
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 16 (Tuesday, January 26, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 4177-4191]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-01505]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM15-14-000]


Revised Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves 
seven critical infrastructure protection (CIP) Reliability Standards: 
CIP-003-6 (Security Management Controls), CIP-004-6 (Personnel and 
Training), CIP-006-6 (Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems), CIP-007-
6 (Systems Security Management), CIP-009-6 (Recovery Plans for BES 
Cyber Systems), CIP-010-2 (Configuration Change Management and 
Vulnerability Assessments), and CIP-011-2 (Information Protection). The 
proposed Reliability Standards address the cyber security of the bulk 
electric system and improve upon the current Commission-approved CIP 
Reliability Standards. In addition, the Commission directs NERC to 
develop certain modifications to improve the CIP Reliability Standards.

DATES: This rule will become effective March 31, 2016.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Daniel Phillips (Technical Information), Office of Electric 
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street 
NE., Washington DC 20426, (202) 502-6387, daniel.phillips@ferc.gov.
Simon Slobodnik (Technical Information), Office of Electric 
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street 
NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6707, simon.slobodnik@ferc.gov.
Kevin Ryan (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 
20426, (202) 502-6840, kevin.ryan@ferc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Order No. 822

Final Rule

(Issued January 21, 2016)

    1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the 
Commission approves seven critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
Reliability Standards: CIP-003-6 (Security Management Controls), CIP-
004-6 (Personnel and Training), CIP-006-6 (Physical Security of BES 
Cyber Systems), CIP-007-6 (Systems Security Management), CIP-009-6 
(Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems), CIP-010-2 (Configuration Change 
Management and Vulnerability Assessments), and CIP-011-2 (Information 
Protection) (proposed CIP Reliability Standards). The North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified 
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted the seven proposed 
CIP Reliability Standards in response to Order No. 791.\2\ The 
Commission also approves NERC's implementation plan and violation risk 
factor and violation severity level assignments. In addition, the 
Commission approves NERC's new or revised definitions for inclusion in 
the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards (NERC 
Glossary),

[[Page 4178]]

subject to modification. Further, the Commission approves the 
retirement of Reliability Standards CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5.1, CIP-006-5, 
CIP-007-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o.
    \2\ Version 5 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability 
Standards, Order No. 791, 78 FR. 72,755 (Dec. 3, 2013), 145 FERC ] 
61,160 (2013), order on clarification and reh'g, Order No. 791-A, 
146 FERC ] 61,188 (2014).
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    2. The proposed CIP Reliability Standards are designed to mitigate 
the cybersecurity risks to bulk electric system facilities, systems, 
and equipment, which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered 
unavailable as a result of a cybersecurity incident, would affect the 
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.\3\ As discussed below, the 
Commission finds that the proposed CIP Reliability Standards are just, 
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the 
public interest, and address the directives in Order No. 791 by: (1) 
Eliminating the ``identify, assess, and correct'' language in 17 of the 
CIP version 5 Standard requirements; (2) providing enhanced security 
controls for Low Impact assets; (3) providing controls to address the 
risks posed by transient electronic devices (e.g., thumb drives and 
laptop computers) used at High and Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems; and 
(4) addressing in an equally effective and efficient manner the need 
for a NERC Glossary definition for the term ``communication networks.'' 
Accordingly, the Commission approves the proposed CIP Reliability 
Standards because they improve the base-line cybersecurity posture of 
applicable entities compared to the current Commission-approved CIP 
Reliability Standards.
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    \3\ See NERC Petition at 3.
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    3. In addition, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), the Commission 
directs NERC to develop certain modifications to improve the CIP 
Reliability Standards. First, NERC is directed to develop modifications 
to address the protection of transient electronic devices used at Low 
Impact BES Cyber Systems. As discussed below, the modifications 
developed by NERC should be designed to effectively address, in an 
appropriately tailored manner, the risks posed by transient electronic 
devices to Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. Second, the Commission directs 
NERC to develop modifications to CIP-006-6 to require protections for 
communication network components and data communicated between all bulk 
electric system Control Centers according to the risk posed to the bulk 
electric system. With regard to the questions raised in the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) concerning the potential need for additional 
remote access controls, NERC must conduct a comprehensive study that 
identifies the strength of the CIP version 5 remote access controls, 
the risks posed by remote access-related threats and vulnerabilities, 
and appropriate mitigating controls.\4\ Third, the Commission directs 
NERC to develop modifications to its definition for Low Impact External 
Routable Connectivity, as discussed in detail below.
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    \4\ Revised Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability 
Standards, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 FR 43354 (July 22, 
2015), 152 FERC ] 61,054, at 60 (2015).
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    4. The Commission, in the NOPR, also proposed to direct that NERC 
develop requirements relating to supply chain management for industrial 
control system hardware, software, and services.\5\ After review of 
comments on this topic, the Commission scheduled a staff-led technical 
conference for January 28, 2016, in order to facilitate a structured 
dialogue on supply chain risk management issues identified by the NOPR. 
Accordingly, this Final Rule does not address supply chain risk 
management issues. Rather, the Commission will determine the 
appropriate action on this issue after the scheduled technical 
conference.
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    \5\ Id. P 66.
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I. Background

A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards

    5. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified ERO to 
develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to 
Commission review and approval. Reliability Standards may be enforced 
by the ERO, subject to Commission oversight, or by the Commission 
independently.\6\ Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission 
established a process to select and certify an ERO,\7\ and subsequently 
certified NERC.\8\
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    \6\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(e).
    \7\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability 
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and 
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
    \8\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 
61,062, order on reh'g and compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), 
aff'd sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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B. Order No. 791

    6. On November 22, 2013, in Order No. 791, the Commission approved 
the CIP version 5 Standards (Reliability Standards CIP-002-5 through 
CIP-009-5, and CIP-010-1 and CIP-011-1).\9\ The Commission determined 
that the CIP version 5 Standards improve the CIP Reliability Standards 
because, inter alia, they include a revised BES Cyber Asset 
categorization methodology that incorporates mandatory protections for 
all High, Medium, and Low Impact BES Cyber Assets, and because several 
new security controls should improve the security posture of 
responsible entities.\10\ In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of 
the FPA, the Commission directed NERC to: (1) Remove the ``identify, 
assess, and correct'' language in 17 of the CIP Standard requirements; 
(2) develop enhanced security controls for Low Impact assets; (3) 
develop controls to protect transient electronic devices; (4) create a 
NERC Glossary definition for the term ``communication networks;'' and 
(5) develop new or modified Reliability Standards to protect the 
nonprogrammable components of communications networks.
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    \9\ Order No. 791, 145 FERC ] 61,160 at P 41.
    \10\ Id.
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    7. The Commission also directed NERC to conduct a survey of Cyber 
Assets that are included or excluded under the new BES Cyber Asset 
definition and submit an informational filing within one year.\11\ On 
February 3, 2015, NERC submitted an informational filing assessing the 
results of a survey conducted to identify the scope of assets subject 
to the definition of the term BES Cyber Asset as it is applied in the 
CIP version 5 Standards.
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    \11\ Id. PP 76, 108, 136, 150.
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    8. Finally, Order No. 791 directed Commission staff to convene a 
technical conference to examine the technical issues concerning 
communication security, remote access, and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework.\12\ On April 
29, 2014, a staff-led technical conference was held pursuant to the 
Commission's directive. The topics discussed at the technical 
conference included: (1) The adequacy of the approved CIP version 5 
Standards' protections for bulk electric system data being transmitted 
over data networks; (2) whether additional security controls are needed 
to protect bulk electric system communications networks, including 
remote systems access; and (3) the functional differences between the 
respective methods utilized for the identification, categorization, and 
specification of appropriate levels of protection for cyber assets 
using the CIP version 5 Standards as compared with those employed 
within the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
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    \12\ Id. P 225.

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[[Page 4179]]

