[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 77 (Tuesday, April 21, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 22250-22342]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-02500]



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Vol. 85

Tuesday,

No. 77

April 21, 2020

Part II





Department of Defense





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Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers





Environmental Protection Agency





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33 CFR Part 328

40 CFR Parts 110, 112, 116, et al.





The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of ``Waters of the 
United States''; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 77 / Tuesday, April 21, 2020 / Rules 
and Regulations  

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers

33 CFR Part 328

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Parts 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 
401

[EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149; FRL-10004-88-OW]
RIN 2040-AF75


The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of ``Waters of 
the United States''

AGENCY: Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Department of 
Defense; and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the 
Army are publishing a final rule defining the scope of waters federally 
regulated under the Clean Water Act. The Navigable Waters Protection 
Rule is the second step in a comprehensive, two-step process intended 
to review and revise the definition of ``waters of the United States'' 
consistent with the Executive Order signed on February 28, 2017, 
``Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by 
Reviewing the `Waters of the United States' Rule.'' Once effective, it 
replaces the rule published on October 22, 2019. This final rule 
implements the overall objective of the Clean Water Act to restore and 
maintain the integrity of the nation's waters by maintaining federal 
authority over those waters that Congress determined should be 
regulated by the Federal government under its Commerce Clause powers, 
while adhering to Congress' policy directive to preserve States' 
primary authority over land and water resources. This final definition 
increases the predictability and consistency of Clean Water Act 
programs by clarifying the scope of ``waters of the United States'' 
federally regulated under the Act.

DATES: This rule is effective on June 22, 2020.

ADDRESSES: The EPA has established a docket for this action under 
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149. All documents in the docket are 
listed on the http://www.regulations.gov website. Although listed in 
the index, some information is not publicly available, e.g., CBI or 
other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Certain 
other material, such as copyrighted material, is not placed on the 
internet and will be publicly available only in hard copy form. 
Publicly available docket materials are available electronically 
through http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael McDavit, Oceans, Wetlands, and 
Communities Division, Office of Water (4504-T), Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460; 
telephone number: (202) 566-2465; email address: CWAwotus@epa.gov; or 
Jennifer A. Moyer, Regulatory Community of Practice (CECW-CO-R), U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 441 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20314; 
telephone number: (202) 761-5903; email address: 
USACE_CWA_Rule@usace.army.mil.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. General Information
    A. Where can I find information related to this rulemaking?
    B. What action are the agencies taking?
    C. What is the agencies' authority for taking this action?
II. Background
    A. The Final Rule
    B. History of This Rulemaking
    1. The Clean Water Act
    2. Regulatory History
    3. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
    4. The 2015 Rule
    C. Executive Order 13778 and the ``Step One'' Rulemaking
    D. Summary of Stakeholder Outreach and the ``Step Two'' 
Rulemaking
    E. Overview of Legal Construct for the Final Rule
    1. Statutory Framework
    2. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
    3. Principles and Considerations
    F. Summary of Final Rule as Compared to the 1986 Regulations 
Recodified in the 2019 Rule and the 2015 Rule
    G. Existing Guidance
III. Definition of ``Waters of the United States''
    A. Key Terms and Concepts
    1. Typical Year
    2. Perennial, Intermittent, and Ephemeral
    3. Breaks
    B. Territorial Seas and Traditional Navigable Waters
    C. Interstate Waters
    D. Tributaries
    E. Ditches
    F. Lakes and Ponds, and Impoundments of Jurisdictional Waters
    G. Adjacent Wetlands
    H. Waters and Features That Are Not Waters of the United States
    I. Placement of the Definition of ``Waters of the United 
States'' in the Code of Federal Regulations
IV. State, Tribal, and Federal Agency Datasets of Waters of the 
United States
V. Overview of the Effects of the Rule and Supporting Analyses
VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
    A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review; 
Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
    B. Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    F. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
    G. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With 
Indian Tribal Governments
    H. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From 
Environmental Health and Safety Risks
    I. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
    J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
    K. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations
    L. Congressional Review Act

I. General Information

A. Where can I find information related to this rulemaking?

    1. Docket. An official public docket for this action has been 
established under Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149. The official 
public docket consists of the documents specifically referenced in this 
action and other information related to this action. The official 
public docket is the collection of materials that is available for 
public viewing at the OW Docket, EPA West, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution 
Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20004. This Docket Facility is open from 8:30 
a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. The 
OW Docket telephone number is (202) 566-2426. A reasonable fee will be 
charged for copies.
    2. Electronic Access. You may access this Federal Register document 
electronically under the ``Federal Register'' listings at http://www.regulations.gov. An electronic version of the public docket is 
available through EPA's electronic public docket and comment system, 
EPA Dockets. You may access EPA Dockets at http://www.regulations.gov 
to view public comments as they are submitted and posted, access the 
index listing of the contents of the official public docket, and access 
those documents in the public docket that are available electronically, 
including the economic and regulatory analyses for the final rule. For 
additional information about

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EPA's public docket, visit the EPA Docket Center homepage at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/dockets.htm. Although not all docket materials may 
be available electronically, you may still access any of the publicly 
available docket materials through the Docket Facility.

B. What action are the agencies taking?

    In this notice, the agencies are publishing a final rule defining 
``waters of the United States'' in 33 CFR 328.3 and 40 CFR 120.2.

C. What is the agencies' authority for taking this action?

    The authority for this action is the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., including sections 301, 304, 311, 
401, 402, 404, and 501.

II. Background

A. The Final Rule

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. 
Department of the Army (Army or Corps) (together, ``the agencies'') are 
publishing the Navigable Waters Protection Rule defining the scope of 
waters subject to federal regulation under the Clean Water Act (CWA or 
the Act), in light of the U.S. Supreme Court cases in United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes (Riverside Bayview), Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. United States (SWANCC), and Rapanos v. United 
States (Rapanos), and consistent with Executive Order 13778, signed on 
February 28, 2017, entitled ``Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, 
and Economic Growth by Reviewing the `Waters of the United States' 
Rule.''
    In this final rule, the agencies interpret the term ``waters of the 
United States'' to encompass: The territorial seas and traditional 
navigable waters; perennial and intermittent tributaries that 
contribute surface water flow to such waters; certain lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and wetlands adjacent to other 
jurisdictional waters. Paragraph (a) of the final rule identifies four 
categories of waters that are ``waters of the United States.'' These 
waters are referred to as ``jurisdictional'' in this notice and in the 
regulatory text. Paragraph (b) of the final rule identifies those 
waters and features that are excluded from the definition of ``waters 
of the United States.'' These waters are referred to as ``non-
jurisdictional'' or ``excluded'' in this notice and as ``non-
jurisdictional'' in the regulatory text. Paragraph (c) of the final 
rule defines applicable terms.
    As a baseline concept, this final rule recognizes that waters of 
the United States are waters within the ordinary meaning of the term, 
such as oceans, rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, and wetlands, and that 
not all waters are waters of the United States. The final rule includes 
the agencies' longstanding category of the territorial seas and 
traditional navigable waters. A ``tributary'' is defined in the final 
rule as a river, stream, or similar naturally occurring surface water 
channel that contributes surface water flow to a territorial sea or 
traditional navigable water in a typical year either directly or 
indirectly through other tributaries, jurisdictional lakes, ponds, or 
impoundments, or adjacent wetlands. A tributary must be perennial or 
intermittent in a typical year. The alteration or relocation of a 
tributary does not modify its jurisdictional status as long as it 
continues to be perennial or intermittent and contributes surface water 
flow to a traditional navigable water or territorial sea in a typical 
year. A tributary does not lose its jurisdictional status if it 
contributes surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in 
a typical year through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface water 
feature, through a subterranean river, through a culvert, dam, tunnel, 
or other similar artificial feature, or through a debris pile, boulder 
field, or similar natural feature. The term ``tributary'' includes a 
ditch that either relocates a tributary, is constructed in a tributary, 
or is constructed in an adjacent wetland as long as the ditch is 
perennial or intermittent and contributes surface water flow to a 
traditional navigable water or territorial sea in a typical year.
    The final rule defines ``lakes and ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters'' as standing bodies of open water that 
contribute surface water flow in a typical year to a territorial sea or 
traditional navigable water either directly or through a tributary, 
another jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment, or an adjacent 
wetland. The agencies note that to be jurisdictional, an ``impoundment 
of a jurisdictional water'' must be an impoundment of a territorial sea 
or traditional navigable water, tributary, jurisdictional lake or pond, 
or an adjacent wetland, and must meet the conditions in paragraph 
(c)(6) of the final rule. A lake, pond, or impoundment of a 
jurisdictional water does not lose its jurisdictional status if it 
contributes surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in 
a typical year through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface water 
feature, through a culvert, dike, spillway, or similar artificial 
feature, or through a debris pile, boulder field, or similar natural 
feature. A lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water is also 
jurisdictional if, in a typical year, it is inundated by flooding from 
a territorial sea or traditional navigable water, or tributary, or from 
another jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment.
    The final rule defines ``adjacent wetlands'' as wetlands that abut 
a territorial sea or traditional navigable water, a tributary, or a 
lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water; are inundated by 
flooding from a territorial sea or traditional navigable water, a 
tributary, or a lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water in 
a typical year; are physically separated from a territorial sea or 
traditional navigable water, a tributary, or a lake, pond, or 
impoundment of a jurisdictional water only by a natural berm, bank, 
dune, or similar natural feature; or are physically separated from a 
territorial sea or traditional navigable water, a tributary, or a lake, 
pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water only by an artificial 
dike, barrier, or similar artificial structure so long as that 
structure allows for a direct hydrological surface connection to the 
territorial sea or traditional navigable water, tributary, or lake, 
pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water in a typical year, such 
as through a culvert, flood or tide gate, pump, or similar artificial 
feature. ``Abut'' means when a wetland touches a territorial sea, 
traditional navigable water, tributary, or lake, pond, or impoundment 
of a jurisdictional water at least at one point or side. An adjacent 
wetland is jurisdictional in its entirety when a road or similar 
artificial structure divides the wetland, as long as the structure 
allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection through or over that 
structure in a typical year.
    The final rule excludes from the definition of ``waters of the 
United States'' all waters or features not mentioned above. In addition 
to this general exclusion, the final rule specifically clarifies that 
waters of the United States do not include the following:
     Groundwater, including groundwater drained through 
subsurface drainage systems;
     ephemeral features that flow only in direct response to 
precipitation, including ephemeral streams, swales, gullies, rills, and 
pools;
     diffuse stormwater runoff and directional sheet flow over 
upland;
     ditches that are not traditional navigable waters, 
tributaries, or that are

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not constructed in adjacent wetlands, subject to certain limitations;
     prior converted cropland;
     artificially irrigated areas that would revert to upland 
if artificial irrigation ceases;
     artificial lakes and ponds that are not jurisdictional 
impoundments and that are constructed or excavated in upland or non-
jurisdictional waters;
     water-filled depressions constructed or excavated in 
upland or in non-jurisdictional waters incidental to mining or 
construction activity, and pits excavated in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters for the purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or 
gravel;
     stormwater control features constructed or excavated in 
upland or in non-jurisdictional waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or 
store stormwater run-off;
     groundwater recharge, water reuse, and wastewater 
recycling structures constructed or excavated in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters; and
     waste treatment systems.
    In addition, the agencies have defined the terms ``upland,'' 
``prior converted cropland,'' and ``waste treatment system'' to improve 
regulatory predictability and clarity.
    To develop this revised definition of ``waters of the United 
States,'' the agencies looked to the text and structure of the CWA, as 
informed by its legislative history and Supreme Court guidance, and 
took into account the agencies' expertise, policy choices, and 
scientific principles. This final rule presents a unifying legal theory 
for federal jurisdiction over those waters and wetlands that maintain a 
sufficient surface water connection to traditional navigable waters or 
the territorial seas. This definition strikes a reasonable and 
appropriate balance between Federal and State waters and carries out 
Congress' overall objective to restore and maintain the integrity of 
the nation's waters in a manner that preserves the traditional 
sovereignty of States over their own land and water resources. The 
final rule also provides clarity and predictability for Federal 
agencies, States, Tribes, the regulated community, and the public. This 
final rule is intended to ensure that the agencies operate within the 
scope of the Federal government's authority over navigable waters under 
the CWA and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

B. History of This Rulemaking

1. The Clean Water Act
    Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 
or the CWA as it is commonly called,\1\ in 1972 to address longstanding 
concerns regarding the quality of the nation's waters and the federal 
government's ability to address those concerns under existing law. 
Prior to 1972, the ability to control and redress water pollution in 
the nation's waters largely fell to the Corps under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA). While much of that statute focused on 
restricting obstructions to navigation on the nation's major waterways, 
section 13 of the RHA made it unlawful to discharge refuse ``into any 
navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any 
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such 
navigable water.'' \2\ 33 U.S.C. 407. Congress had also enacted the 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Public Law 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 
(June 30, 1948), to address interstate water pollution, and 
subsequently amended that statute in 1956 (giving the statute its 
current formal name), 1961, and 1965. The early versions of the CWA 
promoted the development of pollution abatement programs, required 
States to develop water quality standards, and authorized the Federal 
government to bring enforcement actions to abate water pollution.
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    \1\ The FWPCA is commonly referred to as the CWA following the 
1977 amendments to the FWPCA. Public Law 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 
(1977). For ease of reference, the agencies will generally refer to 
the FWPCA in this notice as the CWA or the Act.
    \2\ The term ``navigable water of the United States'' is a term 
of art used to refer to waters subject to federal jurisdiction under 
the RHA. See, e.g., 33 CFR 329.1. The term is not synonymous with 
the phrase ``waters of the United States'' under the CWA, see id., 
and the general term ``navigable waters'' has different meanings 
depending on the context of the statute in which it is used. See, 
e.g., PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 591-93 (2012).
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    These early statutory efforts, however, proved inadequate to 
address the decline in the quality of the nation's waters, see City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 310 (1981), so Congress performed 
a ``total restructuring'' and ``complete rewriting'' of the existing 
statutory framework in 1972, id. at 317 (quoting legislative history of 
1972 amendments). That restructuring resulted in the enactment of a 
comprehensive scheme (including voluntary as well as regulatory 
programs) designed to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution in the 
nation's waters generally, and to regulate the discharge of pollutants 
into navigable waters specifically. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine 
Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 385 (2006) (noting that ``the Act 
does not stop at controlling the `addition of pollutants,' but deals 
with `pollution' generally'').
    The objective of the new statutory scheme was ``to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters.'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). In order to meet that objective, 
Congress declared two national goals: (1) ``that the discharge of 
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985''; and (2) 
``that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which 
provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and 
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by 
July 1, 1983 . . . .'' Id. at 1251(a)(1)-(2).
    Congress also established several key policies that direct the work 
of the agencies to effectuate those goals. For example, Congress 
declared as a national policy ``that the discharge of toxic pollutants 
in toxic amounts be prohibited; . . . that Federal financial assistance 
be provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works; . . . 
that areawide waste treatment management planning processes be 
developed and implemented to assure adequate control of sources of 
pollutants in each State; . . . [and] that programs for the control of 
nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an 
expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this Act to be met 
through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution.'' 
33 U.S.C. 1251(a)(3)-(7).
    Congress provided a major role for the States in implementing the 
CWA, balancing the preservation of the traditional power of States to 
regulate land and water resources within their borders with the need 
for a national water quality regulation. For example, the statute 
highlighted ``the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and 
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, 
reduce, and eliminate pollution'' and ``to plan the development and use 
. . . of land and water resources.'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(b). Congress also 
declared as a national policy that States manage the major construction 
grant program and implement the core permitting programs authorized by 
the statute, among other responsibilities. Id. Congress added that 
``[e]xcept as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall 
. . . be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or 
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including 
boundary waters) of such States.'' Id. at 1370.\3\ Congress

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pledged the Federal government to provide technical support and 
financial aid to the States ``in connection with the prevention, 
reduction, and elimination of pollution.'' Id. at 1251(b).
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    \3\ 33 U.S.C. 1370 also prohibits authorized States from 
adopting any limitations, prohibitions, or standards that are less 
stringent than required by the CWA.
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    To carry out these policies, Congress broadly defined ``pollution'' 
to mean ``the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, 
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water,'' 33 U.S.C. 
1362(19), in keeping with the objective of the Act ``to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters.'' Id. at 1251(a). Congress then crafted a non-
regulatory statutory framework to provide technical and financial 
assistance to the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution in 
the nation's waters generally. For example, section 105 of the Act, 
``Grants for research and development,'' authorized the EPA ``to make 
grants to any State, municipality, or intermunicipal or interstate 
agency for the purpose of assisting in the development of any project 
which will demonstrate a new or improved method of preventing, 
reducing, and eliminating the discharge into any waters of pollutants 
from sewers which carry storm water or both storm water and 
pollutants.'' Id. at 1255(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 105 also 
authorized the EPA ``to make grants to any State or States or 
interstate agency to demonstrate, in river basins or portions thereof, 
advanced treatment and environmental enhancement techniques to control 
pollution from all sources . . . including nonpoint sources, . . . 
[and] . . . to carry out the purposes of section 301 of this Act . . . 
for research and demonstration projects for prevention of pollution of 
any waters by industry including, but not limited to, the prevention, 
reduction, and elimination of the discharge of pollutants.'' Id. at 
1255(b)-(c) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1256(a) (authorizing the 
EPA to issue ``grants to States and to interstate agencies to assist 
them in administering programs for the prevention, reduction, and 
elimination of pollution'').
    Section 108, ``Pollution control in the Great Lakes,'' authorized 
the EPA to enter into agreements with any State to develop plans for 
the ``elimination or control of pollution, within all or any part of 
the watersheds of the Great Lakes.'' 33 U.S.C. 1258(a) (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 1268(a)(3)(C) (defining the ``Great Lakes 
System'' as ``all the streams, rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water 
within the drainage basin of the Great Lakes'') (emphasis added). 
Similar broad pollution control programs were created for other major 
watersheds, including, for example, the Chesapeake Bay, see id. at 
1267(a)(3), Long Island Sound, see id. at 1269(c)(2)(D), and Lake 
Champlain, see id. at 1270(g)(2). Some commenters noted that the Great 
Lakes, Long Island Sound, Chesapeake Bay, and Lake Champlain are waters 
of the United States to which regulatory programs apply, and that the 
purpose of the technical assistance and grants in the cited sections is 
to assist states and others in achieving the requirements of the Act. 
The agencies agree that these waters are waters of the United States, 
but the emphasized language in the cited provisions above makes clear 
that these provisions address all bodies of water in the watersheds of 
the Great Lakes, Long Island Sound, Chesapeake Bay, and Lake Champlain, 
regardless of the jurisdictional status of those waters.
    In addition to the Act's non-regulatory measures to control 
pollution of the nation's waters generally, Congress created a federal 
regulatory permitting program designed to address the discharge of 
pollutants into a subset of those waters identified as ``navigable 
waters,'' defined as ``the waters of the United States,'' 33 U.S.C. 
1362(7). Section 301 contains the key regulatory mechanism: ``Except as 
in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, 
and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall 
be unlawful.'' Id. at 1311(a). A ``discharge of a pollutant'' is 
defined to include ``any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters 
from any point source,'' defined to mean ``any discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance'' such as a pipe or ditch. Id. at 1362(12), 
(14). The term ``pollutant'' means ``dredged spoil, solid waste, 
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, 
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, 
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, 
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.'' Id. at 
1362(6). Thus, it is unlawful to discharge pollutants into the ``waters 
of the United States'' from a point source unless the discharge is in 
compliance with certain enumerated sections of the CWA, including 
obtaining authorization pursuant to the section 402 National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program or the section 404 
dredged or fill material permit program. See id. at 1342, 1344. 
Congress therefore intended to achieve the Act's objective ``to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters'' by addressing pollution of all waters via non-
regulatory means and federally regulating the discharge of pollutants 
to the subset of waters identified as ``navigable waters.'' \4\
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    \4\ Members of Congress were aware when they drafted the 1972 
CWA amendments that different types of the Nation's waters would be 
subject to different degrees of federal control. For instance, in 
House debate regarding a proposed and ultimately failed amendment to 
prohibit the discharge of pollutants to groundwater in addition to 
navigable waters, Representative Don H. Clausen stated, ``Mr. 
Chairman, in the early deliberations within the committee which 
resulted in the introduction of H.R. 11896, a provision for ground 
waters . . . was thoroughly reviewed and it was determined by the 
committee that there was not sufficient information on ground waters 
to justify the types of controls that are required for navigable 
waters . . . . I refer the gentleman to the objectives of this act 
as stated in section 101(a). The objective of this act is to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters. I call your attention to the fact that this does 
not say the Nation's [`]navigable waters,' `interstate waters,' or 
`intrastate waters.' It just says `waters.' This includes ground 
waters.'' 118 Cong. Rec. at 10,667 (daily ed. March 28, 1972).
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    Many commenters on this rulemaking agreed with this summary of the 
CWA, stating that it accurately characterizes the full scope of the Act 
and the thoughtful, holistic approach Congress enacted to address water 
pollution in this country. Many commenters stated that Congress 
developed both regulatory and non-regulatory approaches for addressing 
water pollution, whereby ``navigable waters'' are subject to federal 
regulatory requirements under the CWA but many other classes of the 
``nation's waters'' are not. Some commenters disagreed that the CWA 
distinguishes between the ``nation's waters'' and a subset of those 
waters known as the ``navigable waters.'' Many of these commenters 
suggested that the agencies' interpretation is not supported by the 
text or structure of the Act and is based instead on 
mischaracterizations of the Act's provisions. Some commenters argued 
that the two terms are synonymous under the Act, and others stated that 
the non-regulatory provisions of the CWA were intended to complement 
the regulatory requirements applicable to waters of the United States, 
as opposed to addressing a separate category of waters. Fundamental 
principles of statutory interpretation support the agencies' 
recognition of a distinction between the ``nation's waters'' and 
``navigable waters.'' As the Supreme Court has observed, ``[w]e assume 
that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a 
particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.'' Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137, 146 (1995)

[[Page 22254]]

(recognizing the canon of statutory construction against superfluity). 
Further, ``the words of a statute must be read in their context and 
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.'' FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United Sav. Ass'n of 
Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(``Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision 
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the 
remainder of the statutory scheme--because the same terminology is used 
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear[.]'') (citation 
omitted). Here, the non-regulatory sections of the CWA reveal Congress' 
intent to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation's waters 
using federal assistance to support State and local partnerships to 
control pollution in the nation's waters and a federal regulatory 
prohibition on the discharge of pollutants to the navigable waters. If 
Congress had intended the terms to be synonymous, it would have used 
identical terminology. Instead, Congress chose to use separate terms, 
and the agencies are instructed by the Supreme Court to presume 
Congress did so intentionally.
    Under the enacted statutory scheme, the States are primarily 
responsible for developing water quality standards for waters of the 
United States within their borders and reporting on the condition of 
those waters to the EPA every two years. 33 U.S.C. 1313, 1315. States 
must develop total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for waters that are not 
meeting established water quality standards and must submit those TMDLs 
to the EPA for approval. Id. at 1313(d). States also have authority to 
issue water quality certifications or waive certification for every 
federal permit or license issued within their borders that may result 
in a discharge to navigable waters. Id. at 1341.
    These same regulatory authorities can be assumed by Indian tribes 
under section 518 of the CWA, which authorizes the EPA to treat 
eligible Indian tribes with reservations in a manner similar to States 
for a variety of purposes, including administering each of the 
principal CWA regulatory programs. 33 U.S.C. 1377(e). In addition, 
States and Tribes retain authority to protect and manage the use of 
those waters that are not navigable waters under the CWA. See, e.g., 
id. at 1251(b), 1251(g), 1370, 1377(a). At this time, forty-seven 
States administer portions of the CWA section 402 permit program for 
those waters of the United States within their boundaries,\5\ and two 
States (Michigan and New Jersey) administer the section 404 permit 
program for those waters that are assumable by States pursuant to 
section 404(g). Several additional states are exploring the possibility 
of assuming the section 404 permit program. At present, no Tribes 
administer the section 402 or 404 programs, although some are exploring 
the possibility. For additional information regarding State and tribal 
programs, see the Resource and Programmatic Assessment for the final 
rule.
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    \5\ Three States (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico) 
do not currently administer any part of the CWA section 402 program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Regulatory History
    In May 1973, the EPA issued its first set of regulations to 
implement the new NPDES permit program established in the 1972 CWA 
amendments. Those regulations defined the phrase ``navigable waters'' 
as:
     All navigable waters of the United States;
     Tributaries of navigable waters of the United States;
     Interstate waters;
     Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized 
by interstate travelers for recreational or other purposes;
     Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which fish or 
shellfish are taken and sold in interstate commerce; and
     Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized 
for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce.
38 FR 13528, 13529 (May 22, 1973) (codified at 40 CFR 125.1 (1973)).

    In 1974, the Corps issued its first set of regulations defining 
``waters of the United States'' for the purpose of implementing section 
404 of the CWA as well as sections 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 of the RHA. 
These regulations reaffirmed the Corps' view that its dredged and fill 
jurisdiction under section 404 was the same as its traditional 
jurisdiction under the RHA. See 39 FR 12115, 12119 (Apr. 3, 1974) 
(codified at 33 CFR 209.120). Specifically, the Corps defined the 
``waters of the United States'' as waters that ``are subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, 
or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate 
or foreign commerce.'' Id.
    Environmental organizations challenged the Corps' 1974 regulation 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that 
the Corps' definition of ``navigable waters'' was inadequate because it 
did not include tributaries or coastal marshes above the mean high tide 
mark or wetlands above the ordinary high water mark. The District Court 
held that the term ``navigable waters'' is not limited to the 
traditional tests of navigability and ordered the Corps to revoke its 
definition and publish a new one ``clearly recognizing the full 
regulatory mandate of the Water Act.'' Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
    In response to this decision, the Corps issued interim regulations 
in 1975 that defined the term ``navigable waters'' to include 
periodically inundated coastal wetlands contiguous with or adjacent to 
navigable waters, periodically inundated freshwater wetlands contiguous 
with or adjacent to navigable waters, and, as in the EPA's 1973 
regulations, certain intrastate waters based on non-transportation 
impacts on interstate commerce. The Corps revised the definition in 
1977 to encompass traditional navigable waters, tributaries to 
navigable waters, interstate waters, adjacent wetlands to those 
categories of waters, and ``[a]ll other waters'' the ``degradation or 
destruction of which could affect interstate commerce.'' 42 FR 37122, 
37144 (Jul. 19, 1977).
    The EPA and the Corps have maintained separate regulations defining 
the statutory term ``waters of the United States,'' but the text of the 
regulations has been virtually identical starting in 1986.\6\ In 1986, 
for example, the Corps consolidated and recodified its regulations to 
align with clarifications that the EPA had previously promulgated. See 
51 FR 41206 (Nov. 13, 1986). While the Corps stated in 1986 that the 
recodified regulation neither reduced nor expanded jurisdiction, its 
previous exclusion for ditches was moved from the regulatory text to 
the final rule preamble. Id. at 41216-17. And the Corps added to the 
preamble what later became known as the ``Migratory Bird Rule,'' which 
claimed jurisdiction over any waters which are or may be used by birds 
protected by migratory bird treaties, waters which may be used as 
habitat for birds flying across state lines, waters which may be used 
by endangered species, and waters used to

[[Page 22255]]

irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce. Id. at 41217.
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    \6\ For convenience, the agencies generally refer to the Corps' 
regulations throughout this notice at 33 CFR 328.3. The EPA's 
codification of the definition of ``waters of the United States'' is 
found at 40 CFR 110.1, 112.2, 116.3, 117.1, 122.2, 230.3, 232.2, 
300.5, 302.3, 401.11, and Appendix E to Part 300. This final rule 
also codifies the definition of ``waters of the United States'' in a 
new section 120.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 1986 regulatory text identified the following as waters of the 
United States:
     All traditional navigable waters,\7\ interstate waters, 
and the territorial seas;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ ``Traditional navigable waters'' (or waters that are 
traditionally understood as navigable) refers to all waters which 
are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to 
use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters subject 
to the ebb and flow of the tide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     All impoundments of jurisdictional waters;
     All ``other waters'' such as lakes, ponds, and sloughs the 
``use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or 
foreign commerce'';
     Tributaries of traditional navigable waters, interstate 
waters, impoundments, or ``other waters''; and,
     Wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters, 
interstate waters, the territorial seas, impoundments, tributaries, or 
``other waters'' (other than waters that are themselves wetlands).

33 CFR 328.3(a)(1)-(7) (1987). The 1986 regulation also excluded 
``waste treatment systems'' from the definition of ``waters of the 
United States,'' consistent with the EPA's regulatory definition. Id. 
at 328.3 (a)(7), (b) (1987); see also 44 FR 32854 (June 7, 1979).
    On August 25, 1993, the agencies amended the regulatory definition 
of ``waters of the United States'' to categorically exclude ``prior 
converted croplands.'' 58 FR 45008, 45031 (Aug. 25, 1993) (``1993 
Rule'') (codified at 33 CFR 328.3(a)(8) (1994)). The stated purpose of 
the amendment was to promote ``consistency among various federal 
programs affecting wetlands,'' in particular the Food Security Act of 
1985 (FSA) programs implemented by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the CWA programs implemented by the agencies.\8\ 58 FR 
45031. The agencies did not include a definition of ``prior converted 
cropland'' in the text of the Code of Federal Regulations but noted in 
the preamble to the 1993 Rule that the term was defined at that time by 
the USDA National Food Security Act Manual (NFSAM). Id. The agencies at 
that time also declined to establish regulatory text specifying when 
the prior converted cropland designation is no longer applicable. In 
the preamble to the 1993 Rule, the agencies stated that ``[t]he Corps 
and EPA will use the [Natural Resources Conservation Service's] 
provisions on `abandonment,' thereby ensuring that PC cropland that is 
abandoned within the meaning of those provisions and which exhibit[s] 
wetlands characteristics will be considered wetlands subject to Section 
404 regulation.'' Id. at 45034. The agencies summarized these 
abandonment provisions by explaining that prior converted cropland 
which meets wetland criteria is considered to be abandoned unless: At 
least once in every five years the area has been used for the 
production of an agricultural commodity, or the area has been used and 
will continue to be used for the production of an agricultural 
commodity in a commonly used rotation with aquaculture, grasses, 
legumes, or pasture production. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985, as amended, 
encourages participants in USDA programs to adopt land management 
measures by linking eligibility for USDA program benefits to farming 
practices on highly erodible land and wetlands (i.e., the wetland 
conservation provisions). USDA policy guidance regarding 
implementation of the wetland conservation provisions is found in 
the current edition of the Natural Resource Conservation Service 
National Food Security Act Manual (NFSAM), including the procedures 
for how to delineate wetlands and make wetland determinations in 
accordance with Subpart C of 7 CFR part 12. Due to the unique 
statutory provisions of the FSA, USDA wetland determinations may 
identify certain areas as exempt under the 1985 Act but remain 
subject to the requirements of the CWA. To avoid potential 
confusion, USDA clearly informs program participants that USDA 
wetland determinations are for purposes of implementing the wetland 
conservation provisions only, and that participants should contact 
the Corps for clarification as to whether a particular activity will 
require a CWA section 404 permit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress amended the FSA wetland conservation provisions in 1996 to 
state that USDA certifications of eligibility for program benefits 
(e.g., determinations by the Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS) that particular areas constitute prior converted cropland) 
``shall remain valid and in effect as long as the area is devoted to an 
agricultural use or until such time as the person affected by the 
certification requests review of the certification by the Secretary [of 
Agriculture].'' Public Law 104-127, 322(a)(4), 110 Stat. 888 (1996); 16 
U.S.C. 3822(a)(4). Thus, for purposes of farm program eligibility, the 
1996 amendments designate as prior converted cropland those areas that 
may not have qualified for the CWA exclusion under the abandonment 
principles from the 1993 preamble, so long as such areas remain in 
agricultural use. The agencies did not update their prior converted 
cropland regulations for purposes of the CWA following the 1996 
amendments to wetland conservation provisions of the FSA, as those 
regulations neither defined prior converted cropland nor specified when 
a valid prior converted cropland determination might cease to be valid. 
However, in 2005, the Army and USDA issued a joint Memorandum to the 
Field (the 2005 Memorandum) in an effort to again align the CWA section 
404 program with the FSA amendments.\9\ The 2005 Memorandum provided 
that a ``certified [prior converted] determination made by [USDA] 
remains valid as long as the area is devoted to an agricultural use. If 
the land changes to a non-agricultural use, the [prior converted] 
determination is no longer applicable and a new wetland determination 
is required for CWA purposes.'' 2005 Memorandum at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Natural Resources Conservation Service and U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers. Memorandum to the Field on Guidance on Conducting 
Wetland Determinations for the Food Security Act of 1985 and section 
404 of the Clean Water Act (Feb. 25, 2005), available at https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll11/id/2508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2005 Memorandum did not clearly address the abandonment 
principle that the agencies had been implementing since the 1993 
rulemaking. The change in use policy was also never promulgated as a 
rule and was declared unlawful by one district court because it 
effectively modified the 1993 preamble language without any rulemaking 
process. New Hope Power Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 746 F. Supp. 
2d 1272, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
3. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
    From the earliest rulemaking efforts following adoption of the 1972 
CWA amendments, to the agencies' most recent attempt to define ``waters 
of the United States'' in 2015, the sparse statutory definition has 
spurred substantial litigation testing the meaning of the phrase. 
Hundreds of cases and dozens of courts have attempted to discern the 
intent of Congress when crafting the phrase. See, e.g., Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality) 
(briefly summarizing case history). The federal courts have established 
different analytical frameworks to interpret the phrase, and the 
applicable test may differ from State to State. See, e.g., Memorandum 
from Dick Pedersen, President of the Environmental Council of the 
States (ECOS) of September 11, 2014, Concerning Waters of the United 
States under the Act at 2-23 (2014) (hereinafter, the ``ECOS 
Memorandum''), available at http://acoel.org/file.axd?file=2014%2f9%2fWaters+of+the+U+S+Final+9_11_14.pdf 
(summarizing case history following Rapanos).
    As part of this complex litigation history, three key U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions have interpreted the term

[[Page 22256]]

``waters of the United States'' and its implementing regulations and 
serve as guideposts for the agencies' interpretation of the phrase 
``waters of the United States.'' In 1985, the Supreme Court deferred to 
the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands actually abutting a 
traditional navigable water in Michigan, stating that adjacent wetlands 
may be regulated as waters of the United States because they are 
``inseparably bound up'' with navigable waters and ``in the majority of 
cases'' have ``significant effects on water quality and the aquatic 
ecosystem'' in those waters. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
474 U.S. 121, 131-35 & n.9 (1985). The Court recognized that ``[i]n 
determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges under the 
Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends 
and land begins . . . . Where on this continuum to find the limit of 
`waters' is far from obvious.'' Id. at 132. The Court acknowledged the 
``inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable 
waters,'' and deferred to the agencies' interpretation that the close 
ecological relationship between adjacent wetlands and traditional 
navigable waters provided a legal justification for treating wetlands 
as waters. Id. at 134. The Court also ``conclude[d] that a definition 
of `waters of the United States' encompassing all wetlands adjacent to 
other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction is a 
permissible interpretation of the Act.'' Id. at 135.
    The Supreme Court again addressed the definition of ``waters of the 
United States'' in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC). In SWANCC, the 
Court rejected a claim of federal jurisdiction over nonnavigable, 
isolated, intrastate ponds that lack a sufficient connection to 
traditional navigable waters, noting that the term ``navigable'' must 
be given meaning within the context and application of the statute. Id. 
The Court held that interpreting the statute to extend to nonnavigable, 
isolated, intrastate ponds that lack a sufficient connection to 
traditional navigable waters would invoke the outer limits of Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 172. Where an administrative 
interpretation of a statute presses against the outer limits of 
Congress' constitutional authority, the Court explained, it expects a 
clear statement from Congress that it intended that result, and even 
more so when the broad interpretation authorizes federal encroachment 
upon a traditional State power. Id. The CWA contains no such clear 
statement. Id. at 174.
    In January 2003, the EPA and the Corps issued joint guidance 
interpreting the Supreme Court decision in SWANCC.\10\ The guidance 
indicated that SWANCC focused on nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate 
waters, and called for field staff to coordinate with their respective 
Corps or EPA Headquarters on jurisdictional determinations that 
asserted jurisdiction over such waters. The agencies at that time 
focused their interpretation of SWANCC to its facts, and applied the 
decision narrowly as restricting the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
solely based on the Migratory Bird Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See U.S. EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Legal 
Memoranda Regarding Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County 
(SWANCC) v. United States (Jan. 15, 2003), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/swancc_guidance_jan_03.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Court most recently interpreted the term ``waters of the United 
States'' in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Rapanos 
involved two consolidated cases in which the CWA had been applied to 
wetlands located near man-made ditches that were ultimately connected 
to traditional navigable waters. All members of the Court agreed that 
the term ``waters of the United States'' encompasses some waters that 
are not navigable in the traditional sense.
    A four-Justice plurality interpreted the term ``waters of the 
United States'' to ``include[ ] only those relatively permanent, 
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water `forming geographic 
features' that are described in ordinary parlance as `streams[,] . . . 
oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,' '' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., 
plurality) (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 
1954)), and ``wetlands with a continuous surface connection'' to a 
``relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional 
interstate navigable waters.'' Id. at 742. The plurality explained that 
``[w]etlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic 
connection to `waters of the United States' do not implicate the 
boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview,'' and thus do not have 
the ``necessary connection'' to covered waters that triggers CWA 
jurisdiction. Id. at 742. The plurality also noted that its reference 
to ``relatively permanent'' waters did ``not necessarily exclude 
streams, rivers, or lakes that might dry up in extraordinary 
circumstances, such as drought,'' or ``seasonal rivers, which contain 
continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow during dry 
months.'' Id. at 732 n.5 (emphasis in original).
    In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy took a different approach, 
concluding that ``to constitute `navigable waters' under the Act, a 
water or wetland must possess a `significant nexus' to waters that are 
or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.'' 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172). He stated that adjacent wetlands 
possess the requisite significant nexus if the wetlands ``either alone 
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of other covered waters more readily understood as `navigable.' '' Id. 
at 780.
    Following Rapanos, on June 7, 2007, the agencies issued joint 
guidance entitled ``Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Decision in Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. 
United States'' to address the waters at issue in that decision. The 
guidance did not change the codified definition of ``waters of the 
United States.'' The guidance indicated that the agencies would assert 
jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters and their adjacent 
wetlands, relatively permanent nonnavigable tributaries of traditional 
navigable waters and wetlands that abut them, nonnavigable tributaries 
that are not relatively permanent if they have a significant nexus with 
a traditional navigable water, and wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable 
tributaries that are not relatively permanent if they have a 
significant nexus with a traditional navigable water. The guidance was 
reissued with minor changes on December 2, 2008 (hereinafter, the 
``Rapanos Guidance'').\11\ After issuance of the Rapanos Guidance, 
Members of Congress, developers, farmers, State and local governments, 
environmental organizations, energy companies, and others asked the 
agencies to replace the guidance with a regulation that would provide 
clarity and certainty regarding the scope of the waters federally 
regulated under the CWA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See U.S. EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Clean Water 
Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in 
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States at 1 (Dec. 2, 
2008) (``Rapanos Guidance''), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_jurisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since Rapanos, litigation has continued to confuse the regulatory 
landscape. See, e.g., ECOS Memorandum at 2-23. The Supreme

