
[Federal Register: November 20, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 223)]
[Proposed Rules]               
[Page 60218-60227]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr20no09-31]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 91, 119, 125, 133, 137, 141, 142, 145 and 147

[Docket No. FAA-2008-1154; Notice No. 09-13]
RIN 2120-AJ36

 
Restrictions on Operators Employing Former Flight Standards 
Service Aviation Safety Inspectors

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This proposed rule would prohibit any person holding a 
certificate to conduct certain operations from knowingly employing, or 
making a contractual arrangement with, certain individuals to act as an 
agent or a representative of the certificate holder in any matter 
before the FAA under certain conditions. These restrictions would apply 
if the individual, in the preceding 2-year period: Directly served as, 
or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a Flight Standards 
Service Aviation Safety Inspector; and had direct responsibility to 
inspect, or oversee the inspection of, the operations of the 
certificate holder. This proposed rule would also apply to persons who 
own or manage fractional ownership program aircraft that are used to 
conduct operations under specific regulations described in this 
document. This proposed rule would establish these restrictions to 
prevent potential organizational conflicts of interests which could 
adversely affect aviation safety.

DATES: Send your comments to reach us on or before February 18, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments identified by Docket Number FAA-2008-
1154 using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room W12-
140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.

For more information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to 
http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you 
provide. Using the search function of our docket Web site, anyone can 
find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any of 
our dockets, including the name of the individual sending the comment 
(or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, 
etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the 
Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you 
may visit http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to 
http://www.regulations.gov at any time and follow the online 
instructions for accessing the docket, or, go to the Docket Operations 
in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue, SE., Washington,

[[Page 60219]]

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this proposed rule, contact Nancy Lauck Claussen, Air Transportation 
Division, AFS-200, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8166, e-mail 
Nancy.L.Claussen@faa.gov. For legal questions concerning this proposed 
rule, contact Paul G. Greer, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of 
the Chief Counsel, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
Telephone: 202-267-3073, e-mail: Paul.G.Greer@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in this preamble under the Additional 
Information section, we discuss how you can comment on this proposal 
and how we will handle your comments. Included in this discussion is 
related information about the docket, privacy, and the handling of 
proprietary or confidential business information. We also discuss how 
you can get a copy of related rulemaking documents.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes 
the authority of the FAA Administrator, to include the authority to 
issue, rescind, and revise regulations. Subtitle VII, Aviation 
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority. 
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Chapter 447, Safety Regulation. Under Section 
44701(a) the FAA is charged with promoting the safe flight of civil 
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum 
standards for other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for 
safety in air commerce and national security.

I. Background

    On March 5, 2008, the FAA proposed a $10.2 million civil penalty 
against a major airline for operating 46 airplanes without performing 
mandatory inspections for fuselage fatigue cracking. The FAA alleged 
that the airline operated 46 Boeing 737 airplanes on almost 60,000 
flights from June 2006 to March 2007 while failing to comply with an 
existing FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) that required repetitive 
inspections of certain fuselage areas to detect fatigue cracking.
    After investigating these events, the FAA took steps to improve its 
safety systems and strengthen regulations to minimize the risk of 
reoccurrence of these or similar events. One such step was to toughen 
Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI) post employment restrictions to prevent 
conflicts of interest. This proposed rulemaking would establish 
restrictions on persons employing former Flight Standards Service (AFS) 
ASIs and those responsible for their oversight.

Review of FAA's Safety Oversight of Airlines and Use of Regulatory 
Partnership Programs

