[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 28 (Friday, February 10, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8729-8740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-02771]



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 Rules and Regulations
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  Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 28 / Friday, February 10, 2023 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 8729]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 27 and 29

[Docket No.: FAA-2017-0990; Amdt. Nos. 27-51, 29-59]
RIN 2120-AK80


Normal and Transport Category Rotorcraft Certification

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is amending the certification standards of normal and 
transport category rotorcraft. These changes are necessary to address 
modern designs currently used in the rotorcraft industry and will 
reduce the burden on applicants for certification of new rotorcraft 
designs. The changes will reduce or eliminate the need for certain 
special conditions currently required to obtain certification of modern 
rotorcraft. These changes also incorporate the provisions of equivalent 
level of safety findings and means of compliance issue papers that the 
FAA has made when approving certain design features.

DATES: Effective April 11, 2023.

ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking 
documents and other information related to this final rule, see ``How 
To Obtain Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions concerning this action, 
contact Sandra Shelley, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management 
Group, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 
222-5110; email Sandra.Shelle[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 describes 
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation 
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, sections 44701 and 44704. Under 
section 44701, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
minimum standards required in the interest of safety for the design and 
performance of aircraft. Under section 44704, the Administrator issues 
type certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and 
specified appliances when the Administrator finds the product is 
properly designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the 
regulations and minimum standards prescribed under section 44701(a). 
This rulemaking is within the scope of these authorities because it 
promotes safety by updating the minimum prescribed standards used 
during the type certification process.

I. Overview of Final Rule

    This final rule revises regulations in title 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR) part 27 (Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category 
Rotorcraft) and part 29 (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category 
Rotorcraft) related to the certification of rotorcraft. These changes 
are necessary due to the extensive application of advancing 
technologies to rotorcraft. Current airworthiness standards do not 
adequately address increasing design complexity. To address these 
advances, the FAA has been issuing reoccurring special conditions, 
equivalent level of safety (ELOS) findings, and means of compliance 
(MOC) issue papers. This final rule addresses these areas by updating 
those standards that have been addressed by these special conditions, 
ELOS findings and MOC issue papers. Compliance with the regulatory 
changes implemented by this final rule will continue to be shown by the 
same testing, analysis, and inspections required by existing special 
conditions, ELOS findings and MOC issue papers. However, there will be 
a reduced administrative burden, to both the rotorcraft industry and 
the FAA, through the reduction or elimination of reoccurring special 
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers.

II. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

    This final rule updates parts 27 and 29 because the regulations in 
these parts were originally published in 1964 and past revisions to the 
airworthiness standards have not kept pace with advances in technology 
for rotorcraft. The FAA addresses these changes to technology by 
issuing reoccurring special conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue 
papers. These three processes are necessary to address new design 
features for which airworthiness standards are lacking, compliance with 
a rule cannot be achieved, or alternative methods of compliance are 
proposed. Special conditions are prescribed under 14 CFR 21.16 when the 
FAA finds the applicable airworthiness standards do not contain 
adequate or appropriate safety standards because of a novel or unusual 
design feature. The FAA issues ELOS findings under Sec.  21.21(b)(1) 
where a design does not comply with the airworthiness standards, but 
compensating factors exist that provide an equivalent level of safety. 
MOC issue papers document compliance methodologies that fall outside 
existing guidance and policies.
    The process of developing, drafting and finalizing these special 
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers has an impact on both 
the FAA's and the applicants' resources. In addition, they impact 
applicants' schedules for obtaining FAA approval of their products. By 
updating the affected standards, many of these special conditions, ELOS 
findings, and MOC issue papers are now unnecessary, thus reducing the 
burden on both the FAA and industry.
    In some cases, advancements in technology have rendered the 
regulations in parts 27 and 29 obsolete. This final rule revises those 
regulations. This final rule also updates a few of these rules to 
correct typographical errors.

B. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations

    As a result of incidents involving smoke and fire caused by failure 
of lithium batteries installed on Boeing 787 aircraft, the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued Safety

[[Page 8730]]

Recommendations A-14-032 through 036 to the FAA on May 22, 2014.\1\ The 
NTSB recommended the FAA develop abuse tests to simulate failures 
observed in the incidents investigated and to address findings in 
recent research (A-14-032), perform these tests on new aircraft for 
certain installations (A-14-033), develop guidance on acceptable 
methods to induce thermal runaway that reliably simulates battery 
failures (A-14-034), review methods of compliance used to certificate 
in-service lithium-ion battery aircraft installations to ensure that 
they adequately protect against adverse effects of a cell thermal 
runaway (A-14-035), and develop policy to establish a panel of 
technical experts to advise on compliance and best practices for safely 
installing new technology (A-14-036). This final rule incorporates 
these NTSB recommendations as they relate to rotorcraft into Sec. Sec.  
27.1353 and 29.1353.
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    \1\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-14-032-036.pdf.
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C. Summary of the NPRM

    On November 1, 2017, the FAA published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM), ``Normal and Transport Category Rotorcraft 
Certification'' (82 FR 50583). In the NPRM, the FAA proposed changes 
necessary to address modern designs currently used in the rotorcraft 
industry and to reduce the burden on applicants for certification of 
new rotorcraft designs. The FAA proposed changes that would reduce or 
eliminate the need for certain special conditions that were often 
required to obtain certification of modern rotorcraft. The FAA also 
proposed to incorporate the provisions of ELOS findings and MOC issue 
papers that the FAA has made when approving certain design features.
    The comment period closed on January 30, 2018.

D. General Overview of Comments

    The FAA received comments from 22 commenters. About half of the 
commenters were individuals. The remaining commenters included the 
NTSB, aviation manufacturers, industry groups and organizations, and 
foreign civil aviation authorities. One commenter, the Aircraft 
Electronics Association, supported the proposed rule without change. 
Most commenters were generally supportive of the proposal but some 
suggested changes to the proposed rule, as discussed in more detail 
later in this preamble. Some comments were beyond the scope of the 
proposal.

III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule

A. Engines (Sec.  27.903(d))

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to reformat the paragraph designation 
in Sec.  27.903(d) to be consistent with Sec.  29.903(e). When Sec.  
27.903(d) was adopted, the paragraph designation of Sec.  29.903(e) was 
not used even though the FAA intended the requirements to be identical. 
This designation led to confusion. This final rule eliminates the 
confusion by reformatting the paragraph designation in Sec.  27.903(d) 
as proposed in the NPRM. The restart capability requirements of Sec.  
27.903(d) are not being changed in this rulemaking.
    Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell) and the General Aviation 
Manufacturers Association (GAMA) requested that part 27 appendix C be 
revised to remove the need for compliance with Sec.  29.903(e), as the 
requirements are identical to proposed Sec.  27.903(d). The FAA agrees 
and has removed the reference to Sec.  29.903(e) from appendix C of 
part 27.

