[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 5, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 60338-60344]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-21571]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 21

[Docket No. FAA-2022-0533]


Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for 
the Insitu Inc. ScanEagle3 Unmanned Aircraft

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed airworthiness criteria.

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SUMMARY: The FAA announces the availability of and requests comments on 
proposed airworthiness criteria for the Insitu Inc. Model ScanEagle3 
unmanned aircraft (UA). This document proposes the airworthiness 
criteria that the FAA finds to be appropriate and applicable for the UA 
design.

DATES: Send comments on or before November 4, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2022-0533 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140, 
West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m., and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to https://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal 
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the 
docket website, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all 
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the 
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an 
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act 
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at https://www.dot.gov/privacy.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of 
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher J. Richards, Emerging 
Aircraft Strategic Policy Section, AIR-618, Strategic Policy Management 
Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 6020 28th Avenue South, Room 103, 
Minneapolis, MN 55450, telephone (612) 253-4559.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested people to take part in the development 
of these airworthiness criteria by sending written comments, data, or 
views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the 
airworthiness criteria, explain the reason for any recommended change, 
and include supporting data. Comments on operational, pilot 
certification, and maintenance requirements would address issues that 
are beyond the scope of this document.
    Except for Confidential Business Information as described in the 
following paragraph, and other information as described in title 14, 
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 11.35, the FAA will file in the 
docket all comments received, as well as a report summarizing each 
substantive public

[[Page 60339]]

contact with FAA personnel concerning these proposed airworthiness 
criteria. Before acting on this proposal, the FAA will consider all 
comments received on or before the closing date for comments. The FAA 
will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without 
incurring delay. The FAA may change these airworthiness criteria based 
on received comments.

Confidential Business Information

    Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial 
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by 
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), 
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to 
these proposed airworthiness criteria contain commercial or financial 
information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually 
treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to these proposed 
airworthiness criteria, it is important that you clearly designate the 
submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission 
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked 
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and the indicated comments 
will not be placed in the public docket of these proposed airworthiness 
criteria. Send submissions containing CBI to the individual listed 
under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Comments the FAA receives, which 
are not specifically designated as CBI, will be placed in the public 
docket for these proposed airworthiness criteria.

Background

    Insitu Inc. (Insitu) applied to the FAA on November 10, 2017, for a 
special class type certificate under 14 CFR 21.17(b) for the Model 
ScanEagle3 UA.
    The Model ScanEagle3 consists of a fixed-wing airplane UA and its 
associated elements (AE) including communication links and components 
that control the UA. The Model ScanEagle3 UA has a maximum gross 
takeoff weight of 85 pounds. It has a wingspan of approximately 13 feet 
and is approximately 6.5 feet in length. The Model ScanEagle3 UA is 
powered by a single internal combustion engine. The unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) operations would rely on high levels of automation and 
include a single UA operated by a single pilot. Insitu anticipates 
operators will use the Model ScanEagle3 for surveillance of linear 
infrastructure (gas/oil pipelines, electric transmission lines, 
railroad tracks, etc.), area assessments (forest fires, natural 
disasters, ship channels, etc.), and maritime operations (ice floe 
movement, marine mammal tracking, etc.). The proposed concept of 
operations for the Model ScanEagle3 identifies a maximum operating 
altitude of 3,500 feet above ground level, a maximum airspeed of 80 
knots, operations beyond visual line of sight of the pilot, and 
operations over human beings. Insitu has not requested type 
certification for flight into known icing for the Model ScanEagle3.
    Under 14 CFR 21.17(c), an application for type certification is 
effective for 3 years. Section 21.17(d) provides that where a type 
certificate has not been issued within that 3-year time limit, the 
applicant may file for an extension and update the designated 
applicable regulations in the type certification basis. The effective 
date of the applicable airworthiness requirements for the updated type 
certification basis must not be earlier than 3 years before the date of 
issue of the type certificate. Since the project was not certificated 
within 3 years after the application date above, the FAA approved the 
applicant's request to extend the project. The date of the updated type 
certification basis is June 1, 2020, based upon the applicant's 
proposed type certificate issuance date of June 1, 2023.