    On June 30, 2008, the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of 
Inspector General issued its review of the FAA's oversight of airlines 
and use of regulatory partnership programs. The report concluded that 
the FAA Certificate Management Office overseeing the airline that 
failed to perform the required inspections had developed an overly 
collaborative relationship with the airline. That relationship allowed 
repeated self-disclosures of AD violations without ensuring that the 
airline had developed a comprehensive solution for those reported 
safety problems.
    The report noted that the Regulatory Compliance Manager for the 
airline was a former FAA ASI who reported directly to the FAA Principal 
Maintenance Inspector assigned to the airline when the former ASI 
worked for the FAA. The former employee had become a manager at the 
airline two weeks after leaving the FAA. In his new position at the 
airline, the former ASI served as the liaison between the carrier and 
the FAA and managed both the airline's AD Compliance Program and its 
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program.
    The report also concluded that the overly collaborative 
relationship with the air carrier occurred because the FAA lacked 
effective management controls over its partnership program. The report 
stated that effective management controls would address: (1) Adequate 
segregation of duties; (2) the avoidance of potential conflicts of 
interests among its employees dealing with the carrier; and (3) 
verification of the propriety and integrity of corrective actions 
taken.
    The report recommended that the FAA should enhance management 
controls by implementing post-employment guidance that includes a 
``cooling-off'' period to prohibit an air carrier from hiring an FAA 
ASI who previously inspected the air carrier from acting in any type of 
liaison capacity between that air carrier and the FAA. A full copy of 
the report is contained in the docket for this rulemaking.

Proposed Legislation

    On July 15, 2008, Congressman James L. Oberstar introduced the 
Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008 (H.R. 6493). Section 4 of the 
proposed legislation included post employment restrictions for AFS 
ASIs. The proposed legislation would prohibit certificate holders from 
employing or contracting with a former AFS ASI or other person with 
certificate holder oversight responsibilities to represent that 
certificate holder in any matter before the FAA for a 2-year period 
after leaving the FAA. The proposed legislation was passed unanimously 
by the House of Representatives on July 22, 2008. However, it was not 
subsequently passed by the Senate prior to adjournment of the 110th 
Congress.
    On May 21, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2009 (H.R. 915). Section 333 of the proposed 
legislation contains language identical to that proposed earlier in 
section 4 of the Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2008. Similar 
provisions are also found in Section 513 of the FAA Air Transportation 
Modernization and Safety Improvement Act which was introduced in the 
Senate on July 14, 2009 (S. 1451).

Managing Risks in Civil Aviation: A Review of the FAA's Approach to 
Safety

    On May 1, 2008, former Secretary of Transportation, Mary E. Peters, 
appointed an independent review team to examine the FAA's safety 
culture and its implementation of safety management systems. She asked 
the team to prepare recommendations that would optimize the FAA's 
regulatory effectiveness. On September 2, 2008, the independent review 
team issued its report titled, ``Managing Risks in Civil Aviation: A 
Review of the FAA's Approach to Safety.'' A full copy of the report may 
be found in the docket for this rulemaking.
    The report stated that ``[t]he FAA, like all other regulators, 
faces the danger of regulatory capture. Capture occurs when a 
regulatory agency draws so close to those with whom it deals on a daily 
basis (i.e. the regulated) that the agency ends up elevating their 
concerns at the expense of the agency's core mission. One feature of 
the FAA's current structure has the potential to increase this risk: 
the inspection teams are mostly organized around airlines, rather than 
cutting across multiple airlines and organizing around some other 
dimension, like geography, or type of plane. Most regulatory agencies 
organize by broad functional areas (like

[[Page 60220]]

enforcement, education, etc.) and also by geography; as a result, any 
one inspector normally deals with multiple corporations on a daily 
basis. By contrast, the majority of FAA airline inspectors are assigned 
to a specific Certificate Management Office, and deal with one airline, 
full time, and for many years at a stretch * * *''
    Further, the report stated that the panel does ``understand the 
enhanced risk of regulatory capture that long-standing relationships 
between regulators and regulated entities might produce. We understand 
also the countervailing value in accumulating a detailed knowledge of a 
specific airline's operations. We believe that any enhanced risk of 
capture can be properly mitigated * * *'' This proposal would serve to 
mitigate the risks associated with regulatory capture by establishing a 
``cooling off'' period for former AFS ASIs, while allowing AFS ASIs 
assigned to a specific operator to acquire the level of knowledge 
necessary to conduct effective oversight.