B. Powerplant Instruments (Sec. Sec.  27.1305 and 29.1305)

    Current Sec. Sec.  27.1305 and 29.1305 prescribe the specific 
required powerplant instruments for rotorcraft. The changes to these 
sections will allow for other means of compliance for certain 
powerplant instrument indicators. Additionally, for Sec.  29.1305, the 
FAA will permit an optional feature to simulate one engine inoperative 
(OEI) conditions without damaging the engines. Rotorcraft with OEI 
Training Mode will require additional indications to differentiate the 
simulated OEI conditions from actual engine failure.
    Airbus Helicopters requested that the FAA use different wording to 
describe a synthesized power indicator (SPI) for an instrument that 
provides a single indicator of engine performance, because presenting 
the information as a percentage of power to the nearest engine limit is 
only one of the methods of informing the flightcrew.
    The commenter's request did not pertain to the proposed regulatory 
text but rather to industry examples in the NPRM preamble. However, the 
guidance associated with this final rule, Advisory Circulars (AC) 27-
1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft and AC 29-2C, 
Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft, identifies other 
concepts of showing proximity to engine limits other than as a 
percentage.
    Airbus Helicopters also commented that certification of SPIs can be 
accomplished using the existing rules, and provided examples of two 
designs that have been approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA). These technologies could only be certificated in the past by 
the FAA through processes such as that necessary for an ELOS finding. A 
key purpose of this rulemaking is to reduce or eliminate the need for 
reoccurring special conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers. 
Therefore, the FAA has made no changes to the regulatory text in 
response to this comment.
    Bell, GAMA, Transport Canada, and an individual requested the FAA 
expand the changes to Sec. Sec.  27.1305 and 29.1305 to allow 
synthesized dual/triple tachometers. This requested change is beyond 
the scope of the proposal. A key purpose of this rulemaking is to 
reduce or eliminate the need for reoccurring special conditions, ELOS 
findings, and MOC issue papers. The FAA has not issued any of these 
documents for synthesized dual or triple tachometers.
    EASA requested that the FAA change the reference in the proposed 
Sec.  27.1305(o) from engine ``torque'' to engine ``power'' to be 
consistent with Sec.  29.1305(a)(16) and allowing for other forms of 
power determination. The requirement in Sec.  27.1305(o) to display 
engine torque to the pilot is contingent on the establishment of a 
torque limitation for the engine under Sec.  27.1521(e). Therefore, the 
requested change would create an incompatibility between Sec. Sec.  
27.1305(o) and 27.1521(e). The FAA did not make any changes in response 
to this comment.
    Transport Canada requested that the FAA correct a typographical 
error in the current Sec.  27.1305(k)(2) and change ``or'' to ``and.'' 
Transport Canada noted that this correction would make the wording of 
Sec.  27.1305(k)(2) identical to that section's part 29 counterpart, 
Sec.  29.1305(a)(14)(ii). The FAA notes that the word ``or'' in Sec.  
27.1305(k)(2) is not a typographical error. The difference in wording 
between Sec.  27.1305(k)(2) and Sec.  29.1305(a)(14)(ii) has existed in 
the Federal Aviation Regulations from the promulgation of parts 27 and 
29 to replace the Civil Air Regulations.\2\ Moreover, the requested 
change would increase the regulatory requirement. The FAA did not make 
any changes in response to this comment.
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    \2\ 29 FR 15694 (Nov. 24, 1964); 29 FR 16148 (Dec. 3, 1964).
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    Transport Canada also requested the FAA change the wording in 
proposed Sec.  29.1305(a)(5) from ``a means to indicate manifold 
pressure for each reciprocation engine, of the altitude type'' to ``a 
means to indicate manifold pressure for each altitude engine'' to align 
the reference to this type of

[[Page 8731]]

reciprocating engine with references to this same engine type used 
throughout part 27. The FAA agrees and has made this change. 
Additionally, this change provides consistency with Sec.  27.1305(e) 
and with the identification of this type of engine elsewhere in part 
29, and the term ``altitude engine'' is as type of engine that is a 
reciprocating engine.
    Bell, GAMA, and an individual proposed new language for Sec.  
27.1305 that would permit OEI training mode capability. OEI Training 
Mode is a design feature for Category A training purposes. As explained 
by the FAA in the NPRM, the FAA did not propose these changes because 
part 27 Category A rotorcraft are approved under appendix C to part 27, 
which requires compliance with Sec.  29.1305. The FAA did not make any 
changes in response to these comments.

C. Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and Installations (Sec. Sec.  
27.1309, 29.1309, and Appendix C to Part 27)

    Sections 27.1309 and 29.1309 require applicants to assess the 
effects of failures resulting from installed systems and equipment. The 
changes to Sec.  27.1309 made by this final rule now address advances 
in technology and increases in performance of normal category 
rotorcraft that were not envisioned when the rule was originally 
promulgated, and eliminate the distinction between single-engine and 
multi-engine rotorcraft. The final rule broadens the scope of the 
previous performance-based requirement to include catastrophic failure 
conditions, thus eliminating the need for recurring special conditions. 
The final rule also more closely aligns with current industry practices 
and accommodates potential future changes in industry failure analysis 
techniques.
    EASA requested the FAA reserve the paragraph numbering and allocate 
new paragraph numbers for the new regulatory text to avoid confusion 
between the proposed regulations and previous amendments. The FAA has 
determined that this requested change is impracticable as it would 
result in numerous regulatory paragraphs without content. Part 21 
requires aviation manufacturers to be familiar with the airworthiness 
standards that are effective as the certification basis as of the date 
of their application for a type certificate. EASA also suggested 
designating the first paragraph under Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309 as 
``(a)'' for clarity. The FAA did not add such a designation because the 
first two sentences of Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309 are generally 
applicable requirements.
    Bell, GAMA, Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson), and two 
individuals commented that the proposed changes to Sec.  27.1309 would 
increase the amount of analysis necessary to show compliance for normal 
category rotorcraft. GAMA and Bell stated that the proposed changes 
would exceed what is required to address complex systems, eliminate the 
distinction between single and multi-engine rotorcraft, and fail to 
maintain sufficient distinction from Sec.  29.1309. Bell and GAMA also 
expressed that an increase in certification burden would be imposed by 
the changes, and be likely to cause significant economic damage to the 
rotorcraft industry. Similarly, Robinson stated that the proposed 
changes to Sec.  27.1309 would significantly increase the regulatory 
burden on normal category rotorcraft by removing the distinction 
between single and multi-engine. According to Robinson, this would 
require additional failure analysis by the applicant, and alerting 
means in the design, resulting in a significant increase in the cost 
and complexity of small helicopters. Bell and GAMA requested that the 
proposed Sec.  27.1309 be replaced with the recently promulgated Sec.  
23.2510, while Robinson requested that none of the proposed changes be 
made to Sec.  27.1309.
    This rulemaking does not change the current industry standard and 
compliance means for non-critical and noncomplex (simple) systems and 
equipment installed in normal category rotorcraft. As explained in the 
NPRM, the distinction between single and multi-engines no longer 
reflects the level of complexity of the systems installed in 
rotorcraft. Most applicants have been using industry standard methods, 
such as SAE/ARP 4761, for conducting their system safety analyses to 
show compliance with Sec.  27.1309. These methods require assessment at 
the aircraft level regardless of whether the proposed design is a 
single or multi-engine configuration. As stated in the NPRM, the 
applicant's method for conducting the failure analysis remains the 
same. The changes eliminate the need for special conditions by 
incorporating prior special condition requirements for catastrophic and 
hazardous failure conditions into the rule text. The changes also 
provide a means for the integration of new technology into part 27 
rotorcraft. A means of compliance for noncomplex (simple) systems is 
already provided in the guidance material for normal and transport 
category rotorcraft. Finally, the request to incorporate Sec.  23.2510, 
a performance-based regulation contingent on the use of consensus 
standards, is beyond the scope of the NPRM.
    Bell, GAMA, and Robinson commented that the changes to Sec.  
27.1309 eliminate an applicant's use of the FAA's safety continuum 
policy for part 27 rotorcraft. The FAA clarifies that the safety 
continuum policy, Policy No. PS-ASW-27-15, dated June 30, 2017,\3\ 
provides a tiered approach for compliance with Sec.  27.1309, based 
upon the rotorcraft's weight, occupant capacity, and number and type of 
engines. This policy remains applicable as an option for any applicant. 
Under the policy, the certification rigor for simpler, less complex 
rotorcraft and systems differs from that which is necessary for more 
complex rotorcraft and systems to show compliance with Sec.  27.1309.
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    \3\ https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/0D4AF6EE7F3013848625815600705441.0001.
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    EASA, Transport Canada, and an individual requested additional 
definition of the applicability of Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309. The 
commenters stated there will be confusion regarding whether to apply 
Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309 to systems outside of the current 
subpart. The FAA recognized the need to be clear about the 
applicability of the regulation; therefore, the proposed introductory 
text published in the NPRM for Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309 clarified 
that the rule would apply to any system or equipment whose failure has 
not been specifically addressed by another requirement in chapter I of 
title 14 of the CFR. The FAA has determined that the proposed 
regulatory text is adequately clear and has adopted it without change 
in this final rule.
    EASA and Thales AVS France commented on the proposed ACs intended 
to provide acceptable means to comply with Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 
29.1309. These commenters requested that the AC text providing that 
``the catastrophic failure condition should not result from a single 
failure'' should be included in the regulation to resolve the 
inconsistency resulting from the inclusion of such language in the AC 
but not the regulatory text. The guidance materials provide analysis 
techniques for showing how an applicant can achieve ``extremely 
improbable'' in conjunction with a single failure. Single failures are 
not the only failure conditions that need to be addressed in order for 
the analysis to be complete. The FAA has clarified this in AC 27-1B and 
AC 29-2C, which

