
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 102 (Tuesday, May 30, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24458-24462]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-11073]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 29

[Docket No. FAA-2017-0466; Special Conditions No. 29-041-SC]


Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell) Model 
412EP Helicopter in the 412 EPI Configuration; Search and Rescue (SAR) 
With Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Installation

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Bell Model 412EP 
(412EPI configuration) helicopter. This helicopter as modified by Bell 
will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with a SAR AFCS. 
The applicable airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special 
conditions contain the additional safety standards the Administrator 
considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that 
established by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: These special conditions are effective June 29, 2017. We must 
receive your comments by July 31, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number [FAA-2017-0466] 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver comments to the ``Mail'' 
address between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to http://regulations.gov, including any personal information 
the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web 
site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments 
received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual 
sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can 
be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: You can read the background documents or comments received 
at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for 
accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room @12-140 of 
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Harrum, Flight Analyst, FAA, 
Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group, (ASW-111), 10101 
Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas 76177; telephone (817) 222-4087; 
email George.Harrum@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption

    The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the 
notice and comment period previously and has been derived without 
substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that 
prior public comment would result in a significant change from the 
substance contained herein. Therefore, the FAA has determined that 
prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, impracticable, and 
contrary to the public interest, and finds good cause exists for 
adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting 
comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have 
been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment.

Comments Invited

    We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by 
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for 
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do 
so without incurring additional expense or delay. We may change these 
special conditions based on the comments we receive.

Background and Discussion

    On March 20, 2015, Bell applied for a supplemental type certificate 
(STC) for installation of an optional SAR AFCS in certain Model 412EP 
helicopters. The Model 412EP helicopter, approved under Type 
Certificate No. H4SW, is a 14 CFR part 29 transport category helicopter 
certificated in both Category A and Category B and for operation under 
instrument flight rules under the requirements of Appendix B to Part 
29. Bell designated certain serial-numbered Model 412EP helicopters for 
a specific configuration commercially identified as ``412EPI.'' The 412 
EPI configuration includes the following changes from the 412EP: 
Installation of the Pratt & Whitney Canada Model PT6T-9 Twin Power 
Section Turboshaft Engine with Electronic Engine Control, and cockpit 
instruments and avionics replacement with the Bell BasiX-Pro[supreg] 
Integrated Avionics System. This rotorcraft has a maximum take-off 
weight of 12,200 pounds. It carries up to 13 passengers with maximum 
external load of almost 6,614 lbs. and a range up to 609 miles.
    The use of dedicated AFCS upper modes, in which a fully coupled 
autopilot provides operational SAR profiles, is needed for SAR 
operations conducted over water in offshore areas clear of 
obstructions. The SAR modes enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully

[[Page 24459]]

