
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 170 (Thursday, September 1, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60236-60240]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-21122]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2016-4138; Special Conditions No. 25-635-SC]


Special Conditions: Bombardier Inc., Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-
700-2A13 Airplanes; Interactions of Systems and Structures

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Bombardier Inc. 
(Bombardier) Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-700-2A13 airplanes. These 
airplanes will have novel or unusual features when compared to the 
state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for 
transport-category airplanes. These design features include systems 
that, directly or as a result of failure or malfunction, affect 
structural performance. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not 
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design 
features. These special conditions contain the additional safety 
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a 
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing 
airworthiness standards.

DATES: This action is effective on Bombardier on September 1, 2016. We 
must receive your comments by October 17, 2016.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2016-4138 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow the online instructions for sending 
your comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to http://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal 
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the 
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all 
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the 
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an 
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act 
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark Freisthler, FAA, Airframe and 
Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; telephone 425-227-1119; facsimile 425-227-1232.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by 
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing 
date for comments. We may change these special conditions based on the 
comments we receive.

Background

    On May 30, 2012, Bombardier applied for an amendment to type 
certificate no. T00003NY to include the new Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-
700-2A13 airplanes. These airplanes are derivatives of the Model BD-700 
series of airplanes currently approved under type certificate no. 
T00003NY, and are marketed as the Bombardier Global 7000 (Model BD-700-
2A12) and Global 8000 (Model BD-700-2A13). These airplanes are ultra-
long-range, executive-interior business jets.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 
CFR) 21.101, Bombardier must show that the Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-
700-2A13 airplanes meet the applicable provisions of the regulations 
listed in type certificate no. T00003NY, or the applicable regulations 
in effect on the date of application for the change, except for earlier 
amendments as agreed upon by the FAA.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the BD-700-2A12 and BD-700-2A13 
airplanes because of a novel or unusual design feature, special 
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec.  21.16.

[[Page 60237]]

    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended 
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or 
unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on 
the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or 
unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to 
the other model under Sec.  21.101.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, the Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-700-2A13 airplanes must comply 
with the fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, 
and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in 
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type-
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-700-2A13 airplanes will incorporate 
the following novel or unusual design features:
    Systems that affect the airplane's structural performance, either 
directly or as a result of failure or malfunction. That is, the 
airplane's systems affect how it responds in maneuver and gust 
conditions, and thereby affect its structural capability. These systems 
may also affect the aeroelastic stability of the airplane. Such systems 
include flight-control systems, autopilots, stability-augmentation 
systems, load-alleviation systems, and fuel-management systems. These 
systems represent novel and unusual features when compared to the 
technology envisioned in the current airworthiness standards.

Discussion

    The flight-control system of the Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-700-2A13 
airplanes will consist of a full-authority fly-by-wire system with 
Normal and Direct modes of operation. The applicable airworthiness 
regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for 
this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional 
safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to 
establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the 
existing airworthiness standards. Special conditions have been applied 
on past airplane programs, with similar systems, to require 
consideration of the effects of those systems on structures.
    The regulatory authorities and industry developed standardized 
criteria in the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) forum 
based on the criteria defined in Advisory Circular (AC) 25.672-1, dated 
November 11, 1983. The ARAC recommendations have been incorporated in 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specifications 
(CS) 25.302 and CS-25 Appendix K. FAA rulemaking on this subject is not 
complete, thus the need for special conditions.
    These special conditions are similar to those previously applied to 
other airplane models and to EASA CS 25.302. Transport Canada Civil 
Aviation (TCCA) plans to include CS 25.302 in the Model BD-700-2A12 and 
BD-700-2A13 airplanes' Canadian certification basis. The differences 
between these FAA special conditions and the current CS 25.302, which 
the FAA regards as minor, are shown below. Both these special 
conditions and CS 25.302:
     Specify the design load conditions to be considered. 
Special conditions 2(a)(i) and 2(b)(ii)(1) of these special conditions 
clarify that, in some cases, different load conditions are to be 
considered due to other special conditions or equivalent-level-of-
safety findings.
     allow consideration of the probability of being in a 
dispatched configuration when assessing subsequent failures and 
potential ``continuation of flight'' loads (see special condition 2(d), 
below). These special conditions, however, also allow using probability 
when assessing failures that induce loads at the ``time of 
occurrence,'' whereas CS 25.302 does not. The FAA provision is 
relieving as compared to CS 25.302.
    The FAA chooses to preserve these minor differences and go forward 
with this version of the special conditions.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the 
Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-700-2A13 airplanes. Should Bombardier apply at 
a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another 
model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, these 
special conditions would apply to the other model as well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on two model series of airplanes. It is not a rule of general 
applicability.
    The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the 
notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been 
derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is 
unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change 
from the substance contained herein. Therefore, the FAA has determined 
that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, and good cause 
exists for adopting these special conditions upon publication in the 
Federal Register. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested 
persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to 
the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.


