk that warranted further 
action.\19\ After considering alternatives, the 2015 Report recommended 
that NERC modify Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 to maximize reliability 
of protection system performance and align with the directives in Order 
No. 754. In particular, the 2015 Report recommended that three-phase 
faults involving protection system failures be assessed as an extreme 
event in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4. As an extreme event under 
Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Part 4.5, an entity is required to 
evaluate, but not implement, possible actions designed to mitigate 
cascading.\20\ Notably however, the report did not recommend elevating 
three-phase faults with a protection system failure to a planning event 
under Part 2.7, which requires a corrective action plan when analysis 
indicates an inability to meet performance requirements. The report 
explained that the ``[p]robability of three-phase fault with a 
protection system failure is low enough that it does not warrant a 
planning event.'' \21\
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    \19\ NERC, Order No. 754 Assessment of Protection System Single 
Points of Failure Based on the Section 1600 Data Request, at 11 
(September 2015) (2015 Report).
    \20\ Id.
    \21\ Id. at 9.
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D. Order No. 786

    11. In Order No. 786, the Commission approved the currently-
effective version of the transmission system planning standard, 
Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, and issued several directives to NERC. 
First, the Commission expressed concern that the six (6) month outage 
duration threshold in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Requirement R1 
could exclude planned maintenance outages of significant facilities 
from future planning assessments.\22\ The Commission determined that 
planned maintenance outages of less than six (6) months in duration may 
result in relevant impacts during one or both of the seasonal off-peak 
periods, and that prudent transmission planning should consider 
maintenance outages at those load levels when planned outages are 
performed to allow for a single element to be taken out of service for 
maintenance without compromising the ability of the system to meet 
demand without loss of load. The Commission further determined that a 
properly planned transmission system should ensure the known, planned 
removal of facilities (i.e., generation, transmission, or protection 
system facilities) for maintenance purposes without the loss of 
nonconsequential load or detrimental impacts to system reliability such 
as cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding. The 
Commission directed NERC to modify the Reliability Standards to address 
these concerns.
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    \22\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051 at PP 40-45.
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    12. Second, while stating that NERC had met the Commission's Order 
No. 693 directive to include a spare equipment strategy for steady 
state analysis in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, the Commission 
determined that a spare equipment strategy for stability analysis was 
not addressed in the standard.\23\ The Commission stated that a similar 
spare equipment strategy for stability analysis should exist that 
requires studies to be performed for no or single contingency 
categories \24\ with the conditions that the system is expected to 
experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time 
equipment. Rather than direct a change at that time, however, the 
Commission directed NERC to consider the issue during the next review 
cycle of Reliability Standard TPL-001-4.\25\
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    \23\ Id. PP 85, 88-89 (citing Mandatory Reliability Standards 
for the Bulk-Power System, Order No. 693, 118 FERC ] 61,218, at P 
1786, order on reh'g, Order No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007)).
    \24\ See Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Table 1--Steady State & 
Stability Performance Planning Events, Categories P0, P1, and P2.
    \25\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051 at PP 88-89.
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E. NERC Petition and Reliability Standard TPL-001-5

    13. On December 7, 2018, NERC submitted Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 for Commission approval.\26\ NERC maintains that Reliability 
Standard TPL-001-5 addresses the Order No. 786 directives. With regard 
to protection system single points of failure, NERC indicates that 
Table 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 describes system performance 
requirements for a range of potential system contingencies required to 
be evaluated by the planner.\27\ Table 1 includes three parts: (1) 
Steady State & Stability Performance Planning Events; (2) Steady State 
& Stability Performance Extreme Events; and (3) Steady State & 
Stability Performance Footnotes. Table 1 describes system performance 
requirements for a range of potential system contingencies required to 
be evaluated by the planner. The table categorizes the events as either 
``planning events'' or ``extreme events.'' The table lists seven 
contingency planning events (P1 through P7) that require steady-state 
and stability analysis as well as five extreme event contingencies: 
Three for steady-state and two for stability.
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    \26\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is available on the 
Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM19-
10-000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com.
    \27\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 includes an expanded list of 
protection system components for single points of failure studies. 
The selected list of components account for: (1) Those failed non-
redundant components of a protection system that may impact one or 
more protection systems; (2) the duration that faults remain 
energized until delayed fault clearing; and (3) the additional 
system equipment removed from service following fault clearing 
depending on the specific failed non-redundant component of a 
protection system. NERC Petition at 16.
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    14. According to NERC, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 includes 
certain modifications to better ensure that planning entities are 
performing a more complete analysis of potential protection system 
single points of failure issues on their systems and taking appropriate 
action to address these concerns. NERC explains that Reliability 
Standard TPL-001-5 contains revisions to both the Table 1 planning 
event (Category P5) and extreme events (Stability 2.a-h) and the 
associated footnote 13 to provide for more comprehensive study of the 
potential impacts of protection system single points of failure.

