[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 144 (Monday, July 27, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 45084-45092]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-14721]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 91

[Docket No.: FAA-2011-0246; Amdt. No. 91-321E]
RIN 2120-AL47


Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Tripoli Flight 
Information Region (FIR) (HLLL)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action amends, with modifications to reflect changed 
conditions in Libya and the associated risks to U.S. civil aviation 
safety, the Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) prohibiting 
certain flight operations in the Tripoli Flight Information Region 
(FIR) (HLLL) by all: United States (U.S.) air carriers; U.S. commercial 
operators; persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate 
issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-
registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of U.S.-
registered civil aircraft, except when the operator of such aircraft is 
a foreign air carrier. This action incorporates the FAA's prohibition 
on U.S. civil flight operations in the territory and airspace of Libya 
at all altitudes contained in Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) KICZ A0026/19, 
into the SFAR. In addition, the FAA remains concerned about the safety 
of U.S. civil aviation operations at altitudes below Flight Level (FL) 
300 in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) that are outside the 
territory and airspace of Libya because of the hazards described in the 
preamble to the FAA's March 2019 final rule. Accordingly, this final 
rule also prohibits U.S. civil flight operations below FL300 in those 
portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and airspace 
of Libya. This action also extends the expiration date of the SFAR from 
March 20, 2021, to March 20, 2023. Finally, the FAA republishes the 
approval process and exemption information for this SFAR, consistent 
with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, and makes minor 
administrative revisions.

DATES: This final rule is effective on July 27, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dale E. Roberts, Air Transportation 
Division, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 
800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; telephone 202-267-
8166; email dale.e.roberts@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    This action amends, with modifications to reflect changed 
conditions in Libya and the associated risks to U.S. civil aviation 
safety, the prohibition against certain U.S. civil flight operations in 
the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) by all: U.S. air carriers; U.S. commercial 
operators; persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate 
issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-
registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of U.S.-
registered civil aircraft, except when the operator of such aircraft is 
a foreign air carrier. Specifically, this amendment prohibits all 
persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603 of 
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), from conducting flight 
operations in the territory and airspace of Libya at all altitudes due 
to the geographic expansion and escalation of the ongoing

[[Page 45085]]

conflict between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) 
and the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA) for control over 
Libya's government, territory, and resources. This amendment 
incorporates the flight prohibition contained in NOTAM KICZ A0026/19, 
issued on October 23, 2019, into SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603. This 
amendment also continues the prohibition against all flights by U.S. 
civil operators and airmen at altitudes below FL300 in those portions 
of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and airspace of Libya. 
Cumulatively, the result is that U.S. civil operators and airmen may 
only operate in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) if they remain outside the 
territory and airspace of Libya and at altitudes at or above FL300, 
unless they have received an exemption or approval from the FAA. 
Consequently, U.S. operators continue to have the option of using 
several airways connecting western Africa with the Middle East, 
provided that they operate at altitudes at or above FL300 while they 
are in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL).
    This action also extends the expiration date of this SFAR from 
March 20, 2021, to March 20, 2023. The FAA also republishes the 
approval process and exemption information for this SFAR, consistent 
with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, and makes minor 
administrative revisions.

II. Legal Authority and Good Cause

A. Legal Authority

    The FAA is responsible for the safety of flight in the U.S. and for 
the safety of U.S. civil operators, U.S.-registered civil aircraft, and 
U.S.-certificated airmen throughout the world. Sections 106(f) and (g) 
of title 49, U.S. Code, subtitle I establish the FAA Administrator's 
authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle VII of title 49, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority. Section 40101(d)(1) provides that the Administrator shall 
consider in the public interest, among other matters, assigning, 
maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest 
priorities in air commerce. Section 40105(b)(1)(A) requires the 
Administrator to exercise this authority consistently with the 
obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements.
    The FAA is promulgating this rulemaking under the authority 
described in 49 U.S.C. 44701, General requirements. Under that section, 
the FAA is charged broadly with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft 
in air commerce by prescribing, among other things, regulations and 
minimum standards for practices, methods, and procedures that the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national 
security.
    This regulation is within the scope of the FAA's authority because 
it prohibits the persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 112, 
Sec.  91.1603, from conducting flight operations at all altitudes in 
the territory and airspace of Libya due to the geographic expansion and 
escalation of the ongoing conflict between the Tripoli-based GNA and 
the Tobruk-based LNA for control over Libya's government, territory, 
and resources, as described in the preamble to this final rule. Under 
the same authority, this action also continues the FAA's prohibition on 
U.S. civil flight operations at altitudes below FL300 in the remainder 
of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL), due to the hazards in that airspace, also 
described in the preamble to this final rule.

B. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

    Section 553(b)(3)(B) of title 5, U.S. Code, authorizes agencies to 
dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency 
for ``good cause'' finds that those procedures are ``impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' Section 553(d) also 
authorizes agencies to forgo the delay in the effective date of the 
final rule for good cause found and published with the rule. In this 
instance, the FAA finds good cause exists to forgo notice and comment 
because notice and comment would be impracticable and contrary to the 
public interest. In addition, it is contrary to the public interest to 
delay the effective date of this amendment.
    The risk environment for U.S. civil aviation in airspace managed by 
other countries with respect to safety of flight is fluid because of 
the risks posed by weapons capable of targeting, or otherwise 
negatively affecting, U.S. civil aviation, as well as other hazards to 
U.S. civil aviation associated with fighting, extremist/militant 
activity, or heightened tensions. This fluidity and the need for the 
FAA to rely upon classified information in assessing these risks make 
seeking notice and comment impracticable and contrary to the public 
interest. With respect to the impracticability of notice and comment 
procedures, the potential for rapid changes in the risks to U.S. civil 
aviation significantly limits how far in advance of a new or amended 
flight prohibition the FAA can usefully assess the risk environment. 
Furthermore, to the extent that these rules and any amendments to them 
are based upon classified information, the FAA is not legally permitted 
to share such information with the general public, who cannot 
meaningfully comment on information to which they are not legally 
allowed access.
    Under these conditions, public interest considerations also favor 
not issuing notice and seeking comments for these rules and any 
amendments to them. While there is a public interest in having an 
opportunity for the public to comment on agency action, there is a 
greater public interest in having the FAA's flight prohibitions, and 
any amendments thereto, reflect the agency's most current understanding 
of the risk environment for U.S. civil aviation. This allows the FAA to 
protect the safety of U.S. operators' aircraft and the lives of their 
passengers and crews without over-restricting U.S. operators' routing 
options. The FAA has identified a need to prohibit all persons 
described in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, from 
conducting flight operations at all altitudes in the territory and 
airspace of Libya due to the geographic expansion and escalation of the 
ongoing conflict between the Tripoli-based GNA and the Tobruk-based LNA 
for control over Libya's government, territory, and resources. The FAA 
has also identified a need to continue to prohibit U.S. civil flight 
operations at altitudes below FL300 in those portions of the Tripoli 
FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and airspace of Libya due to the 
continuing hazards in that airspace described in the preamble of this 
final rule.
    For these reasons, the FAA finds good cause to forgo notice and 
comment and any delay in the effective date for this final rule.

III. Background

    As a result of safety and national security concerns regarding 
flight operations in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) during the Libyan 
Revolution and its aftermath, the FAA prohibited U.S. civil flight 
operations at all altitudes in the entire Tripoli FIR (HLLL) between 
March 2011 and March 2019.\1\ In its

[[Page 45086]]

March 2019 final rule (84 FR 9950), the FAA found security and safety 
conditions had sufficiently improved to allow U.S. civil flights to 
operate in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) at altitudes at or above FL300.\2\ 
Extremist/militant elements operating in Libya were believed not to 
possess anti-aircraft weapons capable of threatening U.S. civil 
aviation operations at or above FL260, and there was a lower risk of 
civil-military de-confliction concerns at cruising altitudes at or 
above FL300. Additionally, while there were, and continue to be, two 
air navigation service providers (ANSPs) operating in the Tripoli FIR 
(HLLL),\3\ the FAA determined that this situation posed a minimal 
safety risk to U.S. civil overflight operations. The Tripoli-based 
ANSP, which is recognized by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), had publicized overflight instructions in the 
Aeronautical Information Publication and a NOTAM containing overflight 
procedures for civil aviation operations in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL). The 
FAA also had not received any reports of the two ANSPs providing 
conflicting guidance to civil aircraft or otherwise behaving in ways 
that would pose safety of flight concerns for international 
overflights. Based on this assessment, the FAA determined that 
overflights of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) could be conducted safely at 
altitudes at or above FL300, subject to the approval of, and in 
accordance with the conditions established by, the appropriate 
authorities of Libya.
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    \1\ For a more comprehensive history of SFAR No. 112, 14 CFR 
91.1603, during this time period, see Prohibition Against Certain 
Flights Within the Tripoli (HLLL) Flight Information Region (FIR) 
final rule, 76 FR 16238, March 23, 2011; Prohibition Against Certain 
Flights Within the Tripoli Flight Information Region (FIR); 
Extension of Expiration Date final rule, 79 FR 15679, March 20, 
2014, corrected at 79 FR 19288, April 8, 2014; Prohibition Against 
Certain Flights Within the Tripoli (HLLL) Flight Information Region 
(FIR); Extension of Expiration Date final rule, 80 FR 15503, March 
24, 2015; and Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights 
in the Tripoli (HLLL) Flight Information Region (FIR) final rule, 82 
FR 14433, March 21, 2017.
    \2\ Amendment of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the 
Tripoli Flight Information Region (FIR) (HLLL) final rule, 84 FR 
9950, March 19, 2019.
    \3\ The Tripoli-based ANSP had issued an Aeronautical 
Information Publication and a NOTAM containing overflight procedures 
for civil aviation operations in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL). The ANSP in 
Benghazi provides air navigation services in the eastern part of the 
country.
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    However, as described in the March 2019 final rule, the FAA found 
an extension of the flight prohibition was necessary for the Tripoli 
FIR (HLLL) at altitudes below FL300 to safeguard against continuing 
hazards to U.S. civil aviation. These hazards related to continued 
instability in Libya; fighting involving various militia, extremist, 
and militant elements; the ready availability of anti-aircraft-capable 
weapons to extremists and militants; and aerial activity by foreign 
sponsors supporting various elements operating in Libya that might not 
be adequately de-conflicted with civil air traffic. The risks to U.S. 
civil aviation were greatest at airports in Libya and during low 
altitude operations near airports or in areas of actual or potential 
fighting.
    The FAA also noted in its March 2019 final rule that Libya remained 
politically unstable, with a fragile security situation.\4\ Since the 
fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, Libya had struggled with a power 
vacuum, a limited security apparatus, and limited territorial control. 
Multiple extremist and militant groups with footholds in Libya were 
armed with anti-aircraft-capable weapons. Various militia, extremist, 
and militant groups continued to vie for strategic influence and 
control of vital infrastructure, including airports, resulting in 
flight disruptions and damage to aircraft and airport facilities on 
various occasions in 2017 and 2018. Violent extremists and militants 
active in Libya possessed, or had access to, a wide array of anti-
aircraft-capable weapons posing a risk to U.S. civil aviation operating 
at altitudes below FL260.
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    \4\ Amendment of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the 
Tripoli Flight Information Region (FIR) (HLLL) final rule, 84 FR at 
9952-9953, March 19, 2019.
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    Additionally, foreign sponsor aerial activities, including a 
variety of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), other military aircraft 
operations, and the potential for electronic interference from counter-
UAS measures, presented a civil-military de-confliction challenge for 
civil aircraft operating at altitudes below FL300. While the FAA 
recognized that aircraft overflying the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) at altitudes 
at or above FL300 could potentially encounter electronic interference 
from counter-UAS measures, such interference would not present a 
significant flight safety hazard. At cruising altitudes at or above 
FL300, the FAA expects pilots would have sufficient time to recognize 
the interference and respond to it by using other instruments or 
navigation aids.
    Accordingly, in the March 2019 final rule, based on the improved 
safety and security conditions in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) at altitudes 
at or above FL300, the FAA modified its flight prohibition for U.S. 
civil aviation to permit overflights of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) at 
altitudes at and above FL300, subject to the approval of, and in 
accordance with the conditions established by, the appropriate 
authorities of Libya. However, as a result of the significant 
continuing risk to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operating at 
altitudes below FL300 in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL), the FAA maintained its 
prohibition on U.S. civil flight operations in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) 
at those altitudes and extended the expiration date of SFAR No. 112, 
Sec.  91.1603, from March 20, 2019, to March 20, 2021.