0
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for Bombardier Model BD-700-2A12 and BD-
700-2A13 airplanes.
    For airplanes equipped with systems that affect structural 
performance, either directly or as a result of a failure or 
malfunction, the influence of these systems and their failure 
conditions must be taken into account when showing compliance with the 
requirements of 14 CFR part 25, subparts C and D.
    The following criteria must be used for showing compliance with 
these special conditions for airplanes equipped with flight-control 
systems, autopilots, stability-augmentation systems, load-alleviation 
systems, flutter-control systems, fuel-management systems, and other 
systems that either directly, or as a result of failure or malfunction, 
affect structural performance. If these special conditions are used for 
other systems, it may be necessary to adapt the criteria to the 
specific system.
    1. The criteria defined herein only address the direct structural 
consequences of the system responses and performance. They cannot be 
considered in isolation, but should be included in the overall safety 
evaluation of the airplane. These criteria may, in some instances, 
duplicate standards already established for this evaluation. These 
criteria are only applicable to structure the failure of which could 
prevent continued safe flight and landing. Specific criteria that 
define

[[Page 60238]]

acceptable limits on handling characteristics or stability 
requirements, when operating in the system-degraded or inoperative 
mode, are not provided in these special conditions.
    2. Depending upon the specific characteristics of the airplane, 
additional studies that go beyond the criteria provided in these 
special conditions may be required to demonstrate the airplane's 
capability to meet other realistic conditions, such as alternative gust 
or maneuver descriptions for an airplane equipped with a load-
alleviation system.
    3. The following definitions are applicable to these special 
conditions.
    a. Structural performance: Capability of the airplane to meet the 
structural requirements of 14 CFR part 25.
    b. Flight limitations: Limitations that can be applied to the 
airplane flight conditions following an in-flight occurrence, and that 
are included in the airplane flight manual (e.g., speed limitations, 
avoidance of severe weather conditions, etc.).
    c. Operational limitations: Limitations, including flight 
limitations, that can be applied to the airplane operating conditions 
before dispatch (e.g., fuel, payload and master minimum-equipment list 
limitations).
    d. Probabilistic terms: Terms such as probable, improbable, and 
extremely improbable, as used in these special conditions, are the same 
as those used in Sec.  25.1309.
    e. Failure condition: This term is the same as that used in Sec.  
25.1309. However, these special conditions apply only to system-failure 
conditions that affect the structural performance of the airplane 
(e.g., system-failure conditions that induce loads, change the response 
of the airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot actions, or lower 
flutter margins).

Effects of Systems on Structures

    1. General. The following criteria will be used in determining the 
influence of a system and its failure conditions on the airplane 
structure.
    2. System fully operative. With the system fully operative, the 
following apply:
    a. Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating 
configurations of the system from all the limit conditions specified in 
14 CFR part 25, subpart C (or defined by special conditions or 
equivalent level of safety in lieu of those specified in subpart C), 
taking into account any special behavior of such a system or associated 
functions, or any effect on the structural performance of the airplane 
that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any significant 
nonlinearity (rate of displacement of control surface, thresholds, or 
any other system nonlinearities) must be accounted for in a realistic 
or conservative way when deriving limit loads from limit conditions.
    b. The airplane must meet the strength requirements of 14 CFR part 
25 (static strength, residual strength), using the specified factors to 
derive ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of 
nonlinearities must be investigated beyond limit conditions to ensure 
that the behavior of the system presents no anomaly compared to the 
behavior below limit conditions. However, conditions beyond limit 
conditions need not be considered when it can be shown that the 
airplane has design features that will not allow it to exceed those 
limit conditions.
    c. The airplane must meet the aeroelastic stability requirements of 
Sec.  25.629.
    3. System in the failure condition. For any system-failure 
condition not shown to be extremely improbable, the following apply:
    a. At the time of occurrence. Starting from 1g level flight 
conditions, a realistic scenario, including pilot corrective actions, 
must be established to determine the loads occurring at the time of 
failure and immediately after the failure.
    i. For static-strength substantiation, these loads, multiplied by 
an appropriate factor of safety that is related to the probability of 
occurrence of the failure, are ultimate loads to be considered for 
design. The factor of safety is defined in Figure 1, below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR01SE16.128

    ii. For residual-strength substantiation, the airplane must be able 
to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in special 
condition 3.a.(i). For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined 
with the normal operating differential pressure.
    iii. Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to the 
speeds defined in Sec.  25.629(b)(2). For failure conditions that 
result in speeds beyond VC/MC, freedom from 
aeroelastic instability must be shown to increased speeds, so that the 
margins intended by Sec.  25.629(b)(2) are maintained.
    iv. Failures of the system that result in forced structural 
vibrations (oscillatory failures) must not produce loads that could 
result in detrimental deformation of primary structure.
    b. For the continuation of the flight. For the airplane in the 
system-failed state, and considering any appropriate reconfiguration 
and flight limitations, the following apply:
    i. THE loads derived from the following conditions (or used in lieu 
of the following conditions) at speeds up to VC/
MC (or the speed limitation prescribed for the remainder of 
the flight) must be determined:
    1. The limit symmetrical maneuvering conditions specified in 
Sec. Sec.  25.331 and 25.345.
    2. The limit gust and turbulence conditions specified in Sec. Sec.  
25.341 and 25.345.