coupled maneuvers, to include predefined search patterns during cruise 
flight, and to transition from cruise flight to a stabilized hover and 
departure (transition from hover to cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also 
includes an auxiliary crew control that allows another crewmember (such 
as a hoist operator) to have limited authority to control the 
helicopter's longitudinal and lateral position during hover operations.
    Flight operations conducted over water at night may have an 
extremely limited visual horizon with little visual reference to the 
surface even when conducted under Visual Meteorological Conditions. 
Consequently, the certification requirements for SAR modes must meet 
the criteria in Appendix B to Part 29. While Appendix B to Part 29 
prescribes airworthiness criteria for instrument flight, it does not 
consider operations below instrument flight minimum speed 
(VMINI), whereas the SAR modes allow for coupled operations 
at low speed, all-azimuth flight to zero airspeed (hover).
    The regulations as currently promulgated did not envision 
instrument flight below the Appendix B envelope, including hover using 
AFCS modes. This necessitates the development of a special condition to 
address the gap in 14 CFR part 29 regulations and the lack of adequate 
airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR mode certification to include 
flight characteristics, performance, and installed equipment and 
systems. Also, the requirements of the Bell 412EP Special Conditions 
No. 29-ASW-5 are not adequate to address the safety objectives for this 
SAR AFCS design feature. Special Conditions No. 29-ASW-5 only requires 
provisions for mitigating hazards to required equipment from high 
intensity radio frequency transmission sources.
    The 412EPI configuration SAR operations necessitate safety critical 
navigation and control functions. These functions allow the rotorcraft 
to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR) then transition to 
stabilized visual flight rules hover below required minimum obstacle 
distances. To safely accomplish this specialized operation, the 
equipment must possess minimum functional reliability and availability 
under potentially adverse environmental conditions. The 412EPI 
configuration SAR equipment operates as an integrated system to 
accomplish the functions mentioned above.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, Bell must show that the 
412EP model helicopter in the 412EPI configuration, as changed, 
continues to meet either the applicable provisions of the regulations 
incorporated by reference in type certificate (TC) No. H4SW or the 
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the 
change, depending on the significance of the change as defined by 14 
CFR 21.101. The regulations incorporated by reference in the TC are 
commonly referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The 
regulations incorporated by reference in H4SW are as follows:
    (a) 14 CFR part 29, dated February 1, 1965, including Amendments 
29-1 through 29-51.
    (b) 14 CFR 29.141, 29.143, 29.251, 29.301, 29.303, 29.305, 
29.307(a), 29.561(c), 29.601(a), 29.603, 29.605, 29.609(a), 29.625, 
29.777, 29.831(b)(c)(d), 29.907, 29.993, 29.1023(a), 29.1049, 29.1093. 
29.1203(a)(b)(d), 29.1301, 29.1327, 29.1381, 29.1385, 29.1389, 29.1391, 
29.1393, 29.1395, 29.1431, 29.1435, 29.1523(a)(b), 29.1541, 29.1543(b), 
29.1547, 29.1551, 29.1553, at Amdt. 29-0.
    (c) 14 CFR 29.955(a)(1) at Amdt. 29-2.
    (d) 14 CFR 29.773(a), 29.901, 29.1191(a)(c)(d)(e)(f), at Amdt. 29-
3.
    (e) 14 CFR 29.1397 at Amdt. 29-7.
    (f) 14 CFR 29.1387 at Amdt 29-9.
    (g) 14 CFR part 29.1401 at Amdt. 29-11.
    (h) 14 CFR 29.63, 29.939, 29.1165, 29.1322 at Amdt. 29-12.
    (i) 14 CFR 29.1145 at Amdt. 29-13.
    (j) 14 CFR 29.1335 at Amdt. 29-14.
    (k) 14 CFR 29.29, 29.33(a)(1), 29.1353(a)(b), 29.1501, 29.1527, 
29.1581(a)(b)(d) at Amdt. 29-15.
    (l) 14 CFR 29.1413(a), at Amdt. 29-16.
    (m) 14 CFR 29.1091(a)(b), 29.1545 at Amdt. 29-17.
    (n) 14 CFR 29.571, 29.1529, 14 CFR part 29 Appendix A at Amdt. 29-
20.
    (o) 14 CFR 29.1321, 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B I and IX (a)(b) at 
Amdt. 29-21.
    (p) 14 CFR 29.853(a)(2)(c) at Amdt. 29-23.
    (q) 14 CFR 29.21, 29.45(a)(b)(c)(e)(f), 29.151, 29.672(a), 
29.771(a)(b)(c), 29.1303, 29.1325, 29.1331, 29.1333, 29.1355, 
29.1357(a)(c)(d)(e)(g), 29.1517, 29.1555(a)(b)(c)(d), 29.1559, 29.1583, 
29.1585 at Amdt. 29-24.
    (r) 14 CFR 29.1011(d), 29.1041, 29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047, 
29.1141(a)(b)(c)(d)(f)(2), 29.1337(a)(b)(1)(2)(c)(d)(e), 29.1557(c)(2) 
at Amdt. 29-26.
    (s) 14 CFR 29.337(a), 29.613(d), at Amdt. 29-30.
    (t) 14 CFR 29.783(e), 29.903(a)(b)(c)(3)(d)(e) at Amdt. 29-31
    (u) 14CFR 29.1143(a)(b)(c)(e)(f), 29.1549 at Amdt. 29-34.
    (v) 14 CFR 29.49(a)(b)(c), 29.51, 29.53, 29.55, 29.60, 29.61, 
29.64, 29.65(a), 29.75, 29.79, 29.83(a)(b), 29.87(a), at Amdt. 29-39.
    (w) 14 CFR 29.1305(a)(3)(4)(6-19)(21-23)(25)(26)(b)(c), 
29.1309(a)(b)(2)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h), 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B VIII 
(a)(b)(3)(4)(5)(6)(c), at Amdt. 29-40.
    (x) 14 CFR 
29.1521(a)(b)(1)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(ii)(c)(4)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h)(i)(j) at Amdt. 
29-41.
    (y) 14 CFR 29.1329(f), 29.1351(a)(b)(3)(4)(6)(d), 29.1359 at Amdt. 
29-42.
    (z) 14 CFR 29.865(c)(6) at Amdt. 29-43.
    (aa) 14 CFR 29.59, 29.62, 29.67, 29.77, 29.81, 29.85, 
29.1323(a)(b)(c)(d)(e) at Amdt. 29-44.
    (bb) 14 CFR 29.1317(a)(b)(c), 14 CFR part 29 Appendix E at Amdt. 
29-49.
    (cc) 14 CFR 29.1587 at Amdt. 29-51.
    (dd) Equivalent Level of Safety Findings:
    (1) 14 CFR 29.1305(a)(11-16) and 29.1549(a)(b)(c)(e) for the Power 
Situation Indicator (documented in ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/P-1) dated 
January 16, 2013.
    (2) 14 CFR 29.1545(b)(2) for Airspeed Indicator (documented in ELOS 
Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/F-2) dated September 27, 2012.
    (3) 14 CFR 29.1333(a) and 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B VIII(b)(5)(i) 
and (ii) for Electronically Integrated Flight Instrument Systems 
(documented in ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/S-2) dated January 25, 2013.
    (4) 14 CFR 29.1555(c)(1) for the Useable Fuel Capacity Marking 
(documented in ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/P-2) dated December 18, 2012.
    (ee) If BHT Kit 412-706-140, Increased Gross Weight, is installed 
then compliance has also been shown to 14 CFR 29.25(a)(1)(3)(4) Amend 
29-51, 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B III, IV(a)(b)(1)(3)(c)(1)(d)(1)(e)(f), 
V, VI, VII at Amend 29-21 and 14 CFR 36.1(c) at Amend 36-14.

Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions

    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 29) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the Bell Model 412EP helicopter in the 
412EPI configuration because of a novel or unusual design feature, 
special conditions are prescribed under Sec.  21.16.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec.  11.19, under 
Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under 
Sec.  21.101.

[[Page 24460]]

    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the TC for that model be amended later to 
include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual 
design feature, or should any other model already included on the same 
TC be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, 
the special conditions would also apply to the other model.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Bell Model 412EP helicopter in the 412EPI configuration will 
incorporate the following novel or unusual design features.
    The SAR system is composed of a navigation computer with SAR modes, 
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR functions, hoist operator control, a 
hover speed reference system, and two radio altimeters. The AFCS 
coupled SAR functions include:
    (a) Hover hold at selected height above the surface.
    (b) Ground speed hold.
    (c) Transition down and hover to a waypoint under guidance from the 
navigation computer.
    (d) SAR pattern, transition down, and hover near a target over 
which the helicopter has flown.
    (e) Transition up, climb, and capture a cruise height.
    (f) Capture and track SAR search patterns generated by the 
navigation computer.
    (g) Monitor the preselected hover height with automatic increase in 
collective if the aircraft height drops below the safe minimum height.
    These SAR modes are intended to be used over large bodies of water 
in areas clear of obstructions. Further, use of the modes that 
transition down from cruise to hover will include operation at 
airspeeds below VMINI.
    The SAR system only entails navigation, flight control, and coupled 
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The system does not include 
additional equipment that may be required for over water flight or 
external loads to meet other operational requirements.

Applicability

    These special conditions apply to the Bell Model 412EP helicopter 
in the 412EPI configuration. Should Bell apply at a later date for a 
change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating 
the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would 
apply to that model as well under the provisions of Sec.  21.101(d).