C. NERC Petition

    9. On February 13, 2015, NERC submitted a petition seeking approval 
of Reliability Standards CIP-003-6, CIP-004-6, CIP-006-6, CIP-007-6, 
CIP-009-6, CIP-010-2, and CIP-011-2, as well as an implementation 
plan,\13\ associated violation risk factor and violation severity level 
assignments, proposed new or revised definitions,\14\ and retirement of 
Reliability Standards CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5.1, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, 
CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1.\15\ NERC states that the proposed 
Reliability Standards are just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory 
or preferential, and in the public interest because they satisfy the 
factors set forth in Order No. 672 that the Commission applies when 
reviewing a proposed Reliability Standard.\16\ NERC maintains that the 
proposed Reliability Standards ``improve the cybersecurity protections 
required by the CIP Reliability Standards[.]'' \17\
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    \13\ The proposed implementation plan is designed to match the 
effective dates of the proposed Reliability Standards with the 
effective dates of the prior versions of those Reliability Standards 
under the implementation plan for the CIP version 5 Standards.
    \14\ The six new or revised definitions proposed for inclusion 
in the NERC Glossary are: (1) BES Cyber Asset; (2) Protected Cyber 
Asset; (3) Low Impact Electronic Access Point; (4) Low Impact 
External Routable Connectivity; (5) Removable Media; and (6) 
Transient Cyber Asset.
    \15\ The proposed Reliability Standards are available on the 
Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM15-
14-000 and on the NERC Web site, www.nerc.com.
    \16\ See NERC Petition at 13 and Exhibit C (citing Order No. 
672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204 at PP 323-335).
    \17\ NERC Petition at 4.
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    10. NERC avers that the proposed CIP Reliability Standards satisfy 
the Commission directives in Order No. 791. Specifically, NERC states 
that the proposed Reliability Standards remove the ``identify, assess, 
and correct'' language, which represents the Commission's preferred 
approach to addressing the underlying directive.\18\ In addition, NERC 
states that the proposed Reliability Standards address the Commission's 
directive regarding a lack of specific controls or objective criteria 
for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems by requiring responsible entities ``to 
implement cybersecurity plans for assets containing Low Impact BES 
Cyber Systems to meet specific security objectives relating to: (i) 
Cybersecurity awareness; (ii) physical security controls; (iii) 
electronic access controls; and (iv) Cyber Security Incident 
response.'' \19\
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    \18\ Id. at 4, 15.
    \19\ Id. at 5.
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    11. With regard to the Commission's directive that NERC develop 
specific controls to protect transient electronic devices, NERC 
explains that the proposed Reliability Standards require responsible 
entities ``to implement controls to protect transient devices connected 
to their high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems and associated 
[Protected Cyber Assets].'' \20\ In addition, NERC states that the 
proposed Reliability Standards address the protection of communication 
networks ``by requiring entities to implement security controls for 
nonprogrammable components of communication networks at Control Centers 
with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems.'' \21\ Finally, NERC 
explains that it has not proposed a definition of the term 
``communication network'' because the term is not used in the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Additionally, NERC states that ``any proposed 
definition would need to be sufficiently broad to encompass all 
components in a communication network as they exist now and in the 
future.'' \22\ NERC concludes that the proposed Reliability Standards 
``meet the ultimate security objective of protecting communication 
networks (both programmable and nonprogrammable communication network 
components).'' \23\
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    \20\ Id. at 6.
    \21\ Id. at 8.
    \22\ Id. at 51-52.
    \23\ Id. at 52.
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    12. Accordingly, NERC requests that the Commission approve the 
proposed Reliability Standards, the proposed implementation plan, the 
associated violation risk factor and violation severity level 
assignments, and the proposed new and revised definitions. NERC 
requests an effective date for the Reliability Standards of the later 
of April 1, 2016 or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 
three months after the effective date of the Commission's order 
approving the proposed Reliability Standards, although NERC proposes 
that responsible entities will not have to comply with the requirements 
applicable to Low Impact BES Cyber Systems (CIP-003-6, Requirement R1, 
Part 1.2 and Requirement R2) until April 1, 2017.

D. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    13. On July 16, 2015, the Commission issued a NOPR proposing to 
approve Reliability Standards CIP-003-6, CIP-004-6, CIP-006-6, CIP-007-
6, CIP-009-6, CIP-010-2 and CIP-011-2 as just, reasonable, not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.\24\ The 
NOPR stated that the proposed CIP Reliability Standards appear to 
improve upon the current Commission-approved CIP Reliability Standards 
and to address the directives in Order No. 791.
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    \24\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 (2015).
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    14. While proposing to approve the proposed Reliability Standards, 
the Commission also proposed to direct that NERC modify certain 
proposed standards or provide additional information supporting its 
proposal. First, the Commission directed NERC to provide additional 
information supporting the proposed limitation in Reliability Standard 
CIP-010-2 to transient electronic devices used at High and Medium 
Impact BES Cyber Systems. Second, the Commission stated that, while 
proposed CIP-006-6 would require protections for communication networks 
among a limited group of bulk electric system Control Centers, the 
proposed standard does not provide protections for communication 
network components and data communicated between all bulk electric 
system Control Centers. Therefore, the Commission proposed to direct 
that NERC develop modifications to Reliability Standard CIP-006-6 to 
require physical or logical protections for communication network 
components between all bulk electric system Control Centers. Third, 
while the Commission proposed to approve the new or revised definitions 
for inclusion in the NERC Glossary, it sought comment on the proposed 
definition for Low Impact External Routable Connectivity. The 
Commission noted that, depending on the comments received, it may 
direct NERC to develop modifications to this definition to eliminate 
possible ambiguities and ensure that BES Cyber Assets receive adequate 
protection.
    15. In addition, the Commission raised a concern that changes in 
the bulk electric system cyber threat landscape, identified through 
recent malware campaigns targeting supply chain vendors, have 
highlighted a gap in the protections under the CIP Reliability 
Standards. Therefore, the Commission proposed to direct NERC to develop 
a new Reliability Standard or modified Reliability Standard to provide 
security controls for supply chain management for industrial control 
system hardware, software, and services associated with bulk electric 
system operations.\25\
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    \25\ Id. P 18.
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    16. In response to the NOPR, 41 entities submitted comments. A list 
of commenters appears in Appendix A.

[[Page 4180]]

The comments have informed our decision making in this Final Rule.

II. Discussion

    17. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, we approve 
Reliability Standards CIP-003-6, CIP-004-6, CIP-006-6, CIP-007-6, CIP-
009-6, CIP-010-2 and CIP-011-2 as just, reasonable, not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. We find 
that the proposed Reliability Standards address the Commission's 
directives from Order No. 791 and are an improvement over the current 
Commission-approved CIP Reliability Standards. Specifically, the CIP 
Reliability Standards improve upon the existing standards by removing 
the ``identify, assess, and correct'' language and addressing the 
protection of Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. With regard to the 
directive to create a NERC Glossary definition for the term 
``communication networks,'' we approve NERC's proposal as an equally 
effective and efficient method to achieve the reliability goal 
underlying that directive in Order No. 791. We also approve NERC's 
proposed implementation plan, and violation risk factor and violation 
severity level assignments. Finally, we approve NERC's proposed new or 
revised definitions for inclusion in the NERC Glossary, subject to 
certain modifications, discussed below.
    18. In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we 
direct NERC to develop modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards 
to address our concerns regarding: (1) The need for mandatory 
protection for transient electronic devices used at Low Impact BES 
Cyber Systems in a manner that effectively addresses, and is 
appropriately tailored to address, the risk posed by those assets; and 
(2) the need for mandatory protection for communication links and data 
communicated between bulk electric system Control Centers in a manner 
that reflects the risks posed to bulk electric system reliability. In 
addition, we direct NERC to modify the definition of Low Impact 
External Routable Connectivity in order to eliminate ambiguities in the 
language. Finally, we direct NERC to complete a study of the remote 
access protections in the CIP Reliability Standards within one year of 
the implementation of the CIP version 5 Standards for High and Medium 
Impact BES Cyber Systems.
    19. As noted above, in the NOPR, the Commission proposed to direct 
that NERC develop requirements on the subject of supply chain 
management for industrial control system hardware, software, and 
services. After review of comments on the subject, the Commission 
scheduled a staff-led technical conference for January 28, 2016. The 
Commission will determine the appropriate action on this issue after 
the scheduled technical conference.
    20. Below, we discuss the following matters: (A) Protection of 
transient electronic devices; (B) protection of bulk electric system 
communication networks; (C) proposed definitions; and (D) NERC's 
implementation plan.

A. Protection of Transient Electronic Devices

NERC Petition
    21. In its Petition, NERC states that the revised CIP Reliability 
Standards satisfy the Commission's directive in Order No. 791 by 
requiring that applicable entities: (1) Develop plans and implement 
cybersecurity controls to protect Transient Cyber Assets and Removable 
Media associated with their High Impact and Medium Impact BES Cyber 
Systems and associated Protected Cyber Assets; and (2) train their 
personnel on the risks associated with using Transient Cyber Assets and 
Removable Media. NERC states that the purpose of the proposed revisions 
is to prevent unauthorized access to and use of transient electronic 
devices, mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities associated with unpatched 
software on transient electronic devices, and mitigate the risk of the 
introduction of malicious code on transient electronic devices. NERC 
explains that the standard drafting team determined that the proposed 
requirements should only apply to transient electronic devices 
associated with High and Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems, concluding 
that ``the application of the proposed transient devices requirements 
to transient devices associated with low impact BES Cyber Systems was 
unnecessary, and likely counterproductive, given the risks low impact 
BES Cyber Systems present to the Bulk Electric System.'' \26\
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    \26\ NERC Petition at 34-35.
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    22. NERC further explains that the controls required under 
Attachment 1 to CIP-010-2, Requirement R4 address the following areas: 
(1) Protections for Transient Cyber Assets managed by responsible 
entities; (2) protections for Transient Cyber Assets managed by another 
party; and (3) protections for Removable Media. NERC indicates that 
these provisions reflect the standard drafting team's recognition that 
the security controls required for a particular transient electronic 
device must account for the functionality of that device and whether 
the responsible entity or a third party manages the device. NERC also 
states that Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media have different 
capabilities because they present different levels of risk to the bulk 
electric system.\27\
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    \27\ Id. at 38.
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NOPR
    23. In the NOPR, the Commission stated that proposed Reliability 
Standard CIP-010-2 appears to provide a satisfactory level of security 
for transient electronic devices used at High and Medium Impact BES 
Cyber Systems. The Commission noted that the proposed security controls 
required under proposed CIP-010-2, Requirement R4, taken together, 
constitute a reasonable approach to address the reliability objectives 
outlined by the Commission in Order No. 791. Specifically, the 
Commission stated that proposed security controls outlined in 
Attachment 1 should ensure that responsible entities apply multiple 
security controls to provide defense-in-depth protection to transient 
electronic devices in the High and Medium Impact BES Cyber System 
environments.\28\
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    \28\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 41.
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    24. The Commission raised a concern, however, that proposed CIP-
010-2 does not provide adequate security controls to address the risks 
posed by transient electronic devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems, including Low Impact Control Centers, due to the limited 
applicability of Requirement R4. The Commission stated that this 
omission may result in a gap in protection for Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems where malware inserted at a single Low Impact substation could 
propagate through a network of many substations without encountering a 
single security control. The NOPR noted that ``Low Impact security 
controls do not provide for the use of mandatory anti-malware/antivirus 
protections within the Low Impact facilities, heightening the risk that 
malware or malicious code could propagate through these systems without 
being detected.'' \29\
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    \29\ Id. P 42.
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    25. The Commission also indicated that the burden of expanding the 
applicability of Reliability Standard CIP-010-2 to transient electronic 
devices at Low Impact BES Cyber Systems is not clear from the 
information in the record, nor is it clear what information and 
analysis led NERC to conclude that the application of the transient 
electronic device requirements to Low Impact BES Cyber

