
[Federal Register: November 21, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 226)]
[Proposed Rules]               
[Page 70608-70610]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr21no08-18]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-27223; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-224-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

 
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM); reopening of 
comment period.

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SUMMARY: We are revising an earlier proposed airworthiness directive 
(AD) for certain Boeing Model 767 airplanes. The original NPRM would 
have required modifying the link arms of the number 2 windows in the 
flight compartment. The original NPRM resulted from reports of the 
number 2 windows opening during takeoff roll, which has resulted in 
aborted takeoffs. This supplemental NPRM would require an inspection of 
the number 2 windows to determine whether the link arms are in the 
over-center position. The results of the inspection would determine the 
need for the modification. This supplemental NPRM would also require 
the inspection and applicable corrective action following any rigging 
change or replacement of any number 2 window assembly. We are proposing 
this supplemental NPRM to prevent the opening of the number 2 windows 
during takeoff roll, which could result in an aborted takeoff or an 
unscheduled landing, and adversely affect the flightcrew's ability to 
perform critical takeoff communication.

DATES: We must receive comments on this supplemental NPRM by December 
16, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing 
Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory 
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street 
address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Emerson Hevia, Aerospace Engineer, 
Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150S, FAA, Seattle 
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6414; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2007-
27223; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-224-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,

[[Page 70609]]

economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD because of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (the ``original 
NPRM'') to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an airworthiness directive 
(AD) that would apply to certain Boeing Model 767 airplanes. That 
original NPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 14, 
2007 (72 FR 6980). That original NPRM proposed to require modifying the 
link arms of the number 2 windows in the flight compartment.

Actions Since Original NPRM Was Issued

    Since we issued the original NPRM, the referenced service bulletin 
(Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-56A0010, dated September 7, 2006) 
was determined to inadequately address the need for the link arm to be 
positioned at an angle less than 90 degrees (over-center), in reference 
to the track roller, when the window is closed. Boeing has since 
revised the service bulletin. Revision 1, dated January 24, 2008, adds 
instructions to inspect the link arm on the number 2 openable window to 
determine if an over-center position exists when the window is fully 
closed. This inspection will determine the need for the modification 
described in the original service bulletin (and described previously in 
the original NPRM). The modification, if done, will ensure that the 
window cannot open without input from the operating crank as designed. 
Accomplishment of the actions specified in this service bulletin will 
reduce the risk of a high-speed rejected takeoff if the window opens at 
takeoff. Aside from other minor changes, the remaining procedures in 
the service bulletin are unchanged.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. We considered the comments received.

Request To Withdraw NPRM

    Florida West International Airways feels that proposed modification 
is not necessary. According to the commenter, the windows can be 
prevented from opening during takeoff roll if the crew follows the 
normal Before Start checklist in the FAA-approved operations manual. 
The checklist directs the crew to physically check that the windows are 
closed. Florida West reports that its crews observe this requirement 
and have not experienced this problem even when the windows are opened 
on the ground during aircraft maintenance. Florida West suggests that 
some operational experience with the new modified window--before the 
modification is mandated on the rest of the fleet--will ensure that the 
solution addresses the unsafe condition, and avoid further regulatory 
action.
    We infer that the commenter is requesting that we withdraw the 
NPRM. We disagree. Even though proper closure of the window has been 
added to the preflight checklist, we have continued to receive problem 
reports. We find that the modification, as proposed, will better ensure 
long-term continued operational safety by design changes to remove the 
source of the problem, rather than by relying on flight procedures and 
their inherent associated human factors (variations in flightcrew 
training and familiarity with the airplane, flightcrew awareness in the 
presence of other hazards, flightcrew fatigue, etc.). So in this case 
reliance on the checklist would not provide the degree of safety 
assurance necessary for the transport airplane fleet. The requirements, 
as proposed, are consistent with these conditions. We have not changed 
the AD regarding this issue.

Request To Provide Different Approach To Address Unsafe Condition

    Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of its member Delta Air 
Lines, suggests two ideas that could positively improve the level of 
safety:
    1. An electrical annunciation means of an improperly latched and/or 
locked window.
    2. Increased awareness of proper operating procedures plus a visual 
means to verify that the upper aft cam follower has reached full 
forward travel into the cam block before the window is locked. Delta 
suggests that this could be accomplished by adding match lines visible 
through the cam block cover or making a clear cover over the cam block.
    Delta explains that, if the cam follower has reached full travel 
into the cam block, the window is properly closed and can then be 
properly locked. Delta adds that the modification proposed in the NPRM 
would not increase the level of safety because the window is not 
properly in the hole until the upper aft cam has reached full travel in 
the cam block. Delta further adds that the position of the window must 
be verified prior to dispatch, but the modification procedures do not 
include this verification.
    We disagree with Delta's proposals, which would not enhance safety 
beyond the level provided by the proposed design modification specified 
in the NPRM, which prevents the window from opening when the crank is 
rotated to the closed position. An electronic indication system through 
the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) was evaluated 
and was determined to not be cost effective. Operational procedures 
should also be in place to verify that the window is closed for taxi/
takeoff. As previously discussed, even though verification has been 
added to the preflight checklist, we have continued to receive problem 
reports. Additional indicators or procedures would not improve safety 
if the modification did not prevent the window from opening. If an 
indicator were installed to verify that the window was closed, but the 
window opened inadvertently during takeoff, then the level of safety is 
not improved. Accomplishment of the modification as proposed will 
ensure that the window cannot open during takeoff, and will adequately 
address the unsafe condition. We have not changed the supplemental NPRM 
regarding this issue.

FAA's Determination and Proposed Requirements of the Supplemental NPRM

    We are proposing this supplemental NPRM because we evaluated all 
pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is 
likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. 
The additional proposed actions described above expand the scope of the 
original NPRM. As a result, we have determined that it is necessary to 
reopen the comment period to provide additional opportunity for the 
public to comment on this supplemental NPRM.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 896 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet; of these, 384 are U.S.-registered airplanes. The 
following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to 
comply with this proposed AD.

[[Page 70610]]



                                                 Estimated Costs
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                                                  Average labor       Cost per
            Action                 Work hours     rate per hour       airplane               Fleet cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection....................               1              $80              $80   Up to $30,720.
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Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs'' 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866,
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of 
compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

BOEING: Docket No. FAA-2007-27223; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-
224-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by December 16, 2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER 
series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in 
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-56A0010, Revision 1, dated January 
24, 2008.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from reports of the number 2 windows in the 
flight compartment opening during takeoff roll, which has resulted 
in aborted takeoffs. We are issuing this AD to prevent the opening 
of the number 2 windows during takeoff roll, which could result in 
an aborted takeoff or an unscheduled landing, and adversely affect 
the flightcrew's ability to perform critical takeoff communication.

Compliance

    (e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

Inspection

    (f) Do a general visual inspection of the number 2 windows to 
determine whether the link arms are in the over-center position, and 
do all applicable corrective actions, in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
56A0010, Revision 1, dated January 24, 2008. Do the actions at the 
applicable times specified in paragraph 1.E. of the service 
bulletin, including applicable corrective actions before further 
flight following any rigging change or replacement of any number 2 
window assembly.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (g)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 
ATTN: Emerson Hevia, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and 
Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 
98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6414; fax (425) 917-6590; has the 
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different 
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA 
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 
FSDO.

    Issued in Renton, Washington on November 6, 2008.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8-27519 Filed 11-20-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