[[Page 22257]]

Court also has twice weighed in on topics related to the agencies' 
implementation of their authorities under the CWA to help clarify 
federal authority in this area. In each case, members of the Court 
noted the longstanding confusion regarding the scope of federal 
jurisdiction under the CWA and the importance of providing clear 
guidance to the regulated community. In 2012, for example, the Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected the EPA's longstanding position that 
compliance orders issued under the CWA to force property owners to 
restore wetlands are not judicially reviewable as final agency actions. 
See Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 131 (2012). In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Alito referred to the jurisdictional reach of the CWA as 
``notoriously unclear'' and noted that the Court's decision provided 
only ``a modest measure of relief.'' Id. at 133 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(``For 40 years, Congress has done nothing to resolve this critical 
ambiguity, and the EPA has not seen fit to promulgate a rule providing 
a clear and sufficiently limited definition of the phrase [`waters of 
the United States']'').
    In 2016, the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion rejected the 
Corps' longstanding position that jurisdictional determinations issued 
by the Corps were not judicially reviewable as final agency actions. 
Writing for the Court, the Chief Justice recognized that it ``is often 
difficult to determine whether a particular piece of property contains 
waters of the United States, but there are important consequences if it 
does.'' U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 
(2016). Given those important consequences, the Court held that 
jurisdictional determinations are subject to immediate judicial review 
when made. Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, ``not to 
qualify what the Court says but to point out that, based on the 
Government's representations in this case, the reach and systemic 
consequences of the Clean Water Act remain a cause for concern.'' Id. 
at 1816-17 (referring to the ``ominous reach'' of the Act). On remand, 
the lower court found that the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over a 
peat farm more than 90 miles from the nearest traditional navigable 
water based on the ``significant nexus'' test described in the 
agencies' Rapanos Guidance was ``arbitrary and capricious.'' Hawkes Co. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 13-107 ADM/TNL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10680 at *33 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2017).
4. The 2015 Rule
    On June 29, 2015, the agencies issued a final rule (80 FR 37054) 
amending various portions of the CFR that set forth a definition of 
``waters of the United States,'' a term contained in the CWA's 
definition of ``navigable waters,'' 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). One of the 
stated purposes of the 2015 Rule was to ``increase CWA program 
predictability and consistency by clarifying the scope of `waters of 
the United States' protected under the Act.'' 80 FR 37054. The 2015 
Rule defined the geographic scope of the CWA by placing waters into 
three categories: (A) Waters that are categorically ``jurisdictional by 
rule'' in all instances (i.e., without the need for any additional 
analysis); (B) waters that are subject to case-specific analysis to 
determine whether they are jurisdictional; and (C) waters that are 
categorically excluded from jurisdiction. Waters considered 
``jurisdictional by rule'' included (1) waters which are currently 
used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate 
or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide; (2) interstate waters, including interstate 
wetlands; (3) the territorial seas; (4) impoundments of waters 
otherwise identified as jurisdictional; (5) tributaries of the first 
three categories of ``jurisdictional by rule'' waters; and (6) waters 
adjacent to a water identified in the first five categories of 
``jurisdictional by rule'' waters, including ``wetlands, ponds, lakes, 
oxbows, impoundments, and similar waters.'' See 80 FR 37104.
    The 2015 Rule relied on a scientific literature review--the 
Connectivity Report \12\--to support exerting federal jurisdiction over 
certain waters. See 80 FR 37065 (``[T]he agencies interpret the scope 
of `waters of the United States' protected under the CWA based on the 
information and conclusions in the [Connectivity] Report . . . .''). 
Although the agencies acknowledged that science cannot dictate where to 
draw the line of federal jurisdiction, see, e.g., id. at 37060, 
notwithstanding that qualifier, the agencies relied on the Connectivity 
Report extensively in establishing the 2015 Rule's definition of 
``waters of the United States.'' See id. at 37057 (``The [Connectivity] 
Report provides much of the technical basis for [the] rule.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ U.S. EPA. Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to 
Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence 
(Jan. 2015) (EPA/600/R-14/475F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2015 Rule added new definitions of key terms such as 
``tributaries'' and revised previous definitions of terms such as 
``adjacent'' (by adding a new definition of ``neighboring'' that is 
used in the definition of ``adjacent'') that would determine whether 
waters were ``jurisdictional by rule.'' See 80 FR 37105. Specifically, 
a ``tributary'' under the 2015 Rule is a water that contributes flow, 
either directly or through another water, to a water identified in the 
first three categories of ``jurisdictional by rule'' waters that is 
characterized by the presence of the ``physical indicators'' of a bed 
and banks and an ordinary high water mark. According to the 2015 Rule's 
preamble, ``[t]hese physical indicators demonstrate there is volume, 
frequency, and duration of flow sufficient to create a bed and banks 
and an ordinary high water mark, and thus to qualify as a tributary.'' 
Id.\13\ Tributaries under the 2015 Rule could be natural, man-altered, 
or man-made, and do not lose their status as a tributary if, for any 
length, there is one or more constructed breaks (such as bridges, 
culverts, pipes, or dams), or one or more natural breaks (such as 
wetlands along the run of a stream, debris piles, boulder fields, or a 
stream that flows underground) so long as a bed and banks and an 
ordinary high water mark could be identified upstream of the break. Id. 
at 37105-06.
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    \13\ The 2015 Rule did not delineate jurisdiction specifically 
based on categories with established scientific meanings such as 
ephemeral, intermittent, and perennial waters that are based on the 
source of the water and nature of the flow. See 80 FR 37076 (``Under 
the rule, flow in the tributary may be perennial, intermittent, or 
ephemeral.''). Under the 2015 Rule, tributaries also did not need to 
possess any specific volume, frequency, or duration of flow, or to 
contribute flow to a traditional navigable water in any given year 
or specific time period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2015 Rule, the agencies did not expressly amend the 
longstanding definition of ``adjacent'' (defined as ``bordering, 
contiguous, or neighboring''), but the agencies added, for the first 
time, a definition of ``neighboring'' that changed the meaning of 
``adjacent.'' The 2015 Rule defined ``neighboring'' to encompass all 
waters located within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a 
category (1) through (5) ``jurisdictional by rule'' water; all waters 
located within the 100-year floodplain of a category (1) through (5) 
``jurisdictional by rule'' water and not more than 1,500 feet from the 
ordinary high water mark of such water; all waters located within 1,500 
feet of the high tide line of a category (1) through (3) 
``jurisdictional by rule'' water; and all waters within 1,500 feet of 
the ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes. 80 FR 37105. The 
entire water would be considered ``neighboring'' if any portion of it 
lies

[[Page 22258]]

within one of these zones. See id. These quantitative measures did not 
appear in the proposed rule and, as discussed in the 2019 Rule and 
below, the agencies concluded that they were not sufficiently supported 
in the administrative record for the final rule.
    In addition to the six categories of ``jurisdictional by rule'' 
waters, the 2015 Rule identified certain waters that would be subject 
to a case-specific analysis to determine if they had a ``significant 
nexus'' to a water that is jurisdictional. 80 FR 37104-05. The first 
category consists of five specific types of waters in specific regions 
of the country: Prairie potholes, Carolina and Delmarva bays, pocosins, 
western vernal pools in California, and Texas coastal prairie wetlands. 
Id. at 37105. The second category consists of all waters located within 
the 100-year floodplain of any category (1) through (3) 
``jurisdictional by rule'' water and all waters located within 4,000 
feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark of any category 
(1) through (5) ``jurisdictional by rule'' water. Id. These 
quantitative measures did not appear in the proposed rule and, as 
discussed in the 2019 Rule and below, the agencies concluded that they 
were not sufficiently supported in the administrative record for the 
final 2015 Rule.
    The 2015 Rule defined ``significant nexus'' to mean a water, 
including wetlands, that either alone or in combination with other 
similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affected the 
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a category (1) through 
(3) ``jurisdictional by rule'' water. 80 FR 37106. ``For an effect to 
be significant, it must be more than speculative or insubstantial.'' 
Id. The term ``in the region'' meant ``the watershed that drains to the 
nearest'' primary water. Id. This definition was different from the 
test articulated by the agencies in their 2008 Rapanos Guidance. That 
guidance interpreted ``similarly situated'' to include all wetlands 
(not waters) adjacent to the same tributary.
    Under the 2015 Rule, to determine whether a water, alone or in 
combination with similarly situated waters across the watershed of the 
nearest primary water, had a significant nexus, one had to consider 
nine functions such as sediment trapping, runoff storage, provision of 
life cycle dependent aquatic habitat, and other functions. 80 FR 37106. 
A single function performed by a water, alone or together with 
similarly situated waters in the region, that contributed significantly 
to the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the nearest 
category (1) through (3) ``jurisdictional by rule'' water was 
sufficient to establish a significant nexus. Id. Taken together, the 
enumeration of the nine functions and the more expansive consideration 
of ``similarly situated waters in the region'' in the 2015 Rule meant 
that the vast majority of water features in the United States may have 
come within the jurisdictional purview of the Federal government.\14\
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    \14\ ``[T]he vast majority of the nation's water features are 
located within 4,000 feet of a covered tributary, traditional 
navigable water, interstate water, or territorial sea.'' U.S. EPA 
and Department of the Army, Economic Analysis of the EPA-Army Clean 
Water Rule at 11 (May 20, 2015) (``2015 Rule Economic Analysis'') 
(Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20866), available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2015 Rule also retained exclusions from the definition of 
``waters of the United States'' for prior converted cropland and waste 
treatment systems. 80 FR 37105. In addition, the agencies codified 
several exclusions that, in part, reflected longstanding agency 
practice and added others such as ``puddles'' and ``swimming pools'' in 
response to concerns raised by stakeholders during the public comment 
period on the proposed 2015 Rule. Id. at 37096-98, 37105.
    Following the 2015 Rule's publication, 31 States \15\ and numerous 
non-state parties, including environmental groups and groups 
representing farming, recreational, forestry, and other interests, 
filed complaints and petitions for review in multiple federal district 
\16\ and appellate \17\ courts challenging the 2015 Rule. In those 
cases, the challengers alleged numerous procedural deficiencies in the 
development and promulgation of the 2015 Rule and substantive 
deficiencies in the 2015 Rule itself. Some challengers argued that the 
2015 Rule was too expansive, while others argued that it excluded too 
many waters from federal jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico 
(Environment Department and State Engineer), North Carolina 
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources), North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Iowa joined the legal 
challenge later in the process, bringing the total to 32 States. 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Wisconsin have since withdrawn from 
litigation against the 2015 Rule.
    \16\ U.S. District Courts for the Northern and Southern 
Districts of Georgia, District of Minnesota, District of North 
Dakota, Southern District of Ohio, Northern District of Oklahoma, 
Southern District of Texas, District of Arizona, Northern District 
of Florida, District of the District of Columbia, Western District 
of Washington, Northern District of California, and Northern 
District of West Virginia. In April 2019, an additional challenge 
against the 2015 Rule was filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon.
    \17\ U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The day before the 2015 Rule's August 28, 2015 effective date, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota preliminarily 
enjoined the 2015 Rule in the 13 States that challenged the rule in 
that court.\18\ The district court found those States were ``likely to 
succeed'' on the merits of their challenge to the 2015 Rule because, 
among other reasons, ``it appears likely that the EPA has violated its 
Congressional grant of authority in its promulgation of the Rule.'' 
North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1051 (D.N.D. 2015). In 
particular, the court noted concern that the 2015 Rule's definition of 
``tributary'' ``includes vast numbers of waters that are unlikely to 
have a nexus to navigable waters.'' Id. at 1056. Further, the court 
found that ``it appears likely the EPA failed to comply with 
[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] requirements when promulgating the 
Rule,'' suggesting that certain distance-based measures were not a 
logical outgrowth of the proposal to the 2015 Rule. Id. at 1051, 1058. 
No party sought an interlocutory appeal.
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    \18\ Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
and Wyoming. Iowa's motion to intervene in the case was granted 
after issuance of the preliminary injunction. In May 2019, the court 
granted motions from Colorado and New Mexico to withdraw from the 
litigation and lifted the preliminary injunction as to Colorado and 
New Mexico. Order, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-00059 (D.N.D. 
May 14, 2019). At the same time, the court stated that the 
preliminary injunction would remain in effect as to a plaintiff-
intervenor that represents ten counties in New Mexico. The agencies 
filed a motion seeking clarification of the applicability of the 
court's preliminary injunction to those ten counties in New Mexico. 
Defendants' Motion for Clarification Regarding the Scope of the 
Court's Preliminary Injunction, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-
00059 (D.N.D. May 24, 2019). As of the time of signature of this 
final rule, that motion is pending before the court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The numerous petitions for review filed in the courts of appeals 
were consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
In that litigation, State and industry petitioners raised concerns 
about whether the 2015 Rule violated the Constitution and the CWA and 
whether its promulgation violated the APA and other statutes. 
Environmental petitioners also challenged the 2015 Rule, claiming in 
part that the 2015 Rule was too narrow because of the distance 
limitations and other issues. On October 9, 2015, approximately six 
weeks after the 2015 Rule took effect in the 37 States, the District of 
Columbia, and U.S.

[[Page 22259]]

Territories that were not subject to the preliminary injunction issued 
by the District of North Dakota, the Sixth Circuit stayed the 2015 Rule 
nationwide after concluding, among other things, that State petitioners 
had demonstrated ``a substantial possibility of success on the merits 
of their claims.'' In re EPA & Dep't of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804, 
807 (6th Cir. 2015) (``In re EPA'').
    On January 13, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
the question of whether the courts of appeals have original 
jurisdiction to review challenges to the 2015 Rule. See Nat'l Ass'n of 
Mfrs. v. Dep't of Def., 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017). The Sixth Circuit 
granted petitioners' motion to hold in abeyance the briefing schedule 
in the litigation challenging the 2015 Rule pending a Supreme Court 
decision on the question of the court of appeals' jurisdiction. On 
January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that 
the 2015 Rule is subject to direct review in the district courts. Nat'l 
Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2018). Throughout 
the pendency of the Supreme Court litigation (and for a short time 
thereafter), the Sixth Circuit's nationwide stay remained in effect. In 
response to the Supreme Court's decision, on February 28, 2018, the 
Sixth Circuit lifted the stay and dismissed the corresponding petitions 
for review. See In re Dep't of Def. & EPA Final Rule, 713 Fed. Appx. 
489 (6th Cir. 2018).
    Following the Supreme Court's jurisdictional ruling, district court 
litigation regarding the 2015 Rule resumed. At this time, the 2015 Rule 
continues to be subject to a preliminary injunction issued by the 
District of North Dakota as to 12 States: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming.\19\ The 2015 Rule also is subject to a preliminary 
injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Georgia as to 11 more States: Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1364 (S.D. Ga. 
2018). The Southern District of Georgia subsequently issued an order 
remanding the 2015 Rule to the agencies, finding that the 2015 Rule 
exceeded the agencies' statutory authority under the CWA and was 
promulgated in violation of the APA. Georgia v. Wheeler, No. 2:15-cv-
079, 2019 WL 3949922 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2019). ``[I]n light of the 
serious defects identified,'' the court retained its injunction against 
the 2015 Rule. Id. at *36.\20\
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    \19\ As of the date this final rule was signed, the 
applicability and scope of the North Dakota district court's 
preliminary injunction in New Mexico is unclear. See supra note 18.
    \20\ The Southern District of Georgia later denied as moot 
plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration asking the court to vacate, 
rather than remand, the 2015 Rule. Order, Georgia v. Wheeler, No. 
2:15-cv-079 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2020).
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    In September 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction against the 2015 Rule 
in response to motions filed by the States of Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi and several business associations, finding that enjoining 
the rule would provide ``much needed governmental, administrative, and 
economic stability'' while the rule undergoes judicial review. See 
Texas v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-162, 2018 WL 4518230, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 
12, 2018). The court observed that if it did not temporarily enjoin the 
rule, ``it risks asking the states, their governmental subdivisions, 
and their citizens to expend valuable resources and time 
operationalizing a rule that may not survive judicial review.'' Id. In 
May 2019, the court remanded the 2015 Rule to the agencies on the 
grounds that the rule violated the APA. Specifically, the court found 
that the rule violated the APA's notice and comment requirements 
because: (1) The 2015 Rule's definition of ``adjacent'' waters (which 
relied on distance-based limitations) was not a ``logical outgrowth'' 
of the proposal's definition of ``adjacent'' waters (which relied on 
ecologic and hydrologic criteria); and (2) the agencies denied 
interested parties an opportunity to comment on the final version of 
the Connectivity Report, which served as the technical basis for the 
final rule. See Texas v. EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497 (S.D. Tex. 2019).\21\
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    \21\ The Southern District of Texas later denied plaintiffs' 
motions for reconsideration urging the court to vacate, rather than 
remand, the 2015 Rule. Order, Texas v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-00162 (S.D. 
Tex. Nov. 6, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In July 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon 
issued a preliminary injunction against the 2015 Rule in the State of 
Oregon. Order, Or. Cattlemen's Ass'n v. EPA, No. 19-00564 (D. Or. July 
26, 2019). As a result, the 2015 Rule was enjoined in more than half of 
the States.
    Three additional States (Ohio, Michigan, and Tennessee) sought a 
preliminary injunction against the 2015 Rule in the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Ohio. In March 2019, the court denied the 
States' motion, finding that the States had ``failed to demonstrate 
that they will suffer imminent and irreparable harm absent an 
injunction.'' See Ohio v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-02467, 2019 WL 1368850 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 26, 2019). The court subsequently denied the States' motion 
for reconsideration of its order denying the preliminary injunction 
motion, and the States have since filed an appeal of the court's order 
in the Sixth Circuit. See Ohio v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-02467, 2019 WL 
1958650 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2019); Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, Ohio v. 
EPA, No. 2:15-cv-02467 (S.D. Ohio May 28, 2019).\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Parties challenging the 2015 Rule in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, including the State of 
Oklahoma and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, unsuccessfully sought a 
motion for a preliminary injunction against the 2015 Rule and later 
stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the case. See Opinion & 
Order, Oklahoma v. EPA, No. 4:15-cv-00381 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2019); 
Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Oklahoma v. EPA, No. 4:15-cv-
00381 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 7, 2019). Following the effective date of the 
2019 Rule, an additional motion for a preliminary injunction against 
the 2015 Rule was denied as moot in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington. Order, Wash. Cattlemen's Ass'n v. 
EPA, No. 19-00569 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 30, 2019).
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C. Executive Order 13778 and the ``Step One'' Rulemaking

    On February 28, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13778 
entitled ``Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth 
by Reviewing the `Waters of the United States' Rule.'' Section 1 of the 
Executive Order states, ``[i]t is in the national interest to ensure 
that the Nation's navigable waters are kept free from pollution, while 
at the same time promoting economic growth, minimizing regulatory 
uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of the Congress and 
the States under the Constitution.'' The Executive Order directs the 
EPA and the Army to review the 2015 Rule for consistency with the 
policy outlined in Section 1 of the Order and to issue a proposed rule 
rescinding or revising the 2015 Rule as appropriate and consistent with 
law (Section 2). The Executive Order also directs the agencies to 
``consider interpreting the term `navigable waters' . . . in a manner 
consistent with'' Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (Section 3).
    On March 6, 2017, the agencies published a notice of intent to 
review the 2015 Rule and provide notice of a forthcoming proposed 
rulemaking consistent with the Executive Order. 82 FR 12532. Shortly 
thereafter, the agencies announced that they would implement the 
Executive Order in a two-step approach. On July 27, 2017,

[[Page 22260]]

the agencies published the ``Definition of `Waters of the United 
States'--Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules'' notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) (82 FR 34899) that proposed to repeal the 2015 Rule 
and recodify the regulatory text that governed prior to the 
promulgation of the 2015 Rule, consistent with Supreme Court decisions 
and informed by applicable guidance documents and longstanding agency 
practice. The agencies refer to this as the ``Step One'' rule. The 
agencies invited comment on the NPRM over a 62-day period. On July 12, 
2018, the agencies published a supplemental notice of proposed 
rulemaking (SNPRM) to clarify, supplement, and seek additional comment 
on the proposed repeal and recodification. 83 FR 32227. The agencies 
invited comment on the SNPRM over a 30-day period.
    On October 22, 2019, the agencies published a final rule repealing 
the 2015 Rule and recodifying the pre-existing regulations as an 
interim matter until this final rule becomes effective. 84 FR 56626. In 
developing the final Step One rule (referred to as the ``2019 Rule''), 
the agencies reviewed approximately 690,000 public comments received on 
the NPRM and approximately 80,000 comments received on the SNPRM from a 
broad spectrum of interested parties. In the NPRM and SNPRM the 
agencies sought comment on all aspects of the NPRM, the economic 
analysis for the NPRM, and the SNPRM, including the repeal of the 2015 
Rule, the recodification of the prior regulations, the considerations 
underlying the proposal and agencies' reasons for the proposal, and the 
agencies' proposed conclusions that the 2015 Rule exceeded the 
agencies' authority under the CWA.
    The agencies finalized the 2019 Rule, which became effective 
December 23, 2019, and repealed the 2015 Rule for four primary reasons. 
First, the agencies concluded that the 2015 Rule did not implement the 
legal limits on the scope of the agencies' authority under the CWA as 
intended by Congress and reflected in Supreme Court cases, including 
Justice Kennedy's articulation of the significant nexus test in 
Rapanos. Second, the agencies concluded that in promulgating the 2015 
Rule the agencies failed to adequately consider and accord due weight 
to the policy of the Congress in CWA section 101(b) to ``recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States 
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution'' and ``to plan the 
development and use . . . of land and water resources.'' 33 U.S.C. 
1251(b). Third, the agencies repealed the 2015 Rule to avoid 
interpretations of the CWA that push the envelope of their 
constitutional and statutory authority absent a clear statement from 
Congress authorizing the encroachment of federal jurisdiction over 
traditional State land-use planning authority. Lastly, the agencies 
concluded that the 2015 Rule's distance-based limitations suffered from 
certain procedural errors and a lack of adequate record support. The 
agencies found that these reasons, collectively and individually, 
warranted repealing the 2015 Rule.
    At this time, the regulations defining the scope of federal CWA 
jurisdiction are those portions of the CFR as they existed before the 
amendments promulgated in the 2015 Rule. The agencies concluded that it 
was appropriate as an interim matter to restore the pre-existing 
regulations to provide regulatory certainty as the agencies considered 
the proposed revised definition of ``waters of the United States'' and 
because, as implemented, those prior regulations adhere more closely 
than the 2015 Rule to the jurisdictional limits reflected in the 
statute and case law. As anticipated in the 2019 Rule, this final rule 
replaces the recodified pre-2015 regulations, upon its effective date.
    As of the time of signature of this final rule, challenges to the 
agencies' 2019 Rule are pending in six district courts, wherein both 
environmental and industry groups have either filed new complaints or 
sought to supplement existing complaints to challenge the rule in whole 
or in part. See New York v. Wheeler, No. 19-11673 (S.D.N.Y., complaint 
filed Dec. 20, 2019); Wash. Cattlemen's Ass'n v. EPA, No. 2:19-cv-00569 
(W.D. Wash., supplemental amended complaint filed Dec. 20, 2019); 
Murray v. Wheeler, No. 1:19-cv-01498 (N.D.N.Y., complaint filed Dec. 4, 
2019); S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Wheeler, No. 2:19-cv-3006 
(D.S.C., complaint filed Oct. 23, 2019); N.M. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. 
EPA, No. 1:19-cv-988 (D.N.M., complaint filed Oct. 22, 2019); Pierce v. 
EPA, No. 0:19-cv-2193 (D. Minn., supplemental complaint filed Oct. 22, 
2019).

D. Summary of Stakeholder Outreach and the ``Step Two'' Rulemaking

    Following the March 6, 2017 Federal Register notice announcing the 
agencies' intent to review and rescind or revise the 2015 Rule, the 
agencies initiated an effort to engage the public to hear perspectives 
as to how the agencies could define ``waters of the United States,'' 
including creating a new website to provide information on the 
rulemaking. See www.epa.gov/wotus-rule. On April 19, 2017, the agencies 
held an initial Federalism consultation meeting with State and local 
government officials as well as national organizations representing 
such officials. The agencies also convened several additional meetings 
with intergovernmental associations and their members to solicit input 
on the future rule. The EPA, with participation from the Army, 
initiated Tribal consultation on April 20, 2017, under the EPA Policy 
on Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribes. See Section VI for 
further details on the agencies' consultations. The agencies considered 
comments received from federalism and tribal consultations as they 
developed this final rule.
    In addition to engaging State, tribal, and local officials through 
federalism and tribal consultations, the agencies sought feedback on 
the definition of ``waters of the United States'' from a broad audience 
of stakeholders, including small entities (small businesses, small 
organizations, and small government jurisdictions), through a series of 
outreach webinars that were held September 9, 2017, through November 
21, 2017, and through an in-person meeting for small entities on 
October 23, 2017. A summary of these public listening sessions is 
available in the docket (Docket Id. No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-0091) for 
this rule. The webinars were tailored to specific sectors, including 
agriculture (row crop, livestock, silviculture); conservation (hunters 
and anglers); small entities (small businesses, small organizations, 
small government jurisdictions); construction and transportation; 
environment and public advocacy (including health and environmental 
justice); mining; energy and chemical industry; scientific 
organizations and academia; stormwater, wastewater management, and 
drinking water agencies; and the general public.
    At the pre-proposal webinars and meetings with stakeholders, the 
agencies provided a presentation and sought input on specific issues, 
such as potential approaches to defining the phrases ``relatively 
permanent'' waters and ``continuous surface connections'' as 
articulated by the plurality opinion in Rapanos, as well as other 
considerations addressing specific geomorphological features, 
exclusions and exemptions, costs and benefits, and aquatic resource 
data that the agencies might consider in the technical analyses for a 
future rule. As part of this outreach effort, the agencies established 
a public recommendations docket (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2017-0480) 
that opened

[[Page 22261]]

August 28, 2017, and closed November 28, 2017. Participant comments and 
letters submitted represent a diverse range of interests, positions, 
suggestions, and recommendations provided to the agencies. The agencies 
received over 6,300 recommendations (available on Regulations.gov at 
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2017-0480) that were 
considered as the agencies developed the proposed revised definition of 
``waters of the United States.'' The agencies also considered 
recommendations as to how the agencies should define ``waters of the 
United States'' that were submitted in public comments on the agencies' 
proposed ``Step One'' rule (82 FR 34899, July 27, 2017) and the July 
2018 SNPRM (83 FR 32227, July 12, 2018).
    The agencies continued their pre-proposal engagement with States 
and Tribes via additional webinars and in-person meetings. On March 8 
and 9, 2018, the agencies held an in-person State Co-Regulators 
Workshop with representatives from nine States (Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming) 
and convened a subsequent in-person meeting on March 22, 2018, with 
representatives from all States at the spring meeting of the 
Environmental Council of the States. The agencies also held an in-
person Tribal Co-Regulators Workshop on March 6 and 7, 2018, with 
representatives from 20 tribes. These meetings were intended to seek 
technical input as the agencies developed the proposed rule. The 
agencies also sought pre-proposal input from Tribes through national 
and regional tribal meetings, including through listening sessions at 
the Tribal Land and Environment Forum (August 16, 2017 and August 15, 
2018) and the National Congress of American Indians Annual Convention 
(October 24, 2018).
    On December 12, 2018, the agencies signed the proposed rule to 
revise the definition of ``waters of the United States,'' as the second 
step of the comprehensive two-step process consistent with Executive 
Order 13778. The proposal was published on February 14, 2019. 84 FR 
4154. The agencies proposed to interpret the term ``waters of the 
United States'' to encompass: Traditional navigable waters, including 
the territorial seas; tributaries that contribute perennial or 
intermittent flow to such waters; certain ditches; certain lakes and 
ponds; impoundments of otherwise jurisdictional waters; and wetlands 
adjacent to other jurisdictional waters. The 60-day public comment 
period for the proposed revised definition of ``waters of the United 
States'' (``Step Two'' Rule) closed on April 15, 2019.\23\
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    \23\ The pre-publication of the proposed rule was published on 
EPA's website on December 12, 2018, approximately 60 days prior to 
its publication in the Federal Register and the date the formal 
public comment period began.
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    The agencies conducted a variety of stakeholder outreach on the 
proposed rule upon its publication in the Federal Register. On February 
14, 2019, the agencies held a public webcast to present key elements of 
the proposed rule (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ6kFJasDhg&feature=youtu.be), and held a public hearing in 
Kansas City, Kansas, on February 27 and 28, 2019, to hear feedback from 
individuals from regulated industry sectors, environmental and 
conservation organizations, State agencies, tribal governments, and 
private citizens. The agencies also continued engagement with States 
and Tribes through a series of in-person meetings with State and tribal 
representatives in Kansas City, Kansas; Atlanta, Georgia; Albuquerque, 
New Mexico; and Seattle, Washington during the public comment period 
for the proposed rule. During these meetings, the agencies provided an 
overview of the proposed rule, responded to clarifying questions from 
participants, discussed implementation considerations, and heard 
feedback on the agencies' interest in developing geospatial datasets of 
jurisdictional waters. A transcript of the public hearing and related 
materials and summaries of the State and tribal meetings can be found 
in the docket for the final rule. At the request of individual Tribes, 
the agencies also continued to hold staff-level and leader-to-leader 
meetings with individual Tribes.
    In developing this final rule, the agencies reviewed and considered 
approximately 620,000 comments received on the proposed rule from a 
broad spectrum of interested parties. Commenters provided a wide range 
of feedback on the various aspects of the proposal, including the legal 
basis for the proposed rule, the agencies' proposed treatment of 
categories of jurisdictional waters and those features that would not 
be jurisdictional, the economic analysis and resource and programmatic 
assessment for the proposed rule, and the agencies' considerations for 
developing geospatial datasets of jurisdictional waters in partnership 
with other federal agencies, States, and Tribes. The agencies discuss 
comments received and their responses in the applicable sections of 
this final rule. A complete response to comments document is available 
in the docket for this final rule at Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149.
    The agencies also engaged with the EPA's Science Advisory Board 
(SAB) during the development of the rule on several occasions. The 
agencies met with the SAB prior to the proposed rule and following 
publication of the proposed rule to explain the basis for the rule and 
to address the SAB's questions and initial observations. The SAB issued 
a draft commentary on the proposed rule on December 31, 2019, and held 
a public meeting on the matter on January 17, 2020. The SAB's draft 
commentary asserted that the proposed rule did not fully incorporate 
the Connectivity Report and offers no comparable body of peer reviewed 
evidence to support this departure. As the agencies made clear in the 
proposed rule preamble and explain in greater detail in this notice, 
the agencies used the Connectivity Report to inform certain aspects of 
the definition of ``waters of the United States,'' but recognize that 
science cannot dictate where to draw the line between Federal and State 
waters, as this is a legal question that must be answered based on the 
overall framework and construct of the CWA. The SAB's draft also 
addresses the absence of ``ground water protection;'' the exclusion of 
``irrigation canals'' from regulatory jurisdiction; the exclusion of 
``adjacent wetlands that do not abut or have a direct hydrologic 
surface connection to otherwise jurisdictional waters;'' and the 
absence of ``long term clarity'' as a result of the asserted lack of 
scientific basis for the proposed rule.
    The relevant comments raised by the SAB were also raised by public 
commenters throughout the rulemaking process, and as a result, have 
been addressed by the agencies in the final rule, supporting documents, 
and throughout this notice. In brief, however, the agencies note that 
the final rule is consistent with the agencies' longstanding position 
that ``waters of the United States'' do not include groundwater; that 
the agencies do not use the term ``irrigation canals'' in the final 
rule; that ``irrigation ditches'' constructed in uplands and 
``irrigation return flows'' generally have been not been subject to CWA 
regulatory requirements; and that the agencies have expanded 
jurisdiction over certain ``adjacent wetlands'' compared to the 
proposal to better incorporate common principles from the Rapanos 
plurality and concurring opinions, that the final rule strikes a better 
balance between the objective and policy in CWA sections 101(a) and 
101(b), respectively; and that

[[Page 22262]]

the final rule is consistent with the text, structure, legislative 
history, and applicable Supreme Court guidance. A memorandum 
summarizing the agencies' interactions with the SAB and the SAB's draft 
commentary are available in the docket for this final rule.

E. Overview of Legal Construct for the Final Rule

    As the preceding summary of the statutory and regulatory history 
makes clear, the central term delineating the federal geographic scope 
of authority under the CWA--``waters of the United States''--has been 
the subject of debate and litigation for many years. The agencies are 
promulgating a regulation to define ``waters of the United States'' 
adhering to Constitutional and statutory limitations, the policies and 
objective of the CWA, and case law. The revised definition will allow 
the regulatory agencies and the regulated community to protect 
navigable waters from pollution while providing an implementable 
approach to determining regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA. This 
subsection summarizes the legal principles that inform the agencies' 
final rule, and the following section (Section III) describes how the 
agencies are applying those legal principles to support the final 
revised definition of ``waters of the United States.''
1. Statutory Framework
    To determine the scope of executive branch authority under the CWA, 
the agencies begin with the text of the statute. The objective of the 
CWA, as established by Congress, is ``to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.'' 
33 U.S.C. 1251(a). As discussed in Section II.B, in order to meet that 
objective, Congress declared two national water quality goals and 
established several key policies that direct the work of the agencies. 
Congress also envisioned a major role for the States in implementing 
the CWA, carefully balancing the traditional power of States to 
regulate land and water resources within their borders with the need 
for national water quality regulation.
    The agencies have developed regulatory and non-regulatory programs 
designed to ensure that the full statute is implemented as Congress 
intended. See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (``A 
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant.''). This includes pursuing the overall ``objective'' of 
the CWA to ``restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation's waters,'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), while 
implementing the specific ``policy'' directives from Congress to, among 
other things, ``recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution'' and ``to plan the development and use . . . of land and 
water resources.'' Id. at 1251(b); see also Webster's II, New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1994) (defining ``policy'' as a ``plan or course 
of action, as of a government[,] designed to influence and determine 
decisions and actions;'' an ``objective'' is ``something worked toward 
or aspired to: Goal'').\24\ The agencies therefore recognize a 
distinction between the specific word choices of Congress, including 
the need to develop regulatory and non-regulatory programs that aim to 
accomplish the goals of the Act while implementing the specific policy 
directives of Congress.\25\ To do so, the agencies must determine what 
Congress had in mind when it defined ``navigable waters'' in 1972 as 
``the waters of the United States.''
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    \24\ The legislative history of the CWA further illuminates the 
distinction between the terms ``policy'' and ``objective,'' or 
``goal.'' As Congress drafted the 1972 CWA amendments, the Senate 
bill set the ``no-discharge of pollutants into the navigable water 
by 1985'' provision as a policy whereas the House bill set it as a 
goal. The Act was ultimately passed with the ``no-discharge by 
1985'' provision established as a goal. See 33 U.S.C 1251(a)(1). 
During the House's consideration of the Conference Report, 
Representative Robert E. Jones, Jr. captured the policy versus goal 
distinction in section 101(a)(1) as follows: ``The objective of this 
legislation is to restore and preserve for the future the integrity 
of our Nation's waters. The bill sets forth as a national goal the 
complete elimination of all discharges into our navigable waters by 
1985, but . . . the conference report states clearly that achieving 
the 1985 target date is a goal, not a national policy. As such, it 
serves as a focal point for long-range planning, and for research 
and development in water pollution control technology . . . . While 
it is our hope that we can succeed in eliminating all discharge into 
our waters by 1985, without unreasonable impact on the national 
life, we recognized in this report that too many imponderables 
exist, some still beyond our horizons, to prescribe this goal today 
as a legal requirement.'' 118 Cong. Rec. H. 33749 (daily ed. October 
4, 1972).
    \25\ See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519, 544 (2012) (``Where Congress uses certain language in one part 
of a statute and different language in another, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally.''); Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (``[Where] Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion 
or exclusion.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress' authority to regulate navigable waters under the CWA 
derives from its power to regulate the ``channels of interstate 
commerce'' under the Commerce Clause. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1 (1824). In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court 
explained that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to 
regulate in three areas: The ``channels of interstate commerce,'' the 
``instrumentalities of interstate commerce,'' and those additional 
activities having ``a substantial relation to interstate commerce.'' 
514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). Some commenters stated that Congress' 
authority over ``waters of the United States'' is not tethered to 
navigable channels of interstate commerce, but is also derived from its 
authority over the ``instrumentalities of interstate commerce'' and 
activities that ``substantially affect'' interstate commerce. See id. 
The agencies disagree with these comments. The Supreme Court made clear 
in SWANCC that the term ``navigable'' indicates ``what Congress had in 
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: Its traditional 
jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or 
which could reasonably be so made.'' 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). The 
Court further explained that nothing in the legislative history of the 
Act provides any indication that ``Congress intended to exert anything 
more than its commerce power over navigation.'' Id. at 168 n.3. The 
Supreme Court, however, has recognized that Congress intended ``to 
exercise its powers under the Commerce clause to regulate at least some 
waters that would not be deemed `navigable' under the classical 
understanding of that term.'' Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133; see 
also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
    The classical understanding of the term ``navigable'' was first 
articulated by the Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball:

    Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law 
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when 
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways of commerce, over which trade and travel are 
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on 
water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States 
within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction 
from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their 
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a 
continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with 
other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which 
such commerce is conducted by water.