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on one model of helicopter. It is not a rule of general applicability 
and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of 
these features on the helicopter.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell) 
Model 412EP helicopters in the 412EPI configuration when modified by 
Bell by installing an optional Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight 
Control System (AFCS).
    In addition to the 14 CFR part 29 certification requirements for 
Category A and helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B), the following 
additional requirements must be met for certification of the SAR AFCS:
    (a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled SAR flight modes must provide:
    (1) Safe and controlled flight in the three axes at all airspeeds 
(lateral position and speed, longitudinal position and speed, and 
height and vertical speed) from the previous VMINI to a 
hover (within the maximum demonstrated wind envelope).
    (2) Automatic transition to the helicopter instrument flight 
(Appendix B) envelope as part of the normal SAR mode sequencing.
    (3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around mode that safely interrupts any 
other coupled mode and automatically transitions the helicopter to the 
instrument flight (Appendix B) envelope.
    (4) A means to prevent unintended flight below a safe minimum 
height. Pilot-commanded descent below the safe minimum height is 
acceptable provided the alerting requirements in paragraph (b)(8)(i) of 
these Special Conditions alert the pilot of this descent below safe 
minimum height.
    (b) SAR Mode System Architecture. To support the integrity of the 
SAR modes, the following system architecture is required:
    (1) Ground mapping radar function that presents real-time 
information to the pilots.
    (2) A system for limiting the engine power demanded by the AFCS 
when any of the automatic piloting modes are engaged, so full authority 
digital engine control power limitations, such as torque and 
temperature, are not exceeded.
    (3) A system providing the aircraft height above the surface and 
final pilot-selected height at a location on the instrument panel in a 
position acceptable to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and 
usable by any pilot at their station.
    (4) A system providing the aircraft heading and the ability to 
automatically hold a pilot-selected heading set by either setting the 
reference to the current heading or adjusting the reference left or 
right. If the reference setting can change faster than the aircraft 
ability to follow, a display of reference heading is required at a 
location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA 
that will make it plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their 
station.
    (5) A system providing the aircraft longitudinal and lateral hover 
velocities and the pilot-selected longitudinal and lateral velocities 
when used by the AFCS in the flight envelope where airspeed indications 
become unreliable. This information must be presented at a location on 
the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that is 
plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their station.
    (6) A system providing wind speed and wind direction when automatic 
piloting modes are engaged or transitioning from one mode to another.
    (7) A means to monitor for flight guidance deviations and failures 
with alerting that enables the flight crew take appropriate corrective 
action.
    (8) An alerting system that provides visual or aural alerts, or 
both, to the flight crew under any of the following conditions:
    (i) When the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height is 
reached.
    (ii) When a SAR mode system malfunction occurs.
    (iii) When the AFCS changes modes automatically from one SAR mode 
to another. For normal transitions from one SAR mode to another, a 
single visual or aural alert may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or 
a mode having a time-critical component, the flight crew alerting 
system must activate early enough to allow the flight crew to take 
timely and appropriate action. The alerting system means must be 
designed to alert the flight crew in order to minimize crew errors that 
could create an additional hazard.
    (9) The SAR system hoist operator control is considered a flight 
control with limited authority and must comply with the following:

[[Page 24461]]

