[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 106 (Tuesday, June 2, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 33583-33587]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11351]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2020-0493; Product Identifier 2019-CE-046-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Textron Aviation, Inc. Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) 
2019-08-13 for Textron Aviation, Inc. (type certificate previously held 
by Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 525, 525A, and 525B airplanes with 
Tamarack active load alleviation system (ATLAS) winglets installed in 
accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA03842NY. AD 2019-
08-13 resulted from mandatory continuing airworthiness information 
(MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to 
identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The 
MCAI describes the unsafe condition as malfunction of the ATLAS. This 
AD results from the identification of corrective actions that, if 
implemented, allow operators to reactivate the ATLAS and restore 
operations to normal procedures. The FAA is proposing this AD to 
address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by July 17, 
2020.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited and Tamarack Aerospace 
Group service information identified in this AD, contact Cranfield 
Aerospace Solutions Ltd., Cranfield, Bedford MK43 0AL, United Kingdom; 
telephone: +44 1234 754 166; FAX: +44 1234 752 375; email: 
g.mitchell@cranfieldaerospace.com; internet: https://www.cranfieldaerospace.com/service/aircraft-modification-products/et. 
You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, 
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, 
Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of 
this material at the FAA, call (816) 329-4148.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-
0493; or in person at Docket Operations Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this

[[Page 33584]]

proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and 
other information. The street address for the Docket Office is listed 
above. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after 
receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Steven Dzierzynski, Avionics Engineer, 
FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New 
York 11590; telephone: (516) 287-7367; fax: (516) 794-5531; email: 
steven.dzierzynski@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2020-0493; 
Product Identifier 2019-CE-046-AD'' at the beginning of your comments. 
The FAA specifically invites comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. The 
FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date and may 
amend this proposed AD because of those comments.
    The FAA will post all comments received, without change, to https://regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The 
FAA will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact 
received about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The FAA issued AD 2019-08-13, Amendment 39-19634 (84 FR 24007; May 
24, 2019) (``AD 2019-08-13'') for Textron Aviation, Inc. Models 525, 
525A, and 525B airplanes with Tamarack ATLAS winglets installed in 
accordance with STC SA03842NY. AD 2019-08-13 prohibits all flight by 
revising the operating limitations in the airplane flight manual (AFM) 
and fabricating and installing a placard, until a modification has been 
incorporated in accordance with an FAA-approved method. AD 2019-080-13 
was based on MCAI originated by the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the 
European Community. EASA issued AD No. 2019-0086-E, dated April 19, 
2019, to address an unsafe condition related to reports of the ATLAS 
malfunctioning, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.

Actions Since AD 2019-08-13 Was Issued

    Since the FAA issued AD 2019-08-13, Cranfield Aerospace Solutions 
Limited (Cranfield), the holder of STC SA03842NY, determined that 
failure of the Tamarack Active Camber Surface (TACS) control units 
(TCUs) was caused by a printed circuit board attachment screw coming 
loose, which caused a short circuit in the TCU. EASA revised the MCAI 
and issued EASA AD No. 2019-0086R1, dated August 9, 2019, to require 
modifications previously developed by Cranfield to restore the safety 
of the ATLAS design. Cranfield modified the TCUs with a self-locking 
screw, an additional flat washer, and linear variable differential 
transformer potting to prevent detachment from vibration during flight. 
Cranfield also developed centering strips to modify the trailing edge 
of the TACS that will return the TACS to faired when TCU power is 
removed or when the TACS are ``blown'' out of position if ATLAS power 
is removed.
    Installation of the modified TCU will prevent a short circuit of 
the ATLAS TCU, and installation of the centering strips to the TACS 
will ensure the TACS remains in a faired position in case of 
inadvertent power loss to the ATLAS.
    Cranfield also revised the Tamarack maintenance manual supplement 
for airplanes with the Tamarack ATLAS winglets installed to include 
instructions for continued airworthiness related to the centering 
strips.

Comments

    The FAA gave the public the opportunity to comment on AD 2019-08-13 
and received 34 comments. The majority of the commenters were operators 
and maintenance personnel. The remaining commenters included Tamarack 
Aerospace Group (Tamarack) and the General Aviation Manufacturers 
Association (GAMA). The following presents the relevant comments 
received on AD 2019-08-13 and the FAA's response to each comment.