[[Page 4181]]

Systems ``was unnecessary.'' Therefore, the Commission directed NERC to 
provide additional information supporting the proposed limitation in 
Reliability Standard CIP-010-2 to High and Medium Impact BES Cyber 
Systems, stating that the Commission ``may direct NERC to address the 
potential reliability gap by developing a solution, which could include 
modifying the applicability section of CIP-010-2, Requirement R4 to 
include Low Impact BES Cyber Systems, that effectively addresses, and 
is appropriately tailored to address, the risks posed by transient 
devices to Low Impact BES Cyber Systems.'' \30\
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    \30\ Id. P 43.
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Comments
    26. While two commenters support the Commission's proposal, most 
commenters, including NERC, advocate approval of CIP-010-2 without 
expanding the applicability provision of Requirement R4 to include Low 
Impact BES Cyber Systems. NERC questions the Commission's assertion 
that ``malware inserted via a USB flash drive at a single Low Impact 
substation could propagate through a network of many substations 
without encountering a single security control under NERC's proposal.'' 
\31\ In particular, NERC and others commenters assert that the proposed 
security controls in CIP-003-6 adequately address the potential for 
propagation of malicious code or other unauthorized access by 
requiring: (1) All routable protocol communications between low impact 
assets be controlled through a Low Impact Electronic Access Point; (2) 
mandatory cyber security awareness activities; (3) physical security 
controls; (4) electronic access controls; and (5) incident response 
activities.\32\ Trade Associations assert that all asset-to-asset 
routable communications must go through the security control of the Low 
Impact Electronic Access Point under the proposed controls, other than 
extremely time sensitive device-to-device coordination.\33\ Trade 
Associations and NIPSCO suggest that the impact on reliability in the 
event of a successful compromise is inherently low.
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    \31\ NERC Comments at 26 (quoting NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 
42).
    \32\ Id. at 27. See also Trade Associations Comments at 12; 
Southern Comments at 5-6; Luminant Comments at 2; G&T Cooperatives 
Comments at 7.
    \33\ Trade Associations Comments at 12.
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    27. NERC, Trade Associations, Arkansas, G&T Cooperatives, and ITC 
argue that any Commission proposal to expand the protections of CIP-
010-2, Requirement R4 to transient electronic devices used at Low 
Impact BES Cyber Systems would contradict the underlying principles of 
the risk-based approach that was adopted in the Commission-approved CIP 
version 5 Standards. Likewise, these commenters argue that the resource 
burden to develop and implement security controls for low impact 
transient devices would be substantial. NERC, Consumers Energy, and G&T 
Cooperatives express concern that any requirements for transient 
electronic devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber Systems may divert 
resources from the protection of Medium and High Impact BES Cyber 
Systems.\34\
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    \34\ NERC Comments at 24; Consumers Energy Comments at 3-4; G&T 
Cooperatives Comments at 5.
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    28. Trade Associations and Southern assert that developing security 
controls for low impact transient cyber assets would be difficult given 
that, under CIP-003-6, responsible entities are not required to 
identify Low Impact BES Cyber Assets. Trade Associations conclude that 
additional transient cyber asset protections would need to be at the 
asset level to avoid creating administrative burdens disproportionate 
to the risk. Arkansas and G&T Cooperatives claim that the Commission's 
proposal to modify CIP-010-2 could require the implementation of device 
level controls and assert that the cost for complying with such 
regulations would be unprecedented because they would be driven by the 
number of devices and the number of people interacting with those 
devices.\35\
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    \35\ Arkansas Comments at 2-3; G&T Cooperatives Comments at 5.
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    29. ITC and NIPSCO state that the lack of specificity in CIP-010-2, 
Requirement R4 raises concerns with how responsible entities will 
demonstrate compliance, noting that the methods included are general 
and non-exclusive such that a responsible entity cannot be expected to 
know with reasonable confidence whether its plan will be deemed 
compliant. ITC states that, if the Commission intends to approve 
Standards that contain such broad latitude, it must also be prepared to 
accept a wide variety of plans as compliant.
    30. NERC requests that, should the Commission determine that the 
risk associated with transient electronic devices used at Low Impact 
BES Cyber Systems requires expanding protections to those devices, it 
should recognize the varying risk levels presented by Low Impact BES 
Cyber Systems and the need to focus on higher risk issues. Other 
commenters, including Arkansas, KCP&L, and G&T Cooperatives, request 
that the Commission allow the implementation of the low impact controls 
in CIP-003-6 and the transient device controls in CIP-10-2 before 
directing further initiatives to expand the scope of the standards. 
Reclamation suggests that, if the Commission decides to direct NERC to 
address this potential reliability gap, the transient device and 
removable media controls for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems should be 
less stringent than the controls in CIP-010-2 given the facilities with 
which they are associated. Luminant and Reclamation also request that 
any new requirements for low impact transient electronic devices be 
placed in CIP-003-6.
    31. APS and SPP RE generally express support for changes to CIP-
010-2, Requirement R4 to address mandatory protection for transient 
devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. APS states that extending 
transient device protection to low impact systems would likely afford 
some additional security benefits, but notes that there may be cases 
where these controls would be unduly burdensome. SPP RE states that the 
burden of extending certain elements of the Attachment 1 requirements 
to environments containing Low Impact BES Cyber Systems is reasonable, 
with the benefit far outweighing the cost if the controls are carefully 
considered with risk and potential burden in mind. SPP RE suggests that 
the compliance burden could be reduced by allowing Transient Cyber 
Assets and Removable Media to be readily moved between assets 
containing only Low Impact BES Cyber Systems without having to re-
perform the Attachment 1 requirements between sites. Finally, NIPSCO 
seeks clarification on how to determine the ``manager'' of a Transient 
Cyber Asset under CIP-010-2, Requirement R4, noting that the 
requirement appears to allow a Transient Cyber Asset to be owned by the 
responsible entity, but used by a vendor on a day-to-day basis.\36\
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    \36\ NIPSCO Comments at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    32. After consideration of the comments received on this issue, we 
conclude that the adoption of controls for transient devices used at 
Low Impact BES Cyber Systems, including Low Impact Control Centers, 
will provide an important enhancement to the security posture of the 
bulk electric system by reinforcing the defense-in-depth nature of the 
CIP Reliability Standards at all impact levels. Accordingly, we direct

[[Page 4182]]

that NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, develop 
modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to provide mandatory 
protection for transient devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber Systems 
based on the risk posed to bulk electric system reliability. While NERC 
has flexibility in the manner in which it addresses the Commission's 
concerns, the proposed modifications should be designed to effectively 
address the risks posed by transient devices to Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems in a manner that is consistent with the risk-based approach 
reflected in the CIP version 5 Standards.
    33. We are not persuaded by NERC and other commenters that the 
security controls in CIP-003-6 adequately address the potential for 
propagation of malicious code or other unauthorized access stemming 
from transient devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-6 
requires responsible entities, for any Low Impact External Routable 
Connectivity, to implement a Low Impact Electronic Access Point to 
``permit only necessary inbound and outbound bi-directional routable 
protocol access.'' In doing so, however, responsible entities may not 
foresee and configure their devices to limit all unwanted traffic. 
Firewalls only accept or drop traffic as dictated by a preprogrammed 
rule set. In other words, if a piece of malicious code were to leverage 
permissible traffic or protocol patterns, the firewall could not detect 
a malicious file signature. In short, under this requirement of CIP-
003-6, responsible entities have discretion to determine what access 
and traffic are necessary, which does not provide enough certainty that 
the protocols used or ports targeted by future, as-yet-unknown malware 
would result in the firewall rules dropping the malicious traffic.
    34. Second, the firewalls and other security devices installed at 
Low Impact Electronic Access Points for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems 
may not be actively monitored. The system security management controls 
in CIP-007-6 that require logging, alerting, and event review are not 
mandated for low impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-003-6. As a result, 
even if a security device installed at a Low Impact Electronic Access 
Point successfully logged suspicious network traffic, there is no 
assurance that a responsible entity would have processes in place to 
take swift action to prevent malicious code from spreading to other Low 
Impact BES Cyber Systems.
    35. In addition, we disagree with the assertion raised by some 
commenters that directing NERC to address the reliability gap created 
by the limited applicability of CIP-010-2 contradicts the risk-based 
approach adopted in the CIP version 5 Standards,\37\ or will result in 
an unreasonable resource burden or diversion of resources from the 
protection of Medium and High Impact BES Cyber Systems. Rather, in the 
NOPR, the Commission noted that one means to address the identified 
reliability concern would be to modify the applicability section of 
CIP-010-2, Requirement R4 to include Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. This 
is not, however, the only means available to address the Commission's 
concerns. The Commission was clear that any proposal submitted by NERC 
should be designed to effectively address, in a manner that is 
``appropriately tailored to address, the risks posed by transient 
devices to Low Impact BES Cyber Systems.'' \38\ We intend that NERC's 
proposed modifications will be designed to address the risk posed by 
the assets being protected in accordance with the risk-based approach 
reflected in the CIP version 5 Standards, i.e., the modifications to 
address Low Impact BES Cyber Systems may be less stringent than the 
provisions that apply to Medium and High Impact Cyber Systems--
commensurate with the risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See NERC Comments at 24; G&T Cooperatives Comments at 6.
    \38\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. We agree with the Trade Associations that controls for low 
impact transient cyber assets could be adopted at the asset level 
(i.e., facility or site-level) to avoid overly-burdensome 
administrative tasks that could be associated with identifying discrete 
Low Impact BES Cyber Assets.\39\ While responsible entities are not 
explicitly required by the CIP standards to maintain a list of discrete 
Low Impact BES Cyber Assets, entities should be aware of where such 
assets reside in order to apply the existing protections already 
reflected in the policies required under CIP-003-6. As noted above, the 
Commission offered that one possible solution to address the 
reliability gap could be to modify the applicability section of CIP-
010-2, Requirement R4. However, should modifying CIP-010-2 prove overly 
burdensome as asserted by Arkansas and G&T Cooperatives, NERC may 
propose an equally effective and efficient solution. For example, we 
believe it would be reasonable for NERC to consider modifications to 
CIP-003-6, as suggested by Luminant and Reclamation, since the existing 
low impact controls reside in that standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Trade Associations Comments at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. With respect to ITC and NIPSCO's comments regarding potential 
ambiguity in CIP-010-2, Requirement R4, we reiterate that CIP-010-2, 
Requirement R4 contains sufficiently clear control objectives to inform 
responsible entities about the activities that must be performed in 
order for a transient device program to be deemed compliant. We believe 
that the flexibility reflected in Requirement R4 will help responsible 
entities to develop secure and cost effective compliance solutions. To 
the extent that concerns arise in the implementation process, we 
encourage responsible entities to work with NERC and the Regional 
Entities to ensure that responsible entities will have reasonable 
confidence about compliance expectations. Finally, regarding NIPSCO's 
request for clarification, we clarify our understanding that the phrase 
``managed by'' as it is used in CIP-010-2, Requirement R4, is intended 
to distinguish between situations where a responsible entity has 
complete control over a Transient Cyber Asset as opposed to situations 
where a third party shares some measure of control, as discussed in the 
Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-010-2.