IV. Discussion of the Final Rule

    Following the publication of the March 20, 2019, final rule, the 
FAA became concerned about increased hazards to U.S. civil overflights 
of northwestern Libya at or above FL300 related to the ongoing conflict 
for control of the capital, Tripoli. LNA forces had begun operations 
aimed at seizing control of Tripoli, including Tripoli International 
Airport (HLLT). The GNA, with support of militias, had conducted 
counterattacks, including tactical airstrikes on LNA forces. The LNA 
had declared a military zone and was threatening to shoot down aircraft 
operating in portions of northwestern Libya.
    Both GNA and advancing LNA forces had access to advanced man-
portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and likely had access to anti-
aircraft artillery. These ground-based anti-aircraft weapon systems 
presented a risk to U.S. civil aviation at altitudes below FL300. 
However, LNA forces had fighter aircraft capable of intercepting civil 
aircraft operating at altitudes at and above FL300 in the self-declared 
military zone in northwestern Libya. While the LNA fighter aircraft 
threat was likely intended for GNA-associated military aircraft, an 
inadvertent risk remained for U.S. civil aviation operations at all 
altitudes in northwestern Libya due to potential miscalculation or 
misidentification. As a result of this evolving threat, on April 6, 
2019, the FAA issued NOTAM KICZ A0012/19, prohibiting U.S. civil flight 
operations at all altitudes in the territory and airspace of Libya from 
west of 17 degrees east longitude and north of 29 degrees north 
latitude.
    Subsequently, on October 23, 2019, the FAA issued KICZ NOTAM A0026/
19, which prohibited U.S. civil aviation operations in the entire 
territory and airspace of Libya at all altitudes. The FAA assessed the 
area of unacceptable inadvertent risk to U.S. civil aviation operations 
at all altitudes had spread to the entire territory and airspace of 
Libya due to the geographic expansion of the ongoing conflict between 
the GNA and the LNA for control over Libya's government, territory, and 
resources. The conflict featured increased foreign intervention and the 
employment of advanced weapons systems. Foreign state actors continued 
to provide material and technical assistance to rival factions, 
including surface-to-air