Current Post Employment Restrictions of Former Employees

    Section 207(a)(1) of Title 18, United States Code (18 U.S.C.) 
generally places a permanent restriction on former executive branch 
employees (including FAA employees) regarding their ability to 
represent any other person in connection with a particular matter in 
which the United States government has a direct and substantial 
interest and in which that person participated personally and 
substantially.
    In addition, it also places a 2-year restriction on those same 
former employees concerning their ability to represent any other person 
in connection with a particular matter in which the U.S. government has 
a direct and substantial interest and which that person knew, or 
reasonably should have known, was pending under his or her official 
responsibility within 1 year of their separation. Section 207(a)(2) 
basically restricts a person's ability to represent an entity before 
the FAA on particular matters in which they were involved. It does not 
limit a former FAA employee's ability to obtain employment with any 
entity.

Current FAA Flight Standards Service Policy

    In order to minimize the influence of a particular carrier on the 
FAA, AFS policy provides for a 2-year ``cooling off'' period for newly 
employed ASIs, which prohibits them from having certificate management 
responsibilities for their former aviation employer. The proposed rule 
would not change this longstanding FAA policy. It would, however, 
create a corresponding requirement applicable to operators who seek to 
employ certain former FAA ASIs and those responsible for their 
oversight. Current AFS policy was first set forth in a memorandum, 
dated May 10, 1990 from the Director, Flight Standards Service (AFS-1) 
to all AFS staff. It was reiterated in two subsequent AFS-1 memoranda 
dated July 18, 1996 and April 9, 2008.

II. Discussion of the Proposal

    The FAA has considered the proposed legislation, the current ethics 
regulations, and the recommendations raised in the previously discussed 
reports. Although 18 U.S.C. 207 establishes some general restrictions 
for Federal employees after they leave government service, the FAA 
proposes additional safety-based restrictions on certificate holders 
conducting operations under parts 121, 125, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142, 
145 or 147. (Parts 121, 125, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142, 145 and 147 apply 
to: Air carriers conducting domestic, flag, or supplemental operations; 
operators of airplanes having a seating capacity of 20 or more 
passengers or a maximum payload capacity of 6,000 pounds or more; 
rotorcraft external-load operations; commuter and on-demand operations; 
agricultural aircraft operations; pilot schools; training centers; 
repair stations; and aviation maintenance technician schools, 
respectively). The proposed restrictions would apply if the certificate 
holder employs (or makes a contractual arrangement with) a former AFS 
ASI or a person directly responsible for the oversight of the ASI and 
either person had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the 
inspection of, the certificate holder. The proposed restrictions would 
also apply to persons who own or manage fractional ownership program 
aircraft that are used to conduct operations using fractional ownership 
program aircraft under subpart K of part 91.
    The proposed rule would address a significant concern highlighted 
in the report issued by the independent review team--the need to 
address ``regulatory capture'' to mitigate risk. Although the report 
did not specifically recommend a ``cooling off period'' for former AFS 
ASIs after they leave the FAA, this proposed rule is consistent with 
the FAA's commitment to take steps to mitigate the risk that a current 
FAA employee may engage inappropriately with a regulated party. This 
proposed rule would establish restrictions on these operators that 
exceed current restrictions applicable to most businesses who hire 
former Federal employees.
    The proposed rule would specifically apply to AFS ASIs and those 
persons directly responsible for their oversight. The FAA considers an 
AFS ASI to be a properly credentialed individual who holds FAA Form 
110A and is authorized under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 40113 to 
perform inspections and investigations.
    This proposal would prohibit any person conducting operations under 
parts 121, 125, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142, 145, 147, or subpart K of part 
91 from knowingly employing or contracting with a former AFS ASI 
(Avionics, Cabin Safety, Dispatch, Maintenance, or Operations), or 
other person with oversight responsibilities for that operator, to 
represent that operator in any matter before the FAA. These 
restrictions would apply if the person, in the preceding 2-year period 
has served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, an AFS 
ASI and had the direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the 
inspection of, the operator. Operators, however, would only be 
restricted from employing or making a contractual arrangement with 
former AFS ASIs who had inspection or oversight responsibilities for 
that particular operator. The proposed rule would not apply if an 
operator employs or contracts with an AFS ASI who had inspection or 
oversight responsibilities for another operator that has (or may have 
had) a marketing, code share, business partnership, or similar 
relationship with the operator. The FAA contends that these often 
temporary business arrangements between separate and distinct operators 
do not warrant the application of the restrictions set forth in this 
proposed rule.
    The FAA would consider the proposed restrictions to apply only to 
those operators employing persons who had an office location in a 
Flight Standards District Office or a Certificate Management Office 
with oversight responsibilities for the operator (e.g. Office Managers, 
Assistant Office Managers, Unit Supervisors, and Aviation Safety 
Inspectors). AFS ASIs directly engaged in certificate management 
typically develop extensive knowledge of an operator's practices. They 
also develop close working relationships with other AFS ASIs with whom 
they share direct oversight responsibilities for that particular 
operator. The FAA believes that aviation safety could be compromised if 
a former AFS ASI, acting on behalf of the operator, is able to exert 
undue influence on current