A. Supportive Comments

    Erin Saunders, Victor Ochoa, and an anonymous commenter support the 
AD action.

B. Comments Regarding the FAA's Justification of an Unsafe Condition 
Requests for a Thorough Investigation of the Issues

    Many commenters questioned or requested clarification of the FAA's 
determination that there is an unsafe condition. Seven commenters 
stated the FAA should have completed a more thorough investigation and 
analysis of the issues. Tamarack, Advanced Jets, LLC (Advanced Jets), 
and Kenneth Adelman requested the FAA consider that the data extracted 
from the incident aircraft does not agree with the pilot's description 
of an aggressive roll rate. John Harris, Andrew Vann, Douglas Sayre, 
and five other commenters stated that the malfunction of the European 
aircraft that prompted EASA's emergency AD was caused by the failure of 
the operator to comply with the manufacturer's mandatory service 
bulletin. These commenters noted that there have been no failures 
experienced by aircraft with winglets that have complied with the 
manufacturer's mandatory service bulletin. Fourteen commenters stated 
they have been operating for a considerable time with the ATLAS 
winglets and have not experienced any issues. These commenters further 
stated that installation of the winglets increases performance, safety, 
and economy and expressed support for Tamarack as a company.
    The FAA has considered the comments pertaining to the pilot's 
incident report on the European airplane. At the time AD 2019-08-13 was 
issued, the airplane data from the incident that prompted the EASA AD 
was not available. However, the FAA analyzed the information from the 
pilot's incident report and additional information received from EASA 
to make the decision to issue AD 2019-08-13. Since AD 2019-08-13 was 
issued, Cranfield provided data to identify the root cause of the 
unsafe condition and to provide corrective action, which prompted this 
superseding NPRM.
    The FAA agrees with the comments regarding the operator's failure 
to comply with the manufacturer's service bulletin. However, operators 
are not required to comply with manufacturer service bulletins unless 
mandated by the FAA or other civil aviation authority. EASA AD No. 
2019-0086-E, dated April 19, 2019, which prompted AD 2019-08-13, did 
not require incorporation of the service bulletins for TCU modification 
and installation of the centering strips. This NPRM proposes to require 
TCU modification and installation of the centering strips using 
Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin CAS/SB1480, 
Issue A, dated July 2019 (Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A), which 
incorporates two earlier service bulletins for those actions.
    The fact that commenters' personal experience with ATLAS winglets 
has been positive does not negate the existence of an unsafe condition. 
Despite any benefit to individual owners when the system operates

[[Page 33585]]

without failure, the FAA determined that an unsafe condition with the 
ATLAS exists and requires corrective action.

Requests To Clarify the Hazard Caused by a Malfunction

    Four commenters disputed the FAA's determination that a malfunction 
of the ATLAS may reduce the pilot's ability to control the airplane. 
Tamarack noted that this determination conflicts with the certification 
basis and system safety analysis of the design and compliance data 
during certification testing. Advanced Jets stated that the ATLAS has 
been shown to be safe at speeds under 140 knots even if it 
malfunctions. Kenneth Adelman stated that any reduction of pilot 
control when the ATLAS malfunctions is minor and was demonstrated as 
safe during the original certification of the system.
    The FAA disagrees with these comments. The ATLAS complied with the 
certification basis during certification testing. EASA performed the 
certification flight tests, and those tests included the ``worst case'' 
condition where the TACS were deployed in a fully asymmetric failure 
position that induces the greatest roll input. EASA determined that 
case to be ``recoverable.'' However, the incident exposed a failure 
mode that was not anticipated during certification, which is the basis 
of this NPRM.

Requests To Clarify the FAA's Position on the Use of Speed Tape

    Kenneth Adelman, Advanced Jets, and two anonymous commenters 
questioned the FAA's rejection of the use speed tape to hold the 
winglets flush. These commenters noted that speed tape is a product 
that is widely accepted and has been used for decades.
    The FAA disagrees. The statement in the AD regarding the use of 
``speed tape'' as a corrective action to prevent movement of the TACS 
during flight is based on discussions between the FAA and EASA. Speed 
tape is non-structural; therefore, it cannot be relied upon to 
immobilize the TACS. The corrective action in the EASA AD required 
disabling the TACS. Furthermore, any modifications mandated through AD 
action become changes to the type design. As explained in AD 2019-08-
13, the speed tape did not have sufficient testing and analysis to 
support the type design.
    The FAA did not change this NPRM as a result of these comments.