[[Page 8732]]

provide acceptable means to comply with Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309.
    Bell and GAMA requested the FAA not adopt the proposed requirement 
in Sec. Sec.  27.1309(a) and 29.1309(a) for equipment, systems, and 
installations to be analyzed for hazards both individually and with 
regard to their integration with the rest of the aircraft. The 
commenters stated that the appropriate safety analysis methodologies 
for the equipment to be installed are already covered by paragraph (d) 
in Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309. The commenters stated the specific 
analysis is defined in guidance, and that including this statement in 
the regulation imposes a significant increase in the certification 
burden. This is incorrect. The requirement the commenters opposed for 
inclusion in paragraph (a) is already present in Sec.  29.1309 and is 
included in special conditions for part 27 to certify proposed design 
features such as autopilot systems. In addition, this regulatory text 
does not dictate a specific analysis methodology to be used to show 
compliance; therefore, there is no increase in the certification 
burden.
    GAMA, EASA, and Thales AVS France requested that the FAA change 
proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1309(b) and 29.1309(b) to specify three levels 
of failure classification: catastrophic, hazardous, and major. In the 
NPRM, the FAA proposed a top level failure classification 
(catastrophic), a bottom level (minor), and any other level in between 
as long as the probability of the failure condition is inversely 
proportional to its consequences. EASA and GAMA stated that the 
proposed rule change would increase the regulatory burden by requiring 
the same analysis for minor failure conditions as for other, more 
severe failure conditions.
    The FAA recognizes that proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1309(b)(2) and 
29.1309(b)(2) would have inadvertently raised the regulatory burden. 
That was not the FAA's intent, so in this final rule the FAA has 
revised Sec. Sec.  27.1309(b)(2) and 29.1309(b)(2) to change the bottom 
level failure classification to major, in order to maintain the current 
regulatory requirement.
    The final rule provides flexibility for future changes in industry 
standards and practices by allowing as many levels of failure 
classification as an applicant wishes to propose, as long as the 
probability of the failure condition is inversely proportional to its 
consequences.
    GAMA and an individual requested that the FAA make the language in 
Sec. Sec.  27.1309(c) and 29.1309(c) consistent with one another, in 
that the word ``and'' is missing from Sec.  27.1309(c). As explained in 
the NPRM, the FAA intended for these two sections to be consistent and 
thus, has corrected this error in this final rule such that ``and'' is 
included in Sec.  27.1309(c), consistent with current Sec.  29.1309(c).
    Bell and GAMA commented on the FAA proposal to remove Sec. Sec.  
29.1309(b)(2) and 29.1309(e), which are specific to Category A 
rotorcraft, stating that these provisions are necessary companions to 
Sec.  29.903(b) engine systems isolation requirements. The commenters 
stated that without a specific regulation for Category A systems and 
equipment, Sec.  29.903(b) becomes the specific regulation and applies 
rather than Sec.  29.1309. The commenters provided an example that, in 
order to show compliance with Sec.  29.903(b), it would be necessary to 
show physical isolation between left engine and right engine indication 
systems, instead of providing integrated displays with redundancy 
rather than isolation with an appropriate probability for failure 
conditions that might affect both engine's indications. The commenters 
are correct that Sec.  29.903(b) is the specific regulation for 
Category A engine isolation requirements. However, the Sec.  29.903(b) 
analysis is limited to systems required for engine operations. The 
commenters' application of this analysis to engine indication systems 
and displays, which do not affect engine operation, is misplaced. 
Section 29.1309 requires applicants to assess the effects of failures 
resulting from installed systems and equipment, such as engine 
indicators or displays that may be necessary for performing Category A 
operations. These requirements are unchanged by the proposals in the 
NPRM.
    GAMA requested that proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1309(d)(2) and 
29.1309(d)(2), which require an analysis of ``[t]he effect of multiple 
failures and latent failures,'' be revised to preclude future 
interpretations of this paragraph as requiring consideration of 
multiple failures of unrelated functions or systems.
    Although there are cases where the failures of unrelated functions 
or systems should be considered, the FAA shares the commenter's concern 
on the need to limit multiple failure analysis so that every 
combination of failures of unrelated functions or systems will not need 
to be considered. The FAA has changed the guidance material, AC 27-1B 
and AC 29-2C, to provide guidance to help applicants determine the 
depth of analysis necessary when considering multiple failures in 
complying with Sec. Sec.  27.1309(d)(2) and 29.1309(d)(2).
    GAMA and Transport Canada requested that for the analysis of crew 
warning cues in proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1309(d)(4) and 29.1309(d)(4), 
the FAA correct the word ``warning.'' In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 
replace the term ``warning'' with ``annunciation,'' but in Sec. Sec.  
27.1309(d)(4) and 29.1309(d)(4) the term ``warning'' remained in the 
proposed regulatory text. However, Transport Canada suggested that 
``warning'' be replaced with ``alerting.''
    The FAA has determined that the term ``alerting'' is generally 
understood to include warnings and cautions that may include aural and 
visual types of cues to the pilot as appropriate. The FAA agrees that 
``alerting'' more accurately conveys the requirement, and so has 
included it in this final rule.
    An individual requested the FAA address the additional costs that 
may be incurred by U.S. applicants seeking validation of type-
certificated products by EASA. The commenter states that the FAA's 
changes to Sec. Sec.  27.1309 and 29.1309 compromise the rules' 
harmonization with EASA's rules.
    The FAA's changes in this final rule incorporate the provisions of 
prior special conditions. EASA has validated several aircraft designs 
with the provisions of these special conditions. Therefore, the 
commenter's concern about additional costs during validation is not 
warranted.

D. Automatic Pilot and Flight Guidance System (Sec. Sec.  27.1329 and 
29.1329)

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise Sec. Sec.  27.1329 and 
29.1329 by combining the existing requirements for automatic pilot with 
those of Sec. Sec.  27.1335 and 29.1335 for flight director systems 
into one rule for automatic pilot and flight guidance systems. EASA 
noted the FAA proposed to change the requirements in Sec. Sec.  
27.1329(a)(1) and 29.1329(a)(1) so that the system can be overpowered 
by ``one pilot'' to ``the pilot'' and in Sec. Sec.  27.1329(a)(2) and 
29.1329(a)(2) that the system can be disengaged by ``each pilot'' to 
``the pilot.'' EASA stated that these changes reduce the level of 
safety, as the prior rules required that the effort of one pilot be 
enough to overpower the system. The effect of the proposed language as 
described by EASA was not the FAA's intent. Accordingly, the final rule 
refers to ``one pilot,'' in Sec. Sec.  27.1329(a)(1) and 29.1329(a)(1) 
and ``each pilot'' in Sec. Sec.  27.1329(a)(2) and 29.1329(a)(2) to be 
consistent with the existing regulatory requirement.

