[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 123 (Wednesday, June 26, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30105-30108]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-13587]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RD19-3-000]


Petition of North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) for Approval of Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6--Cyber 
Security--Incident Reporting and Response Planning

    In Reply Refer to: North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 
Docket No. RD19-3-000.
    North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 1325 G Street NW, 
Suite 600, Washington, DC 20005.

Attention: Lauren Perotti, Marisa Hecht

Dear Ms. Perotti and Ms. Hecht:

    1. On March 7, 2019, the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) filed a petition requesting approval of proposed 
Reliability Standard CIP-008-6 (Cyber Security--Incident Reporting and 
Response Planning). NERC also requested approval of: (1) The associated 
implementation plan, violation risk factors and violation severity 
levels; (2) the inclusion of proposed revised definitions of ``Cyber 
Security Incident'' and ``Reportable Cyber Security Incident'' into the 
NERC Glossary; \1\ and (3) the retirement of currently-effective 
Reliability Standard CIP-008-5. For the reasons discussed below, we 
grant the requested approvals.
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    \1\ Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (NERC 
Glossary).
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    2. In Order No. 848, the Commission directed NERC to enhance the 
mandatory reporting of Cyber Security Incidents.\2\ The Commission 
explained that the currently-effective reporting threshold, which only 
requires reporting in cases where a Cyber Security Incident has 
``compromised or disrupted one or more reliability tasks,'' may 
understate the true scope of cyber-related threats to the Bulk-Power 
System.\3\ To address this reliability gap, pursuant to section 
215(d)(5) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the Commission directed NERC 
to develop and submit modifications to

[[Page 30106]]