C. Comments Regarding the NTSB Investigation

    Tamarack, Advanced Jets, GAMA, and six other commenters noted that 
AD 2019-08-13 contained an incorrect statement regarding the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of a fatal accident 
and the role the ATLAS may have played in the accident. Most of these 
commenters stated that the preliminary report released by the NTSB did 
not reference the ATLAS. These commenters requested the FAA correct or 
remove the statement if it is not accurate.
    The FAA agrees. The preamble language of AD 2019-08-13 contained a 
statement pertaining to an NTSB investigation into a fatal airplane 
accident. Although the airplane involved in the accident had the ATLAS 
STC installed, since the NTSB has not released its factual report, that 
statement should not have been in the preamble of AD 2019-08-13.

D. Comments Requesting the FAA Rescind the AD

    Vincent Phillips, Stanley Jobe, and CJ Holdings requested that the 
AD be rescinded and the airplanes returned to service. Two of these 
commenters noted that EASA has revised its emergency AD and urged the 
FAA to do the same.
    The FAA partially agrees. The FAA has determined that an unsafe 
condition exists on the ATLAS and that action to address the condition 
is required; therefore, the FAA disagrees with rescinding the AD. 
However, since AD 2019-08-13 was issued, the root cause of the failure 
of the ATLAS winglets has been identified. For the reasons explained in 
more detail in response to other comments, this NPRM proposes to 
supersede AD 2019-08-13 to allow operation of the airplane after 
modifying the ATLAS.

E. Comments Requesting Modifications to the AD

    Twelve commenters noted that Cranfield's TCU upgrade and centering 
strips modification eliminate the unsafe condition. These commenters 
requested the FAA allow the modifications as an alternative to the 
operational prohibition of AD 2019-08-13. Richard Helms and several 
other commenters stated that no aircraft with these modifications have 
experienced upsets. Jerome Simon requested the FAA define an 
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) so the airplanes could return 
to flight.
    The FAA agrees. This NPRM proposes to supersede AD 2019-08-13. 
Instead of the operational prohibition of AD 2019-08-13, this NPRM 
proposes to require modification of the TCU and installation of the 
centering strips on the TACS using Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A, which 
incorporates two earlier service bulletins for those actions. This NPRM 
also proposes revising the Tamarack maintenance manual supplement to 
add inspections for the centering strips.

F. Comments Regarding the Costs of Compliance

    Several commenters requested the FAA modify the cost of compliance 
to include costs associated with loss of revenue from the inability to 
fly the airplanes. These commenters stated that AD 2019-08-13 is 
costing operators anywhere from thousands of dollars per month to 
millions of dollars in total.
    The FAA disagrees. The FAA acknowledges the economic hardship for 
those who depend on their airplanes for income. However, the cost 
analysis in AD rulemaking actions typically includes only the actual 
maintenance costs to comply with the AD and not indirect costs such as 
down-time and loss of revenue.

G. Comments Requesting Clarification on Type Design Change

    GAMA requested clarification on the language in AD 2019-08-13 
regarding speed tape as a type design change. GAMA questioned whether a 
temporary repair while waiting for a permanent design solution should 
be characterized as a type design change.
    The FAA agrees to provide clarification. The language in AD 2019-
08-13 is based on the FAA's Airworthiness Directives Legal 
Interpretation, which explained that AD-mandated modifications to an 
aircraft become part of the FAA-approved type design that must be 
maintained as required by Sec. Sec.  39.7 and 39.9 (81 FR 24695, April 
27, 2016). Regardless of whether a repair mandated by an AD is intended 
to be permanent or temporary, the repair becomes a required change to 
the type design unless and until the AD is superseded or rescinded or 
the operator obtains an approved AMOC.

