

[Federal Register: February 7, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 26)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 7367-7447]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr07fe08-13]                         


[[Page 7367]]

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Part II





Department of Energy





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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission



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18 CFR Part 40



Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection; 
Final Rule


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM06-22-000; Order No. 706]

 
Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection

Issued January 18, 2008.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Final Rule.

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SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the 
Commission approves eight Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
Reliability Standards submitted to the Commission for approval by the 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). The CIP 
Reliability Standards require certain users, owners, and operators of 
the Bulk-Power System to comply with specific requirements to safeguard 
critical cyber assets. In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of 
the FPA, the Commission directs NERC to develop modifications to the 
CIP Reliability Standards to address specific concerns.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule will become effective April 7, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Gary Cohen (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426, (202) 502-8321.
Christy Walsh (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6523.
Regis Binder (Technical Issues), Office of Electric Reliability, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6460.
Jan Bargen (Technical Issues), Office of Electric Reliability, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426, (202) 502-6333.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 





                            TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                               Paragraph
                                                                    Nos.
I. Background..............................................            2
II. Discussion.............................................           13
    A. Overview............................................           13
    B. Approval of NERC's Proposed CIP Reliability                    15
     Standards.............................................
        1. NOPR Proposal...................................           15
        2. Comments........................................           16
        3. Commission Determination........................           24
    C. Applicability.......................................           31
        1. NOPR Proposal...................................           32
        2. Comments........................................           35
        3. Commission Determination........................           47
    D. Compliance Measured by Outcome......................           54
        1. Performance-Based Standards.....................           54
        2. Adequacy of Outcomes............................           65
    E. Implementation Plan.................................           77
        1. Commission Approval of Implementation Plan......           78
        2. Self-Certification..............................           91
        3. Adding a Cyber Security Assessment to NERC's              100
         Readiness Reviews.................................
    F. Issues Presented by Terminology.....................          106
        1. Reasonable Business Judgment....................          107
        2. Acceptance of Risk..............................          139
        3. Technical Feasibility...........................          157
    G. Use of National Institute of Standards and                    223
     Technology (NIST) Standards in Developing Future
     Revisions to the CIP Reliability Standards............
        1. NOPR Proposal...................................          223
        2. Comments........................................          224
        3. Commission Determination........................          232
    H. Discussion of Each CIP Reliability Standard.........          234
        1. CIP-002-1--Critical Cyber Asset Identification..          234
        2. CIP-003-1--Security Management Controls.........          342
        3. CIP-004-1--Personnel and Training...............          413
        4. CIP-005-1--Electronic Security Perimeter(s).....          477
        5. CIP-006-1--Physical Security of Critical Cyber            548
         Assets............................................
        6. CIP-007-1--Systems Security Management..........          584
        7. CIP-008-1--Incident Reporting & Response                  653
         Planning..........................................
        8. CIP-009-1--Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber              688
         Assets............................................
    I. Violation Risk Factors..............................          749
        1. General Issues..................................          754
        2. Specific Modifications to Violation Risk Factors          761
III. Information Collection Statement......................          770
IV. Environmental Analysis.................................          777
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act..............................          778
    A. NOPR Proposal.......................................          782
    B. Comments............................................          788
    C. Commission Determination............................          799
VI. Document Availability..................................          807
VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification.........          810



[[Page 7369]]

    Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Suedeen G. 
Kelly, Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.

Final Rule

    1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the 
Commission approves eight Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
Reliability Standards submitted to the Commission for approval by the 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). The CIP 
Reliability Standards require certain users, owners, and operators of 
the Bulk-Power System to comply with specific requirements to safeguard 
critical cyber assets.\2\ In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of 
the FPA, the Commission directs NERC to develop modifications to the 
CIP Reliability Standards to address specific concerns identified by 
the Commission.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
    \2\ In the context of the CIP Reliability Standards, cyber 
assets are programmable electronic devices and communication 
networks including hardware, software, and data. See Mandatory 
Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 72 FR 43970 (Aug. 6, 2007), FERC Stats & 
Regs. ] 32,620 at P 1 (Jul. 20, 2007) (CIP NOPR).
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I. Background

    2. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified Electric 
Reliability Organization (ERO) to develop mandatory and enforceable 
Reliability Standards, which are subject to Commission review and 
approval. Once approved, the Reliability Standards may be enforced by 
the ERO, subject to Commission oversight, or the Commission can 
independently enforce Reliability Standards.\3\
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    \3\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(3) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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    3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a 
process to select and certify an ERO \4\ and, subsequently, certified 
NERC as the ERO.\5\ On April 4, 2006, as modified on August 28, 2006, 
NERC submitted to the Commission a petition seeking approval of 107 
proposed Reliability Standards. On March 16, 2007, the Commission 
issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693, approving 83 of these 107 
Reliability Standards and directing other related actions.\6\ In 
addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission 
directed NERC to develop modifications to 56 of the 83 approved 
Reliability Standards.\7\
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    \4\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability 
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and 
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204 (2006), order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, 
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
    \5\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 61,062 
(ERO Certification Order), order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 
61,126 (ERO Rehearing Order) (2006), appeal docket sub nom. Alcoa, 
Inc. v. FERC, No. 06-1426 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 29, 2006).
    \6\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System, 
Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 (2007); Order No. 693-A, 
reh'g denied, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007).
    \7\ Section 215(d)(5) provides ``The Commission . . . may order 
the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission a 
proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability 
standard that addresses a specific matter if the Commission 
considers such a new or modified reliability standard appropriate to 
carry out this section.''
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    4. In April 2007, the Commission approved delegation agreements 
between NERC and each of the eight Regional Entities.\8\ Pursuant to 
the delegation agreements, the ERO has delegated responsibility to the 
Regional Entities to carry out compliance monitoring and enforcement of 
the mandatory Reliability Standards.
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    \8\ See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 FERC ] 
61,060, order on reh'g, 120 FERC ] 61,260 (2007).
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    5. Prior to being certified by the Commission as the ERO, NERC had 
developed a cyber security standard for the electric industry on a 
voluntary basis. This voluntary standard, Urgent Action 1200, was 
adopted in 2003, and remained in effect on a voluntary basis until June 
1, 2006, at which time the eight CIP Reliability Standards that are the 
subject of the current rulemaking replaced the Urgent Action 1200 
standard.
    6. On August 28, 2006, NERC submitted to the Commission for 
approval the following eight CIP Reliability Standards: \9\
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    \9\ The CIP Reliability Standards are not codified in the CFR 
and are not attached to the Final Rule. They are, however, available 
on the Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. 
RM06-22-000 and are available on the ERO's Web site, http://www.nerc.com
.


    CIP-002-1--Cyber Security--Critical Cyber Asset Identification: 
Requires a responsible entity to identify its critical assets and 
critical cyber assets using a risk-based assessment methodology.
    CIP-003-1--Cyber Security--Security Management Controls: 
Requires a responsible entity to develop and implement security 
management controls to protect critical cyber assets identified 
pursuant to CIP-002-1.
    CIP-004-1--Cyber Security--Personnel & Training: Requires 
personnel with access to critical cyber assets to have identity 
verification and a criminal check. It also requires employee 
training.
    CIP-005-1--Cyber Security--Electronic Security Perimeters: 
Requires the identification and protection of an electronic security 
perimeter and access points. The electronic security perimeter is to 
encompass the critical cyber assets identified pursuant to the 
methodology required by CIP-002-1.
    CIP-006-1--Cyber Security--Physical Security of Critical Cyber 
Assets: Requires a responsible entity to create and maintain a 
physical security plan that ensures that all cyber assets within an 
electronic security perimeter are kept in an identified physical 
security perimeter.
    CIP-007-1--Cyber Security--Systems Security Management: Requires 
a responsible entity to define methods, processes, and procedures 
for securing the systems identified as critical cyber assets, as 
well as the non-critical cyber assets within an electronic security 
perimeter.
    CIP-008-1--Cyber Security--Incident Reporting and Response 
Planning: Requires a responsible entity to identify, classify, 
respond to, and report cyber security incidents related to critical 
cyber assets.
    CIP-009-1--Cyber Security--Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber 
Assets: Requires the establishment of recovery plans for critical 
cyber assets using established business continuity and disaster 
recovery techniques and practices.

    7. NERC states that these CIP Reliability Standards provide a 
comprehensive set of requirements to protect the Bulk-Power System from 
malicious cyber attacks. They require Bulk-Power System users, owners, 
and operators to establish a risk-based vulnerability assessment 
methodology to identify and prioritize critical assets and critical 
cyber assets. Once the critical cyber assets are identified, the CIP 
Reliability Standards require, among other things, that the responsible 
entities establish plans, protocols, and controls to safeguard physical 
and electronic access, to train personnel on security matters, to 
report security incidents, and to be prepared for recovery actions. 
Further, NERC developed an implementation plan that provides for a 
three-year phase-in to achieve full compliance with all requirements.
    8. Each CIP Reliability Standard uses a common organizational 
format that includes five sections, as follows: (A) Introduction, which 
includes ``Purpose'' and ``Applicability'' sub-sections; (B) 
Requirements; (C) Measures; (D) Compliance; and (E) Regional 
Differences. In this Final Rule, these section titles are capitalized 
when referencing a designated provision of a Reliability Standard.
    9. In a separate filing, NERC submitted 162 Violation Risk Factors 
that correspond to Requirements of the proposed CIP Reliability 
Standards.\10\ Violation Risk Factors delineate the relative risk to 
the Bulk-Power System associated with the violation of each Requirement 
and are used by NERC and the Regional Entities to determine financial 
penalties for violating a Reliability Standard.
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    \10\ See NERC's March 23, 2007 filing in Docket No. RR07-10-000, 
Exh. A.
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    10. On December 11, 2006, the Commission released a ``Staff

[[Page 7370]]

Preliminary Assessment of the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation's Proposed Mandatory Reliability Standards on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection'' prepared by the Commission's staff (CIP 
Assessment). The CIP Assessment identified staff's preliminary 
observations and concerns regarding the eight proposed CIP Reliability 
Standards, describing issues common to a number of the proposed CIP 
Reliability Standards, and discussing various issues raised by 
individual CIP Reliability Standards. While discussing the issues, the 
CIP Assessment did not make specific recommendations on the appropriate 
action to be taken by the Commission on particular proposals.\11\
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    \11\ The CIP Assessment is available on the Commission's webpage 
at http://www.ferc.fed.us/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability.asp
.

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    11. On July 20, 2007, the Commission issued the CIP NOPR, which 
proposed to approve the eight CIP Reliability Standards submitted to 
the Commission for approval by NERC. In addition, the Commission 
proposed to direct NERC to develop modifications to the CIP Reliability 
Standards to address specific concerns identified by the Commission.
    12. In response to the CIP NOPR, comments were filed by about 70 
interested persons. In the discussion below, we will address the issues 
raised by these comments. Appendix A to this Final Rule lists the 
entities that filed comments on the CIP NOPR. Five comments were filed 
after the time prescribed in the CIP NOPR. Nevertheless, the Commission 
will consider these comments, as they will neither prejudice the other 
commenters, nor delay the proceeding.

II. Discussion

A. Overview

    13. In the Final Rule, the Commission approves the eight CIP 
Reliability Standards, finding that they are just and reasonable, not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential and in the public interest. 
Further, the Commission approves NERC's implementation plan that sets 
milestones for responsible entities to achieve full compliance with the 
CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission also directs NERC to develop 
modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards through its Reliability 
Standards development process to address specific concerns identified 
by the Commission. Similar to our approach in Order No. 693, we view 
such directives as a separate action from approval, consistent with our 
authority in section 215(d)(5) of the FPA to direct the ERO to develop 
a modification to a Reliability Standard. As discussed below, such 
modification should not affect the current implementation plan. Rather, 
NERC is directed to develop a timetable for development of the 
modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards and, if warranted, to 
develop and file with the Commission for approval, a second 
implementation plan.
    14. Other determinations in the Final Rule include:

    A directive that the ERO must develop modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards to remove the ``reasonable business judgment'' 
language.
    The ERO must also develop modifications to remove ``acceptance 
of risk'' exceptions from the CIP Reliability Standards.
    The ERO is directed to develop specific conditions that a 
responsible entity must satisfy to invoke the ``technical 
feasibility'' exception. This structure for use of the technical 
feasibility exception allows flexibility and customization of 
implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards in a controlled 
manner.
    The Commission directs the ERO to provide additional guidance 
regarding the development of a risk-based assessment methodology for 
the identification of critical assets pursuant to CIP-002-1. 
Further, external review of critical asset lists is required.
    The Commission directs the ERO to make specific revisions to its 
Violation Risk Factor designations.

B. Approval of NERC's Proposed CIP Reliability Standards

1. NOPR Proposal
    15. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission proposed to approve NERC's 
eight proposed CIP Reliability Standards as mandatory and enforceable. 
As a separate action, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the 
Commission proposed to direct NERC to modify certain provisions of the 
CIP Reliability Standards.
2. Comments
    16. Most commenters strongly support the Commission's proposal to 
approve the CIP Reliability Standards as mandatory and enforceable.\12\ 
For example, EEI states that the CIP Reliability Standards are 
technically sound and well designed to achieve the specified 
reliability goal, namely cyber security for electric industry critical 
assets. EEI adds that the CIP Reliability Standards are designed to 
serve the interest of preserving grid reliability by seeking to prevent 
unauthorized access to control systems and other critical cyber assets, 
whether by physical or electronic means. EEI believes that the CIP 
Reliability Standards strike the appropriate balance in providing 
reasonable flexibility in an environment where systems vary greatly in 
architecture, technology, and risk profile.\13\
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    \12\ E.g., Alliant, Arizona Public Service, Bonneville, 
California Commission, Duke, EEI, Idaho Power, ISO/RTO Council, 
Juniper, KCPL, Luminant, Manitoba, NERC, New York Commission, 
Northeast Utilities, Ontario IESO, Ontario Power, PG&E, PSEG 
Companies, Progress, Puget Sound, ReliabilityFirst, SDG&E, Southern, 
Tampa Electric, Teltone and Xcel.
    \13\ Alliant, KCPL, PG&E, Puget Sound, PSEG Companies and 
Southern support EEI's views.
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    17. By contrast, ABB argues that the Commission should defer action 
so that equipment vendors and the standard-setting organizations such 
as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers can coordinate 
electric power system cyber security initiatives. Applied Control 
Solutions argues that the proposals in the CIP NOPR do not go far 
enough, and that the Commission should go further and immediately adopt 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Security Risk 
Management Framework in place of the CIP Reliability Standards.
    18. NIST itself argues that the Commission should adopt the NERC 
proposed CIP Reliability Standards, as appropriately enhanced based on 
the Commission's proposed directives in the CIP NOPR, as an interim 
measure. NIST advocates that the Commission prescribe plans for a two 
to three year transition to cyber security standards that are identical 
to, consistent with, or based on SP 800-53 and related NIST standards 
and guidelines.
    19. WIRAB supports NERC's CIP Reliability Standards and states that 
they represent a significant advancement for cyber security and Bulk-
Power System reliability. Yet, WIRAB recommends that the Commission 
remand the CIP Reliability Standards to NERC with guidance as to the 
types of changes the Commission would like to see, but without 
direction to make any specific change. WIRAB expresses concern that the 
CIP NOPR proposes numerous detailed directives to modify the CIP 
Reliability Standards and goes beyond providing guidance to NERC. WIRAB 
states that a remand would allow the Reliability Standards development 
process to work as anticipated and, in doing so, would avoid problems 
with different Reliability Standards or different levels of enforcement 
on different sides of the international border.
    20. In response to our proposal to modify certain CIP Reliability 
Standards, some commenters maintain that the Commission's proposals 
were

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overly prescriptive.\14\ Others state that any prescriptive elements of 
the CIP NOPR should be replaced with directions that NERC use its 
Commission-approved Reliability Standards development process to 
address any necessary changes identified by the Commission.\15\ PG&E 
adds that the measures agreed on in the NERC stakeholder process and 
included in the CIP Reliability Standards represent a reasonable 
balance between aggressive Reliability Standards and measures that are 
feasible and sustainable. EEI argues that the Commission needs to be 
careful when it provides guidance that it does not usurp NERC's 
authority as ERO by dictating a specific or exclusive outcome from this 
process.
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    \14\ E.g., CEA, EEI, FirstEnergy, PSEG Companies, SDG&E and 
Tampa Electric.
    \15\ E.g., Georgia Operators, Idaho Power, Muscatine Power, 
NERC, Northern California, NRECA, TAPS and Xcel.
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    21. Commenters also express concern that the Commission might 
intend to sidestep the NERC stakeholder process and have NERC simply 
revise the CIP Reliability Standards in accordance with the 
Commission's proposals without providing NERC stakeholders an 
opportunity to participate in this process.\16\ In this regard, EEI 
urges that the Final Rule make clear that any improvements to the CIP 
Reliability Standards should be considered in the NERC Reliability 
Standards development process before being mandated.
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    \16\ See, e.g., Allegheny, Alliant, Arizona Public Service, 
Duke, EEI, Entergy, FirstEnergy, FPL Group, Iowa Municipals, KCPL, 
Luminant, PG&E, Progress, PSEG Companies, Tampa Electric and TAPS.
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    22. KCPL supports the Commission's proposal to direct NERC to 
develop modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to address 
potential improvements using the Reliability Standards development 
process. KCPL believes that the Commission has authority to direct the 
ERO to modify the CIP Reliability Standards and to provide sufficient 
guidance to the direction that grid reliability should take so as to 
fulfill its obligations under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. However, 
KCPL too is concerned that several of the Commission's proposed 
requirement directives are overly prescriptive.
    23. The New York Commission opposes the Commission placing any 
conditions on its approval of the CIP Reliability Standards, such as 
requiring NERC to rewrite them as a condition for their approval.
3. Commission Determination
    24. The Commission approves the eight CIP Reliability Standards 
pursuant to section 215(d) of the FPA, as discussed below. In approving 
the CIP Reliability Standards, the Commission concludes that they are 
just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the 
public interest. These CIP Reliability Standards, together, provide 
baseline requirements for the protection of critical cyber assets that 
support the nation's Bulk-Power System. Thus, the CIP Reliability 
Standards serve an important reliability goal.\17\ Further, as 
discussed below, the CIP Reliability Standards clearly identify the 
entities to which they apply, apply throughout the interconnected Bulk-
Power System, and provide a reasonable timetable for 
implementation.\18\
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    \17\ See Order No. 672 at P 321.
    \18\ Id. P 322-35.
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    25. The Commission believes that the NIST standards may provide 
valuable guidance when NERC develops future iterations of the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Thus, as discussed below, we direct NERC to 
address revisions to the CIP Reliability Standards CIP-002-1 through 
CIP-009-1 considering applicable features of the NIST framework. 
However, in response to Applied Control Solutions, we will not delay 
the effectiveness of the CIP Reliability Standards by directing the 
replacement of the current CIP Reliability Standards with others based 
on the NIST framework.
    26. With regard to WIRAB's recommendation, we share the ongoing 
concern of promoting coordinated action on Reliability Standards on an 
international basis. However, in this instance, we do not believe a 
remand to NERC, which would result in significant delays in having 
mandatory and enforceable cyber security requirements in effect in the 
United States, is justified or would further such coordination. The 
implementation schedule provided by NERC, which applies continent-wide, 
requires applicable entities to achieve ``auditable compliance'' no 
earlier than mid-2009. This should provide adequate time for entities 
responsible for compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards in the 
United States, Canada and Mexico to achieve compliance on a common 
timetable. As discussed later, future modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards developed pursuant to the direction provided in 
the Final Rule would not overlap with the NERC implementation plan. 
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that this is not a satisfactory 
reason for remanding the CIP Reliability Standards.
    27. In approving the CIP Reliability Standards and directing the 
ERO to modify them, the Commission is taking two independent actions 
and does not condition our approval on the ERO modifying the CIP 
Reliability Standards. First, we are exercising our authority to 
approve a proposed Reliability Standard. Second, we are directing the 
ERO to submit a modification of the Reliability Standards to address 
specific issues or concerns.\19\ Accordingly, New York Commission's 
concerns about the Commission placing any conditions on its approval of 
the CIP Reliability Standards are unnecessary.
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    \19\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5) (``[t]he Commission . . . may order 
the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission a 
proposed Reliability Standard or modification to a Reliability 
Standard that addresses a specific matter if the Commission 
considers such a new or modified Reliability Standard appropriate to 
carry out this section.'').
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    28. With regard to the concerns raised by some commenters about the 
prescriptive nature of the Commission's proposed modifications, the 
Commission agrees that a direction for modification should not be so 
overly prescriptive as to preclude the consideration of viable 
alternatives in the ERO's Reliability Standards development process. 
However, in identifying a specific matter to be addressed in a 
modification to a CIP Reliability Standard, it is important that the 
Commission provide sufficient guidance so that the ERO has an 
understanding of the Commission's concerns and an appropriate, but not 
necessarily exclusive, outcome to address those concerns. Without such 
direction and guidance, a Commission proposal to modify a CIP 
Reliability Standard might be so vague that the ERO would not know how 
to adequately respond.\20\
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    \20\ See Order No. 693 at P 185-87.
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    29. Thus, in some instances, while we provide specific details 
regarding the Commission's expectations, we intend by doing so to 
provide useful guidance to assist in the Reliability Standards 
development process, not to impede it. We find that this is consistent 
with statutory language that authorizes the Commission to order the ERO 
to submit a modification ``that addresses a specific matter'' if the 
Commission considers it appropriate to carry out section 215 of the 
FPA. In the Final Rule, we have considered commenters' concerns and, 
where a directive for modification appears to be determinative of the 
outcome, the Commission provides flexibility by directing the ERO to

[[Page 7372]]

address the underlying issue through the Reliability Standards 
development process without mandating a specific change to the CIP 
Reliability Standard. Further, the Commission clarifies that, where the 
Final Rule identifies a concern and offers a specific approach to 
address that concern, we will consider an equivalent alternative 
approach provided that the ERO demonstrates that the alternative will 
adequately address the Commission's underlying concern or goal as 
efficiently and effectively as the Commission's proposal.
    30. Consistent with section 215 of the FPA, our regulations, and 
Order No. 693, any modification to a Reliability Standard, including a 
modification that addresses a Commission directive, must be developed 
and fully vetted through NERC's Reliability Standard development 
process. Until the Commission approves NERC's proposed modification to 
a Reliability Standard, the preexisting Reliability Standard will 
remain in effect.

C. Applicability

    31. The Applicability section of each proposed CIP Reliability 
Standard identifies the following 11 categories of responsible entities 
that must comply with the CIP Reliability Standard: Reliability 
coordinators, balancing authorities, interchange authorities,\21\ 
transmission service providers, transmission owners, transmission 
operators, generator owners, generator operators, load serving 
entities, NERC, and Regional Reliability Organizations.
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    \21\ See Docket No. RR08-3-000 wherein, on November 11, 2007, 
NERC filed an amendment to its Statement of Compliance Registry 
Criteria to add Interchange Authority to the list of functional 
entities that are required to comply with certain Reliability 
Standards.
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1. NOPR Proposal
    32. The CIP NOPR explained that, with regard to the applicability 
of the CIP Reliability Standards to the ERO, NERC has modified its 
Rules of Procedure to provide that the ERO will comply with each 
Reliability Standard that identifies the ERO as an applicable 
entity.\22\ Further, the delegation agreements between NERC and each of 
the eight Regional Entities expressly state that the Regional Entity is 
committed to comply with approved Reliability Standards. The Commission 
stated its belief that, while it is likely that NERC and the Regional 
Entities are not directly subject to mandatory Reliability Standards as 
users, owners or operators of the Bulk-Power System, their adherence to 
the CIP Reliability Standards pursuant to the NERC Rules of Procedure 
and the delegation agreements suffices.
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    \22\ See CIP NOPR at P 21-31; NERC Rules of Procedure, section 
100.
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    33. The Commission also indicated in the CIP NOPR that it would 
rely on the NERC registration process to determine applicability with 
the CIP Reliability Standards.\23\ While expressing concern about small 
entities becoming a gateway for cyber attacks, the Commission indicated 
that it was prepared to rely on the registration process based in part 
on the expectation that industry will use the ``mutual distrust'' 
posture.\24\ The Commission also explained that it would rely on the 
NERC registration process to include all critical assets and associated 
critical cyber assets, and listed examples. Further, we noted that 
because, as an initial compliance step, each entity that is responsible 
for compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards must first identify 
critical assets through the application of a risk-based assessment, 
CIP-002-1 acts as a filter, determining a subset of entities that must 
comply with the remaining CIP requirements (i.e., CIP-003-1 through 
CIP-009-1).
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    \23\ Id. P 27. The CIP NOPR also affirmed the statement in Order 
No. 693 that the Commission intends to further examine applicability 
issues under section 215 of the FPA in a future proceeding. Order 
No. 693 at P 77.
    \24\ Id. P 28. The term ``mutual distrust '' is used to denote 
how ``outside world'' systems are treated by those inside the 
control system. A mutual distrust posture requires each responsible 
entity that has identified critical cyber assets to protect itself 
and not trust any communication crossing an electronic security 
perimeter, regardless of where that communication originates. This 
concept is discussed further in the context of CIP-003-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    34. The Commission also raised concerns regarding operation of 
critical cyber assets by out-sourced entities.\25\ The CIP NOPR noted 
that, on occasion, NERC negotiates contracts with third-party vendors, 
and the products developed by the vendors are then used by responsible 
entities that, as owners of the critical cyber assets, are ultimately 
responsible for their cyber security protection under the CIP 
Reliability Standards. The Commission solicited comment on whether and 
how out-sourced entities should be contractually obligated to comply 
with the CIP Reliability Standards while satisfying their other 
contractual obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ CIP NOPR at P 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    35. Most commenters that address the issue support the Commission's 
approach to assuring NERC and Regional Entity compliance with the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Commenters also support the Commission's 
reliance on the NERC registration process to identify appropriate 
entities. Numerous commenters address the issue of third-party vendors, 
indicating that such third parties are not subject to mandatory 
Reliability Standards and that responsible entities need to address the 
matter through contractual provisions with their vendors.
a. Applicability to NERC and Regional Entities
    36. EEI supports the Commission's conclusion that NERC's 
modifications to its Rules of Procedure and the delegation agreements 
between NERC and each of the eight Regional Entities with respect to 
compliance with approved Reliability Standards is sufficient and does 
not require any additional measures or revisions at this time. EEI 
expects that the Commission will provide oversight with respect to 
compliance by NERC and a Regional Entity. However, unlike responsible 
entities, the ERO and Regional Entities are not subject to penalties 
under the FPA. Therefore, in considering what level of oversight to 
provide for these entities, EEI urges the Commission to consider that 
these entities do not have the same incentive as responsible entities 
to comply with the CIP Reliability Standards.
    37. Progress believes that the CIP Reliability Standards must apply 
to the ERO and the Regional Entities since they have access to critical 
data of many electric systems and may be perceived as more strategic 
targets than other registered entities. California Commission, Northern 
Indiana and Northeast Utilities also assert that the CIP Reliability 
Standards should apply to NERC and the Regional Entities. Northern 
Indiana states that subjecting NERC to the CIP Reliability Standards 
would obviate Northern Indiana's concern with providing NERC personnel 
with access to information they may need when reviewing and evaluating 
Northern Indiana's compliance measures.
    38. California Commission comments that the CIP NOPR properly 
recognized the ERO as an applicable entity. It also states that the 
delegation agreements between NERC and the Regional Entities mandate 
that the Regional Entities will be subject to the CIP Reliability 
Standards. California Commission states that, if the ERO or Regional 
Entities do not adhere to the CIP Reliability Standards, they could 
become the weak link whose failure could harm the Bulk-Power System.

[[Page 7373]]

b. Reliance on NERC Registration Process
    39. NRECA, MEAG Power and other commenters support the Commission's 
reliance on the NERC registration process to identify appropriate 
entities and also share the concern that entities not registered could 
become a weakness in the security of the Bulk-Power System.\26\ NRECA 
states that the Commission's proposed approach is appropriate and 
consistent with the Commission's prior orders, the statute, and the 
ERO's Statement of Registry Criteria. EEI suggests that proper 
registration, combined with a strong ERO audit program, would assure 
that all critical assets are covered by the CIP Reliability Standards. 
EEI also asks the Commission to clarify that the NERC registration 
process would identify responsible entities, but not critical assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ E.g., Duke, EEI, Energy Producers, Northeast Utilities and 
Reliant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    40. EEI and ISO/RTO Council agree with the statement in the CIP 
NOPR that demand side aggregators might also need to be included in the 
NERC registration process if their load shedding capacity would affect 
the reliability or operability of the Bulk-Power System. EEI comments 
that demand side aggregators do not fit into any of the current 
registry categories and their inclusion would likely require the 
development of a definition of ``demand response'' and ``direct load 
control,'' as well as size thresholds, which are best addressed in the 
NERC Reliability Standards development process.
    41. California Commission comments that small entities can become a 
weak link whose failure could harm Bulk-Power System reliability. It is 
concerned that an entity that should be registered may slip through the 
identification process. Accordingly, California Commission suggests 
that any entity connected to the Bulk-Power System, regardless of size, 
must comply with the CIP Reliability Standards irrespective of their 
registration status.
c. Third-Party Vendors
    42. The majority of commenters contend that neither the ERO, nor 
the Commission, have authority to extend the applicability of the CIP 
Reliability Standards to third-party vendors.\27\ NRECA, for example, 
argues that this conclusion is dictated by statute, as section 215 of 
the FPA only applies to users, owners and operators of the Bulk-Power 
System and does not confer jurisdiction over third-party vendors. 
Accordingly, commenters claim that the relationship between registered 
entities and their outsourced providers is necessarily one of contract, 
and the regulatory compliance obligation falls solely on the registered 
entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See, e.g., Alliant, Mr. Brown, Duke, EEI, ISO/RTO Council, 
NRECA, PG&E, SDG&E and Tampa Electric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. EEI agrees with the CIP NOPR statement that responsible 
entities, as owners of critical assets, are ultimately accountable for 
their cyber security protection under the Reliability Standards. EEI 
also comments that it is reasonable that responsible entities may wish 
to provide their vendors with incentives to comply with CIP Reliability 
Standards while satisfying their other contractual obligations.\28\ 
According to ReliabilityFirst, out-sourced products developed for the 
exchange of data integral to reliability must be developed in 
compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards. It believes the 
responsible entity should contractually obligate vendors of such 
products to comply with appropriate requirements of the CIP Reliability 
Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Alliant, Mr. Brown, PG&E, SDG&E and Tampa Electric agree 
with EEI's position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. ISO/RTO Council comments that, when an application is developed 
and maintained by an outsourced provider, that provider manages access 
to the environment on which the application runs and therefore must be 
contractually obligated by the responsible entity to comply with the 
CIP Reliability Standards. While not in NERC's registry, such third 
parties must perform the services and operate the applications in a 
manner consistent with the CIP Reliability Standards. According to ISO/
RTO Council, the responsible entity should be charged with 
incorporating contractual terms and conditions into its agreements with 
the third-party provider that obligates the provider to comply with the 
requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards. Responsibility for non-
compliance by the third-party vendor should be borne by the responsible 
entity that made the business decision to outsource the application.
    45. Other commenters contend that the CIP Reliability Standards 
must apply to vendors and contractors as well as responsible entities. 
For example, California Commission suggests that the CIP Reliability 
Standards should apply to every entity that has a cyber connection to 
the Bulk-Power System. However, in California Commission's view, some 
special rules must be developed on CIP Reliability Standards 
applicability for entities that are not responsible entities but that 
have entered contracts obligating them to comply with the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Consumers claims that vendors and contactors 
with access (remote and on-site) to the critical cyber assets should be 
required to comply with the CIP Reliability Standards' personnel risk 
assessment guidelines. Consumers also advocates that vendor companies 
should have a personnel risk assessment policy, i.e., background check, 
for all new personnel and all systems (software applications and 
hardware devices) should be tested for quality and reliability.
    46. Northern Indiana comments that third-party vendors working for 
NERC must comply with the CIP Reliability Standards, e.g., background 
checks, just as Northern Indiana's third-party vendors must. Otherwise, 
NERC's vendors should not be given access to critical cyber assets.
3. Commission Determination
    47. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR approach regarding NERC and 
Regional Entity compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards. The 
Commission maintains its belief that NERC's compliance is necessary in 
light of its interconnectivity with other entities that own and operate 
critical assets. Further, we conclude that NERC's Rules of Procedure, 
which state that the ERO will comply with each Reliability Standard 
that identifies the ERO as an applicable entity, provide an adequate 
means to assure that NERC is obligated to comply with the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Likewise, the delegation agreements between NERC 
and each Regional Entity expressly state that the Regional Entity is 
committed to comply with approved Reliability Standards.\29\ Based on 
these provisions, we find that the Commission has authority to oversee 
the compliance of NERC and the Regional Entities with the CIP 
Reliability Standards.
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    \29\ In Order No. 693, at P 157, the Commission directed NERC to 
remove each reference to the Regional Reliability Organization and 
replace it with a reference to the Regional Entity. This directive 
applies to the CIP Reliability Standards as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. With regard to EEI's concerns about NERC's incentives to comply 
with the CIP Reliability Standards, we believe that NERC's position as 
overseer of Bulk-Power System reliability provides a level of assurance 
that it will take compliance seriously. Moreover, section 215(e)(5) of 
the FPA provides that the Commission may take such action as is 
necessary or appropriate against the ERO or a Regional Entity to

[[Page 7374]]

ensure compliance with a Reliability Standard or Commission order.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Section 39.9 of the Commission's regulations provides 
similar language to that of the statute. In Order No. 672, the 
Commission discussed its authority to take action against the ERO or 
a Regional Entity and the types of actions that are available. See 
Order No. 672 at P 761-62.
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    49. The Commission also adopts its CIP NOPR approach and concludes 
that reliance on the NERC registration process at this time is an 
appropriate means of identifying the entities that must comply with the 
CIP Reliability Standards.\31\ We are concerned, like the California 
Commission, that some small entities that are not identified in the 
NERC registry may become gateways for cyber attacks. However, we are 
not prepared to adopt California Commission's suggested approach of 
requiring that any entity connected to the Bulk-Power System, 
regardless of size, must comply with the CIP Reliability Standards 
irrespective of the NERC registry. We believe this approach is overly-
expansive and may raise jurisdictional issues. Rather, we rely on NERC 
and the Regional Entities to be vigilant in assuring that all 
appropriate entities are registered to ensure the security of the Bulk-
Power System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ CIP NOPR at P 26-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    50. With regard to EEI's request for clarification, the NERC 
registry process is designed to identify and register entities for 
compliance with Reliability Standards, and not identify lists of 
assets. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission explained that it would expect 
NERC to register the owner or operator of an important asset, such as a 
blackstart unit, even though the facility may be relatively small or 
connected at low voltage.\32\ While the facility would not be 
registered or listed through the registration process, NERC's or a 
Regional Entity's awareness of the critical asset may reasonably result 
in the registration of the owner or operator of the facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Id. P 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    51. Likewise, we believe that NERC should register demand side 
aggregators if the loss of their load shedding capability, for reasons 
such as a cyber incident, would affect the reliability or operability 
of the Bulk-Power System. EEI and ISO/RTO Council concur that the need 
for the registration of demand side aggregators may arise, but state 
that it is not clear whether aggregators fit any of the current 
registration categories defined by NERC. We agree with EEI and ISO/RTO 
Council that NERC should consider whether there is a current need to 
register demand side aggregators and, if so, to address any related 
issues and develop criteria for their registration.
    52. The Commission agrees with the many commenters that suggest 
that the responsibility of a third-party vendor for compliance with the 
CIP Reliability Standards is a matter that should be addressed in 
contracts between the registered entity that is responsible for 
mandatory compliance with the Standards and its vendor. To the extent 
that the responsible entity makes a business decision to hire an 
outside contractor to perform services for it, the responsible entity 
remains responsible for compliance with the relevant Reliability 
Standards. Thus, it is incumbent upon the responsible entity to assure 
that its third-party vendor acts in compliance with the CIP Reliability 
Standards. We agree with ISO/RTO Council's characterization of the 
matter:

    . . . when an application is developed and maintained by an 
outsourced provider, that outsourced provider manages physical and 
cyber access to the environment on which the application runs and 
therefore must be contractually obligated to the Responsible Entity 
to comply with the Reliability Standards.
    While such providers are not registered entities subject to the 
Reliability Standards, they must perform the services and operate 
the applications in a manner consistent with the Reliability 
Standards . . . the Responsible Entity should be charged with 
incorporating contractual terms and conditions into agreements with 
third-party service providers that obligate the providers to comply 
with the requirements of the Reliability Standards. In that regard, 
if a Responsible Entity determines that it is necessary to outsource 
a service that is essential to the reliable operation of a Critical 
Asset, Critical Cyber Asset, or the bulk electric system, it is 
clear that the Responsible Entity must be held responsible and 
accountable for compliance with the Reliability Standards.[\33\]

    \33\ ISO/RTO Council comments at 21-22.

    53. Further, it is incumbent upon a responsible entity to conduct 
vigorous oversight of the activities and procedures followed by the 
vendors they employ. Thus, we expect a responsible entity to address in 
its security policy under CIP-003-1 its policies regarding its 
oversight of third-party vendors.

D. Compliance Measured by Outcome

1. Performance-Based Standards
a. NOPR Proposal
    54. The CIP NOPR expressed concern that the lack of specificity 
within the proposed CIP Reliability Standards could result in 
inadequate implementation efforts and inconsistent results.\34\ In 
addressing the appropriate amount of specificity, the Commission stated 
that ``performance-based standards may not always be appropriate, for 
example, in situations where the `how' may be inextricably linked to 
the Reliability Standard and may need to be specified to ensure the 
enforceability of the standard.'' \35\ Thus, the Commission indicated 
that it may be appropriate to direct NERC in specific instances to 
develop modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to address the 
``how.''
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    \34\ CIP NOPR at P 32, citing CIP Assessment at 3.
    \35\ Id. at P 33, quoting Order No. 672 at P 260.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    55. The CIP NOPR also noted that the CIP Reliability Standards do 
not provide a mechanism to measure performance. The Commission 
identified three strategies for monitoring performance: (1) Internal 
and external oversight of a responsible entity's activities; (2) 
documenting, monitoring and revisiting a responsible entity's exercise 
of flexibility in a way that excepts it from a Requirement; and (3) 
reporting certain wide-area information and analysis to the Commission.
b. Comments
    56. NERC and others comment that the CIP Reliability Standards 
should prescribe what outcome must be accomplished, but should not 
prescribe how that outcome is accomplished.\36\ These commenters 
contend that discussion on how to implement a Requirement should be 
provided in a separate reference document such as guidelines or white 
papers, but not included in the CIP Reliability Standards themselves. 
This approach would allow responsible entities to retain the 
flexibility to implement a solution that best meets their needs.\37\ 
According to NERC, including ``how'' language in the CIP Reliability 
Standards would dictate the only acceptable manner of implementation 
and thwart other acceptable, and possibly superior, methods of 
satisfying the Reliability Standards. In contrast, a guidance document 
allows more flexibility and is more easily updated as technology 
advances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ E.g., EEI, Alliant, Arizona Public Service, Mr. Brown, 
FirstEnergy, ISO/RTO Council, Luminant, Northeast Utilities, Ontario 
Power, PSEG Companies, Puget Sound and Southern.
    \37\ E.g., NERC, ReliabilityFirst and Mr. Brown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    57. In addition, NERC expresses concern that including acceptable 
solutions as part of the CIP Reliability Standards could introduce 
common vulnerabilities based on all industry participants using a 
nearly identical solution to a given vulnerability.\38\ PSEG Companies 
share this concern, adding that identifying the technology

[[Page 7375]]

to be used to combat vulnerabilities creates vulnerabilities and allows 
hackers to focus their efforts on disrupting those systems. NERC and 
ReliabilityFirst also argue that guidance to address every contingency 
would be voluminous and difficult to write.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Ontario Power and ReliabilityFirst raise similar concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    58. A number of commenters also provide comment regarding 
performance measurement and the Commission's proposal for internal and 
external oversight. NERC contends that much of the proposed additional 
oversight is in place in the existing ERO and regional compliance and 
audit programs. NERC explains that these programs are being updated 
based on the Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards.
    59. Other commenters, such as EEI, ISO/RTO Council and Puget Sound, 
suggest that the determination of whether a responsible entity meets or 
fails to meet the requirements of a CIP Reliability Standard should be 
determined in an audit based on the specific facts and circumstances of 
its use, ownership or operation of the Bulk-Power System. EEI argues 
that a strong auditing requirement serves to ensure quality control, 
and will result in consistency in the implementation of the CIP 
Reliability Standards. KCPL states that the information technology 
associated with cyber security provides a unique challenge for the 
audit function and auditors must have a significant amount of 
experience with both the industry and the cyber security needs to 
ensure that the obligations to the CIP Reliability Standards are 
properly evaluated during an audit. SERC-CIPC adds that the distinction 
between mandatory requirements and non-binding guidance should be made 
clear to auditors, noting that these differences could be subtle.
    60. With regard to external oversight, Northern Indiana believes 
that certain independent entities' employees ``such as [those 
performing] the internal audit function'' can provide a wide-area view. 
Northern Indiana requests clarification on what the Commission means by 
the term ``external oversight.''
c. Commission Determination
    61. The Commission received comments on both sides of the issue of 
specificity. Some commenters caution against the CIP Reliability 
Standards being too specific, while others request more guidance to 
help them comply. In general, the Commission believes it is appropriate 
to provide sufficient guidance to explain Requirements so that 
responsible entities have a high degree of certainty that they 
understand what is necessary to comply with a Requirement. More 
guidance will allow responsible entities to implement measures adapted 
to their specific situations more consistently and effectively. 
Additional guidance need not be included in a specific Requirement, but 
could be in the form of examples. The Commission is not directing that 
the ERO establish a specific end result. Our concern is simply that 
responsible entities have guidance on how to achieve an appropriate 
result in individual cases, which can vary on a case-by-case basis. 
Therefore, in several instances throughout this Final Rule, the 
Commission gives the ERO direction to provide additional guidance. In 
some cases, we require that the guidance be placed in modifications to 
the CIP Reliability Standards. In other cases, we note that some or all 
of the additional guidance could be placed in a reference document 
separate from the CIP Reliability Standards.
    62. Some of the more specific directives in this Final Rule pertain 
to issues that the Commission considers necessary to carry out its 
statutory responsibilities. Examples of this include areas of 
oversight, exceptions to Requirements, and reports to the Commission. 
In developing these directives, we have tried to strike a balance 
between our needs to implement the statute and the concerns expressed 
by commenters.
    63. We agree in general with commenters who point out that 
compliance issues should be determined in audits and that a strong 
auditing process will help to ensure quality control and consistency in 
the implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards. However, we point 
out that audits are only one aspect of the ERO's compliance monitoring 
and enforcement process. All aspects of that process must function 
well. In addition, we note compliance audits are conducted after-the-
fact and do not diminish the necessity for internal and external 
reviews of compliance efforts, including the identification of critical 
assets and critical cyber assets.
    64. In response to Northern Indiana, we explain ``external 
oversight'' in our discussions and determinations of specific 
Requirements in the Final Rule.
2. Adequacy of Outcomes
a. NOPR Proposal
    65. The CIP NOPR noted that many of the Requirements of the CIP 
Reliability Standards consist of broad directives, with corresponding 
Measures and Compliance provisions focusing largely on proper 
documentation.\39\ The Commission asserted that documentation by itself 
does not satisfy the Requirements of a Reliability Standard and, 
rather, implementation of the substance of the Requirements is most 
important in determining compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ CIP NOPR at P 35-41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    66. The Commission also noted that, while certain Requirements of 
the CIP Reliability Standards obligate a responsible entity to develop 
and maintain a plan, policy or procedure, the Requirements do not 
always explicitly require implementation of the plan, policy or 
procedure. The Commission proposed to interpret such provisions to 
include an implicit implementation requirement.
b. Comments
i. Documentation
    67. SPP and ReliabilityFirst agree with the Commission that 
adequate documentation does not substitute for substantive compliance 
with the responsibilities set forth in the requirements of the CIP 
Reliability Standards. However, they express concern that not relying 
on objective documentation requirements to demonstrate compliance could 
result in subjective variations in the audit process and uneven 
application of the Requirements of a Reliability Standard. 
ReliabilityFirst states that, while it is reasonable to apply 
subjective reasoning as part of a readiness assessment, any audit that 
could result in financial sanctions for non-compliance must rely solely 
upon clearly defined objective measures. To remedy the concern that 
documentation may not assure compliance with a CIP Reliability 
Standard, SPP suggests that the Requirements and Measures prescribed in 
a CIP Reliability Standard be enhanced to define the minimum acceptable 
documentation content.
    68. In the context of measuring performance, Northern Indiana 
states that it generally supports the Commission's desire to clarify 
the CIP Reliability Standards but cautions the Commission from 
prescribing modifications that would limit a responsible entity's 
discretion. Northern Indiana comments that, while in some instances 
(such as testing vulnerabilities on a real-time, active system basis) 
documentation should suffice to demonstrate compliance, in other 
situations documentation does not suffice. In these instances, even 
though the responsible entity's documentation may comply with the CIP 
Reliability

[[Page 7376]]

Standards, the responsible entity must nevertheless demonstrate actual 
compliance. In these cases, Northern Indiana suggests that compliance 
can be verified in a subsequent audit.
    69. Xcel notes that, in the CIP NOPR, the Commission indicated that 
``compliance will in all cases be measured by whether a party met or 
failed to meet the Requirement given the specific facts and 
circumstances.'' \40\ Xcel agrees that the Requirements contain the 
substantive obligations of a CIP Reliability Standard. Xcel asks the 
Commission to clarify whether an entity that complies with the 
substance of the Requirements but violates the documentation provisions 
of the Measures or Levels of Non-Compliance may be assessed a penalty. 
Xcel suggests that penalties are not warranted in this circumstance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Xcel comments at 5, quoting CIP NOPR at P 39 (in turn 
quoting Order No. 693 at P 253).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Obligation to Implement Plans, Policies and Procedures
    70. EEI, FirstEnergy, ISO/RTO Council, Northeast Utilities and PG&E 
agree that certain CIP requirements do not explicitly require 
implementation of a plan, policy or procedure that the responsible 
entity is required to develop and maintain. Thus, they support 
directing NERC, in the course of its scheduled industry Reliability 
Standards development process, to consider making explicit that a 
responsible entity must implement a plan, policy or procedure that it 
is required to develop.
    71. Xcel asks the Commission to clarify what it means to implement 
a plan, policy or procedure. Specifically, Xcel asks the Commission to 
clarify that ``this does not mean that an entity has to follow every 
aspect of its plans, policies or procedures to the letter or be in 
violation * * *.'' \41\ Xcel comments that following every feature of a 
plan in all cases would hinder the flexibility that an entity needs to 
respond effectively to a particular situation. Further, according to 
Xcel, the Commission's proposal would make each plan, policy and 
procedure tantamount to an enforceable Reliability Standard. Xcel 
claims that this would give entities an incentive to include fewer 
details in their plans, policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Xcel comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Commission Determination
i. Documentation
    72. While the Commission agrees with commenters that relying on an 
objective determination such as whether a document exists would 
facilitate the compliance audit process, we do not believe such a 
cursory approach is the best way to ensure the protection of the Bulk-
Power System. We adopt our proposal in the CIP NOPR that responsible 
entities must comply with the substance of a Requirement. In this way 
we affirm the Commission's position established in Order No. 693 that, 
``while Measures and Levels of Non-Compliance provide useful guidance 
to the industry, compliance will in all cases be measured by 
determining whether a party met or failed to meet the Requirement given 
the specific facts and circumstance of its use, ownership or operation 
of the Bulk-Power System.'' \42\ While we agree with Northern Indiana 
that, depending on the Requirement in question, in some instances (such 
as active system testing) documentation would suffice to demonstrate 
compliance, even in these cases auditors should look at the content of 
the documentation to determine if the substance of the Requirement has 
been met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Order No. 693 at P 253.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    73. Xcel seeks clarification regarding responsible entities that 
comply with the substance of a Requirement but violate the 
documentation provisions. In Order No. 693, in response to a similar 
request by Xcel, the Commission explained that, ``[w]hile the 
Commission generally agrees that it is a violation of the Requirements 
that is subject to a penalty, we recognize that because Measures are 
intended to gauge or document compliance, failure to meet a Measure is 
almost always going to result in a violation of a Requirement.'' \43\ 
We add that a responsible entity's failure to maintain documentation 
(as set forth in a Measure) that obstructs the ability of the ERO, 
Regional Entity or Commission to determine compliance with the 
substance of a Requirement may warrant a penalty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Id. P 256.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Obligation To Implement Plans, Policies and Procedures
    74. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission also noted that, while certain 
Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards obligate a responsible 
entity to develop and maintain a plan, policy or procedure, the 
Requirements do not always explicitly require implementation of the 
plan, policy or procedure. The Commission proposed to interpret such 
provisions to include an implicit implementation requirement.
    75. Consistent with that proposal, the Commission concludes that, 
where the CIP Reliability Standards obligate a responsible entity to 
develop and maintain a plan, policy or procedure, there should be a 
corresponding obligation to implement the plan, policy or procedure. 
However, while the CIP NOPR proposed to interpret the CIP Reliability 
Standards as including an implicit obligation to implement plans, 
policies and procedures, we are persuaded by the commenters that a 
better approach is for the ERO to develop modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards that contain appropriate implementation language. 
Accordingly, we direct the ERO to develop modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards that require a responsible entity to implement 
plans, policies and procedure that it must develop pursuant to the CIP 
Reliability Standards.
    76. As to Xcel's argument that, at times, the proper course is to 
deviate from a plan, we agree that the details of such plans are not 
equivalent to Requirements of a CIP Reliability Standard. However, the 
responsible entity's plan should be followed unless a deliberate 
decision is made for good reason not to follow it. Such reason should 
be documented and available for compliance auditors to review. Merely 
ignoring plan provisions is equivalent to not having a plan. For 
clarity, we note that a decision not to follow a particular plan 
provision due to circumstances will not except a responsible entity 
from a related Requirement in a CIP Reliability Standard. As discussed 
below, we find that any exception to a CIP Reliability Standard must 
comply with the required conditions for a technical feasibility 
exception.