[[Page 45087]]

missile (SAM) systems, UAS, and jamming equipment.
    In addition, since mid-2019, each side had conducted air strikes 
targeting military airfields co-located with international civil 
airports. These attacks utilized both tactical combat aircraft and, 
increasingly, long-range UAS. Foreign-operated armed UAS had conducted 
multiple strikes on competing airports or airbases, resulting in the 
destruction of multiple parked aircraft, including civil transport 
aircraft. The FAA was concerned these strikes could lead to an 
increased air defense posture, including advanced SAM capabilities, to 
protect airport or airbase operations or fielded forces, which would 
pose an inadvertent risk to U.S. civil aviation. During 2019, the 
increased air strikes prompted GNA- and LNA-aligned forces to increase 
force protection measures, such as jamming, air strikes, and the 
deployment of SAM systems capable of reaching as high as 49,000 feet. 
Each side had employed anti-aircraft weapons to defend against air 
strikes. In September 2019, the LNA reportedly shot down a foreign-
operated UAS during an attempted attack on the airbase at Jufra. In 
addition to foreign-operated air defense capabilities, both GNA and LNA 
forces had, and continue to have, access to advanced MANPADS, some of 
which have a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet; anti-aircraft artillery; 
and possible training, technical, and material support from 
international partners.
    In addition, more advanced, higher-altitude air defense systems 
were reportedly in Libya. As of mid-June 2019, a Pantsir S-1 (SA-22) 
SAM system was reportedly deployed to defend Jufra. The SA-22 has an 
effective range of 20 kilometers (10.8 nautical miles) and a maximum 
altitude of 15,000 meters (49,000 feet). The FAA was concerned the SA-
22 could be relocated in response to the dynamic threat environment, 
and could be repositioned to defend the base at Al Khadim, Libya, with 
little or no warning. Al Khadim was located outside the area of 
northwestern Libya where the FAA had previously prohibited U.S. civil 
flight operations at all altitudes.
    In addition, air strikes had prompted LNA-aligned forces to 
redeploy long-range UAS and SAMs to locations outside the area of 
northwestern Libya where they had previously been located. The 
relocation of these SAMs presented an inadvertent risk to U.S. civil 
aviation at altitudes above FL300 in the territory and airspace of 
Libya. The FAA also was concerned that GNA-and LNA-aligned forces might 
expand their use of UAS air strikes to attack opposition aircraft at 
airbases that are usually co-located with international civil airports, 
presenting a risk to civil aircraft operating at or near such airports.
    While the anti-aircraft capabilities and jamming were likely 
intended to defend against military aircraft, an inadvertent risk 
remained for U.S. civil aviation operations at all altitudes in the 
territory and airspace of Libya due to potential miscalculation or 
misidentification and the mobility of some of the advanced weapons 
systems involved. Increased foreign involvement had resulted in an 
unacceptable inadvertent risk to U.S. civil aviation operations in the 
territory and airspace of Libya due to command and control and airspace 
de-confliction challenges, increased lethality of UAS operations, and 
the introduction of more advanced, higher-altitude anti-aircraft 
systems. Due to these hazards, NOTAM KICZ A0026/19 prohibited U.S. 
civil flight operations at all altitudes in the territory and airspace 
of Libya.
    Since the issuance of NOTAM KICZ A0026/19, the risks to U.S. civil 
aviation operations in the territory and airspace of Libya have further 
increased due to increased foreign intervention. Clashes continue for 
control of the capital, Tripoli, which the LNA has attempted to capture 
since early 2019, and these attacks have increasingly targeted 
aviation. The escalation has resulted in further expansion of foreign 
sponsorship of, and intervention in support of, both the LNA and GNA. 
This support involves third party forces, as well as deployment of 
advanced weapons, including advanced fighter aircraft, weaponized UAS, 
SAM systems, and, likely, jammers. Both sides have conducted air 
strikes, utilizing tactical combat aircraft and long-range, armed UAS 
to target airport infrastructure and aircraft on the ground at 
airports. In May 2020, Russia deployed multiple fighter aircraft to 
Libya to provide close air support to its private military contractors 
and the LNA and protect their operations from attacks by manned 
aircraft and weaponized UAS. The foreign states supporting the LNA and 
GNA also have deployed anti-aircraft weapons and self-protection 
jamming systems to mitigate the air threat. The combination of these 
activities poses airspace de-confliction concerns and an inadvertent 
risk of in-flight engagement of civil aircraft as a result of possible 
misidentification or miscalculation.
    Since November 2019, there have been several GNA UAS shot down near 
Tripoli's Mitiga International Airport (HLLM), and one LNA UAS and one 
LNA MiG-23 shot down near Tripoli. The most recent of those reported 
shoot downs occurred on January 28, 2020, when GNA forces claimed to 
have downed a UAS operating near Misrata. As a result of weapons 
activity posing a potential threat to civil aviation, the GNA closed 
Mitiga International Airport (HLLM) on multiple occasions during 
January and February 2020. In addition, LNA leader General Haftar 
announced on January 23, 2020, that LNA forces would engage any 
military or civil aircraft operating from Mitiga International Airport 
(HLLM).
    The two sides' failure to reach a ceasefire agreement, combined 
with the recent spate of aircraft shoot downs and the potential for 
additional deployments of advanced weapons capabilities, present a 
further increasing risk to civil aviation operations in the territory 
and airspace of Libya at all altitudes. Additional airstrikes targeting 
Libyan airports, and the associated air defense reactions, could 
increase, posing a risk to civil aircraft on the ground and in flight. 
The GNA and LNA possess anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS, some of 
which have a maximum altitude of up to 25,000 feet (7,620 meters).
    However, more advanced, higher-altitude air defense systems have 
been deployed to Libya. In addition to the SA-22 deployment previously 
described, a foreign sponsor associated with the GNA reportedly 
deployed multiple variants of anti-aircraft weapons to provide a 
layered air defense in Tripoli. This deployment included a medium range 
I-Hawk SAM and a Korkut 35mm air defense gun. In addition, both the GNA 
and LNA may augment their air defense operations with increased Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and radio frequency jamming. The FAA assesses 
that the escalating fighting, increased foreign intervention, and 
deployment of additional air defense capabilities present an increasing 
risk to U.S. civil aviation operations in the territory and airspace of 
Libya at all altitudes. For these reasons, this final rule incorporates 
the flight prohibition on U.S civil aviation operation in the territory 
and airspace of Libya at all altitudes, contained in NOTAM KICZ A0026/
19, into SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603.
    In addition, the FAA assesses that the hazards to the safety of 
U.S. civil aviation operations at altitudes below FL 300 described in 
the preamble to the March 2019 final rule remain of concern in those 
portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) that are outside the territory and