the Reliability Standard to require the reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible 
entity's Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) or associated Electronic 
Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS).\4\ With respect to EACMS, 
the Commission directed that enhanced reporting should apply, at a 
minimum, to EACMS that perform the following functions: (1) 
Authentication; (2) monitoring and logging; (3) access control; (4) 
Interactive Remote Access; and (5) alerting.
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    \2\ Cyber Security Incident Reporting Reliability Standards, 
Order No. 848, 164 FERC ] 61,033 (2018).
    \3\ Id. PP 2-3.
    \4\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5) (2012).
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    3. The Commission also directed that information in Cyber Security 
Incident reports should include certain minimum information to improve 
the quality of reporting and allow for ease of comparison by ensuring 
that each report includes specified fields of information.\5\ The 
Commission further directed that filing deadlines for Cyber Security 
Incident reports should be established and that Cyber Security Incident 
reports should be sent to the Electricity Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and the Department of Homeland Security 
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) or 
any successor organization.
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    \5\ The Commission identified the following minimum fields of 
information to be reported: ``(1) the functional impact, where 
possible, that the Cyber Security Incident achieved or attempted to 
achieve; (2) the attack vector that was used to achieve or attempted 
to achieve the Cyber Security Incident; and (3) the level of 
intrusion that was achieved or attempted or as a result of the Cyber 
Security Incident.'' Order No. 848, 164 FERC ] 61,033 at P 91.
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    4. In its petition, NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard 
CIP-008-6 broadens the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security Incidents 
and thus addresses the concern that currently-effective Reliability 
Standard CIP-008-5 may not encompass the full scope of cyber-related 
threats to the Bulk-Power System.\6\ As a predicate to the augmented 
reporting requirements in proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, NERC 
proposes revised NERC Glossary definitions of Cyber Security Incident 
and Reportable Cyber Security Incident. NERC explains that, by applying 
the revised definitions, Cyber Security Incidents (i.e., attempts to 
compromise) and Reportable Cyber Security Incidents (i.e., actual 
compromises) will be reported under proposed Reliability Standard CIP-
008-6.
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    \6\ NERC Petition at 3.
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    5. As proposed by NERC, the revised Cyber Security Incident 
definition includes events involving ``compromises or attempts to 
compromise'' ESPs, EACMS, and Physical Security Perimeters (PSPs) 
associated with high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems and 
``disrupt[ion] or attempts to disrupt the operation of a BES Cyber 
System.'' \7\ NERC contends that the proposed definition of Cyber 
Security Incident addresses the directives in Order No. 848 because, as 
discussed below, once a responsible entity determines that an event is 
a Cyber Security Incident, it must comply with the requirements of 
proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, including initiating its 
response plan and reporting the incident to the E-ISAC and, if subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States, the National Cybersecurity 
and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which is the successor 
to ICS-CERT.
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    \7\ NERC indicates that the standard drafting team included all 
EACMS within the proposed Cyber Security Incident and Reportable 
Cyber Security incident definitions because nearly all EACMS 
associated with high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems perform one 
of the functions identified in Order No. 848. Id. at 13-14.
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    6. NERC's proposed revisions to the Reportable Cyber Security 
Incident definition broaden the scope of reportable events to include 
compromises or disruptions of BES Cyber Systems that perform one or 
more reliability tasks as well as compromises or disruptions to EACMS 
and ESPs associated with high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. NERC 
explains that responsible entities will be required to report on a 
compromise of a BES Cyber System even if it has not affected 
performance of that BES Cyber System's tasks.\8\ For example, NERC 
states that the revised definition would require responsible entities 
to report on malware installed on a BES Cyber Asset component of a BES 
Cyber System that performs one or more reliability tasks regardless of 
whether the BES Cyber System still operates. NERC indicates that while 
the revised Reportable Cyber Security Incident definition does not 
encompass attempts to compromise, under proposed Reliability Standard 
CIP-008-6, attempts to compromise are reported using the Cyber Security 
Incident definition.
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    \8\ Id. at 15.
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    7. NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, 
Requirement R1, Parts 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 address the Order No. 848 
directive to broaden reporting on Cyber Security Incidents to include 
those that ``attempt to compromise'' an ESP or EACMS.\9\ In proposed 
Requirement R1, Part 1.2.1, each responsible entity must develop a 
process that includes criteria to evaluate and define attempts to 
compromise applicable systems. Proposed Requirement R1, Part 1.2.2 
requires that each responsible entity develop a process that identifies 
whether a Cyber Security Incident is an ``attempt to compromise'' 
pursuant to the criteria required by Part 1.2.1. NERC explains that 
Parts 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 work together to help ensure each responsible 
entity first develops criteria for identifying an attempt to compromise 
and then applies the criteria during its Cyber Security Incident 
identification process.\10\ NERC maintains that proposed Parts 1.2.1 
and 1.2.2 acknowledge the differences in system architecture among 
responsible entities and provide each responsible entity with the 
flexibility to develop criteria that reflect what it considers 
``suspicious.'' NERC contends that the benefit of such an approach, 
compared to a one-size-fits-all approach, is that it enables 
responsible entities to better capture real attempts to compromise.\11\
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    \9\ Id. at 18.
    \10\ Id.
    \11\ Id. at 19.
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    8. Similar to the proposed revisions in Requirement R1, NERC states 
that the proposed revisions to Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, 
Requirement R2 address the Commission's directive in Order No. 848 
regarding attempts to compromise.\12\ The proposed revisions to Part 
2.2 do so by requiring that responsible entities use their Cyber 
Security Incident response plans when responding to a Cyber Security 
Incident determined to be an attempt to compromise applicable systems.
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    \12\ Id. at 20.
    \13\ Id. at 22.
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    NERC contends that proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, 
Requirement R4 addresses the Commission's directive to require that 
responsible entities must send each report and update to the E-ISAC and 
ICS-CERT.\13\ Under proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, 
Requirement R4, Part 4.1, responsible entities are required to submit 
incident reports for both Reportable Cyber Security Incidents and Cyber 
Security Incidents. In addition, proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-
6 specifies that the report must contain: (1) The functional impact; 
(2) the attack vector used; and (3) the achieved or attempted level of 
intrusion. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, Requirement R4, 
Parts 4.2 and 4.3 include timelines for initial reports as well as 
follow up reports to the E-ISAC and NCCIC. NERC states that initial 
reports for Reportable Cyber Security Incidents must occur within one 
hour of