H. Comment Requesting Pilot Training

    Three commenters requested or suggested the FAA require pilot 
training and familiarity with emergency procedures in the event of an 
uncommanded deflection of the ATLAS in flight.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenters' request for pilot training 
related to the uncommanded deflection of the ATLAS in flight. Since AD 
2019-08-13 was issued, the root cause of the

[[Page 33586]]

failure of the ATLAS winglets has been identified. This NPRM proposes 
to supersede AD 2019-08-13 to allow operation of the airplane after 
modifying the ATLAS. The ATLAS modification and associated manual 
revisions proposed in this NPRM are expected to mitigate the unsafe 
condition without the need for additional pilot training.

I. Comment Requesting Procedure To Pull ATLAS Circuit Breaker

    Kenneth Adelman requested the FAA require adding a line item to the 
abnormal/emergency section in the Tamarack Winglet AFM Supplement to 
indicate that, in the event of a TCAS runaway, the circuit breaker 
should be pulled.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenter's request to revise the Tamarack 
Winglet AFM Supplement. As stated earlier, since AD 2019-08-13 was 
issued, the root cause of the failure of the ATLAS winglets has been 
identified. This NPRM proposes to supersede AD 2019-08-13 to allow 
operation of the airplane after modifying the ATLAS. The ATLAS 
modification and associated manual revisions proposed in this NPRM are 
expected to mitigate the unsafe condition, precluding the need for the 
requested AFM revision.

J. Comments Regarding the FAA's Rulemaking Process

    Two commenters questioned the FAA's decision to issue AD 2019-08-13 
as an immediately effective rule without prior notice and comment. 
Richard Helms stated that this decision was neither justified nor 
reasonable. Advanced Jets noted that the FAA's action is not an 
emergency because of the amount of time (35 days) between issuance of 
EASA's emergency AD and the FAA's issuance of AD 2019-08-13.
    The FAA acknowledges the commenters' concerns that it took 35 days 
to issue AD 2019-08-13 without notice and comment. The FAA worked 
through the unique difficulties associated with this unsafe condition 
and considered all options. The FAA coordinated with EASA and the 
design approval holder before determining the best course of action to 
mitigate the unsafe condition. The risk to the flying public associated 
with this unsafe condition required immediate action. Allowing notice 
and comment would have delayed mitigating the unsafe condition 
significantly longer than 35 days. The FAA also notes that it is 
proposing to supersede AD 2019-08-13 based on comments received.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed the following service documents proposed for 
compliance with this NPRM:
     Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin 
CAS/SB1480, Issue A, dated July 2019, which contains instructions to 
ensure installation of a modified TCU and the TACS centering strips;
     Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin 
CAS/SB1475, Issue A, dated February 2019, which contains the 
instructions for installing the centering strips to the TACS; and
     Tamarack Aerospace Group Cessna 525, 525A, & 525B ATLAS 
Winglet Maintenance Manual Supplement, Report Number: TAG-1100-0101, 
Issue G, dated September 3, 2019, which adds instructions to inspect 
the centering strips and adds repetitive inspection intervals to the 
Airworthiness Limitations section of the supplement for the centering 
strips.
    This service information is reasonably available because the 
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of 
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section of this 
NPRM.

Other Related Service Information

    The FAA also reviewed the following documents related to this NPRM:
     Tamarack Aerospace Group ATLAS Service Bulletin SBATLAS-
57-03, dated July 27, 2018, which contains instructions to remove the 
ATLAS TCU and return it to the ATLAS repair facility for modification;
     Tamarack Aerospace Group ATLAS Service Bulletin SBATLAS-
57-05, dated February 20, 2019, which contains instructions to install 
centering strips on the TACS; and
     Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin 
CAS/SB1467, Issue B, dated July 2018, which contains instructions to 
remove the ATLAS TCU assembly and modify it as specified in CAS/SB1480, 
Issue A.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it has 
notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and 
service information referenced above. The FAA is proposing this AD 
because it evaluated all information and determined the unsafe 
condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of 
the same type design.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this proposed AD will affect 76 products of 
U.S. registry. The FAA also estimates that it would take 16 work-hours 
with a parts cost of $4,314 per product to modify the TCU, 24 work-
hours with a parts cost of $199 per product to install the centering 
strips, and 1 work-hour per product to revise the limitations section 
as proposed by this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour.
    Based on these figures, the FAA estimates the cost of the proposed 
AD on U.S. operators to be $607,848, or $7,998 per product.
    According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this proposed 
AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on 
affected individuals. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for 
affected individuals. As a result, the FAA has included all costs in 
our cost estimate.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,

[[Page 33587]]

    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13   [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 
2019-08-13, Amendment 39-19634 (84 FR 24007, May 24, 2019) and adding 
the following new AD:

Textron Aviation, Inc. (Type certificate previously held by Cessna 
Aircraft Company): Docket No. FAA-2020-0493; Product Identifier 
2019-CE-046-AD.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments by July 17, 2020.