[[Page 60221]]

FAA employees with whom he or she had established close working 
relationships while working at a Flight Standards District Office or a 
Certificate Management Office. This proposed rule would address these 
concerns.
    The intent of the proposed rule is not to affect employment 
relationships entered into prior to the effective date of this rule. 
Therefore, the proposed rule would not affect any operator currently 
employing a former AFS ASI in any capacity. A former AFS ASI hired by 
an operator prior to the effective date of the rule may continue to act 
as a representative of that operator in any matter before the FAA. The 
proposal would only prohibit an operator from hiring or making a 
contractual arrangement with an individual to act as a representative 
of the operator in any matter before the FAA if the individual had 
direct certificate oversight responsibilities for that operator in the 
previous 2 years and that employment commenced on or after the 
effective date of the rule.
    The following examples further explain the provisions of this 
proposed rule:
    (1) A former AFS ASI who was assigned direct oversight 
responsibilities for air carrier X, who is currently working for air 
carrier X in any position which includes representing air carrier X to 
the FAA prior to the effective date of the rule, may continue in that 
position.
    (2) In order to be hired by training center A for a position which 
includes representing the training center in any matter before the FAA, 
on or after the effective date of the rule, the former AFS ASI must be 
able to look back over the 2 years preceding his or her being hired by 
training center A and determine that during that preceding 2 years the 
former ASI was not assigned oversight responsibilities for training 
center A.
    (3) A former AFS ASI who was assigned direct oversight 
responsibilities for repair station Q may immediately go to work for 
any repair station other than repair station Q in any position.
    (4) A former AFS ASI who was assigned direct oversight 
responsibilities for aviation maintenance technician school Q may 
immediately go to work for aviation maintenance technician school Q in 
any position that does not require representing aviation maintenance 
technician school Q to the FAA.
    The FAA has many employees other than AFS ASIs with direct 
oversight responsibilities for various regulated entities. However, 
after considering the potential safety risks and in light of the 
findings of recent reports, the FAA proposes only to establish 
restrictions for operators who employ or make contractual arrangements 
with former AFS ASIs who previously had direct oversight responsibility 
for that operator. This action is necessary to address the development 
of overly collaborative relationships that may occur during routine AFS 
surveillance of certain operators. Such relationships occur when a 
regulatory agency draws so close to those with whom it deals on a daily 
basis (i.e. the regulated) that the agency ends up elevating their 
concerns at the expense of the agency's core safety mission.
    The proposed rule would not prohibit an operator from employing a 
former AFS ASI to serve in any capacity if that former AFS ASI did not 
have direct oversight responsibilities for that operator within the 
previous 2 years. The FAA acknowledges that the skills and expertise 
former FAA employees bring to the aviation industry are valuable and 
enhance safety. The agency notes that there are many employment 
opportunities for former FAA employees that would not be restricted by 
the proposed rule. There are numerous positions that would typically 
not require representing an operator to the FAA, but would take 
advantage of the unique skill set that a former AFS ASI would possess. 
For example, under most circumstances, working in operations or 
maintenance as an aircraft dispatcher, flight attendant, maintenance 
technician, training instructor, or pilot would not be prohibited by 
the proposed rule. As long as the covered employee did not act as an 
agent or representative of the operator before the FAA, the employee 
would be able to provide highly beneficial expertise and enhance safety 
in areas such as safety management systems, continuous analysis 
programs, operational training programs, crewmember training programs, 
maintenance training programs, aircraft dispatcher training programs, 
ETOPs (Extended Range Operations), operational control systems, 
maintenance, accident investigation, and regulatory compliance.
    Based on recent events and reviews of the FAA's safety oversight 
programs, the agency has determined that the proposed restrictions set 
forth in this notice must be placed on the employment of persons 
holding certain agency positions that could lead to organizational 
conflicts of interest. This proposed rule would enhance the FAA's 
ability to properly perform its safety mission and ensure the integrity 
of the programs administered by the FAA.
    During the development of this proposal, the FAA considered a 
prohibition on operators employing a former AFS ASI to serve in any 
capacity if that former AFS ASI had direct oversight responsibilities 
for that operator within the previous 2 years. The FAA determined that 
as long as the former AFS ASI did not act as an agent or a 
representative of the operator in any matter before the FAA, serving in 
other positions with the operator (e.g. aircraft dispatcher, flight 
attendant, maintenance technician, pilot, or training instructor) would 
not be prohibited by the proposed rule. The FAA also consulted with 
representatives of the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) 
to determine their views on the scope of the restrictions; a record of 
that meeting is available in the docket. The FAA is seeking specific 
comments on whether the prohibition on operators should be more 
restrictive than as proposed.
    In addition, the agency is proposing the period of restriction as a 
sliding timeline, with the 2-year clock starting on the last day the 
AFS ASI or supervisor had direct responsibility for oversight of the 
operator. The FAA is also seeking specific comments on whether the 
prohibition should instead begin on the date the individual's 
employment by the FAA is terminated.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. We have determined that there 
is no new information collection requirement associated with this 
proposed rule.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these proposed regulations.

III. Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, 
International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or

[[Page 60222]]

adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits 
of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze 
the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting 
standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act 
requires agencies to consider international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies 
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other 
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate 
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of 
the economic impacts of this proposed rule.
    Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies 
and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. 
If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule 
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits that a statement 
to that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a 
full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared. 
Such a determination has been made for this proposed rule. The 
reasoning for this determination follows:
    The proposed rule would prohibit any of the previously mentioned 
certificate holders from employing or making a contractual agreement 
with an individual who was responsible for the direct oversight of an 
operator as an FAA AFS ASI or who had responsibility to inspect or 
oversee the inspections of the operator during the preceding 2 years. 
This proposed rule would also apply to fractional owners or fractional 
ownership program managers who conduct operations under subpart K of 
part 91. These proposed restrictions would prevent potential 
organizational conflicts of interest that could adversely affect 
aviation safety or create a perception of such conflicts of interest. 
The proposed rule would have minimal economic impact. The affected 
former FAA employees would be allowed to work for other operators for 
which they did not have direct oversight responsibilities. In addition, 
they would be able to work for operators for which they did have direct 
oversight responsibilities provided that they do not represent the 
operator in any matter before the FAA.

Who Would Be Potentially Affected by This Proposed Rule

    This proposal would affect current and future AFS ASIs and persons 
responsible for their oversight who would perform work after the 
effective date of the rule for an operator for which they had direct 
oversight responsibilities when employed by the FAA. In addition, this 
proposal would affect operators that would have hired former FAA 
employees who had oversight responsibilities for those operators.