[[Page 30107]]

its determination. By contrast, NERC indicates that once a responsible 
entity has determined that a Cyber Security Incident meets its criteria 
for an attempt to compromise an applicable system, it must report the 
Cyber Security Incident by the end of the next calendar day. NERC 
justifies the difference by explaining that the ``proposed notification 
timelines appropriately reflect the severity of the risk of the 
respective incidents.'' \14\ Finally, if a responsible entity does not 
include one or more of the attributes in its initial report because it 
was unknown at the time of the initial reporting, it must report the 
attributes within seven days of determining the attribute.
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    \14\ Id. at 23.
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    9. Notice of NERC's March 7, 2019 filing was published in the 
Federal Register, 84 FR 10,061 (2019), with interventions and protests 
due on or before April 11, 2019. Pursuant to Rule 214 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 385.214 (2018), 
the timely, unopposed motions to intervene serve to make the entities 
that filed them parties to this proceeding.\15\
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    \15\ On April 11, 2019, Public Citizen submitted comments 
requesting that the Commission direct NERC to require the mandatory 
public disclosure of entity names in Notices of Penalty for 
violations of Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability 
Standards. Public Citizen's comments do not address proposed 
Reliability Standard CIP-006-8 or any other proposal contained in 
NERC's petition, and they are therefore outside the scope of this 
proceeding.
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    10. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, we approve 
Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, its associated implementation plan, 
violation risk factors and violation severity levels, and the revised 
definitions of Cyber Security Incident and Reportable Cyber Security 
Incident.\16\ We determine that the proposed Reliability Standard and 
revised definitions satisfy the directive in Order No. 848 to broaden 
mandatory reporting to include Cyber Security Incidents that 
compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible entity's ESP or 
associated EACMS, as well as modifications to specify the required 
information in Cyber Security Incident reports, their dissemination, 
and deadlines for filing reports.
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    \16\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
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Information Collection Statement

    11. In compliance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A), the Commission is soliciting 
public comment on revisions to the information collection FERC-725B 
(Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP) Reliability Standards), which will be submitted to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for a review of the information collection 
requirements. Comments on the collection of information are due within 
60 days of the date this order is published in the Federal Register. 
Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this order will not 
be penalized for failing to respond to these collections of information 
unless the collections of information display a valid OMB control 
number.
    12. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-6 requires Responsible 
Entities \17\ to broaden the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents to include compromises or attempts to compromise BES Cyber 
Systems or their associated ESPs or EACMS. The revised Reliability 
Standard will not significantly increase the reporting burden on 
entities because it builds off the currently-effective reporting 
threshold by expanding it to address reliability gaps, pursuant to 
section 215(d)(5) of the FPA.
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    \17\ ``Responsible Entities'' refers to Balancing Authority 
(BA), Distribution Provider (DP), Generator Operator (GOP), 
Generator Owner (GO), Reliability Coordinator (RC), Transmission 
Operator (TOP), and Transmission Owner (TO).
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    13. Burden \18\ Estimate: The Commission estimates the changes in 
the annual public reporting burden and cost as indicated below.\19\
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    \18\ Burden is defined as the total time, effort, or financial 
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or 
disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency. For 
further explanation of what is included in the information 
collection burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3.
    \19\ For the Reliability Standard being retired in Docket No. 
RD19-3-000, the baseline numbers for respondents, burden, and cost 
are the same figures as those in Order No. 848. The requirements and 
burdens (from the Reliability Standard being retired) are continuing 
in Reliability Standard CIP-008-6, plus the additional requirements 
and burdens as indicated in the table.
    \20\ There are 1,414 unique registered entities in the NERC 
compliance registry as of May 24, 2019. Of this total, we estimate 
that 288 entities will face an increased paperwork burden.
    \21\ The loaded hourly wage figure (includes benefits) is based 
on the average of the occupational categories for 2017 found on the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics website: https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/oessrci.htm.
    Legal (Occupation Code: 23-0000): $143.68
    Information Security Analysts (Occupation Code 15-1122): $61.55
    Computer and Information Systems Managers (Occupation Code: 11-
3021): $96.51
    Management (Occupation Code: 11-0000): $94.28
    Electrical Engineer (Occupation Code: 17-2071): $66.90
    Management Analyst (Code: 43-0000): $63.32
    These various occupational categories are weighted as follows: 
[($94.28)(.10) + ($61.55)(.315) + ($66.90)(.02) + ($143.68)(.15) + 
($96.51)(.10) + ($63.32)(.315)] = $81.30. The figure is rounded to 
$81.00 for use in calculating wage figures in this order.
    \22\ One-time burdens apply in Year 1 only.
    \23\ Ongoing burdens apply in Year 2 and beyond.