(b) Affected ADs

    This AD replaces AD 2019-08-13, Amendment 39-19634 (84 FR 24007, 
May 24, 2019) (``AD 2019-08-13'').

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Textron Aviation, Inc. (type certificate 
previously held by Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 525, 525A, and 
525B airplanes, certificated in any category, with Tamarack active 
load alleviation system (ATLAS) winglets installed in accordance 
with Supplemental Type Certificate SA03842NY.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 27: Flight 
Controls.

(e) Reason

    This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness 
information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another 
country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation 
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as malfunction of 
the ATLAS, which could cause difficulty for the pilot to recover the 
airplane to safe light. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent 
malfunction of the ATLAS and to ensure the Tamarack Active Camber 
Surface (TACS) remains in a faired position in the case of 
inadvertent power loss to the ATLAS, which could lead to loss of 
control of the airplane.

 (f) Compliance

    Unless already done, do the following actions in paragraphs (g) 
and (h) of this AD.

(g) Modifications

    Before further flight after the effective date of this AD, do 
the following corrective actions:
    (1) Determine whether the serial number of the TACS control unit 
(TCU) assembly is listed in table 7.8. of Cranfield Aerospace 
Solutions Limited (Cranfield) Service Bulletin CAS/SB1480, Issue A, 
dated July 2019 (Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A). If the serial 
number of the TCU assembly is not listed in table 7.8., replace the 
TCU assembly with a TCU assembly that has a part number listed in 
section 5 and a serial number listed in table 7.8 of Cranfield CAS/
SB1480, Issue A.
    (2) Determine whether centering strips have been installed on 
the trailing edge of the TACS by following step 7.4. of Cranfield 
CAS/SB1480, Issue A. If the trailing edge of the TCAS does not have 
centering strips, install Cranfield modification CAeM/Cessna/1475.

(h) Revision to the Maintenance Manual Supplement

    (1) Before further flight after the effective date of this AD, 
revise the Airworthiness Limitations section (ALS) and Instructions 
for Continued Airworthiness for your airplane by adding the updates 
in Tamarack Aerospace Group Cessna 525, 525A & 525B ATLAS Winglet 
Maintenance Manual Supplement, Modification CAeM/Cessna/1375/1430/
1440/1452/1475/1480, Report Number: TAG-1100-0101, Issue G, dated 
September 3, 2019.
    (2) Thereafter, except as provided in paragraph (i) of this AD, 
no alternative inspection intervals may be approved for the 
centering strips. Inserting a later issue of the ALS with language 
identical to that contained in Issue G for the centering strips is 
acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this paragraph.
    (3) The AFM revision and placard required by AD 2019-08-13, if 
installed, may be removed after completing the modifications 
required by paragraph (g) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    The Manager, New York ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Program Manager, 
Continued Operational Safety FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart 
Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone: (516) 287-
7321; fax: (516) 794-5531; email: [email protected] Before 
using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 
notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight 
Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(j) Related Information

    Refer to European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD No. 
2019-0086R1, dated August 9, 2019, for related information. You may 
examine the MCAI on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by 
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0493. For Cranfield 
Aerospace Solutions Limited and Tamarack Aerospace Group service 
information identified in this AD, contact Cranfield Aerospace 
Solutions Ltd., Cranfield, Bedford MK43 0AL, United Kingdom; 
telephone: +44 1234 754 166; FAX: +44 1234 752 375; email: 
g.mitchell@cranfieldaerospace.com; internet: https://www.cranfieldaerospace.com/service/aircraft-modification-products/et. You may review copies of the referenced service information at 
the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 
901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the 
availability of this material at the FAA, call (816) 329-4148.

    Issued on May 14, 2020.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-11351 Filed 6-1-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