Discussion

    The FAA establishes airworthiness criteria to ensure the safe 
operation of aircraft in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 44701(a) and 44704. 
UA are type certificated by the FAA as special class aircraft for which 
airworthiness standards have not been established by regulation. Under 
the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17(b), the airworthiness standards for 
special class aircraft are those the FAA finds to be appropriate and 
applicable to the specific type design.
    The applicant has proposed a design with constraints upon its 
operations and an unusual design characteristic: the pilot is remotely 
located. The FAA developed existing airworthiness standards to 
establish an appropriate level of safety for each product and its 
intended use. The FAA's existing airworthiness standards did not 
envision aircraft with no pilot in the flight deck and the technologies 
associated with that capability.
    The FAA has reviewed the proposed design and assessed the potential 
risk to the National Airspace System. The FAA considered the size of 
the proposed aircraft, its maximum airspeed and altitude, and 
operational limitations to address the number of unmanned aircraft per 
operator and to address operations in which the aircraft would operate 
beyond the visual line of sight of the pilot. These factors allowed the 
FAA to assess the potential risk the aircraft could pose to other 
aircraft and to human beings on the ground. Using these parameters, the 
FAA developed airworthiness criteria to address those potential risks 
to ensure the aircraft remains reliable, controllable, safe, and 
airworthy.
    The proposed criteria focus on mitigating hazards by establishing 
safety outcomes that must be achieved, rather than by establishing 
prescriptive requirements that must be met. This is in contrast to many 
current airworthiness standards, used to certificate traditional 
aircraft systems, which prescribe specific indicators and instruments 
for a pilot in a flight deck that would be inappropriate for UA. The 
FAA finds that the proposed criteria are appropriate and applicable for 
the UA design, based on the intended operational concepts for the UA as 
identified by the applicant.
    The FAA selected the particular airworthiness criteria proposed by 
this notice for the following reasons:
    General: In order to determine appropriate and applicable 
airworthiness standards for UA as a special class of aircraft, the FAA 
determined that the applicant must provide information describing the 
characteristics and capabilities of the UA and how it will be used.
    D&R.001 Concept of Operations: To assist the FAA in identifying and 
analyzing the risks and impacts associated with integrating the 
proposed UA design into the National Airspace System, the applicant 
would be required to submit a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The 
proposed criteria would require the applicant's CONOPS to identify the 
intended operational concepts for the UA and describe the UAS and its 
operation. The applicant would be required to describe the information 
in the CONOPS in sufficient detail to determine parameters and extent 
of testing, as well as operating limitations that will be placed in the 
UA Flight Manual. If the applicant requests to include collision 
avoidance equipment, the proposed criteria would require the applicant 
to identify such equipment in the CONOPS.
    D&R.005 Definitions: The proposed criteria include a definitions 
section, distinguishing the term ``loss of flight'' from ``loss of 
control.''
    Design and Construction: The FAA selected the design and 
construction criteria in this section to address airworthiness 
requirements where the flight testing demonstration alone may

[[Page 60340]]