    (i) The hoist operator control must be designed and located to 
provide for convenient operation and to prevent confusion and 
inadvertent operation.
    (ii) The helicopter must be safely controllable by the hoist 
operator control throughout the range of that control.
    (iii) The hoist operator control may not interfere with the safe 
operation of the helicopter.
    (iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls must be able to smoothly 
override the control authority of the hoist operator control, without 
exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without the 
danger of exceeding any other limitation because of the override.
    (10) The reliability of the AFCS must be related to the effects of 
its failure. The occurrence of any failure condition that would prevent 
continued safe flight and landing must be extremely improbable. For any 
failure condition of the AFCS which is shown to not be extremely 
improbable:
    (i) The helicopter must be safely controllable and capable of 
continued safe flight without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 
strength. Additional unrelated probable failures affecting the control 
system must be evaluated.
    (ii) The AFCS must be designed so that it cannot create a hazardous 
deviation in the flight path or produce hazardous loads on the 
helicopter during normal operation or in the event of a malfunction or 
failure, assuming corrective action begins within an appropriate period 
of time. Where multiple systems are installed, subsequent malfunction 
conditions must be evaluated in sequence unless their occurrence is 
shown to be improbable.
    (11) A functional hazard assessment and a system safety assessment 
must address the failure conditions associated with SAR operations:
    (i) For SAR catastrophic failure conditions, changes may be 
required to the following:
    (A) System architecture.
    (B) Software and complex electronic hardware design assurance 
levels.
    (C) High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) test levels.
    (D) Instructions for continued airworthiness.
    (ii) The assessments must consider all the systems required for SAR 
operations, including the AFCS, all associated AFCS sensors (for 
example, radio altimeter), and primary flight displays. Electrical and 
electronic systems with SAR catastrophic failure conditions for both 
visual flight rules and IFR must comply with the 14 CFR 29.1317(a)(4) 
HIRF requirements.
    (c) SAR Mode Performance Requirements.
    (1) The SAR modes must be demonstrated for the requested flight 
envelope, including the following minimum sea-state and wind 
conditions:
    (i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 meters (8.2 feet), considering 
both short and long swells.
    (ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 knots for all other azimuths.
    (2) The selected hover height and hover velocity must be captured 
(including the transition from one captured mode to another captured 
mode) accurately and smoothly and not exhibit any significant overshoot 
or oscillation.
    (3) The minimum use height (MUH) for the SAR modes must be no less 
than the maximum loss of height following any single failure or any 
combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, plus an 
additional margin of 15 feet above the surface. MUH is the minimum 
height at which any SAR AFCS mode may be engaged.
    (4) The SAR mode system must be usable up to the maximum certified 
gross weight of the aircraft or to the lower of the following weights:
    (i) Maximum emergency flotation weight.
    (ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground Effect (OGE) weight.
    (iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
    (d) Flight Characteristics.
    (1) For SAR mode coupled flight below VMINI, at the 
maximum demonstrated winds, the helicopter must be able to maintain any 
required flight condition and make a smooth transition from any flight 
condition to any other flight condition without requiring exceptional 
piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without exceeding the limit 
load factor. This requirement also includes aircraft control through 
the hoist operator's control.
    (2) For coupled flight below the previously established 
VMINI, the following stability requirements replace the 
stability requirements of paragraph IV, V, and VI of Appendix B to Part 
29:
    (i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The requirements of Appendix B 
to part 29, paragraph IV are not applicable.
    (ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: The requirements of 
Appendix B to part 29, paragraph V are not applicable.
    (iii) Dynamic Stability, paragraph VI:
    (A) Any oscillation must be damped and any aperiodic response must 
not double in amplitude in less than 10 seconds. This requirement must 
also be met with degraded upper mode(s) of the AFCS.
    (B) After any upset, such as a wind gust, the AFCS must return the 
aircraft to the last commanded flight condition within 10 seconds or 
less.
    (3) With any of the upper modes of the AFCS engaged, the pilot must 
be able to manually recover the aircraft and transition to the normal 
(Appendix B) IFR flight profile envelope without exceptional skill, 
alertness, or strength.
    (e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) Performance Information.
    (1) The following performance information must be provided in the 
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS):
    (i) OEI performance information and emergency procedures, providing 
the maximum weight that will provide a minimum clearance of 15 feet 
above the surface, following failure of the critical engine in a hover. 
The maximum weight must be presented as a function of the hover height 
for the temperature and pressure altitude range requested for 
certification. The effects of wind must be reflected in the hover 
performance information.
    (ii) Hover OGE performance with the critical engine inoperative for 
OEI continuous and time-limited power ratings for those weights, 
altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.
    (2) These OEI performance requirements do not replace performance 
requirements that may be needed to comply with the airworthiness or 
operational standards (14 CFR 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external 
loads or human external cargo.
    (f) RFMS.
    (1) The RFMS must contain, at a minimum:
    (i) Limitations necessary for safe operation of the SAR system, 
including:
    (A) Minimum crew requirements.
    (B) Maximum SAR weight.
    (C) Engagement criteria for each of the SAR modes to include MUH, 
as determined in paragraph (c)(3) of these Special Conditions.
    (ii) Normal and emergency procedures for operation of the SAR 
system (including operation of the hoist operator control) with AFCS 
failure modes, AFCS degraded modes, and engine failures.
    (iii) Performance information:
    (A) OEI performance and height-loss.
    (B) Hover OGE performance information, utilizing OEI continuous and 
time-limited power ratings.
    (C) The maximum wind envelope demonstrated in flight test.
    (D) Information and/or advisory information concerning operations 
in a heavy salt spray environment, including any airframe or power 
effects as a result of salt encrustation.

[[Page 24462]]

    (g) Flight Demonstration.
    (1) Before approval of the SAR system, an acceptable flight 
demonstration of all coupled SAR modes is required.
    (2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe operations during coupled 
maneuvers. The demonstration of fail-safe operations must include a 
pilot workload assessment associated with manually flying the aircraft 
to an altitude greater than 200 feet above the surface and an airspeed 
of at least the best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
    (3) For any failure condition of the SAR system shown to not be 
extremely improbable, the pilot must be able to make a smooth 
transition from one flight mode to another without exceptional piloting 
skill, alertness, or strength.
    (4) Failure conditions that are shown to not be extremely 
improbable must be demonstrated by analysis, ground testing, or flight 
testing. For failures demonstrated in flight, the following normal 
pilot recovery times are acceptable:
    (i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover 
modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
    (ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 3 seconds.
    (5) All AFCS malfunctions must include evaluation at the low-speed 
and high-power flight conditions typical of SAR operations. 
Additionally, AFCS hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory malfunctions, 
particularly in yaw, require evaluation. AFCS malfunction testing must 
include a single or a combination of failures (such as, erroneous data 
from and loss of the radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and altitude 
sensors) that are shown to not be extremely improbable.
    (6) The flight demonstration must include the following 
environmental conditions:
    (i) Swell into wind.
    (ii) Swell and wind from different directions.
    (iii) Cross swell.
    (iv) Swell of different lengths (short and long swell).

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on May 19, 2017.
Lance T. Gant
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2017-11073 Filed 5-26-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