[[Page 8158]]

    15. NERC states that where the study of a protection system single 
point of failure for a single-line-to-ground fault (i.e., a Category P5 
event) identifies cascading, a corrective action plan is required.\28\ 
NERC considers this a relatively commonplace scenario, and NERC 
explains that an entity would be required to develop a corrective 
action plan if it determines that its system would be unable to meet 
the performance requirements of Table 1 for the Category P5 event.
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    \28\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5, Table 1 (Steady State and 
Stability Performance Planning Events), Category P5 requires the 
study of a single-line-to-ground faulted element (e.g., generator, 
transmission circuit or transformer) along with a failure to operate 
of a non-redundant component of the protection system (i.e., a 
single point of failure) protecting the faulted element.
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    16. In contrast, the revisions treat a protection system single 
point of failure in combination with a three-phase fault as an extreme 
event that does not require a corrective action plan. NERC asserts that 
the three-phase fault scenario is much less common than the single-
line-to-ground fault scenario. According to NERC, like the other 
extreme events in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5, the three-phase fault 
scenario, while rare, could result in more significant impacts to an 
entity's system.\29\ Under this approach, if an entity determines that 
its system will experience cascading as a result of a three-phase fault 
scenario, the entity would evaluate possible actions designed to reduce 
the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of the event; however, a 
corrective action plan would not be required.
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    \29\ Order No. 693, 118 FERC ] 61,218 at P 1826 (describing 
extreme events as ``events resulting in loss of two or more elements 
or cascading'').
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    17. NERC explains that the likelihood of a three-phase fault event 
occurring and resulting in the most severe impacts would be small based 
on an historical analysis of NERC data on protection system 
misoperation. NERC states that it reviewed over 12,000 protection 
system misoperation in its Misoperation Information Data Analysis 
System database reported since 2011, of which only 28 involved three-
phase faults. Of those, NERC states that 10 involved breakers that 
failed to operate, and the remaining 18 involved breakers that were 
slow to operate.\30\ NERC contends that a failure to operate may 
indicate an instance of a protection system single point of failure. 
While the potential for severe impacts from such events remains, NERC 
asserts that none of the 10 failure to trip scenarios reported since 
2011 resulted in events that reached the threshold for reporting under 
Reliability Standard EOP-004 (Event Reporting).\31\ With regard to the 
Order No. 786 directives, NERC maintains that Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 provides for a more complete consideration of factors for 
selecting which known outages will be included in near-term 
transmission planning horizon studies.
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    \30\ NERC Petition at 26, n.55.
    \31\ Reliability Standard EOP-004-3 (Event Reporting), 
Attachment 1: Reportable Events, contains a list of thresholds for 
reporting certain events to NERC. Examples of reporting thresholds 
include: Loss of firm load for 15 minutes or more if 300 MW or 
greater for entities with a previous year's demand of at least 3,000 
MW, or 200 MW or greater for all other entities.
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F. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    18. On June 20, 2019, the Commission issued a NOPR that proposed to 
approve Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as the Reliability Standard 
largely addresses the directives in Order No. 786. The NOPR also 
proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to 
modify the Reliability Standard to require corrective action plans for 
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault if planning studies indicate potential cascading.\32\ The 
NOPR stated that NERC had not adequately justified categorizing 
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault as an extreme event that only requires study, but not a 
corrective action plan, when there is the potential for cascading. The 
NOPR also expressed concern with NERC's assessment that such events do 
not necessitate corrective action plans because of their rarity. The 
NOPR proposed to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability 
Standard for approval within twelve (12) months from the effective date 
of a final rule.
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    \32\ NOPR, 167 FERC ] 61,249 at P 1.
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    19. In addition to inviting comment on the proposed directive, the 
NOPR sought comment on: (1) How many corrective action plans are 
expected for protection system single points of failure in combination 
with a three-phase fault if a study indicates cascading, so the 
Commission could better understand the potential for increased costs 
and other implementation issues; and (2) the Commission's proposal to 
direct NERC address the directive within twelve (12) months of the 
effective date of the final rule.
    20. The Commission received ten sets of NOPR comments. We address 
below the issues raised in the NOPR and the comments submitted in 
response. The Appendix to this final rule lists the entities that filed 
comments.