not be sufficient to demonstrate an appropriate level of safety.
    D&R.100 UA Signal Monitoring and Transmission: To address the risks 
associated with loss of control of the UA, the applicant would be 
required to design the UA to monitor and transmit to the AE all 
information necessary for continued safe flight and operation. Some of 
the AE are located separately from the UA, and therefore are a unique 
feature to UAS. As a result, no regulatory airworthiness standards 
exist that directly apply to this part of the system. The FAA based 
some of the proposed criteria on existing regulations that address the 
information that must be provided to a pilot in the flight deck of a 
manned aircraft, and modified them as appropriate to the UAS. These 
proposed criteria list the specific minimum types of information the 
FAA finds are necessary for the UA to transmit for continued safe 
flight and operation; however, the applicant must determine whether 
additional parameters are necessary.
    D&R.105 UAS AE Required for Safe UA Operations: Because safe UAS 
operations depend and rely on both the UA and the AE, the FAA considers 
the AE in assessing whether the UA meets the criteria that comprise the 
certification basis. While the AE items themselves will be outside the 
scope of the UA type design, the applicant must provide sufficient 
specifications for any aspect of the AE, including the control station, 
which could affect airworthiness. The proposed criteria would require a 
complete and unambiguous identification of the AE and their interface 
with the UA, so that their availability or use is readily apparent.
    As explained in FAA Policy Memorandum AIR600-21-AIR-600-PM01, dated 
July 13, 2021, the FAA will approve either the specific AE or minimum 
specifications for the AE, as identified by the applicant, as part of 
the type certificate by including them as an operating limitation in 
the type certificate data sheet and flight manual. The FAA may impose 
additional operating limitations specific to the AE through conditions 
and limitations for inclusion in the operational approval (i.e., 
waivers, exemptions, operating certificates, or a combination of 
these). In this way, the FAA will consider the entirety of the UAS for 
operational approval and oversight.
    D&R.110 Software: Software for manned aircraft is certified under 
the regulations applicable to systems, equipment, and installations 
(e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2510, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309). There are two 
regulations that specifically prescribe airworthiness standards for 
software: Engine airworthiness standards (Sec.  33.28) and propeller 
airworthiness standards (Sec.  35.23). The proposed UA software 
criteria are based on these regulations and tailored for the risks 
posed by UA software.
    D&R.115 Cyber Security: The location of the pilot separate from the 
UA requires a continuous wireless connection (command and control link) 
with the UA for the pilot to monitor and control it. Because the 
purpose of this link is to control the aircraft, this makes the UA 
susceptible to cyber security threats in a unique way.
    The current regulations for the certification of systems, 
equipment, and installations (e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2510, 25.1309, 
27.1309, and 29.1309) do not adequately address potential security 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by unauthorized access to 
aircraft systems, data buses, and services. For manned aircraft, the 
FAA therefore issues special conditions for particular designs with 
network security vulnerabilities.
    To address the risks to the UA associated with intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions, the applicant would be required 
to design the UAS's systems and networks to protect against intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions and mitigate potential adverse 
effects. The FAA based the language for the proposed criteria on 
recommendations in the final report dated August 22, 2016, from the 
Aircraft System Information Security/Protection (ASISP) working group, 
under the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. Although the 
recommendations pertained to manned aircraft, the FAA has reviewed the 
report and determined the recommendations are also appropriate for UA. 
The wireless connections used by UA make these aircraft susceptible to 
the same cyber security risks, and therefore require similar criteria 
as manned aircraft.
    D&R.120 Contingency Planning: The location of the pilot and the 
controls for the UAS, separate from the UA, is a unique feature to UAS. 
As a result, no regulatory airworthiness standards exist that directly 
apply to this feature of the system.
    To address the risks associated with loss of communication between 
the pilot and the UA, and thus the pilot's inability to control the UA, 
the proposed criteria would require that the UA be designed to 
automatically execute a predetermined action. Because the pilot needs 
to be aware of the particular predetermined action the UA will take 
when there is a loss of communication between the pilot and the UA, the 
proposed criteria would require that the applicant identify the 
predetermined action in the UA Flight Manual. The proposed criteria 
would also include requirements for preventing takeoff when quality of 
service is inadequate.
    D&R.125 Lightning: Because of the size and physical limitations of 
this UA, it would be unlikely that this UA would incorporate 
traditional lightning protection features. To address the risks that 
would result from a lightning strike, the proposed criteria would 
require an operating limitation in the UA Flight Manual that prohibits 
flight into weather conditions conducive to lightning. The proposed 
criteria would also allow design characteristics to protect the UA from 
lightning as an alternative to the prohibition.
    D&R.130 Adverse Weather Conditions: Because of the size and 
physical limitations of this UA, adverse weather such as rain, snow, 
and icing pose a greater hazard to the UA than to manned aircraft. For 
the same reason, it would be unlikely that this UA would incorporate 
traditional protection features from icing. The FAA based the proposed 
criteria on the icing requirements in 14 CFR 23.2165(b) and (c) and 
applied them to all of these adverse weather conditions. The proposed 
criteria would allow design characteristics to protect the UA from 
adverse weather conditions. As an alternative, the proposed criteria 
would require an operating limitation in the UA Flight Manual that 
prohibits flight into known adverse weather conditions, and either also 
prevent inadvertent flight into adverse weather or provide a means to 
detect and to avoid or exit adverse weather conditions.
    D&R.135 Flight Essential Parts: The proposed criteria for flight 
essential parts are substantively the standards for normal category 
rotorcraft critical parts in Sec.  27.602, with changes to reflect UA 
terminology and failure conditions. Because part criticality is 
dependent on safety risk to those onboard the aircraft, the term 
``flight essential'' is used for those components of an unmanned 
aircraft whose failure may result in loss of flight or unrecoverable 
loss of UA control.
    D&R.140 Reciprocating Engine and Fuel Carriage: Proper storage and 
movement of fuel onboard the UA is necessary for safe operation. This 
includes fire prevention and protection, fuel venting and draining, 
prevention of fuel contamination, and fuel system crashworthiness.