Potential Benefits and Costs

    The benefits associated with this proposal would arise from 
preventing potential organizational conflicts of interest. There would 
also be benefits from reducing the potential public perception that: 
(1) A current AFS ASI who was offered post-FAA employment with an 
operator he or she regulates could compromise current aviation safety; 
and (2) future aviation safety could be compromised if a former FAA 
employee working for an operator would be able to exert undue influence 
on current FAA employees with whom he or she had established close 
working relationships. This prohibition would also apply to the more 
likely case of former AFS ASIs who would become consultants to the 
operator. By prohibiting such a close relationship between a former AFS 
ASI and the operator for which he or she had direct oversight 
responsibilities, the potential for an overly collaborative 
relationship leading to a possible lapse in safety standards would be 
avoided, increasing the public's confidence in the safety and integrity 
of the FAA inspection system. Such benefits cannot be quantified.
    The proposed rule would also create some minor inefficiencies. In 
general, an operator can benefit from employing a former AFS ASI 
because that ASI knows more about FAA processes than someone who had 
not worked for the FAA. In addition, that ASI would know more about the 
operator than some other former AFS ASI. Further, a former AFS ASI from 
a specific Flight Standards District Office or Certificate Management 
Office will have greater knowledge about that office (as well as be 
better acquainted with the people in that office) than would a former 
AFS ASI from a different office.
    For example, some operators may believe that employing a former AFS 
ASI who recently had direct oversight responsibilities for their 
operations would reduce the time to obtain FAA approval for manual 
revisions partially due to the personal relationships between the 
former ASI and current FAA employees. Due to the general similarities 
among the groups of operators, the potential inefficiencies from 
employing a former ASI who had not had direct oversight 
responsibilities for that operator would not be significant. Thus, from 
the societal point of view, the overall losses to some individual 
former FAA inspectors would be largely offset by gains to other former 
FAA inspectors or qualified personnel. Although the proposed rule would 
create income transfers among individuals, at this time, we cannot 
quantify this overall loss on an individual basis. From a societal 
basis, the safety differential paid for the incremental loss in 
knowledge will be very small.
    The number of former AFS ASIs who leave the FAA varies from year to 
year. We took the time period of October 1, 2007 to October 2, 2008 as 
a representative year-long period. As shown in Table 1, of the 208 AFS 
ASIs who left FAA employment, 138 voluntarily retired, 8 retired due to 
disability, 27 resigned, 10 were removed, 10 were terminated during 
their probation period, 4 had their appointments terminated, and 11 
died. Of the voluntary retirements, 13 personnel were from FAA 
headquarters and were not specifically assigned to an operator. They 
would not be affected by the proposed rule. The maximum number of AFS 
ASIs who would have been affected had the proposed rule been in effect 
are the 160 non-headquarters personnel who retired, resigned, or became 
disabled. (We assumed that ASIs terminated or removed from their FAA 
position would be unlikely to be hired by an operator to work with 
their former FAA office in the absence of this proposed rule, and 
therefore would not be part of the potential economically affected 
population.)

 Table 1--The Number of AFS ASIs Who Left FAA Employment Between 10/1/07
                               and 10/2/08
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Number of
                   Reason for separation                      inspectors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voluntary Retirement.......................................          138
Disability Retirement......................................            8
Resignation................................................           27
Removal....................................................           10
Termination During Probation Period........................           10
Termination of Appointment.................................            4

[[Page 60223]]


Death......................................................           11
                                                            ------------
    Total..................................................          208
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, the FAA does not officially track the status of former 
AFS ASIs. We believe that few of these former AFS ASIs would become 
involved in post-FAA employment that would be subject to the 
restrictions of the proposed rule. Although the proposal may affect 
only a small number of former AFS ASIs, inappropriate action by a 
single ASI could potentially lead to significant safety issues. We 
further believe that this overall economic impact would be minimal, 
with the potential benefits exceeding the costs. We request comments on 
this analysis.
    The FAA has, therefore, determined that this proposed rule would 
impose minimal cost, and under DOT 2100.5 we did not prepare a full 
regulatory evaluation.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA) 
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall 
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable 
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale 
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions 
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required 
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain 
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given 
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities, 
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small 
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must 
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the 
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    The proposed rule would only prevent an AFS ASI and persons 
responsible for their oversight from being employed by the operator for 
which he or she had direct oversight responsibilities. The cost to an 
operator of being unable to employ a specific individual would be 
minimal because other individuals with similar professional 
qualifications as those possessed by the former AFS ASI would be 
available.
    Therefore the FAA certifies that this proposed rule would not have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The FAA requests comments on this certification.