77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871). Subsequently, this traditional test 
was expanded to include waters that had been used in the past for 
interstate commerce, see Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 
256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921), and waters that are susceptible

[[Page 22263]]

for use with reasonable improvement, see United States v. Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-10 (1940).
    By the time the 1972 CWA amendments were enacted, the Supreme Court 
had held that Congress' authority over the channels of interstate 
commerce was not limited to regulation of the channels themselves but 
could extend to activities necessary to protect the channels. See 
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 523 
(1941) (``Congress may exercise its control over the non-navigable 
stretches of a river in order to preserve or promote commerce on the 
navigable portions.''). The Supreme Court had also clarified that 
Congress could regulate waterways that formed a part of a channel of 
interstate commerce, even if they are not themselves navigable or do 
not cross state boundaries. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 
(1971).
    These developments were discussed during the legislative process 
leading up to the passage of the 1972 CWA amendments, and certain 
members referred to the scope of the amendments as encompassing 
waterways that serve as a ``link in the chain'' of interstate commerce 
as it flows through various channels of transportation, such as 
railroads and highways. See, e.g., 118 Cong. Rec. 33756-57 (1972) 
(statement of Rep. Dingell); 118 Cong. Rec. 33699 (Oct. 4, 1972) 
(statement of Sen. Muskie).\26\ Other references suggest that 
congressional committees at least contemplated applying the ``control 
requirements'' of the Act ``to the navigable waters, portions thereof, 
and their tributaries.'' S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1971). Some 
commenters on this rulemaking stated that Congress' authority under the 
CWA is limited to waters that actually transport commerce, not their 
tributaries or adjacent wetlands, and that this limitation on CWA 
jurisdiction would fully preserve the authority of States to address 
pollution. The agencies disagree with these commenters based on the 
Supreme Court's holdings and the legislative history of the 1972 
amendments discussed above, as well as the text of the 1977 amendments 
to the CWA. Specifically, in 1977, when Congress authorized State 
assumption over the section 404 dredged or fill material permitting 
program, Congress limited the scope of waters that could be assumed by 
a State or Tribe by requiring the Corps to retain permitting authority 
over RHA waters (as identified by the test outlined in The Daniel Ball) 
plus wetlands adjacent to those waters, minus historic-use-only waters. 
See 33 U.S.C. 1344(g)(1).\27\ This suggests that Congress had in mind a 
broader scope of waters subject to CWA jurisdiction than waters 
traditionally understood as navigable. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171; 
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 138 n.11. Thus, Congress intended to 
assert federal authority over more than just waters traditionally 
understood as navigable, and Congress rooted that authority in ``its 
commerce power over navigation.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3. However, 
there must be a limit to that authority and to what water is subject to 
federal jurisdiction. How the agencies should exercise that authority 
has been the subject of dispute for decades, but the Supreme Court on 
three occasions has analyzed the issue and provided some instructional 
guidance for the agencies to consider in developing this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The agencies recognize that individual member statements 
are not a substitute for full congressional intent, but they do help 
provide context for issues that were discussed during the 
legislative debates. For a detailed discussion of the legislative 
history of the 1972 CWA amendments, see Albrecht & Nickelsburg, 
Could SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the Legislative History of the 
Clean Water Act, 32 ELR 11042 (Sept. 2002).
    \27\ For a detailed discussion of the legislative history 
supporting the enactment of CWA section 404(g), see Final Report of 
the Assumable Waters Subcommittee (May 2017), App. F., available at 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-06/documents/awsubcommitteefinalreprort_05-2017_tag508_05312017_508.pdf < 
Caution-https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-06/documents/awsubcommitteefinalreprort_05-2017_tag508_05312017_508.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
a. Adjacent Wetlands
    In Riverside Bayview, the Supreme Court considered the Corps' 
assertion of jurisdiction over ``low-lying, marshy land'' immediately 
abutting a water traditionally understood as navigable on the grounds 
that it was an ``adjacent wetland'' within the meaning of the Corps' 
then-existing regulations. 474 U.S. at 124. The Court addressed the 
question of whether non-navigable wetlands may be regulated as waters 
of the United States on the basis that they are ``adjacent to'' 
navigable-in-fact waters and ``inseparably bound up with'' them because 
of their ``significant effects on water quality and the aquatic 
ecosystem.'' See id. at 131-35 & n.9.
    In determining whether to give deference to the Corps' assertion of 
jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands, the Court acknowledged the 
difficulty in determining where federal jurisdiction ends, noting that 
the line is somewhere between open water and dry land:

    In determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges 
under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which 
water ends and land begins. Our common experience tells us that this 
is often no easy task: The transition from water to solid ground is 
not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between 
open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, 
swamps, bogs--in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly 
aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where on 
this continuum to find the limit of ``waters'' is far from obvious.

Id. at 132 (emphasis added). Within this statement, the Supreme Court 
identifies a basic principle for adjacent wetlands: The limits of 
jurisdiction lie within the ``continuum'' or ``transition'' ``between 
open waters and dry land.'' Observing that Congress intended the CWA 
``to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 
`navigable,' '' the Court held that it is ``a permissible 
interpretation of the Act'' to conclude that ``a wetland that actually 
abuts on a navigable waterway'' falls within the ``definition of 
`waters of the United States.' '' Id. at 133, 135. Thus, a wetland that 
abuts a water traditionally understood as navigable is subject to CWA 
jurisdiction because it is ``inseparably bound up with the `waters' of 
the United States.'' Id. at 134. ``This holds true even for wetlands 
that are not the result of flooding or permeation by water having its 
source in adjacent bodies of open water.'' Id.
    The Supreme Court also noted that the agencies can establish 
categories of jurisdiction for adjacent wetlands. See id. at 135 n.9. 
It made clear that these categories could be reasonable if the Corps 
concludes that ``in the majority of cases, adjacent wetlands have 
significant effects on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem.'' Id. A 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' ``can stand'' even if it 
potentially sweeps in individual wetlands that are not sufficiently 
``intertwined with the ecosystem of adjacent waterways'' to warrant 
protection. Id. In such cases, if the regulating entity determines that 
a particular wetland lacks importance to the aquatic environment, or 
its importance is outweighed by other factors, that wetland could be 
developed through the permit issuance process. Id.
    Some commenters noted that the definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' 
that the Supreme Court unanimously upheld in Riverside Bayview included 
categories of wetlands that would not be per se ``adjacent'' under the 
proposed rule, including all ``[w]etlands separated from other waters 
of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river 
berms, beach dunes and the like.'' 51 FR 41251 (Nov. 13, 1986). These 
commenters stated that the Court deferred to the Corps' judgment that

[[Page 22264]]

wetlands may affect the water quality of jurisdictional waterbodies 
even if the waterbodies do not inundate the wetlands. See Riverside 
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133-35. The proposed rule included wetlands as 
jurisdictional absent inundation by another water. See e.g., 84 FR 4187 
(``The proposed definition of `adjacent wetlands' would not require 
surface water exchange between wetlands and the jurisdictional waters 
they abut to create the jurisdictional link[.]''). As explained in 
Section III.G., the agencies have considered public comments in light 
of the statutory text and other relevant considerations and are 
finalizing a definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' that is more 
encompassing than the proposal. In any event, the agencies note that a 
Court's deference to an agency's particular interpretation of a statute 
does not foreclose alternative interpretations. The Supreme Court has 
held that ``a court's choice of one reasonable reading of an ambiguous 
statute does not preclude an implementing agency from later adopting a 
different reasonable interpretation.'' United States v. Eurodif S.A., 
555 U.S. 305, 315 (2009). This principle follows from Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
which ``established a `presumption that Congress, when it left 
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, 
understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by 
the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess 
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.' '' Nat'l Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)). 
Moreover, an ``initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in 
stone.'' Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863; see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. 
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (``[A]gencies are free to change 
their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation 
for the change.'') (citations omitted). Consistent with the APA and 
applicable case law, in this final rule the agencies have provided 
ample justification for a change in interpretation of the CWA 
concerning the scope of jurisdiction over waters and wetlands, 
including any changes from their prior interpretations.
    The Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview declined to decide whether 
wetlands that are not adjacent to navigable waters could also be 
regulated by the agencies. See 474 U.S. at 124 n.2 and 131 n.8. In 
SWANCC a few years later, however, the Supreme Court analyzed a similar 
question in the context of an abandoned sand and gravel pit located 
some distance from a traditional navigable water, with excavation 
trenches that ponded--some only seasonally--and served as habitat for 
migratory birds. 531 U.S. at 162-63. The Supreme Court rejected the 
government's stated rationale for asserting jurisdiction over such 
``nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters'' as outside the scope of 
CWA jurisdiction. Id. at 171-72. In doing so, the Supreme Court noted 
that Riverside Bayview upheld ``jurisdiction over wetlands that 
actually abutted on a navigable waterway'' because the wetlands were 
``inseparably bound up with the `waters' of the United States.'' Id. at 
167.\28\ As summarized by the SWANCC majority:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ At oral argument during Riverside Bayview, the attorney 
representing the United States characterized the wetland at issue as 
``in fact an adjacent wetland, adjacent--by adjacent, I mean it is 
immediately next to, abuts, adjoins, borders, whatever other 
adjective you might want to use, navigable waters of the United 
States.'' Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (No. 84-701).

    It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 
``navigable waters'' that informed our reading of the CWA in 
Riverside Bayview Homes. Indeed, we did not ``express any opinion'' 
on the ``question of authority of the Corps to regulate discharges 
of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of 
open water . . . .'' In order to rule for [the Corps] here, we would 
have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds 
that are not adjacent to open water. But we conclude that the text 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the statute will not allow this.

Id. at 167-68 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).
    The Court also rejected the argument that the use of the abandoned 
ponds by migratory birds fell within the power of Congress to regulate 
activities that in the aggregate have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, or that the CWA regulated the use of the ponds as 
a municipal landfill because such use was commercial in nature. Id. at 
173. Such arguments, the Court noted, raised ``significant 
constitutional questions.'' Id. ``Where an administrative 
interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' 
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that 
result.'' Id. at 172-73 (``Congress does not casually authorize 
administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of 
congressional authority.''). This is particularly true ``where the 
administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by 
permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.'' Id. 
at 173; see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 
65 (1989) (``[I]f Congress intends to alter the `usual constitutional 
balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make 
its intention to do so `unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute.' '' (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234, 242 (1985))); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) 
(``[The] plain statement rule . . . acknowledg[es] that the States 
retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, 
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.''). ``Rather 
than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state balance in this 
manner, Congress chose [in the CWA] to `recognize, preserve, and 
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States . . . to plan 
the development and use . . . of land and water resources . . . .'' 
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (quoting 33 U.S.C. 1251(b)). The Court found no 
clear statement from Congress that it had intended to permit federal 
encroachment on traditional State power and construed the CWA to avoid 
the significant constitutional questions related to the scope of 
federal authority authorized therein. Id.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The agencies note that during oral argument in SWANCC, 
Justice Kennedy stated, ``[T]his case, it seems to me, does point up 
the problem that petitioner's counsel raised quoting from page 1 of 
the blue brief, `it is the primary responsibility of the states to 
eliminate pollution and to plan development and use of land' . . . . 
It seems to me that this illustrates that the way in which the Corps 
has promulgated its regulation departs from the design of the 
statute.'' Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 
(2001) (No. 99-1178) (emphasis added). And several years later, 
during oral argument in Rapanos, after the U.S. Solicitor General 
stated, ``[W]hat Congress recognized in 1972 is that they had to 
regulate beyond traditional navigable waters,'' Justice Kennedy 
stated, ``But the Congress in 1972 also . . . said it's a statement 
of policy to reserve to the States the power and the responsibility 
to plan land use and water resources. And under your definition, I 
just see that we're giving no scope at all to that clear statement 
of the congressional policy.'' Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, 
Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 
(2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384). Although the agencies do not give 
independent weight to these statements at oral argument, the 
statements are consistent with the agencies' interpretation of the 
CWA and applicable Supreme Court decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Historically, the Federal government has interpreted and applied 
the SWANCC decision more narrowly, focusing on the specific holding in 
the case as rejecting federal jurisdiction over the isolated ponds and 
mudflats at issue in that case based on their use by migratory birds. 
By contrast, members of the regulated community, certain States and 
other interested stakeholders have

[[Page 22265]]

argued that SWANCC stands for a broader proposition based on key 
federalism and separation of powers principles.\30\ In the preamble to 
the proposed rule, the agencies solicited comment as to the proper 
scope and interpretation of SWANCC. 84 FR 4165. Some commenters argued 
that the SWANCC decision should be interpreted narrowly to apply only 
to the facts presented in that case; other commenters argued that the 
agencies should apply the reasoning of the SWANCC decision broadly, in 
a manner similar to how the agencies had previously interpreted the 
reasoning of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Rapanos to extend 
beyond wetlands to tributaries and other waters, for example. The 
agencies agree with commenters that the interpretation and 
implementation of these Supreme Court decisions within agency 
regulatory programs should be consistent, and that the reasoning in the 
SWANCC decision stands for key principles related to federalism and the 
balancing of the traditional power of States to regulate land and water 
resources within their borders with the need for national water quality 
regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ The agencies also recognize that Justice Stevens, writing 
for himself and three other Justices in dissent in SWANCC, 
interpreted the SWANCC majority opinion to apply beyond the 
Migratory Bird Rule and the specific ponds at issue in SWANCC. His 
dissent stated that the decision ``invalidates the 1986 migratory 
bird regulation as well as the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over 
all waters except for actually navigable waters, their tributaries, 
and wetlands adjacent to each.'' 531 U.S. at 176-77 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies recently repealed the 2015 Rule and explained in the 
preamble of that action that the 2015 Rule had improperly allowed for 
the application of the significant nexus standard in a manner that 
would result in the assertion of jurisdiction over waters that the 
Court deemed non-jurisdictional in SWANCC. 84 FR 56626-27. By allowing 
federal jurisdiction to reach certain isolated ponds, such as those at 
issue in SWANCC, and certain physically remote wetlands that ``do not 
implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview,'' the 
agencies concluded that the 2015 Rule asserted federal control over 
some features that ``lack the necessary connection to covered waters . 
. . described as a `significant nexus' in SWANCC[.]'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. 
at 742 (Scalia, J., plurality); see also Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1817 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (``[T]he reach and systemic 
consequences of the Clean Water Act remain a cause for concern.'' 
(emphasis added)). This final rule, in contrast to the 2015 Rule, 
avoids pressing against the outer limits of the agencies' authority 
under the Commerce Clause and Supreme Court case law and recognizes the 
limiting principles articulated by the SWANCC decision. This final rule 
would not allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over waters similar to 
those at issue in SWANCC.
    Several years after SWANCC, the Supreme Court considered the 
concept of adjacency in consolidated cases arising out of the Sixth 
Circuit. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). In one 
case, the Corps had determined that wetlands on three separate sites 
were subject to CWA jurisdiction because they were adjacent to ditches 
or man-made drains that eventually connected to traditional navigable 
waters several miles away through other ditches, drains, creeks, and 
rivers. Id. at 719-20, 729. In another case, the Corps had asserted 
jurisdiction over a wetland separated from a man-made drainage ditch by 
a four-foot-wide man-made berm. Id. at 730. The ditch emptied into 
another ditch, which then connected to a creek, and eventually 
connected to Lake St. Clair,\31\ a traditional navigable water, 
approximately a mile from the parcel at issue. The berm was largely or 
entirely impermeable but may have permitted occasional overflow from 
the wetland to the ditch. Id. The Court, in a fractured opinion, 
vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit's decision upholding the Corps' 
asserted jurisdiction over the four wetlands at issue, with Justice 
Scalia writing for the plurality and Justice Kennedy concurring in the 
judgment but on alternative grounds. Id. at 757 (Scalia, J., 
plurality); id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Lake St. Clair is a Rivers and Harbors Act section 10 
water. See p. 7: https://www.lre.usace.army.mil/Portals/69/docs/regulatory/PDFs/GENSEC10.pdf. It is also described in Justice 
Kennedy's opinion in Rapanos as ``a 430-square mile lake located 
between Michigan and Canada that is popular with boating and fishing 
and produces some 48 percent of the sport fish caught in the Great 
Lakes[.]'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 764 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The plurality determined that CWA jurisdiction extended to only 
adjacent ``wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that 
are `waters of the United States' in their own right, so that there is 
no clear demarcation between `waters' and wetlands.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. 
at 742 (Scalia, J., plurality). The plurality then concluded that 
``establishing . . . wetlands . . . covered by the Act requires two 
findings: First, that the adjacent channel contains a `wate[r] of the 
United States,' (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected 
to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the 
wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it 
difficult to determine where the `water' ends and the `wetland' 
begins.'' Id. (alteration in original).
    In reaching the adjacency component of the two-part analysis, the 
plurality interpreted Riverside Bayview and the Court's subsequent 
SWANCC decision characterizing Riverside Bayview as authorizing 
jurisdiction over wetlands that physically abutted traditional 
navigable waters. Id. at 740-42. The plurality focused on the 
``inherent ambiguity'' described in Riverside Bayview in determining 
where on the continuum between open waters and dry land the scope of 
federal jurisdiction should end. Id. at 740. It was ``the inherent 
difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters,'' id. at 
741 n.10, according to the plurality, that prompted the Court in 
Riverside Bayview to defer to the Corps' inclusion of adjacent wetlands 
as ``waters'' subject to CWA jurisdiction based on proximity. Id. at 
741 (``When we characterized the holding of Riverside Bayview in 
SWANCC, we referred to the close connection between waters and the 
wetlands they gradually blend into: `It was the significant nexus 
between the wetlands and `navigable waters' that informed our reading 
of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.' ''); see also Riverside 
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134 (``For this reason, the landward limit of 
Federal jurisdiction under Section 404 must include any adjacent 
wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to 
other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are part of this 
aquatic system.'' (quoting 42 FR 37128 (July 19, 1977))). The plurality 
also noted that ``SWANCC rejected the notion that the ecological 
considerations upon which the Corps relied in Riverside Bayview . . . 
provided an independent basis for including entities like `wetlands' 
(or `ephemeral streams') within the phrase `the waters of the United 
States.' SWANCC found such ecological considerations irrelevant to the 
question whether physically isolated waters come within the Corps' 
jurisdiction.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 741-42 (emphasis in original).
    Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that 
adjacency requires a ``continuous surface connection'' to covered 
waters. Id. at 772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In 
reading the phrase ``continuous surface connection'' to mean a 
continuous ``surface-water connection,'' id. at 776 (emphasis

[[Page 22266]]

added), and interpreting the plurality's standard to include a 
``surface-water-connection requirement,'' id. at 774 (emphasis added), 
Justice Kennedy stated that ``when a surface-water connection is 
lacking, the plurality forecloses jurisdiction over wetlands that abut 
navigable-in-fact waters--even though such navigable waters were 
traditionally subject to federal authority.'' Id. at 776. He noted that 
the Riverside Bayview Court ``deemed it irrelevant whether `the 
moisture creating the wetlands . . . find[s] its source in the adjacent 
bodies of water.'' Id. at 772 (internal citations omitted); see also 
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134 (``[A]djacent wetlands may be 
defined as waters under the Act. This holds true even for wetlands that 
are not the result of flooding or permeation by water having its source 
in adjacent bodies of open water.'').
    The plurality did not directly address the precise distinction 
raised by Justice Kennedy regarding his interpretation of the 
plurality's ``continuous surface connection'' requirement to mean a 
continuous ``surface-water connection.'' The plurality did note in 
response, however, that the ``Riverside Bayview opinion required'' a 
``continuous physical connection,'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 751 n.13 
(Scalia, J., plurality) (emphasis added), and focused on evaluating 
adjacency between a ``water'' and a wetland ``in the sense of 
possessing a continuous surface connection that creates the boundary-
drawing problem we addressed in Riverside Bayview.'' Id. at 757. The 
plurality also noted that its standard includes a ``physical-connection 
requirement,'' not hydrological, between wetlands and covered waters. 
Id. at 751 n.13 (emphasis added). In other words, the plurality 
appeared to be more focused on the abutting nature rather than the 
source of water creating the wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview to 
describe the legal constructs applicable to adjacent wetlands. See id. 
at 747; see also Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary 
(1994) (defining ``abut'' to mean ``to border on'' or ``to touch at one 
end or side of something''). The plurality agreed with Justice Kennedy 
and the Riverside Bayview Court that ``[a]s long as the wetland is 
`adjacent' to covered waters . . . its creation vel non by inundation 
is irrelevant.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 751 n.13 (Scalia, J., 
plurality).\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ In the Rapanos Guidance, the agencies interpreted the 
plurality's ``continuous surface connection'' as not requiring a 
continuous surface water connection. See, e.g., Rapanos Guidance at 
7 n.28 (``A continuous surface connection does not require surface 
water to be continuously present between the wetland and the 
tributary.''). The agencies continue to endorse that interpretation. 
In Rapanos, both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy recognized that 
a wetland can be adjacent to a jurisdictional water absent 
inundation from that water.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because wetlands with a physically remote hydrologic connection do 
not raise the same boundary-drawing concerns presented by actually 
abutting wetlands, the plurality determined that the ``inherent 
ambiguity in defining where water ends and abutting (`adjacent') 
wetlands begin'' upon which Riverside Bayview rests does not apply to 
such features. Id. at 742 (``Wetlands with only an intermittent, 
physically remote hydrologic connection to `waters of the United 
States' do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside 
Bayview, and thus lack the necessary connection to covered waters that 
we described as a `significant nexus' in SWANCC[.]''). The plurality 
supported this position by referring to the Court's treatment of 
certain isolated waters in SWANCC as non-jurisdictional. Rapanos, 547 
U.S. at 741-42; see also id. at 726 (``We held that `nonnavigable, 
isolated, intrastate waters--which, unlike the wetlands at issue in 
Riverside Bayview, did not `actually abu[t] on a navigable waterway,'--
were not included as `waters of the United States.' '') (internal 
citations omitted). It interpreted the reasoning of SWANCC to exclude 
isolated waters. The plurality also found ``no support for the 
inclusion of physically unconnected wetlands as covered `waters' '' 
based on Riverside Bayview's treatment of the Corps' definition of 
adjacent. Id. at 747; see also id. at 746 (``[T]he Corps' definition of 
`adjacent' . . . has been extended beyond reason . . . .'').
    Although ultimately concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy 
focused on the ``significant nexus'' between adjacent wetlands and 
traditional navigable waters as the basis for determining whether a 
wetland is a water subject to CWA jurisdiction. He quotes the SWANCC 
decision, which explains that ``[i]t was the significant nexus between 
the wetlands and `navigable waters' that informed our reading of the 
[Act] in Riverside Bayview Homes.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. But 
Justice Kennedy also interpreted the reasoning of SWANCC to exclude 
certain isolated waters. His opinion notes that: ``Because such a nexus 
[in that case] was lacking with respect to isolated ponds, the Court 
held that the plain text of the statute did not permit the Corps' 
action.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (internal citation omitted). It further states that the 
wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview were ``adjacent to [a] 
navigable-in-fact waterway[ ]'' while the ``ponds and mudflats'' 
considered in SWANCC ``were isolated in the sense of being unconnected 
to other waters covered by the Act.'' Id. at 765-66. ``Taken together, 
these cases establish that in some instances, as exemplified by 
Riverside Bayview, the connection between a nonnavigable water or 
wetland and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so close, 
that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a `navigable water' under 
the Act. In other instances, as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be 
little or no connection. Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under 
the Act is lacking.'' Id. at 767.
    According to Justice Kennedy, whereas the isolated ponds and 
mudflats in SWANCC lacked a ``significant nexus'' to navigable waters, 
it is the ``conclusive standard for jurisdiction'' based on ``a 
reasonable inference of ecological interconnection'' between adjacent 
wetlands and navigable-in-fact waters that allows for their categorical 
inclusion as ``waters of the United States.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 
(``[T]he assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands [adjacent to 
navigable-in-fact waters] is sustainable under the Act by showing 
adjacency alone.''). Justice Kennedy surmised that it may be that the 
same rationale ``without any inquiry beyond adjacency . . . could apply 
equally to wetlands adjacent to certain major tributaries.'' Id. He 
noted that the Corps could establish by regulation categories of 
tributaries based on volume of flow, proximity to navigable waters, or 
other relevant factors that ``are significant enough that wetlands 
adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform 
important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable 
waters.'' Id. at 780-81. However, ``[t]he Corps' existing standard for 
tributaries'' provided Justice Kennedy ``no such assurance'' to infer 
the categorical existence of a requisite nexus between waters 
traditionally understood as navigable and wetlands adjacent to 
nonnavigable tributaries. Id. at 781. That is because:

    [T]he breadth of the [tributary] standard--which seems to leave 
wide room for regulation of drains, ditches, and streams remote from 
any navigable-in-fact water and carrying only minor water volumes 
towards it--precludes its adoption as the determinative measure of 
whether adjacent wetlands are likely to play an important role in 
the integrity of an aquatic system comprising navigable waters as 
traditionally understood. Indeed, in many cases, wetlands

[[Page 22267]]

adjacent to tributaries covered by this standard might appear little 
more related to navigable-in-fact waters than were the isolated 
ponds held to fall beyond the Act's scope in SWANCC.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781-82.
    To avoid this outcome, Justice Kennedy stated that, absent 
development of a more specific regulation and categorical inclusion of 
wetlands adjacent to ``certain major'' or even ``minor'' tributaries as 
was established in Riverside Bayview, id. at 780-81, the Corps ``must 
establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis when it seeks to 
regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries. Given 
the potential overbreadth of the Corps' regulations, this showing is 
necessary to avoid unreasonable applications of the statute.'' Id. at 
782. Justice Kennedy stated that adjacent ``wetlands possess the 
requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase `navigable 
waters,' if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly 
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily 
understood as `navigable.' '' Id. at 780. ``Where an adequate nexus is 
established for a particular wetland, it may be permissible, as a 
matter of administrative convenience or necessity, to presume covered 
status for other comparable wetlands in the region.'' Id. at 782. In 
establishing this significant nexus test, Justice Kennedy relied, in 
part, on the overall objective of the CWA to ``restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.'' 
Id. at 779 (quoting 33 U.S.C. 1251(a)). However, Justice Kennedy also 
acknowledged that ``environmental concerns provide no reason to 
disregard limits in the statutory text.'' Id. at 778. With respect to 
wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries, Justice Kennedy 
therefore determined that ``mere adjacency . . . is insufficient[.] A 
more specific inquiry, based on the significant-nexus standard, is . . 
. necessary.'' Id. at 786. Justice Kennedy noted that under the Corps' 
interpretation at issue in the case, which did not require adjacent 
wetlands to possess a significant nexus with navigable waters, federal 
regulation would be permitted ``whenever wetlands lie alongside a ditch 
or drain, however remote or insubstantial, that eventually may flow 
into traditional navigable waters. The deference owed to the Corps' 
interpretation of the statute does not extend so far.'' Id. at 778-79.
    Since the Rapanos decision, the Federal government has adopted a 
broad interpretation of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, arguing 
that his ``significant nexus'' test provides an independent basis for 
establishing jurisdiction over certain waters of the United States. And 
rather than limiting the application of Justice Kennedy's opinion to 
the specific facts and wetlands at issue in that case, similar to their 
treatment of the SWANCC decision, the agencies previously have applied 
Justice Kennedy's reasoning more broadly to include, for example, the 
application of the significant nexus test to determining jurisdiction 
over tributaries, not just wetlands. Many courts have deferred to this 
position, and some courts rely exclusively on Justice Kennedy's 
significant nexus test while other courts have held that jurisdiction 
can be established under either the plurality or concurring opinions. 
The agencies' final rule, as explained in Section III, is informed in 
several key aspects by Justice Kennedy's opinion, but the agencies now 
appropriately recognize some of the limiting principles articulated 
within his concurring opinion. The agencies also recognize that the 
reasoning in SWANCC contains more instruction than the agencies have 
historically acknowledged.
    In summary, although the standards that the Rapanos plurality and 
Justice Kennedy established are not identical, and each standard 
excludes some waters and wetlands that the other standard does not, the 
standards contain substantial similarities. The plurality and Justice 
Kennedy agreed in principle that the determination must be made using a 
basic two-step approach that considers (1) the connection of the 
wetland to the tributary; and (2) the status of the tributary with 
respect to downstream traditional navigable waters. The plurality and 
Justice Kennedy also agreed that the connection between the wetland and 
the tributary must be close. The plurality referred to that connection 
as a ``continuous surface connection'' or ``continuous physical 
connection,'' as demonstrated in Riverside Bayview. Id. at 742, 751 
n.13. Justice Kennedy recognized that ``the connection between a 
nonnavigable water or wetland and a navigable water may be so close, or 
potentially so close, that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a 
`navigable water' under the Act.'' Id. at 767. The second part of their 
common analytical framework is addressed in the next section.
b. Tributaries
    As some commenters noted, the definition of ``tributary'' was not 
addressed in either Riverside Bayview or SWANCC, nor were tributaries 
the waters at issue in Rapanos. Yet while the focus of Rapanos was on 
whether the Corps could regulate wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable 
tributaries far removed from navigable-in-fact waters, the plurality 
and concurring opinions provide some guidance as to the scope of CWA 
coverage of tributaries to waters more traditionally understood as 
navigable.
    The plurality and Justice Kennedy both recognized the 
jurisdictional scope of the CWA is not restricted to traditional 
navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., plurality) 
(``[T]he Act's term `navigable waters' includes something more than 
traditional navigable waters.''); id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (``Congress intended to regulate at least some waters 
that are not navigable in the traditional sense.''). Both also agreed 
that federal authority under the Act has limits. See id. at 731-32 
(Scalia, J., plurality) (`` `[T]he waters of the United States' . . . 
cannot bear the expansive meaning that the Corps would give it.''); id. 
at 778-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (``The deference 
owed to the Corps' interpretation of the statute does not extend'' to 
``wetlands'' which ``lie alongside a ditch or drain, however remote or 
insubstantial, that eventually may flow into traditional navigable 
waters.'').
    With respect to tributaries specifically, both the plurality and 
Justice Kennedy focused in part on a tributary's contribution of flow 
to and connection with traditional navigable waters. The plurality 
would include as ``waters of the United States'' ``only relatively 
permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water'' and would define such 
``waters'' as including streams, rivers, oceans, lakes and other bodies 
of waters that form geographical features, noting that all such ``terms 
connote continuously present, fixed bodies of water.'' Rapanos, 547 
U.S. at 732-33, 739 (Scalia, J., plurality). The plurality would have 
also required relatively permanent waters to be connected to 
traditional navigable waters in order to be jurisdictional. See id. at 
742 (describing a `` `wate[r] of the United States' '' as ``i.e., a 
relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate 
navigable waters'') (emphasis added). The plurality would also have 
excluded ephemeral flows and related features, stating ``[n]one of 
these terms encompasses transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of 
water.'' Id. at 733; see also id. at 734 (``In applying the definition 
to `ephemeral streams,' . . .

[[Page 22268]]

the Corps has stretched the term `waters of the United States' beyond 
parody. The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize 
this `Land Is Waters' approach to federal jurisdiction.''). Justice 
Kennedy likely would exclude some streams considered jurisdictional 
under the plurality's opinion, but he may include some that would be 
excluded by the plurality. See id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (noting that under the plurality's test, ``[t]he merest 
trickle, if continuous, would count as a `water' subject to federal 
regulation, while torrents thundering at irregular intervals through 
otherwise dry channels would not'').
    Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy would have included some 
seasonal or intermittent streams as waters of the United States. 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732 n.5, 733 (Scalia, J., plurality); id. at 769 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The plurality noted, for 
example, that its reference to ``relatively permanent'' waters did 
``not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes that might dry up 
in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought,'' or ``seasonal 
rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of the year 
but no flow during dry months.'' Id. at 732 n.5 (emphasis in original). 
Neither the plurality nor Justice Kennedy, however, defined with 
precision where to draw the line. See, e.g., id. (Scalia, J., 
plurality) (``[W]e have no occasion in this litigation to decide 
exactly when the drying-up of a stream bed is continuous and frequent 
enough to disqualify the channel as a `wate[r] of the United States.' 
It suffices for present purposes that channels containing permanent 
flow are plainly within the definition, and that . . . streams whose 
flow is `[c]oming and going at intervals . . . [b]roken, fitful,' . . . 
or `existing only, or no longer than, a day; diurnal . . . short-
lived,' . . . are not.'') (internal citations omitted). The plurality 
provided, however, that ``navigable waters'' must have ``at a bare 
minimum, the ordinary presence of water,'' id. at 734, and Justice 
Kennedy noted that the Corps can identify by regulation categories of 
tributaries based on ``their volume of flow (either annually or on 
average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant 
considerations'' that ``are significant enough that wetlands adjacent 
to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important 
functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable waters,'' id. 
at 780-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
    Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy also agreed that the Corps' 
existing treatment of tributaries raised significant jurisdictional 
concerns. For example, the plurality was concerned about the Corps' 
broad interpretation of tributaries. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738 
(Scalia, J., plurality) (``Even if the term `the waters of the United 
States' were ambiguous as applied to channels that sometimes host 
ephemeral flows of water (which it is not), we would expect a clearer 
statement from Congress to authorize an agency theory of jurisdiction 
that presses the envelope of constitutional validity.''). And Justice 
Kennedy objected to the categorical assertion of jurisdiction over 
wetlands adjacent to waters deemed tributaries under the Corps' then-
existing standard, ``which seems to leave wide room for regulation of 
drains, ditches, and streams remote from any navigable-in-fact water 
and carrying only minor water volumes towards it.'' Id. at 781 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 781-82 
(``[I]n many cases wetlands adjacent to tributaries covered by this 
standard might appear little more related to navigable-in-fact waters 
than were the isolated ponds held to fall beyond the Act's scope in 
SWANCC.'').
    Beyond tributaries, the plurality and Justice Kennedy also offered 
some insight regarding CWA jurisdiction with respect to other 
relatively permanent bodies of water, such as lakes and ponds, and 
their connection to traditional navigable waters. The plurality 
describes a ``water of the United States'' as ``a relatively permanent 
body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters[.]'' 
Id. at 742 (emphasis added). The plurality did not specify, however, 
what would constitute a sufficient connection between such relatively 
permanent waters and downstream traditional navigable waters. When 
considered in the context of Justice Scalia's entire opinion, the 
plurality signaled concern that certain types of connections are likely 
insufficient to maintain jurisdiction; for instance, by characterizing 
an ``expansive definition of `tributaries' '' as one that includes 
``dry arroyos connected to remote waters through the flow of 
groundwater over `centuries,' '' id. at 725-26 (internal citations 
omitted), and describing potential federal control over ``irrigation 
ditches and drains that intermittently connect to covered waters'' as 
``sweeping.'' Id. at 726-27. In addition to ``tributaries,'' the 
plurality noted that the Corps and lower courts have ``define[d] 
`adjacent' wetlands broadly'' to include wetlands ``hydrologically 
connected'' ``to covered waters'' ``through directional sheet flow 
during storm events,'' and wetlands ``connected to the navigable water 
by flooding, on average, once every 100 years[.]'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
728 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Justice Kennedy noted 
that ``in some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the 
connection between a nonnavigable water . . . and a navigable water may 
be so close, or potentially so close, that the Corps may deem the water 
. . . a `navigable water' under the Act. In other instances, as 
exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no connection.'' Id. at. 
767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy also 
stated that ``mere hydrologic connection should not suffice in all 
cases; the connection may be too insubstantial for the hydrologic 
linkage to establish the required nexus with navigable waters as 
traditionally understood.'' Id. at 784-85.
    Some commenters agreed that aspects of the plurality's and Justice 
Kennedy's opinions share similarities regarding the limits of federal 
jurisdiction under the CWA, while other commenters disagreed that the 
opinions share important commonalities. These commenters asserted that 
the opinions have disparate rationales that cannot be reconciled. While 
the agencies acknowledge that the plurality and Justice Kennedy viewed 
the question of federal CWA jurisdiction differently, as discussed 
above, the agencies find that there are sufficient commonalities 
between these opinions to help instruct the agencies on where to draw 
the line between Federal and State waters.
3. Principles and Considerations
    As discussed in the previous sections, a few important principles 
emerge that can serve as the basis for the agencies' final regulatory 
definition. As a threshold matter, the power conferred on the agencies 
under the CWA to regulate the waters of the United States is grounded 
in Congress' commerce power over navigation. The agencies can choose to 
regulate beyond waters more traditionally understood as navigable, 
including some tributaries and relatively permanent bodies of water 
connected to those traditional navigable waters, but the agencies must 
provide a reasonable basis grounded in the language and structure of 
the Act for determining the extent of jurisdiction. The agencies can 
also choose to regulate wetlands adjacent to covered waters beyond 
those traditionally understood as navigable, if the wetlands are 
closely connected to those waters, such as in the transitional zone 
between open waters and dry land. The Supreme

[[Page 22269]]