[[Page 60341]]

    The proposed criteria would require that fluid lines be designed to 
prevent fires due to high temperature environments. Fuel auto-ignition 
typically occurs with temperatures in the 450 [deg]F-550 [deg]F range, 
depending on the fuel type, and oil begins to coke at 300 [deg]F. The 
proposed criteria would require that fuel lines are fire resistant, as 
defined in 14 CFR 1.1, at these temperatures to ensure adequate margin 
between ambient temperatures or hot surfaces and the relevant fluid 
degradation or ignition temperatures.
    The proposed criteria would also require that components be 
shielded or separated from ignition sources to minimize the possibility 
of leaking flammable fluids contacting ignition sources and igniting. 
Ignition sources include hot surfaces with temperatures at or above the 
typical auto-ignition temperature for aviation fuels, oils, and 
hydraulic fluids, or any component that produces an electrical 
discharge. Compliance with the proposed criteria may be shown by 
installation of drainage shrouds around flammable fluid lines or 
fittings, installation of spray shields to deflect leaking fuel away 
from ignition sources, or general component location on the engine that 
minimizes the possibility of starting and supporting a fire. The 
applicant's overall substantiation should show that leaked flammable 
fluid would not likely impinge on an ignition source to the extent of 
starting and supporting a fire.
    The proposed criteria would require adequate and effective 
ventilation and drainage to prevent the accumulation of fuel or fumes 
from minor leakage of fuel tanks or lines and minimize the possibility 
of fire or explosion in these spaces. Component malfunctions that 
result in a fuel, flammable fluid, or vapor leak should be safely 
drained or vented overboard to ensure that a fire hazard is not created 
during either normal or emergency service. Each part of the UA 
powerplant installation and any other designated fire zone utilizing 
flammable fluid or vapor carrying components should have the capability 
for complete, rapid drainage and ventilation. At a minimum, the 
routing, drainage, and ventilation system should accomplish the 
following:
    (1) It should be effective under normal and emergency operating 
conditions.
    (2) It should be designed and arranged so that no discharged fluid 
or vapor will create a fire hazard under normal and emergency operating 
conditions.
    (3) It should prevent accumulation of hazardous fluids and vapors 
in engine compartments and other designated fire zones.
    The primary concern with fuel contamination is the introduction of 
more than trace amounts of water and debris. Rather than requiring 
specific design features such as sumps, drains, vents, and filters, the 
proposed criteria require that the UA be designed to prevent hazardous 
amounts of contamination from reaching the engine. Compliance with this 
requirement will mitigate the risk of engine failure by addressing fuel 
contamination before the fuel reaches the engine.
    When assessing risk posed by UA, the presence of flammable fluids 
provides an additional source of potential hazard in the event of an 
accident due to the possibility of fire, which could spread beyond the 
immediate impact site of the aircraft. While traditional aircraft 
considerations with fuel system crashworthiness focuses on occupant 
protection, the intent of the fuel system crashworthiness for this UA 
is to ensure crash site containment and prevent the risk of injury or 
fatality to persons outside the immediate crash site.
    The durability and reliability of the engine itself will be 
demonstrated through the testing required by D&R.300.
    Operating Limitations and Information: Similar to manned aircraft, 
the FAA determined that the UA applicant must provide airworthiness 
instructions, operating limitations, and flight and performance 
information necessary for the safe operation and continued operational 
safety of the UA.
    D&R.200 Flight Manual: The proposed criteria for the UA Flight 
Manual are substantively the same as those in Sec.  23.2620, with minor 
changes to reflect UA terminology.
    D&R.205 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: The proposed 
criteria for the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) are 
substantively the same as those in Sec.  23.1529, with minor changes to 
reflect UA terminology.
    Testing: Traditional certification methodologies for manned 
aircraft are based on design requirements verified at the component 
level by inspection, analysis, demonstration, or test. Due to the 
difference in size and complexity, the FAA determined testing 
methodologies that demonstrate reliability at the aircraft (UA) level, 
in addition to the design and construction criteria identified in this 
proposal, will achieve the same safety objective. The proposed testing 
criteria in sections D&R.300 through D&R.320 utilize these 
methodologies.
    D&R.300 Durability and Reliability: The FAA intends the proposed 
testing criteria in this section to cover key design aspects and 
prevent unsafe features at an appropriate level tailored for this UA. 
The proposed durability and reliability testing would require the 
applicant to demonstrate safe flight of the UA across the entire 
operational envelope and up to all operational limitations, for all 
phases of flight and all aircraft configurations. The UA would only be 
certificated for operations within the limitations prescribed for its 
operating environment, as defined in the applicant's proposed CONOPS 
and demonstrated by test. The FAA intends for this process to be 
similar to the process for establishing limitations prescribed for 
special purpose operations for restricted category aircraft. The 
proposed criteria would require that all flights during the testing be 
completed with no failures that result in a loss of flight, loss of 
control, loss of containment, or emergency landing outside of the 
operator's recovery zone.
    For some aircraft design requirements imposed by existing 
airworthiness standards (e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2135, 23.2600, 25.105, 
25.125, 27.141, 27.173, 29.51, 29.177), the aircraft must not require 
exceptional piloting skill or alertness. These rules recognize that 
pilots have varying levels of ability and attention. In a similar 
manner, the proposed criteria would require that the durability and 
reliability flight testing be performed by a pilot with average skill 
and alertness.
    Flight testing will be used to determine the aircraft's ability to 
withstand flight loads across the range of operating limits and the 
flight envelope. Because of the size of this UA, it may be subjected to 
significant ground loads when handled, lifted, carried, loaded, 
maintained, and transported physically by hand; therefore, the proposed 
criteria would require that the aircraft used for testing endure the 
same worst-case ground loads as those the UA will experience in 
operation after type certification.
    D&R.305 Probable Failures: The FAA intends the proposed testing 
criteria to evaluate how the UA functions after failures that are 
probable to occur. The applicant will test the UA by inducing certain 
failures and demonstrating that the failure will not result in a loss 
of containment or control of the UA. The proposed criteria contain the 
minimum types of failures the FAA finds are probable; however, the 
applicant must determine the probable failures related to any other 
equipment that will be addressed for this requirement.
    D&R.310 Capabilities and Functions: The proposed criteria for this 
section address the minimum