[[Page 45088]]

airspace of Libya.\5\ The FAA also notes that foreign military manned 
and unmanned tactical aircraft may operate or approach targets from off 
the northern coast, presenting airspace de-confliction challenges at 
altitudes below FL300. Additionally, there is the potential for GPS 
interference bleed over that may impact flights operating over the 
southern Mediterranean Sea in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL). For these 
reasons, this rule also continues the prohibition against all flights 
by U.S. civil operators and airmen at altitudes below FL300 in those 
portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and airspace 
of Libya.
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    \5\ Id.
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    For all of the reasons described in this preamble, the FAA also 
extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, until March 
20, 2023. The FAA will continue to actively monitor the situation and 
evaluate the extent to which U.S. civil operators and airmen might be 
able to operate safely in the territory and airspace of Libya and the 
Tripoli FIR (HLLL). Amendments to SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, could be 
appropriate if the risk to aviation safety and security changes. The 
FAA may amend or rescind SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, as necessary, 
prior to its expiration date.
    By this action, the FAA also republishes the details concerning the 
approval and exemption processes in Sections V and VI of this preamble, 
consistent with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, to 
enable interested persons to refer to this final rule for comprehensive 
information about requesting relief from the FAA from the provisions of 
SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603. The FAA also makes minor administrative 
revisions to the approval process and SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, in 
this final rule.

V. Approval Process Based on a Request From a Department, Agency, or 
Instrumentality of the United States Government

A. Approval Process Based on an Authorization Request From a 
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of the United States Government

    In some instances, U.S. government departments, agencies, or 
instrumentalities may need to engage U.S. civil aviation to support 
their activities in the territory and airspace of Libya or in the rest 
of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL). If a department, agency, or instrumentality 
of the U.S. Government determines that it has a critical need to engage 
any person described in SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, including a U.S. 
air carrier or commercial operator, to conduct a charter to transport 
civilian or military passengers or cargo or other operations, at all 
altitudes in the territory and airspace of Libya or at altitudes below 
FL300 in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory 
and airspace of Libya, that department, agency, or instrumentality may 
request the FAA to approve persons described in SFAR No. 112, Sec.  
91.1603, to conduct such operations.
    An approval request must be made directly by the requesting 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the U.S. Government to the 
FAA's Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety in a letter signed by 
an appropriate senior official of the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality. The FAA will not accept or consider requests for 
approval from anyone other than the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality. In addition, the senior official signing the letter 
requesting FAA approval on behalf of the requesting department, agency, 
or instrumentality must be sufficiently positioned within the 
organization to demonstrate that the senior leadership of the 
requesting department, agency, or instrumentality supports the request 
for approval and is committed to taking all necessary steps to minimize 
operational risks to the proposed flights. The senior official must 
also be in a position to: (1) Attest to the accuracy of all 
representations made to the FAA in the request for approval and (2) 
ensure that any support from the requesting U.S. Government department, 
agency, or instrumentality described in the request for approval is in 
fact brought to bear and is maintained over time. Unless justified by 
exigent circumstances, requests for approval must be submitted to the 
FAA no less than 30 calendar days before the date on which the 
requesting department, agency, or instrumentality wishes the proposed 
operation(s) to commence.
    The letter must be sent to the Associate Administrator for Aviation 
Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, 
Washington, DC 20591. Electronic submissions are acceptable, and the 
requesting entity may request that the FAA notify it electronically as 
to whether the approval request is granted. If a requestor wishes to 
make an electronic submission to the FAA, the requestor should contact 
the Air Transportation Division, Flight Standards Service, at (202) 
267-8166, to obtain the appropriate email address. A single letter may 
request approval from the FAA for multiple persons described in SFAR 
No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, or for multiple flight operations. To the 
extent known, the letter must identify the person(s) expected to be 
covered under the SFAR on whose behalf the U.S. Government department, 
agency, or instrumentality is seeking FAA approval, and it must 
describe--
     The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
mission being supported;
     The service to be provided by the person(s) covered by the 
SFAR;
     To the extent known, the specific locations in the 
territory and airspace of Libya at all altitudes, and in those portions 
of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and airspace of Libya 
at altitudes below FL300, where the proposed operation(s) will be 
conducted, including, but not limited to, the flight path and altitude 
of the aircraft while it is operating in those areas and the airports, 
airfields, or landing zones at which the aircraft will take off and 
land; and
     The method by which the department, agency, or 
instrumentality will provide, or how the operator will otherwise 
obtain, current threat information and an explanation of how the 
operator will integrate this information into all phases of the 
proposed operations (i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-
flight, and post-flight phases).
    The request for approval must also include a list of operators with 
whom the U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality 
requesting FAA approval has a current contract(s), grant(s), or 
cooperative agreement(s) (or its prime contractor has a subcontract(s)) 
for specific flight operations in the territory and airspace of Libya 
at any altitude or in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside 
the territory and airspace of Libya at altitudes below FL300. The 
requestor may identify additional operators to the FAA at any time 
after the FAA approval is issued. Both the operators listed in the 
original request and any operators that the requestor subsequently 
seeks to add to the approval must be identified to the FAA and obtain 
an Operations Specification (OpSpec) or Letter of Authorization (LOA) 
from the FAA, as appropriate, for operations in the territory and 
airspace of Libya at any altitude or in those portions of the Tripoli 
FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and airspace of Libya at altitudes 
below FL300, as applicable, before such operators commence operations. 
The approval conditions discussed below apply to all operators, whether 
included in the original list or subsequently added to