                                                           RD19-3-000--Commission Letter Order
                             [Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards]
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                                    Number of
                                  respondents &   Annual number   Total number    Average burden & cost     Total annual burden hours &      Cost per
                                 type of entity   of responses    of responses      per response \21\            total annual cost        respondent ($)
                                      \20\       per respondent
                                            (1)             (2)     (1) * (2) =  (4)....................  (3) * (4) = (5)...............       (5) / (1)
                                                                            (3)
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Update internal procedures to               288               1             288  50 hrs.; $4,050........  14,400 hrs.; $1,166,400.......          $4,050
 comply with augmented
 reporting requirements (one-
 time) \22\ (CIP-008-6 R1-R4).
Annual cyber security incident              288               1             288  10 hrs.; $810..........  2880 hrs.; $233,280...........             810
 plan review (ongoing) \23\
 (CIP-008-6 R2.1).
Update cyber security incident              288               1             288  10 hrs.; $810..........  2880 hrs.; $233,280...........             810
 plan per review findings
 (ongoing) CIP-008-6 R3).
Incident reporting burden                   288              12           3,456  12 hrs.; $972..........  3456 hrs.; $279,936...........             972
 (ongoing) (CIP-008-6 R4).
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    Total (one-time)...........  ..............  ..............             288  .......................  14,400 hrs.; $1,166,400.......  ..............
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    Total (ongoing)............  ..............  ..............           4,032  .......................  9,216 hrs.; $746,496..........  ..............
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    Title: FERC-725B, Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards.
    Action: Proposed revision to FERC-725B information collection.
    OMB Control No: 1902-0248.
    Respondents: Responsible Entities.
    Frequency of Responses: On occasion.
    14. Necessity of the Information: This order approves the requested 
modifications to Reliability Standards pertaining to critical 
infrastructure protection. As discussed above, the Commission approves 
Reliability Standard CIP-008-6 pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA 
because it improves upon the currently-effective suite of CIP 
Reliability Standards.
    15. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting 
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen 
Brown, Office of the Executive Director], email: 
DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873.
    16. Comments (identified by Docket No. RD19-3-000) concerning the 
collection of information and the associated burden estimate(s) may 
also be sent by either of the following methods: eFiling at 
Commission's website: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp or 
Mail/Hand Delivery/Courier: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. 
Please refer to FERC-725B, OMB Control No. 1902-0248 in your 
submission.
    17. All submissions must be formatted and filed in accordance with 
submission guidelines at: http://www.ferc.gov/help/submission-guide.asp. For user assistance, contact FERC Online Support by email at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or by phone at: (866) 208-3676 (toll-free), 
or (202) 502-8659 for TTY.

    By direction of the Commission.

    Dated: June 20, 2019.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-13587 Filed 6-25-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