[[Page 60342]]

capabilities and functions the FAA finds are necessary in the design of 
the UA and would require the applicant to demonstrate these 
capabilities and functions by test. Due to the location of the pilot 
and the controls for UAS, separate from the UA, communication between 
the pilot and the UA is significant to the design. Thus, the proposed 
criteria would require the applicant to demonstrate the capability of 
the UAS to regain command and control after a loss. As with manned 
aircraft, the electrical system of the UA must have a capacity 
sufficient for all anticipated loads; the proposed criteria would 
require the applicant to demonstrate this by test.
    The proposed criteria contain functions that would allow the pilot 
to command the UA to deviate from its flight plan or from its pre-
programmed flight path. For example, in the event the pilot needs to 
deconflict the airspace, the UA must be able to respond to pilot inputs 
that override any pre-programming.
    In the event an applicant requests approval for certain features, 
such as geo-fencing or external cargo, the proposed criteria contain 
requirements to address the associated risks. The proposed criteria in 
this section would also require design of the UA to safeguard against 
an unintended discontinuation of flight or release of cargo, whether by 
human action or malfunction.
    D&R.315 Fatigue: The FAA intends the proposed criteria in this 
section to address the risks from reduced structural integrity and 
structural failure due to fatigue. The proposed criteria would require 
the applicant to establish an airframe life limit and demonstrate that 
loss of flight or loss of control due to structural failure will be 
avoided throughout the operational life of the UA. These proposed 
criteria would require the applicant to demonstrate this by test, while 
maintaining the UA in accordance with the ICA.
    D&R.320 Verification of Limits: This section would evaluate 
structural safety and address the risks associated with inadequate 
structural design. While the proposed criteria in D&R.300 address 
testing to demonstrate that the UA structure adequately supports 
expected loads throughout the flight and operational envelopes, the 
proposed criteria in this section would require an evaluation of the 
performance, maneuverability, stability, and control of the UA with a 
factor of safety.

Applicability

    These proposed airworthiness criteria, established under the 
provisions of Sec.  21.17(b), are applicable to the Model ScanEagle3 
UA. Should Insitu Inc. apply at a later date for a change to the type 
certificate to include another model, these airworthiness criteria 
would apply to that model as well, provided the FAA finds them 
appropriate in accordance with the requirements of subpart D to part 
21.

Conclusion

    This action affects only the airworthiness criteria for one model 
UA. It is not a standard of general applicability.