E. Implementation Plan

    77. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission explained that, because the CIP 
Reliability Standards are new and require applicable entities in many 
cases to develop new cyber security systems and procedures, NERC 
developed an implementation plan based on a schedule that provides for 
implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards over a three-year 
period.\44\ The implementation plan sets out a proposed schedule for 
accomplishing the various tasks associated with compliance with the CIP 
Reliability Standards. The schedule gives a timeline by calendar 
quarters for completing various tasks and prescribes

[[Page 7377]]

milestones for when a responsible entity must: (1) ``Begin work''; (2) 
``be substantially compliant'' with a Requirement; (3) ``be compliant'' 
with a Requirement; and (4) ``be auditably compliant'' with a 
Requirement. According to the implementation plan, ``auditably 
compliant'' must be achieved in 2009 for certain Requirements by 
certain responsible entities, and in 2010 for others.
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    \44\ CIP NOPR at P 42. See also NERC August 28, 2006 Filing, 
Exhibit B ``Implementation Plan for Cyber Security Standards'' 
(implementation plan).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Commission Approval of Implementation Plan
a. NOPR Proposal
    78. The Commission proposed to approve NERC's implementation plan, 
including the proposed timelines for achieving compliance.\45\ The 
Commission stated its belief that the timetable proposed by NERC sets 
reasonable deadlines for industry compliance, recognizing the broad 
industry input to its development, and the tasks that many responsible 
entities face to purchase and install new equipment and software to 
achieve compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Id. P 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    79. Numerous commenters urge the Commission to accept NERC's 
proposed implementation plan and the proposed timeline for achieving 
compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards.\46\ For example, Applied 
Control Solutions comments that, due to real cyber vulnerabilities to 
the grid, there is an urgent need to move forward with the effective 
dates without delay and not allow any extension of those dates. KCPL 
states that the implementation plan has been developed based on input 
from industry stakeholders and the timetables and processes agreed upon 
in that process represent prudent steps toward the implementation of 
the CIP Reliability Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ E.g., NERC, Applied Control Solutions, EEI, FirstEnergy, 
KCPL, PG&E and Progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    80. Many of these same commenters express concern about how the 
Commission's proposal in the CIP NOPR to direct that NERC develop 
certain modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards would affect the 
implementation schedule. NERC explains that the implementation plan and 
time frame are for the existing CIP Reliability Standards as submitted 
to the Commission. NERC states that any changes to the CIP Reliability 
Standards resulting from the Final Rule will potentially impact the 
implementation plan and time frame, and a new schedule will need to be 
developed during the Reliability Standards development process 
associated with those changes.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See also Allegheny, Alliant, Detroit Edison, Duke, EEI, 
Entergy, FPL Group, Idaho Power, KCPL, Manitoba Hydro, MidAmerican, 
National Grid, OGE, Ontario IESO, PG&E, PSEG Companies, Southern, 
Teltone and Xcel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    81. Similarly, EEI and Entergy advocate that the Final Rule make 
clear that modifications developed pursuant to the Reliability 
Standards development process should not be implemented until the 
conclusion of the NERC implementation plan.\48\ PSEG Companies add that 
responsible entities have already developed budgets and implementation 
plans in reliance on the existing CIP Reliability Standards. PSEG 
Companies indicate that, although they may ultimately support some of 
the changes proposed in the CIP NOPR, they cannot support modifying the 
current CIP Reliability Standards before the 2009 compliance deadline. 
EEI and Alliant claim that, if the Commission directs the NERC 
Reliability Standards development process to consider potential changes 
to the CIP Reliability Standards before the conclusion of the 
implementation plan, responsible entities will be significantly 
discouraged from performing any further work until these changes are 
finalized. Thus, implementation work may slow or come to a stop because 
responsible entities will have an incentive to wait for the final 
outcome of this Commission-imposed revision process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ EEI at 6. Elsewhere, EEI states that the Commission should 
not direct NERC to consider changes to the CIP Reliability Standards 
before the conclusion of the NERC implementation plan. EEI at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    82. Manitoba Hydro comments that the Commission should reject 
NERC's proposed implementation schedule because it is based on the 
unrealistic expectation that the CIP Reliability Standards would be 
approved without the need for any revisions. Muscatine Power & Water 
argues that if the Commission requires utilities to base their risk-
based assessments on formal guidelines provided by NERC, then the 
implementation schedule must be extended to allow additional time for 
compliance.
    83. APPA/LPPC suggest the implementation plan may need adjustment 
if the Regional Entities or some other region-wide institutions 
supplement a responsible entity's list of critical assets. In such 
cases, APPA/LPPC request that the Commission direct NERC to develop a 
reasonable schedule for determining the timeline for being auditably 
compliant with respect to the newly designated assets.
    84. Entergy characterizes the CIP NOPR as proposing to ``remand'' 
CIP-002-1, which according to Energy would leave unresolved the basic 
issue of which assets are subject to the CIP Reliability Standards. 
Entergy contends that without knowledge of which assets the CIP 
Reliability Standards apply, the proposed timeline is unworkable.
    85. SPP maintains that there is no table prescribing a schedule in 
which an existing registered entity can bring a newly identified 
critical asset and its critical cyber assets into compliance. While not 
expected to change frequently, the critical asset list can change for 
any number of valid reasons, and the registered entity needs an 
appropriate period of time in which to achieve compliance for that 
asset. In the absence of a compliance schedule, no guidance is 
available to either the registered entity or the auditor. SPP 
recommends that a new table be developed defining a compliance schedule 
for newly identified critical assets and based upon the date of the 
risk-based assessment. SPP argues that the table should include 
milestones for tasks already completed and milestones for tasks yet to 
be done that will require additional resources and time to comply.
c. Commission Determination
    86. The Commission adopts its CIP NOPR proposal and approves NERC's 
implementation plan and time frames for responsible entities to achieve 
auditable compliance. Responsible entities require a reasonable period 
of time to purchase and install new cyber software and equipment and 
develop new programs and procedures to achieve compliance. Commenters 
indicate that the implementation plan provides that reasonable period 
of time. Further, we agree with commenters that there is an urgent need 
to move forward without any delays. Accordingly, we approve NERC's 
implementation plan.
    87. Commenters raise concerns regarding the impact on the 
implementation plan of the Commission's directives for modifications to 
the CIP Reliability Standards. As explained above, the Commission is 
not modifying the CIP Reliability Standards in this Final Rule. Rather, 
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission in the Final 
Rule directs the ERO to develop certain modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards pursuant to the NERC Reliability Standards 
development process. Even though the development of such modifications 
will take time, this does not present a reason for delay or revision to 
the NERC implementation plan for implementing the CIP

[[Page 7378]]

Reliability Standards approved in this Final Rule.
    88. The Commission believes that the modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards developed by the NERC Reliability Standards 
development process should not be audited prior to the conclusion of 
the approved implementation plan. EEI and other commenters claim that 
commencing the development of such modifications prior to the 
conclusion of the implementation plan would be discouraging to 
industry. The Commission, however, finds that it is unacceptable to 
delay the development of the modifications directed in this Final Rule 
until after the conclusion of the implementation plan. Since it is 
uncertain how long it will take to develop revised CIP Reliability 
Standards, we believe it is not reasonable to wait until the 2009-2010 
time period for the process to start. Features such as enhanced 
conditions on technical feasibility exceptions and oversight of 
critical asset determinations are too important to the protection of 
the Bulk-Power System to wait that long.
    89. While we are both sympathetic and concerned about straining 
industry resources, the Commission and the electric industry must do 
their best to protect the electric infrastructure that is essential to 
the health and safety of the nation. Therefore, we direct the ERO to 
submit a work plan for Commission approval for developing and filing 
for approval the modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards that we 
are directing in this Final Rule. As suggested by NERC, the Commission 
will consider a second implementation plan for achieving compliance 
with the forthcoming revised CIP Reliability Standards.
    90. The Commission did not propose to remand CIP-002-1 as argued by 
Entergy. Nonetheless, Entergy raises a valid concern since the 
Commission's directive, discussed below, that the ERO develop 
modifications to CIP-002-1 could affect a responsible entity's 
identification of critical assets. We share Entergy's concern that 
there are threshold issues regarding CIP-002-1 that must be addressed 
before responsible entities can have certainty regarding which assets 
must be protected according to the CIP Reliability Standards. We also 
believe that responsible entities need certainty regarding the 
conditions for a technical feasibility exception to inform their 
decisions about how to comply with the CIP Reliability Standards, even 
in their current form. Therefore, we direct the ERO, in its development 
of a work plan, to consider developing modifications to CIP-002-1 and 
the provisions regarding technical feasibility exceptions as a first 
priority, before developing other modifications required by the Final 
Rule.
2. Self-Certification
a. NOPR Proposal
    91. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission expressed concern over whether 
responsible entities will be fully prepared for compliance upon 
reaching the implementation deadline and will take reasonable action to 
protect the Bulk-Power System during the interim period.\49\ The 
Commission stated that NERC's plans to require self-certification 
during the interim period are helpful and proposed that, to allow 
adequate monitoring of progress, the ERO develop a self-certification 
process with certifications more frequent than once per year. The CIP 
NOPR suggested that self-certification be tied either to target dates 
in the schedule or perhaps quarterly or semi-annual certifications. The 
Commission indicated that, while an entity should not be subject to a 
monetary penalty if it is unable to certify that it is on schedule, 
such an entity should explain to the ERO the reason it is unable to 
self-certify. The ERO and the Regional Entities should then work with 
such an entity either informally or, if appropriate, by requiring a 
remedial plan, to assist such an entity in achieving full compliance in 
a timely manner. We also stated that the ERO and the Regional Entities 
should provide informational guidance, upon request, to assist a 
responsible entity in assessing its progress in reaching ``auditably 
compliant'' status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ CIP NOPR at P 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    92. Many commenters oppose directing NERC to consider a self-
certification process with more frequent self-certifications than on an 
annual basis.\50\ In this regard, EEI argues that a more frequent self-
certification requirement is likely to impose undue burdens without 
commensurate benefits. KCPL claims that there are sufficient processes 
already in place in order to evaluate and monitor CIP Reliability 
Standards compliance and additional requirements for self-certification 
provide no significant support or benefit to tracking a Responsible 
Entity's obligations to the CIP Reliability Standards and are unneeded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ E.g., Alliant, Bonneville, Entergy, EEI, ISO-NE, KCPL, 
National Grid, Northeast Utilities, PG&E, Portland General, 
Progress, Puget Sound and Southern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    93. Other commenters, such as APPA/LPPC, MidAmerican, Northern 
Indiana and SDG&E either support or do not object to more frequent 
self-certifications. APPA/LPPC support NERC's proposed self-
certification process as a reasonable means of tracking the progress 
made by responsible entities toward full, auditable compliance. Nor do 
they object to the Commission's proposal that such certification be 
rendered quarterly or semi-annually. Northern Indiana supports semi-
annual self-certification during the transition until the 
implementation plan is completed. Northern Indiana contends that more 
frequent self-certification would be unduly burdensome.
    94. METC-ITC also support quarterly or semi-annual self-
certifications because the certifications will properly pressure 
entities to take timely steps to achieve compliance by the deadline for 
auditable compliance. METC-ITC are concerned, however, that having NERC 
monitor progress toward compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards 
via self-certifications, may place a burden on the ERO and the Regional 
Entities that their current staffs may be unable to properly 
administer. Thus, METC-ITC propose that the Commission require the ERO 
to file plans addressing how it will satisfy the new requirements for 
providing assistance to responsible entities and further assessing CIP 
implementation as part of its readiness reviews.
    95. SDG&E supports semi-annual certifications, but comments that 
quarterly certifications would be distracting to the main goal, as well 
as burdensome, time consuming and paper intensive. It agrees with the 
Commission that an entity should not be penalized if it cannot certify 
that it is on schedule. SDG&E does not object to the Commission's 
proposal that the ERO and the Regional Entities should work with such 
an entity to achieving full compliance, provided that the Commission 
clarify that this means ``getting back'' on schedule and not 
accelerating compliance.
c. Commission Determination
    96. While the Commission is sensitive to concerns that more 
frequent self-certifications may be burdensome, it is important that 
the ERO and the Commission know whether industry, or segments of 
industry, are having difficulty implementing the CIP Reliability 
Standards. Therefore, we direct the ERO to require more frequent, semi-
annual, self-certifications prior to

[[Page 7379]]

the date by which full compliance is required. Such additional self-
certifications may be a ``stream-lined'' version, but must be useful 
for the ERO and the Commission to assess industry's progress toward 
achieving compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards.
    97. Further, we adopt our CIP NOPR proposals that, while an entity 
should not be subject to a monetary penalty if it is unable to certify 
that it is on schedule, such an entity should explain to the ERO the 
reason it is unable to self-certify. The ERO and the Regional Entities 
should then work with such an entity either informally or, if 
appropriate, by requiring a remedial plan to assist such an entity in 
achieving full compliance in a timely manner. Further, we expect the 
ERO and the Regional Entities to provide informational guidance, upon 
request, to assist a responsible entity in assessing its progress in 
reaching ``auditably compliant'' status.
    98. With regard to METC-ITC's comment, we will not require NERC and 
the Regional Entities to submit plans describing how it will undertake 
these responsibilities. Rather, the ERO and Regional Entities can 
address any need for additional resources in the ERO's annual budget 
filing. If necessary to fulfill their statutory obligations, the ERO 
and Regional Entities may file a request for additional funding to 
supplement their Commission approved budgets.
    99. With regard to SDG&E's comment, we clarify that the goal of a 
Regional Entity working with a responsible entity that is unable to 
self-certify is to assist the entity in meeting the NERC time frames 
for auditable compliance, and not to accelerate compliance ahead of 
schedule.
3. Adding a Cyber Security Assessment to NERC's Readiness Reviews
a. NOPR Proposal
    100. To further address the Commission's concerns about the period 
prior to when responsible entities achieve full compliance with the CIP 
Reliability Standards, the CIP NOPR also proposed that the ERO add a 
cyber security assessment to NERC's existing readiness reviews.\51\ The 
Commission explained that the assessment should identify best practices 
and deficiencies of the reviewed entities to assist them in preparing 
for implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards and help the 
Commission evaluate the potential effectiveness of the Standards before 
full implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ CIP NOPR at P 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    101. NERC and other commenters oppose the addition of a cyber 
security assessment to NERC's existing readiness reviews.\52\ NERC 
requests that the Commission allow the existing oversight framework to 
work without adding new or different requirements specific to the CIP 
Reliability Standards. EEI points out that, because readiness reviews 
are not conducted on an annual basis, the review would not occur early 
enough in the implementation process to assist responsible entities' 
implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards or assist the 
Commission in assessing the status of compliance efforts. EEI also 
asserts that the most likely result of adding a cyber security 
assessment to NERC's readiness reviews would be to unnecessarily 
distract responsible entities from performing the actual implementation 
of the CIP Reliability Standards. Southern adds that such assessments 
would merely duplicate the self-certifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ E.g., Alliant, Bonneville, EEI, ISO-NE, Luminant, Northeast 
Utilities, Southern and Tampa Electric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    102. Northeast Utilities asks the Commission to reconsider its 
proposal prior to the 2009 deadline for full compliance with the CIP 
Reliability Standards. According to Northeast Utilities, readiness 
reviews are performed by industry peer volunteers under Regional Entity 
guidance to identify best practices and ensure that system operators 
have the tools, processes and procedures in place to operate reliably. 
It contends that, given the limited industry experience with cyber 
security, the readiness review process will not produce the benefits 
the Commission expects.
    103. In contrast, MidAmerican and SDG&E agree with the Commission 
that adding a cyber component to the readiness audit process would be 
beneficial, provided an exception is made for publication of any 
weaknesses found during a typical readiness audit. They submit that any 
areas of concern uncovered by the audit should be considered sensitive 
and confidential with appropriate safeguards developed and in place to 
protect this information. MidAmerican also recommends that the 
Commission consider including a cyber security assessment within the 
ERO's existing readiness reviews.
    104. Xcel asks the Commission to clarify that the CIP NOPR, in 
proposing that NERC add cyber security assessments to its existing 
schedule of reliability readiness reviews, did not intend for NERC to 
revise its schedule of reviews but, rather, add a new element to the 
previously-scheduled reviews.
c. Commission Determination
    105. The Commission is persuaded by comments regarding the limited 
reach of readiness reviews and the questionable utility of such reviews 
prior to the date by which entities are to be compliant; thus, adding 
the CIP Reliability Standards to the readiness reviews at this time 
will delay industry's compliance efforts. Therefore, the Commission 
will not require that the CIP Reliability Standards be added to the 
readiness reviews at this time.

F. Issues Presented by Terminology

    106. The CIP NOPR discussed specific terminology used in the CIP 
Reliability Standards that, while providing flexibility for a 
responsible entity in achieving compliance, also raise concerns 
regarding enforceability of the Standards. Specifically, the Commission 
raised concerns regarding the terms ``reasonable business judgment,'' 
``acceptance of risk,'' and ``technical feasibility.'' As discussed 
below, the Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposals and directs NERC to 
modify the CIP Reliability Standards through the Reliability Standards 
development process to remove the first two terms, and develop specific 
conditions that a responsible entity must satisfy to invoke the 
``technical feasibility'' exception. Moreover, in response to concerns 
raised by commenters, the Commission has changed certain conditions for 
invoking the technical feasibility exception.
1. Reasonable Business Judgment
a. NOPR Proposal
    107. As we stated in the CIP NOPR,\53\ each of the proposed CIP 
Reliability Standards incorporates the concept of ``reasonable business 
judgment'' as a guide for determining what constitutes appropriate 
compliance with those Reliability Standards. The Purpose statement of 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-1 provides that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ CIP NOPR at P 50.

    These standards recognize the differing roles of each entity in 
the operation of the Bulk Electric System, the criticality and 
vulnerability of the assets needed to manage Bulk Electric System 
reliability, and the risks to which they are exposed. Responsible 
entities should interpret and apply Standards CIP-002 through CIP-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
009 using reasonable business judgment.

    108. In addition, each of the subsequent CIP Reliability Standards 
(i.e., CIP Reliability Standards CIP-003-1 through CIP-009-1) includes 
a

[[Page 7380]]

statement that ``Responsible Entities should interpret and apply the 
Reliability Standard using reasonable business judgment.''
    109. The Commission pointed out in the CIP NOPR that NERC's 
Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards (NERC Glossary) does 
not define reasonable business judgment, and the CIP Reliability 
Standards do not otherwise suggest how the term is to be interpreted. 
NERC's Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) document that accompanies the 
CIP Reliability Standards provides the only available guidance on the 
issue.\54\ It states that the phrase is meant ``to reflect--and to 
inform--any regulatory body or ultimate judicial arbiter of disputes 
regarding interpretation of these Standards--that responsible entities 
have a significant degree of flexibility in implementing these 
Standards.'' The FAQ document notes that there is a long history of 
judicial interpretation of the business judgment rule and states that 
``[c]ourts generally hold that the phrase indicates reviewing tribunals 
should not substitute their own judgment for that of the entity under 
review other than in extreme circumstances.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ NERC included the FAQ document in its August 28, 2006 
filing. The FAQ document is also available at ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/standards/sar/Revised_CIP-002-009_FAQs_06Mar06.pdf
.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    110. The Commission proposed, in the CIP NOPR, to direct the ERO to 
modify the CIP Reliability Standards to remove references to the 
``reasonable business judgment'' language before compliance audits 
start in 2009.\55\ In the CIP NOPR, the Commission discussed the 
history of the reasonable business judgment concept and the meaning 
attached to that concept by the courts in the corporate context.\56\ 
The Commission pointed out that, if this term is applied to the CIP 
Reliability Standards, it could easily be understood to have the same 
meaning as in the corporate context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ CIP NORP at P 58.
    \56\ Id. P 59, 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    111. The Commission noted that flexibility and discretion are 
essential in implementing the CIP Reliability Standards and that 
implementing those Reliability Standards must be done on the basis of 
the specific facts and circumstances applicable in the individual case 
at hand. Cyber security problems do not lend themselves to one-size-
fits-all solutions. In addition, the Commission acknowledged that cost 
can be a valid consideration in implementing the CIP Reliability 
Standards. However, the Commission concluded that the traditional 
concept of reasonable business judgment is ill suited to the task of 
implementing an appropriate program of cyber security pursuant to 
section 215 of the FPA.
    112. That concept was developed specifically to address the issue 
of how courts should approach business decisions made by a company's 
officers or directors, and the answer it provides is based on certain 
assumptions about how our economic system operates and who is most 
likely to have the knowledge and expertise needed to make appropriate 
business decisions. However, the concept of reasonable business 
judgment takes on a very different meaning when removed from its 
original context and applied to a different factual situation where 
very different assumptions apply.
    113. The Commission noted in the CIP NOPR that cyber security 
standards are essential to protecting the Bulk-Power System against 
attacks by terrorists and others seeking to damage the grid. Because of 
the interconnected nature of the grid, an attack on one system can 
affect the entire grid. It is therefore unreasonable to allow each 
user, owner or operator to determine compliance with the CIP 
Reliability Standards based on its own ``business interests.'' Business 
convenience cannot excuse compliance with mandatory Reliability 
Standards. The Commission also noted that the explanation of reasonable 
business judgment found in the FAQ document closely tracks the 
treatment of the concept in the corporate law context.
    114. The Commission stated that this test is fundamentally 
incompatible with Congress' decision to adopt a regime of mandatory 
Reliability Standards. The Commission explained that the issue under 
section 215 of the FPA is not whether the management of a business is 
acting in the interest of its own shareholders, but rather whether an 
entity is taking appropriate action to avert risks that could threaten 
the entire grid. Finally, the Commission noted that in the corporate 
governance context, the business judgment rule is invoked only in 
extreme circumstances, generally when an officer or director is found 
to have acted fraudulently, in bad faith, or with gross or culpable 
negligence. For all these reasons, the Commission proposed in the CIP 
NOPR that the ERO remove references to the ``reasonable business 
judgment'' language from the CIP Reliability Standards.
b. Comments
    115. NERC and numerous parties, including California Commission, 
Texas Commission, ISO-NE and ReliabilityFirst, agree that references to 
reasonable business judgment should be removed from the CIP Reliability 
Standards. National Grid concurs to the extent that this language adds 
confusion by incorporating a business law concept into the CIP 
Reliability Standards or could be construed to allow responsible 
entities to avoid liability for violations unilaterally and 
subjectively. APPA/LPPC state that use of reasonable business judgment 
overstates the appropriate amount of discretion to the extent that term 
was intended to incorporate a body of law developed in the corporate 
governance context. NRECA agrees that the term would give responsible 
entities too much latitude in essence to exempt themselves from the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Xcel states that reasonable business judgment 
has developed an exculpatory meaning in corporate law that is not 
applicable to compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards. ISO-NE 
states that the term provides no measurable value to any of the 
Requirements and appears to be an open-ended caveat that is susceptible 
to abuse.
    116. Texas Commission states that, in reviewing costs associated 
with upgrades for physical and cyber security for prudence, it applies 
a more rigorous criterion than reasonable business judgment. It argues 
that a looser criterion in the CIP Reliability Standards could require 
a company to purchase more equipment or software than would later be 
compensated for in their rates. Texas Commission states that reasonable 
business judgment does not relieve an entity from showing that any 
expenditures it made were just and reasonable as required in Texas 
Commission rate cases. Texas Commission concludes that it is in the 
best interest of regulated entities either to remove the term or to 
replace it with a more narrowly focused term with a clearly defined 
statutory basis.
    117. Numerous commenters argue that use of the term reasonable 
business judgment was never intended to import corporate law concepts 
into the CIP Reliability Standards but rather to ensure that 
Responsible Entities have sufficient flexibility when implementing 
them.\57\ EEI states that the term was intended to allow flexible but 
objective decision-making in determining an approach to compliance. It 
was not intended to provide flexibility on whether to comply, only on 
how to comply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ E.g., Alliant, Arizona Public Service, EEI, PSE&G, SoCal 
Edison and Xcel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    118. Mr. Brown states that neither the CIP Reliability Standards 
nor the FAQ document state that the use of

[[Page 7381]]

reasonable business judgment would have the effects that the Commission 
suggests and that the Commission's description of the language and its 
potential effect is an effort to set up a ``straw man'' rather than 
address the clear intent of the language. He maintains that the 
Commission's analysis of the language is speculative and hyper-
legalistic.
    119. A number of commenters either oppose removal of reasonable 
business judgment from the CIP Reliability Standards or express serious 
concern about removing it. Tampa Electric argues that the term should 
be retained or at the very least replaced with language that ensures 
flexibility. SDG&E disagrees with wholesale elimination of the business 
judgment rule and instead urges that parameters or guidelines be 
adopted that determine when and how to apply the concept. MidAmerican 
suggests that it can be retained if accompanied by a mitigation plan 
with a sunset clause. Northern Indiana supports retaining the language, 
explaining that the CIP Reliability Standards are new, and the 
development of best practices regarding them continues to evolve. 
Responsible entities thus must have the flexibility to exercise 
discretion and make the appropriate strategic decisions when 
implementing the Reliability Standards.
    120. A number of commenters argue that use of reasonable business 
judgment makes it clear that cost is a relevant factor. EEI states that 
a responsible entity is expected to weigh cyber security options in 
light of the risk to reliability in the same manner as similarly 
situated entities. Reasonable business judgment does not imply that it 
is acceptable to make purely economic choices to avoid protecting a 
critical cyber asset and thus to jeopardize grid reliability. 
Evaluating whether an asset is critical requires considering the 
asset's role, its cost, and the impact of the asset being compromised, 
as well as the costs of potential protection strategies, consistent 
with good business practice in the electric industry. EEI states that 
even with the inclusion of this language, the other requirements in the 
CIP Reliability Standards, such as documentation of decision-making and 
rigorous auditing, will prevent unfettered discretion in identifying 
and securing critical cyber assets.
    121. Ontario Power states that outright removal will render the CIP 
Reliability Standards too rigid and that removal could be interpreted 
by some to mean that compliance is required regardless of the cost, the 
impact on production systems, or the risk to the Bulk-Power System. 
Tampa Electric argues that without the leeway afforded by reasonable 
business judgment, responsible entities could be forced into cost-
prohibitive controls that do not add value in terms of security simply 
to satisfy an external requirement that is ill-fitted to the particular 
circumstances. SDG&E states that because the cost should not exceed the 
security benefit, certain security investments require business 
judgment. There must be latitude to develop a reasonable business case 
for determining the costs and benefits of investing in or implementing 
a security control based on key risk and investment factors specific to 
an entity.
    122. A number of commenters defend the use of reasonable business 
judgment in terms that focus more on the issue of liability than simple 
flexibility or economic considerations. AMP-Ohio states that the plain 
language of the proposed CIP Reliability Standards could create a 
strict liability environment if there is no exception for ``good 
faith'' or ``reasonable judgment.'' Mr. Brown states that the proposal 
to remove the reasonable business judgment language appears to hold 
utilities, and perhaps individual managers, officers and directors, 
directly responsible for any adverse impact of decisions based upon 
their inherently imperfect knowledge and information regardless of 
whether they acted in good faith and made reasonably well-informed 
decisions. Entergy states that the industry must have reasonable 
assurance that the actions they are implementing meet the CIP 
Reliability Standards and Requirements if they acted in good faith, 
performed the proper evaluation, and took actions consistent with their 
evaluation.
    123. Mr. Brown maintains that there are 200 years of legal 
precedent for determining what constitutes prudent behavior, and 
nothing in the legislative history of section 215 of the FPA suggests 
that Congress intended to depart from that precedent in this case. He 
states that the Commission should proceed with great caution when it 
proposes to depart from this precedent for determining prudent behavior 
without a clear, express mandate from Congress to do so.
    124. EEI and other commenters argue that if the reasonable business 
judgment language is removed from the CIP Reliability Standards, it 
should be replaced with alternative language developed in the 
Reliability Standards development process.\58\ They argue that such 
language is necessary to ensure necessary flexibility. National Grid 
states that the Commission should allow the ERO to develop suitable 
replacement language to allow for the reasonable flexibility that the 
Commission acknowledges that the industry requires in addressing 
critical infrastructure protection issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ E.g., Arizona Public Service, Mr. Brown, Georgia Operators, 
KCPL, NRECA, Northern California, NIPSCO, Northeast Utilities, OGE, 
PG&E, SoCal Edison, Tampa Electric and Xcel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    125. APPA/LPPC suggest that phrases such as ``reasonable judgment'' 
or ``judgment consistent with Good Utility Practice'' as substitutes 
for reasonable business judgment. A number of commenters, including 
NIPSCO and Georgia Operators, point to the phrase ``good utility 
practice'' in the pro forma OATT as a model or starting point for 
alternative language.
    126. A number of commenters, including Manitoba Hydro and NRECA, 
criticize the proposal to remove references to reasonable business 
judgment as overly prescriptive. Manitoba Hydro states that the 
proposal appears to preclude the consideration of alternative wording. 
These commenters stress the importance of reliance on the Reliability 
Standards development process.
    127. Southwest TDUs state that, while the Commission correctly 
proposes to eliminate the so-called business judgment rule, the CIP 
NOPR does not address the dichotomy in application of the CIP 
Reliability Standards between public and private entities. While the 
Commission correctly concludes that flexibility and discretion in 
implementation are necessary, there is no discussion of what that means 
for a public body, nor is there any recognition that a public body may 
be governed by state requirements and possibly by local ordinances.
c. Commission Determination
    128. Consistent with the CIP NOPR, the Commission concludes that 
the concept of reasonable business judgment is inappropriate in the 
context of mandatory CIP Reliability Standards. Accordingly, the 
Commission directs the ERO to develop modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards that do not include this term. We note that many 
commenters, including NERC, agree that the reasonable business judgment 
language should be removed based largely on the rationale articulated 
by the Commission in the CIP NOPR.
    129. While there may have been no intention to import corporate law 
concepts into the CIP Reliability Standards, it is difficult to draw 
any other conclusion on the basis of the

[[Page 7382]]

documents provided. We note that the only guidance on reasonable 
business judgment that emerged from the Reliability Standards 
development process and that was supplied to the Commission is found in 
the FAQ document, and that document appears to invoke the traditional 
corporate law business judgment rule. The FAQ document specifically 
references existing court precedent on the rule, and it sets forth the 
elements of reasonable business judgment in what is essentially a 
restatement of classic formulations of the business judgment rule.\59\ 
Moreover, the FAQ document specifically references one of the most 
objectionable aspects of the business judgment rule in the cyber 
security context, the requirement that the courts defer to the 
decisions of company officers and directors in all but the most extreme 
circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\  See, e.g., Cramer v. General Telephone and Electronics 
Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d 
Cir. 1982); In Re Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 316 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 
2003); Froelich v. Senior Campus Living LLC, 355 F.3d 802 (4th Cir. 
2004); Poth v. Rassey, 281 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    130. In short, the only explanation of reasonable business judgment 
in the documentation responsible entities would rely on focuses on 
corporate law concepts. We thus reject Mr. Brown's claim what we are 
being hyper-legalistic and constructing straw men rather than 
addressing the clear intent of the language. Mr. Brown fails to 
identify where some intent other than to adopt the traditional business 
judgment rule is clearly stated, and his references to 200 years of 
legal precedent only serve to reinforce our conclusion. We are unaware 
of any such extensive body of precedent on reasonable business judgment 
other than that developed in the corporate law context.
    131. The most common argument raised in favor of reasonable 
business judgment is that it ensures flexibility. The Commission, 
however, acknowledged the importance of flexibility and discretion in 
the CIP NOPR.\60\ The CIP Reliability Standards consist for the most 
part of quite general Requirements that must be implemented in a wide 
variety of circumstances. As drafted, they do not provide one-size-
fits-all solutions and, rather, require responsible entities to assess 
their individual situations and devise solutions appropriate to their 
circumstances. We therefore disagree with Ontario Power that outright 
removal of all references to reasonable business judgment would render 
the CIP Reliability Standards too rigid. It will still be necessary for 
responsible entities to choose between available alternatives to arrive 
at cyber security solutions that best fit their situation. In short, 
the CIP Reliability Standards do not simply allow flexibility, they 
require it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See CIP NOPR at P 17, 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    132. Many commenters suggest that the issue is not simply 
flexibility, but rather the flexibility to balance costs against other 
factors when implementing the CIP Reliability Standards. Many of the 
arguments about cost have been raised in connection with the problem of 
technical feasibility as it relates to long-life legacy equipment. We 
will address that issue below and note here simply that cost is a 
relevant consideration for those purposes, and recourse to reasonable 
business judgment is unnecessary to confirm that or to address the 
problem appropriately. Beyond that we disagree that deleting references 
to reasonable business judgment will lead to overly burdensome 
requirements or counterproductive results. For example, we disagree 
with Tampa Electric that without the leeway afforded by reasonable 
business judgment responsible entities would be forced into cost-
prohibitive controls that do not add value in terms of security. No 
explanation was provided as to how this might occur. The Commission 
acknowledged the validity of cost considerations in the CIP NOPR and 
reaffirms that position here. The funds available for cyber security 
will not be infinite and, therefore, a responsible entity will need to 
make careful judgments to ensure that available funds are spent 
effectively. We do not see how the absence of references to reasonable 
business judgment will prevent this from happening.
    133. Finally, some commenters link the need for flexibility with 
the problem of liability. We are keenly aware that unlike many other 
aspects of Bulk-Power System operations, cyber security represents a 
new and rapidly developing field. In other areas, the substance of 
appropriate practices is well established and well understood, but 
there can be considerably more uncertainty in the cyber security realm. 
Responsible entities therefore quite understandably wish to have, in 
Entergy's words, assurances that their actions meet the CIP Reliability 
Standards and Requirements if they act in good faith, perform the 
proper evaluation, and act consistent with their evaluation. We agree 
that they should have such assurances, but we disagree that references 
to reasonable business judgment are an appropriate way to provide such 
assurances. The real issue is whether responsible entities take 
reasonable and prudent actions based on an informed understanding of 
the current state of cyber security practice and how it applies to 
their situation. The Commission, therefore, disagrees with AMP-Ohio and 
Mr. Brown that the absence of references to reasonable business 
judgment will lead to a strict liability enforcement regime.
    134. We disagree with Mr. Brown's claim that removal of reasonable 
business judgment could lead to liability for individual managers under 
section 215 of the FPA. That section applies to users, owners, and 
operators of the Bulk-Power System, and any liability arising under 
section 215 applies to them, not their employees.
    135. Although we disagree with National Grid and others that 
alternative language is necessary to ensure necessary flexibility, we 
agree that the ERO and the participants in the Reliability Standards 
development process may choose to develop alternative language to 
replace reasonable business judgment and propose it for Commission 
approval. Such language would need to be adapted to the issues involved 
in forming judgments on proper cyber security measures and embody an 
objective standard focused on conduct that promotes the interests of 
Bulk-Power System security and reliability. Such language would also 
need to take into consideration our finding discussed below that a 
responsible entity cannot excuse itself from compliance with a 
requirement of the CIP Reliability Standards.
    136. In response to the Southwest TDUs, we note that the CIP 
Reliability Standards apply in the same way to both public and private 
users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power System. Any specific 
issues that Southwest TDUs have with the Reliability Standards should 
be raised in the Reliability Standards development process.
    137. Finally, we reject arguments that we are being overly 
prescriptive in directing the ERO to remove all references to 
reasonable business judgment from the CIP Reliability Standards. We 
discuss that general issue elsewhere in this Final Rule and will not 
repeat that discussion here. It is, however, important to note that 
such objections are inapposite in this instance for an additional 
reason that involves the specific nature of the issue raised. The 
concept of reasonable business judgment speaks to a general legal 
standard of conduct proposed to apply under a statute that Congress has 
directed the Commission to administer. It does not involve matters 
specific to

[[Page 7383]]

reliability but rather is bound up with the problem of legal 
enforceability. The Commission has a particular duty to see that the 
laws it administers can be enforced effectively. We are not being 
overly prescriptive when acting to ensure that this will be the case.
    138. Based on the above discussion, as well as our lengthy analysis 
in the CIP NOPR, the Commission directs the ERO to modify the CIP 
Reliability Standards through its Reliability Standards development 
process to remove references to reasonable business judgment before 
compliance audits begin.
2. Acceptance of Risk
a. NOPR Proposal
    139. The Commission explained in the CIP NOPR that some 
Requirements in the CIP Reliability Standards permit an entity not to 
take the actions specified in the Requirement if they ``document 
compensating measures applied to mitigate risk exposure or an 
acceptance of risk.'' \61\ The CIP NOPR explained that the CIP 
Reliability Standards do not provide explicit guidance on the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to accept the risk of non-
compliance. The Commission further explained that the phrase 
``acceptance of risk'' essentially allows a Responsible Entity to opt 
out of certain provisions of a mandatory Reliability Standard at its 
discretion.\62\ The Commission stated its belief that the acceptance of 
risk language does not serve any justifiable purpose and proposed to 
direct that the ERO remove this language from the CIP Reliability 
Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Id. P 70. See also CIP-007-1, Requirements R2.3, R3.2, and 
R4.1.
    \62\ Id. P 83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    140. Numerous commenters, including NERC, support the removal of 
acceptance of risk language, provided that this is accomplished using 
NERC's Reliability Standards development process.\63\ Texas Commission 
believes that removing the term is warranted and states that one 
entity's acceptance of risk may have an adverse impact on the Bulk-
Power System. ISO-NE argues that the term provides no measurable value 
to any of the Requirements and appears to be an open-ended caveat that 
is susceptible to abuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See also California Commission, CEA, Texas Commission, ISO-
NE and ReliabilityFirst.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    141. EEI, FirstEnergy, Manitoba Hydro and others contend that the 
proposal to remove the acceptance of risk language from the CIP 
Reliability Standards mandates a specific outcome and fails to allow 
for consideration of alternatives to address the Commission's concerns 
in the NERC Reliability Standards development process. FPL recommends 
directing the ERO to consider the issue and either (1) make the 
appropriate modifications based on the Commission's concerns or (2) 
provide justification for an acceptance of risk provision. EEI states 
that the Commission's concerns regarding this language are valid, but 
should be reasonably tempered by the Commission's expectation that 
industry will use the mutual distrust posture.
    142. Some commenters suggest alternate language to replace the term 
``acceptance of risk.'' \64\ SDG&E states it does not disagree with the 
Commission's rationale but proposes, rather than eliminating the 
concept entirely, to substitute the term ``risk-based.'' Similarly, 
Xcel acknowledges that acceptance of risk may be a poor choice of 
words, but that alternate language should be considered. Xcel explains 
that the phrase ``acceptance of risk'' recognizes that an exception may 
be appropriate under some circumstances. For example, Requirement R2.3 
of CIP-007-1 allows an entity to determine that an unused port does not 
need to be disabled and accept the risk of not doing so if it 
determines that the port is insignificant. METC-ITC state that the 
Commission should consider alternate language that promotes the 
quantification, documentation and justification of the risk that an 
entity proposes to accept.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ E.g., METC-ITC, SDG&E and Xcel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    143. A number of other commenters, including Tampa Electric, note 
that it is not possible to eliminate all risks and state that the goal 
should be to minimize risks to an acceptable level that still allows 
business processes to function. Idaho Power states that all businesses 
carry and accept some level of risk, and it is not appropriate to shift 
the burden to the company, ratepayer or shareholder to develop systems 
that may remove all risk. A company can perform an analysis of risk to 
determine a risk level that delivers an adequate level of security for 
the company, neighboring utilities and consumers, while remaining 
manageable to the company from a cost standpoint.
    144. APPA/LPPC agree that the CIP Reliability Standards cannot be 
ignored simply because a company deems a risk acceptable, but believe 
that the intent of this language was to provide a degree of discretion 
where compliance is perceived to pose a greater risk to critical asset 
availability than non-compliance. They envision situations where it is 
reasonable to conclude that compliance poses a significant risk in the 
specific instances where acceptance of risk language appears. For 
example, with respect to Requirement R3.2 of CIP 007-1 (security patch 
management), inadequately tested patches can pose a risk of system 
failure, and an entity must weigh the risk of using software with a 
known flaw against the risk that the vendor's patch will introduce even 
greater risk.
    145. Tampa Electric maintains that the impact of risk to the grid 
should be weighed before disallowing acceptance of risk. References to 
acceptance of risk should not be removed because, when a measure is not 
technically feasible, an effective compensatory control or mitigation, 
short of replacing the system, is not always possible. In addition, 
acceptance of risk is not always based on cost reasons. A compensatory 
step could cause safety issues or some other process problem that makes 
it highly undesirable.
    146. Mr. Brown states that acceptance of risk does not permit an 
entity simply to decline compliance. The intent was to require 
explanation, mitigation efforts, evaluation of the potential 
ramifications of accepting the risk, or other accountability to 
demonstrate how the CIP Reliability Standards are being complied with 
in essence. Mr. Brown states that greater transparency is welcome, but 
removing the language does not mean that such decisions will no longer 
be made. Rather it will result in such decisions being kept out of 
sight.
    147. FPL Group states that the CIP Reliability Standards provide 
guidance that allows documentation of measures taken to mitigate risk 
exposure or an acceptance of risk. This guidance is reasonable and 
based on control system best practices. It allows responsible entities 
to evaluate the value of the mitigation with regard to operability and 
reliability of the Bulk-Power System in comparison to overall 
feasibility. Responsible entities should not have to bear unreasonable 
burdens for mitigation that yields only limited benefit. Responsible 
entities can make the determination to accept the risk-based on 
reasonable technical judgment insofar as there is no material negative 
impact to the Bulk-Power System.
    148. Entergy opposes eliminating acceptance of risk. It argues that 
acceptance of risk by senior management is a long-established practice 
and predates the CIP Reliability Standards. Because of legacy 
technology, removing this option would require expenditure of 
significant

[[Page 7384]]

additional time and money to secure equipment. Associated 
countermeasures would in many cases be of limited relevance and 
effectiveness due to the vintage of these legacy controls.
    149. With regard to CIP-007-1, MidAmerican supports the proposal to 
eliminate acceptance of risk from Requirement R2.3 but believes the 
term should remain in Requirement R3 if accompanied by a mitigation 
plan and sunset provision. MidAmerican argues that, by requiring a 
mitigation plan and a time frame for compliance, the CIP Reliability 
Standard would provide needed flexibility while maintaining the 
certainty of a committed end-date.
c. Commission Determination
    150. The Commission continues to view the term ``acceptance of 
risk'' as representing an uncontrolled exception from compliance that 
creates unnecessary uncertainty about the existence of potential 
vulnerabilities. Responsible entities should not be able to opt out of 
compliance with mandatory Reliability Standards. The Commission, 
therefore, directs the ERO to remove acceptance of risk language from 
the CIP Reliability Standards.
    151. In response to concerns raised by NERC, EEI and others, we 
agree that this action should occur through the Reliability Standards 
development process. In response to the concerns of many commenters who 
argue that it should be possible to propose alternative language, we 
note that this is consistent with the Reliability Standards development 
process. However, any alternative language that provides a similar 
opportunity for a responsible entity to opt out of compliance would be 
subject to remand. Rather, the Commission believes that alternative 
language that deals with such issues in terms of technical feasibility 
is preferable. To that end, we have adapted the concept of technical 
exceptions to encompass a broader range of valid justifications. 
Elsewhere in this Final Rule we address the criticism that our actions 
are overly prescriptive and those remarks apply equally here.
    152. Expanding the use of the technical feasibility conditions 
would address the desire for flexibility expressed by some commenters 
while providing the control that the Commission finds to be necessary. 
It would provide for documentation, reporting and approval of how 
responsible entities have elected to comply with the CIP Reliability 
Standards and thus would permit the ERO and Regional Entities to assess 
the significance of any possible vulnerability. As to the argument by 
METC-ITC that a technical feasibility exception may not be possible in 
all cases, we note that we have found that technical feasibility should 
not be limited simply to whether something is technically possible but 
also whether it is technically safe and operationally reasonable. Thus, 
this approach addresses the issue of inadequately tested patches raised 
by APPA/LPPC, and similar general concerns raised by Tampa Electric.
    153. In response to Entergy, we note that a long-established 
practice of risk acceptance by senior management does not mean that a 
continuation of this practice is appropriate under a new system of 
mandatory cyber security Reliability Standards. We have addressed 
Entergy's concerns about costs-related legacy equipment in connection 
with technical feasibility.
    154. Many commenters defend retention of the acceptance of risk 
language by pointing out that it is impossible to eliminate all risk. 
While likely true, it is beside the point. The acceptance of risk 
language in the CIP Reliability Standards fails to acknowledge that the 
real issue is whether the nature and level of inevitable risk is 
acceptable from a system-wide perspective. Within a system of CIP 
Reliability Standards intended to protect the Bulk-Power System as a 
whole, that problem can be addressed by a system that documents and 
reports the risks in question and ultimately subjects them to approval 
by the ERO or Regional Entities. The Commission's concern in the CIP 
NOPR was with the lack of appropriate controls, and eliminating 
references to acceptance of risk does not imply that all risk can be 
eliminated.
    155. We disagree with Mr. Brown that mutual distrust means that 
risks accepted by one entity do not affect others on an interconnected 
control system. A mutual distrust approach is a good security posture. 
However, its value depends on how well it is implemented. There will 
likely be a variety of levels of sophistication applied to implementing 
mutual distrust. It is not a basis for allowing other responsible 
entities to ignore their obligations under mandatory CIP Reliability 
Standards.
    156. Accordingly, the Commission directs the ERO to develop through 
its Reliability Standards development process revised CIP Reliability 
Standards that eliminate references to acceptance of risk.
3. Technical Feasibility
a. NOPR Proposal
    157. As the Commission explained in the CIP NOPR, two proposed CIP 
Reliability Standards provide exceptions from compliance with 
Requirements based on ``technical feasibility.'' \65\ The NERC Glossary 
does not define the term ``technically feasible,'' nor do the CIP 
Reliability Standards themselves specify how an entity is to determine 
whether an action is technically feasible. NERC's FAQ document provides 
the following guidance on the meaning of the phrase ``where technically 
feasible: ''

    \65\ CIP NOPR at P 68-69. The ``technically feasible'' phrase is 
found in CIP-005-1, Requirements R2.4, R2.6, R3.1, R3.2 and CIP-007-
1, Requirements R4, R5.3, R6, R6.3. Additionally, CIP-007, 
Requirement R2.3 uses ``technical limitations'' to similar effect.

    Technical feasibility refers only to engineering possibility and 
is expected to be a ``can/cannot'' determination in every 
circumstance. It is also intended to be determined in light of the 
equipment and facilities already owned by the responsible entity. 
The responsible entity is not required to replace any equipment in 
order to achieve compliance with the Cyber Security Standards. When 
existing equipment is replaced, however, the responsible entity is 
expected to use reasonable business judgment to evaluate the need to 
upgrade the equipment so that the new equipment can perform a 
particular specified technical function in order to meet the 
requirements of these standards.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ FAQ document at 1.

    158. Based on these concerns, the Commission proposed in the CIP 
NOPR to allow, in the near term, exceptions from compliance based on 
the concept of ``technical feasibility'' in a limited set of 
circumstances, but also stated that responsible entities should not be 
permitted to invoke technical feasibility on the basis of ``reasonable 
business judgment.'' In addition, a responsible entity should not be 
able to except itself unilaterally from a Requirement of a mandatory 
CIP Reliability Standard with no oversight.
    159. Thus, the Commission proposed in the CIP NOPR to direct that 
the ERO establish a structure to require accountability from those who 
rely on ``technical feasibility'' as the basis for an exception. The 
CIP NOPR described such a structure as requiring a responsible entity 
to: (1) Develop and implement interim mitigation steps to address the 
vulnerabilities associated with each exception; (2) develop and 
implement a remediation plan to eliminate the exception, including 
interim milestones and a reasonable completion date; and (3) obtain 
written

[[Page 7385]]

approval of these steps by the senior manager assigned with overall 
responsibility for leading and managing the entity's implementation of, 
and adherence to, the CIP Reliability Standards as provided in CIP-003-
1, Requirement R2.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ CIP NOPR at P 79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    160. The Commission stated in the CIP NOPR that this proposed 
structure should include a review by senior management of the 
expediency and effectiveness of the manner in which a responsible 
entity has addressed each of these three proposed conditions. In 
addition, the Commission proposed to require a responsible entity to 
report and justify to the ERO and the Regional Entity for approval each 
exception and its expected duration. In situations where any of the 
proposed conditions are not satisfied, the Commission proposed that the 
ERO or the Regional Entity would inform the responsible entity that its 
claim to an exception based on technical feasibility is insufficient 
and therefore not approved. Failure to timely rectify the deficiency 
would invalidate the exception for compliance purposes.
    161. The Commission stated its belief that it is important that the 
ERO, Regional Entities and the Commission understand the circumstances 
and manner in which responsible entities invoke the technical 
feasibility provision as well as other provisions that function as 
exceptions to the CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission, therefore, 
proposed to direct the ERO to submit an annual report that would 
include, at a minimum, the frequency of the use of such provisions, the 
circumstances or justifications that prompt their use, the interim 
mitigation measures used to address the vulnerabilities, and the 
milestone schedule to eliminate them and to bring the entities into 
compliance to eliminate future reliance on the exception.
    162. The Commission sought comment on additional categories of 
information that should be included in the content of this report that 
would be useful for the Commission, as well as the ERO and Regional 
Entities, in evaluating the invocation of technical feasibility and 
similar provisions, and the impact on protection of critical assets.
    163. Finally, the Commission proposed to direct the ERO to consider 
making ``technically feasible,'' and derivative forms of that phrase as 
used in the CIP Reliability Standards, defined terms in the NERC 
Glossary, pursuant to the prior clarifications, without any reference 
to reasonable business judgment.
    164. Below, we first address issues related to the general 
rationale underlying technical feasibility exceptions. We then address 
issues connected with documentation of exceptions and their remediation 
and mitigation. Finally, we address the approval of these exceptions.
b. Technical Feasibility Generally
i. Comments
    165. Numerous commenters focused on the need for technical 
feasibility exceptions generally and their underlying rationale. Most 
support technical feasibility exceptions in some form.
    166. Texas Commission expresses concern that technical feasibility 
could be used to justify inaction. It states that flexibility can be 
achieved by other means, but if reference to technical feasibility is 
retained, responsible entities should not be allowed to use it to avoid 
taking necessary action. Texas Commission comments that it is 
reasonable to develop a process under which entities with known 
vulnerabilities self-report to NERC and the Regional Entity and provide 
a timeline for correcting these deficiencies.
    167. NERC states that the Commission properly recognized the 
appropriateness of an exception based on technical feasibility and 
suggests that it be designated an ``exemption for reliability.'' \68\ 
NERC supports clarification of the Reliability Standards to ensure that 
an exemption is documented and justified in terms of its impact on 
Bulk-Power System reliability. ReliabilityFirst makes similar 
proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ NERC comments at 20-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    168. NERC and others believe that the appropriate way to address 
the Commission's specific proposed directives is through the 
Commission-approved Reliability Standards development process.\69\ 
Northern California supports the Commission's recommendation that the 
ERO re-examine and clarify the meaning of technical feasibility and 
provide guidance on the appropriate procedures for claiming an 
exemption based on it. Ontario IESO comments that, if the term 
reasonable business judgment is removed from the CIP Reliability 
Standards, industry and the ERO may find other areas where the concept 
of technical feasibility is applicable when revising the CIP 
Reliability Standards. NRECA states that technical feasibility is a 
matter on which the Commission should defer to the ERO's technical 
expertise and not adhere to a one-size-fits-all approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ E.g., Alliant, Manitoba Hydro, Northern California and 
NRECA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    169. NERC explains that the CIP Reliability Standards include 
references to technical feasibility to recognize that, in many cases, 
equipment in place in substation and generating plant environments was 
implemented with operational functions paramount to all other 
considerations, including security. This equipment is not at the end of 
its useful life and historically has not been designed with ready 
access to software updates and patches. Such software upgrades that 
could increase functionality without directly contributing to 
reliability generally have not been made. NERC states that modern 
replacement equipment is more readily compatible with an environment 
where updates and patches are more commonplace and security 
functionality is an understood necessity. Securable equipment will be 
used when equipment is replaced due to natural end-of-life or failure, 
but this modern equipment represents a very small percentage of the 
installed base of all cyber equipment in substations and generating 
plants.
    170. Many commenters, including APPA/LPPC, Duke, Entergy, NRECA and 
ReliabilityFirst, concur with this explanation of rationale for the 
references to technical feasibility. Duke agrees that technical 
feasibility exceptions should be controlled, but it argues that 
replacing legacy equipment on an accelerated schedule could create 
industry-wide logistical problems and unwarranted ratepayer impacts. 
NRECA maintains that rapid replacement of equipment would mean costs 
for customers, could overwhelm the supply chain, and could lead to 
premature obsolescence of replacement equipment as security technology 
continues to improve. Consumers Energy states that technical 
feasibility exceptions are proposed as a last resort that is forced by 
the limitations of available technology, support and service 
limitations of existing technology, and as-built limitations.
    171. Entergy maintains that the older equipment in question 
generally cannot be compromised through typical hacker techniques, and 
physical access to it is often required. This presents greater 
challenges for attackers and means that only local impact will result 
from a successful attack. Entergy recommends allowing industry three to 
five years to upgrade critical assets with modern cyber controls that 
will provide the needed operational efficiency

[[Page 7386]]

improvements and that would be properly secured as a matter of course.
    172. ReliabilityFirst notes that a very small percentage of the 
installed base of all cyber equipment in substations and power plants 
incorporates security functionality. Consumers Energy explains that 
older control systems can still be very reliable, but many assets 
identified as critical cyber assets do not have malware and virus 
protection, in some cases due to technology conflicts with virus and 
malware protection systems. In addition, managing updates on devices 
that are continuously online is a difficult task. Consumers Energy 
states that there are adequate alternate measures in such cases such as 
firewalls with content security functions that restrict any options for 
infecting systems with viruses and that implement intrusion detection 
for the perimeter with advanced content security services.
    173. NERC states that the drafting team believed that cyber 
security standards should not unnecessarily impede the primary mission 
of maintaining reliable Bulk-Power System operations. NERC and 
ReliabilityFirst argue that changes must be carefully planned and 
tested to ensure that no unintended consequences occur. Technologies 
are constantly evolving, and it is impractical to think that equipment 
always can maintain a leading-edge cyber security posture without 
introducing operating issues.
    174. Manitoba Hydro states that industry attempted to strike a 
balance for security at the various types of facilities while 
recognizing the large base of legacy systems at remote locations. The 
security framework focused on routable protocols and dial up access. 
The Commission's proposals to limit technical feasibility exceptions 
and implement a defense in depth measure in front of legacy systems 
would have a nominal impact on control centers but a significant impact 
on other facilities, systems and equipment, forcing unjustified early 
equipment replacement or installation of technology to provide 
mitigating controls. Manitoba Hydro argues that modifying the 
Reliability Standards on this point could add considerable work for 
responsible entities and require modifications to the implementation 
period.
    175. Northern Indiana, Ontario Power and SoCal Edison support 
retaining the term technical feasibility. Ontario Power maintains that 
removing references to technical feasibility could be interpreted by 
some to mean that mandatory compliance is required, regardless of the 
cost, the impact on production systems, or the risk to the Bulk-Power 
System. Northern Indiana concurs with the Commission's proposal to 
treat instances of technical infeasibility as exceptions that require 
reporting and certain alternative courses of action. However, it 
disagrees with what it describes as the Commission's restrictive 
interpretation of the term and urges the Commission to acknowledge that 
technical infeasibility may apply to future assets as well. Northern 
Indiana advocates that the Commission instead direct NERC to interpret 
technical feasibility narrowly with regard to the technical 
characteristics of both existing and future assets. Northern Indiana 
states that the Commission should not assume technical infeasibility 
will exist only during the transition period and not afterwards, nor 
should it assume only one single means will exist, on a going forward 
basis, to comply with the Reliability Standards.
    176. Mr. Brown states that technical feasibility has less to do 
with whether to comply than with how to comply. Whether or not 
something is technically feasible is purely an engineering issue. On 
the other hand, whether or when to replace equipment that cannot do 
something due to technical feasibility with equipment that can do so is 
purely a managerial decision. Mr. Brown states that in light of his 
interpretation of reasonable business judgment, the Commission should 
have much less concern about the interplay between technical 
feasibility and reasonable business judgment.
    177. Teltone states that it is now easy to incorporate CIP-related 
features such as two-factor authentication (with unique user names and 
passwords) to both dial-up and Internet protocol devices without 
replacing them, upgrading their software, or taking them offline. 
Access and usage logging of legacy devices at substations is easily 
accomplished, something Teltone maintains should quell the problem of 
technical feasibility.
ii. Commission Determination
    178. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal and directs the 
ERO to develop a set of conditions or criteria that a responsible 
entity must follow when relying on the technical feasibility exception 
contained in specific Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards. We 
will modify some of our proposed criteria for that framework of 
accountability further below. We are persuaded by commenters that the 
proposed conditions for invoking the technical feasibility exception 
should allow for operational considerations. In response to Northern 
Indiana and other commenters, we note that the Commission did not 
propose to eliminate references to technical feasibility from the CIP 
Reliability Standards, only that the term be interpreted narrowly and 
without reference to considerations of business judgment.
    179. In response to those commenters who argue that the 
Commission's concerns and directives should be addressed through the 
Reliability Standards development process, we agree that to the degree 
revisions to the Reliability Standards are necessary to address our 
concerns, they would be made through that process. We disagree, 
however, with the arguments that claim we are rewriting the CIP 
Reliability Standards or adhering to a one-size-fits-all approach. With 
respect to the latter point, we note that technical feasibility issues 
are by their nature something that must be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis, as they only arise in specific circumstances. Our concern here 
is primarily with the framework within which decisions on technical 
feasibility are made and ensuring that this framework promotes sound 
decisions that lead to effective results. The oversight provisions we 
describe below are essential elements of such a framework.
    180. We agree with NERC and other commenters on the underlying 
rationale for a technical feasibility exception, i.e., that there is 
long-life equipment in place that is not readily compatible with a 
modern environment where cyber security issues are an acknowledged 
concern. While equipment replacement will often be appropriate to 
comply with the CIP Reliability Standards, such as in instances where 
equipment is near the end of its useful life or when alternative or 
supplemental security measures are not possible, we acknowledge that 
the possibility of being required to replace equipment before the end 
of its useful life is a valid concern.
    181. The Commission, however, disagrees with Northern Indiana that 
technical feasibility should be interpreted to apply to future assets 
also. The justification presented for technical feasibility exceptions 
is rooted in the problem of long-life legacy equipment and the economic 
considerations involved in the replacement of such equipment before the 
end of its useful life. We recognize that these considerations can be 
valid in some cases, but Northern Indiana has not explained why 
technical feasibility exceptions should apply to replacement equipment. 
The Commission neither assumes that technical infeasibility issues will 
be present only during the transition period, nor does it assume

[[Page 7387]]

that on a going forward basis there will be only one single means to 
comply with the CIP Reliability Standards. It does assume, however, 
that all responsible entities eventually will be able to achieve full 
compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards when the legacy equipment 
that creates the need for the exception is supplemented, upgraded or 
replaced.
    182. The Commission agrees with various commenters that the 
implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards should not be permitted 
to have an adverse effect on reliability and that proper implementation 
requires that care be taken to avoid unintended consequences. We thus 
believe it is important to clarify that the meaning of ``technical 
feasibility'' should not be limited simply to whether something is 
technically possible but also whether it is technically safe and 
operationally reasonable.
    183. We disagree with Mr. Brown's view that whether or when to 
replace equipment that cannot do something due to technical feasibility 
with equipment that can do so is purely a managerial decision, 
especially since he intertwines this proposition with the concept of 
reasonable business judgment. While we accept NERC's rationale for 
technical feasibility exceptions, as discussed below, an integral issue 
in individual cases where legacy equipment presents a technical 
feasibility issue is whether an alternative course of action protects 
the reliability of the Bulk-Power System to an equal or greater degree 
than compliance would. This is not a purely managerial decision 
involving reasonable business judgment, regardless of what meaning one 
imparts to that term.
    184. While a number of commenters agree that it is important to 
clarify the meaning of technical feasibility, none appear to support 
defining the term in the NERC Glossary. Therefore, in light of the 
comments received generally and the specific guidance that we are 
providing to the ERO in connection with technical feasibility, we 
conclude that a definition of this type is unnecessary. A definition 
cannot substitute for a framework of conditions or criteria to provide 
accountability, and if those conditions or criteria are implemented, a 
definition is not needed. We do not agree with NERC that replacing the 
term technical feasibility with ``exemption for reliability'' would be 
helpful. We note, in particular, that an ``exemption'' normally is 
understood to be a release from an obligation whereas what is under 
discussion here is an exception that forms an alternative obligation.
    185. While the Commission will not address the merits of any 
particular technology, we note that Teltone's comments raise an 
important general consideration when developing policy on technical 
feasibility. While technical limitations present real issues, and while 
one should not be overly optimistic that technological developments 
will resolve them sooner than expected, one should not be overly 
pessimistic either. Indeed, high standards should, if anything, 
encourage the development of technical solutions.
    186. Based on the above considerations, the Commission adopts its 
proposal in the CIP NOPR that technical feasibility exceptions may be 
permitted if appropriate conditions are in place. The term technical 
feasibility should be interpreted narrowly to not include 
considerations of business judgment, but we agree with commenters that 
it should include operational and safety considerations.
c. Technical Feasibility Exception Mitigation and Remediation
    187. As mentioned above, in the CIP NOPR, the Commission proposed a 
three step structure to require accountability when a responsible 
entity relies on technical feasibility as the basis for an exception. 
This proposed structure would require a responsible entity to: (1) 
Develop and implement interim mitigation steps to address the 
vulnerabilities associated with each exception; (2) develop and 
implement a remediation plan to eliminate the exception, including 
interim milestones and a reasonable completion date; and (3) obtain 
written approval of these steps by the senior manager assigned with 
overall responsibility for leading and managing the entity's 
implementation of, and adherence to, the CIP Reliability Standards, 
along with regional approval through the ERO.
i. Comments
    188. NERC supports clarification of the CIP Reliability Standards 
to ensure that the use of a technical feasibility exemption must be 
documented and justified in terms of its impact on Bulk-Power System 
reliability. Duke also agrees with the proposal to require 
documentation, including appropriate mitigation and a senior 
management-approved remediation plan.
    189. National Grid states that the Commission's mitigation proposal 
is reasonable and appropriate, but it maintains that the Commission 
should clarify that acceptable mitigation for older assets entails 
measures short of replacement, upgrades, or retrofits. A mitigation 
requirement otherwise would undermine any relief associated with an 
exception. Mitigation measures for vulnerabilities associated with 
older assets will need to be in place as long as those assets remain in 
service. National Grid states that the Commission's references to 
``interim'' mitigation and remediation implementation milestones could 
suggest that older assets must be replaced before the end of their 
useful lives or that the mitigation measures would not be as effective 
as the solutions codified in the Reliability Standards. National Grid 
argues that mitigation measures should be as or more effective than 
compliance, and in the case of minor technical or administrative 
requirements, replacement of certain assets before the end of their 
useful lives would be wasteful and inefficient.
    190. SPP believes it is reasonable to treat technical feasibility 
as a documented exception. Such exceptions should be reviewed and 
approved annually, but identifying a reasonable completion date for 
remediation may not always be possible. SPP states that to require 
remediation of a technical feasibility exception by a date certain is 
contrary to the Commission's acknowledgement that cost can be a 
prohibiting factor. Technical limitations may prohibit compliance with 
a requirement. The appropriate response in such cases is to mitigate 
the risk by implementing compensating measures. SPP questions the need 
for remediation where compensating measures are equally effective in 
reducing risk. It recommends that responsible entities be required 
initially to mitigate the risk and then evaluate and document whether 
further remediation is required and technically feasible as part of the 
exception approval process.
    191. Northern Indiana believes a remediation plan should seek to 
eliminate the exception to the extent possible, but complete 
elimination may not be possible in all cases. Northern Indiana states 
that the Commission should consider the development and implementation 
of a remediation plan to eliminate the exception to the extent 
possible. Tampa Electric submits that it is unreasonable to require a 
remediation plan in every case. Sometimes there is no technology that 
would permit compliance with the letter of the CIP Reliability 
Standard.
ii. Commission Determination
    192. With some minor refinements discussed below, the Commission 
adopts the CIP NOPR proposal for a

