
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 50 (Thursday, March 16, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13962-13965]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-05268]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 27

[Docket No. FAA-2017-0167; Special Conditions No. 27-032-SC]


Special Conditions: Robinson Helicopter Company Model R22 BETA 
Helicopter; Installation of Helitrak Autopilot System

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Robinson 
Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R22 BETA helicopter. This 
helicopter as modified

[[Page 13963]]

by Helitrak, Incorporated (Helitrak) will have a novel or unusual 
design feature associated with an autopilot (AP) system. The applicable 
airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety 
standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the 
additional safety standards the Administrator considers necessary to 
establish a level of safety equivalent to that ensured by the existing 
airworthiness standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is March 16, 
2017. We must receive your comments by May 15, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number [FAA-2017-0167] 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver comments to the Docket 
Operations, in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to http://regulations.gov, including any personal information 
the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web 
site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments 
received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual 
sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can 
be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: You can read the background documents or comments received 
at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for 
accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of 
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer, 
FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group (ASW-111), 
10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5134; 
or email to Mark.Wiley@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption

    The FAA considers prior notice to be unnecessary as we have 
provided previous opportunities to comment on substantially identical 
proposed special conditions, and we are satisfied that new comments are 
unlikely. Therefore, the FAA has determined that prior public notice 
and comment are unnecessary and finds that good cause exists for 
adopting these special conditions effective upon issuance. The FAA is 
requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that 
may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for 
comment.

Comments Invited

    While we did not precede this with a notice of proposed special 
conditions, we invite interested people to take part in this action by 
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for 
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do 
so without incurring expense or delay. We may change these special 
conditions based on the comments we receive.

Background

    On January 27, 2012, Helitrak applied for a supplemental type 
certificate (STC) to install an AP system on the Robinson Model R22 
BETA helicopter. The Robinson Model R22 BETA helicopter, currently 
approved under Type Certificate No. H10WE, is a 14 CFR part 27 normal 
category, single reciprocating engine, conventional helicopter designed 
for civil operation. This helicopter model is capable of carrying one 
passenger with one pilot, and has a maximum gross weight of up to 1,370 
pounds. The major design features include a two-blade teetering main 
rotor, an anti-torque tail rotor system, a skid landing gear, and a 
visual flight rule basic avionics configuration. Helitrak proposes to 
modify this model helicopter by installing a two-axis Helitrak AP.
    The present Sec.  27.1309(c) regulation does not adequately address 
the safety requirements for systems whose failures could result in 
``catastrophic'' or ``hazardous/severe-major'' failure conditions, or 
for complex systems whose failures could result in ``major'' failure 
conditions. When Sec.  27.1309(c) was promulgated, it was not 
envisioned that a normal category rotorcraft would use systems that are 
complex or whose failure could result in ``catastrophic'' or 
``hazardous/severe-major'' effects on the rotorcraft. The Helitrak AP 
controls rotorcraft flight control surfaces. Possible failure modes 
exhibited by this system could result in a catastrophic event.

Type Certification Basis

    Under 14 CFR 21.101 and 21.115, Helitrak must show that the 
Robinson Model R22 BETA helicopter, as modified by the installed 
Helitrak AP, continues to meet the applicable provisions of the 
regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. H10WE or 
the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the 
change. Additionally, Helitrak must comply with the following 
equivalent level of safety findings, exemptions, and special conditions 
prescribed by the Administrator as part of the certification basis:

14 CFR part 27 dated February 1, 1965, including Amendments 27-1 
through 27-10
National Environmental Act of 1969
Noise Control Act of 1972
Equivalent Safety Finding: Number TD10352LA-R/S-1
14 CFR part 27.1401(d), Anticollision Light System

    In addition, Helitrak must show the Helitrak AP STC-altered 
Robinson Model R22 BETA helicopter complies with the noise 
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.

Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions

    If the Administrator finds the applicable airworthiness regulations 
(that is, 14 CFR part 27) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety 
standards for the Robinson Model R22 BETA helicopter because of a novel 
or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under 
Sec.  21.16.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec.  11.19, in 
accordance with Sec.  11.38 and they become part of the type 
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should Helitrak apply for an STC to modify any other 
model included on the H10WE type certificate to incorporate the same 
novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also 
apply to the other model.