Court's opinion in SWANCC, however, calls into question the agencies' 
authority to regulate nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters that 
lack a sufficient connection to traditional navigable waters. The 
decision counsels that the agencies should avoid regulatory 
interpretations of the CWA that raise constitutional questions 
regarding the scope of their statutory authority. Finally, the agencies 
can regulate certain waters by category, which could improve regulatory 
predictability and certainty and ease administrative burdens while 
still effectuating the purposes of the Act.
    In developing an appropriate regulatory framework for the final 
rule, the agencies recognize and respect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of States to regulate their land and water resources as 
reflected in CWA section 101(b). 33 U.S.C. 1251(b), see also id. at 
1370. The oft-quoted objective of the CWA to ``restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,'' 
id. at 1251(a), must be implemented in a manner consistent with 
Congress' policy directives to the agencies. The Supreme Court long ago 
recognized the distinction between federal waters traditionally 
understood as navigable and waters ``subject to the control of the 
States.'' The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564-65 (1870). Over 
a century later, the Supreme Court in SWANCC reaffirmed the State's 
``traditional and primary power over land and water use.'' SWANCC, 531 
U.S. at 174; accord Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738 (Scalia, J., plurality). 
While CWA section 101(b) does not specifically identify Tribes, the 
policy of preserving States' sovereign authority over land and water 
use is equally relevant to ensuring the primary authority of Tribes to 
address pollution and plan the development and use of tribal land and 
water resources. This final rule recognizes and preserves the autonomy 
of Tribes just as it recognizes and preserves the authority of States.
    Ensuring that States and Tribes retain authority over their land 
and water resources, reflecting the policy in section 101(b), helps 
carry out the overall objective of the CWA and ensures that the 
agencies are giving full effect and consideration to the entire 
structure and function of the Act. See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755-
56 (Scalia, J., plurality) (``[C]lean water is not the only purpose of 
the statute. So is the preservation of primary state responsibility for 
ordinary land-use decisions. 33 U.S.C. 1251(b).'') (emphasis in 
original). That includes the dozens of non-regulatory grant, research, 
nonpoint source, groundwater, and watershed planning programs that were 
intended by Congress to assist the States in controlling pollution in 
the nation's waters, not just its navigable waters. These non-
regulatory sections of the CWA reveal Congress' intent to restore and 
maintain the integrity of the nation's waters using federal assistance 
to support State, tribal, and local partnerships to control pollution 
of the nation's waters in addition to a federal regulatory prohibition 
on the discharge of pollutants to its navigable waters. See e.g., id. 
at 745 (``It is not clear that the state and local conservation efforts 
that the CWA explicitly calls for, see 33 U.S.C. 1251(b), are in any 
way inadequate for the goal of preservation.''). Regulating all of the 
nation's waters using the Act's federal regulatory mechanisms would 
call into question the need for the more holistic planning provisions 
of the Act and the State partnerships they entail. Therefore, by 
recognizing the distinctions between the nation's waters and its 
navigable waters and between the overall objective and goals of the CWA 
and the specific policy directives from Congress, the agencies can 
fully implement the entire structure of the Act while respecting the 
specific word choices of Congress. See, e.g., Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146; 
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 544.
    Some commenters agreed with the interpretation that the CWA 
establishes a comprehensive scheme to achieve the Act's objective 
through a combination of non-regulatory programs and grants for all of 
the nation's waters, and a more targeted federal permitting program for 
discharges of pollutants to the subset of the nation's waters 
identified as waters of the United States. Other commenters expressed 
concern that the proposed rule would not further the CWA's objective to 
``restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation's waters,'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), because fewer waters would 
be jurisdictional under the proposal than were regulated under the 2015 
Rule or the pre-2015 regulatory regime. The agencies disagree with 
these commenters. The agencies are mindful that ``no legislation 
pursues its purposes at all costs,'' Rodriguez v. United States, 480 
U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987), including the CWA. The CWA's objective must be 
balanced with the policy of Congress to preserve the primary State 
responsibility for ordinary land-use decisions. The purpose of this 
rulemaking is to establish the boundary between regulated ``waters of 
the United States'' and the waters subject solely to State and tribal 
authority. The CWA's longstanding regulatory permitting programs, 
coupled with the controls that States, Tribes, and local entities 
choose to exercise over their land and water resources, will continue 
to address the discharge of pollutants into waters of the United 
States, and the CWA's non-regulatory measures will continue to address 
pollution of the nation's waters generally. These programs and measures 
collectively pursue the objective of restoring and maintaining the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters.
    Some commenters agreed with the statements in the preamble to the 
proposed rule that the CWA preserves a significant and primary role for 
the States in implementing various aspects of the CWA, reflecting an 
intent to balance the States' traditional powers to regulate land and 
water resources within their borders with the need for national water 
quality regulation. Other commenters stated that section 101(b) is 
primarily concerned with State implementation of water pollution 
control measures, not the jurisdictional reach of the Act, and that a 
lawful and protective definition of jurisdictional waters under the Act 
does not disturb or undermine the States' exercise of primary 
authority. Rather, they expressed concern that the rule would harm the 
States in exercising their authority as envisioned by section 101(b) 
by, for example, increasing the financial and administrative burden on 
States to protect their waters.
    The agencies interpret the policy of Congress, set forth in section 
101(b), as relevant to all aspects of the implementation of the CWA, 
both implementing federally-established standards as well as the scope 
of waters subject to such standards and regulatory programs. When 
promulgating the 2015 Rule, the agencies endorsed a narrower view of 
Congress' policy in section 101(b) as limited to implementation of the 
Act's regulatory programs by States and State authority to impose 
conditions on ``waters of the United States'' that are more stringent 
than the conditions that the agencies impose under the Act. In the 
final Step One Rule, the agencies concluded that such a view was 
improperly narrow and failed to place sufficient weight on the policy 
of Congress in section 101(b). See 84 FR 56654. Having considered the 
public comments submitted in this rulemaking, the agencies remain of 
the view that nothing in section 101(b) suggests that it is limited to 
implementing federal regulatory programs or imposing conditions on

[[Page 22270]]

``waters of the United States'' that are more stringent than the 
conditions that the agencies impose under the Act. Indeed, the 
overarching policy statement of 101(b) ``to recognize, preserve, and 
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, 
reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use . . . 
of land and water resources,'' was included in the Act in 1972; the 
additional 101(b) policy statement ``that the States . . . implement 
the permit programs under sections 402 and 404 of this Act'' was not 
added until the 1977 amendments. 91 Stat. 1567, 1575 Public Law 95-217 
(1977); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., plurality) 
(``Thus, the policy [to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution, to plan the development and use . . . of land and water 
resources] plainly referred to something beyond the subsequently added 
state administration program of 33 U.S.C. 1344(g)-(l).'') (citations 
omitted). The agencies acknowledge that States without comprehensive 
pre-existing programs that seek to regulate waters no longer 
jurisdictional under this final rule may incur new costs and 
administrative burdens, and they discuss those costs in the Economic 
Analysis for the final rule. Such obligations are inherent in the 
exercise of the States' authority that Congress embedded in the CWA. 
States are free to evaluate the most effective means of addressing 
their waters and may weigh the costs and benefits of doing so.
    The agencies also heard from Tribes that because the agencies 
generally implement CWA programs on tribal lands, the proposed rule 
would affect Tribes differently than it would affect most States. Some 
Tribes have received Treatment as a State status to administer CWA 
programs, and other Tribes have established tribal water programs under 
tribal law or have the authority to establish such tribal water 
programs. Other Tribes may currently lack the capacity to create a 
tribal water program, to administer a program, or to expand programs 
that currently exist, and may rely on the Federal government for 
enforcement of water quality violations. See Chapter III of the 
Resource and Programmatic Assessment (RPA) for the final rule. The 
final rule preserves tribal authority to choose whether or not to 
regulate waters that are not covered under the CWA.
    The agencies are also cognizant that the ``Clean Water Act imposes 
substantial criminal and civil penalties for discharging any pollutant 
into waters covered by the Act without a permit.'' Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1812; see also Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374-75 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (``[T]he combination of the uncertain reach of the Clean 
Water Act and the draconian penalties imposed for the sort of 
violations alleged in this case still leaves most property owners with 
little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA's tune.''). As the 
Chief Justice observed in Hawkes, ``[i]t is often difficult to 
determine whether a particular piece of property contains waters of the 
United States, but there are important consequences if it does.'' 136 
S. Ct. at 1812; see also id. at 1816-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (stating that ``the reach and systemic consequences of the 
Clean Water Act remain a cause for concern'' and ``continue[] to raise 
troubling questions regarding the Government's power to cast doubt on 
the full use and enjoyment of private property throughout the 
Nation''). Given the significant civil and criminal penalties 
associated with the CWA, the agencies seek to promote regulatory 
certainty and to provide fair and predictable notice of the limits of 
federal jurisdiction. A number of commenters expressed support for the 
emphasis on the importance of fair notice in the proposed rule and 
cited in support Justice Gorsuch's concurring opinion in Sessions v. 
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223-25 (2018) (characterizing fair notice as 
possibly the most fundamental of the customary protections provided by 
the Constitution's guarantee of due process, and stating that vague 
laws are an exercise of ``arbitrary power . . . leaving the people in 
the dark about what the law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts 
to make it up'').
    The agencies interpret their authority to include promulgation of a 
new regulatory definition of ``waters of the United States,'' as 
directed by Executive Order 13778, so long as the new definition is 
authorized under the law and based on a reasoned explanation. FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (``Fox''). A 
revised rulemaking based on a change in interpretation of statutory 
authorities is well within federal agencies' discretion. Nat'l Ass'n of 
Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Fox, 
556 U.S. at 514-15). Under this rule, the agencies do not view the 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' as conclusively 
determining which of the nation's waters warrant environmental 
protection and which do not; rather, the agencies interpret the 
definition as drawing the boundary between those waters subject to 
federal requirements under the CWA and those waters that States and 
Tribes are free to manage under their independent authorities. The 
agencies are establishing this line-drawing based primarily on their 
interpretation of their authority under the Constitution and the 
language, structure, and legislative history of the CWA, as articulated 
in decisions by the Supreme Court.
    Some commenters viewed the proposed rule as complicated and, 
because one of the agencies' goals in proposing a new definition was to 
provide simplicity and clarity, stated that the proposal failed to meet 
that goal and is therefore arbitrary and capricious. The agencies 
disagree with these commenters' view that the proposed rule would not 
have provided necessary clarity. Notwithstanding this disagreement, the 
agencies have made certain enhancements to the final rule that will 
further promote clarity and provide fair notice to the public. As a 
threshold matter, the agencies for the first time have streamlined the 
regulatory text to four simple categories of jurisdictional waters, 
provided clear exclusions for many water features that traditionally 
have not been regulated, and defined the operative terms used in the 
regulatory text. And while the categories of jurisdiction in the final 
rule must be applied to specific facts to determine jurisdiction, the 
final rule does not include a regulatory category of case-specific 
jurisdiction as the 2015 Rule did in paragraphs (a)(7) and (a)(8). As 
such, the agencies believe the final rule will be clearer than either 
the 2015 Rule or the pre-existing regulatory regime restored by the 
2019 Rule. However, clarity as an end in itself is not the primary or 
fundamental basis for the final rule.
    Section III of this notice describes in detail the fundamental 
bases for this rule as the text and structure of the CWA and the 
constitutional boundaries within which Congress enacted the CWA. The 
final rule is securely grounded in the text of the CWA and is supported 
by legislative history and Supreme Court case law. As to simplicity and 
clarity, the agencies acknowledge that field work may frequently be 
necessary to verify whether a feature is a water of the United States; 
however, replacing the multi-factored case-specific significant nexus 
analysis with categorically jurisdictional and categorically excluded 
waters in the final rule provides clarifying value for members of the 
regulated community. The application of a clear test for categorically 
covered and excluded

[[Page 22271]]

waters, as presented in this final rule, is inherently less complicated 
than a complex multi-factored significant nexus test that must be 
applied on a case-by-case basis to countless waters and wetlands across 
the nation.
    Some commenters stated that the agencies' desire to facilitate 
implementation of the regulatory definition does not override the 
agencies' legal obligations under the CWA, including fulfillment of the 
goals of the CWA. The agencies agree in principle. The agencies have 
determined that requiring surface water flow in a typical year from 
relatively permanent bodies of water to traditional navigable waters 
and wetlands adjacent to such waters as a core requirement of the rule 
is the most faithful way of interpreting the Federal government's CWA 
authority over a water. The agencies carefully considered the comments 
received on the proposal and have made certain revisions to the 
regulatory text that provide further clarity without sacrificing or 
undermining the fundamental legal and constitutional bases for the 
rule. A number of commenters stated that the proposed rule failed to 
incorporate scientific and ecological principles into the definition of 
``waters of the United States.'' The agencies disagree. While science 
informs the agencies' interpretation of the definition of ``waters of 
the United States,'' science cannot dictate where to draw the line 
between Federal and State or tribal waters, as those are legal 
distinctions that have been established within the overall framework 
and construct of the CWA. The definition of ``waters of the United 
States'' must be grounded in a legal analysis of the limits on CWA 
jurisdiction reflected in the statute and Supreme Court case law. The 
agencies are precluded from exceeding their authority under the CWA to 
achieve specific scientific, policy, or other outcomes. Within the 
legal limits of the CWA, the agencies have looked to scientific 
principles to inform implementation of the final rule as the agencies 
differentiate between waters of the United States and non-
jurisdictional waters and features. For example, and as discussed 
further in Section III.A.1, in requiring the use of a ``typical year'' 
scenario to assess the surface water connection between a particular 
water or wetland and a downstream water identified in paragraph (a)(1), 
(2), or (3) (generally referred to as ``paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
waters'' or ``a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water'' in this notice), 
the agencies recognize the influence of precipitation, 
evapotranspiration, and other climatic variables on the flow of surface 
water in a tributary and its contribution of flow to downstream waters 
and the hydrologic surface connection between a jurisdictional water 
and an adjacent wetland. In other words, the agencies will evaluate the 
flow regime of a stream and the connectedness of a wetland within the 
context of what is typical for that water or wetland to avoid making 
erroneous jurisdictional determinations at times that may be too wet or 
too dry to be considered ``normal.'' The agencies also looked to 
science to inform other aspects of the final rule; for example, in 
defining the terms ``perennial,'' ``intermittent,'' and ``ephemeral''; 
in establishing that wetlands separated from jurisdictional waters only 
by a natural berm, bank, dune, or similar natural feature are 
``inseparably bound up with'' and adjacent to those waters; and in 
accounting for the connectivity gradient \33\ in deciding how to apply 
key principles from the Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos 
decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ As part of the 2015 Rule, EPA's SAB stressed that ``the EPA 
should recognize that there is a gradient of connectivity.'' See 
Letter to Gina McCarthy. SAB Review of the Draft EPA Report 
Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review 
and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence at 3 (Oct. 17, 2014) (``SAB 
Review''). The SAB recommended that ``the interpretation of 
connectivity be revised to reflect a gradient approach that 
recognizes variation in the frequency, duration, magnitude, 
predictability, and consequences of physical, chemical, and 
biological connections.'' Id. at 2 (emphasis added); see also 
Connectivity Report at 1-18 (``Variation in the degree of 
connectivity is critical to the integrity and sustainability of 
downstream waters, and can be described in terms of the frequency, 
duration, magnitude, timing, and rate of change of fluxes to and 
biological exchanges with downstream waters. These descriptors 
characterize the range over which streams and wetlands vary and 
shift along connectivity gradients and the probable effects of 
different types (hydrologic, chemical, biological) and degrees of 
connectivity over time. . . . Ultimately, differences in the 
frequency, duration, magnitude, timing, and rate of change of 
physical, chemical, and biological connections describe different 
positions along the connectivity gradient and produce different 
types of downstream effects.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies consider the priorities they have outlined to be 
reasonable, especially in light of the long history of controversy and 
confusion over the definition of ``waters of the United States.'' In 
concurring with the Rapanos plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts 
stated that ``[g]iven the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but clearly 
limiting terms Congress employed in the Clean Water Act, the [agencies] 
would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in developing some notion 
of an outer bound to the reach of their authority'' under the CWA, and 
that the agencies' interpretations under the Act are ``afforded 
generous leeway by the courts.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original); see also id. (``Rather than 
refining its view of its authority in light of our decisions in SWANCC, 
. . . the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of 
the scope of its power. The upshot today is another defeat for the 
agency.''). In this rule, as described in detail in Section III, the 
agencies are reasonably interpreting the scope of their authority under 
the Act in a manner that is consistent with its text, structure, 
legislative history, and applicable Supreme Court guidance. This final 
rule presents a unifying legal theory for federal jurisdiction over 
those waters and wetlands that maintain a sufficient surface water 
connection to traditional navigable waters or the territorial seas.

F. Summary of Final Rule as Compared to the 1986 Regulations Recodified 
in the 2019 Rule and the 2015 Rule

    The agencies are finalizing a definition of ``waters of the United 
States'' that they consider to be superior to the 1986 regulations re-
codified in the 2019 Rule, as well as to the 2015 Rule. The agencies 
are revising previous regulatory definitions of this term to 
distinguish between waters that are ``waters of the United States'' 
subject to Federal regulation under the CWA and waters or features that 
are subject to exclusive State or tribal jurisdiction, consistent with 
the scope of jurisdiction authorized under the CWA and the direction in 
the Act to both ``restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation's waters,'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), and 
``recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States to . . . plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources 
. . . .'' Id. at 1251(b). The Supreme Court has recognized that new 
administrations may reconsider the policies of their predecessors so 
long as they provide a reasonable basis for the change in approach. 
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 682 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The 
agencies intend that the revised interpretation of the federal 
regulatory scope of the CWA will resolve longstanding confusion over 
broad and unclear definitions of ``waters of the United States.''
    This final rule is more consistent with the agencies' 
constitutional and statutory authority than the 2015 Rule,

[[Page 22272]]

for the reasons discussed in the preamble to the 2019 Rule as well as 
the rest of this section and Section III of this notice. The 2015 Rule 
did not implement the legal limits on the scope of the agencies' 
authority under the CWA as intended by Congress and as reflected in 
Supreme Court cases, including Justice Kennedy's articulation of the 
significant nexus test in Rapanos. In the 2019 Rule, the agencies 
concluded that in promulgating the 2015 Rule the agencies failed to 
adequately consider and accord due weight to the policy of the Congress 
in CWA section 101(b) to ``recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution'' and ``to plan the development and use . . . of land and 
water resources.'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(b). The 2015 Rule interpreted the CWA 
in a manner that pushed the envelope of the agencies' constitutional 
and statutory authority in the absence of a clear statement from 
Congress authorizing substantial encroachment upon traditional State 
land-use planning authority. See Georgia v. Wheeler, No. 2:15-cv-079, 
2019 WL 3949922, at *23 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2019) (finding the 2015 Rule 
``unlawful'' given its ``significant intrusion on traditional state 
authority'' without ``any clear or manifest statement to authorize 
intrusion into that traditional state power'').
    In addition, the agencies recognize that the 2015 Rule has been 
remanded by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
for failing to comply with the APA. That court found that the 2015 Rule 
suffered from several problems, including that the distance-based 
limitations in the 2015 Rule were not a logical outgrowth of the 
proposal in violation of the APA's public notice and comment 
requirements. See Texas v. EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497 (S.D. Tex. 2019). 
The court found this error ``significant'' because the specific 
distance-based limitations ``alter[ed] the jurisdictional scope of the 
Act.'' Id. at 504. Litigants challenging the 2015 Rule alleged other 
APA deficiencies, including the lack of record support for the 
distance-based limitations inserted into the final rule without 
adequate notice. Several commenters on the proposed repeal of the 2015 
Rule raised similar concerns, arguing that the 2015 Rule was arbitrary 
and capricious because of the lack of record support for those 
limitations. The agencies recognize that the Federal government, in 
prior briefs before the various district courts that heard challenges 
to the 2015 Rule, defended the procedural steps the agencies took to 
develop and support the 2015 Rule. Having considered the public 
comments and relevant litigation positions, and the decision of the 
Southern District of Texas on related arguments, the agencies concluded 
in the 2019 rulemaking that the administrative record for the 2015 Rule 
did not contain sufficient record support for the distance-based 
limitations that appeared for the first time in that final rule. This 
conclusion is further supported by similar findings of the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, which remanded the 
2015 Rule to the agencies in August 2019 after identifying substantive 
and procedural errors with respect to numerous provisions, including 
the rule's distance limitations. Georgia v. Wheeler, 2019 WL 3949922, 
at *12-32. By contrast, for the reasons discussed elsewhere in this 
section and in Section III of this notice, this final rule remains 
within the bounds of the agencies' authority under the Constitution and 
the CWA, is properly supported by the record in this rulemaking, and is 
a logical outgrowth of the NPRM.
    Finally, the agencies believe that this final rule will be clearer 
than the pre-existing regulatory regime restored by the regulatory text 
of the 2019 Rule and the prior implementation of that regime in 
response to adverse Supreme Court decisions and agency guidance. For 
the reasons discussed in the 2019 Rule preamble, that regulatory regime 
is preferable to the 2015 Rule; however, a clear, comprehensive 
regulation that encompasses the Supreme Court's interpretations is 
preferable to the pre-existing regulatory regime restored by the 2019 
Rule. The language of the 2019 Rule regulatory text leaves 
substantially more room for discretion and case-by-case variation than 
does this final rule, particularly paragraph (a)(3) in the 2019 Rule, 
which claims jurisdiction over waters that are used by interstate or 
foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes, with no reference 
to navigable waters. Following the Supreme Court's opinions on the 
definition of ``waters of the United States,'' particularly SWANCC and 
Rapanos, the 2019 Rule must be implemented taking into account the 
Court's holdings and agency guidance interpreting those cases. In the 
decade since the Rapanos decision, the agencies and the public have 
become familiar with this multi-layered interpretive approach, which is 
in part why the agencies finalized the 2019 Rule to maintain the pre-
existing regime during the process of developing and considering public 
comments on this final rule. The regulatory definition of ``waters of 
the United States'' set forth in this final rule reflects Supreme Court 
case law and clearly establishes the scope of jurisdictional waters 
under the CWA. It provides greater regulatory predictability than the 
regulatory regime restored by the 2019 Rule.
    In sum, as compared with both the 2015 Rule and the regulatory 
regime restored by the 2019 Rule, this final rule more appropriately 
reflects the scope of the agencies' authority under the statute and the 
Constitution; respects the vital role of the States and Tribes in 
managing their land and water resources; and addresses the need of the 
public for predictable, more easily implementable regulations that aim 
to accomplish the objective of the Act, ``to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.'' 
33 U.S.C. 1251(a).

G. Existing Guidance

    In several places in the preamble to the proposed rule, the 
agencies solicited comment on whether they should revoke the 2003 
SWANCC Guidance or the 2008 Rapanos Guidance if the agencies were to 
finalize the proposal. 84 FR 4165, 4167. These guidance documents were 
drafted to inform the agencies' implementation of the 1986 and 1988 
regulations, which the 2019 Rule recodified, in a manner consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decisions in SWANCC and Rapanos. Some 
commenters thought that the 2003 and 2008 guidance documents provided 
helpful information and assistance to the public in understanding how 
the agencies might implement a definition of ``waters of the United 
States.'' Other commenters thought that the documents should be 
rescinded to avoid confusion during implementation of this final rule, 
particularly because the agencies have totally restructured the 
regulatory definitions. The agencies considered these comments and 
conclude that, when this final rule becomes effective, these and other 
related agency guidance documents, memoranda, and materials will be 
rendered inoperative because they will no longer be necessary or 
material, and they may in fact create confusion as the agencies 
implement this final rule. The agencies can develop new guidance to 
facilitate implementation of this final rule should questions arise, if 
any, regarding the application of the rule to specific 
circumstances.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ To the extent that, as a result of litigation, the 1986 and 
1988 regulations, which the 2019 Rule recodified, remain or become 
legally effective after the effective date of this rule as a result 
of litigation, the agencies intend to use the guidance documents 
relevant to those regulations, including the 2003 SWANCC Guidance 
and 2008 Rapanos Guidance, if necessary to inform implementation of 
those regulations.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 22273]]

III. Definition of ``Waters of the United States''

    The following is a summary of the key elements and each substantive 
provision of this final rule. Each subsection describes what the 
agencies are finalizing, why the agencies are finalizing the regulatory 
text, and how the agencies plan to implement the final rule. To assist 
the reader, the longer subsections have internal headings.
    In this final rule the agencies interpret the term ``the waters'' 
in the phrase ``the waters of the United States'' to encompass 
relatively permanent flowing and standing waterbodies that are 
traditional navigable waters in their own right or that have a specific 
surface water connection to traditional navigable waters, as well as 
wetlands that abut or are otherwise inseparably bound up with such 
relatively permanent waters. As the plurality decision in Rapanos 
notes, the term ``the waters'' is most commonly understood to refer to 
``streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, 
rivers, lakes,'' or ``the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or 
floods, making up such streams or bodies.'' 547 U.S. at 732 (citing 
Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954)); see also 
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131 (characterizing ``waters of the 
United States'' as including ``rivers, streams, and other hydrographic 
features more conventionally identifiable as `waters' ''); see also 118 
Cong. Rec. 33699 (Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (referring 
to ``navigable waters'' as ``water bodies''). According to the Rapanos 
plurality, however, the ordinary meaning of the term ``waters'' does 
not include areas that are dry most of the year, and which may 
occasionally contain ``transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of 
water.'' 547 U.S. at 733.
    The agencies received considerable public comments on the scope of 
the proposed definition of ``waters of the United States.'' Some 
commenters stated that the proposed rule would include more waters and 
wetlands than appropriate under a strict reading of Justice Scalia's 
plurality opinion in Rapanos and is therefore inconsistent with 
Executive Order 13778. Some commenters agreed with the proposed rule, 
stating that it struck an appropriate balance of asserting jurisdiction 
over waters that should be regulated by the Federal government, 
provided clear direction for the regulated community, and respected 
State and tribal authority over their own land and water resources. 
Some commenters stated that the proposal failed to include ecologically 
important waters and wetlands and failed to give due weight to Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Rapanos. Other commenters stated that 
the proposed rule and supporting rationale were based exclusively on 
the CWA section 101(b) policy to ensure that States maintain primary 
authority over land and water resources and failed to give due weight 
to the objective in CWA section 101(a) to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters.
    The agencies disagree with commenters' suggestion that the 
Executive Order requires the agencies to rely exclusively on Justice 
Scalia's opinion in Rapanos. The Executive Order requires the agencies 
to consider that opinion, which is what the agencies have done here. 
The agencies also disagree with commenters' suggestion that the 
proposal failed to incorporate principles from Justice Kennedy's 
opinion, and further disagree with commenters' suggestion that the 
agencies failed to consider the objective of section 101(a) in 
determining where to draw the line of federal jurisdiction. However, 
the agencies considered these and other public comments, and have made 
modifications in the final rule to better incorporate common principles 
of the Rapanos plurality and concurring opinions, and to strike a 
careful balance between the clear directive from Congress to ensure 
that States maintain primary authority over land and water resources, 
and the importance of maintaining federal authority over those waters 
that Congress determined should be regulated by the Federal government 
under its Commerce Clause powers.
    The final definition of ``waters of the United States'' aligns with 
the intent of Congress to interpret the term ``navigable waters'' 
beyond just commercially navigable-in-fact waters. This definition 
recognizes Congress' intent ``to exercise its powers under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 
`navigable' under the classical understanding of that term,'' Riverside 
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133, but at the same time acknowledges that 
``[t]he grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, 
though broad, is not unlimited.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173. The 
definition also recognizes the constitutional underpinning of the CWA, 
which was Congress' exercise of ``its commerce power over navigation.'' 
Id. at 168 n.3.
    This final rule establishes categorical bright lines to improve 
clarity and predictability for regulators and the regulated community 
by defining ``waters of the United States'' to include the following 
four categories: (1) The territorial seas and traditional navigable 
waters; (2) tributaries of such waters; (3) certain lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and (4) wetlands adjacent to 
other jurisdictional waters (other than waters that are themselves 
wetlands). The final rule eliminates the case-specific application of 
the agencies' previous interpretation of Justice Kennedy's significant 
nexus test in the Rapanos Guidance, and instead establishes clear 
categories of jurisdictional waters that adhere to the basic principles 
articulated in the Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos decisions 
while respecting the overall structure and function of the CWA.

A. Key Terms and Concepts

    Each of the four categories of waters of the United States 
established by this final rule, as well as the waters that fall beyond 
CWA jurisdiction, is discussed in detail in Sections III.B through 
III.H below. Many of the operative terms used in the final rule are 
defined in paragraph (c), and their applicability is discussed at 
length throughout those subsections. This subsection summarizes a few 
key terms and concepts that help inform the overall implementation of 
the jurisdictional categories established by paragraph (a) and the non-
jurisdictional waters established by paragraph (b), and are highlighted 
here for ease of reference and additional clarity.
    One such term is ``typical year.'' As discussed above, the meaning 
of the phrase ``waters of the United States'' has been mired in 
confusion for decades. This is in part because courts, regulators, the 
regulated community, and members of the public have lacked clear 
guidance as to how far up the watershed federal jurisdiction extends, 
and what connection is required for waters to be considered part of the 
regulated tributary system to traditional navigable waters and the 
territorial seas. The last two Supreme Court cases on point--SWANCC and 
Rapanos--provided clear instruction to the agencies that their prior 
interpretations had exceeded their jurisdictional authority under the 
CWA. The phrase ``typical year'' as used in the final rule and 
throughout this notice is intended to provide a predictable framework 
in

[[Page 22274]]

which to establish federal jurisdiction over relatively permanent 
waters that contribute surface water flow to waters identified in 
paragraph (a)(1) (generally referred to as ``paragraph (a)(1) waters'' 
or ``a paragraph (a)(1) water'' in this notice), and wetlands adjacent 
to such waters. The term ``typical year'' is summarized in Section 
III.A.1 and is further discussed throughout the notice.
    The agencies are also defining the terms ``perennial,'' 
``intermittent,'' and ``ephemeral'' in the final rule, adding clarity 
and certainty for how these frequently used terms apply in the ``waters 
of the United States'' context. The agencies have used these terms to 
assess jurisdictional status under the CWA, but until this final rule 
have never defined them in the regulatory text. The terms have specific 
meaning in the scientific community, but when used in legal settings, 
common parlance often converges with scientific meaning, creating 
opportunities for misunderstanding. For example, while the Rapanos 
plurality stated that the term ``waters of the United States'' does not 
include ``ordinarily dry channels through which water occasionally or 
intermittently flows,'' 547 U.S. at 733 (emphasis added), it also 
stated the phrase does ``not necessarily exclude seasonal rivers, which 
contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow 
during dry months.''). Id. at 732 n.5 (emphasis in original). 
``Seasonal rivers''--which the plurality would not categorically 
exclude--are known among scientists as ``intermittent streams''--which 
the plurality stated it would exclude. The plurality also appears to 
confuse the scientific understanding of the terms `` `intermittent' and 
`ephemeral' streams,'' conflating them to mean ``streams whose flow is 
. . . `existing only, or no longer than, a day[.]' '' Id. Indeed, this 
description more accurately captures the hydrological definition of 
``ephemeral streams'' which only flow during or in immediate response 
to rainfall. By contrast, ``intermittent streams'' typically flow for a 
more continuous period like the ``seasonal rivers'' the plurality 
describes. Because the definition of ``tributary'' specifically uses 
and relies on the terms ``perennial'' and ``intermittent,'' but not 
``ephemeral,'' the agencies are clearly defining these terms in the 
final rule. These terms are summarized below in Section III.A.2 and are 
further discussed throughout the preamble.
    Another challenging issue that has confounded the meaning of 
``waters of the United States'' for years is what types of natural or 
artificial features potentially sever jurisdiction between the upstream 
and downstream portions of a waterway. For example, if the waters of a 
perennial headwater stream are diverted to another basin for 
consumptive use and the downstream reach runs dry for major portions of 
a year, or the flow of a stream disappears into the desert floor before 
reaching a traditional navigable water, questions are frequently raised 
regarding the jurisdictional status of those waters. Subsection III.A.3 
below discusses the ``breaks'' topic in detail and how the agencies 
have addressed the various artificial and natural features that either 
maintain or sever jurisdiction under the final rule.
1. Typical Year
    In this final rule, the agencies use the term ``typical year'' to 
help establish the surface water connection between a relatively 
permanent body of water and traditional navigable waters, and between 
certain wetlands and other jurisdictional waters, that is sufficient to 
warrant federal jurisdiction. ``Typical year'' is defined in the final 
rule to mean when precipitation and other climatic variables are within 
the normal periodic range (e.g., seasonally, annually) for the 
geographic area of the applicable aquatic resource based on a rolling 
thirty-year period. Under this final definition, a typical year would 
generally not include times of drought or extreme flooding. In other 
words, the purpose of the term is to ensure that flow characteristics 
are not assessed under conditions that are too wet or are too dry. As 
discussed in Section III.G.2, climatic conditions, including flow or 
flooding, that may occur under ``typical year'' conditions do not 
necessarily occur in every calendar year.
    The agencies proposed to use the term ``typical year'' to mean 
within the normal range of precipitation over a rolling thirty-year 
period for a particular geographic area; that is, during times when it 
is not too wet and not too dry. However, some commenters on the 
proposed rule expressed confusion about the proposed ``typical year'' 
definition, including how it is calculated and what timeframe it 
represents. Commenters also expressed concern that the proposed 
definition included only precipitation as a driver of streamflow 
classification. Other commenters supported the typical year concept as 
proposed. In response to these comments, the agencies have modified the 
definition of ``typical year'' to expressly include other climatic 
variables in addition to precipitation and additional description of 
the normal periodic range, signaling that such range need not be based 
on a calendar year. The agencies believe the revised definition more 
appropriately reflects what the agencies intended to measure, which is, 
simply put, the characteristics of a waterbody at times that are not 
too wet and not too dry.
    To determine whether water features are being assessed during 
normal precipitation conditions, the agencies currently use data from 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Global 
Historic Climatology Network, which integrates climate data from over 
20 sources. The agencies evaluate normal precipitation conditions based 
on the three 30-day periods preceding the observation date. For each 
period, a weighted condition value is assigned by determining whether 
the 30-day precipitation total falls within, above, or below the 70th 
and 30th percentiles for totals from the same date range over the 
preceding 30 years. The agencies make a determination of ``normal,'' 
``wetter than normal,'' or ``drier than normal'' based on the condition 
value sum. While the agencies will generally use this method to 
implement this final rule, the agencies also recognize there may be 
other accurate and reliable measurements of normal precipitation 
conditions and will make adjustments to the approach as is 
scientifically warranted. The agencies may also consider alternative 
methods that are developed and appropriately validated, including 
different statistical percentiles, evaluation periods, or weighting 
approaches for condition values.
    Some commenters on the proposed rule were concerned that a 30-year 
period may be too long or too short of a record, or that rolling 30-
year climate percentiles would be difficult to calculate. The agencies 
have concluded that a rolling 30-year period would account for 
variability to provide a reliable indicator of the climate in a given 
geographic area without being confounded by a year or two of unusual 
climate data. A standard timeframe is necessary to ensure consistent 
application across the country, and 30 years is the most common and 
recognized timeframe utilized in other government climatic data 
programs (e.g., NOAA's National Climatic Data Center climate normals, 
which are based on World Meteorological Organization requirements). 
Nearly a century ago, the International Meteorological Organization, 
now known as the World Metrological Organization, instructed member 
nations to calculate climate normals using 30-year periods, beginning 
with 1901 to 1930 (see https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/news/

[[Page 22275]]

defining-climate-normals-new-ways). Recognizing that precipitation and 
temperature change over time, the agencies have determined that a 
rolling 30-year record is necessary to ensure that changing conditions 
are captured by the calculation. The agencies have considered other 
alternative time periods and are maintaining the well-established 30-
year period.
    The agencies proposed that the geographic area be on a watershed-
scale basis to ensure specific climatic data are representative of the 
landscape in relation to the feature under consideration for meeting 
the ``tributary'' definition and sought comment on the appropriate 
watershed scale. Some commenters on the proposed rule suggested 
constraining precipitation data sources to the smallest practicable 
watershed scale (e.g., a USGS HUC-12 scale). However, other commenters 
noted that 30 years of data may not always be available at that scale, 
and other considerations such as distance or ecoregion are also 
important for identifying appropriate climatic data. In response to 
these comments, the agencies have determined that specifying a 
particular watershed size or Hydrologic Unit Code (HUC) could preclude 
the use of the best available data sources, but that watershed 
boundaries should be a consideration when selecting climate records. 
Other considerations should include data availability, topography, and 
distance of climatic data collection in relation to the aquatic 
resource location.
    The agencies recognize that precipitation data may not be the only 
appropriate indicator for determining ``typical year,'' as was noted by 
many commenters on the proposed rule. Although the agencies will 
generally use the methodology described in this notice for determining 
normal precipitation conditions, the agencies will consider and use the 
best available data and information, which provides the most accurate 
and reliable representative information for the aquatic resource in 
question, to determine ``typical year.'' For instance, determinations 
of ``typical year'' based on precipitation totals may conflict with 
other sources of information such as drought indices, which account for 
other hydrologic factors like evapotranspiration and water storage. The 
agencies currently use professional judgment and a weight of evidence 
approach as they consider precipitation normalcy along with other 
available data sources. These data sources include, but are not limited 
to, the Web-based Water-Budget Interactive Modeling Program (WebWIMP) 
for approximate dates of wet and dry seasons for any terrestrial 
location based on average monthly precipitation and estimated 
evapotranspiration (http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~wimp/); Climate 
Analysis for Wetlands Tables (known as WETS tables, or similar tools, 
as the WETS tables are currently in a fixed 30-year timeframe), which 
are provided by the NRCS National Water and Climate Center (https://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/climate/wets_doc.html) and were calculated from 
long-term (30-year) weather records gathered at National Weather 
Service meteorological stations; and drought indices, such as the 
Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) (Sprecher and Warne 2000), where 
time-series plots of PDSI values by month or year are available from 
the National Climatic Data Center (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/drought/historical-palmers/psi/201811-201910 or https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/monitoring_and_data/drought.shtml).
2. Perennial, Intermittent, and Ephemeral
    Though ``perennial,'' ``intermittent,'' and ``ephemeral'' are 
commonly used scientific terms, the agencies are including definitions 
of these terms in the final rule to ensure that the regulation is 
clear. In this final rule, the agencies define the term ``perennial'' 
to mean surface water flowing continuously year-round. The term 
``intermittent'' in the final rule means surface water flowing 
continuously during certain times of the year and more than in direct 
response to precipitation (e.g., seasonally when the groundwater table 
is elevated or when snowpack melts). The phrase ``certain times of the 
year'' is intended to include extended periods of predictable, 
continuous surface flow occurring in the same geographic feature year 
after year. Continuous surface water flow during certain times of the 
year may occur seasonally such as in the spring when evapotranspiration 
is low and the groundwater table is elevated. Under these conditions, 
the groundwater table intersects the channel bed and groundwater 
provides continuous baseflow for weeks or months at a time even when it 
is not raining or has not very recently rained. Melting snowpack can be 
the sole or primary source of perennial or intermittent flow in a 
tributary. The term ``snowpack'' is defined as ``layers of snow that 
accumulate over extended periods of time in certain geographic regions 
or at high elevation (e.g., in northern climes or mountainous 
regions).'' Perennial or intermittent flow in certain mountain streams, 
for example, may result primarily from melting snowpack, not from 
groundwater contributions to the channel. The term ``ephemeral'' in the 
final rule means surface water flowing or pooling only in direct 
response to precipitation, such as rain or snow fall. With these 
definitions, the agencies distinguish ephemeral flow resulting from a 
snow fall event from sustained intermittent flow resulting from melting 
snowpack that is continuous, such as for weeks or months at a time.
    Some commenters requested that the final rule require that 
groundwater must be the source for perennial and intermittent flow in 
tributaries. The agencies recognize that groundwater input is an 
element of most scientific definitions of perennial and intermittent 
flow,\35\ but have decided not to mandate groundwater input as part of 
the definition of ``perennial'' or ``intermittent'' in the final rule. 
As a threshold matter, the agencies believe that such an approach would 
too narrowly limit CWA jurisdiction over waters that provide continuous 
or intermittent and predictable flow to traditional navigable waters in 
a typical year. For example, many headwater streams in mountainous 
regions flow through channels incised in bedrock with no groundwater 
interface with the bed of the stream. These streams instead are fed by 
glacial or high elevation snowpack melt. The same scenario may also 
exist in northern climes, where spring flows could be fed almost 
exclusively through melting snowpack absent elevated groundwater 
tables. Mandating a groundwater interface and contribution of flow 
could also be challenging to implement, as identifying whether the 
channel bed intersects the groundwater table may be difficult to 
accomplish in the field, gathering the relevant data could be time 
consuming, and implementing a source water-based definition could 
require new tools and training of field staff and the regulated public. 
The requirement for a groundwater flow source could also render 
effluent-dependent streams non-jurisdictional. The agencies do not 
interpret the text or legislative history of the CWA or Supreme Court 
guidance to mandate groundwater input as a condition precedent for 
asserting jurisdiction over tributaries to traditional navigable 
waters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See, e.g., 82 FR 2006 (Jan. 6, 2017) (Corps nationwide 
permit program); National Research Council. 2002. Riparian Areas: 
Functions and Strategies for Management. Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10327.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters asked for clarification to better distinguish