[[Page 45089]]

the approval. Updated lists should be sent to the email address to be 
obtained from the Air Transportation Division by calling (202) 267-
8166.
    If an approval request includes classified information, requestors 
may contact Aviation Safety Inspector Dale E. Roberts for instructions 
on submitting it to the FAA. His contact information is listed in the 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this final rule.
    FAA approval of an operation under SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, 
does not relieve persons subject to this SFAR of their responsibility 
to comply with all other applicable FAA rules and regulations. 
Operators of civil aircraft must comply with the conditions of their 
certificate, OpSpecs, and LOAs, as applicable. Operators must also 
comply with all rules and regulations of other U.S. Government 
departments or agencies that may apply to the proposed operation(s), 
including, but not limited to, regulations issued by the Transportation 
Security Administration.

B. Approval Conditions

    If the FAA approves the request, the FAA's Aviation Safety 
Organization will send an approval letter to the requesting department, 
agency, or instrumentality informing it that the FAA's approval is 
subject to all of the following conditions:
    (1) The approval will stipulate those procedures and conditions 
that limit, to the greatest degree possible, the risk to the operator, 
while still allowing the operator to achieve its operational 
objectives.
    (2) Before any approval takes effect, the operator must submit to 
the FAA:
    (a) A written release of the U.S. Government from all damages, 
claims, and liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and 
expenses, relating to any event arising out of or related to the 
approved operations in the territory and airspace of Libya at all 
altitudes and in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the 
territory and airspace of Libya at altitudes below FL300; and
    (b) The operator's written agreement to indemnify the U.S. 
Government with respect to any and all third-party damages, claims, and 
liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and expenses, 
relating to any event arising from or related to the approved 
operations at all altitudes in the territory and airspace of Libya and 
in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and 
airspace of Libya at altitudes below FL300.
    (3) Other conditions that the FAA may specify, including those that 
may be imposed in OpSpecs or LOAs, as applicable.
    The release and agreement to indemnify do not preclude an operator 
from raising a claim under an applicable non-premium war risk insurance 
policy issued by the FAA under chapter 443 of title 49, U.S. Code.
    If the FAA approves the proposed operation(s), the FAA will issue 
an OpSpec or a LOA, as applicable, to the operator(s) identified in the 
original request authorizing them to conduct the approved operation(s), 
and will notify the department, agency, or instrumentality that 
requested the FAA approval of any additional conditions beyond those 
contained in the approval letter.