[[Page 13964]]

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Robinson Model R22 BETA will incorporate the following novel or 
unusual design features: A Helitrak AP. This AP system performs non-
required flight control functions. The Helitrak AP is a two-axis system 
with two operational flight control modes: Heading and airspeed hold or 
heading and altitude hold. Other flight control functions include 
unusual attitude recovery, collective pulldown, and an autorotation 
function.

Discussion

    The effect on safety is not adequately covered under Sec.  27.1309 
for the application of new technology and new application of standard 
technology. Specifically, the provisions of Sec.  27.1309(c) do not 
adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures 
could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure 
conditions and for complex systems whose failures could result in major 
failure conditions.
    To comply with these special conditions, we require that Helitrak 
provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the final 
Helitrak AP installation configuration that will adequately address the 
safety objectives established by a functional hazard assessment (FHA) 
and a preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), including the fault 
tree analysis (FTA). This will ensure that all failure conditions and 
their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the installed 
Helitrak AP. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the 
overall safety assessment process discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 
27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft, and Society of 
Automotive Engineers document Aerospace Recommended Practice 4761, 
Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on 
Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.
    These special conditions require that the Helitrak AP installed on 
a Robinson Model R22 BETA helicopter meets the requirements to 
adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and 
subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity 
requirements.

Applicability

    These special conditions are applicable to the Robinson Model R22 
BETA helicopter. Should Helitrak apply at a later date for an STC to 
modify any other model included on Type Certificate No. H10WE to 
incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special 
conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on one model helicopter. It is not a rule of general applicability and 
affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these 
features on the helicopter.
    Under standard practice, the effective date of final special 
conditions would be 30 days after the date of publication in the 
Federal Register; however, the substance of these special conditions 
has been subjected to the notice and comment period previously and has 
been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. 
As it is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a 
significant change from the substance contained herein, the FAA 
considers prior notice to be unnecessary and finds that good cause 
exists to make these special conditions effective upon issuance.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 
44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) 
Model R22 BETA helicopters as modified by Helitrak, Incorporated.
    In addition to the requirement of Sec.  27.1309(c), the Helitrak 
autopilot (AP) system installation on Robinson Model R22 BETA 
helicopters must be designed and installed so that the failure 
conditions identified in the functional hazard assessment (FHA) and 
verified by the system safety assessment (SSA) are adequately addressed 
in accordance with the following requirements.
    Helitrak, Incorporated must provide the FAA with a SSA for the 
final Helitrak AP installation configuration that will adequately 
address the safety objectives established by the FHA and the 
preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), including the fault tree 
analysis (FTA). This will show that all failure conditions and their 
resulting effects are adequately addressed for the installed Helitrak 
AP.
    Note 1: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the 
overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory 
Circular (AC) 27-1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace Recommended 
Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety 
Assessment Process on civil airborne Systems and Equipment).
    Failure Condition Categories. Failure conditions are classified, 
according to the severity of their effects on the rotorcraft, into one 
of the following categories:
    1. No Effect. Failure conditions have no effect on safety. These 
failure conditions would not affect the operational capability of the 
rotorcraft or increase crew workload; however, could result in an 
inconvenience to the occupants, excluding the flight crew.
    2. Minor. Failure conditions do not significantly reduce rotorcraft 
safety, and involve crew actions that are well within their 
capabilities. Minor failure conditions would include, for example, a 
slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight 
increase in crew workload, such as, routine flight plan changes, or 
result in some physical discomfort to occupants.
    3. Major. Failure conditions reduce the capability of the 
rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating 
conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a 
significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a 
significant increase in crew workload or result in impairing crew 
efficiency, physical distress to occupants, including injuries, or 
physical discomfort to the flight crew. The potential for a failure to 
result in a condition characterized as major should be remote with a 
probability of occurrence between 1 x 10-\3\ to 1 x 
10-\5\ failures/flight hour.
    4. Hazardous/Severe-Major.
    a. Failure conditions reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or 
the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to 
the extent that there would be:
    (1) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
    (2) physical distress or excessive workload that would impair the 
flight crew's ability to the extent that they could not be relied on to 
perform their tasks accurately or completely; or
    (3) possible serious or fatal injury to a passenger or a cabin 
crewmember, excluding the flight crew. The potential that a failure 
results in a condition characterized as hazardous/severe-major should 
be extremely remote with a probability of occurrence between 1 x 
10-\5\ to 1 x 10-\7\ failures/flight hour.