[[Page 7388]]

three step structure to require accountability when a responsible 
entity relies on technical feasibility as the basis for an exception. 
We address mitigation and remediation in this section and direct the 
ERO to develop: (1) A requirement that the responsible entity must 
develop, document and implement a mitigation plan that achieves a 
comparable level of security to the Requirement; and (2) a requirement 
that use of the technical feasibility exception by a responsible entity 
must be accompanied by a remediation plan and timeline for eliminating 
the use of the technical feasibility exception. While the CIP NOPR 
proposed that each remediation plan contain a reasonable completion 
date, the Commission is persuaded by the comments of National Grid and 
SPP that a date certain for remediation may not be possible in some 
instances. While we expect remediation by a date certain to be the 
norm, we will not require a date certain for remediation in every 
instance that a responsible entity invokes the technical feasibility 
exception. An entity must provide an explanation when it believes that 
it is not possible for a remediation plan to provide a reasonable 
completion date.
    193. We also agree with Northern Indiana that in some instances 
remediation can be required only to the extent possible. For example, 
in some cases it may never be possible to enclose certain critical 
cyber assets within a six-sided physical boundary as required under 
CIP-006-1. However, such cases need to be sufficiently justified, the 
mitigation strategies must be ongoing and effective, and the 
justification must be subject to periodic review. We also are mindful 
that accelerated replacement of equipment can be economically wasteful 
where security is not otherwise compromised. We thus agree with 
National Grid that where mitigation measures are as or more effective 
than compliance, and in the case of minor technical or administrative 
requirements, replacement of certain assets before the end of their 
useful lives can be wasteful and inefficient. We also agree with SPP 
that remediation might not be necessary where compensating measures are 
equally effective in reducing risk. However, such cases must be subject 
to clear criteria and periodic review and, where necessary, updates.
    194. However, in adopting this approach, we do not intend to 
suggest that it would never be necessary to replace equipment before 
the end of its useful life to achieve cyber security goals. Where 
equipment is near the end of its useful life or if insufficient 
mitigation measures are available, the equipment should be replaced. 
However, such situations must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. We 
emphasize that responsible entities must protect assets that are 
critical to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.
d. Approval and Control of Specific Exceptions
    195. This section discusses the Commission's directions with regard 
to approval of a technical feasibility exception, the third component 
of our framework for allowing technical feasibility exceptions. As 
described above, the CIP NOPR proposed that NERC develop a requirement 
that a responsible entity relying on the technical feasibility 
exception must obtain written approval of a remediation plan by a 
senior manager.\70\ The Commission also proposed that the responsible 
entity report and justify to the ERO and the Regional Entity for 
approval of each exception. In addition, the Commission proposed to 
direct that the ERO submit an annual report regarding industry use of 
the technical feasibility exception.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ CIP NOPR at P 79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments
    196. California Commission states that approval of technical 
feasibility exceptions by the ERO and the relevant Regional Entity is 
critical because it prevents attempts to manipulate the system and 
induces responsible action.
    197. National Grid supports providing Regional Entities with notice 
of technical feasibility exceptions and audits of exceptions by 
Regional Entities. It states that a central clearinghouse that catalogs 
all technical feasibility exceptions would be helpful because of the 
interdependencies among the Bulk-Power System assets. This 
clearinghouse could verify whether reliance on exceptions (or the 
associated mitigation measures) adequately maintains reliability and 
does not create reliability issues for neighboring systems. ISO-NE 
states that reporting exceptions to Regional Entities would be useful 
in identifying CIP Reliability Standards and Requirements with frequent 
implementation issues that call for modifications.
    198. In contrast, ISO/RTO Council, EEI and others do not believe 
that reporting and approval of technical feasibility exceptions is 
appropriate.\71\ EEI states it does not believe that NERC or the 
Regional Entities have the technical expertise to make these types of 
determinations. ISO-NE states it is unlikely that either Regional 
Entities or the ERO will have the necessary skills to evaluate the 
broad spectrum of situations that the industry presents. MidAmerican 
states that requiring ERO and Regional Entity approval would burden 
those entities, create delays, and divert resources away from more 
urgent cyber security concerns. Tampa Electric states that the 
Commission should ensure that delays do not interfere with timely 
compliance by responsible entities. Idaho Power believes that the 
Commission's proposals on technical feasibility would place 
administrative burdens on both company and the Regional Entities that 
outweigh the benefits. Idaho Power sees little value in policing the 
use of the technical feasibility exception with such a burdensome 
administrative process that may, in the end, delay the resolution of 
legitimate technical feasibility issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ E.g., FirstEnergy, ISO-NE, KCPL, SERC-CIPC and SoCal 
Edison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    199. ReliabilityFirst argues that a responsible entity's senior 
manager must already approve any exceptions, making reporting and 
approval unnecessary, and it will be very difficult for the ERO or 
Regional Entity staff to review a responsible entity's exceptions 
effectively and assess them realistically. SERC-CIPC recommends that 
the requirement to authorize and document exceptions remain with the 
entity's designated senior manager.
    200. ISO/RTO Council argues that granting the Regional Entities 
authority to adjudicate exceptions along with the ability to apply 
sanctions for non-compliance creates a conflict of interest. Auditors 
should be independent, and an assessor should not be involved with 
review and approval of policy exceptions. ISO/RTO Council argues that 
instead of requiring that exceptions be reported and justified, the 
Commission should consider directing the ERO to detail the type of 
justifications and considerations that must be documented when invoking 
a technical feasibility exemption. Responsible entities would then be 
required to incorporate them into their analysis of possible 
exemptions.
    201. EEI, OGE and SoCal Edison question how the ERO and Regional 
Entities would determine what is technically feasible for a particular 
model of equipment in a specific context. If there is to be external 
review and approval, there should be an appeals process, and that would 
delay implementation of future revisions to the CIP Reliability 
Standards. Alliant, EEI and Tampa Electric believe that NERC should 
require that decisions on technically feasible be subject to audits

[[Page 7389]]

that are ultimately reported to the Commission. Duke, KCPL and SoCal 
Edison maintain that evaluation of technical feasibility issues should 
be left to compliance audits.
    202. Northern Indiana seeks clarification of the information that 
will be needed to justify an exception. It suggests that, similar to 
the Commission's proposed approach regarding self-certification, a 
responsible entity should have the opportunity to consult with the ERO 
and Regional Entities. Northern Indiana also advocates the waiver of 
monetary penalties during this time as well as within the timeframe of 
any remediation plan.
    203. APPA/LPPC state that the Commission should clarify that when a 
Regional Entity or the ERO rejects a technical feasibility exception 
request, the responsible entity may rely on the exception until it has 
been ruled upon. In addition, the organization should be allowed a 
reasonable time to come into compliance.
    204. Entergy states that there is no indication that the benefits 
of reporting exceptions would outweigh the detriments, but if further 
reporting is required, it recommends a single annual report from each 
registered entity that includes a summary description of the exceptions 
and actions taken or to be taken. The ERO could use this report to 
satisfy its annual reporting requirement.
    205. A number of other commenters emphasize the sensitivity of 
information about technical feasibility exceptions. SPP states that an 
annual report must contain information that qualifies as Critical 
Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) to be of any value. SERC-CIPC 
also recommends CEII treatment for this information. SPP is concerned 
that if the report is not treated as CEII, sensitive data could be 
inadvertently made public. To protect against disclosure, SPP proposes 
that the ERO could make exception documentation available for 
Commission staff inspection in the ERO offices as a possible 
alternative to a report. National Grid states that information about 
exceptions should be subject to adequate information protection 
controls to avoid disclosure and misuse.
    206. Duke opposes an annual report by the ERO to the Commission 
because, even if it does not contain CEII, it will compromise security 
by publicly identifying problem areas for the industry and the 
mitigation measures being employed. If a report must be submitted, 
there must be stringent and enforceable confidentiality measures to 
prevent inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure. OGE believes reporting 
and approval for all exceptions is contrary to the purpose of the CIP 
Reliability Standards because information on exceptions sent to the ERO 
or Regional Entity could indicate weaknesses in security that could be 
compromised and exposed. These same concerns lead Xcel to urge that 
Regional Entities develop confidentiality protocols for such 
communications.
    207. ISO-NE states that detailed technical descriptions of 
exceptions should not be passed to the Regional Entities or the ERO 
because the information would be potential vulnerability information 
that the responsible entity should protect as critical cyber asset 
information under CIP-003-1, Requirement R4. Tampa Electric states 
that, if the Commission decides to require ERO or Regional Entity 
review, it should also prescribe controls to ensure the confidentiality 
and security of the information under review.
    208. Although not commenting specifically on reporting of technical 
feasibility issues, Bonneville notes that under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), release of information to an external party 
generally waives any privileges against disclosure with respect to 
subsequent requests to the federal agency for that same information. 
Bonneville is concerned that submission of critical asset information 
to the Regional Entity, particularly the vulnerability-related 
rationales for including and excluding various facilities on the 
critical asset list, may act as such a waiver.
ii. Commission Determination
    209. For the reasons discussed below, the Commission concludes that 
technical feasibility exceptions should be reported and justified and 
subject to approval by the ERO or the relevant Regional Entity. The 
Commission thus adopts its CIP NOPR proposal that use and 
implementation of technical feasibility exceptions must be governed by 
a clear set of criteria. However, because we are persuaded by the 
commenters, we have modified certain elements of our original proposal, 
as discussed below.
    210. Most objections to the CIP NOPR proposal regarding the review 
and approval of technical feasibility exceptions are not objections in 
principle but rather focus on practical issues of implementation, such 
as limited ERO and Regional Entity resources and sensitivity of the 
information in question. To the extent that objections in principle 
have been raised, we disagree. Thus, we disagree with 
ReliabilityFirst's argument that senior manager approval of exceptions 
is unnecessary because of the responsibilities already assigned to the 
senior manager by CIP-003-1. These technical feasibility exceptions 
implicate matters that go beyond the purview of individual responsible 
entities and must be subject to review and approval by those with a 
wider-area view and general responsibility for system reliability. We 
also disagree with the ISO/RTO Council that the Commission should 
simply direct the ERO to detail the type of justifications and 
considerations that must be documented when invoking a technical 
feasibility exemption. While such guidance could be useful, it cannot 
substitute for reporting, review, and approval, which is necessary to 
address concerns that extend beyond the reach of an individual 
responsible entity.
    211. With regard to the senior management approval, we continue to 
believe that internal approval is an important component of an overall 
framework of accountability with regard to use of the technical 
feasibility exception. Therefore, we adopt this aspect of our CIP NIPR 
proposal and direct the ERO to include approval of the mitigation and 
remediation steps by the senior manager (identified pursuant to CIP-
003-1) in the course of developing this framework of accountability.
    212. However, the practical considerations pointed out by a number 
of the comments have convinced us to adopt an approach to the issue of 
external oversight different from the one originally proposed. We 
agree, in particular, with those commenters who argue that pre-approval 
could tax ERO and Regional Entity resources, delay implementation, and 
possibly create undue risks that sensitive information will be 
disclosed.
    213. The Commission agrees with National Grid that Regional 
Entities should, in the first instance, receive and catalogue notices 
of technical feasibility exceptions that are claimed. Such notices must 
include estimates of the degree to which mitigation measures achieve 
the goals set by a CIP Reliability Standard and be in sufficient detail 
to allow verification of whether reliance on exceptions (or the 
associated mitigation measures) adequately maintains reliability and 
does not create reliability issues for neighboring systems. Initial 
submission of notices should be provided by responsible entities at 
least by the ``Compliant'' stage of implementation in order to allow 
Regional Entities to plan for

[[Page 7390]]

auditing exceptions, as described in more detail below.
    214. The Commission also agrees with National Grid, EEI and others 
that actual evaluation and approval of technical feasibility exceptions 
should be performed in the first instance in the audit process. This 
would allow assessment of exceptions within their specific context and 
thus facilitate greater understanding in evaluating individual 
exceptions, as well as related mitigation steps and remediation plans. 
This also would increase the amount of sensitive information that 
remains on-site and reduces the risk of improper disclosure. In 
addition, it will allow the ERO and Regional Entities, informed by the 
initial notices discussed above, to include personnel in audit teams 
with sufficient expertise to judge the need for a technical feasibility 
exception and the sufficiency of preferred mitigation measures.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ General reliance on the audit process does not preclude the 
Commission, the ERO or a Regional Entity from exercising its 
authority to review a claimed exception, whether resulting from a 
complaint, an incident or on its own initiative outside of the audit 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    215. Given the significance of technical feasibility exceptions, 
the Commission believes that initial audits of technical feasibility 
exceptions should be expedited, i.e., performed earlier than otherwise, 
including moving the audit to an earlier year. Also, in general, 
responsible entities claiming such exceptions should receive higher 
priority when determining which entities to audit, and the more 
exceptions an entity has, the higher the priority for audit should be. 
Further, NERC may provide an appeals process for the review of 
technical feasibility exceptions, if it determines that this is 
appropriate.
    216. However, the Commission notes that the audit process is a 
Regional Entity and ERO process, and audit team findings regarding 
exceptions are subject to Regional Entity and ERO review. The 
Commission believes that the audit report should form the basis for ERO 
or Regional Entity approval of individual exceptions. Approval thus 
represents a determination on compliance with the applicable CIP 
Reliability Standards, and we disagree with the ISO/RTO Council that 
approval of technical feasibility exceptions raises any conflict of 
interest or due process concerns. The proposed procedures raise no 
special issues in this respect.
    217. We agree with EEI and others that approvals and potential 
appeals should not be allowed to delay implementation, but we believe 
our revised proposal resolves this problem. We also agree with APPA/
LPPC that responsible entities should be able to rely on a technical 
feasibility exception prior to formal approval. However, we disagree 
with Northern Indiana that penalties should be waived within the time 
when an approved remediation plan is being implemented, as proper 
implementation of the plan itself constitutes a necessary element of 
compliance.
    218. In summary, on the issues pertaining to external approval of a 
responsible entity's use of the technical feasibility exception, rather 
than a pre-approval process, we direct the ERO to design and conduct an 
approval process through the Regional Entities and the compliance audit 
process. This process should require the ERO or a Regional Entity to 
approve any technical feasibility exception, taking into account 
whether the technical feasibility exception is needed and whether the 
mitigation and remediation steps are adequate to the circumstance.
    219. We agree with comments emphasizing the importance of 
protecting sensitive information relating to technical feasibility 
exceptions. We agree with SPP and others that CEII treatment should be 
available for any such information. In response to Bonneville, we agree 
that a governmental entity subject to FOIA requirements should not be 
required to submit sensitive information about critical assets or 
critical cyber assets that could be deemed a waiver of FOIA protection 
that is otherwise available. Nonetheless, a governmental entity's 
decision to rely on a technical feasibility exception should also be 
subject to appropriate oversight and accountability. Thus, we direct 
NERC, in developing the accountability structure for the technical 
feasibility exception, to include appropriate provisions to assure that 
governmental entities that are subject to Reliability Standards as 
users, owners or operators of the Bulk-Power System can safeguard 
sensitive information.
    220. As stated in the CIP NOPR, the Commission believes that it is 
important that the ERO, Regional Entities and the Commission understand 
the circumstances and manner in which responsible entities invoke the 
technical feasibility exception.\73\ Accordingly, we direct the ERO to 
submit an annual report to the Commission that provides a wide-area 
analysis regarding use of the technical feasibility exception and the 
effect on Bulk-Power System reliability. The annual report must 
address, at a minimum, the frequency of the use of such provisions, the 
circumstances or justifications that prompt their use, the interim 
mitigation measures used to address vulnerabilities, and efforts to 
eliminate future reliance on the exception.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ CIP NOPR at P 80.
    \74\ Responsible entities must cooperate with the ERO and the 
Regional Entities in providing information deemed necessary for the 
ERO to fulfill its reporting obligation to the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    221. While we agree with commenters that the compilation of data 
for the annual report must not compromise the security of the Bulk-
Power System, we disagree that this is a reason not to require the 
report. Rather, as we indicated in the CIP NOPR, the report should not 
provide a level of detail that divulges CEII data. Rather, the report 
should contain aggregated data with sufficient detail for the 
Commission to understand the frequency with which specific provisions 
are being invoked as well as high level data regarding mitigation and 
remediation plans over time and by region. Further, we direct the ERO 
to control and protect the data analysis to the extent necessary to 
ensure that sensitive information is not jeopardized by the act of 
submitting the report to the Commission.
e. Conclusion
    222. In conclusion, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we 
direct the ERO to develop a set of criteria to provide accountability 
when a responsible entity relies on the technical feasibility 
exceptions in specific Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards. 
As discussed above, structural elements of this framework include 
mitigation steps, a remediation plan, a timeline for eliminating use of 
the technical feasibility exception unless appropriate justification 
otherwise is provided, regular review of whether it continues to be 
necessary to invoke the exception, internal approval by the senior 
manager, wide-area approval through the ERO's audit process, and 
cooperation with the ERO to provide the Commission with high-level, 
wide-area analysis regarding the effects the technical feasibility 
exception on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. We direct the 
ERO to develop appropriate modifications, as discussed above.

G. Use of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Standards in Developing Future Revisions to the CIP Reliability 
Standards

1. NOPR Proposal
    223. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that it expects NERC

[[Page 7391]]

to monitor the development and implementation of the NIST standards to 
determine if they contain provisions that will better protect the Bulk-
Power System.\75\ The CIP NOPR also stated that it expects the ERO to 
consult with federal entities that are subject to both the CIP 
Reliability Standards and NIST standards on the effectiveness of the 
latter. While the Commission declined to propose that NERC incorporate 
specific provisions of NIST into the CIP Reliability Standards, it 
indicated that it may revisit the issue in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ CIP NOPR at P 88.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    224. Congressional Representatives filed comments expressing their 
support for the Commission's efforts to require NERC to develop 
modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards. However, they believe 
that Bulk-Power System reliability will be better protected by cyber 
security standards that incorporate the security measures set forth in 
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 as applied to industrial control 
systems. Congressional Representatives state that NIST research 
prepared a technical report comparing the proposed CIP Reliability 
Standards with SP 800-53. This technical report found that an 
organization conforming to the baseline set of security controls in SP 
800-53 will also comply with the management, operational and technical 
security requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards, though the 
converse may not be true. The technical report concluded that the CIP 
Reliability Standards are both ``inadequate for protecting critical 
national infrastructure,'' and ``inadequate for all electric energy 
systems when the impact of regional and national power outages is 
considered.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Congressional Representatives comments at 9, citing 
Marshall D. Abrams, ``Addressing Industrial Control Systems in NIST 
Special Publication 800-53,'' MITRE Technical Report (March 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    225. Further, Congressional Representatives point out that federal 
government-owned elements of the Bulk-Power System must comply with 
both CIP Reliability Standards and NIST SP 800-53, while privately 
owned elements must comply only with the former. They express concern 
that ``inconsistent regulatory structures create weak links and 
potential vulnerabilities in the entire system.'' \77\ Congressional 
Representatives, therefore, urge the Commission to modify the CIP 
Reliability Standards to incorporate aspects of SP 800-53 and the 
related NIST standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    226. NIST itself compliments the Commission for proposing a 
derivative of the CIP Reliability Standards that is an improvement over 
the original NERC CIP Reliability Standards. However, according to 
NIST, the CIP NOPR proposal still falls short of meeting the federal 
mandatory minimum security measures set forth in NIST Special 
Publication (SP) 800-53 as applied to industrial control systems. In 
NIST's view, the CIP Reliability Standards, if modified pursuant to the 
proposals in the CIP NOPR, will leave information systems that support 
private sector bulk electric power systems less protected than 
comparable federal information systems. NIST suggests that the 
Commission consider strengthening the minimum controls currently 
required by the CIP Reliability Standards.
    227. NIST recommends that the Commission adopt the CIP Reliability 
Standards with the enhancements proposed by the Commission as an 
interim measure. Additionally, NIST advocates that the Commission 
prescribe plans for a two to three year transition to cyber security 
Reliability Standards that are identical to, consistent with, or based 
on SP 800-53 and related NIST standards and guidelines. NIST argues 
that this approach would strengthen the CIP Reliability Standards.
    228. Although Entergy states that it generally disagrees with the 
Commission's approach of dictating specific revisions that the ERO must 
adopt, if the Commission determines that the CIP Reliability Standards 
require further development, Entergy argues that the Commission should 
modify its approach to the NIST Framework and require the ERO to 
consider it as a resource in developing revisions to the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Entergy argues that the industry needs 
immediate, clear direction and there already exists guidance that the 
Commission can rely on to provide such direction. Entergy notes that 
the NIST ``Security Risk Management Framework'' has been developed over 
many years by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The NIST Framework is 
devoid of conflicts of interest and has been broadly vetted, both 
domestically and internationally.
    229. SDG&E states that, while it welcomes the use of industry 
standards in NERC CIP compliance, it cautions that NIST standards 
provide many controls that are considered best practices. It also 
explains that NIST was developed for government and some NIST standards 
that work well for government may be cost-prohibitive in the private 
sector.
    230. Bonneville understands the Commission's directive that NERC 
consider NIST standards in the further development of the CIP 
Reliability Standards to apply to CIP-003-1. Bonneville suggests that 
existing guidelines, such as the NIST Special Publications, should be 
incorporated to the extent practicable. Bonneville argues that creating 
another set of directives describing how the standards are to be met 
without incorporating, or at least considering, existing guidelines 
could create considerable confusion and conflict.
    231. Applied Control Solutions urges the immediate adoption of the 
NIST ``Security Risk Management'' framework in place of the CIP 
Reliability Standards. It explains that the NIST framework provides a 
hierarchical three-tiered set of countermeasure and controls 
requirement-sets for application as appropriate and related guidance 
documents. According to Applied Control Solutions, the NIST framework 
has been broadly vetted, is not onerous, provides guidance on how to 
address older in-service cyber assets, and allows flexibility for 
organizations to tune their cyber security programs for their specific 
operating scenarios. It also contends that NIST addresses the major 
concerns raised by the Commission regarding the CIP Reliability 
Standards, for example, by providing additional granularity and 
requiring compensating measures where technical feasibility becomes an 
issue. Applied Control Solutions also comments that the ISA-99 
standards process has expertise, and NERC should be directed to work 
with ISA in revising the CIP Reliability Standards.
3. Commission Determination
    232. As proposed in the CIP NOPR, the Commission will not at this 
time direct NERC to incorporate specific provisions of the NIST 
standards into the CIP Reliability Standards. While commenters provide 
compelling information that suggests that the NIST standards may 
provide superior measures for cyber security protection, the Commission 
is concerned that the immediate adoption of the NIST standards would 
result in unacceptable delays in having any mandatory and enforceable 
Reliability Standards that relate to cyber security.
    233. The Commission continues to believe--and is further persuaded 
by the comments--that NERC should monitor the development and 
implementation of the NIST standards to determine if they contain 
provisions that will protect the Bulk-Power System better than the CIP 
Reliability Standards. Moreover, we

[[Page 7392]]

direct the ERO to consult with federal entities that are required to 
comply with both CIP Reliability Standards and NIST standards on the 
effectiveness of the NIST standards and on implementation issues and 
report these findings to the Commission. Consistent with the CIP NOPR, 
any provisions that will better protect the Bulk-Power System should be 
addressed in NERC's Reliability Standards development process. The 
Commission may revisit this issue in future proceedings as part of an 
evaluation of existing Reliability Standards or the need for new CIP 
Reliability Standards, or as part of an assessment of NERC's 
performance of its responsibilities as the ERO.\78\
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    \78\ See Order No. 672 at P 186-91.
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H. Discussion of Each CIP Reliability Standard

1. CIP-002-1--Critical Cyber Asset Identification
    234. Reliability Standard CIP-002-1 deals with the identification 
of critical cyber assets. The NERC Glossary defines ``cyber assets'' as 
``programmable electronic devices and communication networks including 
hardware, software, and data.'' It defines ``critical cyber assets'' as 
``cyber assets essential to the reliable operation of critical 
assets.'' NERC defines ``critical assets'' as ``facilities, systems, 
and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered 
unavailable, would affect the reliability or operability of the Bulk 
Electric System.'' \79\ The accurate identification of critical assets 
and critical cyber assets pursuant to CIP-002-1 is the cornerstone of 
the CIP Reliability Standards because it acts as a filter, determining 
whether a responsible entity must comply with the remaining CIP 
requirements in CIP-003-1 through CIP-009-1.
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    \79\ ``The term `Reliable Operation' means operating the 
elements of the Bulk-Power System within equipment and electric 
system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, 
uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will 
not occur as a result of a suddent disturbance, including a cyber 
security incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements.'' 16 
U.S.C. 824o(a)(4).
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    235. As the first step in identifying critical cyber assets, CIP-
002-1 requires each responsible entity to develop a risk-based 
assessment methodology to use in identifying its critical assets. 
Requirement R1 specifies certain types of assets that an assessment 
must consider for critical asset status and also allows the 
consideration of additional assets that the responsible entity deems 
appropriate. Requirement R2 requires the responsible entity to develop 
a list of critical assets based on an annual application of the risk-
based assessment methodology. Requirement R3 provides that the 
responsible entity must use the list of critical assets to develop a 
list of associated critical cyber assets that are essential to the 
operation of the critical assets. CIP-002-1 requires an annual re-
evaluation and approval by senior management of the lists of critical 
assets and critical cyber assets.
    236. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission approves 
Standard CIP-002-1 as mandatory and enforceable. In addition, pursuant 
to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission directs the ERO to 
develop modifications to Standard CIP-002-1. The required modifications 
are discussed below in the following topics regarding CIP-002-1: (1) 
Need for ERO guidance regarding the risk-based assessment methodology; 
(2) scope of critical assets and critical cyber assets; (3) internal, 
management, approval of the risk-based assessment; (4) external review 
of critical assets identification; and (5) interdependency analysis.
a. Guidance on Risk-Based Assessment Methodology
    237. Requirement R1 of CIP-002-1 requires each responsible entity 
to develop a risk-based assessment methodology to identify critical 
assets. A responsible entity must maintain documentation describing its 
methodology that includes procedures and evaluation criteria. 
Requirement R1 identifies specific assets that the methodology must 
``consider,'' including control centers, facilities critical to system 
restoration and automatic load shedding, and substations and generation 
resources that support reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System--as 
well as any other assets that support reliable operations and the 
responsible entity deems appropriate to include in its assessment.
i. NOPR Proposal
    238. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission expressed concern that 
responsible entities have enough guidance to devise an assessment 
methodology that is adequate to identify the types of assets necessary 
to protect Bulk-Power System reliability.\80\ The Commission stated 
that responsible entities would benefit from NERC providing some common 
understanding regarding the scope, purpose and basic direction of the 
assessment methodology. As an example, the Commission indicated that a 
proper methodology should examine (1) the consequences of the loss of 
the asset to the Bulk-Power System and (2) the consequences to the 
Bulk-Power System if an adversary gains control of the asset for 
intentional misuse. Accordingly, the Commission proposed to direct the 
ERO to develop modifications to provide additional guidance as to the 
features and functionality of an adequate risk-based assessment 
methodology.
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    \80\ See CIP NOPR at P 100-05.
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    239. The CIP NOPR also noted that smaller entities may have 
difficulty in determining whether a particular asset is ``critical'' 
since the impact of the asset may be dependent on their connection with 
a transmission owner or operator. Thus, the Commission proposed that 
the ERO and Regional Entities provide reasonable technical support to 
relatively smaller registered entities to assist them in determining 
whether their assets are critical to the Bulk-Power System.
ii. Comments
(a) Need for Additional Guidance
    240. Many commenters, including NERC, agree with the Commission 
that there is a need for further guidance regarding the risk-based 
assessment methodology. Other commenters do not oppose the development 
of general guidance on what would constitute an acceptable risk-based 
assessment methodology, provided that this guidance does not rule out 
other approaches. Commenters also identify specific concerns that they 
believe would benefit from further guidance.
    241. While first reiterating that the CIP Reliability Standards 
contain the appropriate specificity as performance based standards, 
NERC agrees that it could provide further guidance in the form of a 
``supplemental guideline'' on performing risk-based assessments to be 
used to determine critical assets. NERC states that its Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Committee's Risk Assessment Working Group has 
begun development of such a guideline. NERC asserts that this 
guideline, when completed, will address the Commission's fundamental 
concern by providing guidance to responsible entities on how to perform 
the required risk-based assessments.
    242. Numerous commenters agree that additional guidance is needed 
regarding a risk-based assessment methodology.\81\ For example, Energy 
Producers and California Cogeneration comment that, without such 
guidance, responsible entities will not know whether they are

[[Page 7393]]

complying with the Requirement until they are audited. Arizona Public 
Service is also concerned that CIP-002-1 lacks sufficient detail and 
needs to provide further guidance so that responsible entities are not 
placed in the position of not knowing whether their risk-based 
methodologies will adequately identify all critical assets in a way 
that fully satisfies NERC's requirements. Arkansas Electric comments 
that without needed guidance, a responsible entity could invest large 
amounts of effort into the assessment, only to be found non-compliant 
later. Reliant comments that ERO guidance would benefit users of the 
Bulk-Power System, such as generators, that may not have sufficient 
information to properly determine whether their assets are critical.
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    \81\ E.g., California Cogeneration California Commission, 
Congressional Representatives, Duke, Energy Producers, FirstEnergy, 
ISA99 Team, KCPL, MidAmerican, National Grid, ReliabilityFirst, 
Reliant, SDG&E and U.S. Power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    243. While EEI opposes any modification to Requirement R1 of CIP-
002-1 to provide additional specificity regarding the assessment 
methodology, it agrees that responsible entities would benefit from 
``some basic guidance'' provided that it is non-prescriptive.\82\ EEI 
supports guidance regarding the common understanding of the scope, 
purpose and basic direction of the methodology. EEI also urges that the 
process for developing this guidance should be open and transparent. 
Similarly, APPA/LPPC comment that they do not object to the proposal 
that NERC provide some basic guidance on the content of the 
methodology, provided that it allows needed flexibility to take account 
of the individual circumstances of a responsible entity.
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    \82\ See also Alliant, Arizona Public Service, ISO/RTO Council, 
Luminant, Northern California, OGE, Portland General and Southern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    244. A number of commenters identify specific topics that would 
benefit from further guidance. For example, NRC comments that the risk-
based assessment should identify transmission lines, substations and 
generators that are relied on to operate or shut down nuclear 
generating stations as critical assets. U.S. Power maintains that 
additional guidance is needed as to when generating facilities and 
their related systems will be deemed ``critical'' to the Bulk Electric 
System. U.S. Power explains that, given the built-in reserve margin for 
generation in New England, absent a known local reliability need, any 
generator in New England could logically assume that none of its 
individual generating assets would be regarded ``critical.'' U.S. Power 
states that without additional guidance as to what the Commission and 
NERC intend, however, there is no way of knowing if this is an 
appropriate assumption. Further, it seeks additional guidance regarding 
blackstart units, noting that a generating unit that has blackstart 
capability but is not part of a system restoration plan may not be 
deemed critical to Bulk-Power System reliability.
    245. Luminant comments that significant regional differences, such 
as geography, climate, demographics, electric system structure and 
demands, affect the identification of critical cyber assets and how the 
particular asset would be protected.
    246. Several commenters agree with the Commission's statement that 
a risk-based assessment methodology should examine the consequences of 
the loss of the asset to the Bulk-Power System as well as the 
consequences if an adversary gains control of the asset. For example, 
Applied Control Solutions states that a proper risk-based assessment 
methodology should examine the consequences of the loss or improper 
operation of the assets to the Bulk-Power System. It also comments that 
the methodology should define ``risk'' as a formula (i.e., 
risk=frequency multiplied by consequence). Because there is 
insufficient data available to determine frequency, it should be 
assumed that an event will occur. Luminant also states that the risk-
based assessment methodology should focus on the consequences of an 
outage, not the likelihood of an outage.
    247. ISA99 Team suggests that the guidance to be developed by NERC 
should be written in a manner that assures that a larger portion of 
critical infrastructure assets, and associated cyber assets are 
included within the scope of the standards. In this regard, ISA99 Team 
states that the results of the current requirements, which are based on 
an unspecified ``risk-based'' approach, and which place no limits on 
what constitutes an acceptable risk, may or may not include sufficient 
assets to provide adequate protection for the bulk power grid. Thus, 
ISA99 Team argues that a more definitive means of assuring adequate 
scope needs to be established.
    248. A number of entities commented on the Commission's proposal 
that the ERO and Regional Entities provide reasonable technical support 
to relatively smaller entities that may have difficulty determining 
whether a particular asset is critical because, for example, the impact 
of the facility may be dependent on their connection with a 
transmission owner or operator. NERC and ReliabilityFirst oppose this 
proposal, stating that such a ``consulting service'' would place an 
undue burden on the ERO and Regional Entities.\83\ NERC and 
ReliabilityFirst believe that this creates a serious conflict to 
impartially assess compliance with the standards and suggest that, if 
such an external assistance is deemed necessary, it should be the 
obligation of the responsible entity's reliability coordinator or 
regional transmission organization. According to NERC, its reliability 
readiness program is in an ideal position to assess the effectiveness 
of an entity's risk-based assessment methodology, thus, no additional 
consulting role by NERC is needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See also Entergy and ISO/RTO Council.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    249. In contrast, FirstEnergy agrees that NERC should provide 
guidance to entities without a wide-area view, such as a generation 
owner or a partial generation owner, on how to approach a risk-based 
assessment. Likewise, Northern California suggests that NERC establish 
a process for informal, case-by-case consultations with responsible 
entities that need assistance in complying with CIP-002-1. In addition, 
as part of the re-examination of CIP-002-1, Northern California 
encourages the incorporation of a formalized ``feedback loop'' to 
assist the industry in developing policies and procedures.
    250. Xcel seeks clarification of CIP-002-1, Requirement R1.2.4, 
which provides that a risk-based assessment methodology consider 
``systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including 
blackstart generators and substations in the electrical path of 
transmission lines used for initial system restoration.'' Xcel asks 
that either the Commission clarify or direct NERC to clarify the 
meaning of the phrase ``used for initial system restoration'' and 
specify whether it refers to facilities on the primary transmission 
restoration path or on all potential alternative transmission 
restoration paths.
    251. MidAmerican seeks Commission clarification of the 
appropriateness of an N minus 1 criterion when applying a risk-based 
assessment methodology to critical assets. It states that NERC's CIP 
Reliability Standards require all affected entities to withstand the 
loss of one element without affecting the reliability of the Bulk-Power 
System. Yet, MidAmerican notes, the Commission's discussion uses the 
singular term ``asset'' in the first sentence when describing what a 
proper risk-based assessment methodology should examine. MidAmerican is 
concerned that this implies that a risk-based assessment methodology 
should be based on the loss of a single critical asset (transformer, 
line or generating

[[Page 7394]]

unit) one at a time. MidAmerican submits that the term ``asset'' should 
be revised to make clear that a broad-based cyber attack should 
essentially be assumed to affect several of an entity's critical 
facilities simultaneously.
    252. Entergy suggests, as an alternative approach to critical asset 
identification, that the ERO provide a Design-Basis Threat (DBT)--a 
profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary--
that would assist the industry as a technical baseline against which to 
establish the proper designs, controls and processes. Entergy claims 
that a DBT approach would address many of the Commission's concerns 
regarding the risk-based methodology. For example, a DBT would focus 
the appropriate emphasis on the potential consequences from an outage 
of a critical asset. In addition, a DBT would address the Commission's 
concern that responsible entities will not have enough guidance in 
developing a risk-based methodology and not know how to identify a 
``critical asset.'' Entergy contends that a DBT approach would provide 
the industry with more certainty in implementing the CIP Reliability 
Standards.
iii. Commission Determination
    253. The Commission believes that the comments affirm that 
responsible entities need additional guidance on the development of a 
risk-based assessment methodology to identify critical assets. While we 
adopt our CIP NOPR proposal, we recognize that the ERO has already 
initiated a process to develop such guidance. The CIP NOPR proposed to 
direct that NERC modify CIP-002-1 to incorporate the guidance. However, 
we are persuaded by commenters that stress the need for flexibility and 
the need to take account of the individual circumstances of a 
responsible entity. Thus, we modify our original proposal and in this 
Final Order leave to the ERO's discretion whether to incorporate such 
guidance into the CIP Reliability Standard, develop it as a separate 
guidance document, or some combination of the two. A responsible 
entity, however, remains responsible to identify the critical assets on 
its system.
    254. Commenters raise a number of topics that they believe should 
be addressed in the NERC guidance, such as how to assess whether a 
generator or a blackstart unit is ``critical'' to Bulk-Power System 
reliability, the proper quantification of risk and frequency, 
facilities that are relied on to operate or shut down nuclear 
generating stations, and the consequences of asset failure and asset 
misuse by an adversary. We believe these are all appropriate topics to 
be addressed and direct the ERO to consider these commenter concerns 
when developing the guidance.
    255. The Commission proposed in the CIP NOPR that the ERO and 
Regional Entities provide reasonable technical support to relatively 
smaller entities that may have difficulty determining whether a 
particular asset is critical because, for example, the impact of the 
facility may be dependent on their connection with a transmission owner 
or operator. While we believe that there is a need to assist entities 
that lack a wide-area view, we are mindful of the ERO's concern that it 
would place an undue burden on it and the Regional Entities. If the ERO 
believes that it and the Regional Entities do not have sufficient 
resources to take on this responsibility, it should designate another 
type of entity with a wide-area view, such as a reliability 
coordinator, to provide needed assistance. This approach is consistent 
with our determination (discussed later in this Final Rule) regarding 
the external review of critical asset lists. Accordingly, we direct 
either the ERO or its designees to provide reasonable technical support 
to assist entities in determining whether their assets are critical to 
the Bulk-Power System.
    256. Regarding MidAmerican's comments on use of the N minus 1 
criterion when applying a risk-based assessment methodology to the 
identification of critical assets, we agree with MidAmerican that an N 
minus 1 criterion is not an appropriate risk-based assessment 
methodology for identifying critical assets. While the N minus 1 
criterion may be appropriate in transmission planning, use of an N 
minus 1 criterion for the risk-based assessment in CIP-002-1 would 
result in the nonsensical result that no substations or generating 
plants need to be protected from cyber events. A cyber attack can 
strike multiple assets simultaneously, and a cyber attack can cause 
damage to an asset for such a time period that other asset outages may 
occur before the damaged asset can be returned to service. Thus, the 
fact that the system was developed to withstand the loss of any single 
asset should not be the basis for not protecting that asset. Also, we 
note that the definition of ``critical assets'' is focused on the 
criticality of the asset, not the likelihood of an outage. Based on 
this reasoning, in response to U.S. Power, we clarify that a generator 
should not assume that none of its individual generating assets would 
be regarded ``critical'' to the Bulk-Power System.\84\
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    \84\ Further, Requirement R.1.2.3 provides that the risk-based 
assessment must consider ``generation resources that support the 
reliable operation'' of the Bulk-Power System. This language 
indicates that certain generation facilities, and presumably some 
facilities within a region identified as critical, must be 
considered in an assessment. Beyond this, we leave it to the ERO to 
provide sufficient guidelines to inform generation owners and 
operators on how to determine whether it should identify a facility 
as a critical asset. As discussed later in the Final Rule, the 
Commission will monitor and evaluate the outcome of this endeavor--
the list of critical assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    257. With regard to Xcel's request for clarification regarding the 
meaning of the phrase ``used for initial system restoration,'' in CIP-
002-1, Requirement R1.2.4, we direct the ERO to consider this 
clarification in its Reliability Standards development process.
    258. As to Entergy's suggestion that the ERO provide a DBT profile 
of potential adversaries, the ERO should consider this issue in the 
Reliability Standards development process. Likewise, the ERO should 
consider Northern California's suggestion that the ERO establish a 
formal ``feedback loop'' to assist the industry in developing policies 
and procedures.\85\
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    \85\ Consistent with our approach in Order No. 693, the ERO 
should address NOPR comments suggesting specific new improvements to 
the CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission, however, does not 
direct any outcome other than that the comments receive 
consideration. See Order No. 693 at P 188.
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b. Scope of Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets
i. Data as a Critical Asset
(a) NOPR Proposal
    259. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission noted that NERC's definition 
of ``cyber assets'' includes ``data.'' The Commission stated that 
``marketing or other data essential to the proper operation of a 
critical asset, and possibly the computer systems that produce or 
process the data, would be considered critical cyber assets'' subject 
to the CIP Reliability Standards.\86\ The Commission proposed to direct 
the ERO to develop guidance on the steps that would be required to 
apply the CIP Reliability Standards to such data and to include 
computer systems that produce the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ CIP NOPR at P 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Comments
    260. NERC agrees with the Commission that critical cyber assets 
include ``data,'' as specified in the definition. NERC then states that 
the ``data'' provision only refers to data associated with the reliable 
operation of the Bulk-Power System, thereby excluding ``marketing and 
other data'' as

[[Page 7395]]

well as data market systems that support the market function. NERC 
suggests that the Final Rule remove references to marketing and other 
data and supports referring, instead to ``reliability data.'' NERC adds 
that it is not arguing that these systems do not need protection, but 
merely that they are beyond the scope of the CIP Reliability Standards. 
NERC states that, only in cases where reliability functions and market 
functions are implemented within the same system, or are implemented on 
systems located within the electronic security perimeter, should they 
be protected by the CIP Reliability Standards, and then only as cyber 
assets located within the same electronic security perimeter as 
critical cyber assets.
    261. Numerous other commenters contend that the Commission is 
mistaken to consider ``marketing and other data'' as a critical cyber 
asset. For example, NRECA comments that marketing data seldom performs 
a reliability-related function. Northeast Utilities states that only 
data pertaining to design or operating specifications necessary for the 
operation of cyber assets should be included in the definition of cyber 
assets. PG&E states that the Commission's proposal to include 
``marketing and other data'' is unnecessary because the CIP Reliability 
Standards already apply to data that are housed and maintained within 
critical cyber assets and information about critical cyber assets. PG&E 
asserts that Requirement R4 of CIP-003-1 specifically protects critical 
cyber asset information, so no additional modifications are needed.\87\
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    \87\ See also Alliant, EEI, ISO-NE, ISO/RTO Council, Luminant, 
National Grid, Ontario Power, ReliabilityFirst, SDG&E, SPP and WAPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    262. Bonneville requests clarification whether the Commission's 
reference to marketing data and system data are intended to apply to 
data and systems related to power transactions to be delivered 
physically about which data are sent to grid operators (e.g., systems 
that generate E-tags) or all marketing data and systems even if the 
transactions are settled financially and never get to physical 
delivery.
    263. MidAmerican agrees with the Commission on the need for 
additional guidance regarding the definition of ``data'' as critical 
cyber assets. It recommends deletion of the term ``data'' from the NERC 
definition of a ``critical cyber asset'' and, instead, its inclusion in 
the information protection standard. MidAmerican contends that access 
to data is of secondary importance when compared to access to a 
physical critical cyber asset and, thus, data should be protected as 
any other critical asset information would be protected.
    264. ISO/RTO Council and Ontario Power argue that, although the 
computers and other devices that contain data may use a routable 
protocol or may be dial-up accessible, the data itself does not use a 
routable protocol, nor is it, in its own right, dial-up accessible. 
Therefore, they submit that Reliability Standard CIP-002-1 does not 
require that ``data'' be considered a critical cyber asset. In 
addition, ISO/RTO Council argues that, since every responsible entity's 
definitive list of critical cyber assets is developed pursuant to 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-1, Requirement R3, the ``further 
qualified'' reference in Requirement R3 applies to the use of the term 
``critical cyber asset'' wherever the term is used in the CIP 
Reliability Standards. ISO/RTO Council believes that including data as 
a critical cyber asset would go beyond the scope and intent of any of 
the Reliability Standards.
    265. ISO-NE and SPP agree with ISO/RTO Council that data by itself 
does not meet the definition of a critical cyber asset. ISO-NE states 
that the Commission is further viewing data as a potential critical 
asset. ISO-NE agrees with this view in concept, but believes that 
consideration of reliability data is already intrinsic to the process 
of evaluating assets to determine their criticality. Such reliability 
data are ``real-time data'' and are highly transient as they pass 
through, and are presented by, such supporting critical cyber assets. 
Given that protection of critical cyber assets is already addressed, 
the protection of the data component of a cyber asset during its 
instance of viability as useful reliability data is satisfied. To 
address a broader focus of data protection would expand the scope of 
the current CIP Reliability Standards. Such a focus deserves 
considerable review and discussion. If the Commission continues to have 
concern regarding data protection from a broader view, ISO-NE 
recommends this be considered in a future proceeding.
    266. SoCalEdison is concerned that applying the CIP Reliability 
Standards to data that are essential to the proper operation of a 
critical asset and including computer systems that produce the data 
might greatly increase the scope of CIP-002-1 and will have a major 
impact on the industry's ability to meet the standards requirements 
schedule. SoCalEdison argues that, if the Commission directs these 
modifications to the standard, they should be handled through the NERC 
Reliability Standards development process which should consider any 
impact to the implementation schedule.
    267. OGE also is concerned that a definition of ``critical cyber 
assets'' that could include computer systems that produce or process 
such sensitive data may encompass network servers and devices. If 
network servers and devices are considered critical cyber assets, OGE 
argues that additional controls will be necessary to isolate and 
protect these network servers and devices. These additional controls 
will provide only a minor increase in protection to the bulk electric 
system.
    268. Idaho Power supports the protection of data that defines 
location, network topography, device descriptions, and similar 
information; however, Idaho Power cannot support the position that data 
originating or used in an Energy Management System, for instance, 
should be treated as ``critical'' after the fact. In Idaho Power's 
view, the actual data, upon transfer to data historian servers, fails 
to meet any definition of ``critical.''
    269. Juniper recommends that other enterprise databases, such as 
human resources data, be considered part of the critical assets. 
Juniper states that its concern applies to any data that can enable a 
hacker to gain access to cyber assets. Juniper comments that any 
essential data that could allow an attacker to weaken or defeat any 
cyber or physical security must be considered a critical cyber asset.
(c) Commission Determination
    270. As discussed above, commenters that address the subject 
uniformly oppose the CIP NOPR statement that ``marketing or other data 
essential to the proper operation of a critical asset, and possibly the 
computer systems that produce or process the data, would be considered 
critical cyber assets'' subject to the CIP Reliability Standards. These 
commenters contend that marketing data typically does not qualify as a 
critical cyber asset and the Commission's proposal is beyond the 
current scope of the CIP Reliability Standards. Moreover, several 
commenters suggest that some data and support systems may fit the 
definition of critical asset and, thus, supporting critical cyber 
assets must comply with CIP-002-1.
    271. The Commission remains concerned that, while not all marketing 
data or other data may be considered a critical cyber asset essential 
to the proper operation of a critical asset, there may be times where 
it is properly classified as such. For example, if a critical asset is 
configured such that it cannot operate and support the

[[Page 7396]]

reliability and operability of the Bulk-Power System without a real-
time stream of data, that data fits the definition of a critical cyber 
asset, and should be protected. Once a particular piece of data is no 
longer needed by the critical asset, it is no longer a critical cyber 
asset. On this point, we agree with commenters that there is a temporal 
characteristic to data as a critical asset.
    272. Based on the range of comments received on this topic, the 
Commission is convinced that the consideration and designation of 
various types of data as a critical asset or critical cyber asset 
pursuant to CIP-002-1 is an area that could benefit from greater 
clarity and guidance from the ERO. Accordingly, the Commission directs 
the ERO, in developing the guidance discussed above regarding the 
identification of critical assets, to consider the designation of 
various types of data as a critical asset or critical cyber asset. In 
doing so, the ERO should consider Juniper's comments. Further, the 
Commission directs the ERO to develop guidance on the steps that would 
be required to apply the CIP Reliability Standards to such data and to 
consider whether this also covers the computer systems that produce the 
data.
    273. The Commission also agrees with ISO-NE that experience in the 
implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards may indicate a need to 
further address this topic in a future proceeding.
ii. Control Systems
    274. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission expressed concern that 
sufficient rigor is applied in examining whether control systems are 
determined to be critical assets.\88\ The Commission stated that, while 
it seems obvious that an evaluation of a control system for critical 
asset status would consider the potential loss of operability, the 
Commission also believes that such an evaluation should examine any 
misuse of the control system and the impact this misuse could have on 
any electric facilities that the responsible entity controls, and the 
combined impact of such facilities.
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    \88\ CIP NOPR at P 115.
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(a) Comments
    275. NERC and ReliabilityFirst comment that the Commission appears 
to have incorrectly concluded that ``control systems'' are critical 
assets. They explain that, in context, the control center, substations 
or power plant could be a critical asset. The ``control system,'' 
however, would be a critical cyber asset.
    276. SPP concurs with the Commission's assertion that consideration 
of misuse of control systems should be part of the risk-based 
assessment. Compromise and misuse of a cyber asset often pose greater 
risks to the reliability of the Bulk-Power System than an induced total 
failure of the cyber asset. SPP comments that both insider and external 
threats should be considered as part of the risk-based assessment. In 
contrast, Entergy opposes the Commission's proposal to require an 
evaluation of the misuse of control systems.
    277. Applied Control Solutions comments that there should be a 
formally accepted method for identifying critical cyber assets, 
explaining that existing methods are often reliability-based, not 
cyber-based, resulting in entities reporting too few assets.
    278. ISA99 Team objects to the exclusion of communications links 
from CIP-002-1 and non-routable protocols from critical cyber assets, 
arguing that both are key elements of associated control systems, 
essential to proper operation of the critical cyber assets, and have 
been shown to be vulnerable--by testing and experience. In contrast, 
Energy Producers notes that CIP-002-1 as proposed by NERC provides that 
a critical cyber asset must have either routable protocols or a dial-up 
connection. Energy Producers states that this is a useful, objective 
criterion which will assist in the unambiguous identification of such 
assets and therefore should be retained.
(b) Commission Determination
    279. The Commission accepts the explanation of the ERO and 
ReliabilityFirst that a control system could be a critical cyber asset, 
but not a critical asset.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ As was stated in the CIP Assessment, a ``control system'' 
is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct or regulate 
the behavior of other devices or systems. It is typically a 
specialized computer system or programmable logic controller that 
manages, commands, directs or regulates the behavior of other 
devices or systems in a physical environment, e.g., open or close 
switches or relays, start or stop motors, or control motor speed. In 
the case of the Bulk-Power System, control systems consist primarily 
of sophisticated computer hardware and software designed to process 
the mass of real-time data associated with the Bulk-Power System and 
enable its reliable operation by, among other things, monitoring the 
grid through remote sensors, sounding alarms when grid conditions 
warrant, and operating equipment in field locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    280. The Commission has two concerns regarding the misuse of 
facilities, and clarifies those concerns here. First, Requirement 
R1.2.1 requires responsible entities to consider control centers and 
backup control centers as potential critical assets. In determining 
whether those control centers should be critical assets, we believe 
that responsible entities should examine the impact on reliability if 
the control centers are unavailable, due for example to power or 
communications failures, or denial of service attacks. Responsible 
entities should also examine the impact that misuse of those control 
centers could have on the electric facilities they control and what the 
combined impact of those electric facilities could be on the 
reliability of the Bulk-Power System. The Commission recognizes that, 
when these matters are taken into account, it is difficult to envision 
a scenario in which a reliability coordinator, transmission operator or 
transmission owner control center or backup control center would not 
properly be identified as a critical asset.
    281. Second, the Commission is concerned about the misuse of a 
control system that controls more than one asset. The assets could be 
multiple generating units, multiple transmission breakers, or perhaps 
even multiple substations. All of the controlled assets could be taken 
out of service simultaneously due to a failure or misuse of the control 
system. Individually, perhaps none of the controlled assets would be 
considered as a critical asset. However, with a simultaneous outage due 
to the single point of control, the controlled assets might affect the 
reliability or operability of the Bulk-Power System and, therefore, 
should be considered as critical assets. In that case, the common 
control system should be considered a critical cyber asset.
    282. Therefore, consistent with the discussion above, the 
Commission directs the ERO, through the Reliability Standards 
development process, to specifically require the consideration of 
misuse of control centers and control systems in the determination of 
critical assets. The clarification of our concern over misuse of 
control systems addresses Entergy's comment on this issue as well.
    283. The Commission concurs with SPP that both insider and external 
threats should be considered as part of a risk-based assessment.
    284. We share Applied Control Solutions' concern that too few 
assets may be identified as critical cyber assets. However, there is no 
evidence that will be the case, and there is no formally accepted 
method for identifying critical cyber assets before us at this time. 
Therefore, we decline to direct that such a method be incorporated into 
the CIP Reliability

[[Page 7397]]

Standards at this time. The Commission may revisit this circumstance in 
a future proceeding.
    285. As to the conflicting comments of ISA99 Team and Energy 
Producers, Requirement R2 of CIP-002-1 provides that a critical cyber 
asset must either have routable protocols or dial-up access. Energy 
Producers argues that Requirement R2 should be retained, while ISA99 
Team argues that devices that use non-routable protocols should also be 
considered as possible critical cyber assets. We do not find sufficient 
justification to remove this provision at this time. However, we direct 
the ERO to consider the comment from ISA99 Team. We also do not find 
sufficient justification to order the inclusion of communication links 
in CIP-002-1 at this time.
iii. Explanation Why an Asset Chosen or Not Chosen as Critical
    286. In the CIP NOPR, at P 115, the Commission expressed concern 
that all critical assets be identified. To further this goal, the 
Commission interpreted the phrase, ``[t]he risk-based assessment shall 
consider the following assets * * *'' in Requirement R1.2 to mean that 
a responsible entity must be able to show why, based on the risk-based 
methodology, specific assets were chosen or not chosen. The Commission 
proposed to direct that the ERO modify Requirement R1.2 to make this 
obligation explicit.
(a) Comments
    287. Most commenters addressing the subject oppose the Commission's 
proposal.\90\ For example, MidAmerican comments that a requirement that 
a responsible entity provide reasons for selecting or not selecting a 
particular asset as critical is unreasonably burdensome and unnecessary 
because this should be adequately addressed when more direction is 
given for the assessment methodology and selection criteria for 
critical assets. Likewise, EEI and Entergy oppose the Commission's 
proposal as unnecessary, contending that responsible entities will 
identify critical assets based on the risk-based assessment methodology 
required by CIP-002-1, which will be subject to audit. EEI questions 
what further explanation an entity could provide beyond the assessment 
methodology. Entergy notes that many entities operate hundreds of 
substations and thousands of pieces of field equipment, and a 
requirement to defend the exclusion of specific equipment would be 
onerous.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ E.g., Alliant, EEI, ISO/RTO Council, KCPL, MidAmerican, 
National Grid, OGE and Tampa Electric.
    \91\ See also ISO/RTO Council, National Grid, PG &E and Tampa 
Electric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Commission Determination
    288. To clarify, the Commission did not propose to direct that the 
ERO develop a requirement for responsible entities to document why each 
specific asset was identified or not identified as ``critical.'' 
Rather, the Commission's intent was that a responsible entity must be 
able to explain such determinations, for example upon inquiry by an 
auditor, to confirm compliance with the Reliability Standard. 
Nonetheless, we are persuaded by the commenters that the documentation 
of a responsible entity's risk-based assessment methodology pursuant to 
Requirement R1.1 and the results of its annual application of the 
methodology pursuant to Requirement R2 should suffice to explain a 
responsible entity's asset determinations. Accordingly, the Commission 
will not direct the ERO to develop a modification to address this 
concern. However, if experience shows that responsible entities are 
failing to consider in their assessments specific types of assets that 
the Commission, ERO or others believe should be included in an 
assessment and therefore not in compliance with the Reliability 
Standard, there may be a need to revisit this matter in the future.
c. Internal Approval of Risk-Based Assessment
i. NOPR Proposal
    289. Requirement R4 of CIP-002-1 requires that a senior manager 
``or delegate(s)'' must approve annually the list of critical assets 
and critical cyber assets. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission proposed to 
direct that the ERO develop a modification to CIP-002-1 to include a 
requirement that a senior manager annually review and approve the risk-
based assessment methodology.\92\ The Commission stated that senior 
management approval of the risk-based assessment methodology helps to 
implement Blackout Report Recommendation 43, which calls for 
establishing clear authority and ownership for physical and cyber 
security.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ See CIP NOPR at P 106-08 for the Commission's discussion 
and proposal on this topic.
    \93\ See U.S.-Canada Power System Blackout Task Force, Final 
Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and 
Canada: Causes and Recommendations (April 2004) (Blackout Report). 
The Blackout Report is available on the Internet at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/blackout.asp
.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
    290. Alliant, APPA/LPPC, Congressional Representatives, EEI, KCPL 
and Luminant agree with the Commission that it is important that there 
is internal oversight of the responsible entity's activities. EEI adds 
that, although senior manager review of the risk-based assessment 
methodology is implicit in the current CIP Reliability Standards, such 
a provision should be made explicit through the Reliability Standards 
development process to establish the ``clear authority'' recommended by 
the Blackout Report. Luminant adds that such a provision would provide 
a degree of certainty for a responsible entity's senior management to 
approve the risk-based assessment methodology the responsible entity 
adopts. KCPL also supports NERC's development of an ``explicit'' 
requirement that senior management review and approve a responsible 
entity's risk-based assessment methodology.
    291. METC-ITC believe that the Commission can further strengthen 
the CIP Reliability Standards by raising the apparent level of 
responsibility of CIP compliance to a corporate officer level, 
replacing ``senior manager'' with ``officer'' in such instances 
throughout the CIP Reliability Standards. In contrast, Northern Indiana 
claims that senior management might not be the most knowledgeable about 
cyber security issues and urges the Commission to continue to allow a 
responsible entity to delegate this review to knowledgeable personnel.
    292. ISO/RTO Council argues that the requirement for internal 
oversight already is an implicit requirement under the CIP Reliability 
Standards. In ISO/RTO Council's view, it is abundantly clear that the 
senior manager is fully accountable for both the thoroughness of the 
methodology used to establish the critical asset list as well as the 
completeness of the list itself.
    293. Bonneville seeks clarification whether the intent of the 
Commission's proposal is to make senior managers personally accountable 
for a responsible entity's violation of the CIP Reliability Standards 
so that the senior manager is subject to civil penalties. Bonneville 
comments that, if this is the intended purpose or result, then the 
extent of such personal liability must be made clear so that affected 
senior managers can take necessary precautions, such as obtaining 
additional insurance coverage. NRECA raises similar concerns regarding 
a senior manager's penalty liability.