VI. Information Regarding Petitions for Exemption

    Any operations not conducted under an approval the FAA issues 
through the approval process set forth previously must be conducted 
under an exemption from SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603. A petition for 
exemption must comply with 14 CFR part 11. The FAA will consider 
whether exceptional circumstances exist beyond those contemplated by 
the approval process described in the previous section. In addition to 
the information required by 14 CFR 11.81, at a minimum, the requestor 
must describe in its submission to the FAA--
     The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
operation;
     The service to be provided by the person(s) covered by the 
SFAR;
     The specific locations in the territory and airspace of 
Libya at all altitudes, and in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) 
outside the territory and airspace of Libya at altitudes below FL300, 
where the proposed operation(s) will be conducted, including, but not 
limited to, the flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it is 
operating in those areas and the airports, airfields, or landing zones 
at which the aircraft will take off and land;
     The method by which the operator will obtain current 
threat information and an explanation of how the operator will 
integrate this information into all phases of its proposed operations 
(i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-flight, and post-
flight phases); and
     The plans and procedures that the operator will use to 
minimize the risks, identified in this preamble, to the proposed 
operations, to establish that granting the exemption would not 
adversely affect safety or would provide a level of safety at least 
equal to that provided by this SFAR. Note: The FAA has found 
comprehensive, organized plans and procedures to be helpful in 
facilitating the agency's safety evaluation of petitions for exemption 
from flight prohibition SFARs.
    Additionally, the release and agreement to indemnify, as referred 
to previously, are required as a condition of any exemption that may be 
issued under SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603.
    The FAA recognizes that the operations SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, 
might affect could include operations planned for the governments of 
other countries with the support of the U.S. Government. While the FAA 
will not permit these operations through the approval process, the FAA 
will consider exemption requests for such operations on an expedited 
basis and prior to other exemption requests.
    If a petition for exemption includes security-sensitive or 
proprietary information, requestors may contact Aviation Safety 
Inspector Dale E. Roberts for instructions on submitting it to the FAA. 
His contact information is listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this final rule.

VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct that each 
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354), 
as codified in 5 U.S.C. 603 et seq., requires agencies to analyze the 
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as codified in 19 U.S.C. 
Chapter 13, prohibits agencies from setting standards that create 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In 
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies 
to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they 
be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter 25, 
requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of 
the economic impacts of this final rule.

[[Page 45090]]

    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this 
final rule has benefits that justify its costs. This rule is a 
significant regulatory action, as defined in section 3(f) of Executive 
Order 12866, as it raises novel policy issues contemplated under that 
Executive Order. As notice and comment under 5 U.S.C. 553 are not 
required for this final rule, the regulatory flexibility analyses 
described in 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 regarding impacts on small entities 
are not required. This rule will not create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. This rule will not impose an 
unfunded mandate on State, local, or tribal governments, or on the 
private sector, by exceeding the threshold identified previously.

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    This action amends, with modifications to reflect changed security 
conditions in Libya and the associated risks to U.S. civil aviation 
safety, the SFAR prohibiting certain flight operations in the Tripoli 
FIR (HLLL). This action prohibits U.S. civil flight operations in the 
territory and airspace of Libya at all altitudes, incorporating the 
flight prohibition contained in NOTAM KICZ A0026/19 into the SFAR, as a 
result of the significant hazards to U.S. civil aviation detailed in 
the preamble of this final rule. This action also extends the 
expiration date of the SFAR for an additional two years and continues 
the prohibition against all U.S. civil flights at altitudes below FL300 
in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and 
airspace of Libya. As a result of this rule, U.S. civil operators and 
airmen may only operate in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) if they remain 
outside the territory and airspace of Libya and at altitudes at or 
above FL300, unless they have received an exemption or approval from 
the FAA.
    Consequently, U.S. operators have the option to continue using 
several airways connecting western Africa with the Middle East, 
provided that they operate at altitudes at or above FL300 in the 
Tripoli FIR (HLLL) and remain outside of Libyan territorial airspace. 
In addition, U.S. Government departments, agencies, and 
instrumentalities may take advantage of the approval process on behalf 
of U.S. operators and airmen with whom they have a contract, grant, or 
cooperative agreement, or with whom their prime contractor has a 
subcontract. U.S. operators and airmen who do not have any of the 
foregoing types of arrangements with the U.S. Government may petition 
for exemption from this rule.
    The FAA acknowledges the expanded flight prohibition in NOTAM KICZ 
A0026/19, which this final rule incorporates into SFAR No. 112, Sec.  
91.1603, may result in additional costs to some U.S. operators, such as 
increased fuel costs and other operational-related costs. However, the 
FAA expects the costs of this action are exceeded by the benefits of 
avoided risks of fatalities, injuries, and property damage that could 
result from a U.S. operator's aircraft being shot down (or otherwise 
damaged) while operating in the territory and airspace of Libya at all 
altitudes or in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the 
territory and airspace of Libya at altitudes below FL300. The FAA will 
continue to monitor and evaluate the risks to U.S. civil operators and 
airmen as a result of security conditions in the territory and airspace 
of Libya, as well as in the rest of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL).

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), in 5 U.S.C. 603, requires an 
agency to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing 
impacts on small entities whenever an agency is required by 5 U.S.C. 
553, or any other law, to publish a general notice of proposed 
rulemaking for any proposed rule. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. 604 requires an 
agency to prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis when an 
agency issues a final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553, after being required by 
that section or any other law to publish a general notice of proposed 
rulemaking. The FAA found good cause exists to forgo notice and comment 
and any delay in the effective date for this rule. As notice and 
comment under 5 U.S.C. 553 are not required in this situation, the 
regulatory flexibility analyses described in 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 are 
similarly not required.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and 
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil 
aviation from risks to aircraft operations in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL), a 
location outside the U.S. Therefore, this final rule complies with the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $155 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined there 
is no new requirement for information collection associated with this 
final rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, the FAA's policy is to conform to ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. 
The FAA has determined there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended 
Practices that correspond to this regulation.
    The FAA finds that this action is fully consistent with the 
obligations under 49 U.S.C. 40105(b)(1)(A) to ensure that the FAA 
exercises its duties consistently with the obligations of the United 
States under international agreements.
    While the FAA's flight prohibition does not apply to foreign air 
carriers, DOT codeshare authorizations prohibit foreign air carriers 
from carrying a U.S. codeshare partner's code on a flight segment that 
operates in airspace for which the FAA has issued a flight prohibition 
for U.S. civil aviation. In addition, foreign air carriers and other 
foreign operators may choose to avoid, or be advised or directed by 
their civil

[[Page 45091]]

aviation authorities to avoid, airspace for which the FAA has issued a 
flight prohibition for U.S. civil aviation.