International Trade Impact Analysis

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related 
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of 
standards is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign 
commerce of the United States, so long as the standards have a 
legitimate domestic objective, such as the protection of safety, and do 
not operate in a manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. 
The statute also requires consideration of international standards and, 
where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA 
notes the purpose is to ensure the safety of the American public, and 
has assessed the effects of this rule to ensure that it does not 
exclude imports that meet this objective. As a result, this rule is not 
considered as creating an unnecessary obstacle to foreign commerce.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $136.1 million in lieu of $100 
million. This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore, 
the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and, therefore, would not have federalism implications.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this proposed rulemaking action qualifies for the 
categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no 
extraordinary circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this NPRM under Executive Order 13211, Actions 
Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). While this NPRM is a ``significant 
regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, we have determined 
that it is not a ``significant energy action'' under the executive 
order because it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on 
the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

Additional Information

Comments Invited
    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also 
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain 
duplicate comments, please send only one copy of written comments, or 
if you are filing comments electronically, please submit your comments 
only one time.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel

[[Page 60224]]

concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, we 
will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for 
comments. We will consider comments filed after the comment period has 
closed if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. 
We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.
Proprietary or Confidential Business Information
    Do not file in the docket information that you consider to be 
proprietary or confidential business information. Send or deliver this 
information directly to the person identified in the FOR FURTHER 
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. You must mark the 
information that you consider proprietary or confidential. If you send 
the information on a disk or CD-ROM, mark the outside of the disk or 
CD-ROM and also identify electronically within the disk or CD-ROM the 
specific information that is proprietary or confidential.
    Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when we are aware of proprietary information 
filed with a comment, we do not place it in the docket. We hold it in a 
separate file to which the public does not have access, and we place a 
note in the docket that we have received it. If we receive a request to 
examine or copy this information, we treat it as any other request 
under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). We process such a 
request under the DOT procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
    You can get an electronic copy of rulemaking documents using the 
Internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://
www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at: http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at: http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket or notice number of this rulemaking.
    You may access all documents the FAA considered in developing this 
proposed rule, including economic analyses and technical reports, from 
the Internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in 
paragraph (1).

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 91

    Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 119

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 125

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 133

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 137

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 141

    Educational facilities, Schools.

14 CFR Part 142

    Educational facilities, Schools.

14 CFR Part 145

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 147

    Aircraft, Educational facilities, Schools.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

    1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1155, 40103, 40113, 40120, 44101, 
44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 
44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 47528-
47531, articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180).

    2. Add Sec.  91.1050 to read as follows:


Sec.  91.1050  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no 
fractional owner or fractional ownership program manager may knowingly 
employ or make a contractual arrangement which permits an individual to 
act as an agent or representative of the fractional owner or fractional 
ownership program manager in any matter before the Federal Aviation 
Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the fractional owner or fractional ownership 
program manager.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a fractional 
owner or fractional ownership program manager in a matter before the 
agency if the individual makes any written or oral communication on 
behalf of the fractional owner or fractional ownership program manager 
to the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with 
a particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a fractional 
owner or fractional ownership program manager from knowingly employing 
or making a contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act 
as an agent or representative of the fractional owner or fractional 
ownership program manager in any matter before the Federal Aviation 
Administration if the individual was employed by the fractional owner 
or fractional ownership program manager before [effective date of the 
rule].

PART 119--CERTIFICATION: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS

    3. The authority citation for part 119 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1153, 40101, 40102, 40103, 40113, 
44105, 44106, 44111, 44701-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903, 44904, 44906, 
44912, 44914, 44936, 44938, 46103, 46105.

    4. Add Sec.  119.73 to read as follows:


Sec.  119.73  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no 
certificate holder conducting operations under part 121 or 135 of this 
chapter may knowingly employ or make a contractual arrangement which 
permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the 
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation 
Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be

[[Page 60225]]

acting as an agent or representative of a certificate holder in a 
matter before the agency if the individual makes any written or oral 
communication on behalf of the certificate holder to the agency (or any 
of its officers or employees) in connection with a particular matter, 
whether or not involving a specific party and without regard to whether 
the individual has participated in, or had responsibility for, the 
particular matter while serving as a Flight Standards Service aviation 
safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate 
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement 
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the 
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation 
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder 
before [effective date of the rule].