[[Page 7398]]

iii. Commission Determination
    294. The Commission adopts its CIP NOPR proposal and directs the 
ERO to develop, pursuant to its Reliability Standards development 
process, a modification to CIP-002-1 to explicitly require that a 
senior manager annually review and approve the risk-based assessment 
methodology. This determination is consistent with the Blackout 
Report's recommendation to establish clear authority and ownership for 
physical and cyber security. Further, regardless of whether the current 
Requirements implicitly require senior manager review of the assessment 
methodology, we believe the matter is too important to rely on 
inference. Accordingly, the Commission directs the ERO to develop a 
modification to CIP-002-1 to explicitly require that a senior manager 
annually review and approve the risk-based assessment methodology.
    295. With regard to Northern Indiana's concerns, we are not 
directing a revision to the current language of Requirement R4 which 
provides for ``the senior manager or delegate(s)'s approval'' of the 
list of critical assets and list of critical cyber assets. As we 
understand the provision, the senior manager still retains ultimate 
responsibility for the determinations of his or her delegate(s). 
Otherwise, senior management could avoid responsibility by `delegating 
downward.'
    296. With regard to METC-ITC's comment, the ERO should consider in 
its Reliability Standards development process the suggestion that the 
CIP Reliability Standards require oversight by a corporate officer (or 
the equivalent, since some entities do not have corporate officers) 
rather than by a ``senior manager.''
    297. In response to comments by Bonneville and NRECA, the 
Commission clarifies that we do not intend that an individual employee 
of a user, owner or operator of the Bulk-Power System will be subject 
to a penalty pursuant to section 215 of the FPA because a responsible 
entity violates a CIP Reliability Standard. This matter is addressed in 
more detail in our discussion of CIP-003-1.
d. External Oversight of Critical Assets Identification To Provide 
Regional Perspective
i. NOPR Proposal
    298. The CIP NOPR emphasized that the responsibility for 
identifying critical assets should be placed on the individual 
responsible entity as the asset owner or operator, and not shifted to 
Regional Entities or another organization.\94\ In addition, the 
Commission expressed its belief that a systematic approach to external 
oversight of the identification of critical assets would assure a wide-
area view and thereby better ensure that responsible entities are 
identifying appropriate assets as ``critical.'' The Commission 
explained that, without external oversight using a wide-area view, 
trends or deviations may not be identified prior to an incident or 
audit. The CIP NOPR also noted that a wide-area view would help to 
ensure that assets that have regional importance, such as for reactive 
power supply, are included as critical assets. Therefore, the 
Commission proposed that the ERO develop a modification to CIP-002-1 to 
include a mechanism for the external review and approval of critical 
asset lists based on a regional perspective by the Regional Entities, 
possibly among others. The Commission stated that, while proposing that 
the Regional Entities perform this review function, it did not exclude 
the possibility of a critical asset review process that allows for the 
participation of other organizations, such as transmission planners and 
reliability coordinators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See CIP NOPR at P 111-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
(a) Responsible Entity for Identifying Critical Assets
    299. Several commenters, including ISO/RTO Council, EEI, 
FirstEnergy, National Grid and Northeast Utilities, agree with the 
Commission that responsibility for identifying critical assets should 
not be placed on the Regional Entities or any organization other than 
the categories of applicable entities currently identified in CIP-002-
1. They believe that this responsibility rightfully rests with the 
asset owner or operator, and the Regional Entities would be 
overburdened by such a task.
    300. In contrast, AMP Ohio advocates the revision of CIP-002-1 to 
make Regional Entities responsible for the identification of critical 
assets because they have an area-wide view of the grid--as opposed to 
small generation owners, generation operators and load serving entities 
that have a limited view of the Bulk-Power System. AMP Ohio also argues 
that making small generation owners, generation operators and load 
serving entities responsible for asset identification would place a 
burden on these small entities that they are ill-positioned to bear. 
AMP Ohio explains that it is not proposing that responsible entities 
abdicate responsibility but, rather, suggests that the Regional Entity 
take the first step to identify critical assets. The asset owner or 
operator, as a responsible entity, must then ensure that the critical 
cyber assets associated with the critical asset are identified and 
protected. AMP Ohio suggests that, if responsible entities remain 
responsible for identifying assets, the CIP Reliability Standard should 
include a safe harbor provision for good faith compliance, even if 
subsequent events demonstrate that critical assets may have been 
overlooked.
    301. SPP and ReliabilityFirst suggest a modification to CIP-002-1 
that would allow an entity to rely on the assessment of another entity 
with interest in the matter. For example, a merchant generator may 
through a legitimate assessment determine that its plant is not 
critical whereas the balancing authority's assessment indicates that it 
is. They suggest that in such a situation the merchant generator would 
accept the risk-based assessment of the balancing authority as a 
substitute for performing its own assessment with limited data.
(b) Need for External Review and Alternatives
    302. While some commenters agree with the Commission that there is 
a need for external review and approval of a responsible entity's 
critical asset list, others believe that such a requirement is 
unnecessary.
    303. Arkansas Electric, Juniper, MidAmerican, National Grid, 
Ontario IESO, and U.S. Power agree with the Commission that a process 
for regional review of an entity's critical asset list by either the 
ERO or the Regional Entity would be beneficial. According to Arkansas 
Electric, this would provide an entity with the opportunity for a 
review of its critical asset list prior to a full CIP audit. Arkansas 
Electric is concerned that, without such a review, entities could be 
subject to sanctions based on a critical asset list later deemed 
deficient by an auditor. MidAmerican finds that a regional perspective 
could add consistency to the critical asset determination. U.S. Power 
maintains that, in organized markets where a generator does not 
typically possess a ``regional perspective'' to objectively determine 
the criticality of an individual asset, external review could be 
helpful in assuring that a regionally consistent approach is followed; 
and that such determinations are based on the most relevant, available 
information.
    304. FirstEnergy agrees with the Commission that a formal or 
systematic approach to external oversight of the identification of 
critical assets would

[[Page 7399]]

better ensure that responsible entities are identifying similar assets. 
FirstEnergy comments that external review is crucial to the 
comprehensive application of the CIP Reliability Standards and such 
review should be conducted by an entity with a wide-area view.
    305. National Grid comments that it would support the development 
of an appropriate mechanism for Regional Entities to collection 
documentation of each responsible entity's assessment methodology and 
list of critical assets. However, National Grid would not support a 
requirement for Regional Entity pre-approval of the methodology or list 
because the Regional Entity lacks the necessary expertise and 
resources. Similarly, Northern Indiana supports external review, 
particularly where lists of cyber security assets will not be shared 
and responsible entities must determine their asset lists based on 
mutual distrust. However, Northern Indiana opposes requiring approval 
of a responsible entity's list of critical assets by the entity 
conducting the external review. It also opposes granting Regional 
Entities or reliability coordinators the ability to supplement a 
critical asset list. This concern would be removed, however, if the 
regional entity approved the risk-based assessment methodology, rather 
than the list of critical assets.
    306. In contrast, NERC and others oppose modifying CIP-002-1 to 
require external review and approval of critical asset lists.\95\ NERC 
requests that the Commission allow the current oversight framework--
which includes audits, readiness reviews and self-certification--to 
work without imposing new or different requirements from the current 
CIP Reliability Standards. Similarly, EEI comments that, while it 
understands the Commission's view that external oversight may have 
potential value by providing a wide-area view, it believes that NERC's 
Uniform Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program already provides 
effective tools that may provide such oversight. EEI does not, however, 
oppose voluntary random spot checking as a means to provide an ``area-
wide view'' before the ``auditably compliant'' stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ E.g., Alliant, Mr. Brown, Duke, EEI, Entergy, Idaho Power, 
Luminant, OGE, Ontario Power, Puget Sound, SERC-CIPC and Southern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    307. Alliant objects to external approval of a critical asset list 
because the ERO auditing regime provides a ``wide-area view'' and 
external approval would require an appeals process that would delay 
implementation without accruing reasonable benefits. Duke claims that 
the ERO's guidance document should result in adequate consistency in 
the development of critical asset lists and suggests that any external 
review should be optional. Southern contends that a responsible entity 
is generally in the best position to determine which assets are 
critical to the Bulk-Power System and, if needed, industry experience 
can be shared through existing forums and through the voluntary 
exchange of information. Puget Sound and others propose that industry 
forums could be used to promote a wide-area view in developing critical 
asset lists. Idaho Power insists that regional concerns should be 
addressed before an entity develops its critical asset list.
    308. Many of the commenters that oppose an external review and 
approval process believe that the Commission's objectives can be 
accomplished through a Regional Entity audit process.\96\ SERC CIPC 
claims that the regions, if presented with a raw list of asset names, 
will have no basis on which to state whether the list is sufficient or 
not. According to SERC CIPC, during the audit process, the audit team 
will review the risk-based assessment methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ E.g., Duke, EEI, Entergy, National Grid, OGE and SERC-CIPC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(c) Appropriate Organization to Conduct External Review
    309. Among the commenters that support the need for external 
oversight, some prefer that an organization other than a Regional 
Entity be made responsible for external oversight. For example, ISO/RTO 
Council believes that the reliability coordinator is in the best 
position to provide such oversight because it has a wide-area view that 
is focused on grid operation. ISO/RTO Council believes that Regional 
Entities need to remain independent to enforce the CIP Reliability 
Standards and should not be involved in CIP Reliability Standard 
implementation; and likewise, considers that transmission planners are 
not sufficiently focused on the operational aspects of the grid where 
cyber security is most critical. Further, ISO/RTO Council suggests that 
reliability coordinator oversight be limited to a review of the 
methodologies used to identify critical assets, since reliability 
coordinators have no special expertise in identifying critical cyber 
assets.
    310. By contrast, Ontario IESO, Reliant, ReliabilityFirst and SPP 
advocate that reliability coordinators, not Regional Entities, should 
provide oversight of critical asset identification. Ontario IESO and 
SPP believe that the reliability coordinators are most suited for this 
task because they are directly involved in the daily activities of 
ensuring Bulk-Power System reliability. They comment that the 
reliability coordinators currently perform a wide-area function that 
includes studying power system dynamics and interrelationship of assets 
as well as coordination among neighboring systems. Reliant urges that 
the Commission require the reliability coordinator to play a major role 
in the external review of critical asset lists because it possesses a 
broad array of operating and system data.
    311. Ontario IESO comments that, because Regional Entities perform 
a critical CIP Reliability Standards development and compliance role, 
Regional Entity approval of an entity's critical asset list creates a 
conflict of interest in the situation where a Regional Entity is 
required to investigate and enforce non-compliance of a CIP Reliability 
Standard. The Regional Entity may have approved the critical asset list 
and thus may be reluctant to subsequently find a deficiency in the list 
discovered during the course of a compliance investigation. Ontario 
IESO also respectfully suggests that Regional Entities lack the 
technical expertise and intimate knowledge of their members' power 
system equipment and behaviors to provide the necessary oversight in 
the determination of critical asset lists.
    312. Ontario IESO suggests that, in the event an asset owner and 
the reliability coordinator disagree as to whether an asset should be 
listed as critical, the latter should prevail. APPA/LPPC ask that the 
Commission direct NERC to develop written procedures for a responsible 
entity to challenge an external, third-party decision to alter a 
responsible entity's list of critical assets. APPA/LPPC argue that, 
regardless of the reviewer, an appellate process akin to the process 
described in Rule 410 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, providing for 
appeals to the Commission, is needed. EEI and Alliant also believe that 
an appeal process would be needed if regional oversight occurs.
(d) Confidentiality Concerns
    313. Many of the commenters that oppose an external review and 
approval process are concerned that an external review process will 
create new issues regarding the protection of sensitive information 
that inevitably is included

[[Page 7400]]

in the critical asset lists.\97\ These commenters believe that the 
review of critical asset lists during on-site audits would better 
protect this highly-sensitive information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ E.g., Duke, EEI, Entergy, Manitoba Hydro, National Grid and 
SERC-CIPC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    314. EEI and Manitoba Hydro express concern that off-site, third 
party review of a critical asset list may conflict with an entity's 
responsibility to protect information such as a critical asset list in 
CIP-003-1, Requirement R4.1. EEI urges that the Final Rule clarify that 
this information should only be divulged in on-the-premise audits.
    315. CEA is also concerned that the Commission's proposal to 
include a mechanism for the external review and approval of critical 
assets lists would involve the submission of sensitive information. CEA 
and Manitoba Hydro maintain that some Canadian utilities are prohibited 
from sharing security information with U.S. authorities. In addition, 
some utilities regard sharing sensitive security information externally 
or with a foreign entity as a security risk. Currently, sensitive 
information is kept on site and shared with external audit teams during 
visits and the information remains on-site following the audit. The 
Commission's proposed changes would require sensitive material to be 
shared on a regular basis and stored externally and perhaps in a 
foreign jurisdiction. Given the impact on Canadian utilities from such 
changes to the CIP Reliability Standards, CEA requests that the 
Commission exercise caution with respect to this issue.
    316. Xcel asks, in a situation where an entity's risk-based 
assessment identifies a critical asset owned by another entity, how 
should this information properly be communicated while maintaining 
confidentiality? Xcel recommends that the Regional Entities develop 
confidentiality protocols to address such situations.
    317. SDG&E requests clarification that information associated with 
the CIP Reliability Standards will be treated with confidentiality. 
Tampa Electric and SoCal Edison also urge that steps be taken to 
protect confidentiality if information is released to accomplish 
external reviews. SoCal Edison is concerned with the risks associated 
with storing critical information in a common place.
    318. Bonneville agrees with the Commission's goal of providing a 
mechanism for the external review and approval of responsible entities' 
critical asset lists based on a regional perspective; however, it is 
concerned that the Commission's proposal could result in FOIA concerns 
for Bonneville and other federal entities. Under FOIA, the release of 
information to an external party generally waives any privileges 
against disclosure with respect to subsequent requests to the federal 
agency for that same information. Bonneville is concerned that 
submission of critical asset information to the Regional Entity, 
particularly disclosure of the vulnerability-related rationales for 
including and documentation of why it chose to exclude particular 
facilities from inclusion on the critical asset list, may act as such a 
waiver. In addition, Bonneville notes that external reviewers of 
critical federal security information may need to obtain federal 
security clearances before federal entities can allow such review.
iii. Commission Determination
(a) Responsible Entity for Identifying Critical Assets
    319. The Commission affirms its CIP NOPR determination that 
responsibility for identifying critical assets should not be shifted to 
the Regional Entity or another organization instead of the applicable 
responsible entities identified in the current CIP Reliability 
Standards. As we stated in the CIP NOPR,\98\ and confirmed by 
commenters, such a shift would not improve the identification of 
critical assets, but would likely overburden the Regional Entities. 
While we are sympathetic to AMP Ohio's concerns regarding small 
generation owners, generation operators and load serving entities that 
have a limited view of the Bulk-Power System, we believe that NERC's 
development of guidance on the risk-based assessment methodology and 
our direction above to provide assistance to small entities should 
support the efforts of entities--both small and large--in performing a 
proper assessment. We do not believe that the lack of a wide-area view 
is sufficient reason to forego an assessment or taking responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ CIP NOPR at P 111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    320. We will not allow a ``safe harbor'' for good faith compliance 
as requested by AMP Ohio. We do not believe that blanket waivers from 
an enforcement action are appropriate in this context and have 
previously denied other requests for safe harbors from enforcement.\99\ 
Rather, we believe that demonstrable good faith compliance is a 
legitimate mitigating factor in an enforcement action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See, e.g., North American Electric Reliability Council, 119 
FERC ] 61,060 at P 133; order on reh'g, 120 FERC ] 61,260 at P 41 
(2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    321. SPP and ReliabilityFirst suggest modifying CIP-002-1 to allow 
an entity to rely upon the assessment of another entity with interest 
in the matter. We believe that this is a worthwhile suggestion for the 
ERO to pursue and the ERO should consider this proposal in the 
Reliability Standards development process. We note that, even without 
such a provision, an entity such as a small generator operator is not 
foreclosed from consulting with a balancing authority or other 
appropriate entity with a wide-area view of the transmission system.
(b) Need for External Review and Alternatives
    322. The Commission adopts its CIP NOPR proposal to direct that the 
ERO develop through its Reliability Standards development process a 
mechanism for external review and approval of critical asset lists. The 
Commission finds that an external review of critical assets by an 
appropriate organization is needed to assure that such lists are 
considered from a wide-area view (i.e., from a regional perspective) 
and to identify trends in critical asset identification. Further, while 
we recognize that individual circumstances may likely vary, an external 
review will provide an appropriate level of consistency.
    323. The Commission disagrees with the suggestion of Luminant and 
others that external review should be voluntary. The identification of 
critical assets pursuant to CIP-002-1 is crucial to cyber security 
protection because this determination controls whether a responsible 
entity must comply with the remaining CIP requirements in CIP-003-1 
through CIP-009-1. External review will help ensure that responsible 
entities have an accurate and complete list of critical assets, which 
will in turn allow them to be appropriately protected to further the 
security of the nation's Bulk-Power System. Allowing external review as 
a voluntary measure is not adequate to ensure that responsible entities 
are prepared to address cyber vulnerabilities and cyber threats. Based 
on the same reasoning, we reject the suggestion of Northern Indiana and 
others that the external review should only address the assessment 
methodology, and not critical asset lists.
    324. The Commission also disagrees with commenters who insist that 
the external review can be performed pursuant to the ERO's and Regional 
Entity's current compliance and enforcement programs, and the audit 
process in particular. While the Commission decided earlier in the 
Final Rule to rely on the ERO and regional audit processes to examine 
exceptions

[[Page 7401]]

to compliance based on ``technical feasibility,'' the Commission does 
not believe that the audit process will provide timely feedback to a 
responsible entity regarding critical asset determinations. Review of 
critical asset lists through individual audits would span a significant 
period of time, measured in years, during which time such lists would 
not undergo review and possibly gaps in security could result. While 
EEI's suggestion of spot checks prior to the ``auditably compliant'' 
stage would provide more timely feedback it would, by design, not be 
comprehensive. The Commission concludes that a structured program for 
the formal, timely review of critical assets lists is a reasonable 
means to provide timely, comprehensive guidance to responsible entities 
on the adequacy of their critical asset lists.
    325. The Commission agrees with Ontario IESO that in a dispute 
between a responsible entity and the external reviewer over whether to 
identify an additional asset as critical, the external reviewer should 
prevail. (However, an external reviewer's role should be limited to 
determining if additional assets should be added, and should not 
include making recommendations to remove an asset from the list of 
critical assets.) We recognize, however, that there may be a legitimate 
reason for a responsible entity to dispute such a determination, 
possibly through an appeal. We leave it to the ERO to determine the 
need for such an appeal mechanism and, if appropriate, the development 
of appropriate procedures (or reliance on appeal procedures currently 
provided in the NERC Rules of Procedure). While the ERO may determine 
that an appeals process is a necessary aspect of this program, we do 
not believe that the burden of such appeals outweighs the benefits of 
the external review of critical asset lists.
(c) Appropriate Organization To Conduct External Review
    326. The Commission in the CIP NOPR proposed that the Regional 
Entities be responsible for the external review of critical asset 
lists, and also expressed a willingness to consider a review process 
that allows for the participation of other organizations such as 
reliability coordinators and transmission planners. As indicated above, 
a number of commenters question whether the Regional Entities have the 
expertise or resources to conduct the reviews. Rather, there was 
considerable support for reliability coordinators conducting the 
external review because of their technical expertise, their wide-area 
view and their role of coordinating among neighboring systems.
    327. The Commission believes that the Regional Entities must have a 
role in the external review to assure that there is sufficient 
accountability in the process. Further, a Regional Entity role is 
necessary because the Regional Entities and ERO are ultimately 
responsible for ensuring compliance with Reliability Standards. For 
example, if the ERO determines that an appeals process is needed, this 
process cannot rest with an active owner or operator of the Bulk-Power 
System such as a reliability coordinator. Moreover, the ERO and the 
Commission have oversight authority of the Regional Entities' programs 
and procedures pursuant to section 215 of the FPA.
    328. Beyond the direction that the Regional Entities maintain a 
role in the external review process to assure that there is sufficient 
accountability, we leave to the ERO to determine whether the Regional 
Entities have, or can timely develop, the resources to conduct the 
external reviews.\100\ Alternatively, the ERO may determine that 
another entity such as reliability coordinators may be best equipped to 
conduct the reviews. While commenters have made what the Commission 
believes to be a strong case that reliability coordinators are the 
appropriate entity to perform the reviews, the ERO should decide the 
best approach with its understanding of the capabilities and 
limitations of the Regional Entities. Regardless of this determination, 
however, the Commission notes that the Regional Entities have the 
oversight responsibility.\101\
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    \100\ The Commission does not believe that Regional Entity 
review creates a conflict of interest as claimed by some commenters 
because the Regional Entity has no pecuniary interest. The mere fact 
that a Regional Entity performs a development and compliance role is 
not a sufficient reason to find a conflict of interest.
    \101\ The Commission notes that general reliance on Regional 
Entity oversight does not preclude the Commission, the ERO or a 
Regional Entity from exercising its authority to review critical 
asset lists, whether resulting from a complaint, an incident or on 
its own initiative.
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    329. Based on the above discussion, the Commission directs the ERO, 
using its Reliability Standards development process, to develop a 
process of external review and approval of critical asset lists based 
on a regional perspective.
e. Confidentiality Concerns
    330. The Commission agrees with commenters that critical asset 
lists contain sensitive information that needs to be protected from 
public dissemination. The Commission, however, does not believe that 
this concern is a persuasive rationale for not having an external 
review mechanism. Rather, adequate safeguards need to be developed to 
assure that the information contained in critical asset lists are not 
released during the external review process. While Requirement R4 of 
CIP-003-1 obligates a responsible entity to ``implement and document a 
program to identify, classify, and protect information associated with 
Critical Cyber Assets,'' the Commission does not view this as 
inherently conflicting with an external review process that has 
adequate safeguards to prevent the release of sensitive information.
    331. In developing an appropriate external review mechanism, the 
ERO should include features for the controlled delivery of critical 
assets to the entity performing the external review. Likewise, the ERO 
should identify minimum safeguards that the external reviewer must 
deploy to protect sensitive information from disclosure. We agree with 
commenters' concern that the external reviewer should not become a 
``central repository'' for critical asset lists, and this information 
should be returned to the responsible entity once the review is 
complete. The ERO should develop any other safeguards that it believes 
to be appropriate to protect the disclosure of sensitive information 
during the external review process.
    332. CEA and Manitoba Hydro comment that some Canadian utilities 
are prohibited from sharing security information with U.S. authorities. 
They also note that some Canadian utilities regard sharing sensitive 
security information externally or with a foreign entity as a security 
risk. In response, the Commission's Final Rule only addresses the 
obligations of users, owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System in 
the United States (excluding Hawaii and Alaska). Accordingly, the 
Commission's directives regarding the development of an external review 
mechanism applies only to entities subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction pursuant to section 215 of the FPA. Whether a similar 
review process is appropriate or lawful in other jurisdictions is 
beyond the scope of this Final Rule.
    333. Bonneville comments that external review could result in FOIA 
concerns for Bonneville and other federal entities. It also cautions 
that external reviewers of critical federal security information may 
need federal security clearances before being allowed access to 
classified information. In response to Bonneville, we agree that a 
governmental entity subject to FOIA requirements should not be required 
to share sensitive information about

[[Page 7402]]

critical assets lists that could be deemed a waiver of FOIA protection 
that is otherwise available. Nonetheless, a governmental entity's 
identification of critical assets should be subject to appropriate 
oversight. Thus, we direct the ERO, in developing the accountability 
structure for the technical feasibility exception, to include 
appropriate provisions to assure that governmental entities can 
safeguard sensitive information. The ERO should consult with 
governmental entities that are subject to the CIP Reliability Standards 
in developing such appropriate provisions and we, likewise, encourage 
Bonneville and other governmental entities to participate in the 
development of such provisions.
    334. Further, if a governmental entity has classified material 
regarding its critical assets, this information may not be disclosed 
except in accordance with controlling laws and regulations. The ERO's 
external review process must explicitly recognize this limitation.
f. Interdependency
i. NOPR Proposal
    335. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission noted that, while CIP-002-1 
pertains to the identification of assets critical to Bulk-Power System 
reliability, broader interdependency issues with other infrastructures 
cannot be ignored.\102\ The Commission stated its intention to revisit 
this matter through future proceedings and in cooperation with other 
agencies to help to inform the electric sector and itself about the 
need for future CIP Reliability Standards, especially when the 
interdependent infrastructures affect generating capabilities, such as 
through fuel transportation.
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    \102\ CIP NOPR at P 118.
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ii. Comments
    336. APPA/LPPC and other commenters support the Commission's 
proposed determination that the scope of reliability regulation is 
properly limited to assets critical to the Bulk-Power System, and does 
not extend to the management of assets that may be important to the 
operation of other (even if presumably critical) non-electric assets. 
MidAmerican comments that the expansion of CIP Reliability Standards 
beyond Bulk-Power System reliability should be approached with caution 
and only after the compliance effort is complete for the current CIP 
Reliability Standards. Luminant agrees with the Commission that issues 
pertaining to system interdependency are complicated and more 
appropriately addressed in a separate proceeding after the Commission 
completes its action approving the current NERC CIP Reliability 
Standards.
    337. By contrast, Applied Control Solutions suggests that 
interdependencies should be included in risk-based assessments, as they 
can have direct (e.g., electronic connections between electric entities 
and major customers) and indirect impacts (e.g., loss of major fuel 
sources) on Bulk-Power System reliability.
    338. Likewise, the Congressional Representatives find fault in the 
CIP Reliability Standards for failing to address interdependencies with 
other critical infrastructures. The Congressional Representatives state 
that the Bulk-Power System is an enormous, interconnected network that 
is both redundant and resilient, making the sole focus on 
``reliability'' and ``operability'' of the grid as a whole 
inappropriate. They explain that every critical infrastructure in the 
country is dependent on the Bulk-Power System, including chemical 
plants, banks, refineries and military installations. Thus, according 
to the Congressional Representatives, ``focusing on assets relative to 
the functioning of the grid misses the importance of each individual 
asset to the functions of our society.'' \103\ To address the 
shortcoming, the Congressional Representatives suggest that every 
electronically connected asset be considered ``critical.''
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    \103\ Congressional Representatives comments at 7.
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    339. Related, the Congressional Representatives are critical of 
NERC's definition of critical assets as ``facilities, systems, and 
equipment that would affect the reliability and operability'' of the 
Bulk-Power System. The Congressional Representatives explain that this 
definition fails to understand the importance of individual elements of 
the Bulk-Power System that are essential to the delivery of power to 
the nation's critical infrastructure. They state that generation units 
serving individual communities, individual substations, 
telecommunication equipment and distribution assets are critical to the 
safety and security of the U.S., yet are excluded under CIP-002-1.
iii. Commission Determination
    340. The Commission is sensitive to the concerns raised by the 
Congressional Representatives regarding the severe impact that a cyber 
attack on assets not critical to the Bulk-Power System could still have 
on the public. The Commission, however, believes that its authority 
under section 215 of the FPA does not extend to other infrastructure. 
Section 215 of the FPA authorizes the Commission to approve Reliability 
Standards that ``provide for the reliable operation of the bulk-power 
system,'' which the statute defines as the facilities and control 
systems necessary for operation of an interconnected electric energy 
transmission network and the electric energy needed to maintain 
transmission system reliability. In addition, section 215(a)(1) 
specifically excludes from the definition of Bulk-Power System 
``facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.'' 
Moreover, given the complexities surrounding this issue and the 
aggressive timeline that will be necessary merely to meet the more 
modest task of developing and implementing cyber security standards 
capable of protecting the reliability of the Bulk-Power System, we will 
follow the approach that we described in the CIP NOPR of approving CIP 
Reliability Standards designed to safeguard the reliability of the 
Bulk-Power System.
    341. Although the Commission will not direct modifications to the 
scope of critical assets to be identified under CIP-002-1, for the 
reasons discussed above, the Commission agrees with commenters 
regarding the importance of considering interdependencies with other 
critical infrastructures. The Commission believes that to meaningfully 
address interdependencies with other critical infrastructures, it is 
important to coordinate with the stakeholders of these other 
infrastructures as well as with other government agencies and 
organizations. Thus, we affirm our CIP NOPR approach that ``[w]hile 
broader interdependency issues cannot be ignored, the Commission 
intends to revisit this matter through future proceedings and with 
other agencies. This work will help inform the electric sector and this 
Commission about the need for future Reliability Standards, especially 
when the interdependent infrastructures affect generating capabilities, 
such as through fuel transportation.'' \104\
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    \104\ CIP NOPR at P 118.
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2. CIP-003-1--Security Management Controls
    342. Reliability Standard CIP-003-1 seeks to ensure that each 
responsible entity has minimum security management controls in place to 
protect the critical cyber assets identified pursuant to CIP-002-1. To 
achieve this goal, a responsible entity must develop a cyber security 
policy that represents management's commitment and ability

[[Page 7403]]

to secure its critical cyber assets. It also must designate a senior 
manager to direct the cyber security program and to approve any 
exception to the policy.
    343. CIP-003-1, in addition, requires a responsible entity to 
implement an information protection program to identify, classify, and 
protect sensitive information concerning critical cyber assets, as well 
as an access control program to designate who may have access to such 
information. Finally, a responsible entity must establish a ``change 
control and configuration management'' program to oversee changes made 
to the hardware or software of critical cyber assets.
    344. The Commission approves Reliability Standard CIP-003-1 as 
mandatory and enforceable. In addition, we direct the ERO to develop 
modifications to this Reliability Standard through its standards 
development process and to take other actions. These actions pertain to 
(1) the adequacy of policy guidance; (2) discretion to grant 
exceptions; (3) leadership; (4) access authorization; (5) change 
control and configuration management; and (6) interconnected networks.
a. Adequacy of Policy Guidance
    345. Requirement R1 of Reliability Standard CIP-003-1 directs a 
responsible entity to ``document and implement a cyber security policy 
that represents management's commitment and ability to secure its 
critical cyber assets.'' The only guidance that is given with regard to 
the nature and scope of the cyber security policy is that it should 
address ``the Requirements in CIP-002-1 through CIP-009-1, including 
the provisions for emergency situations.''
i. NOPR Proposal
    346. The Commission proposed in the NOPR that the ERO modify CIP-
003-1 to provide additional guidance for the topics and processes that 
the required cyber security policy should address to ensure that a 
responsible entity reasonably protects its critical cyber assets.\105\ 
We noted that Recommendation 34 of the Blackout Report called for grid-
related organizations to have a planned and documented security 
strategy, governance model, and architecture for energy management 
automation systems. The CIP NOPR provided examples of possible topics 
for security policy guidance, such as communication networks related to 
control systems; the appropriate use of defense in depth strategy; the 
use of wireless communications for control systems; uninterruptible 
power supplies; and heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) 
equipment for critical cyber assets.
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    \105\ See CIP NOPR at P 123-27.
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ii. Comments
    347. NERC and other commenters contend that the Commission should 
not direct the ERO to modify CIP-003-1 to provide additional guidance 
for the topics and processes that the required cyber security policy 
should address.\106\ The Commission should instead permit and encourage 
the development of ``how'' guidelines and work papers. Ontario Power is 
concerned that the expectation that security policies will address 
issues that are not currently reflected in the CIP Reliability 
Standards implies that an entity could be found non-compliant for not 
following its own policies that are outside of the Reliability 
Standards. Ontario Power maintains that this would be an unfounded 
increase in the scope of the CIP Reliability Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ E.g., Alliant Energy, Mr. Brown, First Energy, Idaho 
Power, ISO/RTO Council and Ontario Power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    348. ISO/RTO Council opposes the Commission proposal and expresses 
concern that if a responsible entity's security policies go beyond the 
specific Requirements of the Reliability Standards, it could be 
penalized for failure to implement the policies fully. ISO/RTO Council 
also objects to reporting any steps that exceed what the CIP 
Reliability Standards require to any third party. It argues that it 
would be wasteful to require development of one set of plans, policies 
and standards to meet what is explicitly required by the Reliability 
Standards and another that is applicable to other assets such as market 
systems. ISO/RTO Council requests that the Commission clarify that 
monitoring for non-compliance will pertain to the specific Requirement 
of the Reliability Standards, not requirements expressed in corporate 
policies relevant to security.
    349. In contrast, SoCal Edison believes that it is appropriate to 
include guidance in CIP-003-1 on important systems that have not yet 
been addressed such as data and communications networks, but that 
guidance on topics such as power supplies, heating, and other equipment 
is too detailed for a corporate level policy. APPA/LPPC agrees that 
security policies will address issues that are not currently reflected 
in the CIP Reliability Standards but that are important for control 
system security. Further, APPA/LPPC state that the nature and scope of 
a responsible entity's cyber security management policy generally 
should be left to the entity's discretion.
    350. ReliabilityFirst and SPP comment that an entity's overall 
organizational security policies should address protection of 
supporting infrastructure and appropriately define a defense in depth 
posture. However, they are concerned that, by including such 
infrastructure in the scope of the CIP Reliability Standards, an audit 
could determine that the devices supporting the network throughout the 
entity should be considered either critical cyber assets or electronic 
security perimeter access points and thus become subject to all of the 
Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards. Their concern is the 
possibility of increasing the scope of the electronic security 
perimeter to include the entity's entire communications network and all 
assets connected thereto.
    351. Other commenters raise concerns whether specific issues should 
be addressed in this guidance. Idaho Power disagrees with the 
Commission's proposal to address the protection of support systems 
(e.g., communication and HVAC) in the CIP Reliability Standards. It 
states that other Commission-approved Reliability Standards are better 
suited for addressing these issues. For example, according to Idaho 
Power, communication concerns should be addressed in COM-001.
    352. Tampa Electric notes that cyber assets associated with 
communications networks and data communication links between distinct 
electric security perimeters are exempt under the CIP Reliability 
Standards. It urges that this exemption be maintained and that further 
consideration of the exemption's merit should be addressed only in the 
Reliability Standards development process. Likewise, National Grid and 
MidAmerican oppose expanding the CIP Reliability Standards to cover 
communications and data networks beyond those directly involved in the 
security of control systems.
    353. APPA/LPPC agree that it is reasonable for responsible entities 
to be responsible for the communications systems they own and operate. 
However, they cannot be expected to oversee the operations of 
commercial communication carriers. APPA/LPPC state the Commission 
should recognize that it has no authority to compel commercial 
communication carriers to comply with the CIP Reliability Standards and 
that responsible entities cannot compel them to comply.

[[Page 7404]]

    354. ReliabilityFirst and SPP are concerned that environmental 
systems would become subject, at a minimum, to the requirements of CIP-
006-1 (Physical Security). Environmental systems are often not fully 
enclosed within a physical security perimeter as defined by the 
Reliability Standard and it is impractical in some instances to do so. 
ReliabilityFirst states that, besides expanding the scope of the 
Reliability Standards to encompass issues that either have no bearing 
on Bulk-Power System reliability, or are specifically excluded from the 
CIP Reliability Standards, the Commission's proposal improperly deals 
with ``how'' a responsible entity is to address a Requirement.
iii. Commission Determination
    355. The Commission believes that responsible entities would 
benefit from additional guidance regarding the topics and processes to 
address in the cyber security policy required pursuant to CIP-003-1. 
While commenters support the need for guidance, many are concerned 
about providing such guidance through a modification of the Reliability 
Standard. We are persuaded by these commenters. Accordingly, the 
Commission directs the ERO to provide additional guidance for the 
topics and processes that the required cyber security policy should 
address. However, we will not dictate the form of such guidance. For 
example, the ERO could develop a guidance document or white paper that 
would be referenced in the Reliability Standard. On the other hand, if 
it is determined in the course of the Reliability Standards development 
process that specific guidance is important enough to be incorporated 
directly into a Requirement, this option is not foreclosed. The 
entities remain responsible, however, to comply with the cyber security 
policy pursuant to CIP-003-1.
    356. In response to ISO/RTO Council, Ontario Power and other 
commenters, the Commission's intent in the CIP NOPR--as well as the 
Final Rule--is not to expand the scope of the CIP Reliability 
Standards. Requirement R1 of CIP-003-1 requires a responsible entity to 
document and implement a cyber security policy ``that represents 
management's commitment and ability to secure its Critical Cyber 
Assets.'' The Requirement then states that the policy, ``at a 
minimum,'' must address the Requirements in CIP-002-1 through CIP-009-
1. The Commission believes that there are other topics, besides those 
addressed in the Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards, which 
are relevant to securing critical cyber assets. The Commission 
identified examples of such topics in the CIP NOPR. Thus, the 
Commission, in directing the ERO to develop guidance on additional 
topics relevant to securing critical cyber assets, is not expanding the 
scope of the CIP Reliability Standards.
    357. Nor do we believe, as suggested by Idaho Power, that the 
proposed topics for guidance are better addressed by revisions to other 
Reliability Standards. Again, the guidance is in the context of 
securing critical cyber assets and is best addressed in the CIP 
Reliability Standards or a supporting guidance document.
    358. In response to SoCal Edison, we disagree that guidance on 
topics such as power supplies, heating, and other equipment is too 
detailed for a corporate level policy. These topics are potentially 
relevant to securing critical cyber assets and, therefore, appropriate 
topics for guidance.
    359. ISO/RTO Council, Ontario Power and other commenters raise 
concerns regarding potential civil penalty liability if a responsible 
entity addresses the additional guidance topics in its cyber security 
policy. The Commission does not believe that the inclusion of 
additional topics in the cyber security policy will increase a 
responsible entity's penalty liability. We provide our views regarding 
the enforcement of cyber security policies below in addressing 
exceptions to such policies. In particular, we state there that our 
concern is that a good policy exists and that it is implemented through 
the exercise of sound reasoning. Consistent with the discussion in the 
following section, we do not believe that an entity's decision to not 
follow its cyber security policy in a particular situation should 
trigger a penalty, as long as no Reliability Standard Requirement 
(other than Requirement R1 in CIP-003-1) is violated as a result. We do 
require that the reasoning be documented to ensure that the responsible 
entity is indeed implementing the security policy as required by 
Requirement R1 of CIP-003-1.
    360. We agree with APPA/LPPC that responsible entities cannot be 
expected to oversee the operations of commercial communications 
carriers. However, this is an example of precisely why more guidance 
would be useful. Since responsible entities cannot oversee commercial 
communications carriers, it is important that they consider what they 
can do to guard against potential threats from that quarter.
b. Discretion to Grant Exceptions
    361. Requirement R3 of CIP-003-1 provides that a responsible entity 
must document as an exception each instance where it cannot conform to 
its security policy developed pursuant to Requirement R1. Exceptions 
need senior manager approval. The documentation must include ``an 
explanation as to why the exception is necessary and any compensating 
measures, or a statement accepting risk.'' An exception to the cyber 
security policy must be documented within 30 days of senior management 
approval. An authorized exception must be reviewed and approved 
annually to ensure that the exception is still required and valid.
i. NOPR Proposal
    362. The Commission expressed concern in the CIP NOPR that 
Requirement R2 allows a responsible entity too much latitude in 
excusing itself from compliance with its cyber security policy.\107\ 
The Commission, therefore, proposed to direct the ERO to develop 
modifications to CIP-003-1 that require a responsible entity to submit 
documentation of cyber security policy exceptions periodically to the 
relevant Regional Entity to provide added assurance that exceptions are 
adequately justified.
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    \107\ See CIP NOPR at P 128-33.
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    363. Further, the Commission distinguished between situations where 
a responsible entity excepts itself from its cyber security policy and 
where it excepts itself from specific Requirements of the CIP 
Reliability Standards based on technical feasibility and stated that 
exceptions from a policy provision do not also excuse compliance with a 
Requirement. In that regard, the Commission proposed that the ERO 
develop modifications to clarify that the exceptions mentioned in 
Requirements R2.3 and R3 of CIP-003-1 do not except responsible 
entities from the Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards.
ii. Comments
    364. While NERC and ReliabilityFirst do not comment specifically on 
Regional Entity review of exceptions to a responsible entity's cyber 
security policy, their general comment is that the Commission should 
rely on NERC's existing oversight structure is applicable here.
    365. EEI and other commenters oppose requiring responsible entities 
to submit documentation of exceptions to the cyber security policy to 
Regional Entities. EEI disagrees with the Commission's assertion that 
CIP-003-1

[[Page 7405]]

gives a responsible entity too much latitude to excuse itself from 
compliance with its cyber security policy. EEI adds that it is 
sufficient that exceptions to a cyber security policy must be explained 
in writing and approved by a designated manager. According to EEI, 
external accountability for such decisions is a function of the audit 
process, and the Commission should not suggest that the Regional Entity 
step outside its role of enforcing the Reliability Standards and engage 
in enforcing a responsible entity's internal cyber security policy. 
PG&E submits that the proposal is burdensome.
    366. Entergy disagrees that responsible entities should be required 
to submit documentation of exceptions periodically to their Regional 
Entity. Entergy believes that a proper security policy will track what 
the Reliability Standards require. The Commission, the ERO, and 
Regional Entities should not be concerned with policy exceptions but 
rather only with whether the Requirements of the CIP Reliability 
Standards are being met. Entergy also argues that requiring 
documentation of exceptions could cause internal policies to be written 
less rigorously to avoid the burden of excessive documentation.
    367. CEA and Manitoba Hydro are concerned that periodic submission 
of documents on cyber security policy exceptions to Regional Entities 
may allow the release of highly sensitive information. Manitoba Hydro 
states that such documentation would contain details about existing 
critical cyber assets and their security weaknesses that would threaten 
both security and reliability if it were released inadvertently into 
the wrong hands. SoCal Edison suggests that it is more appropriate for 
responsible entities to house all justifications for policy exceptions 
internally and have them reviewed during an audit. Bonneville is 
concerned that the practice could be deemed a waiver of FOIA 
protections. Bonneville also is concerned that external reviewers may 
be required first to obtain required federal security clearances before 
accessing the information.
    368. MidAmerican believes that the reporting of exceptions will 
indicate a weak spot in a responsible entity's cyber security policy 
and a secure method of handling these exceptions would need to be 
established.
    369. Several commenters address the Commission's proposal to 
clarify that the exceptions mentioned in Requirements R2.3 and R3 of 
CIP-003-1 do not except responsible entities from the Requirements of 
the CIP Reliability Standards. EEI opposes the Commission's proposal 
for the same reasons described above. MidAmerican comments that it has 
not interpreted Requirements R2.3 and R3 as the ability to avoid 
compliance.
    370. Related, SPP states that a responsible entity cannot exempt 
itself from a Requirement of a CIP Reliability Standard. Once a policy 
is in place to comply with these Requirements, the only recourse in 
cases of technical infeasibility or other valid reason is to document 
an exception to the security policy. SPP maintains that the 
Commission's proposal for reporting and approval of technical 
feasibility exceptions would, if adopted, extend to exceptions to the 
required security policy if the exception would make the responsible 
entity incapable of complying fully with a Requirement of the CIP 
Reliability Standards.
    371. Northern Indiana requests clarification of the information 
that would be required to justify an exception and suggests that it 
match the level of information required in self-certifications. It 
suggests that a responsible entity would benefit from consultation when 
attempting to justify an exception and that monetary penalties should 
be waived during this time as well as within the timeframe of any 
remediation plan. Northern Indiana also contends that security policy 
exceptions which do not affect compliance with the Reliability 
Standards need not be documented. Some policies may be stricter than 
the Reliability Standards, and responsible entities should not be 
required to submit documentation of exceptions that are consistent with 
the Reliability Standards Requirements.
iii. Commission Determination
    372. The Commission continues to believe that it is important that 
there be ERO and Regional Entity oversight of exceptions from required 
security policies, however, the Commission agrees with commenters such 
as EEI and PG&E that this oversight is best accomplished through the 
existing Regional Entity oversight and audit process.
    373. Requirement R1 of CIP-003-1 requires the development and 
implementation of a security policy. Requirement R3 provides that a 
responsible entity must document exceptions to its policy with 
documentation and senior management approval. The Commission is 
concerned that, if exceptions mount, there would come a point where the 
exceptions rather than the rule prevail. In such a situation, it is 
questionable whether the responsible entity is actually implementing a 
security policy. We therefore believe that the Regional Entities should 
perform an oversight role in providing accountability of a responsible 
entity that excepts itself from compliance with the provisions of its 
cyber security policy. Further, we believe that such oversight would 
impose a limited additional burden on a responsible entity because 
Requirement R3 currently requires documentation of exceptions.
    374. That being said, the Commission agrees with EEI and others 
that Regional Entity review of exceptions to a responsible entity's 
cyber security policy is best accomplished pursuant to the existing 
Regional Entity audit process where all the relevant facts and 
circumstances can be considered. Further, review of exceptions to a 
cyber security policy in the audit process should effectively address 
commenter concerns regarding disclosure of sensitive information by 
keeping that data on site.\108\
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    \108\ In the Final Rule, the Commission has directed the ERO to 
develop somewhat different external review processes in different 
contexts. As discussed immediately above, the Commission believes 
that exceptions to a responsible entity's cyber security policy are 
appropriately addressed in the course of the Regional Entity's audit 
process. The Commission has also directed that Regional Entities 
evaluate and approve a responsible entity's reliance on the 
technical feasibility exception as part of the audit process. In 
addition, to provide the Regional Entity with an ``upfront'' 
understanding regarding the extent of industry reliance on the 
technical feasibility exception, as well as to allow the Regional 
Entity to adequately prepare for an audit, the Commission also 
required that a responsible entity submit a ``notice'' to the 
Regional Entity when the exception is invoked. In contrast, due to 
the importance of timely verifying that responsible entities have 
developed accurate cyber asset lists pursuant to CIP-002-1, the 
Commission has directed the development of an external review 
separate from the audit process. Thus, the Commission has tailored 
different review processes to different situations to minimize the 
burden on industry yet satisfy the goal of assuring adequate 
oversight.
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    375. As we discuss elsewhere in the Final Rule, we agree with 
Bonneville regarding the need to preserve a governmental entity's FOIA 
protections and address security clearance concerns. The ERO should 
address these concerns through consultation with relevant governmental 
entities.
    376. Further, the Commission adopts its CIP NOPR proposal and 
directs the ERO to clarify that the exceptions mentioned in 
Requirements R2.3 and R3 of CIP-003-1 do not except responsible 
entities from the Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards. In 
response to EEI, we believe that this clarification is needed because, 
for example, it is important that a responsible entity understand that 
exceptions that

[[Page 7406]]

individually may be acceptable must not lead cumulatively to results 
that undermine compliance with the Requirements themselves.
    377. The Requirement to develop and implement a security policy 
differs from many other Requirements in that it is a means to the end 
of implementing those Requirements. Our concern that exceptions be 
documented and justified is primarily a concern that there be reasoned 
decision-making, consistency, and subsequent effectiveness in 
implementing the policy. We thus disagree with Northern Indiana that 
security policy exceptions which do not affect compliance with the 
Reliability Standards need not be documented. Further, in response to 
Entergy, as stated elsewhere in this Final Rule, our concern is that a 
good policy exists and that it is implemented through the exercise of 
sound reasoning. We do not believe that an entity's decision to not 
follow its cyber security policy in a particular situation should 
trigger a penalty, as long as no Reliability Standard Requirement 
(other than Requirement R1 in CIP-003-1) is violated as a result. We do 
require that the reasoning be documented to ensure that the responsible 
entity is indeed implementing the security policy as required by 
Requirement R1 of CIP-003-1.
    378. In response to Northern Indiana's request for clarification of 
the information that would be required to justify an exception, we 
leave it to the ERO to provide guidance on the level of information 
that it considers appropriate, consistent with our discussion above.
c. Leadership
i. NOPR Proposal
    379. Requirement R2 of CIP-003-1 requires that a senior manager be 
assigned overall responsibility for implementation of the CIP 
Reliability Standards. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission interpreted this 
Requirement to require the designation of a single manager who has 
direct and comprehensive responsibility and accountability for 
implementation and ongoing compliance with the CIP Reliability 
Standards.\109\ The Commission noted that Recommendation 43 of the 
Blackout Report called for clear lines of authority and ownership for 
security matters, and it proposed to direct that the ERO modify CIP-
003-1 to make clear the senior manager's ultimate responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See CIP NOPR at P 134-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
    380. Bonneville states that the Commission should clarify whether 
its intent is to make the senior manager personally accountable for 
violations of the CIP Reliability Standards, i.e., subject to civil 
penalties for violations, so that necessary action can be taken to 
protect the manager, such as acquiring additional personal insurance 
coverage. Similarly, NRECA asks the Commission to confirm that the 
senior manager responsible for CIP Reliability Standards compliance is 
not, by virtue of his position, subject to civil penalties pursuant to 
section 215 of FPA.
iii. Commission Determination
    381. The Commission adopts its CIP NOPR interpretation that 
Requirement R2 of CIP-003-1 requires the designation of a single 
manager who has direct and comprehensive responsibility and 
accountability for implementation and ongoing compliance with the CIP 
Reliability Standards. The Commission's intent is to ensure that there 
is a clear line of authority and that cyber security functions are 
given the prominence they deserve. The Commission agrees with 
commenters that the senior manager, by virtue of his or her position, 
is not a user, owner or operator of the Bulk-Power System that is 
personally subject to civil penalties pursuant to section 215 of FPA.
d. Information Access Authorization
    382. Requirement R5 of CIP-003-1 directs the responsible entity to 
implement a program for managing access to protected critical cyber 
asset information and requires, among other things, that the list of 
personnel responsible for authorizing access to protected information 
be verified at least annually.
 i. NOPR Proposal
    383. The Commission explained in the CIP NOPR that CIP-007-1, 
Requirement R5 (access implementation), CIP-004-1, Requirement R4 
(access revocation), and CIP-003-1, Requirement R5 (access review and 
approval) each contain provisions on access to information, and it took 
the position that these various provisions are not interlinked as 
clearly as they should be. The Commission noted that Recommendation 44 
of the Blackout Report stresses the need to prevent inappropriate 
disclosure of information. Thus, the CIP NOPR proposed to direct that 
the ERO modify Reliability Standards CIP-003-1, CIP-004-1, and/or CIP-
007-1, to ensure that when access to protected information is revoked, 
it is done so promptly.
ii. Comments
    384. CPUC agrees with the Commission's proposal on clarifying that 
a revocation of access to protected information should be accomplished 
promptly, but it maintains that that the term ``promptly'' is too 
subjective. It would be more appropriate to specify a definite time 
interval for revoking access. FirstEnergy agrees with the Commission's 
proposal and states that in all cases of access authorization under the 
CIP Reliability Standards, responsible entities should revoke an 
employee's access to critical cyber assets within 24 hours in cases of 
termination for cause and within seven days for other personnel no 
longer needing such access. MidAmerican takes a similar position.
    385. Northern Indiana states that while a responsible entity may 
remove an employee's or vendor's access to its critical cyber assets 
and systems, it cannot eliminate all possible access to information. A 
responsible entity cannot enter the employee's home to remove or 
destroy information that the employee, particularly the vendor's 
employee, may have maintained in his home because in the course of his 
employment he wanted ready reference to such information. A responsible 
entity may make a reasonable request that information be returned, but 
immediate return may not occur.
iii. Commission Determination
    386. The Commission adopts its CIP NOPR proposal and directs the 
ERO to develop modifications to Reliability Standards CIP-003-1, CIP-
004-1, and/or CIP-007-1, to ensure and make clear that, when access to 
protected information is revoked, it is done so promptly. In general, 
the Commission agrees with commenters and believes that access to 
protected information should cease as soon as possible but not later 
than 24 hours from the time of termination for cause.
    387. In response to Northern Indiana, while we acknowledge that 
responsible entities are not authorized to enter private homes, we 
believe that an appropriate cyber security policy will ensure that such 
information is present in an employee's home only for legitimate 
reasons specified in the policy and should require the return of all 
information upon request.
e. Change Control and Configuration Management
    388. Requirement R6 of CIP-003-1 requires a responsible entity to 
establish a process of ``change control and configuration management'' 
for adding,