II. Discussion

    21. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission 
approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as just, reasonable, not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. We conclude 
that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is an improvement over currently-
effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 and will improve Bulk-Power 
System reliability by requiring enhanced transmission system planning 
regarding the study of protection system single points of failure in 
combination with a single-line-to-ground fault, as discussed in Order 
No. 754. The Commission also approves the associated violation risk 
factors, violation severity levels, and implementation plan.
    22. The Commission determines that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 
satisfies the Order No. 786 directives regarding planned maintenance 
outages and stability analysis for spare equipment strategies. First, 
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 provides for a more complete 
consideration of factors for selecting which known outages will be 
included in near-term transmission planning horizon studies. The 
modifications in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 also address the 
Commission's concern that the exclusion of known outages of less than 
six (6) months in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 
could result in outages of significant facilities not being studied. 
Second, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 modifies requirements for 
stability analysis to require an entity to assess the impact of the 
possible unavailability of long lead time equipment, consistent with 
the entity's spare equipment strategy. For these reasons, the 
Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.
    23. In addition, the Commission determines not to direct NERC to 
develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standards to 
require corrective action plans to address protection system single 
points of failure in combination with a three-phase fault if planning 
studies indicate potential cascading. We are persuaded by NERC and 
other commenters of the improbability of single points of failure in 
combination with three-phase faults resulting in cascading outages.\33\ 
Our determination is also supported by the 2015 Report's assessment 
that the probability of an adverse system impact from a three-phase 
fault accompanied by a protection system failure is low

[[Page 8159]]

enough that it does not warrant being a planning event (i.e., requiring 
a corrective action plan). Although the Commission previously noted 
that there is an average of approximately one three-phase fault event 
every three (3) months since 2011, only ten indicated instances of a 
protection system single point of failure, which we agree is a rare 
occurrence. Given the NERC standard drafting team's assessment of the 
improbability of single points of failure in combination with three-
phase faults resulting in cascading outages, we determine that it is 
reasonable to address such occurrences as extreme events only requiring 
analysis and evaluation of possible mitigating actions designed to 
reduce adverse impacts.
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    \33\ See, e.g., NERC Petition 25-26, NERC Comments at 5, Trade 
Associations Comments at 5-6.
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    24. Further, we do not adopt BPA's recommendation, as an 
alternative to the NOPR directive, for NERC to conduct a two-year pilot 
to determine whether the types of actions that could reduce or mitigate 
the impacts of single point of failure events are a cost-effective 
means of ensuring reliability.\34\ As discussed above, we conclude that 
the record reflects the infrequent nature of single points of failure 
in combination with three-phase faults resulting in cascading outages 
and therefore justifies our determination not to adopt the NOPR 
directive.
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    \34\ BPA Comments at 2-3.
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Other Issues Raised in NOPR Comments

    25. MISO's comments include recommendations apart from the issues 
discussed above. First, MISO recommends revising Reliability Standard 
TPL-001-5 to address the need for planned outage flexibility in the 
planning horizon. MISO contends that since very few planned outages are 
scheduled in the planning horizon, the Reliability Standard omits 
consideration of planned (i.e., known) outages in the planning 
assessment. MISO states that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 does not 
define the term ``known'' outages. MISO believes that the industry 
stakeholders will primarily interpret the term ``known'' to require 
that only scheduled outages be included in transmission planning 
models. MISO maintains that because the eventual occurrence of a future 
planned outage is certain to occur, such planned outages should be 
considered ``known'' for purposes of applying Reliability Standards to 
the transmission planning process.
    26. Second, MISO recommends adding instrument transformers (i.e., 
current transformers and voltage transformers) to Reliability Standard 
TPL-001-5, Table 1, Footnote 13 to define protection system non-
redundancies. MISO observes that instrument transformers are components 
listed in the NERC definition of protection system and, according to 
NERC, represent valid single points of failure.