[[Page 22276]]

between flow ``in direct response to precipitation'' versus ``more than 
in direct response to precipitation,'' as well as further clarification 
on the distinction between ephemeral and intermittent flow 
classifications in general. For example, they requested clarification 
on whether streams that flow continuously during a rainy season (e.g., 
monsoon-driven streams in the arid West) are considered intermittent. 
The use of the term ``direct'' by the agencies in the proposed rule and 
maintained in this final rule is intended to distinguish between flow 
solely caused by individual precipitation events (including multiple, 
individual back-to-back storms), and continuous flow resulting, for 
example, from weeks- or months-long accumulation of precipitation in 
the form of snowpack that melts slowly over time or an elevated 
groundwater table that provides baseflow to the channel bed.
    Ephemeral flow may occur simply because it is raining or has very 
recently rained or it has recently snowed and the snow has melted. For 
example, ephemeral flow could be the result of a small, brief storm 
event, one long storm event producing rainfall for several days without 
pause, or several back-to-back storms. Continuous flow occurring more 
than in direct response to precipitation could include ``seasonal'' 
flow, such as when snowpack melts or when groundwater is elevated and 
provides baseflow to the channel bed. Streamflow that occurs during the 
monsoon season in certain parts of the country (typically June through 
September in the arid West) may be ephemeral or intermittent, with the 
distinction made according to the definition of each term in the final 
rule. For example, a stream in the arid West is ephemeral if it flows 
only in direct response to rainfall, even if the flow may appear 
relatively continuous as a result of multiple, individual storms during 
the monsoon season. On the other hand, when monsoon floodwaters locally 
recharge the riparian aquifer through bank infiltration and supply 
sustained baseflow to streams in the arid West when it is not raining 
or has not recently rained, such streams meet the rule's definition of 
``intermittent'' if they flow seasonally, for example, or ``perennial'' 
if they flow continuously year-round.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See e.g., Baillie, M.N., J.F. Hogan, B. Ekwurzel, A.K. 
Wahi, and C.J. Eastoe. 2007. Quantifying water sources to a semiarid 
riparian ecosystem, San Pedro River, Arizona, J. Geophysical Res., 
112, GO3S02, doi: 10.1029/2006JG000263. Ballie et al. (2007) found 
that locally recharged monsoon floodwater is one of the dominant 
water sources in the main stem of the spatially intermittent San 
Pedro River in Arizona. The authors also define ``monsoon storms'' 
as ``short, intense rainstorms that generate significant amounts of 
flooding and ephemeral flow (i.e., flow in ephemeral channels on the 
basin floor) and represent, on average, the bulk of summer 
moisture.'' (Emphasis added). See also Connectivity Report at B-39 
(``Monsoon-generated, short-duration runoff dominates the San Pedro 
watershed. . . Most perennial and intermittent rivers in the 
Southwest are groundwater dependent, flowing primarily in a baseflow 
regime and supported by discharge from a connected regional or 
alluvial aquifer or both. . . . [P]art of the baseflow is often 
sustained or augmented by slow drainage of a shallow alluvial 
aquifer from past flooding.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters requested clarity on the specific geographic 
regions where ``snowpack'' as defined under the proposed rule would 
occur. Other commenters requested that the agencies clarify how melting 
snowpack is distinguished from melting snowfall and clearly articulate 
the amount of snow needed to meet the definition of ``snowpack,'' as 
well as provide clarity on what ``extended periods'' of time means. 
They also requested clarification on the sources of information (e.g., 
from NOAA, NRCS, or another source) that can be used to identify 
``snowpack.'' ``Extended periods of time'' refers to more than merely a 
single snowfall event or periodic events with repeated snowmelts after 
each occurrence, but rather recurring snow events which result in an 
accumulation of multiple layers of snow in certain geographic regions, 
which may include, for example, parts of North Dakota or Alaska, or at 
high elevation, to potentially include the Rocky, Sierra Nevada, or 
Cascade mountains. A foot of new snow fall on the high plains of 
southern Wyoming in May will typically melt quickly under the intense 
sun of subsequent days, while a foot of snow in northern Wisconsin in 
January will likely contribute to seasonal snowpack that may not melt 
until spring thaw. The first scenario is more likely to cause ephemeral 
flow, the second is more likely to cause intermittent flow. The 
agencies could consider any data sources that provide an accurate 
estimation of ``snowpack'' in identifying that feature. The agencies 
are not limiting the identification of snowpack to one data source, 
such as those provided by NOAA or NRCS, although those are reliable 
existing sources to find information on snowpack. The Bureau of 
Reclamation and several western States depend on accurate snow fall and 
accumulation data to project water availability for consumptive needs 
and the allocation of water rights. Analyzing the location and 
seasonality of snowpack is a common, well understood practice in other 
contexts and will not pose implementation challenges to the agencies 
under the final rule as they draw on the expertise of other Federal and 
State partners.
    In certain parts of the country and during certain times of the 
year, snowpack may have a more significant influence on flow 
classifications than rainfall. Sources of information on ``snowpack'' 
can be found in the NOAA national snow analyses maps (https://www.nohrsc.noaa.gov/nsa/), in NRCS sources (https://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/snow/), or by using hydrographs of subject 
locations as a potential guide to alert the regulated public and 
regulators as to which regions of the country have to consider snowpack 
scenarios. In these regions, for example, a hydrograph could indicate a 
large increase in discharge volume due to the late spring/early summer 
thaws of melting snowpack. These are indicators of a regular, 
predictable, seasonal occurrence of flow. The large water contribution 
source for those northern geographic regions which do not have 
significant elevation changes, but which do have a consistent, 
predictable snowfall that accumulates on the ground for extended 
periods of time, are covered in this rule's definition of ``snowpack'' 
in paragraph (c)(10), in addition to mountainous regions with snowpack.
3. Breaks
    Under the proposed rule, an artificial or natural ephemeral feature 
(e.g., an ordinarily dry channel only flowing during or in immediate 
response to precipitation) occurring in a typical year at any point 
along a tributary network would have severed jurisdiction upstream of 
the ``break'' because the waterbody would not convey surface water to a 
paragraph (a)(1) water year-round or continuously for extended periods 
of time. 84 FR 4173-74. To be jurisdictional, lakes and ponds that are 
not paragraph (a)(1) waters would have needed to maintain perennial or 
intermittent flow to a paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year or be 
flooded by a jurisdictional water in a typical year. Id. at 4182. In 
other words, to be jurisdictional, the proposed rule would have 
required tributaries and most lakes and ponds to maintain a perennial 
or intermittent surface water connection all the way to a downstream 
paragraph (a)(1) water. The agencies received public comments 
indicating that this approach could affect the jurisdictional status of 
many waters, particularly in the arid West; that it could inadvertently 
subject otherwise exempt water transfers to CWA section 402 permitting; 
and it could create

[[Page 22277]]

implementation challenges. The agencies received other comments 
supporting the proposed approach.
    As further discussed below, the final rule contains some important 
changes to address these concerns, which are intended to better 
incorporate common principles from the Rapanos plurality and concurring 
opinions, and to strike a better balance between the objective and 
policy in CWA sections 101(a) and 101(b), respectively. Changes made in 
the final rule, however, remain faithful to the overall text, 
structure, and legislative history of the CWA and the legal principles 
outlined in Section II.E. Many of the changes were designed to address 
questions and concerns regarding under what circumstances a natural or 
artificial feature severed upstream jurisdiction, as discussed in 
detail in this subsection and as further explained throughout Section 
III.
    The Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the question of 
whether a non-jurisdictional ephemeral break along or downstream of an 
otherwise jurisdictional tributary, lake, pond, or impoundment would 
sever jurisdiction of upstream waters. As described in Section II.E, 
Supreme Court precedent provides some insight regarding CWA 
jurisdiction of relatively permanent bodies of water, including 
tributaries, lakes, and ponds, and their connection to traditional 
navigable waters, but it does not provide comprehensive guidance. For 
example, the Rapanos plurality describes a ``water of the United 
States'' as ``a relatively permanent body of water connected to 
traditional interstate navigable waters[.]'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 
(emphasis added). Regarding the connection between a water in question 
and downstream navigable waters, Justice Kennedy noted that ``in some 
instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the connection between 
a nonnavigable water . . . and a navigable water may be so close, or 
potentially so close, that the Corps may deem the water . . . a 
`navigable water' under the Act. In other instances, as exemplified by 
SWANCC, there may be little or no connection.'' Id. at. 767. Justice 
Kennedy also stated that ``mere hydrologic connection should not 
suffice in all cases; the connection may be too insubstantial for the 
hydrologic linkage to establish the required nexus with navigable 
waters as traditionally understood.'' Id. at 784-85.
    Although the Rapanos plurality opinion did not specify what would 
constitute a sufficient connection between relatively permanent waters 
and downstream traditional navigable waters, it did signal types of 
connections that are likely insufficient to maintain jurisdiction when 
read in context with the principles articulated throughout the balance 
of the opinion. For instance, the plurality characterized an 
``expansive definition of `tributaries' '' as including ``dry arroyos 
connected to remote waters through the flow of groundwater over 
`centuries,' '' id. at 725-26 (internal citations omitted), and 
described federal control over ``irrigation ditches and drains that 
intermittently connect to covered waters'' as ``sweeping assertions of 
jurisdiction.'' Id. at 726-27. In addition to ``tributaries,'' the 
plurality noted with disapproval that the Corps and lower courts had 
``define[d] `adjacent' wetlands broadly'' to include wetlands 
``hydrologically connected'' ``to covered waters'' `` `through 
directional sheet flow during storm events,' '' and wetlands 
``connected to the navigable water by flooding, on average, once every 
100 years[.]'' Id. at 728. The agencies considered these observations 
in developing the final rule but recognize that the Supreme Court has 
not spoken directly to every aspect of the agencies' existing 
regulations or every fact pattern that may raise questions of federal 
jurisdiction. The final rule therefore is also based on the text, 
structure, and legislative history of the CWA, the reasoned policy 
choices of the executive branch agencies authorized by Congress to 
implement the Act, and the agencies' technical and scientific expertise 
administering the CWA over nearly five decades.
    The proposed rule, which would have severed jurisdiction upstream 
of any ephemeral feature, reflected a reasonable interpretation of the 
CWA and incorporated relevant Supreme Court guidance. However, upon 
further consideration, the agencies conclude that the proposed rule's 
treatment of ephemeral features would have severed jurisdiction for 
certain relatively permanent bodies of water that are regularly 
``connected to'' traditional navigable waters via channelized surface 
water flow, allowing such waters to connect and become 
indistinguishable when flowing. Some ephemeral reaches between upstream 
and downstream relatively permanent (i.e., perennial or intermittent) 
waters convey surface water from the upstream water to the downstream 
covered water during a typical year. These reaches allow upstream 
relatively permanent jurisdictional waters to have a surface water 
connection to downstream jurisdictional waters in a typical year when 
there is sufficient water in the system. In contrast, other ephemeral 
streams, including those at the very headwaters of a channel network, 
do not connect relatively permanent jurisdictional waters to downstream 
jurisdictional waters; rather, they are merely ``channels that 
periodically provide drainage for rainfall.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S at 739 
(Scalia, J. plurality). The agencies conclude in this final rule that 
certain ephemeral features between upstream relatively permanent 
jurisdictional waters and downstream jurisdictional waters do not sever 
jurisdiction upstream so long as such features satisfy the conditions 
described further below. Like the proposed treatment of ephemeral 
features, the final rule is based on an equally reasonable 
interpretation of the CWA and Supreme Court precedent, and 
appropriately balances the plurality and concurring opinions in Rapanos 
and the objective of the Act and the policy of Congress set forth in 
CWA sections 101(a) and 101(b).
    In the final rule, certain ephemeral features do not sever 
jurisdiction of an upstream relatively permanent jurisdictional water 
so long as they provide a surface water connection to a downstream 
jurisdictional water in a typical year. Specifically, the final rule 
provides that a tributary does not lose its jurisdictional status if it 
contributes surface water flow in a typical year to a downstream 
jurisdictional water through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface 
water feature, through a subterranean river, through a culvert, dam, 
tunnel, or similar artificial feature, or through a debris pile, 
boulder field, or similar natural feature. See paragraph (c)(12). The 
final rule applies the same basic principles to the category of lakes, 
ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters. See paragraph (c)(6). 
A lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water does not lose 
its jurisdictional status if it contributes surface water flow to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through artificial 
features such as culverts and spillways. The agencies conclude that 
such features do not necessarily sever jurisdiction of upstream waters. 
However, if an artificial feature does not allow for the contribution 
of surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical 
year, it severs jurisdiction upstream of the artificial feature. The 
final rule treats natural features such as debris piles and boulder 
fields the same way that it treats the artificial features described 
above.
    The changes made in the final rule address concerns raised by 
commenters about features that would sever the jurisdiction of upstream 
portions of the

[[Page 22278]]

tributary network, including relatively permanent upstream waters that 
contribute surface water flow to downstream waters when enough water is 
in the system. It also addresses concerns raised by water management 
interests that suggested the proposed rule could have inadvertently 
undermined the NPDES permitting exemption authorized by the EPA's Water 
Transfers Rule, 73 FR 33697 (June 13, 2008). That rule does not require 
NDPES permits for water transfers between waters of the United States 
because they do not result in the ``addition'' of a pollutant. Id. at 
33699. In many regions of the country, particularly the arid West, 
inter- and intra-basin water transfers may originate in perennial or 
intermittent waters that may be disconnected from downstream waters by 
ephemeral breaks. In many circumstances, those ephemeral breaks may be 
caused by water management systems, including through water transfers, 
water storage reservoirs, flood irrigation channels, and similar 
structures. Not all diversions will cause a downstream portion of an 
otherwise perennial or intermittent stream to become ephemeral in a 
typical year; however, the modifications made by the final rule to the 
categories of tributaries and of lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters help address the concerns raised by commenters 
regarding the potential impact of the proposed rule on longstanding 
water management practices in this country. The agencies are cognizant 
of the importance of water management in the States and the explicit 
policy directives of Congress to recognize the authority of States to 
allocate and manage water resources within their respective 
jurisdictions. See 33 U.S.C. 1251(g), 1370.
    Under the final rule, ephemeral features and other excluded 
artificial and natural features are not jurisdictional and do not 
become jurisdictional even if they episodically convey surface water 
from upstream relatively permanent jurisdictional waters to downstream 
jurisdictional waters in a typical year, and thereby help maintain the 
jurisdictional status of the upstream waters. This approach 
incorporates the plurality's requirement that jurisdictional waters be 
continuously present, fixed bodies of water and that dry channels, 
transitory puddles, and ephemeral flows be excluded from jurisdiction. 
547 U.S. at 733-34; see also id. at 731 (``[T]he CWA authorizes federal 
jurisdiction only over `waters.' 33 U. S. C. 1362(7).''). This approach 
also requires a regular and predictable surface water connection--one 
that occurs in a typical year--which addresses Justice Kennedy's 
concern that speculative and insubstantial connections may not be 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Id. at 784-86. The types of 
connections that maintain jurisdiction between relatively permanent 
bodies of water are described more fully below.
    The agencies conclude that tributaries, lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters that are relatively permanent 
flowing or standing waterbodies upstream of certain excluded features 
are jurisdictional so long as the non-jurisdictional feature maintains 
a channelized surface water connection to downstream jurisdictional 
waters in a typical year. Paragraph (b) of the final regulation 
identifies twelve categories of excluded features, but only those 
features that convey channelized surface flow between upstream 
relatively permanent waters and downstream jurisdictional waters in a 
typical year can maintain jurisdiction of the upstream waters. For 
example, non-jurisdictional ditches could be capable of conveying 
channelized surface water flow between upstream relatively permanent 
jurisdictional waters and downstream jurisdictional waters in a typical 
year. Similarly, a surface water connection may occur through an 
ephemeral channelized conveyance and may result in the mixing of 
upstream and downstream relatively permanent waters following 
sufficient precipitation, but in all cases such a connection must occur 
in a typical year.
    The final rule also provides that other types of artificial or 
natural features, such as dams or boulder fields, may maintain 
jurisdiction so long as they convey surface water flow from an upstream 
tributary, lake, pond or impoundment of a jurisdictional water to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year. The agencies have 
concluded that water flowing through features such as dams or boulder 
fields can sustain a regular and predictable surface connection between 
upstream and downstream waters and therefore can maintain jurisdiction 
between such waters.
    By contrast, diffuse stormwater runoff and directional sheet flow 
by their very nature do not convey channelized surface flow and do not 
provide regular and predictable surface water connections between 
upstream relatively permanent bodies of water and downstream 
jurisdictional waters. Unchannelized surface flow, such as diffuse 
runoff or overland sheet flow, lacks an adequate physical indicator of 
regular surface flow and can be ubiquitous across the landscape, 
occurring over parking lots and lawns, for example. As Justice Kennedy 
notes in Rapanos, ``mere hydrologic connection should not suffice in 
all cases[,]'' 547 U.S. at 784, and the agencies agree with the Rapanos 
plurality that ``[t]he plain language of the statute simply does not 
authorize [a] `Land is Waters' approach to federal jurisdiction.'' Id. 
at 734. The agencies ``must necessarily choose some point at which 
water ends and land begins[,]'' Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132, and 
conclude that diffuse runoff and overland sheet flow connections are 
``too insubstantial for the hydrologic linkage to establish the 
required nexus with navigable waters as traditionally understood.'' 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 784-85 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment). 
In this final rule, the agencies therefore conclude that surface water 
flowing as unchannelized runoff or sheet flow over land cannot sustain 
a regular or predictable surface water connection between upstream and 
downstream waters and therefore cannot maintain jurisdiction between 
such waters. By contrast, channelized ephemeral features may indicate 
that surface water predictably moves from upstream relatively permanent 
waters to downstream jurisdictional waters, such that they may be 
capable of providing a surface water connection sufficient to warrant 
federal regulation over the upstream water. As noted above, a non-
jurisdictional feature remains non-jurisdictional even if it provides a 
channelized surface water connection between jurisdictional waters in a 
typical year.
    Like diffuse overland flow, the agencies also conclude that 
relatively permanent bodies of water that are connected to downstream 
jurisdictional waters only via groundwater are not jurisdictional and 
are more appropriately regulated by the States and Tribes under their 
sovereign authorities. The agencies have long interpreted the CWA as 
not authorizing jurisdiction over groundwater and have historically 
excluded groundwater from the definition of ``waters of the United 
States.'' The agencies are retaining that longstanding principle in 
this final rule. See paragraph (b)(2). If groundwater is not 
jurisdictional, it also makes practical sense that surface water 
features connected only via groundwater likewise are not 
jurisdictional. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725-26 (Scalia, J., plurality) 
(identifying groundwater connections as an example of the expansive 
interpretation of

[[Page 22279]]

tributaries under the Act). The term ``navigable'' as used in the 
statute must be given some meaning, see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172, and 
regulating surface waters with no surface water connection to 
traditionally navigable waters stretches that meaning ``beyond 
parody.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734 (Scalia, J., plurality). There are, 
however, certain unique subsurface connections that could maintain 
jurisdiction as discussed below; the agencies recognize that there are 
some relatively permanent tributaries that are relocated below ground 
to allow reasonable development to occur.
    In urban areas, for example, it can be common for surface waters to 
be buried underground through an artificial tunnel system to facilitate 
urban development. See, e.g., Connectivity Report at 3-3. Examples 
include Jones Falls, which flows under Baltimore, Maryland, and 
daylights into the Baltimore's Inner Harbor; Park River which flows 
under Hartford, Connecticut, and daylights into the Connecticut River; 
and Mill Creek, a tributary of Lake Erie, which is diverted underground 
beneath downtown Erie, Pennsylvania, and daylights into Presque Isle 
Bay. These underground tunnels and similar channelized subsurface 
features do not become groundwater, even though they flow under the 
surface of the ground for a period of time. These features do not break 
the jurisdictional status of upstream tributaries subject to the 
conditions of paragraph (c)(12). In some cases where such channels 
never return to the surface or otherwise do not contribute surface 
water flow to a paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year, the upstream 
surface water features may not be jurisdictional under the final rule. 
In all cases, the underground or buried portion of a channel network is 
not jurisdictional under the final rule. By comparison, tributaries 
that are relocated through a ditch or similar artificial surface 
channel are jurisdictional under the final rule so long as they 
continue to meet the flow conditions of paragraph (c)(12), including 
through the relocated portion.
    In very limited circumstances, a tributary can naturally, 
temporarily flow underground as a channelized river or stream, 
maintaining the same or very nearly the same flow volume underground 
and at the downstream point where it returns to the surface. These 
natural systems are commonly referred to as subterranean rivers or 
streams and can occur as a result of unique geologic formations, such 
as sink holes and lava tubes. Examples include the Popo Agie River in 
Wyoming, which becomes subterranean and daylights about a quarter of a 
mile downstream; the Lost River in Indiana, which flows underground for 
eight miles from where it disappears, to where it rises at two places 
to flow aboveground again; and formations like the St. Marks and Santa 
Fe Rivers in Florida, which flow into large sinkholes and reappear a 
little over one-half mile and three miles downstream, respectively. The 
agencies do not consider subterranean rivers to be groundwater, even 
though they flow under the surface of the ground for what is generally 
a short period of time through subterranean natural channels. Although 
it has never been promulgated in regulatory text, the agencies have 
historically treated these subterranean flowing connections as not 
severing jurisdiction over the upstream surface channel, and the Corps 
has developed expertise in performing field verifications for these 
unique waters. The final rule does not change this longstanding 
practice and for the first time provides certainty and transparency 
regarding the agencies' approach for making jurisdictional 
determinations. The agencies have added the phrase ``subterranean 
river'' to paragraph (c)(12) to clarify that subterranean rivers, as 
compared to groundwater and other subsurface waters, may not break 
jurisdiction of upstream tributaries, including any jurisdictional 
lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters that contribute 
surface water flow through these tributaries, depending on the factual 
circumstances. These subterranean rivers are distinguished in this 
final rule from other surface waters that, for example, may disappear 
underground and never daylight or daylight as an aquifer-fed spring or 
headwater of another river.\37\ The final rule does not maintain 
jurisdiction upstream of these other surface waters that may disappear 
underground and become part of the aquifer because the aquifer holds 
groundwater. The agencies have concluded that groundwater connections 
are an insufficient basis to assert jurisdiction over otherwise 
disconnected waters. In all cases, the underground portions of all 
waters are not jurisdictional under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See Connectivity Report at A-1, defining ``aquifer'' as 
``[a] geologic formation (e.g., soil, rock, alluvium) with permeable 
materials partially or fully saturated with ground water that yields 
ground water to a well, spring, or stream.'' (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule also establishes that waters that do not contribute 
surface water to a downstream territorial sea or traditional navigable 
water in a typical year are not jurisdictional. These waters include 
completely losing streams (e.g., streams that experience a complete 
loss of surface water to a groundwater system) that do not reach 
traditional navigable waters in a typical year and waters that connect 
downstream only as a result of precipitation events that generally do 
not occur in a typical year (e.g., 10-, 25-, 50-, 100- or 500-year 
storms or floods). These waters do not provide a regular surface water 
connection to jurisdictional waters. Given that the term ``navigable'' 
must be given some effect, and that the Supreme Court has cautioned the 
agencies to avoid interpretations of the statute that raise significant 
constitutional questions, the agencies conclude that such waters are 
more properly regulated as land and water resources of the States and 
Tribes. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
    As described in detail in Section III.G, adjacent wetlands are 
subject to a different jurisdictional test than tributaries, lakes, 
ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters. According to the 
Rapanos plurality, for example, to be ``waters of the United States,'' 
a tributary, lake, pond, or impoundment must be ``a relatively 
permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable 
waters,'' 547 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., plurality); to be ``waters of 
the United States,'' a wetland must have ``a continuous surface 
connection'' to such relatively permanent waters, ``making it difficult 
to determine where the `water' ends and the `wetland begins.'' Id. The 
final rule defines ``adjacent wetlands'' to include all wetlands that 
abut--meaning to touch at least one point or side of--a territorial 
sea, traditional navigable water, tributary, lake, pond, or impoundment 
of a jurisdictional water. The final rule also includes other wetlands 
that are inseparably bound up with jurisdictional waters and relies on 
certain regular hydrologic surface connections to establish 
jurisdiction. For instance, the ``adjacent wetlands'' definition 
includes wetlands physically separated only by artificial structures 
such as dikes, or barriers, or divided by roads and similar structures 
so long as the structure allows for a direct hydrologic surface 
connection in a typical year: For example, through a culvert, flood or 
tide gate, pump, or similar feature. Jurisdiction of the wetland is 
severed when, in a typical year, an artificial feature does not allow 
for a direct hydrologic surface connection between the wetland and the 
jurisdictional water, or the wetland is not inundated by flooding from 
a territorial sea, traditional navigable

[[Page 22280]]

water, tributary, lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water. 
See 547 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., plurality) (such wetlands ``do not 
implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview,'' and thus 
do not have the ``necessary connection'' to jurisdictional waters that 
triggers CWA jurisdiction); see also id. at 747 (the plurality found 
``no support for the inclusion of physically unconnected wetlands as 
covered `waters' '').
    Wetlands are jurisdictional if they are inundated by flooding from 
a territorial sea, traditional navigable water, tributary, lake, pond, 
or impoundment of a jurisdictional water in a typical year. The 
agencies conclude that these wetlands are inseparably bound up with 
their adjacent jurisdictional waters and are therefore jurisdictional. 
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., plurality) (quoting Webster's 
New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954)) (recognizing floods as 
``making up such streams or bodies'' of water); id. at 740 (recognizing 
the principle that wetlands that adjoin other jurisdictional waters are 
part of those waters for purposes of CWA jurisdiction). The final rule 
likewise asserts jurisdiction over lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters that are inundated in a typical year by flooding 
from a territorial sea, traditional navigable water, tributary, or 
another lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water.
    The final rule also provides that wetlands separated from 
jurisdictional waters only by a natural berm, bank, dune, or other 
similar natural feature are adjacent wetlands. These natural features 
are indicators of a sufficient hydrologic surface connection between 
the jurisdictional water and the wetland, and the agencies conclude 
that wetlands that are separated from jurisdictional waters only by 
such features are inseparably bound up with the adjacent jurisdictional 
waters and are therefore ``part of those waters.'' Id.
    Physically remote isolated wetlands (i.e., wetlands that do not 
abut, are separated by more than a natural berm from, are not inundated 
by flooding in a typical year from, and do not have a direct hydrologic 
surface connection in a typical year to a jurisdictional non-wetland 
water) are not adjacent wetlands under the final rule. For example, 
impoundments that are formerly adjacent wetlands that are physically 
disconnected from other jurisdictional waters in a typical year are not 
jurisdictional under the final rule. Additionally, in keeping with the 
agencies' longstanding practice, the final rule maintains that wetlands 
can be jurisdictional only if they are adjacent to the territorial seas 
or a traditional navigable water, tributary, lake, pond or impoundment 
of a jurisdictional water. In 1986, the Corps defined ``waters of the 
United States'' as including ``wetlands adjacent to [other 
jurisdictional] waters (other than waters that are themselves 
adjacent),'' 51 FR 41250, meaning that wetlands obtain jurisdictional 
status under the CWA by virtue of their adjacency to traditional 
navigable waters, tributaries, and other actual waters, not by 
adjacency to other wetlands.\38\ In 2019, the agencies recodified this 
definition of ``waters of the United States.'' 84 FR 56626. Under this 
final rule, wetlands cannot be adjacent to other wetlands; they can 
only be adjacent to the territorial seas, a traditional navigable 
water, a tributary, or a lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional 
water. This holds true regardless of any hydrologic connection between 
a distinct wetland (i.e., a wetland delineated with boundaries distinct 
from those of an adjacent wetland) and an adjacent wetland when the 
distinct wetland is physically separated from the adjacent wetland by 
upland or other artificial or natural features. Because the agencies 
believe that the final rule's definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' is 
clear on the jurisdictional linchpin for adjacency (by tethering 
jurisdiction to paragraph (a)(1) through (3) waters), the agencies are 
not including the ``other than waters that are themselves adjacent'' 
provision from the 2019 Rule (and earlier versions) in this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ The agencies note that at oral argument in Rapanos, Chief 
Justice Roberts recognized this principle, stating that the 1986 
definition ``covers wetlands adjacent to waters other than waters 
that are themselves wetlands,'' and ``the Corps says we're not going 
to reach the wetland that is adjacent to another wetland.'' 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, 47, Rapanos v. United States and 
Carabell v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-
1384). The Chief Justice added that this ``suggests that even the 
Corps recognized that at some point you've got to say stop because 
logically any drop of water anywhere is going to have some sort of 
connection through drainage. And they're stopping there, and I 
wonder if we ought to take that same instinct that you see in [the 
wetlands definition] and apply it to your definition of tributary 
and say, at some point, the definition of tributary has to have an 
end. Otherwise, you're going to go and reach too far, beyond what 
Congress reasonably intended.'' Id. at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Territorial Seas and Traditional Navigable Waters

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    The agencies are making no substantive textual changes to the 
longstanding inclusion of traditional navigable waters and the 
territorial seas in the definition of ``waters of the United States.'' 
The agencies are finalizing this portion of the rule as proposed, with 
slight modifications discussed below. The final rule maintains these 
categories of ``waters of the United States'' but consolidates them 
into a single paragraph in the regulatory text.
    Many commenters supported the retention of the agencies' 
longstanding foundational category of CWA jurisdiction, unchanged from 
previous regulatory text. They stated that the category was well 
understood, and its application guided by a developed body of case law. 
Most commenters supported integrating territorial seas into a single 
category with traditional navigable waters, agreeing with the agencies 
that it helped streamline the regulatory text, but some requested 
clarifications to maintain the distinction between the two types of 
waters. Some commenters requested that the agencies modify the test for 
traditional navigable waters by clarifying that such waters must be 
used to ``transport commerce'' rather than simply being ``used'' for or 
susceptible to ``use'' in interstate or foreign commerce, reflecting 
the terminology used by Congress in section 404(g) of the CWA. 
Responding to the agencies' request for comment on Appendix D, several 
commenters requested that the agencies eliminate or modify Appendix D 
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional Determination Form 
Instructional Guidebook (hereinafter, ``Appendix D''),\39\ stating that 
Appendix D is confusing, overstates the agencies' authority under 
existing case law, and allows the agencies to regulate virtually any 
isolated water by misapplying the established judicial tests for 
navigability under the CWA. Other commenters suggested the agencies 
retain Appendix D as useful field guidance and to avoid

[[Page 22281]]

confusion associated with any changes in the agencies' approach to 
traditional navigable water determinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional Determination 
Form Instructional Guidebook, available at https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll11/id/2316. The agencies note that Appendix D is sometimes referred to as 
``Appendix D to the Rapanos Guidance'' and was inadvertently 
referred to as such in the preamble to the proposed rule. The 
appendix actually resides as an attachment to the Jurisdictional 
Determination Form Instructional Guidebook that was published in 
2007 concurrently with the 2007 Rapanos Guidance. The Rapanos 
Guidance was later undated in 2008, but Appendix D has remained 
unchanged since 2007. Appendix D notes (at page 1) that ``EPA and 
the Corps are providing this guidance on determining whether a water 
is a `traditional navigable water' for purposes of the Rapanos 
Guidance, the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the agencies' CWA 
implementing regulations.'' This sentence is what is often used to 
link the Rapanos Guidance to Appendix D, as the two were intended to 
operate in tandem, with other agency resources, to assist in guiding 
field implementation of CWA jurisdictional determinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies have considered all of the public comments received 
addressing these topics and are finalizing paragraph (a)(1) as 
proposed, with slight modifications to address questions regarding the 
inclusion of the territorial seas within a single category with 
traditional navigable waters. The agencies are not modifying the 
definition of ``traditional navigable waters'' as it has existed in 
regulatory text for decades. As discussed in Section II.G, when this 
final rule becomes effective, certain agency guidance documents, 
memoranda, and materials (e.g., the 2003 SWANCC Guidance and 2008 
Rapanos Guidance) will be rendered inoperative because they will no 
longer be necessary or material, and they may in fact create confusion 
as the agencies implement this final rule. However, because the 
agencies have not modified the definition of ``traditional navigable 
waters,'' the agencies are retaining Appendix D to help inform 
implementation of that provision of this final rule, as discussed 
further in Section III.B.2.
2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comment
    The final rule defines ``waters of the United States'' to encompass 
traditional navigable waters and the territorial seas. The agencies' 
existing definition of ``waters of the United States'' includes all 
waters that are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be 
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all 
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. See, e.g., 33 
CFR 328.3(a)(1). This paragraph of the 2019 Rule (and previous 
regulations) encompasses waters that are often referred to as waters 
more traditionally understood as navigable or ``traditional navigable 
waters.'' A separate paragraph of the 2019 Rule (and previous 
regulations) lists the territorial seas as jurisdictional. See 33 CFR 
328.3(a)(6). To streamline and simplify the definition of ``waters of 
the United States,'' the agencies are finalizing the rule as proposed 
to include both traditional navigable waters and the territorial seas 
into a single paragraph of jurisdictional waters. The final rule makes 
no other substantive changes to these historically regulated categories 
of waters.
    The agencies note that the term ``territorial seas'' is defined in 
CWA section 502(8), 33 U.S.C. 1362(8), as ``the belt of the seas 
measured from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the 
coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking 
the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of 
three miles.'' The territorial seas establish the seaward limit of 
``waters of the United States.'' The agencies did not propose including 
this definition in the rule because it is already defined by statute 
and are not including the definition or any further interpretation in 
the final rule.
    In this final rule, the agencies are streamlining the regulation so 
that the first category of jurisdictional waters includes both 
traditional navigable waters and the territorial seas. Most commenters 
on this topic agreed with the proposal to combine the territorial seas 
and traditional navigable waters into one paragraph of the regulation, 
stating that it would streamline and simplify the definition of 
``waters of the United States,'' and makes practical sense since the 
jurisdictional status of other categories of waters relies on their 
surface water connection to either a traditional navigable water or the 
territorial seas.
    In the proposed rule, the agencies included the territorial seas as 
a type of traditional navigable water because the agencies had not 
identified an instance in which a territorial sea would not also be 
considered traditionally navigable and thus proposed that the broader 
term should suffice. A few commenters expressed concern that the 
proposed rule implied that the definition of ``waters of the United 
States'' included only the portions of the territorial seas that are 
navigable and capable of use in interstate or foreign commerce. The 
agencies did not intend to exclude any portion of the territorial seas 
as the term is defined in CWA section 502(8), 33 U.S.C. 1362(8). To 
avoid any confusion, the agencies have made minor modifications to the 
proposed rule text to further clarify that this category of 
foundational waters includes both traditional navigable waters and the 
territorial seas. The final rule states that the category of ``waters 
of the United States'' defined in paragraph (a)(1) includes ``the 
territorial seas, and water which are currently used, or were used in 
the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign 
commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide.''
    The agencies have not changed their interpretation of traditional 
navigable waters in this final rule, and the agencies are retaining 
Appendix D to help inform implementation of this provision with 
additional clarification in this notice in response to comments. As 
discussed in Section II.E, the definition of navigable-in-fact waters 
originates with the Supreme Court's decision in The Daniel Ball, 77 
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). In that case, the Supreme Court stated:

    Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law 
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when 
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are 
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on 
water.