[[Page 8733]]

    Transport Canada noted that the proposed rule appeared to include 
fly-by-wire in its definition of an automatic flight guidance and 
control system, and that manufacturers would not be able to comply with 
a requirement to completely disengage a fly-by-wire system. Transport 
Canada therefore requested the rule be changed so that a proposed 
design would only have to only disengage ``any malfunctioning 
components of'' the system.
    The FAA did not intend for Sec. Sec.  27.1329 and 29.1329 to cover 
flight control systems, including fly-by-wire. The section title and 
the introductory sentence have been changed in this final rule to 
remove references to ``control.'' Sections 27.1329(a)(2) and 
29.1329(a)(2) have also been changed in this final rule so that 
applicants may design the system to either disengage the entire system, 
any malfunctioning component of the system, or both.
    Bell, GAMA, Transport Canada, and Thales AVS France commented that 
the proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1329(d) and 29.1329(d) would have eliminated 
the condition of ``assuming that corrective action begins within a 
reasonable period of time.'' The commenters stated that the FAA did not 
explain the elimination of this statement.
    The existing text identified by commenters was inadvertently 
omitted from the NPRM, but is included in this final rule.

E. Instrument Systems (Sec.  29.1333 and Appendix B to Parts 27 and 29)

    Current Sec.  29.1333(a) requires isolating the pilot instrument 
system from any other operating systems because at the time the rule 
was promulgated, these systems were federated, and connecting the 
systems increased the likelihood that a fault in one system could cause 
a failure in the pilot instrument system. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 
to revise Sec.  29.1333(a) and section VIII(b)(5)(i) of appendix B to 
parts 27 and 29 limiting it to pneumatic systems, allowing for the use 
of current technology to display integrated information to the pilot.
    Airbus Helicopters requested that the FAA change the word 
``system'' to ``parts'' so that the requirement for physical 
independence only applies to the pneumatic parts of a system.
    The FAA intended for only the pneumatic portion of the system to 
have physical independence. The FAA is not changing the proposed rule 
text as suggested by the commenter because the word ``parts,'' could be 
interpreted as a component as opposed to only the pneumatic portion of 
the system. This section of the rule is adopted as proposed in the 
NPRM.

F. Energy Storage System (Sec. Sec.  27.1353 and 29.1353)

    The FAA's current regulations pertaining to batteries for 
rotorcraft include requirements specific to lead-acid batteries and 
nickel-cadmium batteries. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed performance-
based requirements to accommodate any energy storage system. As a 
result, this final rule incorporates, for rotorcraft, the NTSB's 
recommendation that the FAA require aircraft manufacturers to 
demonstrate acceptable performance as part of the certification of any 
new aircraft design that incorporates the installation of lithium-ion 
batteries.
    Bell and GAMA requested that the FAA modify proposed Sec. Sec.  
27.1353(a) and 29.1353(a) by removing the word ``automatic'' from the 
protective design features required for hazard mitigation, and 
expressed concern that a requirement that the features be ``automatic'' 
would increase certification requirements. Current Sec. Sec.  
27.1353(g) and 29.1353(c) contain a similar requirement for automatic 
features to monitor the battery system for nickel-cadmium batteries and 
prevent or mitigate an over temperature condition or battery failure. 
Special conditions issued by the FAA to certificate lithium battery 
installations have required automatic features to monitor the battery 
system and protect the aircraft. The proposed regulation does not 
change this requirement but rather incorporates it into a rule that 
accommodates any energy storage system. Some energy storage system 
hazards may occur too rapidly to be mitigated by pilot action; 
therefore, automatic monitoring and control is necessary which would 
not increase certification requirements.
    In another comment, the NTSB suggested including more prescriptive 
language in Sec. Sec.  27.1353(a) and 29.1353(a) to address all 
possible mitigation strategies. By using performance-based 
requirements, this final rule allows both current and future mitigation 
strategies. A prescriptive list of current acceptable mitigation 
strategies may not allow for future energy storage technologies. 
Accordingly, in this final rule, the FAA has adopted Sec. Sec.  
27.1353(a) and 29.1353(a) as proposed.
    Bell and GAMA requested modifying proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1353(b) 
and 29.1353(b), because they would have required venting as the means 
of limiting the accumulation of hazardous gases, fluids, and smoke. The 
FAA agrees with these comments and has adopted Bell and GAMA's 
recommended language in this final rule, in order to allow other types 
of hazard mitigation. The intent of the rule is to require that 
emissions not accumulate in hazardous (flammability, toxicity, 
visibility, etc.) quantities. Designs may accomplish this through 
venting or through other means.
    Bell and GAMA commented that the term ``damage'' in Sec. Sec.  
27.1353(c) and 29.1353(c) is unclear and requested that the rule be 
revised from ``must not damage surrounding structures, adjacent 
equipment, or systems necessary for continued safe flight and landing'' 
to ``must not result in any hazardous effect on structures, equipment, 
or systems necessary for continued safe flight and landing.'' The 
language proposed in the NPRM was retained from the current rule and 
accurately captures the requirement. The commenter's suggested change 
would allow damage to occur undetected until it evolved into a 
hazardous condition, which was not the intent of the rule. Accordingly, 
in this final rule, the FAA has adopted Sec. Sec.  27.1353(c) and 
29.1353(c) as proposed.
    The NTSB requested that proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1353(d) and 
29.1353(d) be revised to address the maximum amount of pressure from an 
energy storage system failure. The FAA agrees, since a rapid increase 
in pressure that exceeds the maximum amount for an energy storage 
system that is not contained may result in damage to surrounding 
systems or structure. Proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1353(d) and 29.1353(d) 
have been revised consistent with the NTSB comment.
    GAMA commented that the Sec. Sec.  27.1353(e) and 29.1353(e) 
requirement to provide a means to monitor and inform the pilot of 
energy storage system health precludes other mitigating design features 
and may be unnecessary when effective containment measures are used. 
GAMA requested adding an alternative requirement to allow sufficient 
containment of the energy storage system.
    GAMA's requested change to Sec. Sec.  27.1353(e) and 29.1353(e) 
would invalidate the requirement that the pilot be notified of all 
critical system parameters. The pilot must know the health of the 
required energy storage system. The regulation does not preclude other 
mitigating strategies but these must include a means for the pilot to 
know the condition of all critical system parameters. Accordingly, in 
this final rule, the FAA has adopted Sec. Sec.  27.1353(e) and 
29.1353(e) as proposed.

[[Page 8734]]

G. Airspeed Indicator (Sec.  27.1545)

    Current Sec.  27.1545 requires instruments to be marked with a 
green arc and red radial lines. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to remove 
the restrictive requirement for some instrument markings to allow 
alternative means of compliance.
    Bell and GAMA requested the rule specify when VNE must 
be displayed, allow provisions for variable VNE information, 
and clarify that a VNE caution range is not always 
applicable. These requested changes are beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking, which was to make the color and depiction of the airspeed 
indicator markings less prescriptive. In addition, the suggested 
wording would be more prescriptive, and therefore restrict traditional 
systems from being approved.
    An individual requested the FAA change the term ``yellow arc'' in 
Sec.  27.1545(b)(3) to ``amber arc'' to be consistent with Sec.  
27.1322(b). The requested change is beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking, which was to eliminate the need for reoccurring MOC issue 
papers for a lack of green arc in modern electronic displays. The FAA 
has not created any issue papers because of the requirement for a 
``yellow'' arc.