Commission Determination

    27. The Commission agrees with MISO that ``because the eventual 
occurrence of a future planned outage is certain to occur, such planned 
outages should be considered `known' for purposes of applying 
Reliability Standards to the transmission planning process.'' \35\ As 
MISO observes, the Commission stated in Order No. 786 that a ``properly 
planned transmission system should ensure the known, planned removal of 
facilities (i.e., generation, transmission or protection system 
facilities) for maintenance purposes without the loss of non-
consequential load or detrimental impacts to system reliability such as 
cascading, voltage instability or uncontrolled islanding.'' \36\ 
Moreover, the Commission indicated in Order No. 786 that known planned 
facility outages (i.e. generation, transmission or protection system 
facilities) should be addressed so long as their ``planned start times 
and durations may be anticipated as occurring for some period of time 
during the planning time horizon.'' \37\ Given these statements, we are 
not convinced that registered entities will interpret ``known'' in 
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 to mean scheduled, as MISO contends. 
Accordingly, we decline to adopt MISO's recommendation to modify the 
Reliability Standard.
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    \35\ MISO Comments at 5.
    \36\ Order No. 786, 45 FERC ] 61,051 at P 41.
    \37\ Id. P 44.
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    28. The Commission also declines to direct NERC to include 
instrument transformer (i.e., current transformers and voltage 
transformers) failure as a single component failure in Reliability 
Standard TPL-001-5, Footnote 13. The standard drafting team explained 
in the Technical Rationale document for Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 
that the ``[System Protection and Control Subcommittee and System 
Modeling and Analysis Subcommittee] report described voltage or current 
sensing devices [i.e., current transformers and voltage transformers] 
as having a lower level of risk of failure to trip due to robustness 
and likelihood to actually cause tripping upon failure. Therefore, 
these components of a Protection System are omitted from Footnote 13.'' 
\38\ While it contends that ``ignoring instrument transformers . . . is 
contrary to good utility practice,'' MISO acknowledges that 
``instrument transformers are generally more robust than the other 
components of a protection system.'' \39\ Based on this record, the 
Commission declines to adopt MISO's recommendation.
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    \38\ NERC Petition, Exhibit F (Technical Rationale) at 5.
    \39\ MISO Comments at 12.
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III. Information Collection Statement

    29. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) \40\ requires each federal 
agency to seek and obtain the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) 
approval before undertaking a collection of information (including 
reporting, record keeping, and public disclosure requirements) directed 
to ten or more persons or contained in a rule of general applicability. 
OMB regulations require approval of certain information collection 
requirements imposed by rules (including deletion, revision, or 
implementation of new requirements).\41\ Upon approval of a collection 
of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and expiration 
date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this rule will 
not be penalized for failing to respond to the collection of 
information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB 
Control Number.
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    \40\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-21.
    \41\ 5 CFR 1320.
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    30. The Commission is submitting these reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements to OMB for its review and approval under section 3507(d) 
of the PRA. The Commission solicits comments on the Commission's need 
for this information, whether the information will have practical 
utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the 
quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected or 
retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, 
including the use of automated information techniques.
    31. Burden Estimate: \42\ The estimated burden \43\ and cost \44\ 
for the

[[Page 8160]]

requirements contained in this final rule follows:
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    \42\ ``Burden'' is the total time, effort, or financial 
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or 
disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency. For 
further explanation of what is included in the information 
collection burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3.
    \43\ The estimated burden is a one-time burden estimate in 
addition to the already approved burden estimate in Reliability 
Standard TPL-001-4.
    \44\ Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) figures for May 2018 (Sector 22, Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate that Office and 
Administrative Support (Occupation code: 43-0000) would perform the 
functions associated with recordkeeping requirements, at an average 
hourly cost (for wages and benefits) of $42.11. We estimate the 
functions associated with reporting requirements would be performed 
by an Electrical Engineer (Occupation code: 17-2051) at an average 
hourly cost (including wages and benefits) of $68.17. These 
occupational categories' wage figures are averaged and weighted 
equally as follows: ($42.11 hour + $68.17 hour) / 2 = $55.14/hour. 
The resulting wage figure is rounded to $55.00/hour for use in 
calculating wage figures in the final rule in Docket No. RM19-10-
000.

