
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 40 (Tuesday, March 1, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10610-10611]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-04387]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket Nos. EL16-6-001; ER16-121-000]


PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.; Notice Inviting Post-Technical 
Conference Comments

    On February 4, 2016, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(Commission) staff conducted a technical conference concerning PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C.'s (PJM) existing and proposed Auction Revenue 
Rights (ARR) and Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) tariff provisions. 
All interested persons are invited to file post-technical conference 
comments on PJM's filings and the topics discussed during the technical 
conference, including those indicated below.
    Regarding PJM's filing and proposed changes, specifically:
     Whether PJM's conservative modeling of outages that 
limited the allocation of Stage 1B ARRs have resulted in an inequitable 
cost shift, and please explain why.
     PJM proposes to eliminate portfolio netting. Comment on 
the current practice of netting positively valued FTRs against 
negatively valued FTRs within an FTR holder's portfolio. Do the current 
tariff provisions on netting work to protect the markets against the 
potential exercise of manipulation, and if so, how? If netting is 
eliminated and causes the potential for the exercise of manipulation, 
what measures would need to be put into place to prevent potential 
market manipulation? Would allocating surplus funds to load rather than 
to FTR holders, or carrying surplus funds forward to fund any future 
revenue inadequacy be ways of addressing potential manipulation?
     The appropriateness of using the 1.5 percent adder for all 
zones, regardless of the actual zonal load growth rate and negative 
load growth projections for some areas; and the appropriateness of 
conducting the 10-year study with different growth rates as a 
sensitivity study, as is done for other RTEP studies. Is the cost of 
building transmission as a result of the 1.5 percent adder justified by 
the benefit of being able to accommodate the current allocations in 
Stage 1A?
    Regarding PJM's proposed solutions in the context of its current 
tariff, please discuss if there are other solutions to consider. 
Specifically, please comment on:
     If infeasible Stage 1A ARRs should continue to be awarded 
and treated as they are today.

[[Page 10611]]

     The options and implications for, and potential benefits 
or drawbacks of, ARR allocation based on more frequent updates of the 
Simultaneous Feasibility Test model, which could, for example, allow 
for seasonal variations of line ratings, as well as more timely 
recognition and modeling of transmission outages and upgrades placed 
into service.
     The options to update PJM's Simultaneous Feasibility Test 
model, including source points and sink points, to reflect current 
system usage and topology; concerns about updating the model; the 
potential benefits or drawbacks for updating the model; and processes 
for allowing more frequent updates. If the Simultaneous Feasibility 
Test model were to be updated more frequently, would infeasible ARRs 
continue to exist?
     Whether the incentives for Transmission Owners to schedule 
outages and conduct timely work align with ARR/FTR construct, and 
whether there are any proposals that can improve this alignment; and 
the effectiveness of the current reporting requirements for 
Transmission Owners to share information with PJM.
     Whether continuing to include balancing congestion \1\ in 
the definition of FTRs is appropriate (and why), or whether FTRs should 
be defined and settled only including day-ahead congestion. Are there 
any aspect(s) of balancing congestion that should be included in the 
definition of FTRs, and, if so, what are they and why they should be 
included?
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    \1\ Negative balancing congestion occurs when real-time 
transmission capacity is less than day-ahead transmission capacity. 
FTRs are allocated negative balancing congestion charges, which in 
turn can result in FTR underfunding because the revenues allocated 
for meeting the FTR funding target amount are decreased.
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    Commenters need not address every question and may provide comments 
on relevant issues other than those listed above. These comments are 
due no later than 5:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 15, 
2016. Reply comments are due on or before 5:00 p.m. EST on March 29, 
2016. The written comments will be included in the formal record for 
the proceeding, which, together with the record developed to date, will 
form the basis for further Commission action.
    For more information about this Notice, please contact:

Pamela Quinlan (Technical Information), Office of Energy Market 
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6179, Pamela.Quinlan@ferc.gov
Kent Carter (Legal Information), Office of General Counsel, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 
20426, (202) 502-8604, Kent.Carter@ferc.gov
Daniel Kheloussi (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and 
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6391, Daniel.Kheloussi@ferc.gov

    Dated: February 23, 2016.
 Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.
 Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-04387 Filed 2-29-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