[[Page 7407]]

modifying, replacing, or removing critical cyber asset hardware or 
software.
i. NOPR Proposal
    389. The Commission noted in the CIP NOPR that Requirement R6 does 
not address accidental consequences or malicious actions by individuals 
where commercial vendors test and certify that the electronic security 
patches they provide will not adversely affect other electronic systems 
already in place.\110\ The Commission proposed to direct that the ERO 
develop a modification to Requirement R6 to require that authorized 
changes made to critical cyber assets only affect the processes they 
are intended to affect (to address both accidental consequences and 
malicious actions by individuals performing the changes). Also, the CIP 
NOPR proposed that the ERO develop a new requirement for responsible 
entities to take actions to detect unauthorized changes to critical 
cyber assets, whether originating from inside or outside the 
responsible entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ See id. P 140-44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
    390. Entergy, ISO/RTO Council, Northern Indiana and PG&E oppose the 
Commission's proposed modifications to Requirement R6 of CIP-003-1. 
Entergy argues that the Commission's concern will be addressed by CIP-
007-1 when implemented by information security professionals and 
changes to CIP-003-1 are unnecessary and burdensome. Entergy and BPA 
also believe that the NIST Security Risk Management Framework offers 
further comprehensive controls. Northern Indiana points out that assets 
and systems targeted by the proposal include software as well as 
hardware.
    391. MidAmerican believes that Requirement R6 is sufficient as 
written and clearly outlines the process of review, testing and 
approval, and is adequate for monitoring of change control and 
configuration management. Idaho Power is concerned about the current 
availability of technology to assist in detecting accidental and 
malicious modifications. It asks whether the Commission is concerned 
with unauthorized changes, unintended changes or both. Idaho Power 
opposes additional changes and states that it can reduce the risk of 
unauthorized changes significantly, but it cannot eliminate them 
entirely. Idaho Power believes that there will be adequate protection 
against unintended changes where there are appropriate test plans, 
trained and qualified personnel, and a regimented change management 
process.
    392. ISO/RTO Council states that it does not understand what the 
Commission meant by ``detection and monitoring controls'' and suggests 
that it consider the phrase ``verification that unintended changes have 
not been made.'' ISO/RTO Council objects to testing the functionality 
of changes made to live production systems. It agrees that verification 
of manually initiated changes is appropriate, and responsible entities 
should also be required to monitor and determine whether unintended 
changes have been made to devices in the production environment and to 
investigate and remediate any unintended changes. According to ISO/RTO 
Council, it is not always possible to confirm definitively or safely 
that applying a tested and approved change on a production device has 
had the intended effect, especially where the modification is rarely 
triggered or where testing could adversely affect reliability. ISO/RTO 
Council prefers a requirement to verify that changes have been made on 
the intended devices, to monitor for unintended or unplanned changes, 
and to investigate and remediate any exceptions that are discovered.
    393. Further, ISO/RTO Council states some changes are intentionally 
initiated automatically using pre-approved means, such as automated 
virus signature updates. These changes can be unpredictable and can 
occur multiple times per day. ISO/RTO Council agrees these changes need 
to be verified, but states it is impractical and unnecessary to verify 
each change as it happens and suggests periodic verification that the 
necessary updates, or their cumulative equivalent, have been 
effectuated.
    394. PG&E argues that technical problems could cause downtime of 
critical assets if this requirement is imposed. Any requirements for 
detection and monitoring controls for unintended changes must allow for 
controls that do not require considerable downtime for the critical 
cyber assets.
    395. Puget Sound argues that the CIP Reliability Standards should 
expressly recognize that change control and configuration management 
processes for critical cyber assets cannot ensure 100 percent integrity 
for those assets when making changes. The CIP Reliability Standards 
also should recognize that test environments can mimic portions of the 
production environment but cannot capture all of the actual 
interactions among critical cyber assets.
    396. ReliabilityFirst and SPP state that changes should be properly 
tested prior to implementation, although it may not always be feasible 
to test a change in an offline environment. They believe that a strict 
interpretation of the Commission proposal would be impossible to 
implement, as it would require a comprehensive regression test, 
including failure testing, to be performed on the entire environment. 
Even that might not detect an unintended consequence of the change and 
could conceivably result in an expectation to report an issue of non-
compliance. Regression testing is appropriately reserved for 
significant changes, such as version upgrades or new applications, but 
not all changes. They state that appropriate mitigation measures exist 
for reducing the risk of unintended consequences resulting from 
changes.
iii. Commission Determination
    397. Based upon the comments received the Commission is altering 
its position on how best to address the apparent deficiencies of 
Requirement R6 in CIP-003-1. The Commission directs the ERO to develop 
modifications to Requirement R6 of CIP-003-1 to provide an express 
acknowledgment of the need for the change control and configuration 
management process to consider accidental consequences and malicious 
actions along with intentional changes. The Commission believes that 
these considerations are significant aspects of change control and 
configuration management that deserve express acknowledgement in the 
Reliability Standard. While we agree with Entergy that the NIST 
Security Risk Management Framework offers valuable guidance on how to 
deal with these matters, our concern here is that the potential 
problems alluded to be explicitly acknowledged. Our proposal does not 
speak to how these problems should be addressed. We do not believe that 
the changes will have burdensome consequences, but we also note that 
addressing any unnecessary burdens can be dealt with in the Reliability 
Standards development process.
    398. We agree with ISO/RTO Council that the phrase ``verification 
that unintended changes have not been made'' captures the core issue. 
Our concern is that some form of verification is performed to detect 
when unauthorized changes have been made and to identify those changes, 
as well as ensuring that the proper alerts are issued.
    399. Many of the comments address practical issues involved in 
addressing accidental consequences and malicious actions, and we 
recognize that such issues exist. We, thus, agree with Puget Sound that 
change control and

[[Page 7408]]

configuration management processes for critical cyber assets cannot 
ensure 100 percent integrity for those assets when making changes. We 
do not seek absolute assurances but rather are concerned that there be 
processes in place that permit a reasonably high level of confidence 
modifications do not have unintended consequence. However, we reject 
Puget Sound's proposal that the Reliability Standard should expressly 
recognize that absolute assurances are not required. We also believe 
that our revised directive to the ERO on Requirement R6 addresses Puget 
Sound's concern about the limitations imposed by a test environment.
    400. In response to ReliablityFirst and SPP, we understand that 
comprehensive regression testing is not necessary for every change 
regardless of how insignificant. We also agree with ISO/RTO Council 
that it can be impractical and unnecessary to verify every intentional 
automatic change as it occurs. We believe that our revised directive to 
the ERO addresses these concerns.
f. Interconnected Networks
i. NOPR Proposal
    401. The Commission proposed in the CIP NOPR to direct the ERO to 
modify Reliability Standard CIP-003-1 to provide direction on the 
issues and concerns that a mutual distrust posture must address to 
protect a control system from the ``outside world.'' \111\ The 
Commission noted that interconnected control system networks are 
susceptible to infiltration by a cyber intruder and stated that 
responsible entities should protect themselves from whatever is outside 
their control systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ Id. at P 147. An architecture with a mutual distrust 
posture could involve various hardware or software mechanisms or 
manual procedures to restrict and verify access to the control 
system from these outside sources. Examples include: firewalls; data 
checking software(s); or procedures for manually implementing a 
connection to allow a vendor to perform maintenance work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
    402. FirstEnergy agrees with the intent of the Commission's 
proposal that there be more direction on what constitutes a mutual 
distrust posture, but it argues that the need for uniform processes 
should be balanced against the need for flexibility in individual 
cases. FirstEnergy argues that each entity may have a unique 
architecture that requires a unique protection scheme. In addition, a 
common security method could cause a vulnerability of its own, in that 
one successful cyber attack could compromise all security systems if 
there are similarities across all systems.
    403. ISO-NE agrees that the mutual distrust principle is a useful 
consideration when determining when to protect cyber assets and in 
designing a secure system architecture, but it disagrees that it should 
be used as a measurable requirement. ISO-NE thus asks the Commission to 
omit any direction to the ERO to address the concept of mutual 
distrust.
    404. Northern Indiana comments that the Commission's proposal on 
mutual distrust is unnecessary because the issue is addressed in 
Reliability Standards CIP-005-1 and CIP-007-1. It argues that if the 
Commission's proposal on mutual distrust were applied in unqualified 
terms, it would have to sever the Midwest ISO's communication link to 
the Northern Indiana control system. Northern Indiana states that it 
trusts the Midwest ISO in its role as the reliability coordinator over 
the Northern Indiana electric system and thus argues that the 
Commission should exempt reliability coordinators. If the Commission 
does not exempt reliability coordinators, Northern Indiana respectfully 
requests that the Commission clarify and refine the definition of the 
term mutual distrust.
    405. Entergy argues that the Commission needs to direct the ERO to 
define the term mutual distrust in CIP-003-1 to foreclose ambiguities 
in application and enforcement. Entergy notes that NIST has many 
documents in its SP800 Series that provide excellent treatment of the 
issues and variables involved in the concept of mutual distrust and 
that complement the NIST Security Risk Management Framework. The 
Commission could direct the ERO to consider this guidance. Entergy 
argues that the broad wording of the Commission's proposal extends 
beyond the scope of the Reliability Standards. It also argues that the 
Commission's proposal would direct the ERO to specify what the end 
result must be rather than permitting the Reliability Standards process 
to establish the optimum solution.
    406. MidAmerican submits that the terms mutual distrust and outside 
world require clarification to facilitate compliance. MidAmerican 
recommends that the Commission ensure that the guidelines to be 
developed have no impact on either performance or reliability. EMS/
SCADA systems are tuned for and certified by their vendor at specific 
communication rates. The introduction of delays due to additional 
security layers to communications and data exchange may impact 
reliability.
iii. Commission Determination
    407. The Commission proposed in the CIP NOPR that the ERO provide 
direction, i.e., guidance, regarding the issues and concerns that a 
mutual distrust posture must address in order to protect a responsible 
entity's control system from the outside world. The Commission noted 
that a mutual distrust posture requires each responsible entity that 
has identified critical cyber assets to protect itself and not trust 
any communication crossing an electronic security perimeter, regardless 
of where that communication originates.
    408. The Commission agrees with FirstEnergy on the importance of 
flexibility in developing a mutual distrust posture, but does not see a 
conflict between the need for flexibility and what it is proposing, 
which is simply more guidance. More guidance will allow responsible 
entities to implement measures adapted to their specific situations 
more consistently and effectively. Additional guidance need not be 
included in a specific Requirement, but could be in the form of 
examples. We will leave it to the Reliability Standards development 
process and the ERO to decide whether some or all of the guidance can 
be contained in separate guidance documents referenced in the 
Reliability Standard. In response to Entergy, the Commission is not 
directing that the ERO establish a specific end result. Our concern is 
simply that responsible entities have guidance on how to achieve an 
appropriate result in individual cases, which can vary on a case-by-
case basis. We disagree that providing useful guidance affects the 
scope of the Reliability Standards.
    409. We agree with Entergy that NIST provides much guidance, but we 
disagree that it is necessary to define the term mutual distrust. Our 
proposal is that there be guidance on certain issues and concerns, and 
we therefore do not believe that a formal definition advances that 
goal. In response to MidAmerican, we believe that clarification of the 
terms mutual distrust and outside world, as well as ensuring that any 
guidelines developed do not harm performance or reliability, are 
matters that the ERO should consider in the Reliability Standards 
development process.
    410. We disagree with Northern Indiana that Reliability Standards 
CIP-005-1 and CIP-007-1 address the matters of concern to us. Northern 
Indiana does not explain how these Reliability Standards provide 
guidance of the type we have described. We also

[[Page 7409]]

disagree that the mutual distrust principle would require responsible 
entities to sever their communication links with their ISO or RTO or 
reliability coordinator. The principle could play a role in determining 
what precautions would need to be taken to protect those 
communications, but we do not see why it would lead to the specific 
result that Northern Indiana identifies. Mutual distrust does not imply 
refusal to communicate; it means the exercise of appropriate skepticism 
when communicating. The Commission believes additional guidance on what 
this means specifically in current practice would help responsible 
entities to avoid these misunderstandings.
    411. We disagree with ISO-NE that guidance on mutual distrust is 
unnecessary because responsible entities either are compliant or they 
are not, mutual distrust not withstanding. We do not see how 
responsible entities can fully understand the compliance issues they 
face without some understanding of how mutual distrust is applied in a 
modern security environment. Mutual distrust helps explain where an 
entity's responsibilities begin and end and what assumptions it can 
make about factors outside its control when it performs its risk-based 
assessment.
    412. The Commission therefore directs the ERO to provide guidance, 
regarding the issues and concerns that a mutual distrust posture must 
address in order to protect a responsible entity's control system from 
the outside world.
3. CIP-004-1--Personnel and Training
    413. Standard CIP-004-1 requires that personnel having authorized 
cyber access or unescorted physical access to critical cyber assets 
must have an appropriate level of personnel risk assessment, training 
and security awareness. Responsible entities must develop and implement 
a security awareness program that addresses concerns related to cyber 
security; a cyber security training program for affected personnel that 
addresses policies, access controls, procedures for the proper use of 
critical cyber assets, physical and electronic access to critical cyber 
assets, proper handling of asset information, and recovery methods 
after a cyber security incident; and a personnel risk assessment 
program for all personnel having access to critical cyber assets.
    414. As discussed further below, the Commission approves Standard 
CIP-004-1 as mandatory and enforceable. In addition, we direct the ERO 
to develop modifications to this CIP Reliability Standard. The 
Commission also requires the ERO to clarify and provide guidance on 
other matters. The required modifications are discussed below in the 
following topic areas of concern regarding CIP-004-1: (1) Training; (2) 
personnel risk assessments; (3) cyber and physical access; and (4) 
jointly owned facilities.
a. Training
    415. The requirements for ongoing awareness reinforcement in sound 
security practices specified in Requirement R1 and for training 
specified in Requirement R2 apply to all personnel, contractors, and 
service vendors who have authorized cyber access or unescorted physical 
access to critical cyber assets. Requirement R2.1 allows such personnel 
to have access to critical cyber assets for up to 90 days prior to 
receiving any cyber security training.
 i. NOPR Proposal
    416. In the CIP NOPR,\112\ the Commission stated that training is 
integral to the protection of critical cyber assets, and that allowing 
personnel access to critical cyber assets prior to receiving training 
increases the vulnerability of and risk to such assets. The Commission 
proposed to direct the ERO to modify CIP-004-1 to require affected 
personnel to receive the required training before obtaining access to 
critical cyber assets (rather than within 90 days of access 
authorization), but to limit exceptions to circumstances such as 
emergencies, subject to documentation and mitigation. To facilitate 
communications in emergency situations, the Commission proposed to 
direct the ERO to require responsible entities to identify ``core 
training'' elements to ensure that essential training elements will not 
go unheeded in an emergency and in other contingency situations where 
full training prior to access will not best serve the reliability of 
the Bulk-Power System. We also proposed that the ERO consider what, if 
any, modifications to CIP-004-1 should be made to assure that security 
trainers are adequately trained themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See Id. at P 151-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    417. In addition, the Commission proposed to direct the ERO to 
modify CIP-004-1 to clarify that the cyber security training programs 
required by Requirement R2 are intended to encompass training on the 
networking hardware and software and other issues of electronic 
interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of the critical 
cyber assets. The CIP NOPR stated that CIP-004-1 should clearly state 
that cyber security training concerning a critical cyber asset should 
encompass the electronic environment in which the asset is situated and 
the attendant vulnerabilities. To clarify that point, we proposed that 
the ERO consider adding a provision similar to that in Requirement R1.4 
of CIP-005-1, which specifically subjects any non-critical cyber asset 
within a defined electronic security perimeter to the CIP Reliability 
Standard.
    418. Further, the Commission proposed to direct that the ERO 
increase the guidance in the CIP Reliability Standard as to the scope 
and quality of training, including examples of areas where the 
inclusion of guidance can be considered, as follows: control of 
electronic devices (such as laptop computers); the appropriate 
audiences for the training; delivery methods; and updates of training 
materials. The CIP NOPR stated that the awareness and training 
programs, addressed separately by Requirements R1 and R2, complement 
each other and work in tandem. The Commission also stated its 
expectation that the ERO consider relevant aspects of certain NIST 
Special Publications, as well as other relevant models, to improve CIP-
004-1 and prevent a lowest common denominator result.
ii. Comments
    419. Entergy recommends that the Commission modify its direction to 
the ERO regarding access to critical cyber assets for newly-hired 
personnel to provide access to critical cyber assets for newly-hired 
personnel if they are accompanied by qualified escorts. Entergy insists 
that individuals without training should be allowed to be escorted by a 
trained individual to access a critical cyber asset and, if similar 
required training has been received by an unescorted individual at 
another industry facility, that training should be allowed to be 
credited at the current facility. SDG&E recommends that new employees 
be allowed escorted access to critical cyber assets, even in non-
emergency situations, since training is not always coincident with a 
hiring date.
    420. Entergy disagrees with the proposal to direct the ERO to 
require responsible entities to identify core training elements. On the 
other hand, FirstEnergy and SoCal Edison agree with the Commission's 
proposal that NERC should require the development of core training 
elements. They state that additional guidance in this area would be 
helpful preparation for responsible entities to operate in emergency 
and other contingency

[[Page 7410]]

situations. FirstEnergy proposes that CIP-004-1 be revised to further 
specify what situations should be considered emergency and contingency 
for the purpose of granting access prior to completion of full 
training. Northern Indiana agrees with the common sense approach in the 
CIP NOPR on how responsible entities should be allowed to handle 
emergency conditions, but would retain the 90-day transition period for 
conducting training. Northern Indiana requests clarification of what is 
intended by the term ``core training'' and requests additional guidance 
in the Final Rule with respect to training.
    421. Entergy contends that specific discussion of the many forms of 
training needed is beyond the current scope of the CIP Reliability 
Standards. Entergy argues that, if specificity is needed, the 
Commission should refer to materials issued by other federal agencies, 
including the Defense Information Systems Agency. Mr. Brown argues that 
the level of detail the Commission is proposing to be added to the 
training portion of the CIP Reliability Standards would be more 
appropriately and efficiently developed through some process other than 
that of Reliability Standards development process.
    422. MidAmerican believes that CIP-004-1, Requirement R2 is 
adequate as proposed and that specific job-related training 
requirements are more properly managed by the entity performing or 
contracting the work. MidAmerican submits that the entity performing 
the work is best suited to determine the scope and delivery method of 
job-specific training. MidAmerican believes additional clarification of 
acceptable awareness and training programs is necessary for compliance 
purposes, should the Commission's call for increased guidance be 
adopted.
    423. In response to the Commission's proposal that training 
encompass network and interconnectivity aspects, many commenters 
suggest that training should be tailored to match up with the trainee's 
duties, experience, or ``need to know.'' FirstEnergy suggests that CIP-
004-1 should include a provision that would direct a responsible entity 
to establish access categories based on security roles because access 
categories based on job responsibilities would ensure that the level or 
frequency of exposure to critical cyber assets will be considered. For 
example, a systems analyst would need access to certain critical cyber 
assets on a frequent basis and at a level that allows file 
manipulation, while a system user would need access to the data output 
of the systems during working hours and not necessarily file 
manipulation access. Those with access to critical cyber assets should 
have training specific to the critical cyber asset and those without 
such access should have general awareness training.
    424. Likewise, National Grid argues that, while a general 
understanding of networking hardware and software and interconnectivity 
is important, the focus of the training should be geared toward 
understanding cyber security policies and each trainee's role in 
response and recovery plans. National Grid believes that not every 
employee requires IT training and that training should match an 
employee's required skill set.
    425. FirstEnergy agrees that CIP-004-1 should address training 
regarding access to the cyber assets themselves and the networking 
hardware and software linking them, but it also asks the Commission to 
clarify that only those personnel that have access to both the critical 
cyber assets and the networking hardware and software should have 
training on both. FirstEnergy argues that it would be overly burdensome 
and serve no purpose to do otherwise and, conversely, it serves no 
purpose to train personnel on the networking hardware and software 
security methods, if those personnel have access only to the critical 
cyber asset itself. Training personnel on security measures of 
equipment for which they have no access can create a potential weakness 
in the security measures for such equipment.
    426. ISO-NE argues that requirements for training relating to 
networking hardware and software and other issues of electronic 
interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of the critical 
cyber assets are a business management decision and should be omitted 
from the Final Rule. ISO-NE argues that the decision to determine the 
level of skill training necessary for an individual, based on that 
employee's functional task requirements and coordinated career goals, 
is a business decision beyond the scope of security training for access 
controls, monitoring, and incident response.
    427. Similarly, Northern Indiana contends that CIP-004-1 should not 
specify who should be trained, what the training should include, or how 
frequently training should occur. Northern Indiana argues that the 
responsible entity must be given flexibility to differentiate between 
those aspects of networked systems potentially affecting critical 
control systems and those that should be included in critical cyber 
asset training. Northern Indiana argues that the focus should be on the 
applications, policies and procedures that relate to the critical 
control systems and other critical cyber assets.
    428. ISO/RTO Council and ISO-NE argue that training that addresses 
vulnerabilities is not appropriate for all individuals with access to 
critical cyber assets and, therefore, they disagree with the statement 
in the CIP NOPR that ``CIP-004-1 should leave no doubt that cyber 
security training concerning a critical cyber asset should encompass 
the electronic environment in which the asset is situated and the 
attendant vulnerabilities.'' Information about vulnerabilities 
associated with critical cyber assets and/or their security perimeters 
is highly sensitive. Such information should be known only to those 
with direct responsibility to administer the secure operation of the 
critical cyber assets and their security perimeters.
    429. ReliabilityFirst is concerned that the ERO not lose sight of 
the fact that Requirement R2.2 requires specific training ``appropriate 
to personnel roles and responsibilities'' as it develops the additional 
guidance proposed by the Commission. ReliabilityFirst argues that it is 
inappropriate, for example, to train an operator in the dispatch 
operations center on firewalls and networking devices. Training for 
personnel with electronic or unescorted physical access to systems 
within the electronic security perimeter should be appropriate to the 
trainee's scope of access. The goal of the training is not to make 
operational personnel into network specialists, but to train them on 
the policies and procedures implemented by the responsible entity to 
protect their critical cyber assets.
    430. In response to the Commission's question regarding what, if 
any, modifications to CIP-004-1 should be made to address the concern 
that security trainers be adequately trained themselves, SoCal Edison 
believes that the Commission should require the ERO to have a program 
to have qualified trainers in order to determine the adequacy of 
training. To ensure quality and consistency, this implies that all 
trainers would have to be qualified by the ERO prior to training. Any 
vendor training tools (e.g., online training courses) would similarly 
need to be approved by the ERO.
iii. Commission Determination
    431. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR's proposal and directs the 
ERO to develop a modification to CIP-004-1 that would require affected 
personnel to receive required training before obtaining access to 
critical cyber assets (rather than within 90 days of access

[[Page 7411]]

authorization), but allowing limited exceptions, such as during 
emergencies, subject to documentation and mitigation.
    432. The Commission notes that commenters did not provide specific 
reasons why employees should be granted access prior to training, but 
focused on the nature and scope of our proposed exceptions. Entergy and 
SDG&E recommend that newly-hired employees be allowed access to 
critical cyber assets if they are accompanied by qualified escorts. We 
note that a qualified escort would have to possess enough expertise 
regarding the critical cyber asset to ensure that the actions of the 
newly-hired employee or vendor did not harm the integrity of the 
critical cyber asset or the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. 
However, if the escort is sufficiently qualified, we believe such 
escorted access could be permitted before a newly-hired employee is 
trained.
    433. Based on the concerns of commenters, the Commission modifies 
its CIP NOPR proposal that the ERO identify core training elements to 
ensure that essential training elements will not go unheeded in 
emergencies and in other compelling situations. While the Commission 
continues to believe that the identification of core training elements 
is useful, this issue would benefit from further vetting within the 
Reliability Standards development process. Thus, we direct the ERO to 
consider, in developing modifications to CIP-004-1, whether 
identification of core training elements would be beneficial and, if 
so, develop an appropriate modification to the Reliability Standard. If 
the Reliability Standard development process determines not to identify 
core requirements, the ERO should provide an explanation of this 
decision. In reply to commenters, we clarify that by using the term 
core training our concern is for a responsible entity to pre-plan what 
information and training is necessary for personnel temporarily called 
in to help in an emergency--not that the actual scope of such training 
needs to be articulated in the Reliability Standard and applicable to 
all responsible entities in all circumstances. It is important that 
responsible entities have plans for introducing the personnel called in 
to assist in such situations. We expect that core training would be 
different for different responsible entities.
    434. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR's proposal to direct the 
ERO to modify Requirement R2 of CIP-004-1 to clarify that cyber 
security training programs are intended to encompass training on the 
networking hardware and software and other issues of electronic 
interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of critical 
cyber assets. CIP-004-1 should leave no doubt that cyber security 
training concerning a critical cyber asset should encompass the 
electronic environment in which the asset is situated and the attendant 
vulnerabilities. We note that, according to Requirement R1.4 of CIP-
005-1, all cyber assets within an electronic security perimeter are to 
be protected, not just the critical cyber assets. In reply to 
commenters, we clarify that our proposal discussion on this topic was 
not intended to suggest that personnel have training that is not 
appropriate for an employee's duties, functions, experience, or access 
level. We agree with commenters that information concerning 
vulnerabilities should be revealed on a need to know basis and not 
universally. However, any employee with access to an area where his or 
her actions, or carelessness, could put critical assets at risk, should 
receive the necessary training to assure that the employee understands 
how his or her actions or inactions could, even inadvertently, affect 
cyber security.
    435. Consistent with the CIP NOPR, the Commission directs the ERO 
to determine what, if any, modifications to CIP-004-1 should be made to 
assure that security trainers are adequately trained themselves. 
Commenters provided minimal input on this proposal and, consistent with 
the CIP NOPR, we believe that whether a modification is appropriate to 
address this issue is better determined in the first instance through 
the ERO's Reliability Standards development process. The ERO should 
consider the comments of SoCal Edison with regard to what role and 
steps should be taken by the ERO to ensure quality and consistency of 
trainers.
 b. Personnel Risk Assessment
    436. Requirement R3 of CIP-004-1 requires each responsible entity 
to have a documented personnel risk assessment program. It also 
requires that a personnel risk assessment, including a criminal 
background check, be conducted within 30 days after a person receives 
cyber access or unescorted physical access to critical cyber assets. 
The wording of Requirement R3 would allow access to critical cyber 
assets while an investigation is still underway, and even before an 
investigation has started.
i. NOPR Proposal
    437. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that allowing 
applicable personnel, including vendors, to access critical cyber 
assets prior to the completion of their personnel risk assessment 
increases the vulnerability of, and risk to, these assets.\113\ We also 
observed that Recommendation 41 of the Blackout Report emphasizes the 
need for guidance on implementing background checks.\114\ At the same 
time, the Commission indicated that commenters had raised a valid 
concern regarding the disruptions that would result if current 
employees and vendors with established involvement were denied access 
to critical cyber assets for a 30-day period. Accordingly, the 
Commission proposed to direct the ERO to develop modifications to 
Requirement R2 to provide that newly-hired personnel and vendors should 
not have access to critical cyber assets, except in specified 
circumstances, such as an emergency. To avoid transition disruptions, 
the Commission proposed that the 30-day window allowing access before 
completion of the personnel risk assessment remain in effect for 
current employees and vendors with existing contractual relationships 
with the responsible entity as of the effective date of the Reliability 
Standard. The Commission proposed that the ERO include, in developing 
modifications to CIP-004-1, criteria that address circumstances in 
which current personnel can continue access to critical cyber assets 
during the 30-day investigative period during initial compliance with 
CIP-004-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See id. P 162-66.
    \114\ See Blackout Report at 167-68, Recommendation 41 
(recommending that NERC provide guidance on background checks to be 
completed on contractor and sub-contractor employees in advance of 
allowing access to secure facilities).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
    438. California Commission and MidAmerican support the Commission's 
proposal to require that a personnel risk assessment be performed 
before access is granted except in emergency situations for the reasons 
articulated in the CIP NOPR. California Commission stresses that the 
personal risk assessment must be conducted before a person obtains 
access to critical cyber assets, because, if access is granted before a 
person clears a risk assessment, Requirement R3 is rendered useless. 
California Commission states that the point is to keep unwanted persons 
away from critical cyber assets, not to grant them access for a brief 
period of time and then bar them from access if they do not pass the 
risk assessment.
    439. ReliabilityFirst and SPP do not believe that the CIP 
Reliability

[[Page 7412]]

Standards should attempt to define an all encompassing set of emergency 
contingencies for which unescorted access could be granted in the 
absence of a background check, because there is a risk that a valid 
emergency exists for which the guidance is unsuited. They suggest that 
a more appropriate way to handle the emergency access is to allow a 
short-term exception to the security policy, appropriately justified 
and approved as any other exception to the policies implementing the 
provisions of the CIP Reliability Standards.
    440. FirstEnergy agrees with the Commission that newly hired 
employees or vendors with no previous relationship to the responsible 
entity should not have access to critical equipment while undergoing 
the personnel risk assessment. The 30-day window may be appropriate for 
employees and vendors with which the responsible entity has had a 
working relationship, such as employees transferring to another 
position or contractors that are returning from a reassignment. In 
contrast, SoCal Edison maintains that 30 days is not adequate time to 
update personnel risk assessments during initial implementation on all 
current personnel that would require an updated personnel risk 
assessment. It believes that the 30 days would be adequate if such a 
timeframe begins when personnel risk assessment certification paperwork 
is provided for each individual.
    441. APPA/LPPC note that they do not object to the requirement in 
CIP-004-1 R3.1 that ``[t]he responsible entity shall ensure that each 
assessment conducted include, at least, [a] seven-year criminal check'' 
on employees with access to critical cyber assets. However, they seek 
clarification that responsible entities have discretion in reviewing 
the results of criminal background checks to determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether any crime identified in the background check would 
disqualify an individual from obtaining access to critical cyber 
assets.
    442. SDG&E comments that Requirement R3 may require refinement on 
various issues regarding the personnel risk assessment requirements, 
including whether state and local law should be pre-empted to permit 
industry-wide protocols for periodic background and criminal checks on 
existing employees. SDG&E asks the Commission to clarify that an entity 
may comply with Requirement R3 by using its existing pre-employment 
background check procedures for current employees, at seven year 
intervals, provided that such procedures encompass the required social 
security verification and criminal background checks. SDG&E argues 
that, otherwise, applicable state and local laws could prohibit an 
entity from conducting such periodic checks.
iii. Commission Determination
    443. The Commission adopts with modifications the proposal to 
direct the ERO to modify Requirement R3 of CIP-004-1 to provide that 
newly-hired personnel and vendors should not have access to critical 
cyber assets prior to the satisfactory completion of a personnel risk 
assessment, except in specified circumstances such as an emergency. We 
also direct the ERO to identify the parameters of such exceptional 
circumstances through the Reliability Standards development process. 
FirstEnergy and California Commission agree with the Commission's 
proposals.
    444. ReliabilityFirst and SPP believe that it would be appropriate 
to handle emergency access via a short-term exception to the security 
policy. We note that such access would not be only an exception to the 
security policy, but an exception to a CIP Reliability Standard 
Requirement. Therefore, such exceptions would have to comply with the 
conditions of a technical feasibility exception that we have specified 
elsewhere in this Final Rule. The Commission believes that a workable 
solution is for the Reliability Standards development process to 
identify emergency circumstances that would warrant allowing access to 
critical cyber assets. However, if a responsible entity experienced a 
situation outside of those circumstances that it believed warranted 
access to critical cyber assets, the responsible entity could treat the 
situation as a technical feasibility exception and follow the 
conditions set out by the Commission. With this approach, we believe 
that in most cases it will be unnecessary to go through the 
administrative burden of a technical feasibility exception.
    445. SoCal Edison expresses concern that the 30 days allowed in 
CIP-004-1 for completion of the personnel risk assessment may not be 
enough time to process all existing employees with access. We note that 
there is no reason why such assessments cannot be completed well before 
responsible entities are to be auditably compliant with this provision. 
The ERO should consider SoCal Edison's issue in the Reliability 
Standards development process.
    446. APPA/LPPC seek clarification regarding discretion in reviewing 
results of personnel risk assessments and in coming to conclusions 
regarding the subject employees. SDG&E seeks refinements on various 
issues, including an industry-wide protocol for periodic background and 
criminal checks, and the use of pre-employment background check 
procedures for current employees. The ERO should consider these issues 
when developing modifications to CIP-004-1 pursuant to the Reliability 
Standards development process.
c. Cyber and Physical Access
    447. Requirement R4 of CIP-004-1 directs the responsible entity to 
maintain list(s) of personnel with authorized cyber or authorized 
unescorted physical access to critical cyber assets. The lists do not 
serve to deny personnel access from critical cyber assets prior to 
completion of a personnel risk assessment, although Requirement R4.2 
requires that both cyber and physical access to critical cyber assets 
be revoked within 24 hours for personnel terminated for cause and 
within seven calendar days for personnel who no longer require such 
access.
i. NOPR Proposal
    448. The Commission stated in the CIP NOPR that timely system 
updates to access rights are important because access to critical cyber 
assets by employees, contractors, or vendors represents a gap in 
security when such access is no longer needed. We proposed to direct 
the ERO to develop modifications to CIP-004-1 to require immediate 
revocation of access privileges when an employee, contractor, or vendor 
no longer performs a function that requires authorized physical or 
electronic access to a critical cyber asset for any reason (including 
disciplinary action, transfer, retirement or termination). Further, we 
proposed to direct the ERO to modify Requirement R4 to make clear that 
unescorted physical access should be denied to individuals that are not 
identified on the authorization list.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See CIP NOPR at P 167-69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
    449. Numerous commenters responded to the CIP NOPR proposal to 
require immediate revocation of access to critical cyber assets when an 
employee, contractor or vendor no longer performs a function that 
required authorized physical or electronic access to a critical cyber 
asset for any reason. California Commission agrees with the 
requirements of CIP-004-1, and states that access controls should be 
updated upon termination or transfer of

[[Page 7413]]

personnel. However, as with its recommendation regarding CIP-003-1, 
California Commission suggests that CIP-004-1 should provide a specific 
time limit for revoking access, rather than requiring access to be 
revoked promptly.
    450. MidAmerican supports the proposal, but believes that the 
timelines provided in Requirement R4.2 are clearly defined and 
appropriate for the risk associated with removal of access. 
ReliabilityFirst and SPP agree with the Commission that access should 
be revoked as quickly as possible upon termination or reassignment, but 
believe the use of the term ``immediate'' is subjective and could lead 
to conflicting interpretations. According to ReliabilityFirst, one 
entity might interpret the requirement as allowing a reasonable amount 
of time, perhaps an hour, to revoke access once the termination or 
reassignment has occurred and notifications made, while another entity 
might interpret it as needing to terminate access prior to the moment 
of termination or reassignment, perhaps coincident with the employee 
being notified of his or her termination.
    451. SoCal Edison and Entergy believe that it will be difficult to 
comply with the immediate revocation of access requirement. For 
example, SoCal Edison states that meeting the proposed change would be 
dependent upon direct communication from a manager initiating the 
termination actions, and SoCal Edison believes it is appropriate to 
allow 24 hours to revoke access privileges. FirstEnergy similarly 
argues that an organization will not be aware in advance of personnel 
that are transferred in short order to address an immediate need or 
personnel that are dismissed or fired on the spot for misconduct. 
Entergy asserts that the systems and equipment currently in use across 
the industry simply cannot operate in the type of networked computing 
environment necessary to revoke all access immediately. For example, a 
responsible entity may have a magnetic strip physical access control at 
a substation perimeter, but if the controller is not networked back to 
a central access control system, meeting the immediacy requirement 
would not be possible. The industry will need time and adequate grounds 
to justify modernization of capabilities for rate relief in order to 
implement such a proposal.
    452. First Energy and Idaho Power suggest that the Commission 
should soften its position on immediate revocation and propose that the 
Commission require access to critical cyber assets to be revoked as 
soon as practicable. They suggest allowing either 24 hours or one 
business day for revocations. Ontario Power notes that some activities 
can be performed quickly, but others will take time.
    453. ReliabilityFirst argues that, from a risk perspective, it is 
more time-critical to terminate access when an employee is 
involuntarily terminated or reassigned due to disciplinary action. 
ReliabilityFirst argues that an employee who voluntarily terminates or 
changes positions normally does so on good terms with the employer. In 
addition, both ReliabilityFirst and SPP maintain that, while an entity 
should be cognizant of planned terminations and reassignments within 
the company, the entity has no such insight into a vendor or 
contractor. The entity must rely upon a timely notification from the 
vendor or contractor, especially when the services are provided 
remotely as opposed to on-site. In addition, ReliabilityFirst reasons 
that primary access needs to be terminated as quickly as possible, with 
secondary access not as time-critical. Primary access would include the 
physical access, VPN access, and domain account, and terminating that 
access will effectively quarantine the terminated employee while 
remaining access is disabled. ReliabilityFirst and SPP recommend that, 
in lieu of the term ``immediate,'' a reasonable and measurable time 
frame already exists and has been defined within the CIP Reliability 
Standard itself.
    454. Similarly, ISO-NE argues that personnel transfers can at times 
require a protracted, transitional process, where there is good 
business reason for the individual to retain access privileges after 
the formal transfer date. Most often this would be where continued 
back-up support is appropriate while the individual's replacement is 
being identified, or a personal risk assessment is conducted, and/or is 
trained and becomes familiar with new job responsibilities.
    455. ISO-NE and Northern Indiana oppose requiring revocation of 
access when an employee is facing disciplinary action. ISO-NE argues 
that not all disciplinary action should arbitrarily warrant revocation 
of access privileges. Northern Indiana argues that, notwithstanding the 
disciplinary action, such an employee might still be responsible for 
performing tasks that require access. Northern Indiana argues that 
Requirement R4.2 should be left intact and the timeline for revocation 
should remain 24 hours for personnel terminated for cause and within 
seven calendar days for personnel who no longer require access to 
critical control systems and other critical cyber assets. ISO-NE 
requests management discretionary power in determining when revocation 
is warranted.
    456. Various commenters raise concerns about the timelines 
associated with the Commission's proposal to deny unescorted physical 
access to individuals not identified on the authorization list. For 
example, Northern Indiana is concerned that absolute compliance with 
this requirement would be very difficult to achieve and record within 
the time specified.
    457. EEI objects to the immediate revocation of access privileges 
proposal if the Commission is proposing to require responsible entities 
to perform immediate updating of their authorization lists. EEI argues 
that these changes are not needed, because, at the time any individual 
is terminated for any reason, the manager collects items such as 
badges, keys, tokens used for electronic entrance and other methods of 
access, thus denying the individual access to facilities where critical 
cyber assets are kept. Access control systems are updated using an 
efficient overnight batch process. EEI asserts that converting to 
immediate updates for all situations (including low-risk situations 
such as individuals transferring or retiring) would require significant 
expense with minimal improvement in security.
    458. Duke and others \116\ argue that some flexibility in the 
promptness of access revocation is warranted, but raise many of the 
same points as EEI. Duke concedes that immediate updates of access 
authorization control systems can be performed outside of a batch 
process, but argues that this would involve additional cost and should 
be reserved for situations involving a tangible threat, such as when an 
employee is being terminated for cause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ See also PG&E and Tampa Electric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    459. PG&E argues that CIP-004-1 already provides sufficient 
controls and need not be revised. PG&E argues that CIP-004-1 ensures 
that individuals who are terminated or who no longer require such 
access lose their access in a timely manner, but argues that there 
should be no requirement for immediate updating of authorization lists. 
In this regard, PG&E argues that, although having the means to identify 
individuals with valid access rights is important, if the individual 
has been disabled from access to relevant systems and physical areas, a 
slight delay in updating the list would not significantly compromise 
security and thus there is no need to require the impractical task of

[[Page 7414]]

immediately updating authorization lists.
iii. Commission Determination
    460. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to develop modifications to CIP-004-1 to require immediate revocation 
of access privileges when an employee, contractor or vendor no longer 
performs a function that requires physical or electronic access to a 
critical cyber asset for any reason (including disciplinary action, 
transfer, retirement, or termination).
    461. As a general matter, the Commission believes that revoking 
access when an employee no longer needs it, either because of a change 
in job or the end of employment, must be immediate. As noted in the CIP 
NOPR, most organizations will know in advance the timing of personnel 
actions and can arrange ahead of time for access revocation to be 
concurrent with any disciplinary action, transfer, retirement or 
termination. Revocation of access is usually a matter of assuring that 
a particular employee's credentials no longer permit physical or 
electronic access. We understand that outlying elements may require 
some brief lag before denial of access is effective, in which case, the 
circumstances justifying such lag must be documented for audit 
purposes.
    462. FirstEnergy comments that the term ``immediate'' should be 
clarified and be interpreted as ``as soon as possible'' but not later 
than 24 hours to take care of on-the-spot dismissals. Others also 
comment about various circumstances where advance or coincident 
preparations for revocation to access cannot be made. We continue to 
believe that most dismissals can be anticipated in advance and believe 
that revocation should be immediate upon the employee's notification of 
any personnel action requiring revocation of access. However, the ERO 
may define what circumstances justify an exception that is other than 
immediate and determine what is the fastest revocation possible.
    463. We acknowledge that not all disciplinary actions warrant 
revocation of access privileges. In addition, certain personnel 
transfers can require a protracted transitional process that warrants 
retention of access privileges after the formal transfer date. There 
may be operational reasons that justify retention of access privileges 
after an employee transfers, but the default procedure should be to 
cancel access privileges at transfer and to document any exceptions to 
that policy for audit purposes.
    464. We also adopt our proposal to direct the ERO to modify 
Requirement R4 to make clear that unescorted physical access should be 
denied to individuals that are not identified on the authorization 
list, with clarification. Our concern, in calling for this adjustment, 
is that the current language in the CIP Reliability Standard does not 
describe the purpose of the required list of personnel with authorized 
access; rather, it merely states that such a list must be made, 
reviewed, and updated. Similar to our expectations expressed earlier 
regarding implementation of required plans and policies, we believe 
that the expectation that access not be granted to personnel not on the 
authorized list should be made clear in the Reliability Standard.\117\ 
However, while a responsible entity should not allow access to any 
personnel not included on the list, the Commission believes commenters 
misunderstood the CIP NOPR and inappropriately linked the Commission's 
proposal with respect to the immediate revocation of access with its 
proposal with respect to denying access to personnel not on the list. 
We clarify that we are not requiring the list to be updated 
simultaneously with the revocation of an employee's access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ As we stated in our discussion above, we are directing the 
ERO to revise the CIP Reliability Standards to explicitly add a 
requirement for responsible entities to implement any plans they are 
required to develop as part of these Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Jointly-Owned Facilities
    465. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission addressed concerns raised with 
regard to the application of and compliance responsibility for the CIP 
Reliability Standards, especially on access issues, when facilities 
governed by existing joint use or joint ownership agreements are 
involved.
i. NOPR Proposal
    466. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that joint owners of 
critical cyber assets are equally as subject to the CIP Reliability 
Standards as are other responsible entities.\118\ We further stated 
that, if an asset is designated as a critical cyber asset by one joint 
owner, it must be treated likewise by the other owner(s) and, 
therefore, each owner would be responsible to develop a list of its 
authorized personnel and to respect each other joint owner's 
corresponding list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ See CIP NOPR at P 170-73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    467. With regard to joint use arrangements, the Commission stated 
the principle that the owner of a critical cyber asset is responsible 
under the CIP Reliability Standards for ensuring that all persons 
having access to the critical cyber asset meet the requirements of the 
CIP Reliability Standards, much as the owner is responsible to ensure 
that vendor personnel have the required levels of security training, 
awareness and background checks.
    468. The Commission proposed to require the ERO to consider further 
clarifying CIP-004-1 to address the ``joint use'' concerns expressed by 
APPA/LPPC while developing any modifications to the CIP Reliability 
Standards.
ii. Comments
    469. APPA/LPPC support the Commission's proposal to direct the ERO 
to address the joint use concerns.
    470. Northern Indiana is concerned that the Commission's proposal 
means that a responsible entity must perform risk assessments of the 
other owner's personnel so that such personnel may access a facility 
that the responsible entity has identified as a critical cyber asset. 
Northern Indiana argues that such a broad application of the CIP 
Reliability Standards was never intended and requests that the 
Commission clarify this point. Northern Indiana sees a conflict with 
respect to sharing information with other entities that jointly own or 
jointly use transmission facilities if it is required to maintain a 
mutual distrust posture. Northern Indiana urges the Commission to 
provide for flexibility when applying the CIP Reliability Standards to 
such jointly owned facilities.
    471. SPP believes that jointly operated assets may require 
contractual agreements to assign responsibility and liability for 
compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards, similar to the 
Commission's concern with respect to out-sourced service providers in 
the CIP NOPR. It is unclear to SPP whether the Commission's 
recommendations adequately cover the situation where each party is 
uniquely responsible for a subset of the requirements of the CIP 
Reliability Standards. For example, one entity may place critical cyber 
assets within a facility managed by a second entity. The second entity 
would be fully responsible for the physical security requirements of 
CIP-006-1, while the first entity would be fully responsible for the 
system management requirements of CIP-007-1 only for their own assets. 
A contractual agreement between the two entities should be in place to 
codify the second entity's physical security responsibilities and, as 
with out-sourced services, to absolve the first entity of any 
responsibility for CIP-006-1

[[Page 7415]]

beyond ensuring that the cyber assets are within the second entity's 
physical security perimeter. SPP recommends that the Commission direct 
the ERO to include recognition of such contractual agreements in its 
auditing and sanctioning processes.
    472. NRECA is concerned that the Commission's joint use proposal 
would cause problems for small entities. NRECA also raises concerns 
about how disputes regarding joint use facilities will be addressed.
iii. Commission Determination
    473. The Commission adopts its proposals in the CIP NOPR with a 
clarification. As a general matter, all joint owners of a critical 
cyber asset are responsible to protect that asset under the CIP 
Reliability Standards. The owners of joint use facilities which have 
been designated as critical cyber assets are responsible to see that 
contractual obligations include provisions that allow the responsible 
entity to comply with the CIP Reliability Standards. This is similar to 
a responsible entity's obligations regarding vendors with access to 
critical cyber assets.
    474. Regarding Northern Indiana's comments, we do not believe that 
this Requirement obligates one joint owner of a critical cyber asset to 
perform risk assessments of another owner's personnel. Each such owner 
is responsible for performing assessments of its own personnel.
    475. The ERO should consider the suggestions raised by Northern 
Indiana, SPP and NRECA in the Reliability Standards development 
process.
    476. Therefore, we direct the ERO to modify CIP-004-1, and other 
CIP Reliability Standards as appropriate, through the Reliability 
Standards development process to address critical cyber assets that are 
jointly owned or jointly used, consistent with the Commission's 
determinations above.
4. CIP-005-1--Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
    477. NERC's proposed Standard CIP-005-1 requires identification and 
protection of the electronic security perimeters inside which all 
critical cyber assets are located, as well as all access points. The 
electronic security perimeters are to encompass all the critical cyber 
assets that are identified using the methodology required by Standard 
CIP-002-1. Multiple electronic security perimeters may be required; for 
example, one may be needed around a control room while another may be 
established around a substation. For any electronic security perimeter 
established, the responsible entity must develop mechanisms to control 
and monitor electronic access to all electronic access points and, 
further, it must assess the electronic security perimeter's cyber 
vulnerability and test every electronic access point at least 
annually.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ CIP-005-1 only pertains to electronic security. Physical 
security is addressed in CIP-006-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    478. The Commission approves Standard CIP-005-1 as mandatory and 
enforceable. In addition, we direct the ERO to develop modifications to 
this CIP Reliability Standard. The Commission also requires the ERO to 
clarify and provide guidance on other matters. The required 
modifications are discussed below in the following topic areas of 
concern regarding CIP-005-1: (1) Adequacy of electronic security 
perimeters; (2) protecting access points and controls; (3) monitoring 
access logs; and (4) vulnerability assessments.
a. Adequacy of Electronic Security Perimeters
    479. Requirement R1 of CIP-005-1 requires each responsible entity 
to identify electronic security perimeters and ensure that every 
critical cyber asset resides within one.
i. NOPR Proposal
    480. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that, while the 
electronic security perimeter constitutes a first line of defense, the 
effectiveness of any one defensive measure is often dependent on the 
quality of active human maintenance, and that there is no one perfect 
defensive measure that will guarantee the protection of the Bulk-Power 
System. The Commission proposed to direct the ERO to develop a 
requirement that a responsible entity implement a defensive security 
approach including two or more defensive measures in a defense in depth 
posture when constructing an electronic security perimeter.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See CIP NOPR at P 178-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments
    481. Many commenters, including Manitoba, NERC, NRECA, Ontario 
Power and ReliabilityFirst, maintain that CIP-005-1 is adequate as 
drafted and they oppose the Commission's proposal to require a defense 
in depth strategy.\121\ In contrast, Juniper and ISA99 Team support the 
Commission's proposal. Although Idaho Power expresses support for the 
defense in depth concept, it questions the Commission's proposal to 
require two distinct security measures when developing an electronic 
security perimeter. MidAmerican supports the proposal to require 
implementation of a defensive security approach including two or more 
defensive measures in a defense in depth posture, but submits that the 
term ``defensive measure'' requires clarification to facilitate 
compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ See also Arkansas Electric, APPA/LPPC, Alliant, Arizona 
Public Service, California Commission, Duke, Entergy, FPL Group and 
Northern Indiana.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    482. NERC and ReliabilityFirst argue that the defense in depth 
provisions recommended by the Commission make sense in a control center 
environment, because additional layers of electronic security and 
physical security can be readily implemented, and they are prudent due 
to the centralized function performed at a control center. However, 
they question the direct impact to the reliability of the Bulk-Power 
System from implementing multiple defensive actions in a substation or 
generating plant environment. NRECA believes that the CIP NOPR 
contemplates imposing excessive defense in depth requirements, 
particularly in environments where the additional depth will not yield 
a significant benefit, but will impose costs. NRECA states that a 
better course would be for the Commission to defer to the ERO's 
technical expertise as to the application of defense in depth, rather 
than dictate a specific outcome.
    483. NERC, Idaho Power and ReliabilityFirst further explain that 
the use of multiple electronic security perimeter devices (i.e., 
firewalls) obtained from different vendors, creating rings of 
protection using different methods, is an accepted mainstream 
information technology approach. The expected result is that a failure 
of one device only appears on one of the two perimeters, thereby 
allowing the other perimeter to provide the desired protection. For 
small numbers of zones, which protect relatively large numbers of 
assets (e.g., a single zone containing all of the corporate servers), 
this makes implementation and economic sense.
    484. However, NERC states that the use of multiple electronic 
security perimeter devices comes at a cost to performance and 
reliability. According to NERC, each ``hop'' through a perimeter device 
introduces a delay in the transmission of the data. In a traditional 
information technology environment, this may be tolerable, or may be 
mitigated through the use of higher-speed networks. In a control system 
environment, NERC states that neither option may be acceptable or 
available. Additional equipment takes up space in equipment racks, and 
uses additional power and cooling, which in

[[Page 7416]]

some cases, may be at a premium, or may introduce equipment reliability 
problems. Certified equipment from different vendors may not be 
available for all protocols and toolsets used in the control system 
environment. Additionally, there would be more equipment which must be 
functional in order to maintain reliable operations. Any time there is 
an increase in the number of components that must be running in series, 
the availability of the entire system decreases. In this case, this 
results in an overall decrease in the reliability of the system. Last, 
but not least, is the impact of having more equipment at a substation 
or generating plant to install, service, maintain, and for which to 
provide instruction and training.
    485. Ontario Power argues, similarly, that while the multiple 
layers of security required by a defense in depth strategy may be 
feasible in some situations, it is impractical or impossible in others 
and should be excluded from the Final Rule.
    486. APPA/LPPC and Northern Indiana state that CIP-005-1 provides 
the needed degree of flexibility to accommodate very diverse physical 
and electronic situations.
    487. Arkansas Electric, Duke and Northern Indiana state that there 
is a point at which having multiple defense layers would not be cost-
effective. Arkansas Electric and Duke maintain that the CIP Reliability 
Standards as a whole prescribe a sufficient defense-in-depth strategy. 
In addition to electronic security controls, Arkansas Electric notes 
that the Reliability Standards also require physical security controls, 
access-control, authentication, and intrusion detection at the 
perimeter. The CIP Reliability Standard also requires a general 
``hardening'' of the security of the critical cyber assets. 
Furthermore, policy and procedural controls are required. Adding 
security controls for the sake of redundancy adds unnecessary cost, 
complexity and administrative burden to the system. Further, Duke 
argues that responsible entities must establish sufficient electronic 
and physical security perimeters, which in some situations could 
require multiple layers that other situations do not warrant.
    488. Manitoba maintains that providing one monitored and alarmed 
electronic security measure provides a sufficient and balanced security 
measure when implemented in conjunction with required physical security 
measures. The proposed additional security measure may require other 
security installations within the proposed implementation timeframe for 
CIP Reliability Standards that could delay implementation of the more 
important requirement to establish an electronic perimeter for all 
critical cyber assets.
    489. SDG&E and Entergy raise concerns with the Commission's 
comments regarding the placement of security measures in front of 
systems. SDG&E cautions against giving such ``in front'' measures a 
high priority over those placed inside the system. SDG&E comments that 
consideration of both measures is necessary to make informed defense in 
depth decisions. Alternatively, it agrees with NERC that the Commission 
should omit the requirements for a defense in depth approach in the 
Final Rule. Entergy also disagrees with the Commission's proposal to 
place measures ``in front of'' systems as opposed to ``inside'' 
systems. It argues that data/control centers and field sites are two 
very different matters and that two-factor authentication is more 
challenging in the field, where most equipment being remotely accessed 
simply cannot be upgraded or retro-fitted to affect this technological 
approach.
    490. APPA/LPPC argue that, if the Commission continues to direct 
the ERO to require two or more defensive measures, then it should 
clarify whether or not the second security measure must be on a par 
with the first security measure. NERC and APPA/LPPC maintain that an 
inflexible rule calling for redundant electronic security in all cases 
poses some very practical problems in a variety of settings. APPA/LPPC 
believe that, given sufficient flexibility by the Commission, these 
issues can be worked out in the Reliability Standards development 
process.
    491. In FPL Group's view, the NERC approach of allowing responsible 
entities to develop strategies appropriate for their environment to 
protect their critical cyber assets is preferable to the CIP NOPR 
proposal. FPL Group characterizes the CIP NOPR proposal as a ``one size 
fits all'' approach that could fail to take into account site-specific 
realities. It is concerned that the CIP NOPR approach mandates form 
over function and logic by placing too much emphasis on uniformity and 
ignoring a site's specific environment.
    492. In contrast, Juniper and ISA99 Team argue that multiple layers 
are essential for defense in depth and that the Reliability Standard 
must provide guidance on devices that may be considered to be a layer 
of defense. ISA99 Team argues that single peripheral layers of defense 
are not adequate to protect control networks. More significantly, ISA99 
Team argues, the very nature of the CIP Reliability Standards provides 
defense in depth for many of the control system components. For 
example, not only are perimeters identified and established, and 
defended with access controls, but anti-virus and other defensive 
measures are applied to components within the perimeters. ISA99 Team 
argues that this defense in depth is consistent with guidance provided 
in most references and standards today.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ See ISA99 TEAM at 4, citing NERC Control Systems Security 
Working Group's, Top 10 Vulnerabilities of Control Systems and Their 
Associated Mitigations--2006. The inner layer device may disallow 
certain protocols on port 520, or only allow read commands from 
certain networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    493. In addition, ISA99 Team disagrees that legacy control systems 
can be excused from defense in depth requirements. ISA99 Team argues 
that it is unacceptable to leave critical control systems components, 
like distributed control systems controllers, remote terminal units for 
supervisory control and data acquisition systems, programmable logic 
controllers and intelligent electronic devices, without additional 
protection similar to that commonly used for basic personal computers 
used in business system networks every day. And this protection can be 
provided by various means, including further segmentation and isolation 
of those components from the other parts of the control networks. It 
does mean additional hardware and does require great caution, but it 
can be done effectively and should be required for our critical power 
infrastructure.
    494. Juniper comments that, unless wireless access can be limited 
to a physical boundary, any wireless enabled device must be considered 
as outside the perimeter and must authenticate to gain access and 
encrypt its communications. Jamming of RF signals even with spread-
spectrum is a real concern. An attack does not have to jam all 
transmission. It can cause disruption by corrupting data. If this can 
cause loss of data for even a short duration, that might be enough to 
perpetrate other incursions without raising alarms.
    495. Northern Indiana and Xcel ask the Commission to clarify or 
direct the ERO to clarify the phrase ``single access point at the dial 
up device'' in CIP-005-1, Requirement R1.2. Xcel asks whether this 
refers to the initiating device, the device at the point of 
termination, or both. Northern Indiana would not modify CIP-005-1, but 
urges that any modifications to Requirement R2 should