                                          FERC-725N, Modifications Due to Final Rule in Docket No. RM19-10-000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Annual number                                               Total annual burden
         Areas of modification           Number of respondents \45\    of responses    Total number     Average burden & cost     hours & total annual
                                                                      per respondent   of responses         per response                  cost
                                        (1).........................             (2)     (1) * (2) =  (4).....................  (3) * (4) = (5)
                                                                                                 (3)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single Point of Failure (one-time)....  214 (PC/TP).................               1             214  16 hrs. (reporting: 12    3,424 hrs. & $188,320.
                                                                                                       hrs.; recordkeeping: 4    (reporting, 2,568 hrs.
                                                                                                       hrs.); $880.              & $141,240, &
                                                                                                                                 recordkeeping, 856
                                                                                                                                 hrs., $47,080).
Spare Equipment Strategy (one-time)...  214 (PC/TP).................               1             214  4 hrs. (reporting: 2      856 hrs. & $47,080
                                                                                                       hrs.; recordkeeping: 2    (reporting, 428 hrs. &
                                                                                                       hrs.); $220.              $23,540; recordkeeping,
                                                                                                                                 428 hrs. & $23,540).
Plan Maintenance Outage (one-time)....  214 (PC/TP).................               1             214  16 hrs. (reporting: 12    3,424 hrs. & $188,320
                                                                                                       hrs.; recordkeeping: 4    (reporting, 2,568 hrs.
                                                                                                       hrs.) $880.               & $141,240;
                                                                                                                                 recordkeeping, 856 hrs.
                                                                                                                                 & $47,080).
Sub-Total for Reporting Requirements..  ............................  ..............  ..............  ........................  5,564 hrs.; $306,020
Sub-Total for Recordkeeping             ............................  ..............  ..............  ........................  2,140 hrs.; $117,700
 Requirements.
                                       -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................  ............................  ..............             642  ........................  7,704 hrs.; $423,720
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. This final rule will not significantly change existing burdens 
on an ongoing basis. The Commission estimates a one-time burden 
increase for Year 1 only because Year 1 represents a one-time task not 
repeated in subsequent years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The number of respondents is based on the NERC Registry on 
November 21, 2019, which showed 8 entities registered as planning 
coordinators (PCs), 139 entities registered as transmission planners 
(TPs), ad 67 entities registered as both PCs and TPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: Transmission 
Planning (TPL) Reliability Standards.
    Action: Revision to FERC-725N information collection.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0264.
    Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for-
profit institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: One Time.
    Necessity of the Information: This final rule approves the 
requested modifications to a Reliability Standard pertaining to 
transmission planning. As discussed above, the Commission approves 
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2) 
because it improves upon the currently-effective Reliability Standard 
TPL-001-4.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed Reliability Standard 
TPL-001-5 and determined that its action is necessary to implement 
section 215 of the FPA. The Commission has assured itself, by means of 
its internal review, that there is specific, objective support for the 
burden estimates associated with the information requirements.
    34. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting 
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, [Attention: 
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, email: 
DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873].
    Submit comments concerning the collection of information and the 
associated burden estimate to the Commission in this docket, and to the 
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503, [Attention: Desk 
Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. For security 
reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by email to: 
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should include 
FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264.

IV. Environmental Analysis

    35. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\46\ The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this 
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, 
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the 
effect of the regulations being amended.\47\ The actions proposed 
herein fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987) 
(cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284).
    \47\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    36. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \48\ generally 
requires a description and analysis of rulemakings that will have 
significant economic

[[Page 8161]]

impact on a substantial number of small entities.\49\ The Small 
Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops the 
numerical definition of a small business.\50\ The SBA revised its size 
standard for electric utilities (effective January 22, 2014) to a 
standard based on the number of employees, including affiliates (from 
the prior standard based on megawatt hour sales).\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
    \49\ Id.
    \50\ 13 CFR 121.101.
    \51\ Id. 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is expected to impose an 
additional burden on 214 entities \52\ (PCs and TPs). Of the 214 
affected entities discussed above, we estimate that approximately 10 
percent of the affected entities are small entities. We estimate that 
each of the 21 small entities to whom the proposed modifications to 
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 apply will incur one-time costs 
of approximately $1,980 per entity to implement the proposed 
Reliability Standard. We do not consider the estimated costs for these 
21 small entities to be a significant economic impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Public utilities may fall under one of several different 
categories, each with a size threshold based on the company's number 
of employees, including affiliates, the parent company, and 
subsidiaries. We are using a 500-employee threshold due to each 
affected entity falling within the role of Electric Bulk Power 
Transmission and Control (NAISC Code: 221121).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that this final rule will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

VI. Document Availability

    39. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's 
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 
p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, Washington, DC 
20426.
    40. From FERC's Home Page on the internet, this information is 
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on 
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or 
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket 
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket 
number field.
    41. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's 
website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202) 
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202)502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at 
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    42. These regulations are effective April 13, 2020. The Commission 
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a 
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. The rule will be provided 
to the Senate, House, Government Accountability Office, and the SBA.

    By the Commission.
    Issued: January 23, 2020.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

    Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendix--List of Commenters

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Abbreviation                           Commenter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AF&PA.............................  American Forest and Paper
                                     Association.
APS...............................  Arizona Public Service Company.
BPA...............................  Bonneville Power Administration.
Carder............................  William Carder.
MISO..............................  Midcontinent Independent System
                                     Operator, Inc.
NERC..............................  North American Electric Reliability
                                     Corporation.
Pugh..............................  Theresa Pugh.
Trade Associations................  American Public Power Association,
                                     Edison Electric Institute, Large
                                     Public Power Council, National
                                     Rural Electric Cooperative
                                     Association.
Tri-State.........................  Tri-State Generation and
                                     Transmission Association, Inc.
TVA...............................  Tennessee Valley Authority.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2020-02170 Filed 2-12-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