B. Protection of Bulk Electric System Communication Networks

NERC Petition
    38. In its Petition, NERC states that the standard drafting team 
concluded that it need not create a new definition for communication 
networks because the term ``is generally understood to encompass both 
programmable and nonprogrammable components (i.e., a communication 
network includes computer peripherals, terminals, and databases as well 
as communication mediums such as wires).'' \40\ According to NERC, the 
revised CIP Reliability Standards contain reasonable controls to secure 
the types of equipment and components that responsible entities must 
protect based on the risk they pose to the bulk electric system, as 
opposed to a specific definition of communication networks. Further, 
NERC explains that the standard drafting team focused on 
nonprogrammable communication components at control centers with High 
or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems because those locations present a 
heightened risk to the Bulk-Power System, warranting the increased 
protections.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ NERC Petition at 52 (citing North American Electric 
Reliability Corp., 142 FERC ] 61,203, at PP 13-14 (2013)).
    \41\ Id. at 48.

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[[Page 4183]]

    39. NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard CIP-006-6 
provides flexibility for responsible entities to implement the physical 
security measures that best suit their needs and to account for 
configurations where logical measures are necessary because the entity 
cannot effectively implement physical access restrictions. According to 
NERC, responsible entities have the discretion as to the type of 
physical or logical protections to implement pursuant to Part 1.10 of 
this Standard, provided that the protections are designed to meet the 
overall security objective.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Id. at 49-50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NOPR
    40. In the NOPR, the Commission indicated that NERC's proposed 
alternative approach to addressing the Commission's Order No. 791 
directive regarding the definition of communication networks adequately 
addresses part of the underlying concerns set forth in Order No. 
791.\43\ The Commission proposed to accept NERC's explanation that 
responsible entities must develop controls to secure the 
nonprogrammable components of communication networks based on the risk 
they pose to the bulk electric system, rather than develop a specific 
definition of communication networks to identify assets for protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    41. However, the Commission also indicated that NERC's proposed 
solution for the protection of nonprogrammable components of 
communication networks does not fully meet the intent of the 
Commission's Order No. 791 directive, because proposed CIP-006-6, 
Requirement R1, Part 1.10 would only apply to nonprogrammable 
components of communication networks within the same Electronic 
Security Perimeter, excluding from protection other programmable and 
non-programmable communication network components that may exist 
outside of a discrete Electronic Security Perimeter.\44\ Therefore, the 
Commission proposed to direct that NERC develop a modification to 
proposed Reliability Standard CIP-006-6 ``to require responsible 
entities to implement controls to protect, at a minimum, all 
communication links and sensitive bulk electric system data 
communicated between all bulk electric system Control Centers,'' 
including communication between two (or more) Control Centers, but not 
between a Control Center and non-Control Center facilities such as 
substations.\45\ In addition, the Commission sought comments that 
address ``the value achieved if the CIP Standards were to require the 
incorporation of additional network segmentation controls, connection 
monitoring, and session termination controls behind responsible entity 
intermediate systems,'' including whether these or other steps to 
improve remote access protection are needed, and whether the adoption 
of any additional security controls addressing this topic would provide 
substantial reliability and security benefits.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Id. P 55.
    \45\ Id. P 59.
    \46\ Id. P 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments
    42. NERC and a number of commenters generally agree that inter-
Control Center communications play a critical role in maintaining bulk 
electric system reliability and do not oppose further evaluation of the 
risks described by the Commission in the NOPR.\47\ NERC states that 
timely and accurate communication between Control Centers is important 
to maintaining situational awareness and reliable bulk electric system 
operations, and notes that the interception or manipulation of data 
communicated between Control Centers ``could be used to carry out 
successful cyberattacks against the [bulk electric system].'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ NERC Comments at 20. See also Comments of IRC, IESO and 
ITC.
    \48\ NERC Comments at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. However, NERC and other commenters also assert that NERC should 
take steps to ensure that reliability is not adversely impacted with 
the adoption of any additional controls.\49\ SPP RE and EnergySec 
indicate that latency should not be a concern for protecting Control 
Center communications. Specifically, SPP RE states that the latency 
introduced by encryption is typically not an operational issue for 
inter-Control Center communications, since regular inter-Control Center 
communications do not require the same millisecond response time as 
communications between protective relays in substations. In addition, 
SPP RE states that protections other than encryption are not as 
effective in protecting sensitive operational data from alteration or 
replay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ NERC Comments at 20. See also Arkansas Comments at 3-4; APS 
Comments at 4; EnergySec Comments at 4; IESO Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. A number of commenters request that the Commission provide 
flexibility to the extent that it issues a directive on this topic. 
NERC, EnergySec, APS, and IESO state that the Commission should allow 
NERC the opportunity to develop an appropriate and risk informed 
approach to any new Reliability Standard or requirement, while APS and 
EnergySec also suggest that NERC be granted the flexibility to 
determine the placement of any new security controls in the body of 
standards.\50\ Trade Associations and Arkansas state that NERC should 
determine the appropriate controls to implement to meet the 
Commission's objectives. Luminant, PNM Resources, and Southern suggest 
that any new standard or requirement should be results-based and not 
prescriptive, affording some measure of flexibility to responsible 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ NERC Comments at 20-21; EnergySec Comments at 4; APS 
Comments at 4; IESO Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. Trade Associations, Southern, Wisconsin, and NEI generally 
agree that protections should be applied to the High and Medium Impact 
BES Cyber System environment, but oppose extending mandatory protection 
to the Low Impact Control Center environment without additional study. 
Trade Associations and PNM also take issue with the blanket application 
of security controls over all bulk electric system Control Center data 
and believe that NERC should have the opportunity to determine what 
data is truly sensitive.
    46. A number of commenters oppose the Commission's proposal to 
require responsible entities to implement controls to protect all 
communication links and sensitive bulk electric system data 
communicated between all bulk electric system Control Centers. NIPSCO 
and G&T Cooperatives argue that the risks posed by such communication 
networks do not justify the costs of implementing a new standard and, 
therefore, the standard should, at a minimum, not apply to Low Impact 
BES Cyber Systems. NIPSCO opines that the Commission's proposal may 
cause unintentional consequences since data and communications 
exchanged between Control Centers is often time-sensitive. SCE suggests 
that the Commission's proposal is premature and that the risks should 
be studied before taking further actions. Foundation opposes the 
Commission's proposal because it objects to the exclusion of secure 
connections to grid facilities other than Control Centers, stating that 
the Commission should do more to protect the grid.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Foundation Comments at 47-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. Other commenters request clarification of the Commission's 
proposal. KCP&L, PNM, UTC, TVA, Idaho Power, and NIPSCO seek