[[Page 7417]]

allow continued reliance on legacy systems.
iii. Commission Determination
    496. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR's proposal to direct the 
ERO to develop a requirement that each responsible entity must 
implement a defensive security approach including two or more defensive 
measures in a defense in depth posture when constructing an electronic 
security perimeter. However, in light of the comments received, the 
Commission understands that there may be instances in which certain 
facilities cannot implement defense in depth or where such an approach 
would harm reliability rather than enhance it. For that reason, the 
Commission believes that it is appropriate to allow the ERO and the 
Regional Entities to grant exceptions based on the technical 
feasibility of implementing defense in depth, consistent with the 
Commission's determination on technical feasibility above. However, the 
responsible entity should implement electronic defense in depth 
measures or justify why it is not doing so pursuant to our discussion 
of technical feasibility exceptions.
    497. As stated in the CIP NOPR, the Commission recognizes that 
there is a point at which having multiple defense layers would not be 
cost effective. However, we continue to believe that the effectiveness 
of any one defense measure is often dependent on the quality of active 
human maintenance, and there is no one perfect defense measure that 
will guarantee the protection of the Bulk-Power System. The Commission 
does not agree with Manitoba that providing one monitored and alarmed 
electronic security measure provides a sufficient and balanced security 
measure when implemented in conjunction with required physical security 
measures. A single electronic device is too easy to bypass and a 
physical security measure cannot thwart an electronic cyber attack. 
Therefore, we believe it is in the public interest to require that a 
responsible entity must implement two or more distinct security 
measures when constructing an electronic security perimeter.
    498. Many of the commenters' concerns with regard to the impact on 
performance and reliability will be alleviated by allowing Regional 
Entities to grant justified exceptions based on technical feasibility. 
For example, an exception might be granted if an entity can demonstrate 
that implementing any defense in depth mechanism would create a delay 
in the transmission of the data that is not tolerable on the system and 
cannot be mitigated. In addition, the Commission does not think that 
there will be a problem with respect to a delay in data transmission. 
If this is a problem for older or distant equipment, the responsible 
entity can claim a technical feasibility exception. Newer equipment 
should operate at sufficiently high speeds that multiple hops will not 
affect data transmission. In fact, some vendor companies claim that 
their devices will actually increase transmission speeds due to 
compression and other techniques.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ See, e.g., http://aegistech.us/?page_id=73; http://www
.teltone.com/products/security/features.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    499. Further, an exception might be granted until equipment is 
available for a given protocol or toolset used in a specific control 
system environment. However, the fact that additional equipment may 
take up space or use additional power and cooling alone does not 
warrant reversing the Commission proposal.
    500. The Commission agrees with the ERO that requiring two or more 
defensive measures may increase the chance of equipment failure. But, 
the ERO has not provided the Commission with an adequate explanation of 
why the availability of the entire system would decrease with two or 
more defensive measures. Defensive measures can often be formatted so 
that if they fail, they do so in a fail-safe mode that still allows 
operation. Therefore, system availability would not decrease.
    501. In response to SDG&E and Entergy, in stating that the 
placement of security measures in front of systems provides a layer of 
protection for those systems, the Commission was not giving priority to 
``in front'' measures. In fact, the Commission acknowledged in the CIP 
NOPR that defense in depth measures are generally integrated within and 
constitute part of a system or program. In commenting that defense in 
depth measures may also be effectively placed in front of a system, the 
Commission intended only to acknowledge that there are multiple ways to 
implement a defense in depth strategy. The Commission is not mandating 
any specific mechanism to be the second security measure. We are also 
not requiring uniformity of security measures, only that each 
responsible entity have at least two security measures unless it is not 
technically feasible to do so. The revised CIP Reliability Standard 
should allow enough flexibility for a responsible entity to take into 
account each site's specific environment. The Commission believes that 
this, in conjunction with the allowance of technical feasibility 
exceptions, alleviates FPL Group's concern that the Commission's 
proposal is a ``one size fits all'' approach.
    502. In response to APPA/LPPC, the Commission clarifies that it 
does not intend to create an inflexible rule calling for redundant 
electronic security in all cases. While the Commission directs that a 
responsible entity must implement two or more distinct security 
measures when constructing an electronic security perimeter, the 
specific requirements should be developed in the Reliability Standards 
development process. This would include whether or not the second 
security measure must be ``on par'' with the first. The Commission also 
directs the ERO to consider, based on the content of the modified CIP-
005-1, whether further guidance on this defense in depth topic should 
be developed in a reference document outside of the Reliability 
Standards.
    503. In response to Manitoba's concern that the proposed additional 
security measure could delay implementation of the more important 
requirement of an electronic perimeter for all critical cyber assets, 
the Commission notes that this Final Rule approves the Reliability 
Standard as filed by the ERO. The Commission is directing the ERO to 
revise the Reliability Standard to require two or more defensive 
measures. Until that Reliability Standard is developed by the ERO and 
approved by the Commission, responsible entities in the United States 
will not be required to implement two or more defensive measures.
    504. The ERO should consider in the Reliability Standards 
development process Northern Indiana's and Xcel's concerns regarding 
the phrase ``single access point at the dial up device.''
b. Protecting Access Points and Controls
    505. Requirement R2 of CIP-005-1 requires a responsible entity to 
implement organizational processes and technical and procedural 
mechanisms for control of electronic access at all electronic access 
points to the electronic security perimeter. Requirement R2.4 requires 
``strong procedural and technical controls'' at enabled external access 
points ``to ensure authenticity of the accessing party, where 
technically feasible.''
i. NOPR Proposal
    506. The Commission indicated that requiring ``strong'' controls 
does not provide sufficient guidance toward ensuring authenticity of 
the accessing party, and proposed to direct the ERO to modify 
Requirement R2.4 of CIP-

[[Page 7418]]

005-1 to provide greater clarity regarding the expectation for adequate 
compliance by identifying examples of specific verification 
technologies that would satisfy the Requirement, while also allowing 
compliance pursuant to other technically equivalent measures or 
technologies.\124\ The Commission acknowledged that strong verification 
includes technologies such as digital certificates and two-factor 
authentication. We also noted that Recommendation 32 of the Blackout 
Report emphasizes the need ``to ensure access is granted only to users 
who have corresponding job responsibilities.''\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See CIP NOPR at P 182-91.
    \125\ See Blackout Report at 164-65, Recommendation 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    507. Consistent with our discussion of technical feasibility, we 
did not propose to direct the ERO to remove the technical feasibility 
language from Requirement R2.4 of CIP-005-1. However, we proposed that 
Regional Entities review the application of ``technical feasibility'' 
as the basis for allowing a responsible entity an exception to full 
compliance with a Requirement.
    508. The Commission also clarified the specific conditions and 
accountability measures needed to be granted an exception based on 
technical feasibility.
ii. Comments
    509. SoCal Edison and MidAmerican agree with the Commission that 
Requirement R2.4 needs to be clarified. ISO-NE raises a concern 
regarding the phrasing of `` `strong controls' * * * such as digital 
certificates and two-factor authentication.'' ISO-NE asks that the 
Commission ensure that ``use of either digital certificates or two-
factor authentication'' constitutes an acceptable example for strong 
authentication. Entergy generally agrees with the Commission's proposal 
to direct the ERO to modify this CIP Reliability Standard in accordance 
with the Blackout Report. In Entergy's view, well-constructed passwords 
should be satisfactory as long as password management best practices 
are employed, such as configuring equipment to `drop calls' after 
presentation of three successive incorrect passwords.
    510. Juniper also argues that several CIP Reliability Standards 
require the use of encryption. Juniper recommends that specific NIST or 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) encryption standards be 
mentioned as minimum requirements for compliance as weak encryption 
mechanisms can be easily reverse engineered.
iii. Commission Determination
    511. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR's proposal to direct the 
ERO to identify examples of specific verification technologies that 
would satisfy Requirement R2.4, while also allowing compliance pursuant 
to other technically equivalent measures or technologies. In response 
to commenters, in discussing digital certificates and two-factor 
authentication, the Commission was providing examples of strong 
authentication, not limiting authentication to those options. The 
Commission is not prescribing the specific methods as an exclusive 
solution pursuant to Requirement R2.4. The ERO can propose an 
alternative solution that it believes is equally effective and 
efficient. If the ERO believes it would be helpful to responsible 
entities, additional guidance beyond the examples that are eventually 
included in Requirement R2 can be given in a separate reference 
document. Since we are directing the ERO to provide guidance on what 
constitutes strong authentication, it is not necessary for the 
Commission to respond to ISO-NE's request that digital certifications 
or two-factor authentication are acceptable methods of authentication. 
In identifying examples or categories of specific verification 
technologies that would satisfy Requirement R2.4, the ERO should take 
into account the specific comments raised in this proceeding. 
Similarly, while encryption is one method to accomplish two-factor 
authentication, and is an effective process for ensuring authenticity 
of the accessing party, for some facilities, we leave it to the ERO in 
the Reliability Standards development process to evaluate whether and 
how to address the use of encryption. In the alternative, the ERO may 
identify verification technologies or categories of verification 
technologies in a reference document.
c. Monitoring Access Logs
    512. Requirement R3 of CIP-005-1 requires responsible entities to 
implement electronic or manual processes for monitoring and logging 
access at access points to the electronic security perimeter at all 
times. Further, where technically feasible, the security monitoring 
process must detect and alert for attempts at or actual unauthorized 
access. Where such alerts are not technically feasible, Requirement 
R3.2 requires a responsible entity to review access logs at least every 
90 calendar days.
i. NOPR Proposal
    513. The Commission stated that regular manual review of logs is 
beneficial because, while automated review systems provide a reasonable 
daily check and a convenient screening for obvious system breaches, 
periodic manual review provides the opportunity to recognize an 
unanticipated form of malicious activity and improve automated 
detection settings. The Commission stated that frequent reviews of 
access logs are necessary to detect breaches that automated alerts do 
not detect and, moreover, where automated alerts are not used, frequent 
monitoring takes on even greater importance.
    514. The Commission recognized that accessibility of an access log 
may affect the review interval. We stated, for instance, that readily 
available logs, such as those from within a control room setting, 
should be reviewed at least weekly. Those logs that are not readily 
available, such as those located at a remote substation, are less 
accessible and therefore can be read less frequently. We stressed, 
however, that any attempt to differentiate the required frequency of 
review of these logs must be balanced against the criticality of the 
facilities; it is not acceptable to dismiss a critical facility from 
timely review simply because it is remote.
    515. The Commission proposed to direct the ERO to develop a 
bifurcated review requirement of access logs at electronic access 
points in which readily available logs are reviewed more frequently 
than every 90 days. The Commission stated that such review should be 
performed at least weekly. As part of developing this bifurcated review 
requirement, the Commission proposed to direct the ERO to include in 
the Reliability Standard guidance on how a responsible entity should 
designate individual assets as ``readily accessible'' or ``not readily 
accessible,'' consistent with our discussion above.
ii. Comments
    516. EEI and Tampa Electric maintain that the proposal to revise 
the log review requirements in CIP-005-1 is overly prescriptive.
    517. Entergy, MidAmerican, Northern Indiana, PG&E, 
ReliabilityFirst, SPP and Tampa Electric do not agree with the 
Commission that a weekly review of access logs at electronic access 
points is necessary. A weekly review would place an undue burden on the 
industry without a clear direct benefit to improved security given the 
proposed level of increased frequency. Entergy argues that the 
Commission should

[[Page 7419]]

recognize that the other access controls contemplated by the CIP 
Reliability Standards, as well as the 90-day review, should be 
sufficient to initially identify any unanticipated form of malicious 
activity. More frequent reviews should only be required where 
additional efforts are justified based on site specific or industry 
information.
    518. Tampa Electric argues that weekly manual reviews of 
substantial data are too burdensome especially when an entity is 
capable of performing electronic reviews. Along the same lines, Idaho 
Power argues that the proposed bifurcated review process may be 
extremely difficult to perform without technological advances in 
products. Idaho Power agrees that a review must occur; however, without 
technology to assist, it argues that implementation will be difficult.
    519. ISO-NE comments that automated log monitoring to detect and 
alert on any unauthorized or suspicious events is sufficient, and that 
manual review of logs should only be required in situations where 
automated monitoring and alerting tools are not technically feasible. 
However, ISO-NE does suggest that review of automated alerts should be 
frequent. ISO-NE maintains that its perspective is supported by 
evaluations that it conducted against a subset of cyber assets similar 
to those that would be used to maintain an electronic security 
perimeter and those that would be found inside an electronic security 
perimeter. ISO-NE found that the logs generated by its testing were 
voluminous and any effort to routinely manually review logs would be 
futile and burdensome. In ISO-NE's view, other than during a forensic 
investigation in response to an automated alert, any expectation of 
useful manual review on a routine basis is not reasonable.
    520. ReliabilityFirst and SPP disagree that a regular manual review 
of logs is always beneficial. For example, a weekly manual review of 
logs in a control room setting may be impossible. In a control center 
environment, the electronic security perimeter firewalls may log 
several million events per day. The outer network perimeter firewalls 
will typically log an even greater number of events per day. Servers 
and workstations may record hundreds to thousands of events per day 
across the system, security, and wide variety of application logs. The 
only way to monitor and analyze the logs is through the use of 
automation.
    521. While MidAmerican supports frequent review, it maintains that 
the review intervals should be designed to accomplish the detection and 
improvement objectives discussed in the CIP NOPR. MidAmerican submits 
that basing review intervals on accessibility of records will not 
optimally achieve this objective and would be unduly burdensome for 
responsible entities and should be reconsidered. MidAmerican would 
support a frequency of 30 days for electronically generated access logs 
and a 45-day review frequency for manually generated logs.
    522. SPP believes that a periodic review of the log correlation and 
analysis engine's rules should be conducted to ensure the automated 
analysis is properly alerting on pertinent events. This may require a 
manual examination of the raw log files. A weekly review is excessive--
a quarterly review may be more appropriate, as would a review upon a 
significant change to the access controls.
    523. By contrast, Juniper argues that logs should be reviewed 
daily, stating that there are correlation tools that can prioritize 
events automatically and reduce the effort required to go through all 
logs manually. Juniper argues that the requirement for reporting within 
an hour of an incident seems to be at odds with not requiring frequent 
review of the logs.
    524. MidAmerican maintains that the term ``bifurcated review'' is 
inadequately defined. MidAmerican recommends that the Commission add 
specific language addressing the use of a combination of automated and 
manual review of logs to satisfy this requirement. Likewise, the terms 
applying to whether the logs are ``readily available,'' ``readily 
accessible'' and ``not readily accessible'' need clarification to 
facilitate compliance. Northern Indiana also requests that the 
Commission clarify the scope of the reviews and what is meant by the 
term ``readily accessible.''
iii. Commission Determination
    525. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to require the ERO 
to modify CIP-005-1 to require logs to be reviewed more frequently than 
90 days, but clarifies its direction in several respects. At this time, 
the Commission does not believe that it is necessary to require 
responsible entities to review logs daily, as requested by Juniper.
    526. The Commission agrees with MidAmerican that the review 
intervals should be designed to accomplish the detection and 
improvement objectives discussed in the CIP NOPR. Requirement R3 of 
CIP-005-1 does not currently require a responsible entity to manually 
review logs if it has alerts. However, the Commission continues to 
believe that, while automated review systems provide a reasonable day-
to-day check of the system and a convenient screening for obvious 
system breaches, periodic manual review provides the opportunity to 
recognize an unanticipated form of malicious activity and improve 
automated detection settings. Further, manual review is beneficial to 
judge the effectiveness of protection measures, such as firewall 
settings. If a firewall setting is incorrect or ineffective, an 
automated review system may not identify a cyber security intrusion. 
For those entities without automated log review and alerts, it is even 
more important to perform a manual review because this will be the only 
review of the logs. The Commission believes allowing 90 days to pass 
without a log review is unacceptable. In that time, an incident could 
have occurred undetected or an attacker could have gained access to a 
critical system and extended that access throughout the enterprise with 
the targeted entity being unaware that the security of their systems 
had been compromised. For this reason, the Commission directs the ERO 
to modify CIP-005-1 through the Reliability Standards development 
process to require manual review of those logs without alerts in 
shorter than 90-day increments. The Commission continues to believe 
that, in general, logs should be reviewed at least weekly, but leaves 
it to the Reliability Standards development process to determine the 
appropriate frequency. In addition, the Commission directs the ERO to 
modify CIP-005-1 to require some manual review of logs, consistent with 
our discussion of log sampling below, to improve automated detection 
settings, even if alerts are employed on the logs.
    527. In response to MidAmerican's concern about the term 
``bifurcated review,'' the Commission intent was that certain assets, 
deemed readily accessible, would be reviewed at least weekly while 
other assets would continue to be reviewed every 90 days. However, the 
Commission will not adopt this direction from the CIP NOPR. We leave it 
to the Reliability Standards development process to decide whether 
different timeframes are appropriate for logs that are readily 
accessible and not readily accessible. If different review timeframes 
are adopted, the ERO should provide guidance as to what constitutes a 
readily accessible log and a log that is not readily accessible. The 
ERO may also delineate different timeframes for manual review for other 
reasons, but must clearly define how to determine in

[[Page 7420]]

what timeframe a specific log must be reviewed. However, we reiterate 
that any attempt to differentiate the required frequency of review of 
these logs must be balanced against the criticality of the facilities; 
it is not acceptable to dismiss a critical facility from timely review 
simply because it is remote.
    528. Finally, the Commission also agrees with commenters that a 
full review of logs could be burdensome. Therefore, the Commission 
clarifies its direction with regard to reviewing logs. In directing 
manual log review, the Commission does not require that every log be 
reviewed in its entirety. Instead, the ERO could provide, through the 
Reliability Standards development process, clarification that a 
responsible entity should perform the manual review of a sampling of 
log entries or sorted or filtered logs. The Commission recognizes that 
the manner in which a responsible entity determines what sample to 
review may not be the same for all locations. Therefore, the revised 
Reliability Standard does not need to prescribe a single method for 
producing the log sampling. However, any requirements for creating this 
sample review could be detailed in its cyber security policy so that it 
can be audited. The Reliability Standards development process should 
decide the degree to which the revised CIP-005-1 describes acceptable 
log sampling. The ERO could also provide additional guidance on 
creating the sampling of log entries, which could be in a reference 
document. The final review process, however, must be rigorous enough to 
enable the responsible entity to detect intrusions by attackers.
d. Vulnerability Assessments
    529. Requirement R4 of CIP-005-1 requires a responsible entity to 
``perform a cyber vulnerability assessment of the electronic access 
points to [an] electronic security perimeter at least annually.'' The 
minimum criteria provided do not specify whether a live vulnerability 
assessment is required, as opposed to a paper assessment.
i. NOPR Proposal
    530. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that annual 
vulnerability assessments are sufficient when no modifications are 
made, but that when the electronic security perimeter or another 
measure in a defense in depth strategy is modified, it is not 
acceptable to wait a year to test modifications.\126\ The Commission 
proposed to direct the ERO to revise the Reliability Standard to 
require a vulnerability assessment of the electronic access points as 
part of, or contemporaneously with, any modifications to the electronic 
security perimeter or defense in depth strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ See CIP NOPR at P 198-202.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    531. The Commission also proposed to direct the ERO to modify 
Requirement R4 to require live vulnerability assessments at least once 
every three years, with annual paper assessments allowable in the 
intervening years. The Commission stated that, if such live 
vulnerability assessments are not ``technically feasible,'' then a 
responsible entity may apply to be excused from full compliance to the 
Regional Entity, fully documenting the necessary interim actions, 
milestone schedule, and mitigation plan.
ii. Comments
    532. Northern California and PG&E support live, not paper, 
vulnerability assessments of the electronic security perimeter, subject 
to exceptions where necessary. PG&E qualifies its support, explaining 
that technical infeasibility is not the only valid reason for not 
performing a live vulnerability assessment.
    533. NERC, ReliabilityFirst, Northern Indiana, SDG&E and Ontario 
Power address their concerns about live testing issues generally, 
across Requirements that span several of the CIP Reliability Standards. 
They argue that the Commission should omit the requirements to include 
``live vulnerability testing'' requirements in the Final Rule.\127\ 
NERC and ReliabilityFirst argue that implementing such a requirement 
would be ill-advised because of the potential for disruption of 
operations resulting from an improperly run test, or the activation of 
an unknown or unforeseen vulnerability. NERC and ReliabilityFirst agree 
that performing such tests in a test environment is extremely useful 
and desirable, but performing such tests in situ in almost all cases 
would directly lead to significantly degraded reliability at that 
critical asset. FirstEnergy agrees that the risks of certain forms of 
live assessments are greater than their benefits. Similarly, NRECA 
maintains that the Bulk-Power System was not designed to facilitate 
live testing and is concerned that live testing, where inappropriate, 
could negatively impact reliability and service to consumers.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ Live vulnerability testing is discussed in several of the 
CIP Reliability Standards. Where commenters generally discuss live 
vulnerability testing, those comments are discussed in this section. 
Comments about specific Reliability Standards are discussed in the 
section concerning that Reliability Standard.
    \128\ One example cited by NRECA is software ``patches'' in 
other industries that failed to work as intended and instead 
disrupted service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    534. NERC and ReliabilityFirst believe that ``active'' 
vulnerability assessments of test systems are beneficial to 
understanding potential attacks. However, NERC finds it problematic to 
require test environments for all possible instances of electronic 
security perimeters and critical cyber assets. While most modern 
control centers contain such environments, they are rare for substation 
and generating plant environments, and the required resources could not 
be justified simply to perform active vulnerability tests once every 
three years.
    535. NERC and ReliabilityFirst argue that, while test systems are 
required for testing of patches and software updates, these are not 
required to exactly match or mirror the operational system. For 
example, if a substation consists of many intelligent electronic 
devices, but only a few different models of intelligent electronic 
devices, then the test environment for patches and updates need only 
have one of each model in order to test updates. Depending on the 
vendor implementation, a single intelligent electronic device 
representative of all of the intelligent electronic devices may be 
sufficient for this purpose. This environment is suitable to test for 
software vulnerabilities, even though it is not a ``full'' or 
``complete'' replication of the real environment, because it represents 
the essential equipment to perform the test. NERC states that it could 
support performing active tests in such an environment, provided the 
responsible entity could document and demonstrate that the test 
environment and the tests performed do, in fact, map to all the 
implemented components of the live environment.
    536. NERC therefore requests that the Commission decline to include 
its proposed requirements for live vulnerability testing in the Final 
Rule. Rather, NERC proposes replacing live vulnerability testing with 
``active vulnerability assessments of test systems.'' \129\ NERC 
believes that the active nature of the NERC proposed language addresses 
the concerns of the Commission, while ensuring reliable operations of 
the Bulk-Power System. These modifications also must be effectuated 
through the Commission-approved Reliability Standards development 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ Alliant, Arizona Public Service and ReliabilityFirst 
support these wording changes.

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[[Page 7421]]

    537. Northern Indiana argues that the current Reliability Standard 
allows the flexibility of performing live or paper vulnerability 
assessments as appropriate.
    538. Juniper argues that, in addition to the paper assessment, 
creation of a ``sandbox'' environment that is fairly representative of 
the physical plant must be mandatory. Semi-annual penetration test of 
such a sandbox is essential.
    539. MidAmerican believes that conducting a vulnerability 
assessment of the electronic access points as part of, or 
contemporaneously with, any modifications to the electronic security 
perimeter or defense in depth strategy on a three-year cycle would be 
an extremely burdensome task. It suggests the following: (1) A baseline 
audit; (2) an assessment during the change control process of the 
vulnerability implications; and (3) a periodic review based upon the 
assessment.
    540. Several commenters state that the Commission's proposal to 
require a vulnerability assessment when any ``modification'' of the 
electronic security perimeter or defense in depth strategy is made is 
too broad.\130\ Commenters generally state that the Commission's use of 
the modifier ``any'' suggests that the Commission believes that all 
modifications of the electronic security perimeter, no matter how 
nominal, must result in a live vulnerability assessment of the entire 
perimeter. Northern California maintains that, as a result, the 
contemporaneous testing requirement could be a perverse disincentive 
that prevents upgrades to increase security when an entity's existing 
electronic security perimeter is ``good enough.'' An entity with ``good 
enough'' security may delay upgrades to security in order to minimize 
testing. Several commenters offer specific examples of modifications 
which they believe would not warrant a vulnerability assessment. 
Northern California believes that an appropriate Reliability Standard 
should require live vulnerability testing within 90 to 180 days of an 
electronic security perimeter modification.
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    \130\ See, e.g., Northern California, FirstEnergy, FPL Group, 
PG&E and SPP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Commission Determination
    541. The Commission notes that the concerns expressed by some 
commenters of triggering an unknown vulnerability during a live test is 
one reason why some form of live or active testing is necessary. A 
responsible entity cannot protect its system from exploitation of 
vulnerabilities that it does not know about. However, in light of the 
comments received, the Commission will not adopt its proposal as set 
out in the CIP NOPR regarding live vulnerability assessments in 
Requirement R4 of CIP-005-1. Instead, we adopt the ERO's proposal to 
provide for active vulnerability assessments rather than full live 
vulnerability assessments. Further, as discussed below, we clarify that 
an interim vulnerability assessment will only need to be performed if a 
responsible entity makes a significant modification to the electronic 
security perimeter.
    542. The Commission's goal in proposing live vulnerability testing 
is to provide a level of confidence that the Bulk-Power System has a 
certain level of resistance to attack. We understand the concerns 
raised by commenters that live vulnerability testing could, at this 
time, diminish reliability. While the Commission's goal is to require 
full live vulnerability testing on the entire Bulk-Power System at some 
point, we understand that this may not be possible at this time. As 
suggested by FirstEnergy, industry may need time to gain experience in 
this area before it can conduct full live vulnerability testing. 
Therefore, the Commission adopts the ERO's recommendation of requiring 
active vulnerability assessments of test systems.\131\
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    \131\ The Commission approaches the live testing issues in CIP-
007-1, CIP-008-1 and CIP-009-1 from this same perspective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    543. The Commission agrees with the ERO that test systems do not 
need to exactly match or mirror the operational system. However, to 
perform active vulnerability assessments, the responsible entities 
should be required to create a representative system, i.e., one that 
replicates the actual system as closely as possible. The active 
vulnerability assessment should be carried out on this representative 
system. In doing so, a responsible entity must document the differences 
between the operational and representative system for the auditors. As 
part of this documentation, the responsible entity should also document 
how test results on the representative system might differ from the 
operational system, and how the responsible entity accounts for such 
differences in operating the system. Our goal is to ensure that each 
responsible entity understands the differences between its 
representative system and the operational system and how those 
differences might affect its test results. The entities remain 
responsible, however, to ensure that the testing systems are adequate 
to model the production systems and to document and account for the 
differences between the two.
    544. Further, the Commission agrees with commenters that requiring 
each responsible entity to perform a vulnerability assessment of the 
electronic access points when any modification is made to the 
electronic security perimeter or defense in depth strategy is too 
broad. Instead, the Commission directs the ERO to revise the 
Reliability Standard so that annual vulnerability assessments are 
sufficient, unless a significant change is made to the electronic 
security perimeter or defense in depth measure, rather than with every 
modification. To be clear, the Commission is not requiring the 
Reliability Standard to use the terminology that a ``significant 
change'' is made to the electronic security perimeter or defense in 
depth strategy. Rather, we are directing the ERO to determine, through 
the Reliability Standards development process, what would constitute a 
modification that would require an active vulnerability assessment. For 
example, we would anticipate that updating an attack signature file on 
the electronic access point would not require an active vulnerability 
assessment, but replacing the devices that comprise the electronic 
access point would require an active vulnerability assessment.
    545. Given our changes to the Commission proposal, and based upon 
the comments, the Commission does not believe performing an active 
vulnerability assessment once every three years will pose too great a 
burden on company personnel. The burden above that is required by the 
Reliability Standard as proposed by the ERO is justified by the 
insights that will be gained from the active assessments.
    546. At this time, the Commission does not believe it is necessary 
to require twice a year penetration tests by responsible entities, as 
requested by Juniper. We believe that the combination of annual testing 
and active vulnerability assessments is sufficient for the Reliable 
Operation of the Bulk-Power System.
    547. In sum, we direct the ERO to modify Requirement R4 to require 
these representative active vulnerability assessments at least once 
every three years, with subsequent annual paper assessments in the 
intervening years. The ERO should develop the details of how to 
determine what constitutes a representative system and what 
modifications require an active vulnerability assessment in the 
Reliability Standards development process. The revised Reliability 
Standard should contain the essential

[[Page 7422]]

requirement that an active assessment must be performed at least once 
every three years. Based on the amount of guidance contained in the 
modified Reliability Standard, the ERO should consider at that time 
whether additional guidance should be provided in a reference document.
5. CIP-006-1--Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets
    548. Reliability Standard CIP-006-1 addresses the physical security 
of the critical cyber assets identified in Reliability Standard CIP-
002-1. In particular, CIP-006-1 requires a responsible entity to create 
and maintain a physical security plan that ensures that all cyber 
assets within an electronic security perimeter also reside within an 
identified physical security perimeter.\132\ The physical security plan 
must be approved by senior management and must contain processes for 
identifying, controlling, and monitoring all access points and 
authorization requests.
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    \132\ As defined in the NERC Glossary, an ``Electronic Security 
Perimeter'' means, ``[t]he logical border surrounding a network to 
which Critical Cyber Assets are connected and for which access is 
controlled * * *'' and a Physical Security Perimeter is ``the 
physical, completely enclosed (``six-wall'') border surrounding 
computer rooms, telecommunications rooms, operations centers, and 
other locations in which Critical Cyber Assets means are housed and 
for which access is controlled * * *.''
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    549. Reliability Standard CIP-006-1 also addresses operational and 
procedural controls to manage physical access at all access points to 
the physical security perimeter at all times by the use of alarm 
systems and/or human observation or video monitoring. The Reliability 
Standard also requires that the logging of physical access must occur 
at all times, and the information logged must be sufficient to uniquely 
identify individuals crossing the perimeter. Finally, the Reliability 
Standard requires responsible entities to test and maintain all 
physical security mechanisms on a three-year cycle.
    550. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission proposed to approve 
Reliability Standard CIP-006-1 as mandatory and enforceable. In 
addition, we proposed to direct the ERO to develop modifications to 
this Reliability Standard. Further, the Commission also proposed to 
require the ERO to consider various other matters of clarification, 
guidance, and modification. In our discussion below, we address the 
following topic areas regarding CIP-006-1: (1) Physical security plan; 
(2) physical access controls and monitoring physical access; and (3) 
maintenance and testing.\133\
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    \133\ In the NOPR, the Commission also addressed the issue of 
physical security breaches, and proposed no modification to CIP-006-
1. We stated that our concerns would be resolved with modifications 
proposed to CIP-008-1, pertaining to the term ``reportable 
incident.'' We affirm that position here.
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a. Physical Security Plan
    551. Requirement R1.1 of CIP-006-1 addresses processes that a 
responsible entity must include in its physical security plan to ensure 
that all cyber assets within an electronic security perimeter also 
reside within an identified physical security perimeter. The CIP 
Assessment noted that Requirement R1.1 anticipates that there may be 
instances where a completely enclosed border cannot be established and 
that, in such instances, the responsible entity shall deploy and 
document ``alternative measures'' to control physical access to the 
critical cyber assets. It cautioned, however, that Requirement R1.1 
does not provide guidance on how an alternative measure should be 
identified or determined to be adequate.
    552. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that the phrase 
``alternative measures'' as referenced in Requirement R1.1 should be 
interpreted to be an exception to the Requirement, and that our 
discussion of technical feasibility exceptions should apply to 
Requirement R1.1. We noted that, under this Requirement, the 
responsible entity is required to deploy and document alternative 
measures if a completely enclosed six-wall border cannot be established 
to control physical access to the critical cyber assets. However, we 
observed that the Requirements did not provide guidance on how an 
alternative measure should be identified or determined to be adequate. 
Therefore, the Commission proposed to direct the ERO to treat the 
allowance of alternative measures as interim actions developed and 
implemented as part of a mitigation plan under a technical feasibility 
exception.
i. Comments
    553. NERC, APPA/LPPC, OGE, SoCal Edison and SDG&E disagree with the 
Commission's proposal to treat the allowance of alternative measures as 
interim actions developed and implemented as part of a mitigation plan 
under a technical feasibility exception.
    554. MidAmerican generally supports the proposal to treat an 
alternative measure to a six-walled perimeter as an exception and 
mitigated under a technical feasibility exception for the reasons 
articulated in the CIP NOPR. However, MidAmerican recommends that the 
Commission consider the alternative measures to be implemented when a 
six-wall border cannot be established, where appropriately equivalent, 
as the mitigation solution and not an interim action. The merits of the 
alternative measures can be evaluated at the time of an audit.
    555. NERC, APPA/LPPC, Arizona Public Service, and Consumers 
maintain that, where the equipment cannot be contained within a six-
wall border, alternative measures should be permitted on a permanent 
basis. NERC argues that the Commission's proposal implies that by 
treating these alternative measures as interim actions with required 
mitigation plans, the responsible entity could overcome the physical or 
safety-related obstacles to achieving the completely enclosed physical 
boundary. NERC believes this is impractical, if not impossible. APPA/
LPPC assert that the configuration or layout of a specific cyber asset 
simply may not lend itself to a complete physical perimeter, and 
alternative means of protection (including electronic protections) may 
be entirely adequate, given the level of security risk posed by the 
asset and the nature of the alternative form of protection. In some 
cases, NERC states that there is no possibility of mitigation. The 
responsible entity does not choose not to completely enclose the 
asset--it is a physical limitation which cannot be overcome. In cases 
where the physical or safety limitations do not exist, the responsible 
entity is expected to comply with the Requirements, and not use 
alternative measures. In cases where the physical limitations cannot be 
overcome, NERC argues that the responsible entity cannot ignore the 
Requirement, but must implement an alternative. NERC also argues that 
this alternative is expected to be a permanent solution, not an interim 
measure.
    556. Arizona Public Service agrees with NERC that the Commission 
should omit this proposal from the Final Rule and supports remanding 
this provision to NERC to modify R1.1 to permit the use of alternative 
measures on a permanent basis under requirements, developed through the 
NERC Reliability Standards development process, which could include 
documenting and justifying the need for the alternative measure and 
describing the alternative measures implemented.
    557. Georgia Operators states that the industry will continue to 
struggle for years to agree on a clear definition of

[[Page 7423]]

what comprises six walls for a physical security perimeter: not every 
wall need necessarily be bunker-strength concrete, but neither should 
every wall be paper-thin.
    558. While APPA/LPPC maintain that alternative measures should be 
documented by the Regional Entity, Northern Indiana argues that, if a 
responsible entity establishes or has established adequate alternative 
measures, then the responsible entity should not need to document or 
otherwise justify the alternative measure. Northern Indiana requests 
that, if the Commission does require NERC to modify Requirement R1 in 
the Final Rule, it clarify what is meant by alternative measures.
ii. Commission Determination
    559. We are persuaded by commenters that there may be instances in 
which the physical or safety-related obstacles to achieving a 
completely enclosed physical boundary cannot be overcome. In such 
instances, we agree with commenters that it would be inappropriate to 
treat the alternative measures under this CIP Reliability Standard as 
interim actions under the technical feasibility exception, as the 
exception was proposed in the CIP NOPR. However, the Commission has 
revised its determination with respect to the technical feasibility 
exception to address concerns such as those raised by commenters on 
Requirement R1.1 of CIP-006-1. The Commission believes that allowing a 
technical feasibility exception to Requirement R1.1 of CIP-006-1, with 
the changes discussed in the Technical Feasibility section of this 
Final Rule, should address commenters' concerns. Specifically, the 
Commission acknowledges that some circumstances merit reliance on 
mitigation strategies that are ongoing and effective, so long as they 
are justified and reviewed periodically. This should alleviate the 
concern of commenters that the Commission is not allowing exceptions to 
Requirement R1.1 on a long-term basis.
    560. Therefore, the Commission directs the ERO to treat any 
alternative measures for Requirement R1.1 of CIP-006-1 as a technical 
feasibility exception to Requirement R1.1, subject to the conditions on 
technical feasibility exceptions.\134\ In evaluating the requests for a 
technical feasibility exception to Requirement R1.1, we expect the ERO 
to work with the responsible entities to ensure consideration of any 
emerging technologies that may allow the responsible entity to satisfy 
Requirement R1.1.
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    \134\ In section II.F.3 of this Final Rule, we explain the 
circumstances under which technical feasibility exceptions can be 
claimed and direct the ERO, through the Reliability Standards 
development process, to revise the Reliability Standards 
accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Physical Access Controls and Monitoring Physical Access
    561. Requirement R2 of the CIP Reliability Standard requires the 
use of at least one of four listed physical access control methods, but 
does not require or suggest that the method(s) employed to control 
physical access consider the characteristics of the access point at 
issue and the criticality of the asset being protected. Requirement R3 
requires monitoring at each access point to the physical security 
perimeter, including alarm systems and/or human monitoring. For both 
Requirement R2 and Requirement R3, a responsible entity can choose 
whether to implement single or multiple access control methods and 
monitoring devices.
    562. The CIP NOPR suggested that a responsible entity must, at a 
minimum, implement two or more different security procedures when 
establishing a physical security perimeter. It stated that use of a 
minimum of two different security procedures would, for example, enable 
continuous security protection when one of the security protection 
measures is undergoing maintenance and provides redundant security 
protection in the event that one of the measures is breached. 
Therefore, while the Commission recognized that there is a point at 
which implementing multiple layers of defense becomes an unreasonable 
burden to responsible entities, the Commission nevertheless proposed to 
direct the ERO to modify this CIP Reliability Standard to state that a 
responsible entity must, at a minimum, implement two or more different 
security procedures when establishing a physical security perimeter 
around critical cyber assets.
i. Comments
    563. While California Commission finds the Requirements of CIP-006-
1 to be sound and succinct, it also finds the proposal in the CIP NOPR 
to require two or more security procedures to be sound policy. It adds 
that defense in depth strategy should be used in such situations, 
because multiple security procedures make it harder for a potential 
attacker to penetrate the system. FirstEnergy finds the Commission's 
proposal to require a minimum of two different security procedures is 
appropriate where technically feasible. However, it notes that a 
variety of different security procedures could satisfy this 
requirement. For example, the minimum of two different security 
procedures could be met by having two doors each with one security 
device or one door with two security devices.
    564. Within a substation, NERC and ReliabilityFirst argue that 
there is no practical way to implement a second physical perimeter 
without jeopardizing the reliability of the substation itself. If the 
``outer'' perimeter is outside the building, NERC and ReliabilityFirst 
see space problems with adding the mandated physical security perimeter 
(e.g., monitoring, logging, access control, personnel management, and 
training) on the border fence, noting that, in most substations, 
physical space around the control building is at a premium, and 
implementing an additional perimeter is problematic.
    565. NERC and ReliabilityFirst raise similar concerns with 
requiring two physical security controls as they do with respect to 
electronic security controls in CIP-005-1. They further argue that, if 
the control building structure is still expected to be the inner 
perimeter, then, by necessity, a new perimeter (most likely an 
additional fence) will need to be built. In space-restricted 
substations this will likely be impossible. Similarly, if the control 
building structure is expected to be the outer perimeter, additional 
construction--whether solid walls or fence-like caging--will need to be 
constructed inside the control building. In this regard, NERC objects 
to a requirement to retrofit existing installed equipment to require 
additional construction or cabinet installation required due to the 
distributed nature of the equipment. NERC considers it counterintuitive 
to require that these new constructions be built as ``cabinets within 
cabinets'' or ``rooms within rooms,'' contending that this kind of 
construction or implementation is burdensome without real benefit.
    566. APPA/LPPC, Idaho Power, Northern Indiana, OGE and Tampa 
Electric do not believe that it is appropriate to categorically require 
two different security procedures when establishing a physical security 
perimeter. APPA/LPPC are concerned that the Commission's proposal to do 
so could necessitate needless and expensive redundancy. Since 
Requirements R2 and R3 are already designed to be redundant (controlled 
access is backed up by monitoring), APPA/LPPC assert the Commission's 
proposal would appear to require a total of four measures. If the 
Commission meant that four separate and distinct security measures are 
necessary to comply with Requirements R2 and R3,

[[Page 7424]]

then APPA/LPPC disagree with the proposed change.
    567. Entergy argues that the term ``security procedures'' in CIP-
006-1 is confusing and that the Commission should direct NERC to define 
the term. Entergy argues that the terms physical security ``measures'' 
or ``barriers'' in the context of perimeters would improve clarity, 
whereas the term ``procedures'' better applies to access control 
management (R2) and monitoring (R3).
    568. Several commenters seek clarification of what the Commission 
intended in requiring two or more security procedures. For example, SPP 
interprets the Commission's comment as requiring two independent 
security procedures at the physical security perimeter access point, as 
opposed to complementary security controls such as closed-circuit 
television observation of a secured door. SPP recommends that the 
Commission clarify that this is its intent, and offers that if a proper 
defense in depth strategy is used that provides for progressively 
restricted access or other obstructions to access as one approaches the 
physical security perimeter, multiple access controls at the physical 
security perimeter access point are excessive. SPP recommends that a 
progressive security scheme be acceptable in lieu of implementing 
multiple access controls at the physical security perimeter access 
point. SPP further recommends that the Commission clarify its intent as 
to whether an asset perimeter fence would constitute an acceptable 
obstruction and achieve the goal of the Commission's proposal. 
Similarly, MidAmerican requests that the Commission clarify whether the 
security procedures must be completely independent or may rely on a 
common component.
    569. Arkansas Electric states it is uncertain if the Commission 
intends the term security procedures to apply to actual methods of 
implementing physical security (e.g., locks, gates, fences) or to 
procedural methods (e.g., logging). Arkansas Electric argues that 
adequate security fencing with a special lock should suffice for a 
secondary physical security procedure.
    570. Idaho Power states that, for example, special locks and key 
cards would meet the Commission's recommended security procedures; 
however, they are significantly the same control measure and do nothing 
to provide defense in depth. While they afford back-up during 
maintenance, they fall short on defense since one can override the 
other. If the Commission truly wants to promote defense in depth, Idaho 
Power states that the chosen options should be required to support one 
another (e.g., key cards and closed circuit television), and not be 
just two of the provided four options.
    571. Northern Indiana argues that it is unreasonable to put in 
place two different security measures in remote or field locations. 
National Grid also argues that two or more different security 
procedures may not always be needed to accomplish defense in depth.
ii. Commission Determination
    572. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to modify this CIP Reliability Standard to state that a responsible 
entity must, at a minimum, implement two or more different security 
procedures when establishing a physical security perimeter around 
critical cyber assets. However, similar to our determination in CIP-
005-1 regarding defense in depth for electronic security perimeters, in 
light of the comments received, the Commission understands that there 
may be instances in which certain facilities cannot implement defense 
in depth or where such an approach would harm reliability rather than 
enhance it. For that reason, the Commission believes that it is 
appropriate to allow the ERO and the Regional Entities to grant 
exceptions based on the technical feasibility of implementing defense 
in depth, consistent with the Commission's determination on technical 
feasibility above. However, the responsible entity should implement 
physical security perimeter defense in depth measures or justify why it 
is not doing so pursuant to our discussion of technical feasibility 
exceptions.
    573. As stated in the CIP NOPR, the Commission recognizes that 
there is a point at which implementing multiple layers of defense 
becomes an unreasonable burden to responsible entities. However, as 
more fully detailed in our discussion of defense in depth in CIP-005-1, 
we continue to believe that the effectiveness of any one defense 
measure is often dependent on the quality of active human maintenance, 
and there is no one perfect defense measure that will guarantee the 
protection of the Bulk-Power System.\135\ Therefore, we continue to 
require the use of layered and complementary security procedures that a 
defense in depth approach embodies.
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    \135\ See discussion of CIP-005-1, section II.F.4.a, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    574. In response to APPA/LPPC's comments, the Commission does not 
require two or more different monitoring methods under Requirement R3. 
We did not propose to modify Requirement R3 and are not doing so in 
this Final Rule. Further, the Commission did not intend to require two 
or more physical perimeters, as suggested by NERC and ReliabilityFirst. 
Rather, the Commission intended only to require the ERO to modify R2 to 
provide for two or more different and complementary physical assess 
controls at a physical access point of the perimeter. The Commission 
believes that this should clarify what it meant by the term 
``procedures'' and sees no need to direct the ERO to define the term, 
as requested by Entergy.
    575. In response to commenters' questions regarding specific 
physical access controls, the Commission clarifies that it does not 
intend to create an inflexible rule calling for redundant physical 
security. While the Commission continues to believe that a responsible 
entity must implement two or more distinct and complementary physical 
access controls at a physical access point of the perimeter, the 
specific requirements should be developed in the Reliability Standards 
development process when the ERO develops its modifications in response 
to this Final Rule.\136\ The Commission also directs the ERO to 
consider, based on the content of the modified CIP-006-1, whether 
further guidance on this defense in depth topic should be developed in 
a reference document outside of the Reliability Standards.
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    \136\ The Commission notes that the requirements in Standard 
CIP-005-1 are not alone sufficient to address the Commission's goal. 
CIP-005-1 concerns electronic security perimeters. A single physical 
security measure is too easy to bypass and an electronic security 
measure could not thwart a physical attack. Therefore, we believe it 
is in the public interest to require that a responsible entity must 
implement two or more distinct physical security measures at a 
physical access point of the perimeter.
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    576. Northern Indiana raises a concern about security measures in 
remote or field locations, but did not provide specific information. 
The Commission believes that, if it is not possible to implement two or 
more distinct physical security measures in a remote or field location, 
a Regional Entity could grant justified exceptions based on technical 
feasibility.
c. Maintenance and Testing
    577. Requirement R6 of CIP-006-1 requires responsible entities to 
implement maintenance and testing programs of physical security systems 
on a cycle no longer than three years and retain testing and 
maintenance records for the same timeframe. In addition, Requirement R6 
requires retention of outage records of certain physical security 
systems for a minimum of one year. In the CIP NOPR,

[[Page 7425]]

the Commission stated that maintenance and testing of physical security 
systems should occur more frequently than once every three years. 
However, the Commission also stated that testing at remote substations 
should be allowed less frequently. Therefore, the Commission proposed 
to direct the ERO to modify this Reliability Standard to require that: 
(1) A readily accessible critical cyber asset be tested every year with 
a one-year record requirement for the retention of testing, 
maintenance, and outage records; and (2) a non-readily accessible 
critical cyber asset be tested in a three-year cycle with a three-year 
record retention requirement. The Commission stated that this approach 
provides an appropriate assurance that security measures for 
geographically dispersed physical assets are functioning properly.
i. Comments
    578. FirstEnergy agrees with the Commission that the frequency of 
the maintenance and testing programs should be a function of the 
accessibility of critical cyber assets. The Requirement should specify 
the form of testing and the frequency of such testing that will be 
considered adequate. For example, testing the functionality of a system 
that is part of the work environment and used every day may be 
excessive, while a more extreme form of testing, such as simulated 
break-ins may be appropriately applied biennially or triennially. In 
addition, the CIP Reliability Standards should clarify what is 
considered readily accessible and what is not. Any testing requirements 
should consider the specific facilities being tested and allow entities 
to use their discretion until more experience is gained in this area. 
Finally, changes to the frequency of the maintenance and testing 
program cycles should be considered in the Reliability Standards 
development process.
    579. National Grid argues that the testing of critical cyber assets 
(as opposed to testing of physical security measures for such critical 
cyber assets) is beyond the scope of the physical security requirements 
in Reliability Standard CIP-006-1. Thus, it requests that the 
Commission clarify that the CIP NOPR's reference to the testing of 
critical cyber assets was inadvertent, and that the Commission was 
merely proposing testing intervals for physical security measures.
    580. Northern Indiana requests that the Final Rule clarify what is 
intended by a ``test.'' A test of a card access system, for example, 
can be the normal operation with the card and the operation with a non-
programmed card to determine whether the lock is working. The protocol 
for physical security system tests are dictated more by the type of 
equipment to be tested as well as the equipment's application. Northern 
Indiana states that, like the Commission, it believes in a strong 
maintenance and testing program. However, Northern Indiana also 
believes the focus of the Final Rule should be on whether an 
unauthorized person accesses the physical security system, and not the 
administrative nature of testing the system. Clarification of what is 
intended by, or what makes up, an acceptable test will in effect 
strengthen the Requirement.
ii. Commission Determination
    581. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal and directs the 
ERO to develop a modification to CIP-006-1 to require a responsible 
entity to test the physical security measures on critical cyber assets 
more frequently than every three years, but clarifies our direction in 
several respects. Similar to our action with respect to reviewing logs 
in CIP-005-1, the Commission will not adopt the proposal to require 
different testing periods for physical security measures on critical 
cyber assets that are readily accessible or not readily accessible. 
Instead, we leave it to the Reliability Standards development process 
to decide whether different timeframes are appropriate for physical 
security measures on critical cyber assets that are readily accessible 
and not readily accessible. Similar to our direction in CIP-005-1, if 
different review timeframes are adopted, the ERO should provide 
guidance as to what constitutes a readily accessible facility and a 
facility that is not readily accessible. The ERO may also delineate 
different timeframes for testing for other reasons, but must clearly 
define how to determine in what timeframe the physical security 
measures on a specific critical cyber asset must be reviewed.
    582. In response to Northern Indiana, the Commission does not 
believe it is necessary at this time to specify what would constitute a 
test, because each test may be different based on the type of physical 
security measure employed. Northern Indiana may ask the ERO to provide 
guidance on this matter.
    583. In response to National Grid, we clarify that the CIP NOPR's 
reference to the testing of critical cyber was inadvertent, and that we 
proposed testing intervals for physical security measures.
6. CIP-007-1--Systems Security Management
    584. The Purpose statement in CIP-007-1 states that it requires 
responsible entities to define methods, processes and procedures for 
securing those systems determined to be critical cyber assets, as well 
as the non-critical cyber assets within the electronic security 
perimeter(s). This Reliability Standard deals primarily with changes 
made to the operating production systems and verification that such 
changes will not inadvertently have adverse effects.\137\
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    \137\ See CIP NOPR at P 224-25 and CIP Assessment at 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    585. The Commission approves Reliability Standard CIP-007-1 as 
mandatory and enforceable. In addition, we direct the ERO to develop 
modifications to this Reliability Standard. The required modifications 
are discussed below in the following topic areas of concern regarding 
CIP-007-1: (1) Acceptance of risk and technical feasibility; (2) test 
procedures; (3) malicious software prevention; (4) security status 
monitoring; (5) disposal or redeployment; (6) cyber vulnerability 
assessment; and (7) documentation review and maintenance.
a. General Issues Regarding Acceptance of Risk and Technical 
Feasibility in CIP-007-1
    586. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission expressed various concerns 
regarding acceptance of risk and technical feasibility language in CIP-
007-1. For example, Requirement R2.3 allows a responsible entity to 
accept risk rather than take mitigating action where unused ports and 
services cannot be disabled due to ``technical limitations'' and 
Requirement R3.2 allows an acceptance of risk in lieu of mitigating 
risk exposure through a patching program. Requirement R4 requires the 
responsible entity to use antivirus software and malicious software 
prevention tools where technically feasible. Requirement R6 of CIP-007-
1 requires responsible entities to ensure that all cyber assets within 
the electronic security perimeter, as technically feasible, implement 
automated tools or organizational process controls to monitor system 
events that are related to cyber security.
    587. Requirement R3 of CIP-007-1 requires a responsible entity to 
establish and document a security patch management program for 
tracking, evaluating, testing and installing applicable cyber security 
software patches for all cyber assets within an electronic security 
perimeter. Among other things, a responsible entity must

[[Page 7426]]

document the implementation of security patches. Where a patch is not 
installed, the responsible entity must document compensating measure(s) 
applied to mitigate risk exposure or an acceptance of risk.
    588. The Commission proposed to direct the ERO to eliminate the 
acceptance of risk language from Requirement R3.2.\138\ We stated that 
patch management choices must be weighed in light of the risks 
involved, with senior management involved in the decision. We noted 
that this provision is a component of implementing Recommendation 33 of 
the Blackout Report,\139\ which states that using up-to-date patches 
that deal specifically with security vulnerabilities is of the utmost 
importance, provided it does not degrade the system and the patch does 
not create more vulnerability than the problem it is intended to fix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ See id. P 235-39.
    \139\ See Blackout Report at 164, Recommendation 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    589. The Commission also proposed to direct the ERO to eliminate 
the acceptance of risk language from Requirement R2.3. At the same 
time, the Commission proposed to leave intact the exception for 
technical limitations in Requirement R2.3. However, the Commission 
stated that the technical limitations language of Requirement R2.3 
raised the same concerns as raised concerning the technical feasibility 
language. While the Commission acknowledged that an exception for 
technical limitations might be appropriate, it stated that the language 
must include the same conditions as discussed in the context of 
technical feasibility. Accordingly, we proposed that the same 
conditions and reporting requirements should apply here. Thus, the 
Commission proposed to direct the ERO to revise Requirement R2 and its 
subparts to remove the acceptance of risk language and to impose the 
same conditions and reporting requirements here for ``technical 
limitations'' as imposed elsewhere in the CIP NOPR regarding 
``technical feasibility.''
i. Comments
    590. The California Commission agrees with the proposal to remove 
the phrase ``acceptance of risk'' from the Reliability Standard. The 
California Commission also finds the existence of the term 
``technically feasible'' in this Reliability Standard acceptable with 
the burden of proof on the individual organization to prove the 
exception. MidAmerican supports the Commission's proposal to eliminate 
acceptance of risk from Requirement R2.3 and that exceptions for 
technical limitation may be appropriate but must be treated as an 
exception the same as technical feasibility issues. However, 
MidAmerican cautions that the terms ``technical limitations'' and 
``technical feasibility'' need clarification to facilitate compliance.
    591. Juniper maintains that it is not technically feasible to turn 
off ports. It states that, if a device cannot turn off unused ports, it 
must be protected with a firewall in front of it. Unused open ports are 
the most common form of attack since devices can fail in unplanned ways 
when they receive unexpected traffic. Ideally, device providers must be 
mandated to provide the list of ports they require to be opened, with a 
description of the protocol expected on each open port.
    592. Commenters also raise concerns about the Commission's 
treatment of security patches. According to APPA/LPPC, the Commission's 
proposal to eliminate the acceptance of risk language from CIP-007-1, 
Requirement R3.2 would appear to prevent responsible entities from 
exercising any discretion to determine not to implement a security 
patch on the ground that it posed more risk than justified. Limiting 
the use of acceptance of risk to instances where adoption of a specific 
compliance measure is determined by the responsible entity to pose more 
risk than alternative compliance measures, is appropriate, but 
eliminating all discretion in this area undermines necessary 
flexibility. In the alternative, APPA/LPPC argue that the Commission 
should give responsible entities the discretion to determine whether 
specific security patches create more vulnerability to the Bulk Power 
System than they solve. In this regard, APPA/LPPC note that the 
Commission itself stated in the CIP NOPR that the most up-to-date 
patches should be used, provided this does not ``degrade the system and 
the patch does not create more vulnerability than the problem it is 
intended to fix.'' Thus, APPA/LPPC argue that, if the Commission 
proceeds to delete the acceptance of risk language, it should 
specifically include the disclaimer on patches referenced above.
    593. MidAmerican opposes the Commission's proposal to direct NERC 
to revise the Reliability Standard to remove acceptance of risk from 
the provisions for security patch management in Requirement R3. 
MidAmerican believes that the acceptance of risk should remain in the 
Reliability Standard if accompanied by a mitigation plan and sunset 
provisions for the exception. By requiring a mitigation plan to reduce 
the risk and a time frame to come into compliance the standard provides 
needed flexibility while maintaining the certainty of a committed end-
date.
    594. Northern Indiana does not support the Commission's proposal 
that senior management be involved in each and every case because it is 
not necessary. The Commission should refine its proposal and provide 
that senior management should be consulted when mitigation is needed, 
but not in situations not requiring mitigation. Such situations can be 
appropriately addressed by senior management's delegate.
    595. FPL Group states that, the Commission's statement that patch 
management must be weighed in light of the risks involved, with senior 
management involved in the decision, acknowledges that a certain level 
of risk associated with patch management must be taken into account. 
However, FPL Group states that this analysis is no different than the 
acceptance of risk language that the Commission rejects. The Commission 
is essentially stating that by using technical judgment, a responsible 
entity's senior management can accept the risk associated with not 
applying security patches in instances where the patches would degrade 
performance after performing a risk assessment. Therefore, FPL Group 
recommends directing the ERO Reliability Standards development process 
to consider the issue related to acceptance of risk and make 
appropriate modifications, if any, to the Reliability Standards.
    596. Juniper states that an inline intrusion prevention system or 
intrusion detection system that is able to automatically identify and 
understand the protocols being used on a control network provides a 
mitigation for conditions where applying patches against known 
vulnerabilities is not feasible. Hence, in locations where patches 
cannot be applied such a network device must be required.
ii. Commission Determination
    597. The Commission affirms its proposals with respect to technical 
feasibility and acceptance of risk. Therefore, the Commission directs 
the ERO to eliminate the acceptance of risk language from Requirements 
R2.3 and R3.2. However, as discussed in the CIP NOPR, this leaves 
intact the exception for technical limitations in Requirement R2.3, so 
long as the treatment of Requirement R2.3 conforms to our findings 
regarding the technical feasibility exceptions.