[[Page 60239]]

    3. The limit rolling conditions specified in Sec.  25.349, and the 
limit unsymmetrical conditions specified in Sec. Sec.  25.367, and 
25.427(b) and (c).
    4. The limit yaw-maneuvering conditions specified in Sec.  25.351.
    5. The limit ground-loading conditions specified in Sec. Sec.  
25.473 and 25.491.
    ii. For static-strength substantiation, each part of the structure 
must be able to withstand the loads in special condition 3.b.(i), 
multiplied by a factor of safety depending on the probability of being 
in this failure state. The factor of safety is defined in Figure 2, 
below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR01SE16.129

Qj = (Tj)(Pj)

Where:

Qj = Probability of being in failure mode j
Tj = Average time spent in failure mode j (in hours)
Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per 
hour)

    Note:  If Pj is greater than 10-3 per 
flight hour, then a 1.5 factor of safety must be applied to all 
limit load conditions specified in 14 CFR part 25, subpart C.

    iii. For residual-strength substantiation, the airplane must be 
able to withstand two-thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph 
3.b.(ii) of these special conditions. For pressurized cabins, these 
loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.
    iv. If the loads induced by the failure condition have a 
significant effect on fatigue or damage tolerance, then their effects 
must be taken into account.
    v. Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to a speed 
determined from Figure 3, below. Flutter clearance speeds V' and V'' 
may be based on the speed limitation specified for the remainder of the 
flight using the margins defined by Sec.  25.629(b).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR01SE16.130

V' = Clearance speed as defined by Sec.  25.629(b)(2).
V'' = Clearance speed as defined by Sec.  25.629(b)(1).

Qj = (Tj)(Pj)

Where:

Qj = Probability of being in failure mode j
Tj = Average time spent in failure mode j (in hours)
Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per 
hour)

    Note:  If Pj is greater than 10-3 per 
flight hour, then the flutter clearance speed must not be less than 
V''.

    vi. Freedom from aeroelastic instability must also be shown up to 
V' in Figure 3, above, for any probable system-failure condition, 
combined with any damage required or selected for investigation by 
Sec.  25.571(b).
    b. Consideration of certain failure conditions may be required by 
other sections of 14 CFR part 25 regardless of calculated system 
reliability. Where analysis shows the probability of these failure 
conditions to be less than 10-9, criteria other than those 
specified in this paragraph may be used for structural substantiation 
to show continued safe flight and landing.
    4. Failure indications. For system-failure detection and 
indication, the following apply:
    a. The system must be checked for failure conditions, not extremely 
improbable, that degrade the structural capability below the level 
required by 14 CFR part 25, or that significantly reduce the 
reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably practicable, 
the flightcrew must be made aware of these failures before flight. 
Certain elements of the control system, such as mechanical and 
hydraulic components, may use special periodic inspections, and 
electronic components may use

[[Page 60240]]

daily checks, in lieu of detection and indication systems, to achieve 
the objective of this requirement. These certification-maintenance 
requirements must be limited to components that are not readily 
detectable by normal detection-and-indication systems, and where 
service history shows that inspections will provide an adequate level 
of safety.
    b. The existence of any failure condition, not extremely 
improbable, during flight, that could significantly affect the 
structural capability of the airplane, and for which the associated 
reduction in airworthiness can be minimized by suitable flight 
limitations, must be signaled to the flightcrew. For example, failure 
conditions that result in a factor of safety between the airplane 
strength and the loads of 14 CFR part 25, subpart C below 1.25, or 
flutter margins below V'', must be signaled to the crew during flight.
    5. Dispatch with known failure conditions. If the airplane is to be 
dispatched in a known system-failure condition that affects structural 
performance, or that affects the reliability of the remaining system to 
maintain structural performance, then the provisions of these special 
conditions must be met, including the provisions of special condition 2 
for the dispatched condition, and special condition 3 for subsequent 
failures. Expected operational limitations may be taken into account in 
establishing Pj as the probability of failure occurrence for 
determining the safety margin in Figure 1. Flight limitations and 
expected operational limitations may be taken into account in 
establishing Qj as the combined probability of being in the 
dispatched failure condition and the subsequent failure condition for 
the safety margins in Figures 2 and 3. These limitations must be such 
that the probability of being in this combined failure state, and then 
subsequently encountering limit load conditions, is extremely 
improbable. No reduction in these safety margins is allowed if the 
subsequent system-failure rate is greater than 10-\3\ per 
hour.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 23, 2016.
John P. Piccola, Jr.,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-21122 Filed 8-31-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