H. Powerplant Instruments (Sec.  27.1549)

    The current regulation requires instruments to be marked with a 
green arc and red radial lines. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to remove 
these requirements for some instrument markings.
    EASA suggested the term ``radial'' in Sec. Sec.  27.1549(a) and 
29.1549(a) be replaced with ``range,'' similar to the proposed 
Sec. Sec.  27.1549(d) and 29.1549(d). Sections 27.1549(a) and 
29.1549(a) specify the requirement for marking of maximum and minimum 
safe operating limits. A red line is a defined limit. A range, in this 
context, would allow a level of ambiguity in the marking of the 
indicator. The FAA did not make any changes in response to the comment.
    Transport Canada requested that the term ``marked'' be changed to 
``displayed'' throughout Sec. Sec.  27.1549 and 29.1549. The term 
``marked'' is more consistent with the other instrument regulations for 
rotorcraft and airplanes. The FAA did not make any changes in response 
to the comment.
    An individual requested the FAA change the term ``yellow arc'' in 
Sec. Sec.  29.1549(b)(3) and 29.1549(c) to ``amber arc'' to be 
consistent with Sec.  27.1322(b). The requested change is beyond the 
scope of this rulemaking, which was to eliminate the need for 
reoccurring MOC issue papers for a lack of green arc in modern 
electronic displays. The FAA has not created any issue papers because 
of the requirement for a ``yellow'' arc.
    Bell and GAMA requested that the word ``propeller'' be changed to 
``rotor'' in Sec. Sec.  27.1549(d) and 29.1549(d). The word 
``propeller'' comes from a prior rule amendment to parts 27 and 29 that 
was based on a part 25 rule. Although ``propeller'' is an appropriate 
term for airplanes, ``rotor'' is the more appropriate term for 
rotorcraft. The FAA agrees and has made the requested change.
    One commenter noted the typographical omission of the word ``and'' 
between the proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1549(d) and 27.1549(e). The FAA has 
corrected this error in this final rule by including ``and'' at the end 
of paragraph (d), consistent with the current rule.

I. Control Marking (Sec. Sec.  27.1555 and 29.1555)

    The control marking regulations required marking the usable fuel 
capacity at the fuel quantity indicator. The intent of these 
regulations was to provide a continuous indication of usable fuel 
capacity at the fuel quantity indicator. Older, analog gauges used a 
placard to comply with this requirement. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 
performance-based requirements to permit other means of informing the 
pilot of the usable fuel system capacity. However, this final rule 
requires that alternative methods address any lack of continuous 
display by ensuring the information is readily accessible to the pilot.
    Bell and GAMA requested modifying proposed Sec. Sec.  27.1555(c)(1) 
and 29.1555(c)(1) to require ``a means to provide the usable fuel 
capacity to the pilot.'' The intent of the language proposed in the 
NPRM was to keep the existing requirement for applicants that choose to 
follow that method, while providing an additional, less prescriptive 
method.
    Similarly, EASA requested the FAA make the requirement more generic 
by eliminating the reference ``to the pilot'' within Sec. Sec.  
27.1555(c)(1)(i) and 29.1555(c)(1)(i), since this information is also 
used during maintenance and servicing. However, removing the 
requirement that the information be accessible to the pilot would not 
ensure that the pilot always has access to the data, which is the 
purpose of this rule.
    GAMA also requested modifying Sec. Sec.  27.1555(c)(2) and 
29.1555(c)(2), which contains usable fuel capacity requirements for 
fuel systems with selector controls, to match the proposed language in 
Sec. Sec.  27.1555(c)(1) and 29.1555(c)(1) for fuel systems with no 
selector controls. The changes in the NPRM were proposed to eliminate 
the issues associated with placarding a digital display in a modern 
glass cockpit. Placarding near or at the selector switches does not 
create these issues.
    Additionally, GAMA requested that the FAA update Sec. Sec.  
27.1583(b)(3) and 29.1583(b)(3) to require that the flight manual 
include the usable fuel capacity information required per Sec. Sec.  
27.1555(c)(1) and 29.1555(c)(1) respectively. This requested change is 
not appropriate, because the requirement to add the capacity 
information into the flight manual is only necessary if it is not 
continuously displayed at the indicator. The commenter's requested 
language would require the information in the flight manual for all 
designs.
    Airbus Helicopters requested that the FAA clarify whether ``usable 
fuel capacity'' refers to the actual remaining fuel or to the total 
usable capacity of the fuel system. The FAA notes that the term 
``usable fuel capacity'' refers to the total usable capacity of the 
fuel system. The requirements for indicating the actual usable quantity 
are contained within Sec. Sec.  27.1305, 27.1337, 29.1305, and 29.1337. 
In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose modifying the language or meaning 
of ``usable fuel capacity.'' Changing the meaning is outside the scope 
of this rulemaking. The proposed rule language provides an alternative, 
less prescriptive requirement allowing the applicant to relay the fuel 
system capacity to the crew by means other than a placard at the fuel 
quantity indicator.

J. Undue Burden on Industry

    In the NPRM preamble, the FAA stated that this rulemaking would 
update several rules that cause unnecessary burdens in cost and time to 
both the FAA and the rotorcraft industry. These changes are necessary 
due to the extensive application of advancing technologies to 
rotorcraft, which the airworthiness standards did not adequately 
address. The FAA proposed that, by updating the affected standards, 
many special conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers would 
become unnecessary, thus reducing the burden of cost and time on the 
FAA and industry.
    GAMA requested rewording or deleting ``reduced burden for the 
rotorcraft industry,'' because showing compliance by the same testing 
analysis and inspections strongly implies there is no reduced burden. 
Additionally,

[[Page 8735]]

GAMA requested that the FAA perform an analysis of the economic impact 
of the regulatory changes on small entities and provide access to the 
results of such analysis in the proposed rulemaking.
    This rule updates parts 27 and 29 to address changes in technology 
and to include updated airworthiness standards. The FAA maintains that 
while compliance is shown by the same testing, analysis, and 
inspections, there will be savings to both the FAA and industry from 
updating the airworthiness standards. Updating the airworthiness 
standards reduces the number of reoccurring special conditions, ELOS 
findings, and MOC issue papers and the administration burden associated 
with processing one of the three documents.
    Further information regarding final rule revisions that address 
comments on this issue is provided in discussions, C. Rotorcraft 
Equipment, Systems, and Installations (Sec. Sec.  27.1309, 29.1309, and 
Appendix C to Part 27) and F. Energy Storage System (Sec. Sec.  27.1353 
and 29.1353). Additionally, the FAA has complied with the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act for this rulemaking and certified that a regulatory 
flexibility analysis is not required, as this rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