[[Page 4184]]

clarification whether Control Centers owned by multiple, different 
registered entities would be included in the Commission's proposal. TVA 
asks whether the Commission's proposal is focused on protecting the 
data link or the data itself. UTC questions the nature of the 
reliability gap described in the NOPR given the protections in CIP-005-
5 for inbound and outbound communications. In addition, APS and 
EnergySec seek clarification regarding the term ``control center'' in 
the context of adopting controls to protect reliability-related data. 
APS and EnergySec note that transmission owner SCADA systems do not 
meet the current definition of control centers despite the fact that 
these systems contain identical reliability data as the systems 
operated by reliability coordinators, balancing authorities, and 
transmission operators. As a result, APS and EnergySec ask that the 
Commission clarify what constitutes a ``control center'' for the 
purposes of communication security.\52\ Finally, Idaho Power, KCP&L, 
and UTC seek clarification whether responsible entities would be held 
individually accountable for implementing the controls adopted under 
the CIP Standards when there may be overlapping responsibilities 
associated with the protection of inter-entity control center 
communication.\53\ For example, Idaho Power opines that two neighboring 
responsible entities with control centers that communicate with each 
other should both be equally responsible for implementing the CIP 
Standards, but states that it is unclear how compliance would be 
measured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See APS Comments at 4; EnergySec Comments at 3.
    \53\ Idaho Power Comments at 2; UTC Comments at 2; KCP&L 
Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. PNM and NIPSCO suggest that, if the NOPR proposal is aimed at 
protecting intra-control center communications, the Commission should 
consider modifications to Reliability Standard EOP-008-1. TVA requests 
that the Commission consider removing the requirement for protecting 
``all communication links'' and focus on the ``sensitive bulk electric 
system data'' moving between Control Centers. TVA states that physical 
and logical protections for communications network components between 
bulk electric system Control Centers should be limited to only 
essential communications networks.
    49. With regard to the Commission's question on the potential need 
for additional remote access protections, NERC and a number of 
commenters argue that there are not enough data to conclude that the 
proposed controls for remote access will be ineffective and suggest 
that the Commission delay consideration of additional remote access 
protections until after the CIP version 5 remote access provisions are 
implemented.\54\ NERC and IRC provide a list of the relevant controls 
applied to remote access systems as evidence that there are substantial 
controls already in place to address threats associated with remote 
access. APS and Arkansas assert that the current Standards and 
industry-developed guidance provide sufficient tools for securing 
interactive remote access and, thus, additional controls would not 
provide significant reliability or security benefits. TVA claims that 
the current requirement language is too prescriptive because it 
precludes a registered entity's usage of specific technologies due to 
prejudices against certain ``architectures.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ NERC Comments at 21-23. See also Trade Association Comments 
at 14; KCP&L Comments at 4; Southern Comments at 7; IRC Comments at 
6.
    \55\ TVA Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    50. Commenters supporting the development of additional remote 
access controls for the CIP Standards contend that the current suite of 
CIP Standards fails to adequately address specific threats and 
vulnerabilities. SPP RE and CyberArk note the lack of restrictions on 
what systems remote users can access after successfully logging on to 
the intermediate system.\56\ CyberArk also asserts that there is a lack 
of protection for remote user credentials after successfully logging 
onto the intermediate system and a lack of controls to regulate 
encryption strength and key management. Waterfall states that the 
proposed controls lack methods to detect and prevent compromised 
endpoint devices, which, according to Waterfall and SPP RE, presents 
the opportunity for an attacker to access multiple remote sites from a 
compromised central site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ SPP RE Comments at 7-8; CyberArk Comments at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    51. PNM agrees that some of the controls mentioned by panelists at 
the April 2014 FERC technical conference may improve reliability and 
security. However, PNM states that such controls may have only marginal 
benefits to reliability and security since the increased complexity of 
these steps would present problems with staff support for such 
systems.\57\ AEP asserts that, while additional controls may enhance a 
defense-in-depth strategy, prescriptive requirements on intermediate 
systems may create a need for technical feasibility exceptions for 
situations where security could impede reliability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ PNM Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    52. We adopt the NOPR proposal and find that NERC's alternative 
approach to addressing the Commission's Order No. 791 directive 
regarding the definition of communication networks adequately addresses 
part of the underlying concerns set forth in Order No. 791.\58\ In 
accepting this alternative approach, we accept NERC's explanation that 
responsible entities must develop controls to secure the 
nonprogrammable components of communication networks at Control Centers 
with High or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    53. As discussed in detail below, however, the Commission concludes 
that modifications to CIP-006-6 to provide controls to protect, at a 
minimum, communication links and data communicated between bulk 
electric system Control Centers are necessary in light of the critical 
role Control Center communications play in maintaining bulk electric 
system reliability. Therefore, we adopt the NOPR proposal and direct 
that NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, develop 
modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to require responsible 
entities to implement controls to protect, at a minimum, communication 
links and sensitive bulk electric system data communicated between bulk 
electric system Control Centers in a manner that is appropriately 
tailored to address the risks posed to the bulk electric system by the 
assets being protected (i.e., high, medium, or low impact).
    54. NERC and other commenters recognize that inter-Control Center 
communications play a critical role in maintaining bulk electric system 
reliability by, among other things, helping to maintain situational 
awareness and reliable bulk electric system operations through timely 
and accurate communication between Control Centers.\59\ We agree with 
this assessment. In order for certain responsible entities such as 
reliability coordinators, balancing authorities, and transmission 
operators to adequately perform their reliability functions, their 
associated control centers must be capable of receiving and storing a 
variety of sensitive bulk electric system data from interconnected 
entities. Accordingly, we find that additional measures to protect both 
the integrity and availability of sensitive bulk electric

[[Page 4185]]

system data are warranted.\60\ We also understand that the attributes 
of the data managed by responsible entities could require different 
information protection controls.\61\ For instance, certain types of 
reliability data will be sensitive to data manipulation type attacks, 
while other types of reliability data will be sensitive to 
eavesdropping type attacks aimed at collecting operational information 
(such as line and equipment ratings and impedances). NERC should 
consider the differing attributes of bulk electric system data as it 
assesses the development of appropriate controls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ NERC Comments at 20.
    \60\ Protecting the integrity of bulk electric system data 
involves maintaining and ensuring the accuracy and consistency of 
inter-Control Center communications. Protecting the availability of 
bulk electric system data involves ensuring that required data is 
available when needed for bulk electric system operations.
    \61\ Moreover, in order for certain responsible entities to 
adequately perform their Reliability Functions, the associated 
control centers must be capable of receiving and storing a variety 
of sensitive data as specified by the IRO and TOP Standards. For 
instance, pursuant to Reliability Standard TOP-003-3, Requirements 
R1, R3 and R5, a transmission operator must maintain a documented 
specification for data and distribute its data specification to 
entities that have data required by the transmission operator's 
Operational Planning Analyses, Real-time Monitoring and Real-time 
Assessments. Entities receiving a data specification must satisfy 
the obligation of the documented specification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    55. With regard to NERC's development of modifications responsive 
to our directive, we agree with NERC and other commenters that NERC 
should have flexibility in the manner in which it addresses the 
Commission's directive. Likewise, we find reasonable the principles 
outlined by NERC that protections for communication links and sensitive 
bulk electric system data communicated between bulk electric system 
Control Centers: (1) Should not have an adverse effect on reliability, 
including the recognition of instances where the introduction of 
latency could have negative results; (2) should account for the risk 
levels of assets and information being protected, and require 
protections that are commensurate with the risks presented; and (3) 
should be results-based in order to provide flexibility to account for 
the range of technologies and entities involved in bulk electric system 
communications.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See NERC Comments at 20-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    56. We disagree with the assertion of NIPSCO and G&T Cooperatives 
that the risk posed by bulk electric system communication networks does 
not justify the costs of implementing controls. Communications between 
Control Centers over such networks are fundamental to the operations of 
the bulk electric system, and the record here does not persuade us that 
controls for such networks are not available at a reasonable cost 
(through encryption or otherwise). Nonetheless, we recognize that not 
all communication network components and data pose the same risk to 
bulk electric system reliability and may not require the same level of 
protection. We expect NERC to develop controls that reflect the risk 
posed by the asset or data being protected, and that can be implemented 
in a reasonable manner. It is important to recognize that certain 
entities are already required to exchange necessary real-time and 
operational planning data through secured networks using a ``mutually 
agreeable security protocol,'' regardless of the entity's size or 
impact level.\63\ NERC's response to the directives in this Final Rule 
should identify the scope of sensitive bulk electric system data that 
must be protected and specify how the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of each type of bulk electric system data should be 
protected while it is being transmitted or at rest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See Reliability Standards TOP-003-3, Requirement R5 and 
IRO-010-2, Requirement R3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    57. With regard to Foundation's argument that the Commission should 
do more to promote grid security by mandating secure communications 
between all facilities of the bulk electric system, such as 
substations, the record in the immediate proceeding does not support 
such a broad requirement at this time. However, if in the future it 
becomes evident that such action is warranted, the Commission may 
revisit this issue.
    58. Several commenters sought clarification whether Control Centers 
owned by multiple registered entities would be included under the 
Commission's proposal. We clarify that the scope of the directed 
modifications apply to Control Center communications from facilities at 
all impact levels, regardless of ownership. The directed modification 
should encompass communication links and data for intra-Control Center 
and inter-Control Center communications.
    59. Idaho Power, KCP&L, and UTC seek clarification whether entities 
would be held individually accountable for implementing the Standard 
when there may be overlapping responsibilities. We clarify that 
responsible entities may be held individually accountable depending 
upon the security arrangements with their neighbors and functional 
partners. Many organizations currently use joint and coordinated 
functional registration agreements to assign accountability for 
reliability tasks with joint functional obligations.\64\ These 
mechanisms could be leveraged to address responsibilities under the CIP 
Standards. For example, if several registered entities have joint 
responsibility for a cryptographic key management system used between 
their respective Control Centers, they should have the prerogative to 
come to a consensus on which organization administers that particular 
key management system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See NERC Compliance Public Bulletin #2010-004, available on 
the NERC Web site at www.NERC.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    60. UTC seeks further explanation regarding the nature of the 
reliability gap described in the NOPR given the protections in CIP-005-
5 for inbound and outbound communications. We clarify that the 
reliability gap addressed in this Final Rule pertains to the lack of 
mandatory security controls to address how responsible entities should 
protect sensitive bulk electric system communications and data. As 
noted above, while responsible entities are required to exchange real-
time and operational planning data necessary to operate the bulk 
electric system using mutually agreeable security protocols, there is 
no technical specification for how this transfer of information should 
incorporate mandatory security controls. Although the CIP Standards 
provide a measure of defense-in-depth for responsible entity 
information systems, the current security controls primarily focus on 
boundary protection controls. For instance, CIP-005-5 focuses on access 
control and malicious code prevention, which requires authentication of 
the user and ensuring that no malware is included in the communication, 
but does not provide for security of the actual data while it is being 
transmitted between Electronic Security Perimeters. Thus, the current 
CIP Reliability Standards do not adequately address how to protect the 
transfer of sensitive bulk electric system data between facilities at 
discrete geographic locations.
    61. With respect to APS and EnergySec's request for clarification 
regarding the meaning of the term ``control center'' in the context of 
adopting controls to protect reliability-related data, we clarify that 
we are using here the NERC Glossary definition of a Control Center.\65\ 
Whether particular