Authority Citation

    The authority citation for these airworthiness criteria is as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

Proposed Airworthiness Criteria

    The FAA proposes to establish the following airworthiness criteria 
for type certification of the Insitu Inc. Model ScanEagle3 UA. The FAA 
proposes that compliance with the following would mitigate the risks 
associated with the proposed design and Concept of Operations 
appropriately and would provide an equivalent level of safety to 
existing rules:

General

D&R.001 Concept of Operations

    The applicant must define and submit to the FAA a concept of 
operations (CONOPS) proposal describing the unmanned aircraft system 
(UAS) operation in the National Airspace System for which unmanned 
aircraft (UA) type certification is requested. The CONOPS proposal must 
include, at a minimum, a description of the following information in 
sufficient detail to determine the parameters and extent of testing and 
operating limitations:
    (a) The intended type of operations;
    (b) UA specifications;
    (c) Meteorological conditions;
    (d) Operators, pilots, and personnel responsibilities;
    (e) Control station, support equipment, and other associated 
elements (AE) necessary to meet the airworthiness criteria;
    (f) Command, control, and communication functions;
    (g) Operational parameters (such as population density, geographic 
operating boundaries, airspace classes, launch and recovery area, 
congestion of proposed operating area, communications with air traffic 
control, line of sight, and aircraft separation); and
    (h) Collision avoidance equipment, whether onboard the UA or part 
of the AE, if requested.

D&R.005 Definitions

    For purposes of these airworthiness criteria, the following 
definitions apply.
    (a) Loss of control: Loss of control means an unintended departure 
of an aircraft from controlled flight. It includes control reversal or 
an undue loss of longitudinal, lateral, and directional stability and 
control. It also includes an upset or entry into an unscheduled or 
uncommanded attitude with high potential for uncontrolled impact with 
terrain. A loss of control means a spin, loss of control authority, 
loss of aerodynamic stability, divergent flight characteristics, or 
similar occurrence, which could generally lead to crash.
    (b) Loss of flight: Loss of flight means a UA's inability to 
complete its flight as planned, up to and through its originally 
planned landing. It includes scenarios where the UA experiences 
controlled flight into terrain, obstacles, or any other collision, or a 
loss of altitude that is severe or non-reversible. Loss of flight also 
includes deploying a parachute or ballistic recovery system that leads 
to an unplanned landing outside the operator's designated recovery 
zone.

Design and Construction

D&R.100 UA Signal Monitoring and Transmission

    The UA must be designed to monitor and transmit to the AE all 
information required for continued safe flight and operation. This 
information includes, at a minimum, the following:
    (a) Status of all critical parameters for all fuel and energy 
storage systems;
    (b) Status of all critical parameters for all propulsion systems;
    (c) Flight and navigation information as appropriate, such as 
airspeed, heading, altitude, and location; and
    (d) Communication and navigation signal strength and quality, 
including contingency information or status.

D&R.105 UAS AE Required for Safe UA Operations

    (a) The applicant must identify and submit to the FAA all AE and 
interface conditions of the UAS that affect the airworthiness of the UA 
or are otherwise necessary for the UA to meet these airworthiness 
criteria. As part of this requirement--
    (1) The applicant may identify either specific AE or minimum 
specifications for the AE.
    (i) If minimum specifications are identified, they must include the 
critical

[[Page 60343]]

requirements of the AE, including performance, compatibility, function, 
reliability, interface, operator alerting, and environmental 
requirements.
    (ii) Critical requirements are those that if not met would impact 
the ability to operate the UA safely and efficiently.
    (2) The applicant may use an interface control drawing, a 
requirements document, or other reference, titled so that it is clearly 
designated as AE interfaces to the UA.
    (b) The applicant must show the FAA that the AE or minimum 
specifications identified in paragraph (a) of this section meet the 
following:
    (1) The AE provide the functionality, performance, reliability, and 
information to assure UA airworthiness in conjunction with the rest of 
the design;
    (2) The AE are compatible with the UA capabilities and interfaces;
    (3) The AE must monitor and transmit to the operator all 
information required for safe flight and operation, including but not 
limited to those identified in D&R.100 and
    (4) The minimum specifications, if identified, are correct, 
complete, consistent, and verifiable to assure UA airworthiness.
    (c) The FAA will establish the approved AE or minimum 
specifications as operating limitations and include them in the UA type 
certificate data sheet and Flight Manual.
    (d) The applicant must develop any maintenance instructions 
necessary to address implications from the AE on the airworthiness of 
the UA. Those instructions will be included in the Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness (ICA) required by D&R.205.

D&R.110 Software

    To minimize the existence of software errors, the applicant must:
    (a) Verify by test all software that may impact the safe operation 
of the UA;
    (b) Utilize a configuration management system that tracks, 
controls, and preserves changes made to software throughout the entire 
life cycle; and
    (c) Implement a problem reporting system that captures and records 
defects and modifications to the software.