K. Other Comments

    One individual requested guidance for installing antennas on 
helicopters for both part 27 and 29. Two other individuals requested 
the FAA adopt rules to address accident rates, such as adding Sec.  
25.1302 to parts 27 and 29 and implementing Terrain Awareness and 
Warning Systems and Radar Altimeters. Another individual provided 
comments about minimum backup systems for VFR-only rotorcraft. The FAA 
appreciates the interest in aviation safety from these commenters; 
however, these comments were beyond the scope of this rulemaking 
effort.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct 
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon 
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. 
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of 
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act 
(Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In 
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of 
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with 
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's 
analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule.
    This final rule revises regulations in 14 CFR part 27 
(Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft) and part 29 
(Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Rotorcraft) related to the 
certification of rotorcraft. The changes are necessary because the 
airworthiness standards did not adequately address the increases in 
design complexity resulting from advancing technologies. As a result, 
many regulatory sections have been subject to reoccurring special 
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers. This rulemaking 
addresses these items by updating the rules that cause unnecessary 
burdens in cost and time to both the rotorcraft industry and the FAA.
    The FAA received comments on the NPRM that was published on 
November 1, 2017. The comments and the FAA's response to them are 
discussed in ``III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule,'' in 
the preamble to this final rule. The FAA made changes to the proposed 
rule as a result of the public comments. However, the changes assisted 
the FAA in clarifying and updating the proposal to ensure there will 
not be additional costs from this rulemaking. These changes did not 
result in additional costs to industry or the FAA. The FAA expects this 
rule will not result in additional costs to industry since it 
incorporates current industry practice. In addition, the rule will 
provide small savings to industry and the FAA by avoiding the burden 
and costs associated with developing special conditions, ELOS findings 
and MOC issue papers. The rule affects U.S. manufacturers of normal and 
transport category rotorcraft plus any rotorcraft operator or owner who 
applies for a supplemental type certificate (STC). The remainder of 
this section provides discussion of the impact and savings of this 
final rule by topic.
1. Powerplant Instruments (Sec. Sec.  27.1305 and 29.1305)
    Changes to these sections will allow for other means of compliance 
for certain powerplant instrument indicators. These means of compliance 
are voluntary and do not impose any new cost but could be cost 
relieving for applicants that choose to use them. Additionally, for 
Sec.  29.1305, the FAA will permit an optional feature to simulate OEI 
conditions without damaging the engines. Rotorcraft with OEI Training 
Mode must have additional indications to differentiate the simulated 
OEI condition from actual engine failure. The OEI Training Mode is 
often installed in modern multi-engine rotorcraft. The FAA finds that 
this change will not result in additional costs to industry. The OEI 
Training Mode is optional and this change removes the need to issue 
special conditions for those manufacturers or modifiers including OEI 
training modes in their rotorcraft.
2. Normal Category Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and Installations 
(Sec.  27.1309 and Appendix C to Part 27)
    The FAA revises the failure analysis requirement for equipment, 
systems, and installations to reduce the need for special conditions. 
These changes more closely align with current industry practices and 
also accommodate future changes in industry failure analysis 
techniques. Additionally, the FAA eliminates the distinction between 
single-engine and multi-engine rotorcraft. This distinction is no 
longer relevant because current analysis tools for technologies and 
associated failure effects no longer consider the number of engines. 
This will reduce the need to issue recurring special conditions, 
potentially providing small savings for manufacturers and anybody who 
modifies the rotorcraft. As these are current industry practice, the 
FAA finds there are no additional costs associated with these changes.
3. Transport Category Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and Installation 
(Sec.  29.1309)
    This section is updated to be consistent with industry standards 
and practices for conducting failure analysis. The rule clarifies the 
requirement to perform a failure analysis and recognizes that the 
severity of failures can vary. Additionally, this section accommodates 
future changes in industry failure analysis techniques and reflects 
current certification practices.

[[Page 8736]]

The rule allows for other options that will reduce the need to issue 
recurring special conditions, potentially providing small savings for 
manufacturers and applicants looking to modify a rotorcraft.
4. Automatic Pilot and Flight Guidance Systems (Sec. Sec.  27.1329, 
27.1335, 29.1329, and 29.1335)
    This rule standardizes terminology and combines the requirements 
for automatic pilot and flight director systems into one rule. Modern 
designs combine both automatic pilot and flight director systems and 
are now referred to as automatic pilot and flight guidance systems.
5. Instrument Systems (Sec.  29.1333 and Appendix B to Parts 27 and 29)
    The change allows for the use of more modern integrated systems to 
monitor and display highly integrated information regarding the 
rotorcraft. This section does not impose additional costs as the 
updates reflect modern industry practices of integrating instrument 
systems.
6. Electrical Systems and Equipment (Sec.  29.1351) and Energy Storage 
Systems (Sec. Sec.  27.1353 and 29.1353)
    The changes accommodate different energy storage systems. The 
regulation applies to lead acid, nickel-cadmium, and lithium batteries 
without imposing additional requirements. The changes will provide the 
flexibility necessary for the regulations to keep up with changes in 
technology.
7. Instrument Markings (Sec. Sec.  27.1545, 29.1545, 27.1549, and 
29.1549)
    The final rule provides flexibility for some instrument markings. 
Allowing for other markings will not result in additional mandatory 
costs and may be possibly cost relieving for manufacturers that elect 
to outfit the rotorcraft with different instrument markings.
8. Control Markings (Sec. Sec.  27.1555 and 29.1555)
    The rule permits more than one method to inform the pilot of the 
usable fuel system capacity. However, alternative methods must address 
the lack of continuous display currently required. Changes to this 
section allow for more than one means of compliance at no additional 
costs. Offering alternative means of compliance allows industry to meet 
the requirement with the least costly option, which can be cost 
relieving.
9. Typographical and Standardizing Corrections (Sec. Sec.  27.87, 
27.903, 29.955, 29.977, 29.1019, 29.1517, and 29.1587)
    There are no additional costs for changes to these sections as 
these are typographical or standardizing corrections.
    Based on the discussion above, the FAA has determined that this 
final rule is not a ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in 
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA) 
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall 
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable 
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale 
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions 
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required 
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain 
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given 
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities, 
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small 
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must 
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the 
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    This final rule amends the certification standards of normal and 
transport category rotorcraft to incorporate modern designs currently 
used in the rotorcraft industry. Currently, changes in technology are 
addressed by issuing reoccurring special conditions, ELOS findings, and 
MOC issue papers. These three processes are necessary to address new 
design features for which airworthiness standards are lacking, 
compliance with a rule cannot be achieved, or alternative methods of 
compliance are proposed. These special conditions, ELOS findings, and 
MOC issue papers impact FAA and industry resources as well as 
applicants' schedules for obtaining FAA approval of their products. By 
updating the affected standards with this final rule, many special 
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers will become 
unnecessary, thus reducing both the FAA and industry's administration 
burden associated with processing one of the three documents.
    As the rule reduces the administrative burden and does not include 
any new regulatory burden, the FAA expects this rule will not result in 
additional costs and may result in small cost savings for any small 
entity affected by this rulemaking action. If an agency determines that 
a rulemaking will not result in a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities, the head of the agency may so 
certify under section 605(b) of the RFA. Therefore, as provided in 
section 605(b), the head of the FAA certifies that this rulemaking will 
not result in a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and 
determined that the potential benefits are available to both domestic 
and international firms, which would either have no effect or a 
positive effect on international trade.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the

[[Page 8737]]

aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a 
``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-
adjusted value of $155 million in lieu of $100 million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that 
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated 
with this final rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these final regulations.

G. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical 
exclusion identified in paragraph 5-6.6.f and involves no extraordinary 
circumstances.

V. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has determined that this 
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and, therefore, would not have Federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211, Actions 
Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it 
will not be a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order 
and will not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

VI. How To Obtain Additional Information

A. Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained from 
the internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at 
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at 
www.GovInfo.gov.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by 
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.

B. Comments Submitted to the Docket

    Comments received may be viewed by going to https://www.regulations.gov and following the online instructions to search the 
docket number for this action. Anyone is able to search the electronic 
form of all comments received into any of the FAA's dockets by the name 
of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if 
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).

C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document, 
may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. 
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 27

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 29

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

The Amendments

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) parts 27 and 29 as follows:

PART 27--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT

0
1. The authority citation for part 27 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.


0
2. Amend Sec.  27.87 by revising the section heading and paragraph (a) 
introductory text to read as follows:


Sec.  27.87  Height-velocity envelope.

    (a) If there is any combination of height and forward velocity 
(including hover) under which a safe landing cannot be made under the 
applicable power failure condition in paragraph (b) of this section, a 
limiting height-velocity envelope must be established (including all 
pertinent information) for that condition, throughout the ranges of--
* * * * *

0
3. Amend Sec.  27.903 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  27.903  Engines.

* * * * *
    (d) Restart capability. (1) A means to restart any engine in flight 
must be provided.
    (2) Except for the in-flight shutdown of all engines, engine 
restart capability must be demonstrated throughout a flight envelope 
for the rotorcraft.
    (3) Following the in-flight shutdown of all engines, in-flight 
engine restart capability must be provided.

0
4. Amend Sec.  27.1305 by revising paragraphs (e), (k) introductory 
text, (n), and (o) to read as follows:


Sec.  27.1305  Powerplant instruments.