[[Page 4186]]

facilities meet or do not meet this definition should be determined 
outside of this rulemaking. However, the proposed modification will 
apply to Control Centers at all impact levels (high, medium, or low).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ The NERC Glossary defines Control Center as ``One or more 
facilities hosting operating personnel that monitor and control the 
Bulk Electric System (BES) in real-time to perform the reliability 
tasks, including their associated data centers, of: (1) A 
Reliability Coordinator, (2) a Balancing Authority, (3) a 
Transmission Operator for transmission Facilities at two or more 
locations, or (4) a Generator Operator for generation Facilities at 
two or more locations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    62. Several commenters addressed encryption and latency. Based on 
the record in this proceeding, it is reasonable to conclude that any 
lag in communication speed resulting from implementation of protections 
should only be measureable on the order of milliseconds and, therefore, 
will not adversely impact Control Center communications. Several 
commenters raise possible technical implementation difficulties with 
integrating encryption technologies into their current communications 
networks. Such technical issues should be considered by the standard 
drafting team when developing modifications in response to this 
directive, and may be resolved, e.g., by making certain aspects of the 
revised CIP Standards eligible for Technical Feasibility Exceptions.
    63. We reject the suggestion of two commenters that any efforts to 
protect intra-Control Center communications should be considered 
through modifications in Reliability Standard EOP-008-1. As an initial 
matter, Reliability Standard EOP-008-1 focuses on backup functionality 
in the event that primary control center functionality is lost.\66\ 
Reliability Standard EOP-008-1 also does not provide security for 
communication links or data and, therefore, does not provide for the 
protection of communication links and sensitive bulk electric system 
data communicated between bulk electric system Control Centers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See http://www.nerc.com/files/eop-008-1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    64. Finally, with regard to the NOPR discussion regarding the 
potential need for additional protections related to remote access,\67\ 
we are persuaded by commenters' suggestions that it would be prudent to 
assess the extent to which the CIP version 5 Standards provide 
effective controls for remote access before pursuing additional 
revisions to the CIP Standards.\68\ Therefore, we direct NERC to 
conduct a study that assesses the effectiveness of the CIP version 5 
remote access controls, the risks posed by remote access-related 
threats and vulnerabilities, and appropriate mitigating controls for 
any identified risks. NERC should consult with Commission staff to 
determine the general contents of the directed report. We direct NERC 
to submit a report on the above-outlined study within one year of the 
implementation of the CIP version 5 Standards for High and Medium 
Impact BES Cyber Systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 60.
    \68\ See NERC Comments at 21-23; Trade Association Comments at 
14; KCP&L Comments at 4; Southern Comments at 7; IRC Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Proposed Definitions

NERC Petition
    65. In its Petition, NERC proposes the following definition for Low 
Impact External Routable Connectivity:

    Direct user-initiated interactive access or a direct device-to-
device connection to a low impact BES Cyber System(s) from a Cyber 
Asset outside the asset containing those low impact BES Cyber 
System(s) via a bidirectional routable protocol connection. Point-
to-point communications between intelligent electronic devices that 
use routable communication protocols for time-sensitive protection 
or control functions between Transmission station or substation 
assets containing low impact BES Cyber Systems are excluded from 
this definition (examples of this communication include, but are not 
limited to, IEC 61850 GOOSE or vendor proprietary protocols).\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ NERC Petition at 28.

    66. NERC explains that the proposed definition describes the 
scenarios where responsible entities are required to apply Low Impact 
access controls under Reliability Standard CIP-003-6, Requirement R2 to 
their Low Impact assets. Specifically, if Low Impact External Routable 
Connectivity is used, a responsible entity must implement a Low Impact 
Electronic Access Point to permit only necessary inbound and outbound 
bidirectional routable protocol access.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ Id. at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NOPR
    67. In the NOPR, the Commission sought comment on the proposed 
definition for Low Impact External Routable Connectivity. First, the 
Commission sought comment on the purpose of the meaning of the term 
``direct'' in relation to the phrases ``direct user-initiated 
interactive access'' and ``direct device-to-device connection'' within 
the proposed definition.\71\ In addition, the Commission sought comment 
on the implementation of the ``layer 7 application layer break'' 
contained in certain reference diagrams in the Guidelines and Technical 
Basis section of proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-6, noting that 
the guidance provided in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of 
the proposed standard may conflict with the plain reading of the term 
``direct.'' \72\ The Commission noted a concern that a conflict in the 
reading of the term ``direct'' could lead to complications in the 
implementation of the proposed CIP Reliability Standards, hindering the 
adoption of effective security controls for Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems. The Commission indicated that, depending upon the responses 
received, the final rule may direct NERC to develop a modification to 
the definition of Low Impact External Routable Connectivity to 
eliminate ambiguities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 70.
    \72\ See CIP-003-6 Guidelines and Technical Basis Section, 
Reference Model 6 at p. 39. The layer 7 application layer break 
concept appears to permit a responsible entity to log into an 
intermediate application or device to access the Low Impact BES 
Cyber System or device to avoid implementing Low Impact Electronic 
Access Point security controls under CIP-003-6, Attachment 1, 
Section 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments
    68. NERC and other commenters do not oppose a modification of the 
Low Impact External Routable Connectivity definition, so long as it 
remains consistent with the Guidelines and Technical Basis for section 
for CIP-003-6.\73\ NERC, referencing the Guidelines and Technical Basis 
section of proposed CIP-003-6, explains that the purpose of the term 
``direct'' is to distinguish between the scenarios where an external 
user or device could electronically access the Low Impact BES Cyber 
System without a security break (i.e., direct access) from those 
situations where an external user or device could only access the Low 
Impact BES Cyber System following a security break (i.e., indirect 
access).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ NERC Comments at 31. See also Trade Associations Comments 
at 15; Southern Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    69. NERC explains further that Low Impact External Routable 
Connectivity would exist and a Low Impact Electronic Access Point would 
be required if an entity's implementation of a layer 7 application 
layer break does not provide a sufficient security break (i.e., the 
layer 7 application does not prevent direct access to the Low Impact 
BES Cyber System).\74\ Southern states that it believes that the Low 
Impact External Routable Connectivity definition, when combined with 
the language in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section for CIP-003-
6, is sufficiently clear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ NERC Comments at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    70. SPP RE, EnergySec, and APS recommend that the Commission direct 
NERC to revise the Low Impact External Routable Connectivity definition 
because the definition, as drafted, would permit transitive connections 
through out of scope cyber assets at sites

[[Page 4187]]

containing Low Impact BES Cyber Systems with no required security 
controls.\75\ SPP RE posits that indirect access, through an 
intervening or intermediate system such as the non-BES Cyber Asset on 
the same network segment, should also be considered Low Impact External 
Routable Connectivity because this kind of access would enable ``pivot 
attacks'' on low impact networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ SPP RE Comments at 14-18; EnergySec Comments at 2-3; APS 
Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    71. SPP RE, EnergySec, TVA, and APS assert that any electronic 
remote access into a routable network containing BES Cyber Systems 
should be construed as External Routable Connectivity and 
protected.\76\ SPP RE suggests that the layer 7 application layer break 
language is not well understood by industry, as some responsible 
entities currently hold the view that a security gateway appliance 
effectively serves as the layer 7 protocol break eliminating Low Impact 
External Routable Connectivity. SPP RE asserts that the security 
gateway appliance acting in this way does not maintain two independent 
conversations and, as a result, should still be considered as 
externally routable connected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ SPP RE Comments at 14-18; EnergySec Comments at 2-3; TVA 
Comments at 1-2; APS Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    72. ITC states that it considers the layer 7 application layer 
break referenced in Model 6 of the Guidelines and Technical Basis 
section to be an illustrative example that in no way requires integrity 
of the data stream down to layer 7 for compliance with CIP-003-6.\77\ 
ITC notes that the illustrative example referenced by the Commission is 
contained within the non-binding Guidelines and Technical basis 
section, and does not believe that the controlling language of CIP-003-
6 requires such a control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ ITC Comments at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    73. Based on the comments received in response to the NOPR, the 
Commission concludes that a modification to the Low Impact External 
Routable Connectivity definition to reflect the commentary in the 
Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-003-6 is necessary to 
provide needed clarity to the definition and eliminate ambiguity 
surrounding the term ``direct'' as it is used in the proposed 
definition. Therefore, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we 
direct NERC to develop a modification to provide the needed clarity, 
within one year of the effective date of this Final Rule. We agree with 
NERC and other commenters that a suitable means to address our concern 
is to modify the Low Impact External Routable Connectivity definition 
consistent with the commentary in the Guidelines and Technical Basis 
section of CIP-003-6.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ E.g., NERC Comments at 31; Trade Associations Comments at 
15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    74. As discussed above, NERC clarifies that the purpose of the 
``direct'' language in the Low Impact External Routable Connectivity 
definition is to distinguish between scenarios where an external user 
or device could electronically access a Low Impact BES Cyber System 
without a security break (direct access) from those situations where an 
external user or device could only access a Low Impact BES Cyber System 
following a security break (indirect access); therefore, in order for 
there to be no Low Impact External Routable Connectivity, the security 
break must be ``complete'' (i.e., it must prevent allowing access to 
the Low Impact BES Cyber Systems from the external cyber asset). NERC's 
clarification on this issue resolves many of the concerns raised by 
EnergySec, APS, and SPP RE regarding the proposed definition, as a 
complete security break would not appear to permit transitive 
connections through one or more out of scope cyber assets to go 
unprotected under the definition, and would appear to require the 
assets to maintain ``separate conversations'' as suggested by SPP RE.
    75. We decline to adopt the recommendations from EnergySec and APS 
that the Commission direct NERC to modify the standards to utilize the 
concept of Electronic Security Perimeters for low impact systems and to 
leverage existing definitions for Electronic Access Point and External 
Routable Connectivity. The Commission believes that the electronic 
security protections developed by the standard drafting team for Low 
Impact BES Cyber Systems will provide sufficient protection to these 
systems with the modifications that we are directing to the Low Impact 
External Routable Connectivity definition. However, we may revisit this 
decision in the future if we determine that CIP-003-6, Requirement R2 
and the Low Impact External Routable Connectivity definition provide 
insufficient electronic access protection for Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems.