D&R.115 Cybersecurity

    (a) UA equipment, systems, and networks, addressed separately and 
in relation to other systems, must be protected from intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions that may result in an adverse 
effect on the security or airworthiness of the UA. Protection must be 
ensured by showing that the security risks have been identified, 
assessed, and mitigated as necessary.
    (b) When required by paragraph (a) of this section, procedures and 
instructions to ensure security protections are maintained must be 
included in the ICA.

D&R.120 Contingency Planning

    (a) The UA must be designed so that, in the event of a loss of the 
command and control (C2) link, the UA will automatically and 
immediately execute a safe predetermined flight, loiter, landing, or 
termination.
    (b) The applicant must establish the predetermined action in the 
event of a loss of the C2 link and include it in the UA Flight Manual.
    (c) The UA Flight Manual must include the minimum performance 
requirements for the C2 data link, defining when the C2 link is 
degraded to a level where remote active control of the UA is no longer 
ensured. Takeoff when the C2 link is degraded below the minimum link 
performance requirements must be prevented by design or prohibited by 
an operating limitation in the UA Flight Manual.

D&R.125 Lightning

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the UA 
must have design characteristics that will protect the UA from loss of 
flight or loss of control due to lightning.
    (b) If the UA has not been shown to protect against lightning, the 
UA Flight Manual must include an operating limitation to prohibit 
flight into weather conditions conducive to lightning activity.

D&R.130 Adverse Weather Conditions

    (a) For purposes of this section, ``adverse weather conditions'' 
means rain, snow, and icing.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, the UA 
must have design characteristics that will allow the UA to operate 
within the adverse weather conditions specified in the CONOPS without 
loss of flight or loss of control.
    (c) For adverse weather conditions for which the UA is not approved 
to operate, the applicant must develop operating limitations to 
prohibit flight into known adverse weather conditions and either:
    (1) Develop operating limitations to prevent inadvertent flight 
into adverse weather conditions; or
    (2) Provide a means to detect any adverse weather conditions for 
which the UA is not certificated to operate and show the UA's ability 
to avoid or exit those conditions.

D&R.135 Flight Essential Parts

    (a) A flight essential part is a part, the failure of which could 
result in a loss of flight or unrecoverable loss of UA control.
    (b) If the type design includes flight essential parts, the 
applicant must establish a flight essential parts list. The applicant 
must develop and define mandatory maintenance instructions or life 
limits, or a combination of both, to prevent failures of flight 
essential parts. Each of these mandatory actions must be included in 
the Airworthiness Limitations section of the ICA.

D&R.140 Reciprocating Engine and Fuel Carriage

    The applicant must show that the engine meets the following 
requirements.
    (a) Lines containing or conveying flammable fluids subject to high 
temperatures must be fire resistant.
    (b) Components must be shielded or located to safeguard against the 
ignition of leaking flammable fluid.
    (c) Compartments, including fuel tanks, where flammable fluid or 
vapor may exist must have adequate and effective ventilation and 
drainage.
    (d) The powerplant installation must be designed to prevent 
hazardous amounts of contamination of the fuel supplied to the engine.
    (e) The fuel system must protect the UA from damage that could 
result in spillage of enough fuel to constitute a fire hazard as a 
result of a reasonably foreseeable UA accident, based on the operating 
environment documented in the CONOPS.

Operating Limitations and Information

D&R.200 Flight Manual

    The applicant must provide a Flight Manual with each UA.
    (a) The UA Flight Manual must contain the following information:
    (1) UA operating limitations;
    (2) UA operating procedures;
    (3) Performance information;
    (4) Loading information; and
    (5) Other information that is necessary for safe operation because 
of design, operating, or handling characteristics.
    (b) Those portions of the UA Flight Manual containing the 
information specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section must be 
approved by the FAA.

D&R.205 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

    The applicant must prepare the ICA for the UA in accordance with 
Appendix A to Part 23, as appropriate, that are acceptable to the FAA. 
The ICA may be incomplete at type certification

[[Page 60344]]

if a program exists to ensure their completion prior to delivery of the 
first UA or issuance of a standard airworthiness certificate, whichever 
occurs later.