* * * * *
    (e) A means to indicate manifold pressure for each altitude engine.
* * * * *
    (k) A means to indicate the r.p.m. of each engine and at least one 
tachometer, as applicable, for:
* * * * *
    (n) A means to indicate the gas temperature for each turbine 
engine.
    (o) A means to enable the pilot to determine the torque of each 
turbine engine, if a torque limitation is established for that engine 
under Sec.  27.1521(e).
* * * * *

0
5. Revise Sec.  27.1309 to read as follows:

[[Page 8738]]

Sec.  27.1309  Equipment, systems, and installations.

    The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is 
required by this subchapter must be designed and installed to ensure 
that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable 
operating condition. For any item of equipment or system whose failure 
has not been specifically addressed by another requirement in this 
chapter, the following requirements also apply:
    (a) The design of each item of equipment, system, and installation 
must be analyzed separately and in relation to other rotorcraft systems 
and installations to determine and identify any failure that would 
affect the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 
perform their duties in all operating conditions.
    (b) Each item of equipment, system, and installation must be 
designed and installed so that:
    (1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is 
extremely improbable;
    (2) The occurrence of any major failure condition is no more than 
improbable; and
    (3) For the occurrence of any other failure condition between major 
and catastrophic, the probability of the failure condition must be 
inversely proportional to its consequences.
    (c) A means to alert the crew in the event of a failure must be 
provided when an unsafe system operating condition exists and to enable 
them to take corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated 
monitoring and crew alerting means must be designed to minimize crew 
errors that could create additional hazards.
    (d) Compliance with the requirements of this section must be shown 
by analysis and, where necessary, by ground, flight, or simulator 
tests. The analysis must account for:
    (1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and 
misleading data and input from external sources;
    (2) The effect of multiple failures and latent failures;
    (3) The resulting effects on the rotorcraft and occupants, 
considering the stage of flight and operating conditions; and
    (4) The crew alerting cues and the corrective action required.

0
6. Amend Sec.  27.1329 by revising the section heading, adding 
introductory text, and revising paragraphs (a), (d), and (e) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  27.1329  Automatic pilot and flight guidance system.

    For the purpose of this subpart, an automatic pilot and flight 
guidance system may consist of an autopilot, flight director, or a 
component that interacts with stability augmentation or trim.
    (a) Each automatic pilot and flight guidance system must be 
designed so that it:
    (1) Can be overpowered by one pilot to allow control of the 
rotorcraft;
    (2) Provides a means to disengage the system, or any malfunctioning 
component of the system, by each pilot to prevent it from interfering 
with the control of the rotorcraft; and
    (3) Provides a means to indicate to the flight crew its current 
mode of operation. Selector switch position is not acceptable as a 
means of indication.
* * * * *
    (d) The system must be designed so that, within the range of 
adjustment available to the pilot, it cannot produce hazardous loads on 
the rotorcraft, or create hazardous deviations in the flight path, 
under any flight condition appropriate to its use or in the event of a 
malfunction, assuming that corrective action begins within a reasonable 
period of time.
    (e) If the automatic pilot and flight guidance system integrates 
signals from auxiliary controls or furnishes signals for operation of 
other equipment, there must be a means to prevent improper operation.
* * * * *


Sec.  27.1335  [Removed]

0
7. Remove Sec.  27.1335.

0
8. Revise Sec.  27.1353 to read as follows:


Sec.  27.1353  Energy storage systems.

    Energy storage systems must be designed and installed as follows:
    (a) Energy storage systems must provide automatic protective 
features for any conditions that could prevent continued safe flight 
and landing.
    (b) Energy storage systems must not emit any flammable, explosive, 
or toxic gases, smoke, or fluids that could accumulate in hazardous 
quantities within the rotorcraft.
    (c) Corrosive fluids or gases that escape from the system must not 
damage surrounding structures, adjacent equipment, or systems necessary 
for continued safe flight and landing.
    (d) The maximum amount of heat and pressure that can be generated 
during any operation or under any failure condition of the energy 
storage system or its individual components must not result in any 
hazardous effect on rotorcraft structure, equipment, or systems 
necessary for continued safe flight and landing.
    (e) Energy storage system installations required for continued safe 
flight and landing of the rotorcraft must have monitoring features and 
a means to indicate to the pilot the status of all critical system 
parameters.

0
9. Amend Sec.  27.1545 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  27.1545  Airspeed indicator.

* * * * *
    (b) The following markings must be made:
    (1) A red line--
    (i) For rotorcraft other than helicopters, at VNE.
    (ii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-on).
    (iii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-off). If 
VNE (power-off) is less than VNE (power-on) and 
both are simultaneously displayed, the red line at VNE 
(power-off) must be clearly distinguishable from the red line at 
VNE (power-on).
    (2) [Reserved]
    (3) For the caution range, a yellow range.
    (4) For the normal operating range, a green or unmarked range.
* * * * *

0
10. Amend Sec.  27.1549 by revising paragraphs (a) through (d) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  27.1549  Powerplant instruments.

* * * * *
    (a) Each maximum and, if applicable, minimum safe operating limit 
must be marked with a red line;
    (b) Each normal operating range must be marked as a green or 
unmarked range;
    (c) Each takeoff and precautionary range must be marked with a 
yellow range or yellow line;
    (d) Each engine or rotor range that is restricted because of 
excessive vibration stresses must be marked with red ranges or red 
lines; and
* * * * *

0
11. Amend Sec.  27.1555 by revising paragraph (c)(1) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  27.1555  Control markings.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) For fuel systems having no selector controls, the usable fuel 
capacity of the system must be indicated at the fuel quantity indicator 
unless it is:
    (i) Provided by another system or equipment readily accessible to 
the pilot; and
    (ii) Contained in the limitations section of the rotorcraft flight 
manual.
* * * * *

[[Page 8739]]


0
12. Amend Sec.  27.1587 by revising paragraph (a)(1) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  27.1587  Performance information.

    (a) * * *
    (1) Enough information to determine the limiting height-velocity 
envelope.
* * * * *

0
13. Amend appendix B to part 27 by revising paragraphs VIII 
introductory text and VIII(b)(5)(i) to read as follows:

Appendix B to Part 27--Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument 
Flight

* * * * *
    VIII. Equipment, systems, and installation. The basic equipment 
and installation must comply with Sec. Sec.  29.1303, 29.1431, and 
29.1433, with the following exceptions and additions:
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) * * *
    (i) For pneumatic systems, only the required flight instruments 
for the first pilot may be connected to that operating system;
* * * * *

0
14. In appendix C to part 27 amend section ``C27.2 Applicable part 29 
sections'' by removing ``29.1309(b)(2)(i) and (d)--Equipment, systems, 
and installations'' and by revising ``29.903(b)(c) and (e)--Engines'' 
to read as follows:

Appendix C to Part 27--Criteria for Category A

* * * * *
    29.903 (b) and (c)--Engines.
* * * * *

PART 29--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT

0
15. The authority citation for part 29 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.


0
16. Amend Sec.  29.955 by revising paragraph (a)(7) to read as follows:


Sec.  29.955  Fuel flow.

    (a) * * *
    (7) The fuel filter required by Sec.  29.997 is blocked to the 
degree necessary to simulate the accumulation of fuel contamination 
required to activate the indicator required by Sec.  29.1305(a)(18).
* * * * *

0
17. Amend Sec.  29.977 by revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  29.977  Fuel tank outlet.

    (a) * * *
    (1) For reciprocating engine powered rotorcraft, have 8 to 16 
meshes per inch; and
    (2) For turbine engine powered rotorcraft, prevent the passage of 
any object that could restrict fuel flow or damage any fuel system 
component.
* * * * *

0
18. Amend Sec.  29.1019 by revising paragraph (a)(5) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  29.1019  Oil strainer or filter.