[[Page 7427]]

    598. MidAmerican's concerns about clarifying the terms technical 
limitations and technical feasibility through the Reliability Standards 
development process are addressed in our findings regarding technical 
feasibility elsewhere in the Final Rule.
    599. In response to Juniper, the Commission does not believe that 
applying the technical feasibility exception in lieu of acceptance of 
risk means that a responsible entity would not have to mitigate the 
risk of not being able to turn off ports. The Commission believes that 
our discussion of the technical feasibility exception in the Technical 
Feasibility Exception Remediation and Mitigation section above supplies 
the obligation to mitigate that Juniper is seeking.
    600. With respect to security patch management, the Commission 
continues to believe that the acceptance of risk language is 
unacceptable. However, in doing so we do not seek to prevent 
responsible entities from exercising some level of discretion. The 
Commission therefore directs the ERO to revise Requirement R3 to remove 
the acceptance of risk language and to impose the same conditions and 
reporting requirements as imposed elsewhere in the Final Rule regarding 
technical feasibility. The Commission believes that this will allow 
responsible entities the discretion APPA/LPPC seek. Further, this 
essentially accomplishes the outcome sought by MidAmerican. With 
respect to the disclaimer requested by APPA/LPPC, the Commission is not 
convinced to direct such a modification to the Reliability Standard at 
this time. However, this issue should be examined in the Reliability 
Standards development process. Given that we are modifying our 
direction, we do not believe that it is necessary to mandate senior 
management involvement in these decisions here. While we direct the ERO 
to modify Requirement R3 of CIP-007-1 to remove the acceptance of risk 
language, the ERO, through the Reliability Standards development 
process may choose to allow exceptions to this requirement for 
technical infeasibility, consistent with the Commission's determination 
on technical feasibility above. However, the responsible entity should 
implement the requirements for software patches for all cyber assets 
within an electronic security perimeter or justify why it is not doing 
so pursuant to our discussion of technical feasibility exceptions.
b. Test Procedures
    601. Requirement R1 of CIP-007-1 requires a responsible entity to 
ensure that new cyber assets and significant changes to existing cyber 
assets within the electronic security perimeter do not adversely affect 
existing cyber security controls. Responsible entities must create, 
implement, and maintain cyber security test procedures in a manner that 
minimizes adverse effects on the production system and its operation. 
They must document that testing is performed in a manner that reflects 
the production environment and must document test results.
    602. The CIP Assessment suggested that Requirement R1.2 should 
require the responsible entity to document how each significant 
difference between the production and testing environments is 
considered and addressed.\140\
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    \140\ CIP Assessment at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    603. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that, if a testing 
environment does not accurately reflect the production environment, 
testing of systems may not be adequate to judge impacts on reliability. 
While, ideally, testing should be conducted on a precise duplicate of 
the production system, the Commission acknowledged that this is not 
always possible. When it is not, any differences between the test 
environment and the production system should be documented. Therefore, 
the Commission proposed to direct the ERO to modify Requirement R1 and 
its subparts to require documentation of each significant difference 
between the testing and the production environments, and how each such 
difference is mitigated or otherwise addressed.
i. Comments
    604. FirstEnergy argues that, while it is reasonable for the 
Commission to require documentation of significant differences between 
the testing and production environments, the Commission should clarify 
that it is not expecting that the differences themselves would be 
mitigated in the test--other than to simply get the test environment as 
close as possible to the production environment. The Commission should 
ensure that the documentation required to document the differences will 
not be burdensome.
    605. MidAmerican supports the proposal to document differences 
between the testing and production environments, but suggests that 
these differences not be reported for every test version, but only when 
the production and test environments are established.
    606. Northern Indiana maintains that the existence of any 
significant difference means the test will not reflect the production 
environment, which would violate Requirement R1.3. Further, Northern 
Indiana maintains that differences in testing and production 
environments may be difficult to eliminate or to mitigate. In a 
simulated test, differences will exist. Northern Indiana maintains that 
small differences should not require mitigation.
    607. Northern Indiana argues that documenting vulnerability test 
results or the existence of any mitigation or remediation plans would 
reveal any vulnerability on its system. Tampa Electric contends that 
this would produce an unnecessary administrative burden. It explains 
that there are instances when the production system is too large and 
complex to practically reproduce in a test environment. In this 
circumstance, according to Tampa Electric, documenting every detail 
would expend additional resources without producing useful information.
    608. ISO-NE and Northern Indiana ask for clarification of the term 
``significant difference'' in the CIP-007-1 proposal. ISO-NE states 
that the term significant difference is highly subjective and 
potentially burdensome without actually enhancing an entity's security 
posture.
ii. Commission Determination
    609. The Commission has discussed issues related to testing 
environments in CIP-005-1.\141\ In that context, the Commission 
clarifies the CIP NOPR proposal to require differences between the test 
environment and the production system to be documented. As stated with 
respect to CIP-005-1, the Commission understands that test systems do 
not need to exactly match or mirror the production system in order to 
provide useful test results. However, to perform active testing, the 
responsible entities should be required at a minimum to create a 
``representative system''--one that includes the essential equipment 
and adequately represents the functioning of the production system. We 
therefore direct the ERO to develop requirements addressing what 
constitutes a ``representative system'' and to modify CIP-007-1 
accordingly. The Commission directs the ERO to consider providing 
further guidance on testing systems in a reference document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ Section II.H.4.d, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    610. Consistent with our action in CIP-005-1, the Commission will 
not at this time require documentation of each difference between the 
testing and the production environments and how each such difference is 
mitigated or otherwise addressed. In using the term mitigation, our 
goal was to ensure that each responsible entity understands the

[[Page 7428]]

differences between its representative system and the production system 
and how those differences might affect its test results. The Commission 
believes that, as a part of this documentation, the responsible entity 
should also document how any test results might differ from the testing 
system to the production system and how the responsible entity accounts 
for such differences in operating the system. Therefore, we direct the 
ERO to revise the Reliability Standard to require each responsible 
entity to document differences between testing and production 
environments in a manner consistent with the discussion above. Such 
revision should address what types of differences must be documented. 
The entities remain responsible, however, to ensure that the testing 
systems are adequate to model the production systems and to document 
and account for the differences between the two.
    611. With respect to MidAmerican's proposal that the differences 
between the testing and production environments only be reported when 
the production and test environments are established, the ERO should 
consider this matter in the Reliability Standards development process. 
However, the Commission cautions that certain changes to a production 
or test environment might make the differences between the two greater 
and directs the ERO to take this into account when developing guidance 
on when to require updated documentation to ensure that there are no 
significant gaps between what is tested and what is in production.
    612. The Commission understands Northern Indiana's concern that 
documenting vulnerability test results or any mitigation or remediation 
plans may reveal system vulnerabilities. The ERO should alleviate this 
concern by providing for such reports to be reviewed under the 
confidentiality provisions of its Rules of Procedure.
c. Malicious Software Prevention
    613. Requirement R4 of CIP-007-1 requires responsible entities to 
use antivirus and other malicious software prevention tools where 
technically feasible, and allowing an acceptance of risk option. The 
Requirement and its subparts do not provide direction on how to 
implement this type of protection, where it should be deployed, or what 
care must be taken to implement and test malicious code protection in 
order to avoid harm to the production system.
    614. The Commission proposed to direct the ERO to eliminate the 
acceptance of risk language from Requirement R4.2, and also attach the 
same documentation and reporting requirements to the use of technical 
feasibility in Requirement R4, pertaining to malicious software 
prevention, as elsewhere. The Commission discussed the issues of 
defense in depth, technical feasibility, and risk acceptance elsewhere 
in the CIP NOPR and applied those conclusions here. The Commission 
further proposed to direct the ERO to modify Requirement R4 to include 
safeguards against personnel introducing, either maliciously or 
unintentionally, viruses or malicious software into a cyber asset 
within the electronic security perimeter through remote access, 
electronic media, or other means.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See CIP NOPR at P 240-44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments
    615. Consumers argues that requiring antivirus software on every 
system in the electronic security perimeter that uses a routable 
protocol would not be warranted. In Consumers' view, requiring such 
software on a blanket basis would itself lead to reliability problems. 
Thus, Consumers argues that only those systems that are vulnerable to 
this type of threat should require protection under this guideline.
    616. In this regard, Consumers argues that many operating systems, 
like the UNIX operating server systems, switches and bridges, may be 
critical cyber assets. But they are not directly vulnerable to virus 
attacks and need not be protected by antivirus applications. In 
corporate environments, UNIX servers do require antivirus and malware 
protection, since they use hyper text transfer protocol and e-mail 
services which can make them infected carriers. However, there are no 
instances in control system environments requiring any such protection.
    617. Consumers concedes that network infrastructure devices that 
are not directly targeted can be affected as collateral damage. But, it 
argues, some of the critical cyber assets do not have any mechanism for 
antivirus installation. Finally, Consumers argues that the Commission 
should promote the idea of perimeter defense, using firewall based 
content vulnerability security devices to protect the control systems' 
electronic security perimeter rather than application of antivirus 
software to every critical cyber asset.
    618. MidAmerican asks the Commission to clarify the intent of the 
proposal that Requirement R4 be modified to include safeguards against 
personnel introducing, maliciously or unintentionally, viruses or 
malicious software to a cyber asset. Northern Indiana believes that 
systems and protections are in place to prevent unintentional actions 
affecting a cyber asset. It states that there are no safeguards that 
protect against all malicious or unintentional acts. Juniper recommends 
that network-based antivirus and intrusion prevention devices be 
mentioned as minimum requirement for such safeguards against 
unintentional introduction of malware by authorized personnel.
ii. Commission Determination
    619. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal with regard to 
CIP-007-1, Requirement R4. Issues concerning technical feasibility and 
acceptance of risk are discussed above.
    620. The Commission will not adopt Consumers' recommendation that 
every system in an electronic security perimeter does not need 
antivirus software. Critical cyber assets must be protected, regardless 
of the operating system being used. Consumers has not provided 
convincing evidence that any specific operating system is not directly 
vulnerable to virus attacks. Virus technology changes every day. 
Therefore we believe it is in the public interest to protect all cyber 
assets within an electronic security perimeter, regardless of the 
operating system being used. Further, as Consumers admits, any network 
infrastructure devices that are not directly targeted can be affected 
as collateral damage.
    621. While we agree that no safeguard will protect against all 
malicious or unintentional acts, this does not mean that systems should 
not be protected against such acts. In response to MidAmerican, the 
Commission believes that details regarding how to safeguard systems 
against personnel introducing, maliciously or unintentionally, viruses 
or malicious software to a cyber asset are best developed in the 
Reliability Standards development process. The revised Reliability 
Standard does not need to prescribe a single method for protecting 
against the introduction of viruses or malicious software to a cyber 
asset by personnel. However, how a responsible entity does this should 
be detailed in its cyber security policy so that it can be audited for 
compliance with the Reliability Standard. The Reliability Standards 
development process should decide the degree to which the revised CIP-
007-1 describes how an entity should protect against personnel 
introducing viruses or malicious software to a cyber asset. The ERO 
could also provide additional guidance in a reference document.

[[Page 7429]]

    622. Therefore, the Commission directs the ERO to eliminate the 
acceptance of risk language from Requirement R4.2, and also attach the 
same documentation and reporting requirements to the use of technical 
feasibility in Requirement R4, pertaining to malicious software 
prevention, as elsewhere. The Commission also directs the ERO to modify 
Requirement R4 to include safeguards against personnel introducing, 
either maliciously or unintentionally, viruses or malicious software to 
a cyber asset within the electronic security perimeter through remote 
access, electronic media, or other means, consistent with our 
discussion above.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Security Status Monitoring
    623. Requirement R6 of CIP-007-1 requires responsible entities to 
ensure that all cyber assets within the electronic security perimeter, 
as technically feasible, implement automated tools or organizational 
process controls to monitor system events that are related to cyber 
security. Among other things, a responsible entity must maintain logs 
of system events related to cyber security, where technically feasible, 
to support incident response as required in Reliability Standard CIP-
008-1. Logs must be retained for 90 calendar days, and the responsible 
entity must review logs of system events related to cyber security and 
maintain records documenting review of logs.
    624. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that logs should be 
reviewed with the frequency necessary to ensure timely identification 
of a cyber security incident. We noted that this issue of log review 
touches on Blackout Report Recommendation 35, which addresses network 
monitoring, and Recommendation 37 which addresses diagnostic 
capabilities.\144\ The Commission therefore proposed to direct the ERO 
to revise Requirement R6 to include a requirement that logs be reviewed 
on a weekly basis for readily accessible critical assets and reviewed 
within the retention period for assets that are not readily accessible. 
We stated that this direction should be completed consistent with our 
discussion above regarding ``readily accessible'' assets.\145\ The CIP 
NOPR stated that accessibility should take into account both physical 
remoteness and available communications channels. We stated that we 
would expect control centers to fall within the ``readily accessible'' 
category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ See Blackout Report at 165-66, Recommendations 35 and 37.
    \145\ See section II.B.4.c (Monitoring Access Logs) in the CIP 
NOPR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    625. The Commission also proposed to direct the ERO to revise 
Requirement R6.4 to clarify that while the retention period for all 
logs specified in Requirement R6 is 90 days, the retention period for 
logs mentioned in Requirement R6.3 for the support of incident response 
as required in CIP-008-1 is the retention period required by CIP-008-1, 
i.e., three years. The Commission maintained that Requirement R6.4 is 
somewhat unclear and could be read to suggest that the 90 day period 
also applies to logs kept for purposes of CIP-008-1, and such an 
interpretation would conflict with the Requirements of that Reliability 
Standard.
i. Comments
    626. Similar to the concerns raised with regard to the log review 
requirement in CIP-005-1, commenters generally oppose the Commission's 
proposal to include a requirement that logs be reviewed on a weekly 
basis for readily accessible critical assets and reviewed within the 
retention period for assets that are not readily accessible. Northern 
Indiana, FPL Group, Idaho Power, MidAmerican, Entergy and SPP raise the 
same concerns as they did with respect to CIP-005-1. MidAmerican and 
Northern Indiana request clarification of the term ``readily 
accessible'' to facilitate compliance. Northern Indiana also requests 
clarification of what is meant by the reference to forensics and how 
data would be used in forensic investigations.
    627. Juniper argues that it is crucial that logs be maintained for 
at least three years to allow analysis to detect behavioral anomalies 
and perform forensics in case of a successful attack. It argues that 
any device that is network enabled in the broadest sense must be 
considered readily accessible, and its logs ought to be checked at 
least daily.
ii. Commission Determination
    628. Requirement R6 of CIP-007-1 does not address the frequency 
with which logs should be reviewed. Requirement R6.4 requires logs to 
be retained for 90 calendar days. This allows a situation where logs 
would only be reviewed 90 days after they are created. The Commission 
continues to believe that, in general, logs should be reviewed at least 
weekly and therefore adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to require the ERO to 
modify CIP-007-1 to require logs to be reviewed more frequently than 90 
days, but leaves it to the Reliability Standards development process to 
determine the appropriate frequency, given our clarification below, 
similar to our action with respect to CIP-005-1.\146\ Also, at this 
time, the Commission does not believe that it is necessary to require 
responsible entities to maintain all logs for at least three years, as 
requested by Juniper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ In our findings on CIP-005-1, we directed the ERO to 
modify CIP-005-1 through the Reliability Standards development 
process to require manual review of logs without alerts in shorter 
than 90 day increments. In addition, the Commission directed the ERO 
to modify CIP-005-1 to require some manual review of logs even if 
alerts are employed on the logs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    629. For the reasons discussed in CIP-005-1, in directing manual 
log review, the Commission does not require that every log be reviewed 
in its entirety. Instead, the Commission will allow a manual review of 
a sampling of log entries or sorted or filtered logs. The Commission 
recognizes that how a responsible entity determines what sample to 
review may not be the same for all locations. Therefore, the revised 
Reliability Standard does not need to prescribe a single method for 
producing the log sampling. However, how a responsible entity performs 
this sample review should be detailed in its cyber security policy so 
that it can be audited to determine compliance with the Reliability 
Standards. The Reliability Standards development process should decide 
the degree to which the revised CIP-007-1 describes acceptable log 
sampling. The ERO could also provide additional guidance on how to 
create the sampling of log entries, which could be in a reference 
document. The final review process, however, must be rigorous enough to 
enable the entity to detect intrusions by attackers.
    630. In response to Northern Indiana, the Commission discusses our 
use of the term forensics in our discussion of CIP-009-1.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ See section II.H.8.b, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Disposal or Redeployment
    631. Requirement R7 of CIP-007-1 requires the responsible entity to 
establish formal methods, processes and procedures for disposal or 
redeployment of cyber assets. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission addressed 
the concern that solely to ``erase the data,'' as stated several times 
in Requirement R7, may not be adequate because technology exists that 
allows retrieval of ``erased'' data from storage devices, and that 
effective protection requires discarded or redeployed assets to undergo 
high

[[Page 7430]]

quality degaussing.\148\ We noted that erasure is as much a method as 
it is a goal, and that the requirement ultimately needs to assure that 
there is no opportunity for unauthorized retrieval of data from a cyber 
asset prior to discarding it or redeploying it. Degaussing is not the 
sole means for achieving this goal. The Commission therefore proposed 
to direct the ERO to modify Requirement R7 to clarify this point.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ See CIP Assessment at 34-35. To degauss is to demagnetize. 
Degaussing a magnetic storage medium removes all data stored on it.
    \149\ See CIP NOPR at P 253-56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments
    632. Northern Indiana states that the CIP NOPR is unclear what 
needs to be clarified in Requirement R7. Northern Indiana believes the 
only way to allow ``no opportunity'' to access data on storage media is 
to destroy the media. Northern Indiana states that it takes costly 
measures to erase data storage tapes and other storage media and 
follows the requirements of the United States Department of Defense, 
performing a seven-layer wipe of its storage media. Northern Indiana 
maintains that, if the clarification sought by the Commission is 
intended to direct NERC to be more prescriptive about erasure, Northern 
Indiana states that its cost of compliance will rise because failed 
disk devices could no longer be returned to manufacturers for 
replacement without destruction of the drive. Manufacturer warranties 
will no longer be effective after the storage media is destroyed. 
Requirement R7 as written is sufficiently broad and can apply to 
numerous media types. In addition, adherence to Department of Defense 
requirements should be adequate.
ii. Commission Determination
    633. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to clarify what it means to prevent unauthorized retrieval of data from 
a cyber asset prior to discarding it or redeploying it. The Commission 
notes that there is a difference between redeploying an asset and 
discarding it. Redeploying an asset within the same responsible entity 
allows that responsible entity to maintain control over the asset, 
whereas disposing of an asset places it out of the control of the 
responsible entity. The Commission believes that, while the seven layer 
wipe described by Northern Indiana may be sufficient for redeployment 
because the responsible entity maintains control over the cyber asset, 
it is not sufficient for disposing of an asset.
    634. The Commission disagrees with Northern Indiana that the only 
way to allow no opportunity to access data on storage media is to 
destroy the media. As stated in the CIP NOPR, high quality degaussing 
can adequately protect media from unauthorized access. Northern Indiana 
has not provided information that convinces the Commission that a cyber 
asset would have to be destroyed in order to prevent access.
    635. Therefore, the Commission directs the ERO to revise 
Requirement R7 of CIP-007-1 to clarify, consistent with this 
discussion, what it means to prevent unauthorized retrieval of data.
f. Cyber Vulnerability Assessment
    636. Requirement R8 of CIP-007-1 requires a responsible entity to 
perform a cyber vulnerability assessment of all cyber assets within the 
electronic security perimeter at least annually. Requirement R8.4 
requires development of an action plan to remediate or mitigate 
vulnerabilities identified in the assessment, but it does not provide a 
timeframe for completion of the action plan.
    637. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated its belief that 
vulnerability testing is a valuable tool in determining whether actions 
that were taken to shore up the security posture of the electronic 
security perimeter and other areas of responsibility are in fact 
adequate.\150\ We noted that the Blackout Report recognized the 
importance of vulnerability assessments in Recommendation 38, which 
called for vulnerability assessment activities to identify weaknesses 
and mitigating actions.\151\ Recognizing that a poorly chosen 
vulnerability assessment process could result in a false sense of 
security, the direction provided by this Requirement is important. The 
Commission noted that monitoring execution status is a good means to 
keep the action plan on track. Therefore, the Commission proposed to 
direct the ERO to provide more direction on what features, 
functionality, and vulnerabilities the responsible entities should 
address when conducting the vulnerability assessments, and to revise 
Requirement R8.4 to require an entity-imposed timeline for completion 
of the already-required action plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ See id. P 257-60.
    \151\ See Blackout Report at 167, Recommendation 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments
    638. MidAmerican supports the proposal to require the ERO to 
provide additional direction surrounding the vulnerability assessments 
conducted by the responsible entities, and to revise Requirement R8.4 
to require an entity-imposed timeline for completion of an action plan, 
for the reasons articulated in the CIP NOPR.
    639. ISO-NE proposes that the Final Rule omit the Commission's 
proposal because, given the diversity of hardware and software 
implementation throughout the industry, providing more meaningful 
direction on ``features, functionality, and vulnerabilities'' is not 
feasible. In the view of ISO-NE, no Reliability Standard can evolve 
fast enough to keep-up with emerging and diverse technologies and newly 
discovered vulnerabilities. Therefore, ISO-NE requests that the 
Commission omit this proposal from the Final Rule.
    640. FPL Group and NRECA raise the same concerns about cyber 
vulnerability assessments as they did under CIP-005-1. Further, FPL 
Group states that, while specific directions may be appropriate with 
regard to certain Reliability Standards, the intent of this Reliability 
Standard is to determine whether there are vulnerabilities with regard 
to a specific system. In FPL Group's view, overly rigid guidance or 
requirements by the ERO could result in responsible entities failing to 
properly test for vulnerabilities specific to the entities' 
environments and systems, thus undermining the intent of the 
Reliability Standard.
    641. SDG&E agrees that a vulnerability assessment should look for 
and prioritize specific types of vulnerabilities, and provides specific 
suggestions on such prioritization.\152\ SDG&E comments that it should 
be recommended, but not required, that more than one tool should be 
used to find vulnerabilities.
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    \152\ SDG&E identifies: (1) As unacceptable risk, 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited remotely without a user's 
cooperation to obtain access to the victim host; (2) as highly 
critical, vulnerabilities that can be exploited remotely but require 
the victim to take some action, such as open an attachment, to 
obtain access; (3) as medium critical, vulnerabilities that 
unnecessarily increase the attack surface of the victim host such as 
installed applications and unneeded running services; and (4) as low 
priority, vulnerabilities that provide potential attackers with 
reconnaissance information.
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    642. Northern Indiana states that the responsible entity should 
maintain the makeup and depth of any vulnerability or penetration tests 
it undertakes, and control the associated mitigation timeline it 
establishes to address the results of the tests. Northern Indiana

[[Page 7431]]

raises the same concerns about revealing its vulnerability test results 
as it did with respect to CIP-005-1
ii. Commission Determination
    643. The Commission adopts its proposal to direct the ERO to 
provide more direction on what features, functionality, and 
vulnerabilities the responsible entities should address when conducting 
the vulnerability assessments, and to revise Requirement R8.4 to 
require an entity-imposed timeline for completion of the already-
required action plan.
    644. The Commission agrees with ISO-NE that hardware and software 
is implemented in diverse ways throughout the industry, but does not 
believe that this renders providing guidance infeasible. We also agree 
that overly rigid guidance could result in responsible entities failing 
to properly test for vulnerabilities specific to the entities' 
environments and systems. The Commission does not believe that the 
revised Reliability Standard should be inflexible. It should encourage 
responsible entities to take into account emerging and diverse 
technologies and newly discovered vulnerabilities as they emerge. The 
Commission believes that it is appropriate to leave such guidance to 
the Reliability Standards development process. Further, we leave it to 
the ERO's discretion whether to put guidance in the revised Reliability 
Standard or a reference document.
    645. The Commission addressed Northern Indiana's concerns about 
revealing vulnerability test results in our discussion of CIP-005-1. We 
believe that the ERO's confidentiality provisions should adequately 
protect against unwanted disclosure of vulnerability test results.
 g. Documentation Review and Maintenance
    646. Requirement R9 of CIP-007-1 requires the responsible entity to 
review, update and maintain all documentation needed to support 
compliance with the Requirements of CIP-007-1 at least annually. 
Changes resulting from modifications to the systems or controls must be 
documented within 90 calendar days of the change.
    647. The Commission addressed concerns that the 90-day timeframe 
for updating documentation appears excessively long, especially given 
the context that this Reliability Standard establishes a significant 
line of defense for protecting critical cyber assets and that up-to-
date documentation is essential in case of an emergency. The Commission 
proposed to direct the ERO to modify Requirement R9 to state that the 
changes resulting from modifications to the system or controls shall be 
documented within a 30-day time period. We stated our belief that the 
planning and engineering of system and control modifications require 
sufficient lead time to enable the documentation of such modifications 
to take place within a 30-calendar-day timeframe.\153\
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    \153\ See CIP NOPR at P 261-63.
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i. Comments
    648. Northern Indiana, Mr. Brown and MidAmerican object to 
shortening the time allowed for documentation of modifications to the 
system or controls from 90 to 30 days. Northern Indiana argues that a 
90-day period provides flexibility in finalizing such documentation 
given the nature and type of facilities and their locations, 
particularly in light of the potential need for internal reviews and 
approvals by a number of people or groups of people before a 
documentation change can be effected. MidAmerican agrees that the 
proposed time line for required documentation may not be sufficient in 
all instances, particularly for remote locations that are relatively 
resource constrained.
    649. Mr. Brown objects to the proposal to reduce the filing period 
from 90 to 30 days for documenting changes resulting from modifications 
to the system or controls. He argues that, in many organizations that 
will be impossible, or at least extremely costly in staff time. He 
argues that this will simply lead to unnecessary, trivial instances of 
technical noncompliance. Thus, Mr. Brown argues that, while 90 days may 
be too long, a more appropriate, practical and achievable period would 
be 60 days.
    650. ISO-NE and SDG&E ask when the 30-day period begins. They 
request that the Final Rule direct the ERO to clarify for both CIP-007-
1 and CIP-009-1 that changes resulting from modifications to the 
systems, controls, and procedures shall be documented within 30 days of 
final implementation of the modifications. Juniper agrees that the 30-
day period should begin after the modifications are in place, i.e., 
accepted, tested, in production and running.
ii. Commission Determination
    651. The Commission adopts a modified version of the CIP NOPR 
proposal. We direct the ERO to revise Requirement R9 to state that the 
changes resulting from modifications to the system or controls shall be 
documented quicker than 90 calendar days. The Commission believes that 
30 days should provide sufficient time to update any necessary 
documentation with exceptions granted by the Regional Entity for 
extraordinary circumstances. The Commission believes that having 
correct documentation of methods, processes and procedures for securing 
a responsible entity's system is necessary because if an event occurred 
before documentation was updated, an operator may not know of a change 
and could operate the system using out of date information. This puts 
reliability at risk by not informing operators of a method, process or 
procedure to secure the system against a known risk. Therefore, the 
Commission believes that 90 days is too long to allow a responsible 
entity to have incorrect documentation. Thirty days should be 
sufficient time to update any necessary documentation.
    652. The Commission clarifies that the shorter period should begin 
upon final implementation of the modifications. The Commission believes 
that providing that the shorter period begins when the modifications 
are implemented satisfies Northern Indiana's concern about finalizing 
documentation and the potential need for internal reviews and 
approvals. By the time any modification is made, such approvals should 
already have been granted. Similarly, the Commission believes that 
MidAmerican's concern about resource constraints relate more to the 
implementation of a modification, not the documentation of that 
implementation. Once a modification is developed and implemented, 
documenting it should not consume significant time or resources.
7. CIP-008-1--Incident Reporting & Response Planning
    653. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-008-1 requires a responsible 
entity to identify, classify, respond to, and report cyber security 
incidents related to critical cyber assets. Specifically, Requirement 
R1 of CIP-008-1 requires responsible entities to develop and maintain 
an incident response plan that addresses responses to a cyber security 
incident. The plan should characterize and classify pertinent events as 
reportable cyber security incidents and provide corresponding response 
actions. The response actions should include: (1) The roles and 
responsibilities of the incident response teams; (2) procedures for 
handling incidents; and (3) associated communication plans. In 
addition, cyber security incidents must be reported to the Electricity 
Sector Information Sharing and Analysis

[[Page 7432]]

Center (ESISAC) either directly or through an intermediary. The 
incident response plan should be reviewed and tested at least annually. 
Changes to the incident response plan are to be documented within 90 
days. Responsible entities must retain documentation related to 
reportable cyber security incidents for a period of three years.
    654. The Commission approves Reliability Standard CIP-008-1 as 
mandatory and enforceable. In addition, we direct the ERO to develop 
modifications to this Reliability Standard. The required modifications 
are discussed below in the following topic areas of concern regarding 
CIP-008-1: (1) Definition of a reportable incident; (2) reporting; and 
(3) full operational exercises and lessons learned.
a. Definition of a Reportable Incident
    655. Requirement R1 of CIP-008-1 makes reference to reportable 
cyber security incidents, but it does not provide a definition of a 
``reportable incident.''
    656. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission recognized the risk that cyber 
security incidents may go unreported depending upon a responsible 
entity's interpretation of a reportable incident.\154\ We noted that 
the Blackout Report also pointed out the need for ``uniform standards 
for the reporting and sharing of physical and cyber security incident 
information'' in Recommendation 42.\155\ We recognized that the 
definition of a reportable incident is currently undergoing extensive 
industry debate, and stated that it could be a catalyst for developing 
an appropriate level of guidance. We concluded that it is possible to 
provide guidance regarding what should be included in the term 
reportable incident and proposed to direct the ERO to: (1) Develop and 
include in CIP-008-1 language that takes into account a breach that may 
occur through cyber or physical means; \156\ (2) harmonize, but not 
necessarily limit, the meaning of the term reportable incident with 
other reporting mechanisms, such as DOE Form OE 417; (3) recognize that 
the term should not be triggered by ineffectual and untargeted attacks 
that proliferate on the internet; and (4) ensure that the guidance 
language that is developed results in a Reliability Standard that can 
be audited and enforced.\157\
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    \154\ NERC's FAQ document answers the question of ``what is a 
reportable incident?'' by referencing definitions in the ESISAC 
Indications, Analysis, and Warnings Program guidelines document 
entitled ``Indications, Analysis and Warnings Program Standard 
Operating Procedure'' and the Department of Energy Form OE 417 
Report entitled ``Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance 
Report.'' However, since these materials are not incorporated into 
the proposed CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-008-1 remains ambiguous 
in this regard. North American Electric Reliability Council, 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Cybersecurity Standards CIP-002-1 
through CIP-009-1, March 6, 2006, page 27, question 1.
    \155\ See Blackout Report at 168, Recommendation 42.
    \156\ The Commission emphasized in the CIP NOPR that a cyber 
security incident that does not result in a material loss of 
physical assets should not prevent the incident from being reported.
    \157\ See CIP NOPR at P 267-70.
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i. Comments
    657. FirstEnergy, MidAmerican, Northern Indiana, ReliabilityFirst 
and SPP support the Commission's proposal that the ERO should provide 
guidance on the definition of reportable incident. Each also provides 
the Commission with input on how the term should be defined.
    658. ReliabilityFirst and SPP recommend that NERC, as the operator 
of the ESISAC, be directed to publish the reporting criteria and 
thresholds separately from the CIP Reliability Standards and to provide 
appropriate reporting mechanisms for that purpose. They maintain that 
this approach would allow the ERO to maintain maximum flexibility in 
times of emergency. They state that Reliability Standard CIP-008-1 
should then be modified to require entities to report incidents, both 
physical and cyber, that meet the criteria published by the ESISAC. For 
audit purposes, both SPP and ReliabilityFirst maintain that NERC should 
be required to maintain a three-year minimum change history for the 
published criteria and demonstrate that changes to the criteria were 
proactively announced and disseminated to all entities in a timely 
manner. By placing the reporting criteria in the CIP Reliability 
Standard itself, any changes would have to undergo the defined, lengthy 
Reliability Standards revision process and could impact the timely 
collection of information essential to the protection of the North 
America's critical infrastructure.
    659. MidAmerican supports the proposal to further define and 
clarify the definition and reporting requirements for an incident and 
including a breach that may occur through cyber or physical means in an 
incident report, when the breach meets the other requirements outlined 
for an electronic incident. FirstEnergy states that the Commission 
should require reportable incident to be defined as an incident report 
for a security breach that may occur through physical means. According 
to FirstEnergy, a reportable incident determination should consider the 
totality of circumstances surrounding a physical breach.\158\
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    \158\ For example, FirstEnergy states that, if it is apparent 
from an internal assessment of the breach that the intent of the 
perpetrator was not to gain access to cyber assets, then an incident 
report should not be required.
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ii. Commission Determination
    660. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to provide guidance regarding what should be included in the term 
reportable incident. In developing the guidance, the ERO should 
consider the specific examples provided by commenters, described above. 
However, we direct the ERO to develop and provide guidance on the term 
reportable incident. The Commission is not opposed to the suggestion 
that the ERO create a reference document containing the reporting 
criteria and thresholds and requiring responsible entities to comply 
with the reference document in the revised Reliability Standard CIP-
008-1, but will allow the ERO to determine the best method to 
accomplish the goal of better defining reportable incident.
    661. Therefore, the Commission directs the ERO to develop a 
modification to CIP-008-1 to: (1) Include language that takes into 
account a breach that may occur through cyber or physical means; (2) 
harmonize, but not necessarily limit, the meaning of the term 
reportable incident with other reporting mechanisms, such as DOE Form 
OE 417; (3) recognize that the term should not be triggered by 
ineffectual and untargeted attacks that proliferate on the internet; 
and (4) ensure that the guidance language that is developed results in 
a Reliability Standard that can be audited and enforced.\159\
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    \159\ See CIP NOPR at P 267-70.
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b. Reporting
    662. CIP-008-1, Requirement R1.3, requires each responsible entity 
to establish a process for reporting cyber security incidents to the 
ESISAC. The responsible entity must ensure that all reportable cyber 
security incidents are reported to the ESISAC either directly or 
through an intermediary. ESISAC procedures require the reporting of a 
cyber incident within one hour of a suspected malicious incident. 
However, compliance with ESISAC's Indications, Analysis and Warnings 
Program Standard Operating Procedure is voluntary.
    663. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission addressed concerns regarding 
the importance of responsible

[[Page 7433]]

entities receiving timely information about other entities' reportable 
cyber security incidents.\160\ Depending on the nature of the incident, 
timelines of incident reporting may be critical, which raised concern 
as to whether CIP-008-1 should incorporate ESISAC's one-hour reporting 
limit or another reporting interval that would provide adequate time 
for another responsible entity to take meaningful precautions. The 
Commission concluded that the ESISAC one-hour reporting limit is 
reasonable and proposed that it be incorporated into CIP-008-1.
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    \160\ See id. P 271-80.
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    664. The Commission proposed to direct the ERO to modify CIP-008-1 
to require each responsible entity to contact appropriate government 
authorities and industry participants in the event of a cyber security 
incident as soon as possible, but, in any event, within one hour of the 
event, even if it is a preliminary report. We left development of the 
details to the ERO, but stated our view that the reporting timeframe 
should run from the discovery of the incident by the responsible 
entity, and not the occurrence of the incident.
i. Comments
    665. The Texas PUC states that the Commission's proposal for a one-
hour reporting limit is reasonable if there is a uniform reporting 
form. The Texas PUC states that, if a cyber security attack affects 
several facilities, the one-hour reporting requirement would provide 
necessary information to other responsible entities that would allow 
them to take precautionary measures to protect their systems. Further, 
a uniform reporting form could be easily submitted to multiple 
agencies.
    666. FirstEnergy maintains that it would be appropriate to include 
the one-hour time frame for reporting cyber security incidents, but the 
Reliability Standard should specify that the one-hour time period 
applies from the time of the discovery of the event, which may include 
at least a preliminary investigation of the incident by the reporting 
entity. SDG&E asks for clarification that the one-hour time frame would 
commence when the responsible entity is made aware of the event, which 
could be later than actual occurrence.
    667. Northern California supports the Commission's recommendation 
that NERC modify Requirement R1.3 of CIP-008-1 to include a requirement 
that a cyber security incident be reported after the discovery of the 
incident. However, both NRECA and ReliabilityFirst state that the 
appropriate time for response should be addressed through the 
Reliability Standard development process.
    668. In contrast, Entergy, MidAmerican and Northern Indiana object 
to the one-hour reporting limit. Given the potential penalties involved 
for non-compliance, Entergy argues that the Commission should require 
reporting within one hour of discovery of the incident, whether or not 
the reason or cause is known, unless system restoration takes priority 
to ensure reliability. If system restoration is a priority, reporting 
should be performed within four to eight hours depending on the 
measures required for system restoration. Northern California agrees 
that the reporting requirement should contain exceptions to ensure 
entities that are focused on recovery are not punished. According to 
Northern California, these exceptions should be more than technical 
feasibility and should allow for the fact that, in a crisis, human 
beings tend to focus on solving the crisis.
    669. Entergy asks the ERO to clarify the relationship between CIP-
001-1, which requires the reporting of sabotage events, and CIP-008-1, 
which requires the reporting of cyber security incidents. Entergy notes 
that many responsible entities will be required to report an actual or 
suspected cyber or communication attack that causes major interruptions 
of electrical systems events to the U.S. Department of Energy on DOE 
Form OE 417. This report must be submitted within one hour after 
discovery of an actual attack or six hours after a suspected attack. It 
is not clear why this report, which may satisfy certain CIP-001-1 
requirements, would be submitted under a different timeline than any 
report required under CIP-008-1. Entergy believes that reporting for 
cyber security incidents should be coordinated as much as possible. 
Entergy suggests consideration of consolidating the requirements of 
CIP-001-1 and CIP-008-1.
    670. MidAmerican disagrees with the Commission's contention that a 
one-hour notification from discovery provides such probative value as 
to justify the burden involved. On the contrary, MidAmerican submits 
the more likely result will be to cause far too many false positives 
from preliminary reports. MidAmerican recommends that the Commission 
strike a more balanced approach--either extend the window to six to 
twelve hours from discovery or make it one hour from when it is 
classified.
    671. The California Commission maintains that the term appropriate 
government authorities should specify the exact authorities in each 
state. For example, it states that in California, power plants are 
subject to California Commission jurisdiction. Accordingly, California 
Commission argues that, for California, the term appropriate government 
authority should include the California Commission. Similarly, the 
Texas PUC states that, in Texas, the reports should be sent to NERC, 
the Texas PUC, the Texas Regional Entity and ERCOT. According to Texas 
PUC, this would not be unduly burdensome because only minimal changes 
would be needed to existing cyber security plans.
    672. FirstEnergy agrees that there is a need for uniformity for 
reporting and sharing of physical and cyber security incident 
information. In this regard, FirstEnergy argues that NERC should adopt 
the DOE reporting mechanism, DOE Form OE 417, rather than create a new 
mechanism. On this same topic, Applied Control Solutions comments that 
NIST, FIPS PUB 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal 
Information and Information Systems, should be used to make this 
report.
ii. Commission Determination
    673. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to modify CIP-008-1 to require each responsible entity to contact 
appropriate government authorities and industry participants in the 
event of a cyber security incident as soon as possible, but, in any 
event, within one hour of the event, even if it is a preliminary 
report. As stated in the CIP NOPR, the reporting timeframe should run 
from the discovery of the incident by the responsible entity, and not 
the occurrence of the incident.\161\
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    \161\ Id. P 280.
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    674. Most commenters are concerned with the burden placed on a 
responsible entity to report an incident when system restoration should 
take precedence. As stated in the CIP NOPR, while the Commission agrees 
that, in the aftermath of a cyber attack, restoring the system is the 
utmost priority, we do not believe that sending this short report would 
be a time consuming distraction, and we judge that its probative value 
would justify the minimal time spent in making this report. In this 
respect, the Commission now clarifies that the responsible entity does 
not need to initially send a full report of the incident. Rather, to 
report to appropriate government authorities and industry participants 
within one hour, it would be sufficient to simply communicate a 
preliminary report, including the time and nature of the incident and 
whatever

[[Page 7434]]

useful preliminary information is available at the time. This could be 
accomplished by a phone call or another method. The responsible entity 
could then follow up with a full report once the system is restored.
    675. With respect to the arguments by California Commission and 
Texas PUC concerning the term appropriate government authorities, we 
believe this determination should be made through the Reliability 
Standards development process.
    676. Thus, the Commission directs the ERO to modify CIP-008-1 to 
require a responsible entity to, at a minimum, notify the ESISAC and 
appropriate government authorities of a cyber security incident as soon 
as possible, but, in any event, within one hour of the event, even if 
it is a preliminary report. The Reliability Standard development 
process should consider whether the ESISAC could act as an intermediary 
to promptly notify government authorities for responsible entities. 
While we expect the modified Reliability Standard to be consistent with 
our discussion above, we leave development of the details of how to 
report incidents while not burdening the recovery process to the 
Reliability Standards development process.
    677. With respect to Entergy's question about the relationship 
between CIP-001-1 and CIP-008-1, the ERO should consider Entergy's 
concerns in the Reliability Standards development process. However, the 
Commission notes that, while CIP-001-1 requires the reporting of 
sabotage events, CIP-008-1 requires the reporting of all cyber security 
incidents. Not all cyber security incidents will be caused by sabotage, 
so not all incidents required to be reported under CIP-008-1 will be 
required to be reported under CIP-001-1.
c. Full Operational Exercises and Lessons Learned
    678. Requirement R1.5 of CIP-008-1 requires the responsible entity 
to maintain a process to ensure that the cyber security incident 
response plan is reviewed at least annually. Requirement R1.6 requires 
a process to ensure that the response plan is tested at least annually, 
and that such tests can range from a paper drill, a full operational 
exercise, or the response to an actual incident. CIP-008-1 does not 
require documentation or reassessment of a plan's adequacy as a result 
of lessons learned from testing or in response to specific issues.
    679. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission addressed questions of whether 
the annual testing of the incident response plan should require full 
operational exercises due to the potential for such exercises to 
uncover unforeseen complications, and whether prospective benefits 
would balance attendant costs.\162\
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    \162\ See id. P 281-87.
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    680. We recognized that annual testing may be costly and 
disruptive, but also that periodic operational drills are important 
because they may reveal weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and opportunity 
for improvement that a paper drill alone would not identify. The 
Commission stated its view that a full operational exercise should be 
performed at least once every three years, and that tabletop exercises 
are sufficient for the other two years, believing that this arrangement 
strikes an appropriate balance between the benefits of executing an 
operational exercise and the associated costs and potential risks of 
disruptions. Therefore, the Commission proposed to direct the ERO to 
revise the Reliability Standard to require responsible entities to 
perform a ``full operational exercise'' at least once every three 
years, or to fully document its reason for not conducting an exercise 
in full operational mode pursuant to the parameters used elsewhere for 
technical feasibility exceptions. Further, the Commission proposed to 
direct the ERO to provide guidance on the meaning of the term ``full 
operational exercise.'' \163\
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    \163\ The meaning of the term ``full operational exercise'' is 
addressed below.
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    681. The Commission stated that industry will benefit from a 
requirement to document and implement lessons learned from testing or 
responses to actual cyber security incidents. While such information 
may be included in the ``update'' language of Requirement R1.4, we 
believe that CIP-008-1 would be improved by making a ``lessons 
learned'' requirement explicit. Therefore, the Commission proposed to 
direct the ERO to refine CIP-008-1, Requirement R2 to require 
responsible entities to maintain documentation of paper drills, full 
operational drills, and responses to actual incidents, all of which 
must include lessons learned. The Commission also proposed to direct 
the ERO to include language to require revisions to the incident 
response plan to address these lessons learned.
i. Comments
    682. MidAmerican supports the Commission's change to a three-year 
testing cycle, as long as a full operational exercise doesn't require 
the asset be taken out of service. MidAmerican argues that the risk to 
reliability by performing a full operational exercise on a live system 
seems to outweigh the benefits. MidAmerican states that, while many 
EMS/SCADA systems are implemented with redundant failover systems that 
facilitate recovery exercises, this may not be the case for all 
equipment/systems at control centers, substations and/or plants. 
MidAmerican argues that taking equipment out of service during these 
exercises could result in an unexpected impact to reliability. 
MidAmerican also supports the proposal to refine the Reliability 
Standard to require complete documentation and a lessons learned 
section for the reasons articulated in the CIP NOPR.
    683. Idaho Power requests that the Commission not include the 
proposed requirements for full operational exercises in the Final Rule. 
Idaho Power believes that testing should only be performed on a test 
platform. The risk to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System 
outweighs the perceived benefit of this type of testing. With adequate 
test plans, trained and qualified personnel, and a regimented change 
management process, Idaho Power believes adequate protection is in 
place without additional modifications to the standard.
    684. Entergy also disagrees with the proposed requirement to 
perform a full operational cyber exercise involving operational 
systems. This is a formula for unnecessary risk to reliability of the 
control systems used to operate the grid. There is a wide and permuted 
range of potential incident types that would need to be simulated in a 
full exercise, and the response to different incidents can literally 
mean disconnecting control system elements from the network to which 
they are attached--while in production operation. This is perhaps the 
most challenging of all the CIP Reliability Standards to address in 
practice, and in the absence of a representative identical parallel 
test suite of equipment upon which to conduct the exercises, the 
reasonableness of such testing is questionable. Entergy believes that 
the industry should not be required to perform tests in a real time 
production command and control system--the potential risks outweigh the 
potential value.
    685. SoCal Edison states that it conducts numerous operational 
tests and drills and requests clarification that drills conducted under 
CIP-008-1 can be coordinated with other operational tests currently in 
place.
ii. Commission Determination
    686. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to

[[Page 7435]]

modify CIP-008-1, Requirement R2 to require responsible entities to 
maintain documentation of paper drills, full operational drills, and 
responses to actual incidents, all of which must include lessons 
learned. The Commission further directs the ERO to include language in 
CIP-008-1 to require revisions to the incident response plan to address 
these lessons learned.
    687. In light of the comments received, the Commission clarifies 
that, with respect to full operational testing under CIP-008-1, such 
testing need not require a responsible entity to remove any systems 
from service. The Commission understands that use of the term full 
operational exercise in this context can be confusing. We interpret the 
priority of the testing required by this provision to be that planned 
response actions are exercised in reference to a presumed or 
hypothetical incident contemplated by the cyber security response plan, 
and not necessarily that the presumed incident is performed on the live 
system. A responsible entity should assume a certain type of incident 
had occurred, and then ensure that its employees take what action would 
be required under the response plan, given the hypothetical incident. A 
responsible entity must ensure that it is properly identifying 
potential incidents as physical or cyber and contacting the appropriate 
government, law enforcement or industry authorities. CIP-008-1 should 
require a responsible entity to verify the list of entities that must 
be called pursuant to its cyber security incident response plan and 
that the contact numbers at those agencies are correct. The ERO should 
clarify this in the revised Reliability Standard and may use a term 
different than full operational exercise.\164\
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    \164\ Because the use of the term full operational exercise in 
CIP-009-1 appears to have different implications for the testing 
environment, we encourage the development of a different term here 
in CIP-008-1.
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8. CIP-009-1--Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets
    688. The purpose of proposed Reliability Standard CIP-009-1 is to 
ensure that recovery plans for critical cyber assets are in place and 
following established business continuity and disaster recovery 
techniques and practices. This Reliability Standard requires the 
development, updating, and testing of recovery plans, as well as 
storage and testing of associated backup data and backup media.
    689. The Commission approves Reliability Standard CIP-009-1 as 
mandatory and enforceable. In addition, we direct the ERO to develop 
modifications to CIP-009-1 through the Reliability Standards 
development process. Further, the Commission also requires the ERO to 
consider various other matters of clarification, guidance, and 
modification. The required modifications are discussed below in the 
following topic areas of concern regarding CIP-009-1: (1) Recovery 
plans; (2) forensic data collection; (3) operational exercises; (4) 
updating recovery plans; (5) backup and storage of restoration data and 
(6) testing of backup media.
a. Recovery Plans
    690. Requirement R1 of CIP-009-1 requires the responsible entity to 
create and annually review recovery plans for critical cyber assets. 
Requirement R1.1 requires specification of response to ``events or 
conditions of varying duration and severity that would activate the 
recovery plan(s).''
    691. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission recognized that the 
Requirement R1.1 language is very general and does not provide or 
require a definition of what constitutes a precipitating event or 
triggering condition necessary for recovery plan implementation. We 
stated our concern that precipitating events should be readily 
recognized by responsible entities so that recovery plans are promptly 
implemented, but declined to propose modifications of the events and 
conditions language at this time.\165\
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    \165\ See CIP NOPR at P 291-93.
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    692. We also noted that Requirement R1 does not specifically 
require implementation of a recovery plan because it requires that 
recovery plans must be created and reviewed but does not explicitly 
require actual implementation when the events or conditions occur. The 
Commission proposed to direct the ERO to modify CIP-009-1 to include 
this requirement. We stated that, in the interim period, the Commission 
will infer that implementation is embodied in this Requirement when 
enforcing it, i.e., if an entity has the required recovery plan but 
does not implement it when the anticipated event or conditions occur, 
the entity will not be in compliance with this Reliability Standard.
i. Comments
    693. MidAmerican supports the proposal to explicitly require the 
implementation of plans required in this Reliability Standard for the 
reasons articulated in the CIP NOPR. This issue also has arisen with 
regard to other Reliability Standards.
ii. Commission Determination
    694. For the reasons discussed in the CIP NOPR, the Commission 
adopts the proposal to direct the ERO to modify CIP-009-1 to include a 
specific requirement to implement a recovery plan. We further adopt the 
proposal to enforce this Reliability Standard such that, if an entity 
has the required recovery plan but does not implement it when the 
anticipated event or conditions occur, the entity will not be in 
compliance with this Reliability Standard.
b. Forensic Data Collection
    695. Requirement R1 of CIP-009-1, in requiring recovery plans, does 
not require the collection of forensics data and does not address how 
such collection activities relate to restoration of service efforts.
    696. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission stated that concern for the 
reliability of the Bulk-Power System requires attention to forensics 
data collection, and noted that the Blackout Report also emphasized the 
need to improve forensics and diagnostic capabilities in Recommendation 
37.\166\ We explained that obtaining forensic data will benefit the 
long-term reliability of the Bulk-Power System because the lessons 
learned from one event assist in eliminating or dealing with a repeat 
or similar event. We noted that forensic data collection procedures 
could be as minimal as preserving a corrupted drive, making a data 
mirror of the system before proceeding with recovery, or taking the 
important assessment steps necessary to avoid reintroducing the 
precipitating or corrupted data. The Commission proposed to direct the 
ERO to modify CIP-009-1 to incorporate use of good forensic data 
collection practices and procedures into this Reliability Standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ See Blackout Report at 166, Recommendation 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    697. We acknowledged that recovery of critical cyber assets and the 
Bulk-Power System is of short-term critical importance, and information 
collection efforts should not impede or restrict system restoration, 
but emphasized that it is also important to long-term reliability 
interests that responsible entities make solid forensic efforts in a 
given situation, such as collecting the data immediately after system 
restoration or the recovery of critical cyber assets, if that is what 
can be done. We recognize that collecting forensic

[[Page 7436]]

data may not be technically feasible for all situations due to 
equipment limitations, such as some legacy systems or older substation 
installations with little electronic monitoring. Therefore, the 
Commission suggested that it may be appropriate to allow a technical 
feasibility exception for forensic data collection where, if invoked, 
the responsible entity would be required to propose interim actions, 
milestone schedules, and a mitigation plan, the same as required by 
other instances of the clause. Also, we proposed to direct the ERO, 
when incorporating the use of good forensic data collection practices 
into this Reliability Standard, to make clear that such practices 
should not impede or restrict system restoration and to consider 
whether it is necessary to include a technical feasibility 
provision.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ See CIP NOPR at P 294-98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments
    698. NERC, SPP, ReliabilityFirst, Alliant, Arizona Public Service, 
Entergy, Idaho Power and Manitoba argue that the term forensics in 
other arenas conveys concepts of scientific rigor and chain of custody 
to assure that data are not tampered with in a legal proceeding. None 
of these are conducive to rapidly restoring service, or to maintaining 
or enhancing reliable operations of an already failed component. Thus, 
NERC, ReliabilityFirst and Idaho Power argue that this term should be 
removed from the Final Rule and replaced with the phrase ``data 
collection for post-event analysis, where technically feasible.'' 
Alliant agrees with NERC.
    699. NERC believes that the Commission's intent would be better 
served through the development of a guideline concerning how data 
collection and analysis should be performed to determine causes of 
failures. NERC, the Commission and the responsible entities could then 
work together to engage control system vendors and manufacturers to 
develop and implement changes to their products to more readily allow 
the collection of high quality cyber event data, that can be used 
together with operational data to better understand the specific events 
which caused the outage or failure leading up to the need to invoke the 
incident response plan. NERC argues that the vendor community is in the 
best position to develop these toolsets, because, in most cases, both 
hardware and software modifications would be required to allow the 
rapid and efficient collection of quality data. Further, NERC argues 
that technical criteria will need to be developed to allow different 
manufacturers to generate such event log data in a common format for 
analysis. Equipment vendors need to be involved in these technical 
criteria and product development efforts, not the ERO-jurisdictional 
responsible entities. Idaho Power recommends that the ERO or Regional 
Entities develop and support work groups to address the latest 
technologies and methods to alleviate and address the Commission's 
concerns. Alliant agrees with NERC that these modifications should be 
effectuated through the Commission-approved Reliability Standards 
development process.
    700. ISO-NE agrees in part with NERC's comments on the proposal to 
include a reference and requirements regarding the collection of 
forensic data. Further, forensic analysis is a skill used in the 
analysis of security incident data, the retention of which for three 
years is already addressed in CIP-008-1 for incident response. Also, 
ISO-NE states that CIP-005-1, CIP-006-1 and CIP-007-1 already require 
the retention of log data to support initial monitoring, analysis, and 
alerting of identified security incidents.
    701. ISO-NE asserts that the broad-brush use of the term forensic 
data in the Blackout Report included all reliability incident data for 
post incident analysis. The scope is clear that these Reliability 
Standards are limited to cyber security incidents, and not all 
operational incidents impacting reliability. Therefore, ISO-NE believes 
the Reliability Standards already address this topic adequately, and it 
is therefore not appropriate to include in CIP-009-1. ISO-NE requests 
that any direction to the ERO regarding further collection of forensic 
data, or other operational reliability incident data, be omitted.
    702. Entergy argues that forensic procedures can be quite 
complicated and situation dependent. Entergy argues that, if this CIP 
Reliability Standard is to be rewritten, it should be limited to the 
statement that ``use of good forensic data collection practices should 
be employed.'' Separate guidance could be included in ancillary 
advisory documents, such as those already available from NIST and 
various law enforcement authorities.
    703. SoCal Edison and Northern Indiana are concerned that forensic 
data collection practices may hinder efforts to restore Bulk-Power 
System functionality. SoCal Edison believes that there may be impacts 
to restoration timeliness as well as additional personnel and hardware 
required if collection of forensics data are mandated.
    704. NRECA believes that restoring service and reliability after an 
outage or other event must be the primary concern, and the need to 
preserve evidence should not compromise that objective. In some cases, 
both objectives can be achieved, and in other cases they cannot. 
Operating personnel should have the flexibility to make appropriate 
determinations as long as they can provide a reasonable explanation for 
their actions, without being exposed to penalties. In any event, it is 
difficult to reconcile the Commission's statutory authority to approve 
or remand Reliability Standards with a forensics requirement, which is 
not itself a Reliability Standard. The ERO, through its Reliability 
Standards development process, should be allowed to revisit the issue 
of what priority should be afforded to forensics without having a 
specific outcome dictated by the Commission.
    705. MidAmerican suggests that the Commission substitute a 
reference to the National Institute of Justice's Forensic Data 
guideline, in lieu of the reference to ``good forensic data 
collection.''
ii. Commission Determination
    706. The Commission adopts, with clarification, the CIP NOPR 
proposal to direct the ERO to modify CIP-009-1 to incorporate use of 
good forensic data collection practices and procedures into this CIP 
Reliability Standard. The Commission continues to believe that it is 
important to long-term reliability interests that responsible entities 
collect data in certain situations, such as immediately after system 
restoration or the recovery of critical cyber assets. In response to 
ISO-NE, the Commission does not believe that the requirement to keep 
log data contained in other CIP Reliability Standards is sufficient. As 
we stated in the CIP NOPR, the data collection procedures could include 
preserving a corrupted drive, making a data mirror of the system before 
proceeding with recovery, or taking the important assessment steps 
necessary to avoid reintroducing the precipitating or corrupted data. 
None of this is required in the Reliability Standards cited by ISO-NE.
    707. The Commission used the term forensic because that is the term 
used in the Blackout Report. However, the Commission clarifies that it 
does not intend, as suggested by commenters, that the Reliability 
Standard impose the extent of scientific rigor or chain of custody 
required in criminal procedure. Rather, the Commission is concerned 
with responsible entities preserving the