G. Environmental Analysis

    The FAA has analyzed this action under Executive Order 12114, 
Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, and DOT Order 
5610.1C, Paragraph 16. Executive Order 12114 requires the FAA to be 
informed of environmental considerations and take those considerations 
into account when making decisions on major Federal actions that could 
have environmental impacts anywhere beyond the borders of the United 
States. The FAA has determined this action is exempt pursuant to 
Section 2-5(a)(i) of Executive Order 12114, because it does not have 
the potential for a significant effect on the environment outside the 
United States.
    In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: 
Policies and Procedures, paragraph 8-6(c), FAA has prepared a 
memorandum for the record stating the reason(s) for this determination 
and has placed it in the docket for this rulemaking.

VIII. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has determined this 
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and, therefore, would not have Federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211, Actions 
Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use. The agency has determined that it would not be a 
``significant energy action'' under the executive order and would not 
be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy.

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet 
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, 
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has 
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of 
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have 
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.

D. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs

    This rule is not subject to the requirements of Executive Order 
13771 because it is issued with respect to a national security function 
of the United States.

IX. Additional Information

A. Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained from 
the internet by--
     Searching the Federal Document Management System (FDMS) 
Portal at http://www.regulations.gov;
     Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies; or
     Accessing the Government Publishing Office's website at 
http://www.govinfo.gov.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by 
amendment or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal Aviation 
Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue 
SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.
    Except for classified material, all documents the FAA considered in 
developing this rule, including economic analyses and technical 
reports, may be accessed from the internet through the Federal Document 
Management System Portal referenced previously.

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA) (Pub. L. 104-121) (set forth as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601) 
requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or 
advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document may 
contact its local FAA official, or the persons listed under the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. 
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91

    Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety, 
Freight, Libya.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, part 91, as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101, 40103, 40105, 
40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 
44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 
47122, 47508, 47528-47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 
U.S.C. 44703 note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).


0
2. Revise Sec.  91.1603 to read as follows:


Sec.  91.1603  Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 112--Prohibition 
Against Certain Flights in the Tripoli Flight Information Region (FIR) 
(HLLL).

    (a) Applicability. This Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 
applies to the following persons:
    (1) All U.S. air carriers and U.S. commercial operators;
    (2) All persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate 
issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-
registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and
    (3) All operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when 
the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier.
    (b) Flight prohibition. Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and 
(d) of this section, no person described in paragraph (a) of this 
section may conduct flight operations in the following specified areas:
    (1) The territory and airspace of Libya.
    (2) Any portion of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) that is outside the 
territory and airspace of Libya at altitudes below Flight Level (FL) 
300.
    (c) Permitted operations. This section does not prohibit persons 
described in paragraph (a) of this section from conducting the 
following flight operations in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL):
    (1) Overflights of those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) that 
are outside the territory and airspace of Libya that occur at altitudes 
at or above Flight Level (FL) 300; or
    (2) Flight operations in the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) that are conducted 
under a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement with a department, 
agency, or instrumentality of the U.S. Government

[[Page 45092]]

(or under a subcontract between the prime contractor of the department, 
agency, or instrumentality and the person described in paragraph (a) of 
this section), with the approval of the FAA, or under an exemption 
issued by the FAA. The FAA will consider requests for approval or 
exemption in a timely manner, with the order of preference being: 
First, for those operations in support of U.S. Government-sponsored 
activities; second, for those operations in support of government-
sponsored activities of a foreign country with the support of a U.S. 
Government department, agency, or instrumentality; and third, for all 
other operations.
    (d) Emergency situations. In an emergency that requires immediate 
decision and action for the safety of the flight, the pilot in command 
of an aircraft may deviate from this section to the extent required by 
that emergency. Except for U.S. air carriers and commercial operators 
that are subject to the requirements of 14 CFR part 119, 121, 125, or 
135, each person who deviates from this section must, within 10 days of 
the deviation, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal holidays, 
submit to the responsible Flight Standards Office a complete report of 
the operations of the aircraft involved in the deviation, including a 
description of the deviation and the reasons for it.
    (e) Expiration. This Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 
will remain in effect until March 20, 2023. The FAA may amend, rescind, 
or extend this SFAR, as necessary.

    Issued in Washington, DC, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
106(f) and (g), 40101(d)(1), 40105(b)(1)(A), and 44701(a)(5), on 
July 1, 2020.
Daniel K. Elwell,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2020-14721 Filed 7-24-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