PART 125--CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A SEATING 
CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 
6,000 POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH 
AIRCRAFT

    5. The authority citation for part 125 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44705, 44710-
44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722.

    6. Add Sec.  125.26 to read as follows:


Sec.  125.26  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no 
certificate holder may knowingly employ or make a contractual 
arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent or 
representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the 
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 
years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate 
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any 
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a 
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate 
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement 
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the 
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation 
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder 
before [effective date of the rule].

PART 133--ROTORCRAFT EXTERNAL-LOAD OPERATIONS

    7. The authority citation for part 133 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702.

    8. Add Sec.  133.22 to read as follows:


Sec.  133.22  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no 
certificate holder may knowingly employ or make a contractual 
arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent or 
representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the 
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 
years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate 
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any 
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a 
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate 
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement 
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the 
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation 
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder 
before [effective date of the rule].

PART 137--AGRICULTURAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

    9. The authority citation for part 137 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40113, 44701-44702.

    10. Add Sec.  137.40 to read as follows:


Sec.  137.40  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no 
certificate holder may knowingly employ or make a contractual 
arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent or 
representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the 
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 
years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate 
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any 
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a 
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate 
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement 
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the 
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation 
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder 
before [effective date of the rule].

PART 141--PILOT SCHOOLS

    11. The authority citation for part 141 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44703, 44707, 44709, 
44711, 45102-45103, 45301-45302.

    12. Add Sec.  141.34 to read as follows:


Sec.  141.34  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder 
of a pilot

[[Page 60226]]

school certificate or a provisional pilot school certificate may 
knowingly employ or make a contractual arrangement which permits an 
individual to act as an agent or representative of the certificate 
holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation Administration if the 
individual, in the preceding 2 years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate 
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any 
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a 
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of a 
pilot school certificate or a provisional pilot school certificate from 
knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement which permits 
an individual to act as an agent or representative of the certificate 
holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation Administration if the 
individual was employed by the certificate holder before [effective 
date of the rule].

PART 142--TRAINING CENTERS

    13. The authority citation for part 142 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44703, 
44705, 44707, 44709-44711, 45102-45103, 45301-45302.

    14. Add Sec.  142.14 to read as follows:


Sec.  142.14  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder 
of a training center certificate may knowingly employ or make a 
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent 
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the 
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 
years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate 
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any 
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a 
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of a 
training center certificate from knowingly employing or making a 
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent 
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the 
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual was employed by the 
certificate holder before [effective date of the rule].

PART 145--REPAIR STATIONS

    15. The authority citation for part 145 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44707, 44709, 
44717.

    16. Add Sec.  145.160 to read as follows:


Sec.  145.160  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder 
of a repair station certificate may knowingly employ or make a 
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent 
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the 
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 
years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate 
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any 
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a 
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of a 
repair station certificate from knowingly employing or making a 
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent 
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the 
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual was employed by the 
certificate holder before [effective date of the rule].

PART 147--AVIATION MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN SCHOOLS

    17. The authority citation for part 147 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44707-44709.

    18. Add Sec.  147.8 to read as follows:


Sec.  147.8  Employment of former FAA employees.

    (a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder 
of an aviation maintenance technician certificate may knowingly employ 
or make a contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as 
an agent or representative of the certificate holder in any matter 
before the Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the 
preceding 2 years--
    (1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a 
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
    (2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection 
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be 
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate 
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any 
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to 
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a 
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and 
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had 
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight 
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
    (c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of an 
aviation maintenance technician school certificate from knowingly 
employing or making a contractual arrangement which permits an 
individual to act as an agent or representative of the certificate 
holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation Administration if the 
individual was employed by the

[[Page 60227]]

certificate holder before [effective date of the rule].

    Issued in Washington, DC, on November 9, 2009.
John M. Allen,
Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. E9-27852 Filed 11-19-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