    (a) * * *
    (5) An oil strainer or filter that has no bypass, except one that 
is installed at an oil tank outlet, must have a means to connect it to 
the warning system required in Sec.  29.1305(a)(19).
* * * * *

0
19. Amend Sec.  29.1305 by revising paragraphs (a)(5), (11), and (12) 
and adding (b)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  29.1305  Powerplant instruments.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (5) A means to indicate manifold pressure for each altitude engine;
* * * * *
    (11) A means to indicate the gas temperature for each turbine 
engine;
    (12) A means to indicate the gas producer speed for each turbine 
engine;
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4) For each Category A rotorcraft for which OEI Training Mode is 
requested, a means must be provided to indicate to the pilot the 
simulation of an engine failure, the annunciation of that simulation, 
and a representation of the OEI power being provided.
* * * * *

0
20. Revise Sec.  29.1309 to read as follows:


Sec.  29.1309  Equipment, systems, and installations.

    The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is 
required by this subchapter must be designed and installed to ensure 
that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable 
operating condition. For any item of equipment or system whose failure 
has not been specifically addressed by another requirement in this 
chapter, the following requirements also apply:
    (a) The design of each item of equipment, system, and installation 
must be analyzed separately and in relation to other rotorcraft systems 
and installations to determine and identify any failure that would 
affect the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 
perform their duties in all operating conditions.
    (b) Each item of equipment, system, and installation must be 
designed and installed so that:
    (1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is 
extremely improbable;
    (2) The occurrence of any major failure condition is no more than 
improbable; and
    (3) For the occurrence of any other failure condition in between 
major and catastrophic, the probability of the failure condition must 
be inversely proportional to its consequences.
    (c) A means to alert the crew in the event of a failure must be 
provided when an unsafe system operating condition exists and to enable 
them to take corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated 
monitoring and crew alerting means must be designed to minimize crew 
errors that could create additional hazards.
    (d) Compliance with the requirements of this section must be shown 
by analysis and, where necessary, by ground, flight, or simulator 
tests. The analysis must account for:
    (1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and 
misleading data and input from external sources;
    (2) The effect of multiple failures and latent failures;
    (3) The resulting effects on the rotorcraft and occupants, 
considering the stage of flight and operating conditions; and
    (4) The crew alerting cues and the corrective action required.

0
21. Amend Sec.  29.1329 by revising the section heading, adding 
introductory text, and revising paragraphs (a), (d), and (e) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  29.1329  Automatic pilot and flight guidance system.

    For the purpose of this subpart, an automatic pilot and flight 
guidance system may consist of an autopilot, flight director, or a 
component that interacts with stability augmentation or trim.
    (a) Each automatic pilot and flight guidance system must be 
designed so that it:
    (1) Can be overpowered by one pilot to allow control of the 
rotorcraft;
    (2) Provides a means to disengage the system, or any malfunctioning 
component of the system, by each pilot to prevent it from interfering 
with the control of the rotorcraft; and
    (3) Provides a means to indicate to the flight crew its current 
mode of operation. Selector switch position is not acceptable as a 
means of indication.
* * * * *
    (d) The system must be designed so that, within the range of 
adjustment

[[Page 8740]]

available to the pilot, it cannot produce hazardous loads on the 
rotorcraft, or create hazardous deviations in the flight path, under 
any flight condition appropriate to its use or in the event of a 
malfunction, assuming that corrective action begins within a reasonable 
period of time.
    (e) If the automatic pilot and flight guidance system integrates 
signals from auxiliary controls or furnishes signals for operation of 
other equipment, there must be a means to prevent improper operation.
* * * * *

0
22. Amend Sec.  29.1333 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec.  29.1333  Instrument systems.

* * * * *
    (a) For pneumatic systems, only the required flight instruments for 
the first pilot may be connected to that operating system.
* * * * *


Sec.  29.1335  [Removed]

0
23. Remove Sec.  29.1335.

0
24. Amend Sec.  29.1351 by adding paragraphs (e) and (f) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  29.1351  General.

* * * * *
    (e) Electrical equipment, controls, and wiring must be installed so 
that operation of any one unit or system of units will not adversely 
affect the simultaneous operation of any other electrical unit or 
system essential to safe operation.
    (f) Cables must be grouped, routed, and spaced so that damage to 
essential circuits will be minimized if there are faults in heavy 
current-carrying cables.

0
25. Revise Sec.  29.1353 to read as follows:


Sec.  29.1353  Energy storage systems.

    Energy storage systems must be designed and installed as follows:
    (a) Energy storage systems must provide automatic protective 
features for any conditions that could prevent continued safe flight 
and landing.
    (b) Energy storage systems must not emit any flammable, explosive, 
or toxic gases, smoke, or fluids that could accumulate in hazardous 
quantities within the rotorcraft.
    (c) Corrosive fluids or gases that escape from the system must not 
damage surrounding structures, adjacent equipment, or systems necessary 
for continued safe flight and landing.
    (d) The maximum amount of heat and pressure that can be generated 
during any operation or under any failure condition of the energy 
storage system or its individual components must not result in any 
hazardous effect on rotorcraft structure, equipment, or systems 
necessary for continued safe flight and landing.
    (e) Energy storage system installations required for continued safe 
flight and landing of the rotorcraft must have monitoring features and 
a means to indicate to the pilot the status of all critical system 
parameters.

0
26. Amend Sec.  29.1517 by revising the section heading to read as 
follows:


Sec.  29.1517  Limiting height-velocity envelope.

* * * * *

0
27. Amend Sec.  29.1545 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  29.1545  Airspeed indicator.

* * * * *
    (b) The following markings must be made:
    (1) A red line:
    (i) For rotorcraft other than helicopters, at VNE.
    (ii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-on).
    (iii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-off). If 
VNE (power-off) is less than VNE (power-on) and 
both are simultaneously displayed, the red line at VNE 
(power-off) must be clearly distinguishable from the red line at 
VNE (power-on).
    (2) [Reserved]
    (3) For the caution range, a yellow range.
    (4) For the normal operating range, a green or unmarked range.
* * * * *

0
28. Amend Sec.  29.1549 by revising paragraphs (a) through (d) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  29.1549  Powerplant instruments.

* * * * *
    (a) Each maximum and, if applicable, minimum safe operating limit 
must be marked with a red line;
    (b) Each normal operating range must be marked as a green or 
unmarked range;
    (c) Each takeoff and precautionary range must be marked with a 
yellow range or yellow line;
    (d) Each engine or rotor range that is restricted because of 
excessive vibration stresses must be marked with red ranges or red 
lines; and
* * * * *

0
29. Amend Sec.  29.1555 by revising paragraph (c)(1) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  29.1555  Control markings.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) For fuel systems having no selector controls, the usable fuel 
capacity of the system must be indicated at the fuel quantity indicator 
unless it is:
    (i) Provided by another system or equipment readily accessible to 
the pilot; and
    (ii) Contained in the limitations section of the rotorcraft flight 
manual.
* * * * *

0
30. Amend Sec.  29.1587 by revising paragraph (b)(6) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  29.1587  Performance information.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (6) The height-velocity envelope except for rotorcraft 
incorporating this as an operating limitation;
* * * * *

0
31. Amend appendix B to part 29 by revising paragraphs VIII 
introductory text and VIII(b)(5)(i) to read as follows:

Appendix B to Part 29--Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument 
Flight

* * * * *
    VIII. Equipment, systems, and installation. The basic equipment 
and installation must comply with Sec. Sec.  29.1303, 29.1431, and 
29.1433, with the following exceptions and additions:
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) * * *
    (i) For pneumatic systems, only the required flight instruments 
for the first pilot may be connected to that operating system;
* * * * *

    Issued in Washington, DC, on or about February 6, 2023.
Billy Nolen,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-02771 Filed 2-9-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