[[Page 7437]]

data necessary to determine the cause of any problem with the system.
    708. In response to Entergy, NRECA, SoCal Edison and Northern 
Indiana, recovery of critical cyber assets and the Bulk-Power System is 
of immediate critical importance, and information collection efforts 
should not impede or restrict system restoration, as stated in the CIP 
NOPR. We agree that preserving evidence should not hinder system 
restoration.
    709. We do not object to the alternate proposal developed by the 
ERO, including use of the phrase ``data collection for post-event 
analysis, where technically feasible,'' to describe what should be 
required under the revised Reliability Standard. The ERO may also 
consider the methods proposed by Entergy and MidAmerican. We also 
recognize that collecting forensic data may not be technically feasible 
for all situations due to equipment limitations, such as older 
substation installations with little electronic monitoring. Therefore, 
when revising the Reliability Standard, the ERO may incorporate a 
technical feasibility exception, subject to the same conditions for 
exercising the exception as described elsewhere in this Final Rule.
    710. Therefore, we direct the ERO to revise CIP-009-1 to require 
data collection, as provided in the Blackout Report. The modification 
should focus on responsible entities preserving the data necessary to 
determine the cause of any problem with the system and may include a 
technical feasibility exception.
c. Operational Exercises
    711. Requirement R2 of CIP-009-1 requires the responsible entity to 
exercise recovery plans at least annually, and that such exercise can 
range from a paper drill, to a full operational exercise, or to 
recovery from an actual incident.
    712. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission addressed the question of 
whether full operational exercises should be required to aid in 
identifying potential problems and to realize improvements, and 
concluded that some potential problems that could significantly impair 
reliability will not be found without them.\168\ The Commission stated 
its belief that table-top exercises alone, on an ongoing basis, will 
not suffice, given the increasing complexity and interconnection of 
control systems. We also cautioned that technical feasibility and 
suitability of risk must be carefully weighed with the possible 
benefits of conducting the full operational exercises, and therefore 
opted for a limited approach. We concluded that benefits from 
operational exercises are sufficient that the industry as a whole 
should develop suitable operational exercises in the course of evolving 
good cyber security practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See id. P 299-304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    713. Accordingly, the Commission proposed to direct the ERO to 
develop modifications to CIP-009-1 to require a full operational 
exercise once every three years (unless an actual incident occurs), but 
to permit reliance on table-top exercises annually in other years. In 
conjunction, we proposed to direct the ERO to consider the 
appropriateness of a technical feasibility option, in the limited 
fashion proposed earlier.\169\ As an example, we noted that CIP-009-1 
could be modified to allow for partial operational exercises, reduced 
from full operational exercises, only to the extent a responsible 
entity explains and documents, for a particular substation or a 
particular generating plant, technical infeasibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See id. P 77-86 and section II.F.2-3, supra (Technical 
Feasibility and Acceptance of Risk).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    714. The Commission noted the lack of clarity of the term full 
operational exercise and therefore also proposed to direct the ERO to 
either define in its glossary the term full operational exercise or 
provide more direction directly in the Reliability Standard as to the 
parameters of the term for use therein. We acknowledged that many 
operational exercise practices include table-top components in 
significant proportions.
i. Comments
    715. With the changes included in the CIP NOPR, the California 
Commission and Texas PUC view this Reliability Standard as acceptable. 
Consistent with its comments regarding Standard CIP-008-1, MidAmerican 
supports the Commission's change to a three-year testing cycle, as long 
as a full operational exercise does not require the asset to be taken 
out of service.
    716. NERC raises similar concerns with the Commission's use of full 
operational exercises to test recovery plans as it raised with respect 
to full operational exercises of electronic security perimeters in CIP-
005-1.\170\ For example, NERC is concerned that the use of the term 
will require that a substation control environment will need to be 
completely reconstructed from scratch to ensure that it may be 
recovered following an incident. In the case of an information 
technology-only system (such as components of an energy management 
system), or for high-value centralized systems with limited specialized 
components (such as a SCADA system with its communications 
requirements), it may be practical to hold dedicated exercises through 
the use of dedicated equipment. NERC believes that requiring such full 
exercises in a substation or generating plant environment wastes 
resources without providing a significant reliability benefit. Even if 
such exercises were to be performed, each substation or generating 
plant implementation is different. Full exercises might imply that each 
specific substation and generating plant (or even each generating unit 
at a generating plant) would need to be exercised separately to ensure 
that the specific nuances of each implementation are exercised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ See section II.H.4.d.ii, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    717. NERC also argues that, when significant damage or failure 
occurs, responsible entities must take such action as necessary to 
ensure that their equipment meets the operational and cyber security 
requirements and expectations. It may not be possible to exactly 
replicate the damage or failure in a live operations context. NERC 
maintains that the phrase full operational exercises should be replaced 
by ``demonstrated restoration of critical cyber assets in a test 
environment.'' NERC goes on to explain that its comments on 
representative test environments in CIP-005-1 also apply here.
    718. APPA/LPPC support the Commission's proposal. APPA/LPPC also 
agree with the Commission's determination that NERC should either 
define full operational exercise in its glossary or provide more 
direction directly in the Reliability Standard as to the parameters of 
the term.
    719. APPA/LPPC, Arkansas Electric, Idaho Power, FPL Group, SPP and 
Consumers oppose including a live vulnerability test in a full 
operational exercise. APPA/LPPC state that, as noted by the Commission, 
the benefits of operational exercises must be weighed against the 
technical feasibility and operational risks of such exercises.\171\ The 
commenters state that live vulnerability tests would pose operational 
risks that would outweigh any benefits such tests would produce. 
Consumers maintains that, because the activities involved in a live 
vulnerability/penetration test are intrusive and can result in major 
vulnerability exploitation beyond control, they can result in 
unintended damage to the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ CIP NOPR at P 302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    720. FirstEnergy also opposes full operational exercises, on the 
grounds

[[Page 7438]]

that they often require entire systems to be shut down, would require a 
large number of company personnel to be diverted from regular duties, 
and would provide little value until the industry gains more experience 
in this area. Until that time, FirstEnergy argues that paper drills 
and/or table top exercises should be adequate.
    721. Northern Indiana requests clarification of what actual 
incident would excuse a full operational exercise. For instance, an 
incident (the nature of which may not be known) may occur that compels 
the responsible entity to stop the full operational exercise, which 
cannot be rescheduled for several months. The delay in operational 
testing should reset the clock such that the next paper drill of the 
tested system is performed one year from completion of the full 
operational exercise.
    722. Idaho Power also argues that, with adequate test plans, 
trained and qualified personnel, and a regimented change management 
process, adequate protection is in place without additional changes to 
the Reliability Standard. ISO-NE asserts that clarification is needed 
of what constitutes a full operational exercise. ISO-NE thus supports 
the CIP NOPR's directive to direct the ERO to provide greater clarity 
as to the meaning of this term. As to whether to provide a definition 
of full operational exercise in the NERC Glossary, it needs to be 
understood that what may qualify as such an exercise with regards to 
readiness of Bulk-Power System operations would be somewhat different 
from such an exercise with respect to a cyber security incident 
response plan, or for IT back-up and recovery plans. Therefore, ISO-NE 
reserves further judgment of requirements for full operational 
exercises until additional clarity is provided.
    723. Arkansas Electric opposes full operational exercises and 
suggests requiring a ``functional exercise'' be performed at least 
every three years. Arkansas Electric states that functional exercises 
are well defined in the emergency management and disaster recovery 
disciplines. Arkansas Electric notes that the National Incident 
Management System defines a functional exercise as one that ``simulates 
the reality of operations in a functional area by presenting complex 
and realistic problems that require rapid and effective responses by 
trained personnel in a highly stressful environment.'' Arkansas 
Electric argues that these exercises are more rigorous than tabletop 
exercises, yet they do not require the same system disruption as a full 
scale exercise.
    724. Texas PUC maintains that the Commission's proposal to allow 
some entities to conduct partially operational exercises every three 
years appropriately recognizes the constraints faced by some entities. 
However, it states that this exception should not excuse entities from 
conducting more complex drills.
ii. Commission Determination
    725. The Commission adopts, with modifications, the CIP NOPR 
proposal to develop modifications to CIP-009-1 through the Reliability 
Standards development process to require an operational exercise once 
every three years (unless an actual incident occurs, in which case it 
may suffice), but to permit reliance on table-top exercises annually in 
other years. Consistent with our goals and discussion of CIP-005-1, the 
Commission will not at this time require responsible entities to 
perform full operational exercises. Instead, the Reliability Standard 
should require the demonstrated recovery of critical cyber assets in a 
test environment, with the requirements for representative test 
environments and for addressing differences between the test 
environment and the production environment, similar to the conditions 
discussed for live testing in CIP-005-1. Given the range of views 
presented in comments regarding live testing, as the Reliability 
Standard development process forms the details of this ``demonstrated 
recovery'' concept, it should consider offering guidance beyond the 
actual Requirements of the Reliability Standard in separate reference 
documents. The Commission believes this alleviates commenters' concerns 
about the risks associated with such testing.
    726. The Commission notes ISO-NE's concerns about providing a 
definition of full operational exercise in the NERC Glossary are 
addressed since we are not requiring the use of that term in the 
Reliability Standards.
d. Updating Recovery Plans
    727. Requirement R3 of CIP-009-1 requires the responsible entity to 
update the recovery plans to reflect any changes or lessons learned 
from an exercise or the recovery from an actual incident. It requires 
plan updates to be communicated to the personnel responsible for 
activating or implementing the recovery plan within 90 days of the 
change.
    728. The Commission stated its concern that individuals responsible 
for activating and implementing a recovery plan must have the most 
current information available, and its belief that a 90-day time lag 
between when a weakness in a recovery plan is discovered and when it is 
corrected and communicated to such responsible personnel is too 
long.\172\ We noted that failure for the responsible personnel to have 
current information about a recovery plan could cause unnecessary delay 
in restoring critical cyber assets to service and thereby jeopardize 
the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. Therefore, the Commission 
proposed to direct the ERO to modify Requirement R3 of CIP-009-1 to 
shorten the timeline for updating recovery plans to 30 days, while 
continuing to allow up to 90 days for completing the communications of 
that update to responsible personnel. We stated our belief that a 30 
day requirement for updating the recovery plans will promote timely 
incorporation of lessons learned during exercises and actual events, 
while acknowledging that 90 days is reasonable for the completion of 
personnel training sessions, due to varied shift schedules and other 
feasibility issues with regard to facility and organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ See id. P 305-08.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments
    729. MidAmerican supports this proposal for the reasons articulated 
in the CIP NOPR. Northern Indiana supports retaining the Requirement as 
is, that is, to allow a 90-day period to both update and communicate 
recovery plans to responsible personnel.
    730. ISO-NE is concerned that there is no clear indication of when 
the 30 day clock would start and asks that changes resulting from 
modifications to the systems, controls, and procedure shall be 
documented within 30 days of final implementation of said 
modifications, similar to its concerns with respect to CIP-007-1.
ii. Commission Determination
    731. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to modify Requirement R3 of CIP-009-1 to shorten the timeline for 
updating recovery plans. We believe that allowing 30 days to update a 
recovery plan is more appropriate, while continuing to allow up to 90 
days for completing the communications of that update to responsible 
personnel. However, the Reliability Standards development process may 
propose a time period other than 30 days, with justification that it is 
equally efficient and effective. As we stated with respect to change 
made pursuant to CIP-007-1, the Commission believes that having correct

[[Page 7439]]

documentation is necessary because if an event occurred before 
documentation was updated, an operator may not know of a change and 
could attempt to operate the system using out of date information. This 
puts reliability at risk by not informing operators of a method, 
process or procedure to secure the system against a known risk. 
Therefore, the Commission believes that 90 days is too long to allow a 
responsible entity to have incorrect documentation. Thirty days should 
be sufficient time to update any necessary documentation. Northern 
Indiana has not provided us sufficient reason to change the CIP NOPR 
proposal. Finally, as stated with respect to the documentation 
requirements in CIP-007-1, the 30 day period should begin upon final 
implementation of the modifications.
e. Backup and Storage of Restoration Data
    732. Requirement R4 of CIP-009-1 requires that a recovery plan 
include processes and procedures for the backup and storage of 
information necessary to successfully restore critical cyber assets.
    733. We addressed whether the required backups should be tested as 
part of the system change before they are stored and assumed to be 
operational.\173\ The Commission proposed to direct the ERO to modify 
CIP-009-1 to incorporate guidance that the backup and restoration 
processes and procedures required by Requirement R4 should include, at 
least with regard to significant changes made to the operational 
control system, verification that they are operational before the 
backups are stored or relied upon for recovery purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ See id. P 309-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    734. The Commission stated that it understood that preserving 
multiple generations of restoration backups is common practice, and 
that competent implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards would 
tend to include the good and efficient practice of testing recovery 
backups as they are created. However, the Commission did not find that 
direction toward these good practices was contained in, implied by, or 
readily understood from either this or other Requirements among the CIP 
Reliability Standards, such as Requirement R6 of CIP-003-1. The 
Commission reiterated its position, stated with regard to the change 
control processes required by Requirement R6 of CIP-003-1, where no 
backups of any kind are mentioned, that there is a need for enhanced 
direction in issues related to proper change control, and that the CIP 
Reliability Standards should specifically state that a change control 
process should include procedures for a tested backup. We noted that 
adding clarification language here to Requirement R4 of CIP-009-1, such 
as ``these procedures are to include practices to test and verify the 
operability of the backup before it is stored and relied upon for 
recovery,'' would eliminate this ambiguity.
i. Comments
    735. MidAmerican supports the proposal to modify the Reliability 
Standard to require the ERO to provide directions on best practices for 
the back up and restore process for the reasons articulated in the CIP 
NOPR.
    736. FirstEnergy and Northern Indiana disagree with the 
Commission's proposal to require verification and detection after 
adding, modifying, replacing or removing critical cyber asset hardware 
or software, arguing that this requirement is essentially the same as 
requiring continuous assessment. Northern Indiana argues that 
verification that backup tapes are operational is merely the assessment 
that the tapes are functional; verification does not assure the content 
may be used for restoration purposes. In the Final Rule, the Commission 
should clarify what is intended by backup and verify in the context of 
backup and restoration media. MidAmerican requests clarification of 
what constitutes a significant change that would require verification 
because it contends that this process could be extremely onerous if 
required outside of a planned plant shutdown.
    737. SPP suggests that testing backups prior to storage is only one 
mitigation strategy that should be considered along with other 
available mitigations to assure the ability to recover from a system 
failure following any event, not just a significant upgrade. SPP 
suggests that in a properly managed data center environment, a 
combination of image and incremental backups should be regularly 
performed, or inter-site disk-to-disk replication should be 
implemented, regardless of significant system modifications. Periodic 
recovery testing, coupled with sound system backup/replication 
management processes, is adequate to assure recovery and restoration of 
failed cyber assets; special pre-modification backups are not 
necessary. It is impractical and unnecessary to test every backup media 
prior to storing it. Other mitigation strategies that may provide 
equivalent assurance of recovery include reconstitution of the asset 
from installation media with recovery of data from either backup files 
or redundant systems, and complete reconstitution of the asset from a 
redundant system.
    738. Moreover, SPP states that some systems cannot be backed up due 
to their design architecture. In this instance, complete, up-to-date 
system configuration and recovery/or reconstitution documentation must 
be maintained. In addition, given the nature of certain deployed cyber 
assets, it is not possible to perform a restoration test without 
placing the asset and the facility it serves at risk. All of this must 
be weighed when developing the business continuity plan.
ii. Commission Determination
    739. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to modify CIP-009-1 to incorporate guidance that the backup and 
restoration processes and procedures required by Requirement R4 should 
include, at least with regard to significant changes made to the 
operational control system, verification that they are operational 
before the backups are stored or relied upon for recovery purposes. Our 
intent in doing so is to require responsible entities to have a 
procedure in place that gives them a high confidence level that their 
backups will actually restore the system as needed. Auditors should be 
able to determine compliance by reviewing a responsible entity's 
policies, procedures and records to determine how the testing is done 
and what recent tests have been performed. In response to commenters' 
suggestions on how to verify the backup and restoration processes, the 
ERO should determine appropriate methods to accomplish the Commission's 
objectives in the Reliability Standards development process.
    740. The Commission does not agree with FirstEnergy and Northern 
Indiana that requiring verification of backup and restoration processes 
and procedures when a significant change is made to the operational 
control system requires continuous assessment. The Commission does not 
believe that every change will necessitate verification of the backup 
and restoration processes. Rather, it is sufficient to verify a process 
if a significant change, such as adding new hardware or installing new 
software to the control system, is made. The Commission does not 
believe that responsible entities will be making significant changes to 
their backup and restoration processes continuously. Similar to our 
determination with respect to Requirement R4 of CIP-005-1, the ERO 
should determine, through the Reliability Standards development 
process, what would constitute a

[[Page 7440]]

modification that would require verification of the backup and 
restoration processes.
 f. Testing of Backup Media
    741. Requirement R5 requires annual testing of information stored 
on backup media to ensure information essential to recovery is 
available.
    742. The CIP Assessment noted that it is critical that such 
information be accessible in the event of an actual incident, and that 
the Reliability Standard does not specify any actions to be taken in 
the event of a failure in testing, and asked whether such testing 
should also be conducted on a more frequent basis.
    743. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission addressed whether such testing 
should also be conducted on a more frequent basis and what action 
should be taken in the event of a failure in testing. We understood 
that, if these CIP Reliability Standards were implemented in a full and 
competent manner, then adequate backup verification measures would 
probably be in place. However, we stated that Reliability Standards 
demand a higher degree of certainty and should provide the guidance 
that responsible entities need to have procedures to verify backups are 
successfully completed every cycle and to have recovery procedures in 
place for when the backup fails.
    744. The Commission proposed to direct the ERO to modify CIP-009-1 
to provide direction that backup practices include regular procedures 
to ensure verification that backups are successful and backup failures 
are addressed, thus guaranteeing that backups are available for future 
use.\174\ We stated that insertion of language such as, ``backup 
procedures are to include regular verification of successful completion 
and procedures to address backup failures'' would satisfy this goal. We 
stated our view that inability to recognize the failure of a backup 
process poses a great risk, and that the annual restoration testing 
required here is adequate frequency as long as the backup process is 
properly managed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ See id. P 314-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments
    745. ISO-NE agrees with the Commission proposal if the intent is to 
review the backup process. However, ISO-NE states that testing the 
actual backup data are not realistic in most instances, because the 
environment would literally have to be shut down and be restarted with 
the data in order to test it. ISO-NE asserts that, in an emergency, the 
restored data are a good starting point for recovery, but for a test 
process, such activity would not be acceptable due to the impact on 
reliability and market systems. Therefore, ISO-NE requests that the 
Commission omit directing the ERO to make any changes to CIP-009-1 
Requirements R4 and R5.
    746. FirstEnergy states that the requirement to ensure that backups 
are successful and available for future use should be limited to spot 
test restorations, such as restoration of a log file, because the 
ultimate verification of a backup--a complete restoration itself--is 
not practical.
    747. Northern California agrees with the Commission that NERC 
should expand Requirement R5 of CIP-009-1 to include verification of 
backups.
ii. Commission Determination
    748. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to modify CIP-009-1 to provide direction that backup practices include 
regular procedures to ensure verification that backups are successful 
and backup failures are addressed, so that backups are available for 
future use. However, the Commission agrees with ISO-NE that it is 
impractical to require the system to be shut down and be restarted with 
the data in order to test it. As stated above with respect to verifying 
backups after a significant change, our intent is to give responsible 
entities a high confidence level that their backups will actually 
restore the system as needed. Auditors should be able to look at a 
responsible entity's policies, procedures and records to determine how 
the testing is done and what recent tests have been performed. The ERO 
should determine appropriate methods to accomplish the Commission's 
objectives in the Reliability Standards development process.

I. Violation Risk Factors

    749. Violation Risk Factors delineate the relative risk to the 
Bulk-Power System associated with the violation of each Requirement and 
are used by the ERO and the Regional Entities to determine financial 
penalties for violating a Reliability Standard. The ERO assigns a 
lower, medium or high Violation Risk Factor for each mandatory 
Reliability Standard Requirement.\175\ The Commission has established 
guidelines for evaluating the validity of each Violation Risk Factor 
assignment.\176\
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    \175\ The specific definitions of high, medium and lower are 
provided in North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 FERC ] 
61,145 at P 9 (Violation Risk Factor Order), order on reh'g, 120 
FERC ] 61,145 (2007) (Violation Risk Factor Rehearing).
    \176\ The guidelines are: (1) Consistency with the conclusions 
of the Blackout Report; (2) Consistency within a Reliability 
Standard; (3) Consistency among Reliability Standards; (4) 
Consistency with NERC's Definition of the Violation Risk Factor 
Level; and (5) Treatment of Requirements that Co-mingle More Than 
One Obligation. The Commission also explained that this list was not 
necessarily all-inclusive and that it retained the flexibility to 
consider additional guidelines in the future. A detailed explanation 
is provided in Violation Risk Factor Rehearing, 120 FERC ] 61,145 at 
P 8-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    750. In a separate filing, the ERO submitted 162 Violation Risk 
Factors that correspond to Requirements of the proposed CIP Reliability 
Standards.\177\ While the Commission has addressed the Violation Risk 
Factors that correspond to the Requirements of the Reliability 
Standards it has already approved, NERC requested that going forward 
the Commission approve the Violation Risk Factors when it takes action 
on the associated Reliability Standards.\178\ Accordingly, the 
Commission addresses the Violation Risk Factors that correspond to the 
CIP Reliability Standards in this proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ See NERC's March 23, 2007 filing in Docket No. RR07-10-
000, Exh. A.
    \178\ See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 119 
FERC ] 61,145 (2007) (May 18 Order) (approving and modifying 
Violation Risk Factors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    751. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission proposed to approve the 162 
proposed Violation Risk Factor assignments that correspond to the 
Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards and direct the ERO to 
revise 43 of them. In addition, the Commission noted that the ERO did 
not assign Violation Risk Factors to nine Requirements and proposed to 
direct the ERO to make these Violation Risk Factor assignments and file 
them for Commission approval.
    752. The Commission noted that NERC assigned a ``lower'' 
designation to almost 85 percent of the Violation Risk Factors 
corresponding to the Requirements of the CIP Reliability Standards. No 
Requirements received a ``high'' Violation Risk Factor assignment. The 
Commission stated that it believed the ERO mischaracterized many of the 
Requirements as administrative, resulting in a lower Violation Risk 
Factor assignment, where in fact a medium or high designation was more 
appropriate.
    753. We proposed to direct the ERO to submit a filing containing 
revised Violation Risk Factors within 60 days of the date of the Final 
Rule. We also proposed to direct the ERO to include in its filing a 
complete Violation Risk Factor matrix.

[[Page 7441]]

1. General Issues
a. Comments
    754. NERC argues that the Commission should not establish a 60-day 
compliance deadline for NERC to modify the Violation Risk Factors. 
Instead, it suggests that the Commission should find that Violation 
Risk Factors may be addressed in the NERC Reliability Standards 
development process, so long as this produces timely results.\179\ 
Alliant, Arizona Public Service, CEA, Progress and PSEG Companies 
agree. PSEG Companies point out the numerous procedural hurdles that 
would make modification of the 43 Violation Risk Factors within a sixty 
day window extremely difficult. Similarly, while Ontario Power 
disagrees with the Commission that Violation Risk Factors are not a 
part of the Reliability Standards, it does not oppose revisiting the 
Violation Risk Factors through NERC's Reliability Standards development 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ NERC cites North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 
FERC ] 61,046 (2007) in support of this position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    755. While the Commission has elsewhere determined that Violation 
Risk Factors can be changed outside of the full ERO Reliability 
Standards development process, NRECA supports and continues to assert 
that it is preferable for all concerned for such changes to be made 
within the context of that process. It asserts that institutional 
bifurcation of the development of the Reliability Standards from the 
consequences of violation of the Reliability Standards is not a 
desirable practice and should be minimized. The ERO, through its 
Reliability Standards development process, should be allowed to revisit 
the CIP Violation Risk Factors without having a specific outcome 
dictated by the Commission.
    756. Progress maintains that unnecessarily increasing Violation 
Risk Factors for planning Reliability Standards may have unintended 
consequences. According to Progress, assigning overly conservative 
Violation Risk Factors will cause senior managers responsible for CIP 
Reliability Standard compliance to focus more time and resources on 
satisfying those Reliability Standards, potentially to the detriment of 
other Reliability Standards. It maintains that the level of the 
Violation Risk Factor is intended to communicate the importance of the 
Reliability Standards and, consequently, the resources that should be 
devoted to its implementation and the magnitude of the penalty 
associated with its violation.
b. Commission Determination
    757. NERC and other commenters ask the Commission to defer to NERC 
on the determination of Violation Risk Factors and allow NERC to 
reconsider the designations using the Reliability Standards development 
process. The Commission has previously determined that Violation Risk 
Factors are not a part of the Reliability Standards.\180\ In developing 
its Violation Risk Factor filing, NERC has had an opportunity to fully 
vet the CIP Violation Risk Factors through the Reliability Standards 
development process. The Commission believes that, for those Violation 
Risk Factors that do not comport with the Commission's previously-
articulated guidelines for analyzing Violation Risk Factor 
designations, there is little benefit in once again allowing the 
Reliability Standards development process to reconsider a designation 
based on the Commission's concerns. Therefore, we will not allow NERC 
to reconsider the Violation Risk Factor designations in this instance 
but, rather, direct below that NERC make specific modifications to its 
designations. NERC must submit a compliance filing with the revised 
Violation Risk Factors no later than 90 days before the date the 
relevant Reliability Standard becomes enforceable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ Violation Risk Factor Rehearing, 120 FERC ] 61,145 at P 
11-16 (2007), citing North American Reliability Corp., 118 FERC ] 
61,030 at P 91, order on clarification and reh'g, 119 FERC ] 61,046 
(2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    758. That being said, NERC may choose the procedural vehicle to 
change the Violation Risk Factors consistent with the Commission's 
directives. NERC may use the Reliability Standards development process, 
so long as it meets Commission-imposed deadlines.\181\ In this 
instance, the Commission sees no vital reason to direct the ERO to use 
section 1403 of its Rules of Procedure to revise the Violation Risk 
Factors below, so long as the revised Violation Risk Factors address 
the Commission's concerns and are filed no less than 90 days before the 
effective date of the relevant Reliability Standard.\182\ The 
Commission also notes that NERC should file Violation Severity Levels 
before the auditably compliant stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 118 FERC ] 
61,030 at P 91, order on compliance, 119 FERC ] 61,046 at P 33 
(2007).
    \182\ The Commission notes that this is a change from the CIP 
NOPR proposal, which proposed to direct the ERO to submit a filing 
containing these modifications within 60 days of the date of the 
Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    759. Consistent with the Violation Risk Factor Order, the 
Commission directs NERC to submit a complete Violation Risk Factor 
matrix encompassing each Commission-approved CIP Reliability Standard.
    760. The Commission disagrees with Progress that the Commission's 
concerns with respect to the CIP Violation Risk Factors will result in 
overly conservative Violation Risk Factor assignments. We also disagree 
with the characterization that a Violation Risk Factor delineates the 
importance of the Reliability Standard. Rather, the Violation Risk 
Factors delineate the relative risk to the Bulk-Power System associated 
with the violation of each Requirement. The Commission believes that 
the analysis below appropriately takes into account the risk of 
violating each Requirement in the CIP Reliability Standards.
2. Specific Modifications to Violation Risk Factors
    761. The Commission proposed to require NERC to assign several 
Requirements in the CIP Reliability Standards a high Violation Risk 
Factor. For example, CIP-002-1 Requirement R2, which requires the 
identification of assets that are critical to the Bulk-Power System, is 
assigned a lower Violation Risk Factor. While the product of the 
Requirement is a list of critical assets, the Commission stated that 
this is clearly not an administrative Requirement. In fact, the failure 
to properly identify critical assets could place the Bulk-Power System 
at an unacceptable risk or restoration efforts could be hindered. 
Further, this Requirement has a controlling effect over all of the CIP 
Reliability Standards that follow. The Commission stated that, if an 
asset is critical and is not identified as such, the remaining CIP 
Reliability Standards will not be applied to that asset. Depending on 
the asset that is overlooked, and consequently not protected by the 
Reliability Standards, a higher level of Bulk-Power System failure is 
possible. Thus, by NERC's definition, this Requirement should have a 
high Violation Risk Factor assignment. In addition, the recommendations 
related to physical and cyber security contained in the Blackout 
Report,\183\ while largely addressed by the proposed CIP Reliability 
Standards, would essentially be thwarted if a responsible entity does 
not effectively comply with Requirements R2 and R3 of CIP-002-1. 
Accordingly, we proposed to direct the ERO to modify Requirement R2 to 
denote a high Violation Risk Factor assignment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ Blackout Report at 163-69, Recommendations 32-44.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 7442]]

    762. Similarly, CIP-002-1 Requirement R3, which requires the 
identification of cyber assets that are essential to the operation of 
critical Bulk-Power System assets, has a medium Violation Risk Factor 
assignment. By definition, a medium Violation Risk Factor assignment 
means that the Requirement is unlikely, under emergency, abnormal, or 
restoration conditions to lead to Bulk-Power System instability, 
separation, or cascading failures, or to hinder restoration to a normal 
condition. However, if this Requirement is violated, the Bulk-Power 
System could in fact be at an unacceptable risk of failure or 
restoration efforts could be hindered. Further, this Requirement has a 
controlling effect over all of the CIP Reliability Standards that 
follow. As with CIP-002-1 Requirement R2, depending on the asset that 
is overlooked, and consequently not protected by the Reliability 
Standards, a higher level of Bulk-Power System failure is possible. 
Also, we stated that proper compliance with CIP-002-1, Requirement R3 
is essential to the ability of the proposed CIP Reliability Standards 
to satisfy the recommendations of the Blackout Report.\184\ 
Accordingly, we proposed to direct the ERO to modify this Requirement 
to denote a high Violation Risk Factor assignment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    763. The Commission also proposed to direct the ERO to change the 
Violation Risk Factor assignments for several Reliability Standards 
from a lower to a medium assignment. The Commission's primary reason 
for proposing to direct these changes was to promote implementation of 
the recommendations contained in the Blackout Report; to establish 
consistency within a Reliability Standard, i.e., among sub- and main 
Requirements of the same Reliability Standard; and consistency across 
Reliability Standards.
a. Comments
    764. Northern California agrees that many requirements 
inappropriately have a Violation Risk Factor of lower and that NERC 
should re-evaluate the Violation Risk Factors of the Requirements 
identified by the Commission in Appendix B of the CIP NOPR, and urges 
NERC to adopt the Commission's recommended assessment.
    765. While APPA and the LPPC members state that they are committed 
to complying with all of the CIP Reliability Standards, APPA/LPPC 
believe that the Commission's proposal to elevate the violation risk 
factor for CIP-002-1, Requirement R2 from low to high and the violation 
risk factor for CIP-002-1, Requirement R3 from medium to high should be 
reexamined. While overlooked assets could result in Bulk-Power System 
failure, the oversight process now contemplated by Regional Entities 
over asset designation, and the overwhelming incentive responsible 
entities have to proceed cautiously, make it difficult to see a 
substantial potential for assets to be overlooked.
    766. EEI states that the proposal to direct the ERO to modify CIP-
002-1 to denote a high Violation Risk Factor assignment mandates a 
particular outcome and does not allow for consideration of any 
alternative.
b. Commission Determination
    767. The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO 
to revise 43 Violation Risk Factors. While the Commission hopes that 
APPA/LPPC are correct that there is not a substantial potential for 
assets to be overlooked, this is not a reason to not modify the 
Violation Risk Factors. As we stated in Order No. 672, the fundamental 
goal of mandatory, enforceable Reliability Standards and related 
enforcement programs is to promote behavior that supports and improves 
Bulk-Power System reliability.\185\ It is not imposing penalties. 
However, as APPA/LPPC recognize, overlooked assets could result in 
Bulk-Power System failure. This comports with the definition of a high 
Violation Risk Factor as a requirement that, if violated, could 
directly cause or contribute to Bulk-Power System instability, 
separation, or a cascading sequence of failures, or could place the 
Bulk-Power System at an unacceptable risk of instability, separation, 
or cascading failures. APPA/LPPC have not provided a persuasive reason 
for the Commission to change its proposal to direct the ERO to modify 
the Violation Risk Factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ Order No. 672 at P 455.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    768. Further, the Commission is not persuaded by the argument that 
the Violation Risk Factor should not be high because there is an 
incentive for responsible entities to proceed cautiously. The Violation 
Risk Factor should consider the risk to the system of non-compliance, 
regardless of other incentives that users, owners and operators of the 
Bulk-Power System have to comply.
    769. Finally, the regional oversight over asset designation 
discussed by APPA/LPPC is not in place yet. Therefore, the Commission 
cannot rule on what it might be.

III. Information Collection Statement

    770. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Regulations require 
that OMB approve certain reporting and recordkeeping (collections of 
information) imposed by an agency.\186\ The information collection 
requirements proposed in the CIP NOPR were identified under the 
Commission data collection, FERC-725B ``Mandatory Reliability Standards 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection.'' These proposed information 
collections will be submitted to OMB for review under section 3507(d) 
of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\187\ In addition, OMB 
regulations require OMB to approve certain reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements imposed by agency rule.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \187\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
    \188\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    771. The ``public protection'' provisions of the Paperwork 
Reduction of 1995 require each agency to display a currently valid 
control number and inform respondents that a response is not required 
unless the information collection displays a valid OMB control number 
on each information collection or provides a justification as to why 
the information collection control number cannot be displayed. In the 
case of information collections published in regulations, the control 
number is to be published in the Federal Register.
    772. Public Reporting Burden: The Commission developed its estimate 
of burden based upon the CIP Reliability Standards as proposed by NERC. 
The CIP Reliability Standards include only one actual reporting 
requirement. Specifically, CIP-008-1 requires responsible entities to 
report cyber security incidents to ESISAC. In addition, the eight CIP 
Reliability Standards require responsible entities to develop various 
policies, plans, programs and procedures.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ See CIP NOPR at P 334.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    773. The CIP Reliability Standards do not require a responsible 
entity to report to the Commission, ERO or Regional Entities the 
various policies, plans, programs and procedures. However, the 
documentation of the policies, plans, programs and procedures must be 
available to demonstrate compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards. 
The Commission has included the cost of developing the required 
documentation for the required policies, plans, programs and procedures 
in its burden estimate. The Commission, however,

[[Page 7443]]

did not include in our burden estimate the cost of substantive 
compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards, separate from the 
requirements to develop specific documentation.
    774. In formulating our estimate of the reporting burden, the 
Commission has been guided by several factors.
    Number of Entities: As of April 2007, NERC identified 1,266 
registered entities in the United States. The Applicability section of 
each CIP Reliability Standard specifies nine categories of users, 
owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System (as well as NERC and the 
Regional Entities) that must comply with the CIP Reliability Standards. 
The nine categories of users, owners and operators are based on the 
categories of functions identified in the NERC Functional Model. Based 
on a review of NERC's registration list, the Commission estimates that 
approximately 1,000 entities will be required to comply with the CIP 
Reliability Standards.
    Variations in Compliance Burden: The Commission's estimate is based 
on all 1,000 entities documenting an assessment methodology to identify 
critical assets and critical cyber assets pursuant to CIP-002-1. As 
explained above, only those entities that identify critical cyber 
assets pursuant to CIP-002-1 are responsible to comply with the 
requirements of CIP-003-1 through CIP-009-1. Accordingly, the cost 
burden estimate differs for those entities that identify critical cyber 
assets and those that do not.
    Further, the reporting burden would vary with the number of 
critical cyber assets identified pursuant to CIP-002-1. An entity that 
identifies numerous critical cyber assets, including assets located at 
remote locations, will likely require more resources to develop its 
policies, plans, programs and procedures compared to an entity that 
identifies one or two critical cyber assets, housed at a single 
location. Based on this distinction, the Commission has developed 
separate estimates for large investor-owned utilities and other 
responsible entities such as municipals, generators and cooperatives.
    Customary Practices: Prior to the development of CIP-002-1 through 
CIP-009-1, NERC approved through its urgent action process a cyber 
security Reliability Standard known as ``UA-1200,'' which applied to 
entities ``such as control areas, transmission owners and operators, 
and generation owners and operators.'' UA-1200 addressed a number of 
the same reporting burdens as the CIP Reliability Standards at issue in 
this proceeding. For example, UA-1200 required the creation and 
maintenance of a cyber security policy, the identification of 
``critical cyber assets,'' and the development of a cyber security 
training program. Thus, entities that voluntarily complied with UA-1200 
will continue these practices when the mandatory CIP Reliability 
Standards are in effect.
    Further, many entities, including those that did not comply with 
UA-1200, typically have followed certain practices specified in the CIP 
Reliability Standards. The Commission believes that practices such as 
conducting cyber security training, having procedures for whom to 
contact in case of a cyber security incident, and developing a plan for 
how to restore a computerized control system should it fail are usual 
and customary practices in the electric industry and others. The 
Commission has taken such customary practices into account when 
estimating the reporting burden.
    Time Period: The proposed CIP Reliability Standards were approved 
as voluntary reliability standards by the NERC board in May 2006, with 
a designated effective date of June 1, 2006.\190\ The proposed 
implementation schedule submitted with the CIP Reliability Standards 
plans for responsible entities to be ``auditably compliant'' with most 
requirements by mid-2010 or later. Mid-2010 is four years after NERC's 
voluntary reliability standards went into effect. Therefore, the 
Commission developed an annual burden estimate by dividing total costs 
by 4 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ Although NERC designated an effective date of June 1, 
2006, the CIP Reliability Standards are not mandatory and 
enforceable, i.e., subject to penalties for non-compliance, until 
they are approved by the Commission.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Total
                       Data collection                         Number of    Number of    Hours per      annual
                                                              respondents   responses     response      hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FERC-725B:
    Large investor-owned utility............................          155            1        2,080      322,400
    Others, including munis and coops.......................          795            1        1,000      795,000
    Entities that have not identified critical cyber assets.           50            1          160        8,000
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
        Totals..............................................  ...........  ...........  ...........    1,125,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Information Collection Costs: The Commission estimates the costs to 
be:
    Large investor-owned utility = 322,400 hours@$88 = $28,371,200.
    Others, including munis and coops = 795,000 hours@$88 = 
$69,960,000.
    Entities that have not identified critical cyber assets = 8,000 
hours@$88 = $704,000.

    Because auditably compliant status is not required for many 
requirements until mid-2010, the Commission has projected the costs 
over a four-year period. On an annual basis the costs will be 
($28,371,200 + $69,960,000 + $704,000)/4 years = $24,758,800 per year.
    The hourly rate of $88 is a composite figure of the average cost of 
legal services ($200 per hour), technical employees ($39.99 per hour) 
and administrative support ($25 per hour), based on hourly rates from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Using the May 2006 OES Industry-
Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, the median hourly 
rate wage estimate for a computer software engineer is $39.99.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ See http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title: Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection.
    Action: Proposed collection.
    OMB Control Number: 1902-0248.
    Frequency of responses: On occasion.
    Necessity for information: As discussed above, EPAct 2005 adds a 
new section 215 to the FPA, which requires a Commission-certified ERO 
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, which are 
subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the 
Reliability Standards may be enforced by the ERO subject to Commission 
oversight, or the Commission can independently enforce Reliability 
Standards. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission approves 
eight CIP Reliability Standards submitted to the Commission for 
approval by NERC. The CIP Reliability

[[Page 7444]]

Standards require certain users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-
Power System to comply with specific requirements to safeguard critical 
cyber assets. The information collections in the Final Rule are needed 
to protect the electric industry's Bulk-Power System against malicious 
cyber attacks that could threaten the reliability of the Bulk-Power 
System.
1. Comments
    775. MidAmerican states that the Commission's information 
collection assessment warrants revision for significantly 
underestimating the cost of compliance, even after controlling for 
variation in the number of critical cyber security assets identified by 
the responsible entity. MidAmerican alone estimates its total 
compliance costs as a substantial fraction of the burden amount 
estimated by the Commission, based upon compliance with the originally 
proposed CIP Reliability Standards. That cost should be expected to 
increase by ten percent based upon the more stringent Reliability 
Standards and rising labor rates. Based on this actual experience to 
date, MidAmerican submits that the CIP NOPR burden underestimates 
implementation difficulties by inadequately accounting for both the 
replacement costs associated with upgrading existing antiquated cyber 
infrastructure as well as the host of employer recruiting, hiring and 
training challenges responsible entities will face to demonstrate 
compliance. The skilled computer software personnel necessary to 
achieve substantive compliance are in much demand (but short supply), 
nationally, and accordingly command compensation levels considerably 
higher than the CIP NOPR assumptions. To remedy these shortcomings, 
MidAmerican requests that the Commission revisit this issue by sampling 
the 1,000 or so entities expected to be required to comply with the CIP 
Reliability Standards and revising the burden estimate accordingly.
2. Commission Determination
    776. MidAmerican seems to misunderstand the purpose of the 
information collection statement. The OMB regulations require agencies 
to submit a burden estimate for collections of information contained in 
proposed rules, not for the entire cost of compliance. As stated in the 
CIP NOPR, the Commission only included the cost of developing the 
required documentation for the required policies, plans, programs and 
procedures in its burden estimate, but did not include in our burden 
estimate the cost of substantive compliance with the CIP Reliability 
Standards. MidAmerican raises concerns regarding the total cost of 
compliance with the Reliability Standards, rather than the burden 
associated with reporting requirements in the Reliability Standards. 
Therefore, the Commission does not believe it is necessary to revise 
the burden estimate based on MidAmerican's comments.

IV. Environmental Analysis

    777. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\192\ The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from these 
requirements as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment.\193\ The actions proposed here fall within categorical 
exclusions in the Commission's regulations for rules that are 
clarifying, corrective, or procedural, for information gathering, 
analysis, and dissemination, and for sales, exchange, and 
transportation of electric power that requires no construction of 
facilities.\194\ Therefore, an environmental assessment is unnecessary 
and has not been prepared in this Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & 
Regs., Regulations Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987).
    \193\ 18 CFR 308.4.
    \194\ See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii), 380.4(a)(5), 380.4(a)(27).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    778. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \195\ generally 
requires a description and analysis of any final rule that will have 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The RFA does not mandate any particular outcome in a rulemaking. It 
only requires consideration of alternatives that are less burdensome to 
small entities and an agency explanation of why alternatives were 
rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    779. In drafting a rule an agency is required to: (1) Assess the 
effect that its regulation will have on small entities; (2) analyze 
effective alternatives that may minimize a regulation's impact and (3) 
make the analyses available for public comment.\196\ In its NOPR, the 
agency must either include an initial regulatory flexibility analysis 
(initial RFA) \197\ or certify that the proposed rule will not have a 
``significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.'' \198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ 5 U.S.C. 601-604.
    \197\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \198\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    780. If in preparing the NOPR an agency determines that the 
proposal could have a significant impact on a substantial number of 
small entities, the agency shall ensure that small entities will have 
an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking procedure.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ 5 U.S.C. 609(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    781. In its Final Rule, the agency must also either prepare a Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Final RFA) or make the requisite 
certification. Based on the comments the agency receives on the NOPR, 
it can alter its original position as expressed in the NOPR but it is 
not required to make any substantive changes to the proposed 
regulation.

A. NOPR Proposal

    782. In the CIP NOPR, the Commission analyzed the effect of the 
proposed rule on small entities.\200\ The Commission's analysis found 
that the DOE's Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that 
there were 3,284 electric utility companies in the United States in 
2005,\201\ and 3,029 of these electric utilities qualify as small 
entities under the Small Business Administration (SBA) definition. Of 
these 3,284 electric utility companies, the EIA subdivides them as 
follows: (1) 883 cooperatives of which 852 are small entity 
cooperatives; (2) 1,862 municipal utilities, of which 1842 are small 
entity municipal utilities; (3) 127 political subdivisions, of which 
114 are small entity political subdivisions; (4) 159 power marketers, 
of which 97 individually could be considered small entity power 
marketers; \202\ (5) 219 privately owned utilities, of which 104 could 
be considered small entity private utilities; (6) 25 state 
organizations, of which 16 are small entity state organizations; and 
(7) nine federal organizations of which four are small entity federal 
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ CIP NOPR at P 342.
    \201\ See Energy Information Administration Database, Form EIA-
861, Dept. of Energy (2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html
.

    \202\ Most of these small entity power marketers and private 
utilities are affiliated with others and, therefore, do not qualify 
as small entities under the SBA definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    783. In addition, the Commission's analysis relied on NERC's 
compliance registry, applying the NERC Statement of Registry Criteria, 
to identify entities that must comply with the CIP Reliability 
Standards. For an entity to be included in the compliance registry, the 
ERO will have made a determination that a specific small entity has a

[[Page 7445]]

material impact on the Bulk-Power System. Consequently, the compliance 
of such small entities is justifiable as necessary for Bulk-Power 
System reliability. Based on NERC's compliance registry as of June 
2007, the Commission estimated that approximately 1,000 registered 
entities will be responsible for compliance with the CIP Reliability 
Standards. Of these, the Commission estimated that the CIP Reliability 
Standards would apply to approximately 632 small entities, consisting 
of 12 small investor-owned utilities and 620 small municipal and 
cooperatives.
    784. The Commission's analysis concluded that the CIP Reliability 
Standards would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. The majority of small entities would not be 
required to comply with mandatory Reliability Standards based on the 
application of the NERC Registry Criteria. Moreover, the Commission 
explained that a small entity that is registered but does not identify 
critical cyber assets pursuant to CIP-002-1 will not have compliance 
obligations pursuant to CIP-003-1 through CIP-009-1. While a small 
entity that identifies only a few critical cyber assets must comply 
with CIP-003-1 through CIP-009-1, the Commission stated that the 
economic impact of such compliance would not be significant. Likewise, 
the housing of a limited number of critical cyber assets in a single 
location will lessen the economic impact of compliance.
    785. The Commission also noted that, while not required or proposed 
by the CIP NOPR, small entities could choose to collectively select a 
single consultant to develop model software and programs to comply with 
the CIP Reliability Standards on their behalf. Such an approach could 
significantly reduce the costs that would be incurred if each company 
would address these issues independently.
    786. The Commission further explained that, while there would be 
some portion of small entities that would have to expend significant 
amounts of resources on labor and technology to comply with the CIP 
Reliability Standards, the Commission believed that this would be a 
minority. Further, in such circumstances, the economic impact would be 
justified as necessary to protect cyber security assets that support 
Bulk-Power System reliability.
    787. The Commission also investigated possible alternatives. These 
included the Commission's adoption in Order No. 693 of the NERC 
definition of bulk electric system, which reduces significantly the 
number of small entities responsible for compliance with mandatory 
Reliability Standards.\203\ The Commission also noted that small 
entities could join a joint action agency or similar organization, 
which could accept responsibility for compliance with mandatory 
Reliability Standards on behalf of its members and also may divide the 
responsibility for compliance with its members. Based on that analysis, 
the Commission certified that the proposed rulemaking would not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
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    \203\ CIP NOPR at P 347.
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B. Comments

    788. NRECA states that, for the most part, the CIP NOPR treats 
small entities in an appropriate manner. NRECA maintains that the 
approach of having the CIP and other Reliability Standards apply to 
small entities only if they have a material impact on the reliability 
of the Bulk-Power System is appropriate and consistent with the 
Commission's prior orders, the statute, and the ERO's Statement of 
Registry Criteria, and NRECA supports it fully, with the exception of 
the Commission's discussion of jointly-owned facilities, which is 
discussed with respect to CIP-004-1.\204\
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    \204\ We discuss issues concerning jointly-owned facilities in 
section II.F.3.d above.
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    789. APPA/LPPC state that application of the NERC Statement of 
Compliance Registry Criteria has reduced the total number of public 
power utilities potentially subject to NERC's Reliability Standards 
from nearly 2,000 to approximately 326 discrete public power utilities, 
and APPA/LPPC agree with the Commission that NERC's compliance registry 
goes a long way toward mitigating the economic impact of the proposed 
rules on small entities. Nonetheless, APPA/LPPC disagree with the 
Commission's categorical statement that ``the CIP Reliability Standards 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.''
    790. According to APPA/LPPC, approximately 293 of the 326 public 
power systems included on the NERC compliance registry meet the SBA 
definition of a small electric utility.\205\ Therefore, APPA/LPPC argue 
that the proposed regulations will have an impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. They maintain that the question is how 
significant that impact will in fact be. APPA/LPPC believe that some of 
these small entities will incur significant economic costs to comply 
with the CIP Reliability Standards.\206\
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    \205\ The APPA/LPPC estimate is based on a comparison of public 
power systems listed on the NERC compliance registry as of September 
2007 with Energy Information Administration Form 861 data for 2005 
MWh sales to ultimate customers and sales for resale. The Commission 
estimates that ``the CIP Reliability Standards will apply to 
approximately 632 small entities, consisting of 12 small investor-
owned utilities and 620 small municipals and cooperatives.''
    \206\ For example, APPA/LPPC state that many small distribution 
utilities with fewer than 50 employees may nonetheless own and 
operate 20 MVA generators. Many of these generators were constructed 
prior to the industry's adoption of a modern information technology 
infrastructure. A rigid implementation of the ``technical 
feasibility'' exception discussed above may lead to directives to 
adopt remediation plans that bring these units up to current 
industry standards. However, the costs required to retrofit such 
facilities to meet new cyber-security requirements may well force 
the owners to retire many of these units instead. APPA/LPPC at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    791. Despite these reservations, APPA/ LPPC believe that the broad 
contour of the rule contemplated by the CIP NOPR, subject to the 
changes they request in comments, satisfies the requirements of the 
RFA. APPA/LPPC state that they recognize that CIP Reliability Standards 
are necessary to ensure the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power 
System. While NERC's proposed standards will place the burden on many 
small entities to identify critical assets and critical cyber assets, 
this approach is far superior to a top-down approach to asset 
classification. Assuming small entities do have critical assets and 
critical cyber assets, they will have to take on significant burdens 
and incur significant costs to protect their critical cyber assets. 
However, APPA/LPPC state that NERC's proposed timeline for the 
implementation plan appears feasible. Moreover, they state that joint 
action agencies and other similar organizations may form joint 
registration organizations that accept compliance responsibilities for 
their members or provide compliance services to their members.
    792. Arkansas Electric fully supports the comments submitted in 
this docket by NRECA. Arkansas Electric argues that, throughout the CIP 
NOPR, the Commission proposes significant changes to the Reliability 
Standards which will increase the amount of effort and expense required 
to comply. Arkansas Electric is concerned that the costs of these 
additional resources will be especially high for small entities, when 
viewed in a relative sense. Arkansas Electric is concerned that, even 
with the friendly tone that some state regulators have taken toward 
rate recovery for cyber security-related expenses, these dollars would 
still come from its members. Arkansas Electric

[[Page 7446]]

respectfully asks the Commission to keep cooperatives and small 
entities in mind as it proposes changes to the CIP Reliability 
Standards. The resources available within such organizations to comply 
with the Reliability Standards are often quite limited.
    793. California Cogeneration and Energy Producers argue that the 
eight cyber security Reliability Standards will impose significant new 
compliance costs on registered entities to the extent they identify 
critical cyber assets, under CIP-002-1. They suggest that the 
Commission should direct the ERO to develop pro forma models of 
protocols and methodologies to be used by entities to facilitate 
compliance. California Cogeneration submits that pro forma protocols 
could help mitigate the costs of compliance with the requirements of 
Reliability Standards CIP-003-1 through CIP-009-1. California 
Cogeneration points out that the CIP NOPR suggested that groups of 
entities could collaborate to reduce compliance costs; California 
Cogeneration argues that this approach could be expanded to include a 
formal role for NERC.
    794. To maximize the effectiveness and the focus of the Reliability 
Standards, Energy Producers argues that NERC should revisit the NERC 
Functional Model to include a qualifying facility (QF) category so that 
Reliability Standards specific to QFs can be developed to account for 
their unique operating characteristics. To ensure that the regulations 
effectively promote reliability while not imposing unreasonable costs, 
Energy Producers argues that the regulations should provide a rigorous 
definition of critical cyber assets. Such rigor would be provided, 
first, by retaining the definitions contained in the current draft of 
the regulations, and second, by providing greater specificity to the 
risk-based assessment required in CIP-002-1.
    795. Iowa Municipals is concerned about the impact that the CIP 
Reliability Standards will have on smaller entities. While it is true 
that smaller entities can provide a cyber gateway to larger entities, 
and many smaller entities will be excluded through the identification 
of critical cyber assets, it is equally true that some smaller entities 
will, nonetheless, be subjected to the CIP Reliability Standards. The 
CIP NOPR pays insufficient attention to supporting compliance by 
smaller entities. Iowa Municipals makes some suggestions that will 
assist the Commission to enable smaller entities to comply with the 
Reliability Standards.
    796. One area in which smaller entities' compliance efforts can be 
supported is through the self-certification process. Iowa Municipals 
supports the comments filed by MidAmerican that support a semi-annual 
certification process. As an enhancement to this process, Iowa 
Municipals recommends that the Commission require NERC to provide a 
``lessons learned'' report to entities within 30 days of the 
certification deadline. This report has the potential of providing 
invaluable guidance and assistance to smaller entities.
    797. Iowa Municipals also urges the Commission to support smaller 
entities' compliance efforts by providing either a longer compliance 
timetable, or providing temporary waivers upon an adequate showing of 
work to attain compliance. Further, Iowa Municipals suggests that 
compliance by smaller entities can be promoted by allowing smaller 
entities to walk in the footsteps of larger entities and reach 
compliance more quickly by taking advantage of lessons learned by 
others. Iowa Municipals also argues that following such a better path 
to compliance by smaller entities should ultimately provide a higher 
level of system protection.
    798. The Southwest TDUs state that the CIP NOPR seems to be of two 
minds on how the impact of the CIP Reliability Standards might be 
addressed for smaller entities. On the one hand, the Commission 
proposes that NERC and the Regional Entities help the small entities by 
providing technical support to identify critical assets. On the other, 
the Commission acknowledges that these Reliability Standards could be 
made applicable down to the smallest entity, which appears to discount 
the economic impact on these entities required to be analyzed by the 
RFA because cyber security operations may actually be managed by a 
control area operator or other larger entity. Southwest TDUs argue that 
just because a larger entity is performing compliance does not mean the 
costs of compliance are not being passed on to the small entities. 
Indeed, there is every likelihood that that will be the case. Southwest 
TDUs maintain that it does not know how onerous a burden small entities 
face. The Commission must be ready to adjust the CIP requirements, if 
experience shows that the burden on small entities proves to be 
onerous.

C. Commission Determination

    799. As of October 2007, there are 1,772 registered entities, of 
which the Commission estimates that approximately 1,400 will be 
responsible for compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards. Of 
these, the Commission estimates that the CIP Reliability Standards 
would apply to approximately 632 small entities, consisting of 12 small 
investor-owned utilities and 620 small municipal and cooperatives.
    800. Arkansas Electric raises concerns with the cost to small 
entities of the modifications directed by the Commission. These 
modifications will be made by the ERO through the Reliability Standards 
development process. Until NERC files any revised Reliability 
Standards, the Commission cannot estimate their burden on any user, 
owner or operator of the Bulk-Power System, including small entities. 
The Commission therefore does not believe it is appropriate to 
speculate on the cost of compliance with any modified Reliability 
Standard at this time.
    801. The Commission does not believe it is appropriate to grant 
California Cogeneration's request that NERC develop pro forma models of 
protocols and methodologies to be used by entities to facilitate 
compliance. As discussed in the section regarding guidance, that level 
of detail could potentially introduce common vulnerabilities resulting 
from all small entities implementing the Reliability Standards using a 
nearly identical solution. With respect to California Cogeneration's 
suggestion that NERC should have a formal role in collaborating to 
reduce compliance costs, the Commission will not direct that at this 
time. However, NERC should consider providing information to such 
groups. Further, the Commission believes that requiring the ERO to 
develop guidance on how to comply with the Reliability Standards should 
facilitate compliance by small entities.
    802. The Commission also declines to direct the ERO to include a QF 
category in the Functional Model, as requested by Energy Producers. The 
Commission believes that this request is outside the scope of this 
rulemaking, which only concerns the CIP Reliability Standards proposed 
by NERC.
    803. The Commission does not believe it is necessary to allow small 
entities a longer compliance timetable or to provide temporary waivers 
upon an adequate showing of work to attain compliance. As we stated in 
the CIP NOPR, the burden to small entities is not great, but the 
economic impact is justified as necessary to protect cyber security 
assets that support Bulk-Power System reliability. Further, the 
Commission believes that allowing small entities to collectively select 
a

[[Page 7447]]

single consultant to develop model software and programs to comply with 
the CIP Reliability Standard will allow the small entities to take 
advantage of any information known by larger entities or their 
consultants.
    804. While Southwest TDUs are correct that the Commission 
acknowledges that the Reliability Standards could be made applicable 
down to the smallest entity, the Commission disagrees that this 
discounts the economic impact on these entities. As we stated in the 
CIP NOPR, to be included in the compliance registry, the ERO will have 
made a determination that a specific small entity has a material impact 
on the Bulk-Power System. A small entity placed on the compliance 
registry could then appeal the determination to the ERO and the 
Commission.
    805. Further, Southwest TDUs argue that just because a larger 
entity is performing compliance does not mean the costs of compliance 
are not being passed on to the small entities. We agree; however, in 
allowing small entities to pool their resources and select a single 
consultant to develop model software and programs, each entity need not 
separately fund model software and programs development. Rather, that 
cost can be spread over several entities.
    806. For the reasons stated in the CIP NOPR and above, the 
Commission certifies that this rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, 
no regulatory flexibility analysis is required.

VI. Document Availability

    807. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in 
the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's 

Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
    808. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is 
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on 
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or 
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket 
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket 
number field.
    809. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web 
site during normal business hours from FERC's Online Support at 202-
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-

8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at 
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.


VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    810. This Final Rule is effective April 7, 2008. The Commission has 
determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is a ``major 
rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.\207\ The Commission will submit the 
Final Rule to both houses of Congress and to the General Accountability 
Office.
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    \207\ See 5 U.S.C. 804(2) (2007).
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List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40

    Administrative practice and procedure, Electric power, Penalties, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    By the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-1317 Filed 2-6-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