[[Page 13965]]

    b. ``Hazardous/severe-major'' failure conditions can include events 
that are manageable by the crew by the use of proper procedures, which, 
if not implemented correctly or in a timely manner, may result in a 
catastrophic event.
    5. Catastrophic. Failure conditions result in multiple fatalities 
to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation to the flight crew, or 
result in loss of the rotorcraft. The potential that a failure results 
in a condition characterized as catastrophic should be extremely 
improbable with probability of occurrence 1 x 10-\9\ 
failures/flight hour or less.

Requirements

    Helitrak must comply with the existing requirements of Sec.  
27.1309 for all applicable design and operational aspects of the 
Helitrak AP with the failure condition categories of ``no effect'' and 
``minor,'' and for non-complex systems whose failure condition category 
is classified as ``major.'' Helitrak must comply with the requirements 
of these special conditions for all applicable design and operational 
aspects of the Helitrak AP with the failure condition categories of 
``catastrophic'' and ``hazardous severe/major,'' and for complex 
systems whose failure condition category is classified as ``major.'' A 
complex system is a system whose operations, failure conditions, or 
failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of 
analytical methods (for example, FTA, Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis, FHA).

System Design Integrity Requirements

    Each of the failure condition categories defined in these special 
conditions relate to the corresponding aircraft system integrity 
requirements. The system design integrity requirements for the Helitrak 
AP, as they relate to the allowed probability of occurrence for each 
failure condition category and the proposed software design assurance 
level, are as follows:
    Systems with failures that may result in a ``major'' effect must be 
shown to be remote and develop software to the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Document DO-178B, Software 
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Level C 
software design assurance level and must develop complex hardware to 
the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Document DO-254, 
Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, Level C 
hardware design assurance level.
    Systems with failures that may result in ``hazardous/severe-major'' 
effects must be shown to be extremely remote must develop software to 
the RTCA Document DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems 
and Equipment Certification, Level B software design assurance level 
and must develop complex hardware to the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) Document DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for 
Airborne Electronic Hardware, Level B hardware design assurance level.
    Systems with failures that may result in ``catastrophic'' effects 
must be shown to be extremely improbable, and develop software to the 
RTCA Document DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification, Level A design assurance level and must 
develop complex hardware to the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) Document DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for 
Airborne Electronic Hardware, Level A hardware design assurance level.

System Design Environmental Requirements

    The AP system equipment must be qualified to the appropriate 
environmental level per RTCA Document DO-160F, Environmental Conditions 
and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, for all relevant aspects. 
This is to show that the AP system performs its intended function under 
any foreseeable operating condition, including the expected environment 
in which the AP is intended to operate. Some of the main considerations 
for environmental concerns are installation locations and the resulting 
exposure to environmental conditions for the AP system equipment, 
including considerations for other equipment that may be affected 
environmentally by the AP equipment installation. The level of 
environmental qualification must be related to the severity of the 
considered failure conditions and effects on the rotorcraft.

Test & Analysis Requirements

    Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may be 
shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis, 
flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, at a minimum. Compliance 
methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. If 
the AP is a complex system, compliance with the requirements for 
failure conditions classified as ``major'' may be shown by analysis, in 
combination with appropriate testing, to validate the analysis. 
Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as 
``hazardous/severe-major'' may be shown by flight-testing in 
combination with analysis and simulation, and the appropriate testing 
to validate the analysis. Flight tests may be limited for ``hazardous/
severe-major'' failure conditions and effects due to safety 
considerations. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions 
classified as ``catastrophic'' may be shown by analysis and appropriate 
testing in combination with simulation to validate the analysis. Very 
limited flight tests in combination with simulation are used as a part 
of a showing of compliance for ``catastrophic'' failure conditions. 
Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use operational 
variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance aspects to 
address flight safety.
    These special conditions require that the Helitrak AP system 
installed on a Robinson Model R22 BETA helicopter, Type Certificate No. 
H10WE, meet these requirements to adequately address the failure 
effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, 
within the defined design system integrity requirements.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 10, 2017.
Lance Gant,
Manager Rotorcraft Standard Staff, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2017-05268 Filed 3-15-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