Testing

D&R.300 Durability and Reliability

    The UA must be designed to be durable and reliable when operated 
under the limitations prescribed for its operating environment, as 
documented in its CONOPS and included as operating limitations on the 
type certificate data sheet and in the UA Flight Manual. The durability 
and reliability must be demonstrated by flight test in accordance with 
the requirements of this section and completed with no failures that 
result in a loss of flight, loss of control, loss of containment, or 
emergency landing outside the operator's recovery area.
    (a) Once a UA has begun testing to show compliance with this 
section, all flights for that UA must be included in the flight test 
report.
    (b) Tests must include an evaluation of the entire flight envelope 
across all phases of operation and must address, at a minimum, the 
following:
    (1) Flight distances;
    (2) Flight durations;
    (3) Route complexity;
    (4) Weight;
    (5) Center of gravity;
    (6) Density altitude;
    (7) Outside air temperature;
    (8) Airspeed;
    (9) Wind;
    (10) Weather;
    (11) Operation at night, if requested;
    (12) Fuel and energy storage system capacity; and
    (13) Aircraft to pilot ratio.
    (c) Tests must include the most adverse combinations of the 
conditions and configurations in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (d) Tests must show a distribution of the different flight profiles 
and routes representative of the type of operations identified in the 
CONOPS.
    (e) Tests must be conducted in conditions consistent with the 
expected environmental conditions identified in the CONOPS, including 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) and high intensity radiated fields 
(HIRF).
    (f) Tests must not require exceptional piloting skill or alertness.
    (g) Any UAS used for testing must be subject to the same worst-case 
ground handling, shipping, and transportation loads as those allowed in 
service.
    (h) Any UA used for testing must use AE that meet, but do not 
exceed, the minimum specifications identified under D&R.105. If 
multiple AE are identified, the applicant must demonstrate each 
configuration.
    (i) Any UAS used for testing must be maintained and operated in 
accordance with the ICA and UA Flight Manual. No maintenance beyond the 
intervals established in the ICA will be allowed to show compliance 
with this section.
    (j) If cargo operations or external-load operations are requested, 
tests must show, throughout the flight envelope and with the cargo or 
the external load at the most critical combinations of weight and 
center of gravity, that--
    (1) The UA is safely controllable and maneuverable; and
    (2) The cargo or the external load is retainable and transportable.

D&R.305 Probable Failures

    The UA must be designed such that a probable failure will not 
result in a loss of containment or control of the UA. This must be 
demonstrated by test.
    (a) Probable failures related to the following equipment, at a 
minimum, must be addressed:
    (1) Propulsion systems;
    (2) C2 link;
    (3) Global Positioning System (GPS);
    (4) Flight control components with a single point of failure;
    (5) Control station; and
    (6) Any other AE identified by the applicant.
    (b) Any UA used for testing must be operated in accordance with the 
UA Flight Manual.
    (c) Each test must occur at the critical phase and mode of flight, 
and at the highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio.

D&R.310 Capabilities and Functions

    (a) All of the following required UAS capabilities and functions 
must be demonstrated by test:
    (1) Capability to regain command and control of the UA after the C2 
link has been lost.
    (2) Capability of the electrical system to power all UA systems and 
payloads.
    (3) Ability for the pilot to safely discontinue the flight.
    (4) Ability for the pilot to dynamically re-route the UA.
    (5) Ability to safely abort a takeoff.
    (6) Ability to safely abort a landing and initiate a go-around.
    (b) The following UAS capabilities and functions, if requested for 
approval, must be demonstrated by test:
    (1) Continued flight after degradation of the propulsion system.
    (2) Geo-fencing that contains the UA within a designated area, in 
all operating conditions.
    (3) Positive transfer of the UA between control stations that 
ensures only one control station can control the UA at a time.
    (4) Capability to release an external cargo load to prevent loss of 
control of the UA.
    (5) Capability to detect and avoid other aircraft and obstacles.
    (c) The UA must be designed to safeguard against inadvertent 
discontinuation of the flight and inadvertent release of cargo or 
external load.

D&R.315 Fatigue

    The structure of the UA must be shown to withstand the repeated 
loads expected during its service life without failure. A life limit 
for the airframe must be established, demonstrated by test, and 
included in the ICA.

D&R.320 Verification of Limits

    The performance, maneuverability, stability, and control of the UA 
within the flight envelope described in the UA Flight Manual must be 
demonstrated at a minimum of 5% over maximum gross weight with no loss 
of control or loss of flight.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 29, 2022.
Ian Lucas,
Manager, Policy Implementation Section, Policy and Innovation Division, 
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-21571 Filed 10-4-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