D. Implementation Plan

NERC Petition
    76. In its Petition, NERC explains that the proposed implementation 
plan for the revised CIP Reliability Standards is designed to match the 
effective dates of the proposed Reliability Standards with the 
effective dates of the prior versions of the related Reliability 
Standards under the implementation plan of the CIP version 5 Standards. 
NERC states that the purpose of this approach is to provide regulatory 
certainty by limiting the time, if any, that the CIP version 5 
Standards with the ``identify, assess, and correct'' language would be 
effective. Specifically, NERC explains that, pursuant to the CIP 
version 5 implementation plan, the effective date of each of the CIP 
version 5 Standards is April 1, 2016, except for the effective date for 
Requirement R2 of CIP-003-5 (i.e., controls for Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems), which is April 1, 2017. NERC explains further that the 
proposed implementation plan provides that: (1) Each of the proposed 
reliability Standards shall become effective on the later of April 1, 
2016 or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three 
months after the effective date of the Commission's order approving the 
proposed Reliability Standard; and (2) responsible entities will not 
have to comply with the requirements applicable to Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems (CIP-003-6, Requirement R1, Part 1.2 and Requirement R2) until 
April 1, 2017.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ NERC Petition at 53-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    77. NERC also explains that the proposed implementation plan 
includes effective dates for the new and modified definitions 
associated with: (1) Transient devices (i.e., BES Cyber Asset, 
Protected Cyber Asset, Removable Media, and Transient Cyber Asset); and 
(2) Low Impact controls (i.e., Low Impact Electronic Access Point and 
Low Impact External Routable Connectivity). Specifically, NERC proposes 
that: (1) The definitions associated with transient device become 
effective on the compliance date for Reliability Standard CIP-010-2, 
Requirement R4; and (2) the definitions addressing the Low Impact 
controls become enforceable on the compliance date for Reliability 
Standard CIP-003-6, Requirement R2. Lastly, NERC proposes that the 
retirement of Reliability Standards CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5.1, CIP-006-5, 
CIP-007-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1 and CIP-011-1 become effective on the 
effective date of the proposed Reliability Standards.
NOPR
    78. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to approve NERC's

[[Page 4188]]

implementation plan for the proposed CIP Reliability Standards.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ NOPR, 152 FERC ] 61,054 at P 73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments
    79. A number of commenters request that the Commission act on the 
proposed revisions to the CIP Standards in a manner that avoids a 
different implementation date than the CIP version 5 Standards (i.e., 
April 1, 2016) in order to avoid confusion and unnecessary burdens.\81\ 
Trade Associations encourage the Commission to take alternative actions 
to avoid unnecessary burden if a Final Rule facilitating an April 1, 
2016 effective date for the revised CIP Standards is not feasible. 
Reclamation suggests that the Commission update and extend the 
standards implementation plan for each of the CIP version 5 Standards 
to April 1, 2017, except for the effective date for Requirement R2 of 
CIP-003-5, which Reclamation argues should be updated to April 1, 2018. 
ITC contends that April 1, 2016 is an unreasonably aggressive 
compliance deadline and urges the Commission to consider extending the 
deadline by one year to April 1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Trade Associations Comments at 6; SCE Comments at 4-5; 
Reclamation Comments at 2-3; Wisconsin Comments at 3; Luminant 
Comments at 2-3; NextEra Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commission Determination
    80. The Commission approves NERC's proposed implementation plan. As 
a result, the proposed CIP Reliability Standards will be effective the 
first day of the first calendar quarter that is three months after the 
effective date of the Commission's order approving the proposed 
Reliability Standard (i.e., July 1, 2016). Responsible entities must 
comply with the requirements applicable to Low Impact BES Cyber Systems 
(CIP-003-6, Requirement R1, part 1.2 and Requirement R2) beginning 
April 1, 2017, consistent with NERC's proposed implementation plan.
    81. We recognize the concerns raised by Trade Associations and 
other commenters regarding the potential burden of implementing two 
versions of certain CIP Reliability Standards within a short period of 
time. The Commission is willing to consider a request to align the 
implementation dates of certain CIP Reliability Standards or another 
reasonable alternative approach to addressing potential implementation 
issues, should NERC or another interested entity submit such a 
proposal.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Given the upcoming April 1, 2016 implementation date for 
the CIP version 5 Standards, NERC or another interested entity may 
wish to consider seeking expedited action for any request to address 
potential implementation issues. The Commission would be cognizant, 
in considering any request, of the need to provide adequate notice 
of any changes prior to April 1, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Information Collection Statement

    82. The FERC-725B information collection requirements contained in 
this Final Rule are subject to review by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995.\83\ OMB's regulations require approval of certain information 
collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\84\ Upon approval of a 
collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and 
expiration date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this 
rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to these collections 
of information unless the collections of information display a valid 
OMB control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
    \84\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    83. The Commission solicited comments on the need for and purpose 
of the information contained in the proposed CIP Reliability Standards, 
including whether the information will have practical utility, the 
accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, 
and clarity of the information to be collected or retained, and any 
suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including the use 
of automated information techniques. The Commission received no 
comments regarding the need for the information collection or the 
burden estimates associated with the proposed CIP Reliability Standards 
as described in the NOPR.
    84. Public Reporting Burden: The Commission based its paperwork 
burden estimates on the changes in paperwork burden presented by the 
proposed CIP Reliability Standards as compared to the CIP version 5 
Standards. The Commission has already addressed the burden of 
implementing the CIP version 5 Standards.\85\ As discussed above, the 
immediate rulemaking addresses four areas of modification to the CIP 
version 5 Standards: (1) Removal of the ``identify, assess, and 
correct'' language from 17 CIP requirements; (2) development of 
enhanced security controls for low impact assets; (3) development of 
controls to protect transient electronic devices (e.g., thumb drives 
and laptop computers); and (4) protection of communications networks. 
We do not anticipate that the removal of the ``identify, assess, and 
correct'' language will impact the reporting burden, as the substantive 
compliance requirements would remain the same, while NERC indicates 
that the concept behind the deleted language continues to be 
implemented within NERC's compliance function. The development of 
controls to protect transient devices and protection of communication 
networks (as proposed by NERC) have associated reporting burdens that 
will affect a limited number of entities, i.e., those with Medium and 
High Impact BES Cyber Systems. The enhanced security controls for Low 
Impact assets are likely to impose a reporting burden on a much larger 
group of entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See Order No. 791, 145 FERC ] 61,160 at PP 226-244.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    85. The NERC Compliance Registry, as of June 2015, identifies 
approximately 1,435 U.S. entities that are subject to mandatory 
compliance with Reliability Standards. Of this total, we estimate that 
1,363 entities will face an increased paperwork burden under the 
proposed CIP Reliability Standards, and we estimate that a majority of 
these entities will have one or more Low Impact assets. In addition, we 
estimate that approximately 23 percent of the entities have assets that 
will be subject to Reliability Standards CIP-006-6 and CIP-010-2. Based 
on these assumptions, we estimate the following reporting burden for 
entities with Medium and/or High Impact Assets:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Number of       Total burden      Total burden      Total burden
           Registered entities                entities       hours in year 1   hours in year 2   hours in year 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entities subject to CIP-006-6 and CIP-                 313            75,120           130,208           130,208
 010-2 with Medium and/or High Impact
 Assets.................................
                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Totals..............................               313            75,120           130,208           130,208
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 4189]]