    Id. at 563. As explained by the Supreme Court in 2012, ``[t]he 
Daniel Ball formulation has been invoked in considering the 
navigability of waters for purposes of assessing federal regulatory 
authority under the Constitution, and the application of specific 
federal statutes, as to the waters and their beds.'' PPL Montana, LLC 
v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 592 (2012). ``With respect to the federal 
commerce power, the inquiry regarding navigation historically focused 
on interstate commerce.'' Id. at 593. The Supreme Court further 
explained that, ``of course, the commerce power extends beyond 
navigation'' and cautioned ``that the test for navigability is not 
applied the same way'' in all cases. Id. at 592-93; see also Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171 (1979) (``[A]ny reliance upon 
judicial precedent [in this area] must be predicated upon careful 
appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of navigability was 
invoked in a particular case.'' (internal quotation marks, citation 
omitted, and emphasis in original)). But generally, navigability for 
purposes of federal regulatory authority under the federal commerce 
power encompasses waters that were ``once navigable but are no 
longer,'' PPL Montana, 565 U.S.at 592 (citing Economy Light & Power Co. 
v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123-24 (1921)), ``waters that only 
recently have become navigable,'' id. (citing Philadelphia Co. v. 
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 634-35 (1912)), and waters that ``are not 
navigable and never have been but may become so by reasonable 
improvements,'' id. at 592-93 (citing United States v. Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940)). The agencies note that 
this summary articulated by the Supreme Court in 2012 generally 
reflects the basic structure of the longstanding jurisdictional test 
for ``traditional navigable waters'' retained in paragraph (a)(1) of 
the final rule.
    Many commenters expressed support for the agencies' decision to 
retain the existing regulatory text describing traditional navigable 
waters. These

[[Page 22282]]

commenters stated that the existing text is clear, concise, 
predictable, and well understood by the public. Other commenters 
expressed concern about implementation of the regulation and guidance 
and suggested modifications to the regulation. Some commenters 
suggested clarifying that traditional navigable waters must be used to 
``transport commerce,'' as that is the phrase Congress used to describe 
the waters over which the Corps retains permitting authority when 
States and Tribes assume CWA section 404 permitting. See 33 U.S.C. 
1344(g). As discussed in Section II.E, and consistent with a technical 
advisory committee report submitted to EPA as part of an effort to 
modernize the section 404(g) assumption process (see n.28), section 
404(g) refers to RHA section 10 waters. Some commenters recommended 
that the agencies adopt the RHA section 10 definition and the two-part 
legal test established by The Daniel Ball for ``navigable waters of the 
United States'' as the test for ``traditional navigable waters'' for 
purposes of implementing the term ``waters of the United States'' under 
the CWA. That test requires first that a water be navigable-in-fact, 
and second that commerce be transported across State or foreign lines 
on those waters. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
    The Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the precise meaning of 
the phrase ``traditional navigable waters'' as that term applies in the 
CWA context, but it has stated that the statutory ``term `navigable' 
has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its 
authority for enacting the CWA: Its traditional jurisdiction over 
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could 
reasonably be so made.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. In the agencies' 
view, the Supreme Court has therefore signaled an acceptance of the 
first prong of The Daniel Ball test. Whether the second prong applies 
in full to the administrative definition of ``traditional navigable 
waters'' is less clear, but the legislative history suggests that 
Congress had in mind a more expanded notion of interstate commerce when 
enacting the CWA, including overland links to commercial navigation on 
navigable-in-fact waters.\40\ As described in Section II.E, the Supreme 
Court has stated that nothing in the legislative history of the Act 
suggests ``that Congress intended to exert anything more than its 
commerce power over navigation.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 & n.3. The 
agencies therefore are not modifying the longstanding regulatory text 
for traditional navigable waters to specifically align it with the RHA 
test for jurisdiction, as some commenters suggested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See Section II.E for additional discussion of the complex 
legislative history on this topic, as well as the detailed 
discussion of the same in the Albrecht & Nickelsburg article cited 
in note 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies acknowledge that some commenters suggested that 
Appendix D as-applied in certain circumstances has led to confusion. 
For example, some commenters expressed concern that Appendix D could be 
read to support a conclusion that any water that can float a boat, even 
very shallow draft vessels like canoes and kayaks, is by definition 
``susceptible'' to use in interstate commerce and therefore may be 
deemed a traditional navigable water. The agencies believe that this 
interpretation is inconsistent with the cases summarized in Appendix D 
and sweeps too broadly. For example, whether a water is susceptible to 
use in interstate commerce requires more than simply being able to 
float a boat to establish jurisdiction over navigable-in-fact waters 
under paragraph (a)(1); it requires evidence of physical capacity for 
commercial navigation and that it was, is, or actually could be used 
for that purpose. See, e.g., Appendix D (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. 
430, 441-42 (1874); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 
(1926); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940)).
    Other commenters provided examples of traditional navigable water 
determinations about which the commenters asserted that the capacity to 
float a boat in a water that is near an interstate highway was deemed 
sufficient to make a traditional navigable water determination under 
the paragraph (a)(1) standard. This interpretation is inconsistent with 
the applicable case law, including the cases discussed in Appendix D. 
Simply driving across a State line and using a waterbody, or having the 
potential to use a waterbody, is similar to the theory of jurisdiction 
that the Supreme Court specifically rejected in SWANCC. One of the 
arguments raised in support of the ``Migratory Bird Rule'' for CWA 
jurisdiction was that individuals cross State lines and engage in 
commercial activity to hunt or observe migratory birds that use 
isolated waters as habitat. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166; id. at 195 & 
n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The SWANCC Court rejected this 
interpretation of CWA jurisdiction because it raised ``significant 
constitutional questions'' that would require the agencies to 
``evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.'' Id. at 173-74. The 
``substantial effects'' test is the most expansive of the three primary 
bases for exercising congressional authority under the Commerce Clause 
articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 558-59 (1995). This application of the ``substantial effects'' 
test to assert CWA jurisdiction over waters beyond those more 
traditionally understood as navigable was not intended by Appendix D 
and has been rejected by the SWANCC Court because it was inconsistent 
with Congress' intent to exercise its more traditional ``commerce power 
over navigation.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 & n.8. Thus, the legal 
principles summarized in Appendix D were not intended to endorse, and 
should not be interpreted as endorsing, the application of the 
``substantial effects'' test to CWA jurisdiction, or otherwise 
suggesting that the mere capacity to float a boat makes a waterbody 
susceptible to commercial navigation.
    The agencies intend to update their guidance materials, if and as 
necessary, as the agencies begin to implement the revised tests for 
jurisdiction established by the final rule, both initially and as the 
agencies gain field experience to address implementation questions that 
may arise. As part of that process, the agencies will continue to 
evaluate prior guidance on how to apply established case law principles 
to traditional navigable water determinations. The agencies will also 
implement field elevation procedures should difficult legal questions 
arise, including requiring such interpretations to be reviewed by 
senior legal staff at each of the agencies' respective headquarters. 
Implementation of this section of the traditional navigable waters 
provision of paragraph (a)(1) in the final rule will be case-specific, 
as it has always been. This case-specific analysis will include 
relevant portions of EPA and Corps regulations, prior determinations by 
the Corps and by the federal courts, and case law. Should the agencies 
determine that additional, more formal guidance on traditional 
navigable waters is warranted, the agencies will develop any such 
guidance in compliance with Executive Order 13891, and with any 
applicable public participation requirements.

C. Interstate Waters

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    Consistent with the proposal, this final rule removes interstate 
waters, including interstate wetlands, as a separate category of 
``waters of the

[[Page 22283]]

United States.'' The agencies are finalizing this aspect of the 
proposal to more closely align the regulatory definition with the 
constitutional and statutory authorities reflected in the CWA and 
judicial interpretations of the term ``navigable waters,'' while 
balancing the statute's objective to restore and maintain the integrity 
of the nation's waters and its policy directives to preserve and 
protect the rights and responsibilities of the States.
    Many commenters supported the removal of interstate waters and 
wetlands as an independent category of ``waters of the United States.'' 
Those commenters stated that such a category was not authorized by the 
CWA and that, as proposed by the agencies, waters must be connected to 
traditional navigable waters to be jurisdictional under the CWA. 
Commenters also stated that interstate waters and wetlands that 
actually fall within the scope of CWA jurisdiction would be covered by 
the other categories of waters as proposed. Other commenters opposed 
removing interstate waters as an independent jurisdictional category. 
Those commenters stated that any water that crosses a State line is by 
definition a ``water of the United States.'' The same is true, some 
commenters added, for waters that cross tribal boundaries. Additional 
commenters added that the proposed rule would arbitrarily narrow the 
scope of CWA jurisdiction over ecologically important waters and 
recommended that the agencies continue to regulate interstate waters. 
Other commenters suggested that the exclusion for ephemeral features, 
if finalized, would help balance the inclusion of interstate waters as 
a category.
    The agencies have considered this diverse range of opinions, and 
for the reasons discussed below, have concluded that the best 
interpretation of the CWA and its legislative history is to finalize 
the regulatory text as proposed, without a separate interstate waters 
category. Interstate waters and interstate wetlands remain subject to 
CWA jurisdiction under the final rule if they are waters identified in 
paragraph (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4) (generally referred to as 
``paragraph (a)(1) through (4) waters'' or ``a paragraph (a)(1) through 
(4) water'' in this notice).
2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comment
    The agencies have evaluated their earlier legal and policy 
rationales supporting the inclusion of interstate waters as a separate 
category of ``waters of the United States'' and comments on the 
proposed rule and are not including this category in the final rule. 
The agencies have concluded that the regulation of interstate waters as 
a standalone category is based on an overly broad reading of the 
original Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) of 1948 and lacks 
foundation in statutory text of the 1972 CWA amendments. The WPCA 
stated that the ``pollution of interstate waters in or adjacent to any 
State or States (whether the matter causing or contributing to such 
pollution is discharged directly into such waters or reaches such 
waters after discharge into a tributary of such waters), which 
endangers the health or welfare of persons in a State other than that 
in which the discharge originates, is hereby declared to be a public 
nuisance and subject to abatement as herein provided.'' WPCA of 1948, 
2(d)(1), (4), 62 Stat. 1155, 1156-57. The statute defined ``interstate 
waters'' as ``all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across, or 
form a part of, State boundaries.'' Id. at 10(e), 62 Stat. 1161.
    In 1961, Congress amended the statute to substitute the term 
``interstate or navigable waters'' for ``interstate waters'' in the 
statute's enforcement provision while making minor changes to the 
definition of ``interstate waters.'' See Public Law 87-88, 75 Stat. 208 
(1961). In 1965, Congress again amended the statute to require states 
to develop water quality standards for all ``interstate waters'' within 
their borders. See Public Law 89-234, 79 Stat. 908 (1965). In 1972, 
Congress amended the statute again and selected the term ``navigable 
waters'' as the operative term for the major regulatory programs 
established by the 1972 amendments, dropping the definition of 
``interstate waters'' from the statute. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1362(7) 
(defining ``navigable waters'' as ``waters of the United States''). In 
doing so, however, Congress allowed States to retain existing water 
quality standards for interstate waters developed under the pre-1972 
statutory program. See 33 U.S.C. 1313(a).
    The EPA promulgated its first regulatory definition for the term 
``waters of the United States'' in 1973. 38 FR 13528 (May 22, 1973). In 
that regulation, the EPA administratively determined that ``interstate 
waters'' should be a separate category of ``waters of the United 
States,'' distinct from the traditional navigable waters category, and 
until this final rule the agencies had retained it as a separate 
category.
    The agencies previously viewed navigable and interstate waters as 
having distinct and separate meanings because Congress in 1961 used 
both terms in the statute. The agencies explained their prior 
interpretation in part through the doctrine of congressional 
acquiescence, in that Congress was aware of the EPA's retention of 
``interstate waters'' as a separate category when amending the CWA in 
1977 (making no amendments to remove the agencies' regulatory inclusion 
of interstate waters), and therefore acquiesced to its inclusion as a 
separate category. The agencies have also historically relied on two 
Supreme Court cases--Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) 
and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)--addressing 
interstate water pollution to further support their prior 
interpretation. In the 1972 case, which was decided prior to the date 
of the 1972 CWA amendments, the Supreme Court referred to the two 
categories in the disjunctive, implying that the Court viewed the pre-
1972 statutory program as encompassing two separate categories. See 
Illinois, 406 U.S. at 102 (``it is federal, not state, law that in the 
end controls pollution of interstate or navigable waters'') (emphasis 
added). The 1981 case is described further below. The agencies also 
have referred to section 303(a) of the CWA as further evidence that 
Congress intended ``interstate waters'' to be retained as an 
independent category of jurisdictional waters because that provision 
authorized water quality standards for ``interstate waters'' developed 
following the 1965 amendments to remain in effect, subject to revision 
under the new statutory program. A more complete summary of the 
agencies' prior legal position with respect to interstate waters was 
included in a Technical Support Document prepared in support of the 
2015 Rule (``2015 Rule TSD'').\41\ The agencies now conclude that their 
prior interpretation is inconsistent with the text and structure of the 
CWA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ U.S. EPA and U.S. Department of the Army. Technical Support 
Document for the Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the 
United States (May 2015) (Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20869), 
available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20869.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When Congress enacted the 1972 CWA amendments, it selected the term 
``navigable waters'' to frame the scope of federal regulatory 
jurisdiction under the Act. Rather than interpreting those amendments 
as retaining ``interstate waters'' as a separate and distinct category 
of ``waters of the United States,'' the agencies now conclude that a 
more natural interpretation of the 1972 amendments is an express 
rejection of that independent category, as Congress had before it both 
options within the scope of the statute it was modifying. Congress 
specifically did not carry that term forward as the operative phrase 
for

[[Page 22284]]

federal jurisdiction. Under basic canons of statutory construction, the 
agencies begin with the presumption that Congress did so intentionally. 
See, e.g., Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (``When Congress acts 
to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real 
and substantial effect.'').
    Congressional acquiescence is a doctrine of limited application and 
was specifically rejected as a basis for expansive federal jurisdiction 
in SWANCC in the context of analyzing the Corps' 1977 regulations. 
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-71 (``Although we have recognized congressional 
acquiescence to administrative interpretations of a statute in some 
situations, we have done so with extreme care.''). The plurality 
opinion in Rapanos further elaborated, when also rejecting the notion 
that Congress acquiesced to the Corps' 1977 regulations, that 
``Congress takes no governmental action except by legislation. What the 
dissent refers to as `Congress' deliberate acquiescence' should more 
appropriately be called Congress's failure to express any opinion.'' 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., plurality). The plurality 
explained that we cannot know whether Congress' inaction resulted from 
their belief that the Corps' regulations were correct, or from other 
reasons, such as confidence that courts would correct excesses or 
political considerations. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 169-70, 178 n.5 
(``Absent such overwhelming evidence of acquiescence, we are loath to 
replace the plain text and original understanding of a statute with an 
amended agency interpretation.''). The agencies now conclude, 
consistent with the admonitions of SWANCC and the Rapanos plurality, 
that the doctrine of congressional acquiescence is not a sound basis to 
guide the agencies' decision regarding the scope of federal 
jurisdiction over certain waters in this final rule, particularly as it 
applies to interstate waters divorced from any notion of commercial 
navigability.
    The legislative history of the 1972 amendments, in fact, supports 
the agencies' conclusion that Congress did not consider interstate 
waters and navigable waters to be two separate and distinct categories, 
and instead referred to terms in the pre-1972 statutory regime 
conjunctively as ``interstate navigable waters.'' S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
at 2 (1971) (``Each State was required by the 1965 Act to develop 
standards for water quality within its boundaries. These standards were 
to be applied to all interstate navigable waters flowing through the 
State; intrastate waters were not included.'') (emphasis added); id. at 
4 (``The setting of water quality standards for interstate navigable 
waters . . . is the keystone of the present program for control of 
water pollution.'') (emphasis added); id. (``The States have first 
responsibility for enforcement of their standards. When approved by the 
[EPA], however, the standards for interstate navigable waters become 
Federal-State standards.'') (emphasis added). In fact, the legislative 
history suggests that Congress modified the text of the statute in 1972 
in part because the States had narrowly interpreted the phrase 
``interstate'' to apply only to interstate navigable waters and had 
failed to establish water quality standards for the intrastate 
tributaries to such waters. See, e.g., id. at 77 (``The control 
strategy of the Act extends to navigable waters . . . . Through a 
narrow interpretation of the definition of interstate waters the 
implementation [of the] 1965 Act was severely limited.''); 118 Cong. 
Rec. 10240 (1972) (the amendment ``expands the coverage of the law to 
intrastate, as well as interstate navigable waterways'') (emphasis 
added). In 1976, the Supreme Court shared the same view of the pre-1972 
statutory scheme: ``Before it was amended in 1972, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act employed ambient water quality standards 
specifying the acceptable levels of pollution in a State's interstate 
navigable waters as the primary mechanism in its program for the 
control of water pollution.'' EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 202 
(1976) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This history suggests that 
the section 303(a) provision relating to existing water quality 
standards for ``interstate waters'' was referring to ``interstate 
navigable waters,'' not interstate waters more broadly.
    Neither Supreme Court case previously relied on by the agencies and 
discussed in the 2015 Rule TSD addressed the specific question whether 
``interstate waters'' and ``navigable waters'' are separate and 
distinct categories of jurisdictional waters under the CWA. They 
instead addressed interstate water pollution generally, and the water 
at issue in those cases was Lake Michigan, an interstate navigable-in-
fact water. The 1981 decision, however, did recognize that the 1972 
amendments ``were viewed by Congress as a `total restructuring' and 
`complete rewriting' of the existing water pollution legislation 
considered in that case.'' Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317 (citing 
legislative history of the 1972 CWA amendments). This supports the 
agencies' conclusion that prior iterations of the statute, referring to 
both interstate waters and navigable waters, were replaced with a 
completely new program in 1972, not that certain aspects of that 
program continued through congressional acquiescence in a later 
regulatory determination. The final rule therefore eliminates 
``interstate waters'' as a separate category of ``waters of the United 
States.''
    By eliminating a separate category for interstate waters, the final 
rule adheres to the legal principles discussed in Section II.E by 
including within the definition of ``waters of the United States'' 
traditional navigable waters, the territorial seas, and waters subject 
to the ebb and flow of the tide; tributaries to such waters; certain 
lakes, ponds, and impoundments of otherwise jurisdictional waters; and 
wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional waters. Because the agencies' 
authority flows from Congress' use of the term ``navigable waters'' in 
the CWA, the agencies lack authority to regulate waters untethered from 
that term. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1972 CWA 
amendments ``signifies that Congress intended to exert anything more 
than its commerce power over navigation.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3.
    Therefore, those interstate waters that would satisfy the 
definitions in this final rule are jurisdictional; interstate waters 
without any surface water connection to traditional navigable waters or 
the territorial seas are not within the agencies' authority under the 
CWA and are more appropriately regulated by the States and Tribes under 
their sovereign authorities.
    The agencies' rationale is supported by the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Georgia's remand order. Georgia v. Wheeler, 
No. 2:15-cv-00079, 2019 WL 3949922 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2019). There, the 
court directly addressed the 2015 Rule's assertion of authority over 
all interstate waters, including nonnavigable interstate waters. Id. at 
*10-13. The court found that ``the inclusion of all interstate waters 
in the definition of `waters of the United States,' regardless of 
navigability, extends the Agencies' jurisdiction beyond the scope of 
the CWA because it reads the term navigability out of the CWA.'' Id. at 
*12. The court also found that, because the 2015 Rule would assert 
jurisdiction over tributaries, adjacent waters, and case-by-case waters 
based on their relationship to non-navigable isolated interstate 
waters, it would result in federal jurisdiction over even the most 
remote and isolated waters that the Supreme Court held in SWANCC are 
beyond the

[[Page 22285]]

reach of the CWA. Id. at *13. The agencies agree with the court's 
analysis and conclusion.
    This final rule marks a shift away from prior agency positions. The 
agencies received public comment that the proposal had failed to 
analyze potential impacts resulting from the removal of ``interstate 
waters'' as a separate category, but as noted in the preamble to the 
proposed rule, the agencies are not aware of any database that 
identifies the jurisdictional status of interstate waters based solely 
on the fact that they cross state lines, or any other resource that 
would identify these waters. The agencies therefore lack the ability to 
perform a comparative analysis with any precision. Some commenters 
provided examples of interstate waters that may lose jurisdictional 
status if the separate category is eliminated; however, the Corps' ORM2 
database does not contain any jurisdictional determinations based 
solely on a water's status as an interstate water. Since issuance of 
the Rapanos Guidance, the Corps has not tracked this category 
separately for approved jurisdictional determinations conducted under 
the Guidance in ORM2.
    The agencies requested comment on the rationales in favor of and 
opposed to a separate jurisdictional category for ``interstate 
waters.'' Some commenters supported the proposal to remove ``interstate 
waters'' as a separate category, noting that there is no statutory or 
constitutional basis to regulate interstate waters that would not 
otherwise be jurisdictional and suggesting that the agencies lacked the 
authority to include a separate ``interstate'' category in earlier 
versions of the regulations. Other commenters opposed the proposal, 
asserting that the text and structure of the CWA, legislative history, 
and prior court cases, including Justice Scalia's discussion in 
Rapanos, demonstrate that the CWA applies to interstate waters 
regardless of navigability. The agencies considered these comments and, 
for the reasons explained above, conclude that the final rule most 
closely aligns with the agencies' constitutional and statutory 
authorities reflected in the CWA and relevant judicial interpretations 
of the term ``navigable waters'' and the legislative history of the 
CWA, while balancing the statute's objective to restore and maintain 
the integrity of the nation's waters and its policy directives to 
preserve and protect the rights and responsibilities of the States.
    Some commenters stated that the agencies did not provide sufficient 
rationale for deviating from their prior analysis and interpretation, 
as provided in the 2015 Rule TSD. The agencies disagree, as the 
proposal clearly identified independent reasons questioning the 
validity of the agencies' prior interpretation. The agencies' 2015 Rule 
TSD, for example, included three primary arguments supporting the prior 
interpretation: First, the language, structure, and history of the CWA 
demonstrate that Congress intended to include interstate waters in 
addition to navigable waters; second, the Supreme Court decisions in 
Rapanos and SWANCC did not constrain CWA jurisdiction over isolated, 
nonnavigable, interstate waters; and third, Supreme Court precedent 
supports jurisdiction over interstate waters, regardless of 
navigability. These arguments are addressed in the proposal and in 
earlier sections of this notice, but the agencies provide additional 
detail to respond to comments received as follows.
    The 2015 Rule TSD analyzed two Supreme Court decisions to support 
its conclusion that interstate waters should be a separate category of 
jurisdiction under the CWA. The first decision was issued in 1972, just 
prior to the 1972 CWA amendments, and concluded that federal common law 
was appropriate to resolve a cross-border water pollution dispute among 
states where existing statutes did not address the dispute. Illinois, 
406 U.S. 91. The Court found that where ``no fixed rules'' govern 
cross-boundary pollution disputes, ``these will be equity suits in 
which the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely govern.'' 
Id. at 107-08.
    The second decision was issued in 1981, and it analyzed the effect 
of the 1972 amendments on a federal common law claim concerning the 
same cross-border water pollution dispute that was presented the 1972 
case. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304. In that case, the Court 
acknowledged the 1972 amendments and noted that ``[t]he establishment 
of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which 
certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, 
strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to 
improve on that program with federal common law.'' Id. at 319 (emphasis 
added).
    Contrary to the assertions in the 2015 Rule TSD, however, the Court 
did not conclude that the CWA occupies the field with regard to all 
interstate waters.\42\ Instead, the Court considered the facts of the 
case before it--whether NPDES permits issued by an authorized State in 
compliance with the CWA could be modified or augmented by federal 
common law claims brought by a downstream State. Focusing on 
respondents' claims that discharges from the facilities were causing a 
public nuisance, the Court observed that, ``the action of Congress in 
supplanting the federal common law is perhaps clearest when the 
question of effluent limitations for discharges from the two treatment 
plants is considered.'' City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 319-20. The 
Court identified the numerous provisions of the permits that addressed 
discharges and overflows from the facilities, and the State-initiated 
enforcement action contemplated by the CWA, and concluded that 
``[t]here is no `interstice' here to be filled by federal common law: 
Overflows are covered by the Act and have been addressed by the 
regulatory regime established by the Act. Although a Federal court may 
disagree with the regulatory approach taken by the agency . . . such 
disagreement alone is no basis for the creation of federal common 
law.'' Id. at 323.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See U.S. EPA and Department of the Army, Technical Support 
Document of the EPA-Army Clean Water Rule at 210 (May 20, 2015) 
(``2015 Rule TSD'') (Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20869) available 
at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20869. 
(``In City of Milwaukee, the Court found that the CWA was the 
`comprehensive regulatory program' that `occupied the field' (451 
U.S. 317) with regard to interstate water pollution, eliminating the 
basis for an independent common law of nuisance to address 
interstate water pollution.''). The 2015 Rule TSD also asserts that 
the Court ``expressly overruled'' its decision in Illinois; however, 
a more precise statement would be that the Court found no federal 
common law remedy available ``at least so far as concerns the claims 
of respondents'' because Congress occupied the field with a federal 
regulatory program that establishes effluent limits and other 
specific requirements that supersede the ``often vague and 
indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity 
jurisprudence.'' City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317 (emphasis 
added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Court also noted that in its 1972 decision, the Court was 
concerned that the downstream State ``did not have any forum in which 
to protect its interests unless federal common law were created,'' City 
of Milwaukee, 541 U.S. at 325, but that the NPDES permitting provisions 
of the 1972 amendments ``provided ample opportunity for a State 
affected by decisions of a neighboring State's permit-granting agency 
to seek redress.'' Id. at 325-26 (identifying the CWA requirement to 
provide notice to affected States and opportunity to comment and 
request public hearings, the Wisconsin law that provides the same, 
affected States' opportunity under the CWA to petition the EPA to 
object to a NPDES permit, and noting that respondents did not take 
advantage of these provisions). The case therefore presented a dispute 
between States concerning NPDES permits lawfully issued for discharges 
into an otherwise

[[Page 22286]]

navigable water--Lake Michigan. The Supreme Court did not consider 
disputes outside of the NPDES permit program or those concerning non-
navigable interstate waters, and the Court did not broadly conclude 
that the CWA occupies the field of all interstate water pollution.\43\ 
All it had before it was the CWA, and as discussed in Section II, 
Congress chose not to exercise its full powers under the Commerce 
Clause when enacting the 1972 amendments. Congress specifically 
recognized that there are other land and water resources that are more 
appropriately regulated by the States and Tribes under their sovereign 
authorities. Field preemption cannot extend beyond the field. Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) (``[e]very Act of Congress 
occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field 
before we can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of 
any power reserved to it by the Constitution''); see also Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 475 (1996); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724, 756 (1985)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ In a footnote, the 2015 Rule TSD identifies two other 
Supreme Court decisions and concludes that ``[n]othing in either 
decision limits the applicability of the CWA to interstate water 
pollution disputes involving navigable interstate waters or 
interstate waters connected to navigable waters.'' 2015 Rule TSD at 
211 n.16 (referencing International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 
(1987), and Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)). Similar to 
the facts of City of Milwaukee, both of these cases addressed 
disputes that arose in the CWA's NPDES permitting context for waters 
that would otherwise be jurisdictional--Lake Champlain and the 
Illinois River. In neither case was the Court asked to consider 
whether or how the CWA may apply to non-navigable interstate waters, 
and these cases do not provide useful context or precedent on that 
issue. The 2015 Rule TSD similarly concluded that neither SWANCC nor 
Rapanos addressed or limited CWA jurisdiction over non-navigable 
interstate waters. See Section II.E of this notice for the agencies' 
detailed analysis of the SWANCC and Rapanos decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies also requested comment on an alternative approach that 
would retain ``interstate waters'' as a separate category, reflecting 
longstanding agency practice, and whether the term ``interstate'' 
should be interpreted as crossing between States, between States and 
tribal lands, between States and/or tribal lands and foreign countries, 
or other formulations. Some commenters opposed this alternative 
approach, stating that the agencies lacked the authority to codify or 
implement it. Other commenters supported retaining ``interstate 
waters'' as a separate category and expressed concern that removing it 
would eliminate the EPA's role as a co-regulator in cross-boundary 
disputes over water quality.
    The CWA provides two opportunities for the EPA to mediate disputes 
among States: The section 401(a)(2) neighboring jurisdiction 
notification provisions for federally permitted projects that may 
discharge to navigable waters and the section 319(g) provisions 
allowing the EPA to convene an interstate management conference to 
address cross-boundary nonpoint pollution in navigable waters. In the 
past, these provisions have been invoked infrequently by States, and 
the agencies do not expect a significant increase in cross-boundary 
disputes as a result of this rulemaking. In addition, the EPA can 
address concerns of States whose waters may be affected by the issuance 
of a permit in another State through the permit objection process 
pursuant to CWA sections 402(b)(5), 402(d)(d), and 40 CFR 123.44(c)(2). 
As demonstrated in City of Milwaukee, if a cross-boundary dispute is 
one that is contemplated and addressed by the CWA, such as the 
sufficiency of effluent limits in a NPDES permit, the statute has 
occupied the field and federal common law does not provide a remedy. 
451 U.S. at 317. However, if a State NPDES permit or a section 401 
certification is not required, the EPA does not have a role within the 
CWA permitting framework to address cross-boundary disputes; similarly, 
if a water is not a ``water of the United States,'' then the EPA's 
conference convening authorities under section 319(g) would not apply. 
In addition, and as described in the Section II.B of this notice, the 
CWA provides the EPA with numerous other authorities to provide 
technical assistance to States and Tribes to facilitate the management 
of non-jurisdictional waters.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ In addition, the notion that categorical federal regulation 
of interstate waters is necessary to end water pollution disputes 
between States would call into the question the need for CWA section 
103 (``Interstate Cooperation and Uniform Laws''), 33 U.S.C. 1253, 
which establishes a framework for the Administrator to encourage 
cooperation between States for the prevention and control of 
pollution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the current framework, the remedies available for cross-
boundary water pollution disputes over non-jurisdictional waters 
depends upon the parties and the issues in the case. As an initial 
matter, many State programs regulate more waters than are covered by 
the federal definition of ``waters of the United States'' and may have 
similar notification provisions in place for States affected by a 
State-issued NPDES permit. See e.g., Wis. Stat. 281.33 (authorizing 
Wisconsin to issue NPDES permits for all waters of the State); Wis. 
Admin. Code. 203.03 (providing notice during the NPDES process to other 
agencies, including other States potentially affected by the 
discharge). This important fact supports the agencies' conclusion that 
all States protect their water resources under State law and many have 
the ability and expertise to do so in the absence of federal 
regulation, as discussed in more detail in the Resource and 
Programmatic Assessment for the final rule. As they do today, remedies 
for pollution disputes among States that do not implicate CWA sections 
319(g), 401, or 402 would likely derive from federal common law under 
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Illinois, 406 
U.S. at 98-99. Remedies for disputes between a State and a public or 
private party would likely derive from State or federal common law and 
be heard by State or Federal courts. See id. at 100, 107-08; 
International Paper, 479 U.S. at 497-500.

D. Tributaries

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    In this final rule, the agencies retain ``tributaries'' as a 
category of jurisdictional waters subject to CWA jurisdiction. The 
final rule defines ``tributary'' to mean a river, stream, or similar 
naturally occurring surface water channel that contributes surface 
water flow to the territorial seas or traditional navigable waters 
(paragraph (a)(1) waters) in a typical year either directly or through 
one or more tributaries (paragraph (a)(2) waters), lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters (paragraph (a)(3) waters), or 
adjacent wetlands (paragraph (a)(4) waters). A tributary must be 
perennial or intermittent in a typical year. The alteration or 
relocation of a tributary does not modify its jurisdictional status as 
long as it continues to satisfy the flow conditions of this definition. 
A tributary does not lose its jurisdictional status if it contributes 
surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical 
year through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface water feature, 
through a subterranean river, through a culvert, dam, tunnel, or 
similar artificial feature, or through a debris pile, boulder field, or 
similar natural feature.
    As discussed in greater detail in Section III.E, the term 
``tributary'' includes a ditch that either relocates a tributary, is 
constructed in a tributary, or is constructed in an adjacent wetland as 
long as the ditch satisfies the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' 
definition. A ditch can also be a traditional navigable water if it 
meets the

[[Page 22287]]

conditions of that category. The agencies are excluding all other 
ditches from the definition of ``waters of the United States,'' other 
than those identified in paragraph (a)(1) or (2) and ditches any 
portion of which are constructed in an adjacent wetland that lack 
perennial or intermittent flow (meaning they do not satisfy the 
``tributary'' definition in paragraph (c)(12)) but that develop 
wetlands in all or portions of the ditch that satisfy the ``adjacent 
wetlands'' definition in paragraph (c)(1). Excluded ditches may be 
subject to regulation under State or tribal law and could potentially 
be conveyances of discharges of pollutants from ``point sources'' 
subject to CWA permitting (see 33 U.S.C. 1362(14)) if they convey 
pollutants from a discharger to jurisdictional waters.
    Regardless of the name they are given locally (e.g., creek, bayou, 
branch, brook, run), or their size (e.g., discharge volume, width, 
depth, stream order), waters that meet the definition of ``tributary'' 
are jurisdictional under this final rule. Surface features that flow 
only in direct response to precipitation, such as ephemeral streams, 
swales, gullies and rills, are not tributaries. These features lack the 
required perennial or intermittent flow to satisfy the ``tributary'' 
definition and therefore are not jurisdictional. However, such features 
may convey surface water flow from an upstream jurisdictional water to 
a downstream jurisdictional water without severing jurisdiction of the 
tributary.
    The regulatory status of tributaries has evolved over the last 
several decades, resulting in confusion for the regulated community and 
regulators alike. Some commenters said that all channels on the 
landscape that convey water, regardless of flow regime, should be 
subject to CWA regulation, including both natural and artificial 
channels. Others asserted that Congress intended to regulate only 
traditional navigable waters, and navigable tributaries to those 
waters. Some would regulate all ditches, while others would exclude all 
ditches from CWA jurisdiction. Some stated that all ephemeral washes 
should be regulated, while others viewed ephemeral features as more 
like land that is wet after it rains. Some would extend jurisdiction to 
perennial rivers and streams and cut off jurisdiction for intermittent 
or seasonal waters. Others would regulate intermittent waters based on 
a minimum number of days of continuous flow, such as 30, 90, or 185. 
Even the Supreme Court has struggled with articulating clear principles 
governing which tributaries to traditional navigable waters should be 
subject to CWA jurisdiction, as evidenced by the fractured opinion in 
Rapanos. What is clear from that opinion, however, is that a majority 
of the Court believed the agencies' existing standard for tributaries 
at that time raised serious questions regarding the scope of the 
agencies' authority under the CWA. See Section II.E.2.
    The agencies proposed a definition for ``tributary'' that they 
believed respected their statutory and constitutional authorities, 
consistent with principles established in Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, 
and Rapanos. Many commenters agreed with the proposal, indicating that 
it balanced federal authority over the core waters targeted by Congress 
under the CWA with waters that are more appropriately regulated solely 
by the States and Tribes. Others argued that the proposed ``tributary'' 
definition regulated too broadly, preferring instead that the agencies 
restrict jurisdiction to perennial tributaries only. Others argued that 
the agencies failed to regulate ecologically important ephemeral 
reaches and cut off jurisdiction to headwater reaches that are 
important to the tributary network.
    The agencies have considered all comments received and have crafted 
a final regulatory definition of ``tributary'' designed to adhere to 
the legal principles articulated in this notice and that provides a 
predictable, implementable regulatory framework. The agencies are 
finalizing their proposal to regulate perennial and intermittent 
tributaries to traditional navigable waters, while excluding ephemeral 
streams from CWA jurisdiction as those features are more appropriately 
regulated by States and Tribes under their sovereign authorities. 
However, the agencies have modified the final rule to reduce the 
instances in which natural and artificial features and structures sever 
jurisdiction of upstream waters, as discussed in Section III.A.3 and in 
more detail below. The agencies conclude that interpreting upstream 
waters that contribute surface water flow in a typical year to a 
paragraph (a)(1) water to be part of the regulated tributary network 
better balances the CWA's objective in section 101(a) with the need to 
respect State and tribal authority over land and water resources as 
mandated by Congress in section 101(b).
2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comment
    The definition of ``tributary'' in the final rule reflects the 
authority granted by Congress to regulate navigable waters and the 
interconnected nature of the tributary system, as well as the ordinary 
meaning of the term ``waters.'' In addition, the agencies are adhering 
to their constitutional and statutory authority regarding the role of 
the Federal government and limits on its authority to regulate the use 
of land and waters within State and tribal boundaries, and their 
intention to establish a clear and easily implementable definition. The 
definition of ``tributary'' in the final rule sets a boundary on the 
scope of the regulation to ensure that it is consistent with the role 
of the Federal government under the Constitution and the CWA. As the 
Supreme Court recognizes, States traditionally exercise ``primary power 
over land and water use,'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. The Federal 
government should avoid pressing against the outer limits of its 
authority when doing so would infringe upon the traditional rights and 
responsibilities of States to manage their own waters. See id. at 172-
73 and supra Section II.E.
    Under this final rule, a tributary must be perennial or 
intermittent, and it must contribute surface water flow in a typical 
year to a traditional navigable water or territorial sea directly or 
through one or more waters identified in paragraph (a)(2), (3), or (4) 
(generally referred to as ``paragraph (a)(2) through (4) waters'' or 
``a paragraph (a)(2) through (4) water'' in this notice), or through 
one or more of the features described in Section III.A.3. The 
``tributary'' category includes waters that, due to their relatively 
permanent flow classifications and their contribution of surface water 
flow to paragraph (a)(1) waters, are appropriately regulated under the 
Commerce Clause powers that Congress exercised when enacting the CWA. 
The agencies have concluded that their regulatory authority under the 
CWA and Supreme Court precedent is most appropriately interpreted to 
encompass the perennial and intermittent flow classifications provided 
in the definition of ``tributary,'' and that this approach also 
balances the regulation of the Federal government with the authority of 
States and Tribes to more appropriately regulate certain waters within 
their jurisdiction, such as ephemeral streams. The agencies have also 
concluded that this definition effectively furthers both the objective 
of the Act to ``restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the nation's waters'' and the ``policy of 
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution [and] to plan for the development and

[[Page 22288]]

use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and 
water resources . . . .'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(b); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. 
at 737 (Scalia, J., plurality). The agencies' approach to defining 
``tributary'' is also intended to ensure that federal regulatory 
jurisdiction does not intrude upon State, tribal, and local control of 
land and water use decisions. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738 (Scalia, J., 
plurality) (``Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the 
development permits . . . is a quintessential state and local 
power.''). With this final definition, the agencies seek to avoid 
``impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the 
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such 
States.'' 33 U.S.C. 1370.
    A clear regulatory line between jurisdictional and excluded waters 
has the additional benefit of being less complicated than prior 
regulatory regimes that required a case-specific significant nexus 
analysis. Ephemeral features, such as dry washes and arroyos, that lack 
the perennial or intermittent flow necessary to satisfy the 
``tributary'' definition under this final rule are excluded from the 
definition. Although the agencies are not regulating features that flow 
only in direct response to precipitation, certain ephemeral features 
can convey surface water flow that is sufficient to maintain the 
jurisdictional status of the upstream tributary reach, as discussed in 
Section III.A.3. States and Tribes may also address ephemeral features 
as ``waters of the State'' or ``waters of the Tribe'' under their own 
laws to the extent they deem appropriate, as envisioned under section 
101(b) of the CWA. In addition, an ephemeral feature may convey a 
discharge of pollutants from a point source to a water of the United 
States. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743-44 (Scalia, J., plurality).
    Some commenters stated that the agencies' proposal for tributaries 
is not supported by science and is inconsistent with the CWA and 
judicial precedent. The agencies disagree. As discussed in the preamble 
to the proposed rule, the agencies relied on the available science to 
help inform where to draw the line of federal jurisdiction over 
tributaries, consistent with their statutory authorities. See 84 FR 
4175 (``This proposed definition [of tributary] is also informed by the 
science.'') As noted in that preamble, while the SAB found that the 
draft Connectivity Report ``provides strong scientific support for the 
conclusion that ephemeral, intermittent, and perennial streams exert a 
strong influence on the character and functioning of downstream waters 
and that tributary streams are connected to downstream waters,'' the 
SAB stressed that ``the EPA should recognize that there is a gradient 
of connectivity.'' SAB Review at 3. The SAB recommended that ``the 
interpretation of connectivity be revised to reflect a gradient 
approach that recognizes variation in the frequency, duration, 
magnitude, predictability, and consequences of physical, chemical, and 
biological connections.'' Id. at 2 (emphasis added). To describe the 
``connectivity gradient'' and the probability that impacts occurring 
along the gradient will be transmitted downstream, the SAB developed a 
figure as part of its review of the Draft Connectivity Report. See id. 
at 54 figure 3. The figure illustrates the connectivity gradient and 
potential consequences between perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral 
streams and downstream waters and depicts a decreased ``probability 
that changes . . . will be transmitted to downstream waters'' at flow 
regimes less than perennial and intermittent. Id. While the SAB stated 
that ``at sufficiently large spatial and temporal scales, all waters 
and wetlands are connected,'' it found that ``[m]ore important are the 
degree of connection (e.g., frequency, magnitude, timing, duration) and 
the extent to which those connections affect the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of downstream waters.'' Id. at 17.
    The SAB, however, recognized that ``[t]he Report is a science, not 
policy, document that was written to summarize the current 
understanding of connectivity or isolation of streams and wetlands 
relative to large water bodies such as rivers, lakes, estuaries, and 
oceans.'' id. at 2. ``The SAB also recommended that the agencies 
clarify in the preamble to the final rule that `significant nexus' is a 
legal term, not a scientific one.'' 80 FR 37065. And in issuing the 
2015 Rule, the agencies stated, ``the science does not provide a 
precise point along the continuum at which waters provide only 
speculative or insubstantial functions to downstream waters.'' Id. at 
37090. Thus, the agencies use the Connectivity Report to inform certain 
aspects of the revised definition of ``waters of the United States,'' 
such as recognizing the ``connectivity gradient'' and potential 
consequences between perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral streams and 
downstream waters within a tributary system. The ``tributary'' 
definition that the agencies are finalizing, which takes into 
consideration the connectivity gradient, ``rests upon a reasonable 
inference of ecological interconnection'' between those tributaries and 
paragraph (a)(1) waters. 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment). The agencies acknowledge that science alone cannot 
dictate where to draw the line between Federal and State waters, as 
those are legal distinctions that have been established within the 
overall framework and construct of the CWA.
    The agencies also relied on scientific principles, as appropriate 
and within the agencies' statutory limits, to inform several other 
aspects of this final rule, including, for example, how the agencies 
define the flow classifications (perennial, intermittent, ephemeral) 
used throughout the regulation, the incorporation of inundation and 
flooding to create surface water connections, and the use of the 
typical year concept that relies upon a large body of precipitation and 
other climatic data to inform what may be within a normal range for a 
particular geographic region. The agencies will also rely on science to 
implement the final rule, such as with the development of tools and 
scientific-based approaches to identify flow classification and typical 
year conditions.
    Thus, contrary to the assertions of some commenters, the agencies' 
decisions in support of this final rule have been informed by science. 
The agencies therefore agree with other commenters who stated that the 
agencies appropriately balanced science, policy, and the law when 
crafting the proposed rule. But to be clear, as discussed in the 
preamble to the proposed rule, 84 FR 4176, and in Section II.E of this 
notice, science cannot dictate where to draw the line between Federal 
and State or tribal waters, as those are legal distinctions that have 
been established within the overall framework and construct of the CWA. 
The definition of ``waters of the United States'' must be grounded in a 
legal analysis of the limits on CWA jurisdiction reflected in the 
statute and Supreme Court guidance.
    By defining perennial and intermittent tributaries of traditional 
navigable waters as jurisdictional and ephemeral features as non-
jurisdictional, the agencies balance Congress' intent to interpret the 
term ``navigable waters'' more broadly than the classical understanding 
of that term, see Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133, with the fact 
that nothing in the legislative history of the Act ``signifies that 
Congress intended to exert anything more than its commerce power over 
navigation.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3. The final rule's definition 
of ``tributary'' is also consistent with the Rapanos plurality's 
position that `` `the