    86. The following shows the annual cost burden for the group with 
Medium and/or High Impact Assets, based on the burden hours in the 
table above:
     Year 1: Entities subject to CIP-006-6 and CIP-010-2 with 
Medium and/or High Impact Assets: 313 entities x 240 hours/entity * 
$76/hour = $5,709,120.
     Years 2 and 3: 313 entities x 416 hours/entity * $76/hour 
= $9,895,808 per year.
     The paperwork burden estimate includes costs associated 
with the initial development of a policy to address requirements 
relating to transient electronic devices, as well as the ongoing data 
collection burden. Further, the estimate reflects the assumption that 
costs incurred in year 1 will pertain to policy development, while 
costs in years 2 and 3 will reflect the burden associated with 
maintaining logs and other records to demonstrate ongoing compliance.
    Based on the assumptions, we estimate the following reporting 
burden for entities with Low Impact Assets:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Number of       Total burden      Total burden      Total burden
           Registered entities                entities       hours in year 1   hours in year 2   hours in year 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entities subject to CIP-003-6 with Low               1,363           163,560           283,504           283,504
 Impact Assets..........................
                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Totals..............................             1,363           163,560           283,504           283,504
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    87. The following shows the annual cost burden for the group with 
Low Impact Assets, based on the burden hours in the table above:
     Year 1: Entities subject to CIP-003-6 with Low Impact 
Assets: 1,363 entities x 120 hours/entity * $76/hour = $12,430,560.
     Years 2 and 3: 1,363 entities x 208 hours/entity * $76/
hour = $21,546,304 per year.
     The paperwork burden estimate includes costs associated 
with the modification of existing policies to address requirements 
relating to low impact assets, as well as the ongoing data collection 
burden, as set forth in CIP-003-6, Requirements R1.2 and R2, and 
Attachment 1. Further, the estimate reflects the assumption that costs 
incurred in year 1 will pertain to revising existing policies, while 
costs in years 2 and 3 will reflect the burden associated with 
maintaining logs and other records to demonstrate ongoing compliance.
    88. The estimated hourly rate of $76 is the average (rounded) 
loaded cost (wage plus benefits) of legal services ($129.68 per hour), 
technical employees ($58.17 per hour) and administrative support 
($39.12 per hour), based on hourly rates and average benefits data from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See http://bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm and http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm. Hourly figures as of June 1, 
2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    89. Title: Mandatory Reliability Standards, Revised Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Standards.
    Action: Proposed Collection FERC-725B.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0248.
    Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for-
profit institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: On Occasion.
    Necessity of the Information: This Final Rule approves the 
requested modifications to Reliability Standards pertaining to critical 
infrastructure protection. As discussed above, the Commission approves 
NERC's proposed revised CIP Reliability Standards pursuant to section 
215(d)(2) of the FPA because they improve the currently-effective suite 
of cyber security CIP Reliability Standards.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the proposed 
Reliability Standards and made a determination that its action is 
necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA.
    90. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting 
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: 
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, email: 
DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873].
    91. For submitting comments concerning the collection(s) of 
information and the associated burden estimate(s), please send your 
comments to the Commission, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503 
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
phone: (202) 395-0710, fax: (202) 395-7285]. For security reasons, 
comments to OMB should be submitted by email to: 
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should include 
Docket Number RM15-14-000 and OMB Control Number 1902-0248.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    92. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) generally requires 
a description and analysis of Proposed Rules that will have significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.\87\ The 
Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops 
the numerical definition of a small business.\88\ The SBA revised its 
size standard for electric utilities (effective January 22, 2014) to a 
standard based on the number of employees, including affiliates (from 
the prior standard based on megawatt hour sales).\89\ Proposed 
Reliability Standards CIP-003-6, CIP-004-6, CIP-006-6, CIP-007-6, CIP-
009-6, CIP-010-2, and CIP-011-2 are expected to impose an additional 
burden on 1,363 U.S. entities \90\ (reliability coordinators, generator 
operators, generator owners, interchange coordinators or authorities, 
transmission operators, balancing authorities, transmission owners, and 
certain distribution providers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12.
    \88\ 13 CFR 121.101.
    \89\ SBA Final Rule on ``Small Business Size Standards: 
Utilities,'' 78 FR 77343 (Dec. 23, 2013).
    \90\ Public utilities may fall under one of several different 
categories, each with a size threshold based on the company's number 
of employees, including affiliates, the parent company, and 
subsidiaries. For the analysis in this NOPR, we are using a 500 
employee threshold for each affected entity to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    93. Of the 1,363 affected entities discussed above, we estimate 
that 444 entities are small entities. We estimate that 399 of these 444 
small entities do not own BES Cyber Assets or BES Cyber Systems that 
are classified as Medium or High Impact and, therefore, will only be 
affected by the proposed modifications to Reliability Standard CIP-003-
6. As discussed above, proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 enhances 
reliability by providing criteria against which NERC and the Commission 
can evaluate the sufficiency of an entity's protections for Low Impact 
BES Cyber Assets. We estimate that each of the 399 small entities to 
whom the proposed modifications to Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 
applies will incur one-time costs of approximately $149,358 per

[[Page 4190]]

entity to implement this standard, in addition to the ongoing paperwork 
burden reflected in the Information Collection Statement (a total of 
$40,736 per entity over Years 1-3), giving a total one-time cost of 
$190,094 per entity. We do not consider the estimated one-time costs 
for these 399 small entities a significant economic impact.
    94. In addition, we estimate that 14 small entities own Medium 
Impact substations and that 31 small transmission operators own Medium 
or High impact control centers. These 45 small entities represent 10.1 
percent of the 444 affected small entities. We estimate that each of 
these 45 small entities may experience an economic impact of $50,000 
per entity in the first year of initial implementation to meet proposed 
Reliability Standard CIP-010-2 and $30,000 in ongoing annual costs.\91\ 
In addition, those 45 small entities will have paperwork burden 
(reflected in the Information Collection Statement) of $81,472 per 
entity over Years 1-3. Therefore, we estimate that each of these 45 
small entities will incur a total of $191,472 in costs over the first 
three years. We conclude that 10.1 percent of the total 444 affected 
small entities does not represent a substantial number in terms of the 
total number of regulated small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ Estimated annual cost for year 2 and forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    95. Based on the above analysis, the Commission certifies that the 
proposed Reliability Standards will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, no 
regulatory flexibility analysis is required.

V. Environmental Analysis

    96. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\92\ The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this 
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, 
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the 
effect of the regulations being amended.\93\ The actions proposed 
herein fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987).
    \93\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    97. This Final Rule is effective March 31, 2016. The Commission has 
determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is a ``major 
rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. This Final Rule is being submitted to 
the Senate, House, and Government Accountability Office.

VII. Document Availability

    98. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and 
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours 
(8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A, 
Washington, DC 20426.
    99. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this 
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is 
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, 
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type 
the docket number of this document, excluding the last three digits, in 
the docket number field.
    100. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's 
Web site during normal business hours from the Commission's Online 
Support at (202) 502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at 
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

    By the Commission.

    Issued: January 21, 2016.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.

    Note: the following Appendix will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendix

                               Commenters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Abbreviation                           Commenter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AEP.......................................  American Electric Power
                                             Service Corporation.
ACS.......................................  Applied Control Solutions,
                                             LLC.
APS.......................................  Arizona Public Service
                                             Company.
Arkansas..................................  Arkansas Electric
                                             Cooperative.
BPA.......................................  Bonneville Power
                                             Administration.
CEA.......................................  Canadian Electricity
                                             Association.
Consumers Energy..........................  Consumers Energy Company.
CyberArk..................................  CyberArk.
EnergySec.................................  Energy Sector Security
                                             Consortium, Inc.
Ericsson..................................  Ericsson.
Foundation................................  Foundation for Resilient
                                             Societies.
G&T Cooperatives..........................  Associated Electric
                                             Cooperative, Inc., Basin
                                             Electric Power Cooperative,
                                             and Tri-State Generation
                                             and Transmission
                                             Association, Inc.
Gridwise..................................  Gridwise Alliance.
Idaho Power...............................  Idaho Power Company.
Indegy....................................  Indegy.
IESO......................................  Independent Electricity
                                             System Operator.
IRC.......................................  ISO/RTO Council.
ISO New England...........................  ISO New England Inc.
ITC.......................................  ITC Companies.
Isologic..................................  Isologic, LLC.
KCP&L.....................................  Kansas City Power & Light
                                             Company and KCP&L Greater
                                             Missouri Operations
                                             Company.
Luminant..................................  Luminant Generation Company,
                                             LLC.
NEMA......................................  National Electrical
                                             Manufacturers Association.

[[Page 4191]]

 
NERC......................................  North American Electric
                                             Reliability Corporation.
NextEra...................................  NextEra Energy, Inc.
NIPSCO....................................  Northern Indiana Public
                                             Service Co.
NWPPA.....................................  Northwest Public Power
                                             Association.
Peak......................................  Peak Reliability.
PNM.......................................  PNM Resources.
Reclamation...............................  Department of Interior
                                             Bureau of Reclamation.
SIA.......................................  Security Industry
                                             Association.
SCE.......................................  Southern California Edison
                                             Company.
Southern..................................  Southern Company Services.
SPP RE....................................  Southwest Power Pool
                                             Regional Entity.
SWP.......................................  California Department of
                                             Water Resources State Water
                                             Project.
TVA.......................................  Tennessee Valley Authority.
Trade Associations........................  Edison Electric Institute,
                                             American Public Power
                                             Association, National Rural
                                             Electric Cooperative
                                             Association, Electric Power
                                             Supply Association,
                                             Transmission Access Policy
                                             Study Group, and Large
                                             Public Power Council.
UTC.......................................  Utilities Telecom Council.
Waterfall.................................  Waterfall Security
                                             Solutions, Ltd.
Wisconsin.................................  Wisconsin Electric Power
                                             Company.
Weis......................................  Joe Weis.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2016-01505 Filed 1-25-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