[[Page 22289]]

waters of the United States' include only relatively permanent, 
standing, or flowing bodies of waters . . . as opposed to ordinarily 
dry channels . . . or ephemeral flows of water.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
732-33 see also id. at 736 n.7 (``[R]elatively continuous flow is a 
necessary condition for qualification as a `water,' not an adequate 
condition'' (emphasis in original)). Perennial waters, by definition, 
are permanent. And while the plurality did note that waters of the 
United States do not include ``ordinarily dry channels through which 
water occasionally or intermittently flows,'' id. at 733, the plurality 
would ``not necessarily exclude seasonal rivers, which contain 
continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow during dry 
months.'' Id. at 732 n.5 (emphasis in original); compare id. at 770 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (``an intermittent flow can 
constitute a stream . . . while it is flowing . . . [i]t follows that 
the Corps can reasonably interpret the Act to cover the paths of such 
impermanent streams''). The agencies note that intermittent waters may 
occur seasonally, for example, during times when groundwater tables are 
elevated or when snowpack runoff produces relatively permanent flow, 
returning on an annual basis in known, fixed geographic locations.
    By defining ``tributary'' as perennial or intermittent rivers and 
streams that contribute surface water flow to traditional navigable 
waters or the territorial seas in a typical year, the agencies are 
establishing that a mere hydrologic connection cannot provide the basis 
for CWA jurisdiction; the bodies of water must be ``geographical 
features'' (i.e., rivers and streams) that are ``relatively permanent'' 
(i.e., perennial or intermittent) and that contribute surface water 
flow to a traditional navigable water or the territorial seas in a 
typical year. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732. This requirement is informed by 
Rapanos, wherein the plurality determined that the phrase ``the waters 
of the United States'' ``cannot bear the expansive meaning that the 
Corps would give it,'' id. at 732, and challenged the notion that 
``even the most insubstantial hydrologic connection may be held to 
constitute a `significant nexus.' '' Id. at 728. Similarly, Justice 
Kennedy noted, ``mere hydrologic connection should not suffice in all 
cases; the connection may be too insubstantial for the hydrologic 
linkage to establish the required nexus with navigable waters as 
traditionally understood.'' Id. at 784-85. The agencies believe that 
the requirement that a tributary be perennial or intermittent and be 
connected to a traditional navigable water is reasonable and reflects 
the plurality's description of a `` `wate[r] of the United States' '' 
as ``i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to 
traditional interstate navigable waters.'' Id. at 742.
    Under the proposed definition of ``tributary,'' an artificial or 
natural ephemeral feature would have severed jurisdiction upstream of 
the feature, because the waterbody would not contribute surface water 
to a paragraph (a)(1) water on a perennial or intermittent basis. 
Several commenters supported this approach, noting that waters above 
ephemeral breaks are more appropriately subject to State or tribal 
jurisdiction. Others criticized the approach as too restrictive and 
raised concerns regarding the importance of those upstream waters to 
the tributary system. The agencies recognize that the proposed rule's 
treatment of ephemeral features would have severed jurisdiction for 
certain relatively permanent bodies of water that are regularly 
``connected to'' traditional navigable waters in a typical year via 
channelized surface water flow through those features. The final rule 
has been modified to address these concerns regarding ephemeral breaks 
between two relatively permanent waters while remaining faithful to the 
text, structure, and legislative history of the CWA and Supreme Court 
guidance.
    As discussed in Section III.A.3, the final rule provides that 
channelized non-jurisdictional surface water features do not sever 
jurisdiction of upstream perennial or intermittent waters so long as 
they convey surface water from such upstream waters to downstream 
jurisdictional waters in a typical year. The use of ``channelized'' in 
this context generally indicates features with a defined path or 
course, such as a ditch or the bed of an ephemeral stream. The flow 
must be channelized in the sense of being discrete and confined to a 
channel, as opposed to diffuse, non-channelized flow. Channelized non-
jurisdictional surface water features are generally continuously 
present on the landscape as geomorphic features and may regularly 
``connect'' the upstream tributary to the downstream jurisdictional 
water such that those waters can mix and become indistinguishable in a 
typical year. This may occur, for example, where managed water systems 
alter the flow classification of a perennial or intermittent tributary 
to ephemeral but the perennial or intermittent flow returns farther 
downstream. It could also occur as a result of natural conditions, such 
as a tributary that becomes a losing stream for a reach, but then 
becomes perennial again downstream of the losing reach. The losing 
reach could occur because of water infiltrating into the ground and 
recharging groundwater, where the water table is below the bottom of 
the channel bed.
    The final rule also allows for other types of artificial or natural 
features, such as dams or boulder fields, which may maintain 
jurisdiction so long as they convey surface water flow from an upstream 
tributary to a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year. The 
agencies have determined in this final rule that such conditions do not 
sever jurisdiction for the upstream reach of the tributary if a 
channelized non-jurisdictional surface water feature conveys surface 
water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year. The 
agencies have concluded that water flowing through features such as 
dams or boulder fields can sustain a regular and predictable surface 
water connection between upstream and downstream waters and therefore 
can maintain jurisdiction between such waters. In all cases, however, 
the excluded or ephemeral feature remains non-jurisdictional. Certain 
other excluded features are incapable of providing channelized surface 
flow (e.g., groundwater, diffuse stormwater run-off, or directional 
sheet flow over upland) and therefore sever jurisdiction upstream of 
such excluded features.
    The Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the question of 
whether an ephemeral reach along or downstream of an otherwise 
jurisdictional tributary severs jurisdiction, and the agencies believe 
that the final rule appropriately reflects their statutory authority. 
In particular, the plurality decision in Rapanos emphasized that 
jurisdictional waters themselves must be relatively permanent and 
connected to traditional navigable waters, 547 U.S. at 742, but did not 
specify the type of connection necessary between the relatively 
permanent waters and downstream traditional navigable waters. Justice 
Kennedy's opinion stated that the Corps could identify by regulation 
categories of tributaries based on ``their volume of flow (either 
annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other 
relevant considerations,'' id. at 780-81, but fails to provide further 
guidance. The agencies conclude that the final rule appropriately 
reflects and balances these general guiding principles by exercising 
jurisdiction over perennial and intermittent tributaries but not 
ephemeral streams

[[Page 22290]]

and dry washes, while under certain circumstances allowing such 
channelized features to maintain jurisdiction between upstream and 
downstream more permanent waters.
    Some commenters agreed with the agencies' proposal that ephemeral 
reaches should sever jurisdiction of upstream waters because those 
waters no longer have a continuous hydrologic surface connection of 
relatively permanent flow to a downstream jurisdictional water. Other 
commenters stated that the proposed definition of ``waters of the 
United States'' was inconsistent in that some forms of natural or 
artificial features could connect upstream tributaries with downstream 
jurisdictional waters, whereas ephemeral reaches would have severed 
jurisdiction of upstream perennial and intermittent streams. In 
addition, many commenters raised concerns about implementing a 
definition of ``tributary'' in which an ephemeral feature would sever 
jurisdiction of upstream reaches, indicating that it may be difficult 
to apply in the field. Commenters also stated that if ephemeral 
features severed jurisdiction of perennial and intermittent waters 
upstream, many waters in certain regions, such as the arid West, would 
be non-jurisdictional. Some commenters expressed concern that the 
proposed definition would place a burden on project applicants to 
identify and anticipate such ephemeral breaks to avoid potential 
responsibility for compensatory mitigation of upstream losses. The 
agencies have modified the final rule language in a manner that 
addresses these concerns. Under the final rule, tributaries that 
contribute surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in a 
typical year through certain natural features (such as debris piles or 
boulder fields) or artificial features (such as culverts or dams) are 
tributaries, even though these features may result in an interruption 
in the surface water channel. A perennial or intermittent tributary 
above the natural or artificial feature does not lose its 
jurisdictional status as long as the natural or artificial feature 
continues to convey surface water flow from the upstream reach to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year.
    Commenters also requested clarification on whether a natural 
feature through which a tributary flows could be considered a 
jurisdictional feature as part of the tributary itself, such as a 
boulder field or subterranean river. Natural or artificial features 
that do not satisfy the surface water flow conditions of the 
``tributary'' definition are not tributaries under this rule, even if 
they convey surface water flow from upstream relatively permanent 
waters to downstream jurisdictional waters in a typical year. See 
Section III.A.3 for additional discussion.
    Some commenters asked for clarification on whether tributaries are 
viewed as reaches or as an entire network. The agencies are using the 
term ``reach'' in this preamble to the final rule to mean a section of 
a stream or river along which similar hydrologic conditions exist, such 
as discharge, depth, area, and slope.\45\ If a perennial tributary 
becomes intermittent and then ephemeral and then perennial again, it 
may be viewed as four separate reaches (e.g., perennial reach, 
intermittent reach, ephemeral reach, perennial reach), especially if 
they also share other similarities with respect to depth, slope, or 
other factors. In general, a reach can be any length of a stream or 
river, but the agencies are clarifying for implementation purposes that 
such length is bounded by similar flow characteristics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See Connectivity Report at A-10, defining ``reach'' as ``a 
length of stream channel with relatively uniform discharge, depth, 
area, and slope.'' A similar definition is used by the USGS, at 
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-a-reach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters suggested that flow classification and jurisdictional 
status could be determined based on the flow in the majority of a reach 
(i.e., whether it is perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral), which 
they said would be simpler than differentiating various segments from 
the broader stream reach. The agencies are not determining flow 
classification using the majority of the reach. Under the Rapanos 
Guidance, a tributary ``reach'' was identified by a stream order 
classification system where the relevant reach was used for purposes of 
a significant nexus determination. However, stream order is not 
directly relevant to stream and river jurisdiction under this final 
rule, and instead flow classification is a key aspect in determining 
the jurisdictional status of a tributary. The agencies conclude that 
such an approach is easier to implement in light of the final rule's 
``tributary'' definition and is more consistent with the legal and 
scientific foundation for the rule. Along the length of a tributary, 
the flow classification may fluctuate, and the points at which flow 
classifications change are the points at which a reach is bounded. If a 
tributary flows through a non-jurisdictional ephemeral reach to 
downstream jurisdictional waters, the point at which a tributary 
becomes ephemeral may fluctuate upstream and downstream in a typical 
year based on climatic conditions, changes in topography and 
surrounding development, water input, and water withdrawals. When such 
a transition zone of flow classification occurs, the agencies will use 
best professional judgment and various tools to identify where the 
change in flow classification occurs. The agencies have historically 
implemented comparable approaches at transition zones, for example with 
the identification of the extent of tidal influence (also referred to 
as the head of tide). This generally occurs where a river flows into 
tidal waters and the agencies must identify the farthest point upstream 
where a tributary is affected by tidal fluctuations in order to 
determine which lateral extent to apply for the limits of jurisdiction 
(i.e., high tide line or ordinary high water mark), permitting 
requirements, and similar factors. There is generally not a hard 
demarcation distinguishing where a waterbody ceases to be tidal, so the 
agencies must use best professional judgment utilizing all available 
information and tools which may assist in making the determination. See 
Section III.B.3 for additional information.
    Many commenters recommended that tributaries that were altered or 
relocated should remain tributaries. The agencies agree with those 
comments and, consistent with the proposal, have included that 
provision in the final rule. Many commenters expressed concern about 
the challenges of implementing a flow-based ``tributary'' definition 
where many systems have been modified by human actions. Some commenters 
also stated that the use of ``naturally occurring'' in the proposed 
``tributary'' definition was unclear and questioned how it would apply 
to modified systems. The agencies disagree with the proposition that 
identifying flow conditions would be challenging in modified systems. 
An altered tributary is one in which the flow or geomorphic conditions 
have been modified in some way, for example, by straightening a sinuous 
tributary, adding concrete or riprap to stabilize the banks of a 
tributary, reducing flow conditions from perennial to intermittent flow 
due to water withdrawals, or widening or adding physical features (such 
as riffle/pool complex restoration or check dams) to the tributary to 
reduce the velocity of flow. A relocated tributary is one in which an 
entire portion of the tributary may be moved to a different location, 
as when a tributary is rerouted around a city center to protect it from 
flooding or around a mining complex to enable extraction of 
commercially

[[Page 22291]]

valuable minerals. To be considered a tributary, such features must 
continue to meet the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' definition. 
The agencies conclude that identifying flow conditions in these 
features would be no more challenging than identifying flow conditions 
in other tributaries, which the agencies have been doing to apply the 
Rapanos Guidance since 2008. In a relocated tributary, the reach that 
has been relocated may meet the definition of ``ditch'' or may be 
colloquially called a ditch, which is why, for simplicity and clarity, 
the agencies have included these ditches in the definition of 
``tributary.'' The agencies also believe that retaining jurisdiction 
over the relocated tributary is consistent with its legal authorities 
and the agencies' treatment of impoundments of jurisdictional waters 
(see Section III.F), which may alter the course or form of a water of 
the United States but maintains sufficient surface water connection to 
a traditional navigable water in a typical year.
    Some commenters requested clarification on how water diversions may 
affect the jurisdictional status of tributaries. A water diversion that 
completely reroutes a tributary through a tunnel would be considered an 
artificial feature that would not sever jurisdiction under this final 
rule. The tunnel itself is not a tributary under the rule, however, 
because it is not a surface water channel. This final rule clarifies 
that jurisdiction applies based on current flow classification in a 
typical year. When completing jurisdictional determinations in managed 
systems, just as in natural systems, the agencies will consider whether 
features meet the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' definition in a 
typical year. Managed systems are jurisdictional as long as they 
satisfy the definition of ``tributary,'' including the flow conditions. 
If a stream is ephemeral in a typical year due to managed water 
withdrawals, the feature is an excluded ephemeral stream. Tributaries 
that have been altered via water management systems, or whose 
morphology has been altered in some manner, maintain their tributary 
status as long as they are perennial or intermittent and contribute 
surface water flow to the territorial seas or a traditional navigable 
water in a typical year.
    Under the pre-existing regulatory regime (recodified in the 2019 
Rule), the agencies conducted a significant nexus analysis for certain 
types of waters referred to as ``non-relatively permanent waters,'' 
which includes ephemeral features and some intermittent streams. See 
Rapanos Guidance at 7 (`` `[R]elatively permanent' waters do not 
include ephemeral tributaries which flow only in response to 
precipitation and intermittent streams which do not typically flow 
year-round or have continuous flow at least seasonally. However, CWA 
jurisdiction over these waters will be evaluated under the significant 
nexus standard[.]''). The definition of ``tributary'' in the final rule 
replaces existing procedures that utilize a case-specific ``significant 
nexus'' analyses of the relationship between a particular stream and 
downstream traditional navigable water. The agencies are eliminating 
this case-specific ``significant nexus'' analysis by providing a clear 
definition of ``tributary'' that is easier to implement. Justice 
Kennedy's ``significant nexus'' test for wetlands adjacent to 
nonnavigable tributaries was needed only ``absent more specific 
regulations,'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782, because ``the breadth of [the 
Corps' existing tributary] standard . . . seems to leave wide room for 
regulation of drains, ditches, and streams remote from any navigable-
in-fact water and carrying only minor water volumes towards it'' and 
thus ``precludes its adoption as the determinative measure of whether 
adjacent wetlands are likely to play an important role in the integrity 
of an aquatic system comprising navigable waters as traditionally 
understood.'' Id. at 781. In light of the ``more specific [tributary] 
regulations'' finalized in this rule, the agencies are eliminating the 
case-specific significant nexus review through categorical treatment, 
as ``waters of the United States,'' of all tributaries with perennial 
or intermittent flow that contribute surface water flow to downstream 
navigable-in-fact waters in a typical year. See id. at 780-81 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (``Through regulations or adjudication, 
the Corps may choose to identify categories of tributaries that, due to 
their volume of flow (either annually or on average), their proximity 
to navigable waters, or other relevant considerations, are significant 
enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of 
cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system 
incorporating navigable waters.'') (emphasis added). In doing so, the 
agencies believe they avoid interpretations of the CWA that raise 
significant constitutional questions. See id. at 738 (plurality) 
(``Even if the term `the waters of the United States' were ambiguous as 
applied to channels that sometimes host ephemeral flows of water (which 
it is not), we would expect a clearer statement from Congress to 
authorize an agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope of 
constitutional validity.'').
    The agencies recognize that this is a departure from prior 
positions of the Federal government. The agencies also recognize that 
prior to the finalization of this rule, some courts applied the 
significant nexus standard articulated in Justice Kennedy's opinion as 
the exclusive test of CWA jurisdiction over certain waters. As 
described in detail in Section II.E, the agencies have analyzed the 
text, structure, and legislative history of the CWA in light of Supreme 
Court guidance and conclude that this final rule incorporates important 
aspects of Justice Kennedy's opinion, together with those of the 
plurality, to craft a clear and implementable definition that stays 
within their statutory and constitutional authorities.
    The final ``tributary'' definition contains no flow volume 
requirement, but only a requirement of perennial or intermittent flow 
and a contribution of surface water flow to a paragraph (a)(1) water in 
a typical year. The agencies believe that establishing a specific flow 
volume requirement for all tributaries is inappropriate, given the wide 
spatial and temporal variability of flow volume in rivers and streams 
across the country. While the definition may in certain instances 
assert jurisdiction over bodies of water contributing ``the merest 
trickle,'' 547 U.S. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), 
to a traditional navigable water during certain times of the year, the 
agencies conclude that such bodies are `` `waters' in the ordinary 
sense of containing a relatively permanent flow'' regardless of flow 
volume. Id. at 757 (Scalia, J., plurality).
    Some commenters suggested that using stream flow volumes rather 
than flow duration classifications for the definition of ``tributary'' 
would be easier to implement. The agencies disagree with this 
suggestion based on their experience. In 1977, the Corps proposed to 
use flow volumes (i.e., five cubic feet per second) to define 
``headwaters'' in the definition of ``waters of the United States,'' 
and instead finalized the use of flow volumes for implementation of 
their general permit program. 42 FR 37129 (July 19, 1977). Stream flow 
volume is challenging to measure directly, in particular in an 
intermittent stream where flow is not always present and may require 
multiple field-based measurements that can make implementation 
inefficient and result in delays in making a jurisdictional 
determination. While flow duration classifications may also require 
field measurements, in certain instances

[[Page 22292]]

remote tools, such as remote sensing and aerial photography, can be 
used to observe presence or absence of flow and identify flow duration 
classifications, but cannot also assess flow volumes. In addition, the 
agencies have not identified a reasonable or appropriate rationale or 
justification for specific flow volumes that should establish 
jurisdiction given the broad nationwide applicability of the final 
rule.
    A few commenters requested a flow duration metric (e.g., 30, 90, or 
185 days) to determine a jurisdictional tributary. Several commenters 
recommended the agencies adopt a definition of ``intermittent'' that 
contains the requirement of continuous flow for a specific duration, 
such as ``at least one month of the calendar year'' to provide 
certainty for determining flow classification. See e.g., 30 CFR 710.5 
(definition of ``intermittent'' used in a U.S. Department of Interior 
regulation). Several commenters also recommended a regionalized 
approach to flow classification. The agencies have finalized an 
approach that considers streamflow duration in the flow classification 
definitions generally (e.g., ``flowing continuously year-round,'' 
``flowing continuously during certain times of the year and more than 
in direct response to precipitation,'' and ``flowing . . . only in 
response to precipitation'') but without specifying an exact number of 
days of flow. The agencies are not providing a specific duration (e.g., 
the number of days, weeks, or months) of surface flow that constitutes 
intermittent flow, as the time period that encompasses intermittent 
flow can vary widely across the country based upon climate, hydrology, 
topography, soils, and other conditions. The ``typical year'' construct 
captures that variability, however, and provides for regional and local 
variations in the actual application of a uniform nationwide 
definition. The agencies acknowledge that an approach utilizing a 
specific duration would provide for enhanced national consistency, but 
it would also undermine the regionalized implementation of intermittent 
tributaries as provided for under this final rule. Some commenters 
cautioned the agencies against treating intermittent streams similarly 
across the country based on a prescriptive flow duration metric, as 
intermittent streams in the arid West are fundamentally different from 
intermittent streams in the Southeast, for example. A specific duration 
requirement would also be challenging to implement--even landowners 
familiar with their properties may not know the number of days a stream 
flows per year.
    Other commenters recommended the use of physical indicators of 
flow, such as ordinary high water mark and bed and banks, which could 
be regionalized for a field-based approach. These commenters stated 
that physical indicators can be more readily observable and can 
indicate flows of sufficient magnitude and duration to qualify as a 
tributary. The agencies disagree with these comments and conclude that 
physical indicators of flow, absent verification of the actual 
occurrence of flow, may not accurately represent the flow 
classifications required for tributaries under this rule. See, e.g., 
547 U.S at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing 
concerns that a the Corps' existing tributary standard based, in part, 
on the ``possess[ing]'' of ``an ordinary high water mark, defined as a 
`line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and 
indicated by [certain] physical characteristics,' . . . seems to leave 
wide room for regulation of drains, ditches, and streams remote from 
any navigable-in-fact water and carrying only minor water volumes 
towards it''). For example, ephemeral streams can have an ordinary high 
water mark and bed and banks, which would not allow for the agencies or 
the public to distinguish between a non-jurisdictional ephemeral stream 
and a jurisdictional intermittent or perennial tributary using those 
physical indicators. Ephemeral streams in the arid West, for example, 
may have ordinary high water marks that were incised years ago 
following a single large storm. It makes more practical sense for a 
feature to be first assessed as a tributary, after which the lateral 
extent of that tributary can be identified using the ordinary high 
water mark.
    Physical indicators, however, may be one line of evidence the 
agencies could use to evaluate whether a stream meets the flow 
requirements to be a tributary under this definition. These indicators 
could be regionalized to obtain a practical field-based approach for 
identifying the flow classification of a stream which is a required 
component of identifying a tributary. Such physical indicators are 
further discussed in Section III.D.3 of this notice. In addition, the 
agencies cannot always rely on field-based physical indicator methods--
for example, when evaluating a site at a time that does not meet the 
definition of ``typical year.'' In some instances, completing a desktop 
determination with remote tools may supplement or substitute for field-
based indicators.
3. How will the agencies implement the final rule?
    The agencies will employ many different methods and tools to 
identify and determine whether a feature meets the definition of 
``tributary'' under this final rule. A few commenters recommended that 
the agencies identify a variety of methods which may be employed to 
identify flow classifications, and that such methods involve tools 
readily available to a typical landowner. Methods and tools used by the 
agencies are generally available for the public to use so that they can 
make an informed decision about how to proceed with requests for 
jurisdictional determinations or authorization for activities under the 
CWA. The agencies believe that there are numerous cases where an 
informed decision can save valuable time and money by avoiding 
unnecessary jurisdictional determination requests. This can be done, 
for example, where landowners are familiar with the water features on 
their property and know that they only flow in response to a rain 
event, or that an isolated wetland in the middle of a ranch is not 
flooded by a nearby perennial river in a typical year. However, in 
cases where a member of the general public makes an informed decision 
to not request a jurisdictional determination and discharges pollutants 
into a waterbody that is, in fact, jurisdictional without required 
permits, the individual could be subject to the agencies' enforcement 
authorities under the CWA.
    One of the first steps in determining whether a feature is a 
tributary is to identify relevant features on the landscape, such as 
rivers, streams, or similar naturally occurring surface water channels, 
as well as ditches. Field work to include direct observation and other 
reliable methods can indicate the existence of a tributary, such as 
stream gage data, elevation data, historic or current water flow 
records, flood predictions, statistical evidence, aerial imagery, and 
USGS maps.
    Another step in determining whether a feature is a tributary is to 
identify whether the feature contributes surface water flow to a 
paragraph (a)(1) water either directly or through one or more paragraph 
(a)(2) through (4) waters in a typical year. The agencies intend to use 
several sources to identify the flow path of a potential tributary to 
determine whether surface water flow is being contributed eventually to 
a paragraph (a)(1) water. The agencies can use USGS maps, State and 
local knowledge or maps, aerial photography, or other remote sensing 
information so long as

[[Page 22293]]

the tools the agencies use have been verified to be reliable (see, 
e.g., Section IV of this notice regarding limitations of existing 
aquatic resource mapping datasets) to assess a feature's flow path. The 
agencies can also use available models, including models developed by 
Federal, State, tribal and local governments, academia, and the 
regulated community. One such model includes the ``Flow (Raindrop) 
Path'' GIS tool which allows the user to click a point on a map to 
signify a falling raindrop on that point, after which a flow path is 
drawn to estimate where the raindrop may flow, eventually making its 
way to the ocean if the tributary network allows for it (https://streamstats.usgs.gov/ss/). The StreamStats tool may potentially be used 
to identify the flow path from the subject water to the downstream 
paragraph (a)(1) water using the ``Flow (Raindrop) Path'' component of 
the tool. These tools could be used in conjunction with field 
observations, data, and other desktop tools to evaluate whether a 
specific point on a potential tributary may have a surface water 
connection to a downstream paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year.
    In addition to identifying the presence of rivers, streams, or 
similar naturally occurring surface water channels which contribute 
surface water flow to a downstream paragraph (a)(1) water, the agencies 
must assess the feature's flow classification. The agencies have 
substantial experience using visual hydrologic observations, field data 
and indicators, and remote tools to determine flow classification. 
Commenters expressed several key concerns about the flow classification 
concept. Some commenters noted that there is no established or 
universally accepted methodology to identify flow classification. The 
agencies agree that there is no universally accepted methodology; 
however, scientists, environmental consultants, and other water 
resource professionals, including agency staff, have used the terms 
``perennial,'' ``intermittent,'' and ``ephemeral'' for decades in the 
field. Indeed, the agencies have used these terms to evaluate the 
jurisdictional status of waters for more than a decade, in accordance 
with the 2008 Rapanos Guidance.\46\ More recently, the Corps has 
applied these terms in its Nationwide Permit Program (NWP). See 82 FR 
1860, 2005 (January 6, 2017). The terms are used in the NWP in a manner 
similar to the definitions in this final rule, but in the NWP the terms 
adhere more closely to the generally-accepted scientific definitions 
that focus on groundwater rising above the bed of the stream channel as 
differentiating between ephemeral features and perennial and 
intermittent waters. See id. at 2006. For the reasons explained in 
Section III.A.2, however, the agencies have finalized definitions for 
the three flow classification terms in this rule that better align with 
the scope of CWA jurisdiction, while improving clarity of the rule and 
transparency of the agencies' implementation. These flow classification 
terms can be implemented using readily available resources in addition 
to visual assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Under the Rapanos Guidance, the agencies applied a 
different jurisdictional test based upon a tributary's flow regime. 
``The agencies will assert jurisdiction over relatively permanent 
non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters without a 
legal obligation to make a significant nexus finding.'' Rapanos 
Guidance at 7. Relatively permanent tributaries were described in 
the guidance as tributaries that ``typically flow year-round or have 
continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g., typically three 
months)[.]'' Id. at 1. At the same time, the guidance established 
that `` `relatively permanent' waters do not include ephemeral 
tributaries which flow only in response to precipitation and 
intermittent streams which do not typically flow year-round or have 
continuous flow at least seasonally. . . . CWA jurisdiction over 
these waters will be evaluated under the significant nexus [test.]'' 
Id. at 7. The agencies also note that in June 2009, the Corps added 
a classification code ``R6,'' entitled ``Riverine Ephemeral,'' to 
identify ephemeral aquatic resources. The Corps created the ``R6'' 
code to provide clarity to field staff when identifying ephemeral 
waters for entry into the ORM2 database. See https://www.spa.usace.army.mil/Portals/16/docs/civilworks/regulatory/Bulk%20Upload/Bulk%20Data%20Cowardin.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters expressed concern that the information needed to 
determine flow classification would require a high burden of proof and 
would result in significantly longer processing times for 
jurisdictional determinations. The agencies will continue to bear the 
burden of proof for determinations and, as noted above, have already 
implemented a version of the flow classification concept under the 
Rapanos Guidance and the Corps' NWP. The agencies disagree with the 
suggestion that the use of these flow classifications will result in a 
lengthier process for jurisdictional determinations. With the clear and 
categorical definition as to the scope of CWA jurisdiction included in 
this final rule, the elimination of the significant nexus determination 
requirement for tributaries, the use of existing tools, and the 
development of new tools, jurisdictional determinations for tributaries 
should be more efficient under this final rule than under prior 
regulatory regimes.
    Some commenters also noted that the data and resources identified 
in the preamble to the proposed rule to evaluate flow classification 
have limited availability. The agencies agree that some data and 
resources have significant limitations and other national-level tools 
and methods may not be readily available or accurate for use in many 
areas of the country, including in rural or remote areas and in heavily 
modified systems. The agencies will continue to rely on local 
knowledge, information provided by the landowner, and local, State, and 
tribal agencies, and a variety of additional tools and resources to 
evaluate flow classification in such systems. The final rule language 
on flow classifications allows for consistent implementation approaches 
for modified systems and more natural systems.
    Visual observations of surface hydrology are a useful primary 
method to identify flow classifications. The agencies expect that 
landowners will often have sufficient knowledge to understand how water 
moves through their properties, although visual observations could be 
conducted by Federal, State, tribal and local agencies, and other 
public or private organizations, as appropriate. The agencies also 
recognize that a single visual observation may not always be sufficient 
to accurately determine flow classification, and visual observations 
should generally be combined with precipitation and other climate data 
and expected flow seasonality to accurately determine flow 
classification. For example, observing flow directly after a large 
rainfall or observing no flow during a dry season may not be good 
indicators of a stream's typical flow classification.
    In addition to visual observations of surface hydrology, the 
agencies may use field-based indicators and tools as another line of 
evidence to determine flow classification. Some commenters recommended 
using local flow data collected by government agencies, where 
available, and the agencies acknowledge that this could be a useful 
source of data. The agencies have also used methods such as trapezoidal 
flumes and pressure transducers for measuring surface flow. During the 
public comment period, many commenters mentioned the availability of 
existing rapid, field-based, streamflow duration assessment methods 
that have been developed for use across various States or geographic 
regions and suggested that these existing methods could be used to 
distinguish between streams with perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral 
flow classifications. Many commenters also recommended that the 
agencies develop

[[Page 22294]]

similar methods for use across the United States, with input from the 
public and the scientific community.
    The agencies recognize that some States have developed streamflow 
duration assessment methods (SDAMs) that use physical and biological 
field indicators, such as the presence of hydrophytic vegetation and 
benthic macroinvertebrates, to determine the flow duration class of a 
stream reach as perennial, intermittent, or ephemeral (e.g., the 
Streamflow Methodology for Identification of Intermittent and Perennial 
Streams and Their Origins, developed by the North Carolina Division of 
Water Quality, available at http://portal.ncdenr.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=0ddc6ea1-d736-4b55-8e50-169a4476de96&groupId=38364). The EPA, the Corps, and the State of 
Oregon also previously developed a regionalized SDAM that has been 
validated for use throughout the Pacific Northwest since 2015 
(available at http://www.epa.gov/measurements/streamflow-duration-assessment-method-pacific-northwest).
    Because SDAMs use indicators that are robust to seasonal and short-
term climatic variability, these methods can be applied in a single 
site visit to distinguish streamflow duration when a channel is flowing 
or in the absence of flow. The agencies agree with commenters that 
these methods are useful and practical tools that could be used to help 
inform timely and predictable jurisdictional determinations, for 
implementation of the final ``tributary'' definition, in the States and 
regions where previously developed SDAMs are available. The agencies 
also agree with commenters that developing similar methods for use 
across the United States would promote consistent implementation of the 
final tributary definition and note that the agencies are currently 
working to develop regionally-specific SDAMs for nationwide coverage. 
The agencies believe that developing regionally-specific SDAMs is 
important to account for the differences in climate, geology, and 
topography that can influence relationships between physical and 
biological indicators and streamflow permanence.
    A variety of remote, desktop tools could be used to determine flow 
classification of potential tributaries, particularly when coupled with 
site specific information. In meetings with stakeholders, some local 
government officials recommended using local maps developed by 
government agencies, where available, as opposed to national maps, 
noting for example that the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) has been 
shown to overestimate flow in certain areas. The agencies will assess 
flow classification using a compilation of the best available mapping 
sources, which may include the NHD \47\ or local maps, as well as other 
remote tools such as photographs, StreamStats by the USGS (available at 
https://streamstats.usgs.gov/ss/), Probability of Streamflow Permanence 
(PROSPER) by the USGS (available at https://www.usgs.gov/centers/wy-mt-water/science/probability-streamflow-permanence-prosper), Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) hydrologic tools and soil maps, 
desktop tools that provide for the hydrologic estimation of a discharge 
sufficient to generate intermittent or perennial flow (e.g., a regional 
regression analysis or hydrologic modeling), USGS topographic data, or 
modeling tools using drainage area, precipitation data, climate, 
topography, land use, vegetation cover, geology, and/or other publicly 
available information. The agencies will continue to rely on field 
observations and field data to verify desktop assessments as 
appropriate, and will also consider data and tools developed by 
academia, the regulated community, and other stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ As described in the RPA for the final rule, the agencies 
note that NHD at High Resolution does not distinguish intermittent 
from ephemeral features in most parts of the country and may not 
accurately identify on-the-ground flow conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Ultimately, multiple data points and multiple sources of 
information should be used to determine flow classification. For 
example, a ``blue line stream'' on a USGS topographic map and/or mapped 
in the NHD may indicate a potential tributary. Combining this 
information with stream order can further inform determinations of flow 
classification, as higher order streams may be more likely to exhibit 
perennial or intermittent flow compared to lower order streams, though 
some headwater streams are perennial or intermittent. The agencies 
could further determine whether flow data, field indicators, or visual 
observations of surface hydrology are available to confirm a stream's 
flow classification. Field-based and remote information may vary in 
availability and accuracy in different parts of the country, so care 
will be taken to evaluate additional information prior to reasonably 
determining the presence or absence of a tributary. Also, the agencies 
will continue to use the specific, validated tools developed by States 
to identify stream flow classifications.
    As noted previously, the agencies will use best professional 
judgment and various tools to identify where the change in flow 
classification occurs (e.g., from intermittent to ephemeral and vice-
versa). The tools described above can assist in the identification of 
that transition in flow classification and therefore the delineation of 
a reach as used in this final rule. The primary distinction necessary 
under this rule is the identification of when a perennial or 
intermittent reach transitions to an ephemeral reach and vice-versa. 
The agencies acknowledge that there are spatial and temporal variations 
in stream attributes such that there may not always be a distinct point 
demarcating the flow classification changes. For example, a single 
distinct point may occur at the confluence of two ephemeral streams, 
which become intermittent at the confluence. However, in some 
situations between stream confluences, there may be a transition zone 
where the flow classification change fluctuates within that zone 
throughout a typical year. The agencies will gather information from 
upstream and downstream of the transition zone as far as needed to get 
an accurate assessment of the conditions on the ground when it may be 
necessary for a decision point. This transition zone where the change 
in flow classification occurs will be evaluated by the agencies using 
the tools described above, as well as best professional judgment, to 
identify the most appropriate point at which to distinguish flow 
classifications.
    In addition to determining the flow classification of a potential 
tributary, the agencies will also determine whether climatic conditions 
are typical to determine whether the water feature meets the definition 
of ``tributary'' under the final rule. As discussed in Section III.A.1, 
the final rule defines the term ``typical year'' to mean ``when 
precipitation and other climatic variables are within the normal 
periodic range (e.g., seasonally, annually) for the geographic area of 
the applicable aquatic resource based on a rolling thirty-year 
period.'' The agencies will use readily available climatic data and 
tools to evaluate normal precipitation and climatic conditions for the 
region at issue and will ensure that the time period of evaluation is 
representative of the normal characteristics of the subject waterbody 
(i.e., it is neither too wet nor too dry). A detailed discussed of how 
the agencies intend to implement this definition is provided in Section 
III.A.1.
    In utilizing the data sources described above and determining the 
flow classifications of tributaries under typical climatic conditions, 
the agencies recognize the need to consider seasonality and timing of 
tributary

[[Page 22295]]

flows. For instance, in some geographic areas, intermittent streams may 
typically flow only at certain times, such as during seasonally wet 
conditions. Thus, the agencies would not expect to observe streamflow 
in seasonally dry conditions, even if precipitation during those dry 
conditions is considered typical for the dates of interest. The 
agencies may need to use the multiple tools described above to 
determine the flow classification for a tributary that is not flowing 
because of seasonally dry conditions, including remote- and field-based 
hydrologic and non-hydrologic indicators of the flow classification 
that would occur during seasonally wet conditions. For example, remote 
indicators might include a series of aerial and satellite images, 
spanning multiple years and taken under normal climatic conditions, the 
majority of which depict water flowing in the channel.
    In the field, evidence of recent flow can be observed through the 
presence of multiple or abundant signs of certain ordinary high water 
mark indicators for the region, such as the presence of point bars, 
concentrations of drift deposits, or the destruction of terrestrial 
vegetation. Furthermore, certain wetland hydrology indicators can help 
clarify whether water is present in the area only immediately following 
precipitation events, or whether longer-term saturation has likely 
occurred. An example of an indicator is the presence of oxidized 
rhizospheres along living root channels, which can take four to eight 
weeks of continuous saturation to form. This indicator alone cannot be 
conclusive of water flowing above the surface, but multiple positive 
indicators could provide an increased degree of confidence in these 
situations. Conversely, the agencies may observe flow during wetter 
than normal precipitation conditions. In this case, the agencies can 
use other lines of evidence, including remote- and field-based 
hydrologic and non-hydrologic indicators of flow classification as 
appropriate. Streams that contain flowing water during wetter than 
normal climatic conditions, but which lack an ordinary high water mark 
or hydrology indicators may be less likely to flow during normal 
climatic conditions. This assessment is further supported if the 
majority of wet season aerial and satellite images taken during normal 
climatic conditions depict a dry channel. In addition, a landowner's 
specific information indicating whether a water feature meets the 
definition of a ``tributary'' under ``typical year'' conditions may 
also aid in determining flow classification.
    In addition to requesting clarification about when a surface water 
feature meets the definition of ``tributary,'' some commenters also 
stated that it would be helpful to incorporate the lateral limits of 
jurisdiction directly into the ``tributary'' definition and questioned 
how such limits would be determined. In addition, some commenters 
expressed concern regarding the status of braided rivers that migrate 
and have multiple channels where the jurisdictional limits would be 
identified. The lateral limits of jurisdiction for tributaries extends 
to the ordinary high water mark, as indicated by the physical 
characteristics provided in the definition. Consistent with existing 
practice, the agencies intend to continue to use the Corps' ordinary 
high water mark manuals, as well as Regulatory Guidance Letter 05-05, 
when making ordinary high water mark determinations.\48\ The outer 
limits of a braided channel may be used to identify the lateral extent 
when appropriate, which may encompass multiple low-flow channels and 
the migratory islands that separate them. Adding the ordinary high 
water mark concept to the definition of ``tributary'' is unnecessary 
because it is already located in the Corps' regulations at 33 CFR 328.4 
to identify the lateral extent of jurisdiction. The agencies are 
finalizing the rule with the definition of ``ordinary high water mark'' 
as proposed, however, to improve consistency between the corresponding 
regulations and also because the term ``ordinary high water mark'' is 
used in the final rule's definition of ``upland.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ The Corps' ordinary high water mark manuals are available 
at: https://www.erdc.usace.army.mil/Media/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Article-View/Article/486085/ordinary-high-water-mark-ohwm-research-development-and-training/. Regulatory Guidance Letter 05-05 is 
available at: https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll9/id/1253.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Ditches

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    The regulatory status of ditches has long created confusion for 
farmers, ranchers, irrigation districts, municipalities, water supply 
and stormwater management agencies, and the transportation sector, 
among others. To address this confusion, the agencies proposed to add a 
new category to the definition of ``waters of the United States'' for 
jurisdictional ditches and similar artificial features. The agencies 
proposed to include in that category: (1) Ditches that are traditional 
navigable waters or that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide 
(e.g., paragraph (a)(1) waters); (2) ditches that are constructed in 
tributaries or that relocate or alter tributaries as long as the ditch 
satisfies the flow conditions of the tributary definition; and (3) 
ditches constructed in adjacent wetlands as long as the ditch likewise 
satisfies the conditions of the tributary definition. 84 FR 4203. All 
other ditches were excluded from CWA jurisdiction under the proposal.
    Many commenters did not find that the separate jurisdictional 
category of ``ditches'' provided the regulatory clarity and 
predictability that the agencies had sought. They instead stated that 
the separate category created confusion. Other commenters said that the 
proposed separate category provided additional clarity, while others 
argued that all ditches should be excluded. Other commenters stated 
that the proposal was too limiting and should include more ditches as 
jurisdictional, including any ditch that contributes perennial, 
intermittent, or ephemeral flow to other ``waters of the United 
States.''
    In response to these diverse comments, the final rule does not 
include the separate category of ``ditches'' under paragraph (a)(3) as 
proposed and instead incorporates the elements of the proposal into the 
``tributary'' category, with some additional clarifying edits. Ditches 
that are paragraph (a)(1) waters do not need to be identified in 
another jurisdictional category, so that aspect of the proposal has 
been eliminated as unnecessary and redundant. Ditches that are 
constructed in or that relocate a tributary are included in the final 
rule as tributaries, as long as the ditch satisfies the flow conditions 
of the ``tributary'' definition. The same is true for ditches that are 
constructed in adjacent wetlands.
    The agencies did not retain the term ``alter'' from the proposed 
rule given the potential confusion associated with the use of that 
term. As some commenters noted, most, if not all, ditches may have some 
effect on and therefore may ``alter'' a tributary or some portion of 
the tributary system. As described throughout this notice, the CWA does 
not authorize the agencies to regulate all waters, nor does it 
authorize the agencies to regulate all ditches that exist across the 
landscape to assist in water management activities. The agencies 
conclude that ditches that are ``constructed in'' or that ``relocate'' 
a tributary, and that satisfy the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' 
definition, are appropriately within the authority granted to the 
agencies under the CWA, consistent with the legal principles outlined 
in Section II.E. The regulation

[[Page 22296]]

and management of all other ditches is appropriately left to States and 
Tribes as part of their primary authority over land and water resources 
within their border. See 33 U.S.C. 1251(b), 1370.
    The agencies consider it to be clearer to include in the definition 
of ``tributary'' that the alteration of a tributary does not modify its 
jurisdictional status as a tributary as long as it continues to meet 
the flow conditions of the definition, rather than to classify the 
alteration of a tributary as a ditch. This is also consistent with 
longstanding agency practice. The agencies have modified the exclusion 
for ditches in paragraph (b)(5) to reflect these changes. The agencies 
also recognize that in certain circumstances, ditches that are 
constructed in adjacent wetlands that lack sufficient flow to be 
considered tributaries under this final rule may develop wetland 
characteristics if not maintained. As discussed below, in limited 
circumstances, those wetlands may be treated as adjacent wetlands, 
subject to the permitting exemptions in 33 U.S.C. 1344(f). All other 
ditches are excluded under the final rule.
    The agencies believe that this approach to ditches best addresses 
the comments received and provides clarity and regulatory certainty to 
determine when a ditch may be a jurisdictional water and when a ditch 
may be excluded, consistent with the agencies' authority under the CWA. 
Finally, as discussed in Section III.A.3, non-jurisdictional ditches 
under this final rule may be capable of conveying channelized surface 
water flow between upstream relatively permanent jurisdictional waters 
and downstream jurisdictional waters in a typical year. In this 
example, the ditch itself, however, would remain non-jurisdictional.
2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comment
    During the 1970s, the Corps interpreted its authorities under the 
CWA as excluding drainage and irrigation ditches from the definition of 
``waters of the United States.'' See, e.g., 40 FR 31320, 31321 (July 
25, 1975) (``Drainage and irrigation ditches have been excluded.''). 
The ditch exclusion was expressly stated in regulatory text in the 
Corps' 1977 regulations. 33 CFR 323.2(a)(3); 42 FR 37122, 37144 (July 
19, 1977) (``manmade nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated 
on dry land are not considered waters of the United States under this 
definition''). As the Corps explained in 1977: ``nontidal drainage and 
irrigation ditches that feed into navigable waters will not be 
considered `waters of the United States' under this definition. To the 
extent that these activities cause water quality problems, they will be 
handled under other programs of the FWPCA, including Section 208 and 
402.'' 42 FR at 37127 (July 19, 1977). Similar statements in preambles 
to the proposed rules from the early 1980s confirmed this 
interpretation: ``man-made, non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches 
excavated on dry land are not considered waters of the United States.'' 
45 FR 62732, 62747 (September 19, 1980); see also 48 FR 21466, 21474 
(May 12, 1983) (``Waters of the United States do not include the 
following man-made waters: (1) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation 
ditches excavated on dry land, (2) Irrigated areas which would revert 
to upland if the irrigation ceased.'').
    The general exclusion for non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches 
excavated in dry land continued through 1986, although the Corps 
modified its earlier statements that year by noting in preamble text 
that ``we generally do not consider'' such features to be ``waters of 
the United States,'' and indicating that the agency would evaluate 
certain ditches on a case-by-case basis. 51 FR 41206, 41217 (November 
13, 1986).\49\ The EPA also included similar language in a Federal 
Register notice in 1988. 53 FR 20764 (June 6, 1988). The Corps further 
clarified the regulation of ditches in its nationwide permit regulation 
in March 2000, stating that ``non-tidal drainage ditches are waters of 
the United States if they extend the [ordinary high water mark] of an 
existing water of the United States.'' 65 FR 12818, 12823 (March 9, 
2000). In other words, if flow or flooding from a jurisdictional non-
tidal river or stream inundated an upland ditch, the agencies would 
assert jurisdiction over that upland ditch because the ordinary high 
water mark of the river or stream extends into the ditch, and the 
agencies would then assert jurisdiction over the entire reach of that 
ditch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ The Corps also moved the ditch exclusion from rule text to 
preamble language in 1986 but stated that this was not a substantive 
change and that jurisdiction was not expanded. 51 FR 41206, 41216-17 
(November 13, 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule clarifies the regulatory status of ditches in a 
manner that is more consistent with the Corps' regulations following 
the 1972 and 1977 CWA amendments, with some modifications to provide a 
clear definition that also falls within the scope of the agencies' 
authority under the CWA. When Congress enacted the 1972 amendments, it 
specifically included ditches and related artificial features as 
``point sources,'' declaring them to be ``discernible, confined, and 
discrete conveyances . . . from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.'' Public Law 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 887 (1972) codified at 
33 U.S.C. 1362(14). Congress envisioned protecting the quality of the 
navigable waters, defined as ``waters of the United States'' at that 
time, by regulating the discharge of pollutants from conveyances like 
pipes, ditches, channels, tunnels and similar features into waters of 
the United States. Id. at 1362(12) (defining ``discharge of pollutant'' 
as ``any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source'').
    The agencies evaluated the treatment of ditches in the CWA and its 
legislative history to discern whether Congress intended ditches to be 
point sources, navigable waters, or both. For example, Congress 
exempted the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the 
United States when that discharge occurs as a result of the 
construction or maintenance of irrigation ditches, the maintenance of 
drainage ditches, or minor drainage associated with normal farming 
activities. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1)(A), (C) (exempting such activities 
from sections 301, 402, and 404 of the Act). One possible 
interpretation of these exemptions is that they function as an implicit 
acknowledgement that there may be some irrigation or drainage ditches 
that are waters of the United States, thus the need to exempt common 
agricultural and related practices in those waters from CWA section 404 
permitting. Another interpretation is that dredged or fill material or 
other pollutant discharges arising from such activities are not subject 
to federal permitting if those materials get washed down the ditch into 
a connected water of the United States.
    For irrigation ditches, which typically are constructed in upland 
but frequently must connect to a water of the United States to either 
capture or return flow, Congress exempted both the construction and 
maintenance of such facilities. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1)(C); see also 33 
U.S.C. 1362(14) (excluding agricultural stormwater discharges and 
irrigation return flows from the definition of ``point source'').\50\ 
The

[[Page 22297]]

construction activities performed in upland areas are beyond the reach 
of the CWA, but the permitting exemption applies to the diversion 
structures, weirs, headgates, and other related facilities that connect 
the irrigation ditches to jurisdictional waters. See, e.g., Corps, 
Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 07-02, at 1-2 (July 4, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The agencies also note that Congress exempted the discharge 
of irrigation return flows into waters of the United States from the 
section 402 permit program. 33 U.S.C. 1342(l). This exemption 
potentially would not be needed if agricultural drainage ditches 
carrying irrigation return flow were themselves waters of the United 
States, as the entry point of the irrigation return flow into the 
drainage ditch might then lack the requisite point source 
discharging mechanism given the diffuse overland flow entry point 
from the field to ditch in most circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For drainage ditches, by contrast, the permitting exemption is 
limited to only maintenance of such ditches. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1)(C). 
That is because a parallel exemption for construction would allow the 
drainage of wetlands subject to CWA jurisdiction without a permit. 
Congress' intent to prevent such a result is evident in the 
``recapture'' provision of 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(2). See, e.g., Sen. Rpt. 
95-370, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., at 76-77 (July 19, 1977) (noting that 
exempted ``activities should have no serious adverse impact on water 
quality if performed in a manner that will not impair the flow and 
circulation patterns and the chemical and biological characteristics of 
the affected waterbody'' and noting that the ``exemption for minor 
drainage does not apply to the drainage of swampland or other 
wetlands'').
    In summary, Congress may have envisioned the interconnection 
between the irrigation and drainage ditches and down-gradient waters of 
the United States as creating the need for the section 404(f) 
permitting exemptions, not necessarily that those ditches themselves 
are waters of the United States. Or Congress could have envisioned that 
some drainage ditches constructed in jurisdictional wetlands become 
waters of the United States themselves and thus require section 404(f) 
permitting exemptions for maintenance work performed in them. The 
agencies have not been able to identify any legislative history that 
signals the clear intent of Congress on this complex topic, and 
commenters provided a diverse range of viewpoints that failed to 
provide a clarifying position. To resolve the ambiguity, the agencies 
are interpreting the statutory text in section 404(f) and its 
legislative history as an indication that Congress may have intended, 
in certain limited circumstances, that ditches constructed in 
jurisdictional wetlands could become jurisdictional waters themselves. 
The agencies believe that the final rule formulation adheres more 
closely to the language of the statute and the positions articulated by 
the plurality opinion in Rapanos. See, e.g., 547 U.S. at 735-36 and 
n.7.
    Many commenters requested the agencies clarify that a water of the 
United States and point source are mutually exclusive. Some commenters 
expressed concern about features which may be considered point sources 
rather than waters of the United States under the proposed rule, and 
whether such features would require section 402 permits to convey 
pollutants downstream. Other commenters stated that permit requirements 
may need to be modified by sampling at the downstream end of the ditch 
to demonstrate that pollutants are being added to a water of the United 
States. The final rule does not make any changes to the agencies' 
interpretation of the definition of ``point source'' in CWA section 
502(14). The agencies believe that this final rule will help clarify 
whether a ditch is a water of the United States or a point source. 
Either it is a water of the United States that subjects a discharger to 
sections 402 and 404 permitting requirements for direct discharges into 
the ditch, or, if it is non-jurisdictional but conveys pollutants to 
downstream jurisdictional waters, it may be a point source that 
subjects a discharger into a ditch to section 402 permitting 
requirements. Both scenarios could also be subject to statutory 
exemptions that would obviate the need for a permit. In addition, if 
the ditch is a non-jurisdictional water that does not convey 
pollutants, it would not require a permit.
    The agencies recognize that a change in jurisdiction resulting from 
this rule may change the scope of application of the CWA regulatory 
programs to a particular water, but the longstanding approach that the 
agencies have taken to implementing and enforcing those programs would 
remain the same. If a CWA section 402 permit is not currently required 
for a discharge to a water, it is unlikely that this final rule will 
create a requirement for a new CWA permit. If a section 402 permit is 
currently required for a discharge to a water that is no longer 
jurisdictional under this final rule, that permit may no longer be 
required; it may still be required if the non-jurisdictional feature 
conveys a discharge of pollutants from a point source to a water of the 
United States; or it may still be required but the conditions 
associated with the permit may need to be modified, subject to 
applicable anti-backsliding permit requirements.
    This final rule includes the agencies' longstanding interpretation 
that ditches that satisfy any of the conditions of a paragraph (a)(1) 
water are waters of the United States as paragraph (a)(1) waters. This 
also includes tidal ditches and ditches that transport goods and 
services in interstate and foreign commerce, as those ditches--more 
commonly referred to as ``canals''--provide important commercial 
navigation services to the nation and operate more like natural waters 
traditionally understood as navigable. See, e.g., id. at 736 n.7 
(Scalia, J., plurality) (``a permanently flooded man-made ditch used 
for navigation is normally described, not as a `ditch,' but a `canal' 
''). The Los Angeles River, for example, is a water of the United 
States (having been determined to be a traditional navigable water) and 
is not excluded under paragraph (b) even where it has been channelized 
or concreted. Other examples include the St. Lawrence Seaway, the 
Sturgeon Bay Ship Canal, and the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal.
    Under the final rule, the agencies limit the term ``waters of the 
United States'' to apply to clearly defined ditches and related 
features that meet the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' definition 
and are not otherwise excluded. The agencies include ditches in the 
``tributary'' category that were constructed in or relocated a 
tributary and that continue to meet the flow conditions of the 
``tributary'' definition. The final rule retains the agencies' 
longstanding position that the alteration or relocation of a tributary 
does not modify the jurisdictional status of that water. Accordingly, 
ditches that relocate a tributary or are constructed in a tributary 
would be jurisdictional as tributaries. This provision is also 
consistent with the agencies' longstanding, historic position that non-
tidal ditches excavated in upland (and historically described as ``dry 
land'') are not jurisdictional.
    The agencies also include ditches in the ``tributary'' category 
that were constructed in a wetland that meets the definition of 
``adjacent wetland,'' as long as the ditch also satisfies the flow 
conditions of the ``tributary'' definition. As discussed above, this 
approach aligns the rule with the CWA section 404(f) permitting 
exemption for the maintenance but not construction of drainage ditches, 
and the associated concern expressed during the legislative process for 
the 1977 CWA amendments related to draining swamps and wetlands. The 
provision is restricted to ditches that satisfy the flow conditions of 
the definition of ``tributary,'' which aligns the treatment of 
jurisdictional ditches with natural tributaries. See Section III.D for 
a broader discussion of the ``tributary'' category.
    Ditches used to drain surface and shallow subsurface water from 
cropland are a quintessential example of the interconnected 
relationship between land and water resource management, as

[[Page 22298]]

is the case for managing water resources in the Western United States, 
conveying irrigation water to and from fields, and managing surface 
water runoff from lands and roads following precipitation events--all 
activities that rely on ditches. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) (characterizing ``regulation of land use [as] 
perhaps the quintessential state activity''). The majority of these 
ditches will not be jurisdictional under the final rule. This final 
rule therefore effectuates the clear policy directive from Congress to 
preserve and protect the primary authority of States over land and 
water resources within their borders. See 33 U.S.C. 1251(b), 1370.
    Commenters had differing views on the jurisdictional status of 
ditches. Many commenters supported the agencies' proposed approach to 
exclude many types of ditches, in particular those ditches constructed 
in upland which do not relocate a tributary. Some commenters stated 
that ditches should be jurisdictional even if constructed in upland if 
they have perennial flow. Some commenters recommended the agencies use 
the function of the ditch as the basis for an exclusion, such as all 
agricultural ditches, regardless of flow. The agencies disagree with 
the inclusion of upland ditches as jurisdictional waters aside from 
ditches that relocate a tributary or that meet the conditions of 
paragraph (a)(1). Such ditches are not part of the naturally occurring 
tributary system and are not something the agencies consider to be 
within their authority to regulate under the CWA. Upland ditches (other 
than those ditches that relocate a tributary or that meet the 
conditions of paragraph (a)(1)) do not fall under the ordinary meaning 
of the term ``waters'' within the scope of the CWA. In general, upland 
ditches were not jurisdictional for decades under the agencies' 
previous definitions of ``waters of the United States,'' and they are 
not jurisdictional under this final rule (with the exceptions noted 
above). The agencies considered identifying and excluding ditches based 
on the function or purpose of the ditch but concluded that such an 
approach could result in the regulation of ditches with ephemeral flow 
and the exclusion of ditches which are essentially relocated 
tributaries. Both outcomes would be contrary to the agencies' 
interpretation of the scope of CWA jurisdiction described throughout 
this notice.
    The agencies recognize that there have been questions over time 
about the jurisdictional status of ditches that are not maintained. 
Under this final rule, a ditch constructed in an adjacent wetland that 
contributes less than perennial or intermittent flow to a paragraph 
(a)(1) water in a typical year and that, due to lack of maintenance, 
gains wetland characteristics may be viewed as an adjacent wetland if 
it meets the definition of both ``wetlands'' under paragraph (c)(16) 
and ``adjacent wetlands'' under paragraph (c)(1). For example, a ditch 
constructed in an adjacent wetland that abuts a tributary may have 
portions that could be considered an adjacent wetland if the portions 
meet the definition of ``wetland.'' Only the portion or portions of the 
ditch that meets the definition of ``adjacent wetland'' are 
jurisdictional under this final rule. Other ditches not constructed in 
adjacent wetlands, or not otherwise covered by paragraph (a)(1) or (2), 
are excluded from jurisdiction under paragraph (b)(5). Such an approach 
aligns the treatment of ditches as tributaries and adjacent wetlands in 
this final rule with the section 404(f) permitting exemption for the 
maintenance but not construction of drainage ditches, and the 
associated concern expressed during the legislative process for the 
1977 amendments related to draining swamps and wetlands.
    The agencies also note that the maintenance of certain 
jurisdictional ditches may occur without permitting under the section 
404(f) exemptions of the CWA. Congress expressly excluded the 
construction and maintenance of irrigation ditches and the maintenance 
of drainage ditches (such as farm or roadside drainage ditches, many of 
which are also excluded from jurisdiction under this rule) from the 
permitting requirements of sections 301, 402, and 404. Discharges of 
dredged or fill material associated with those exempt activities into a 
ditch constructed in an adjacent wetland are therefore exempt from CWA 
permitting, even if those materials are transported down the ditch to 
other jurisdictional waters. The agencies note that section 404(f) has 
a recapture provision that is designed to override the permitting 
exemptions in section 404(f) if the otherwise exempt activity alters 
the previous use of a jurisdictional water through impairment of the 
circulation or flow of such waters or a reduction in the reach of such 
waters. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(2). The agencies are aware that in some 
circumstances, questions about the applicability of this recapture 
provision to ditches that develop wetland characteristics have created 
confusion. Some question whether the development of wetland 
characteristics in a ditch establishes a new use for the water feature 
such that the recapture provision overrides the ditch maintenance 
exemption. This interpretation would eliminate the maintenance 
exemption from performing the very purpose Congress intended--allowing 
the dredging of the bottom of the ditch to eliminate obstructions to 
flow, including vegetation, without the need for a permit.
    Many commenters noted that under the proposed rule, ditches must 
meet the definition of ``tributary'' to be jurisdictional, but because 
a ``ditch'' was defined as an artificial channel and a tributary was 
``naturally occurring,'' a ditch could never meet the definition of 
``tributary.'' The phrase ``naturally occurring'' does not exclude 
modified natural tributaries. The final rule clarifies that the 
``alteration'' or ``relocation'' of a tributary does not modify its 
jurisdictional status as long as it originally occurred naturally and 
continues to satisfy the flow conditions of the definition. In 
addition, the agencies have clarified in the final rule that the 
definition of ``tributary'' includes ditches that are constructed in or 
relocate tributaries so long as the ditch satisfies the flow conditions 
of the definition. A ``naturally occurring'' tributary may be altered 
in such a manner that it no longer appears ``natural'' and instead has 
been constructed to become a channel that conveys water. One such 
example is the Los Angeles River. Such a feature may satisfy the 
definition of ``ditch'' in this rule, but it also satisfies the 
definition of ``tributary,'' which overrides the general exclusion for 
ditches in paragraph (b)(5) as clarified in that exclusion. A ditch 
that straightens a tributary is considered to be ``constructed in'' a 
tributary, and the ditch would be jurisdictional as a tributary so long 
as it continues to meet the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' 
definition.
    The proposed rule required ditches to satisfy the ``conditions'' of 
the ``tributary'' definition to be jurisdictional as tributaries; 
however, the agencies have clarified in the final rule that the ditches 
must satisfy the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' definition to be 
jurisdictional as a tributary. This requirement allows for such ditches 
to be artificial (as in not ``naturally occurring'') and still be 
considered tributaries. The agencies' longstanding interpretation of 
the CWA is that tributaries that are altered or relocated tributaries 
are jurisdictional, and the agencies are not changing this 
interpretation. If a tributary is channelized, its bed and/or banks are

[[Page 22299]]

altered in some way, it is re-routed and entirely relocated, or its 
flow is modified through water diversions or through other means, then 
it remains jurisdictional under the final rule as long as it continues 
to satisfy the flow conditions in the definition of ``tributary.''
    Finally, the agencies note that starting in the early 2000s, 
certain ditches (such as roadside and agricultural ditches) have been 
regarded by the Corps as jurisdictional if water from another 
jurisdictional water, such as a perennial river, overflows into a ditch 
and extends the ordinary high water mark of the contributing water into 
the ditch. The Corps has then asserted jurisdiction over the entire 
``reach'' of the ditch regardless of the location of the ordinary high 
water mark in that portion of the ditch. Under this final rule, the 
agencies will continue the existing practice of regulating portions of 
otherwise non-jurisdictional ditches as waters of the United States 
based on the ordinary high water mark of the contributing water, but 
only up to the location of the ordinary high water mark, as mandated by 
existing Corps regulations. The agencies will not, however, assert 
jurisdiction over the entire ``reach'' of the ditch regardless of the 
location of the ordinary high water mark in that portion of the ditch. 
Those regulations establish the limits of jurisdiction of non-tidal 
waters of the United States as extending to the ordinary high water 
mark and not beyond. See 33 CFR 328.4(c). The agencies note that 
continuing the practice of regulating portions of otherwise non-
jurisdictional ditches based on the ordinary high water mark of 
contributing down-gradient waters will maintain better alignment with 
the rule's treatment of ditches subject to the ebb and flow of the tide 
as jurisdictional up to the tidal influence. It also provides some 
jurisdictional commonality with the treatment of certain lakes, ponds, 
and impoundments and adjacent wetlands as jurisdictional based on 
inundation by flooding from other jurisdictional waters.
3. How will the agencies implement the final rule?
    The agencies have determined that in order to be jurisdictional 
under this final rule, a ditch or other similar artificial feature 
would first need to meet the definition of ``ditch'' (i.e., a 
constructed or excavated channel used to convey water). Once a feature 
has been determined to meet the definition of ``ditch,'' a ditch would 
be considered a tributary where the ditch relocates a tributary, is 
constructed in a tributary, or is constructed in an adjacent wetland as 
long as the ditch satisfies the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' 
definition. The phrase ``constructed in an adjacent wetland'' refers to 
ditches originating in or constructed entirely within an adjacent 
wetland. The phrase also includes ditches that are constructed through 
adjacent wetlands, but jurisdiction over those ditches only includes 
those portions in adjacent wetlands and downstream to other 
jurisdictional waters, as long as those portions satisfy the flow 
conditions of paragraph (c)(12). Jurisdiction does not extend to upland 
portions of the ditch prior to entry into an adjacent wetland. 
Consistent with the exclusion in paragraph (b)(5), a ditch or portions 
thereof may also be considered an adjacent wetland where it was 
constructed in an adjacent wetland and the portion in that wetland 
meets the conditions of paragraph (c)(1).
    If ditches were tributaries prior to their construction and 
continue to meet the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' definition 
after construction, they are jurisdictional as tributaries under the 
final rule. The burden of proof lies with the agencies to demonstrate 
that a ditch relocated a tributary or was constructed in a tributary or 
an adjacent wetland. For example, if the agencies are not sure whether 
a ditch was constructed in a tributary given the physical appearance 
and functionality of the current ditch, the agencies will review the 
available evidence to attempt to discern when the ditch was constructed 
and the nature of the landscape before and after construction. If the 
evidence does not demonstrate that the ditch was located in a natural 
waterway, the ditch will be non-jurisdictional under this rule. If the 
evidence suggests that the ditch may have been constructed in a natural 
waterway, the agencies will review the available evidence to attempt to 
discern whether that natural waterway would qualify as a tributary 
under this final rule. Absent such evidence, the agencies will conclude 
that the ditch is non-jurisdictional. The same methods above for 
ditches constructed in a tributary apply when determining the 
jurisdictional status of a ditch constructed in an adjacent wetland. 
Note that under this final rule, a ditch cannot render an otherwise 
isolated wetland an ``adjacent wetland'' and thus jurisdictional on 
that basis, unless the ditch itself is a tributary. See Section III.G 
for further discussion regarding the jurisdictional status of wetlands 
under this final rule.
    Many commenters noted that historic conditions at the time of ditch 
construction could be difficult to identify, and some commenters 
requested more specific guidance and standards of evidence which would 
be used by the agencies. Along with field data and current information 
on the subject water, historic tools and resources may be used to 
determine the presence of a tributary or adjacent wetland at the time 
of ditch construction, and several sources of information may be 
required to make such determination. Information sources may include 
historic and current topographic maps, historic and recent aerial 
photographs, local and state records and surface water management 
plans, agricultural records, street maintenance data, precipitation 
records, historic permitting and jurisdictional determination records, 
certain hydrogeomorphological or soil indicators, wetlands and 
conservation programs and plans, and functional assessments and 
monitoring efforts. For example, when a USGS topographic map displays a 
tributary located upstream and downstream of a ditch, this may indicate 
that the ditch was constructed in or relocated a tributary. As another 
example, an NRCS soil survey displaying the presence of specific soil 
series which are linear in nature and generally parallel to a potential 
ditch may be indicative of alluvial deposits formed by a tributary in 
which the ditch was constructed.
    In addition, high-resolution aerial photographs may be used to 
identify whether there are or were characteristics of a tributary 
upstream or downstream of a ditch, indicating that a ditch may have 
been constructed in or relocated a tributary. In some cases, stream 
channel morphology is visible on the aerial photograph along with 
visible persistent water (e.g., multiple dates of aerial photography 
showing visible water) providing evidence of the flow classification 
necessary to identify a tributary under this rule at the time of ditch 
construction. However, characteristics of tributaries may not be 
visible in aerial photographs taken in areas with high shrub or tree 
cover, in which case aerial photographs or satellite imagery taken 
during ``leaf off'' may provide the most beneficial information. The 
burden of proof is on the agencies to determine the historic status of 
the ditch construction, and if evidence does not show that the ditch 
relocated a tributary, was constructed in a tributary, or was 
constructed in an adjacent wetland, then a determination would be made 
that the ditch is not jurisdictional under this final rule.

[[Page 22300]]

F. Lakes and Ponds, and Impoundments of Jurisdictional Waters

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    The final rule includes a category of ``waters of the United 
States'' that combines lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters into a single category. A lake, pond, or impoundment of a 
jurisdictional water meets the definition of ``waters of the United 
States'' if it (1) satisfies any of the conditions in paragraph (a)(1), 
i.e., it is a traditional navigable water like Lake Michigan or Lake 
Mead; (2) contributes surface water flow to the territorial seas or a 
traditional navigable water in a typical year either directly or 
through one or more jurisdictional waters; or (3) is inundated by 
flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year. A 
lake, pond, or impoundment of jurisdictional waters does not lose its 
jurisdictional status if it contributes surface water flow to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through a channelized 
non-jurisdictional surface water feature, through a culvert, dike, 
spillway, or similar artificial feature, or through a debris pile, 
boulder field, or similar natural feature.
    The agencies had proposed to include two separate categories for 
lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters, one for 
jurisdictional lakes and ponds and another for jurisdictional 
impoundments. The proposal followed the historic treatment of 
jurisdictional impoundments in treating them separately as ``waters of 
the United States.'' For lakes and ponds, the agencies proposed 
including them as a separate waterbody-specific category for the first 
time, more clearly tethering jurisdiction over those features to the 
text of the statute and applicable Supreme Court guidance.
    The agencies received a wide range of public comments on the 
proposed approach. Many commenters expressed support for including 
lakes and ponds as a separate category, while others also supported 
retaining separate treatment for impoundments of jurisdictional waters. 
Other commenters suggested that because lakes, ponds, and impoundments 
of jurisdictional waters are functionally similar they should be 
treated as a combined category. Some commenters stated that the 
proposal excluded too many lakes and ponds and said that the CWA should 
apply to such features regardless of their hydrologic surface 
connection to traditional navigable waters. Others argued that the 
proposal asserted jurisdiction over too many lakes and ponds. Some 
commenters stated that the agencies should adopt their longstanding 
treatment of jurisdictional impoundments, retaining jurisdiction over 
them even if they are completely disconnected from the tributary 
system. Others stated that the agencies should regulate impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters only if they continue to contribute flow to other 
jurisdictional waters, arguing for different flow regimes (i.e., 
perennial only, perennial and intermittent, any hydrologic connection). 
The agencies have considered the full range of comments and have 
finalized a rule that balances these diverse viewpoints, as discussed 
below, while streamlining and improving the clarity and applicability 
of the rule and remaining faithful to the agencies' statutory 
authorities as discussed in Section II.B.
2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comment
    Historically, the Corps' regulations specifically defined 
``lakes,'' ``ponds,'' and ``impoundments.'' In 1975, for example, the 
Corps published an interim final regulation, 40 FR 31320 (July 25, 
1975), that administratively defined ``lakes'' as ``natural bodies of 
water greater than five acres in surface area and all bodies of 
standing water created by the impounding of [waters of the United 
States]. Stock watering ponds and settling basins that are not created 
by such impoundments are not included.'' 40 FR 31325. In response to 
the 1975 regulation, the Corps received a number of comments and 
criticisms regarding the definition of ``lake.'' Some stated that the 
size limitation was too small, while others stated that it was too 
large. Others questioned the legality of imposing any size limitation 
on natural lakes, arguing that a lake fewer than five acres in size is 
as much a ``water of the United States'' as one that is more than five 
acres in size. In response, the Corps established two new definitions 
in 1977, one for ``natural lake'' and one for ``impoundment.'' 42 FR 
37129-30 (July 19, 1977). The Corps believed the two definitions would 
help alleviate confusion over the broad definition of ``lake'' provided 
in 1975. In the 1977 regulation, ``natural lake'' was defined as ``a 
natural depression fed by one or more streams and from which a stream 
may flow, that occurs due to the widening or natural blockage of river 
or stream, or that occurs in an isolated natural depression that is not 
part of a surface river or stream.'' 42 FR 37144. The Corps believed 
that definition reflected the three types of situations in which a 
natural lake may exist. The 1977 regulation defined ``impoundment'' as 
a ``standing body of open water created by artificially blocking or 
restricting the flow of a river, stream, or tidal area. As used in this 
regulation, the term does not include artificial lakes or ponds created 
by excavating and/or diking dry land to collect and retain water for 
such purposes as stock watering, irrigation, settling basins, cooling, 
or rice growing.'' 42 FR 37144. No size limitation was placed on the 
1977 definitions, and instead, the size limitations were used as a 
distinguishing element of the CWA section 404 nationwide permit 
program.
    In 1982, the Corps again published an interim final rule which 
combined ``natural lake'' and ``impoundment'' into one term, ``lake.'' 
47 FR 31794-95 (July 22, 1982). Commenters stated that impoundments 
should not be given the same status in the review process as natural 
lakes; however, the Corps believed that the evaluation of the public 
interest should be based on what the impacts are, and not on whether 
the area in question is natural or manmade. In the 1982 regulations, 
the Corps defined ``lake'' as

a standing body of open water that occurs in a natural depression 
fed by one or more streams from which a stream may flow, that occurs 
due to the widening or natural blockage or cutoff of a river or 
stream, or that occurs in an isolated natural depression that is not 
a part of a surface river or stream. The term also includes a 
standing body of open water created by artificially blocking or 
restricting the flow of a river, stream, or tidal area. As used in 
this regulation, the term does not include artificial lakes or ponds 
created by excavating and/or diking dry land to collect and retain 
water for such purposes as stock watering, irrigation, settling 
basins, cooling, or rice growing.

47 FR 31811. This same definition was retained when the Corps issued 
its consolidated set of regulations in 1986 (51 FR 41206, November 13, 
1986); however, the term ``lake'' was only retained in the part of the 
regulations related to ``Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill 
Material into Waters of the United States'' (33 CFR 323) and was not 
included in the new part specifically related to the definition of 
``waters of the United States'' (33 CFR 328). The definition of 
``lake'' remains in the Corps' current regulation at 33 CFR 323.2(b), 
and includes, ``a standing body of open water created by artificially 
blocking or restricting the flow of a river, stream, or tidal area'' 
but excludes, ``artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating and/or 
diking dry land to collect and retain water for such purposes as stock 
watering, irrigation, settling basins, cooling, or rice growing.''

[[Page 22301]]

    Until this final rule, the definition of ``waters of the United 
States'' has not included a separate category for lakes and ponds. To 
date, the agencies viewed non-isolated ``lakes and ponds'' as 
traditional navigable waters or as part of the tributary system where 
they met the tributary standard. For example, if a tributary enters a 
standing body of open water in a natural depression, such as a lake, 
which then outlets into a downstream tributary, the lake was considered 
part of the tributary system and the limits of jurisdiction were 
defined by the ordinary high water mark unless adjacent wetlands were 
present. Starting in the 1982 regulation, impoundments of waters 
otherwise defined as ``waters of the United States'' were included as a 
separate category of ``waters of the United States.'' See 40 CFR 
323.2(a)(4) (1983); 47 FR 31810 (July 22, 1982). In implementing its 
regulations, the Corps deemed impoundments ``waters of the United 
States'' when they were created from a water of the United States, 
still met another category of ``waters of the United States'' after 
creation, or were isolated with a nexus to interstate or foreign 
commerce.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional 
Determination Form Instructional Guidebook p. 58 at: https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll11/id/2310.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this rulemaking, the agencies proposed to maintain the 
``impoundments'' category of ``waters of the United States'' as it 
existed in the 1980s regulation and proposed to create a new category 
for certain lakes and ponds. The agencies requested comment as to 
whether a separate category was needed for impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters or whether those features could be captured in 
other categories of ``waters of the United States,'' such as the 
proposed ``lakes and ponds'' category. The agencies received comments 
in support of maintaining a separate category for impoundments, which 
stated that doing so would provide clarity because it is consistent 
with the agencies' longstanding practice. Commenters supporting a 
separate category for impoundments also stated that impoundments are 
fundamentally different from lakes and ponds and therefore should be 
regulated differently. Other commenters supported combining the two 
categories and stated that lakes, ponds, and impoundments function 
similarly on the landscape and therefore should be regulated 
consistently. These commenters also stated that the agencies do not 
have legal authority to regulate impounded features that do not 
otherwise satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the CWA. Other 
commenters generally found the term ``impoundment'' to be unclear and 
requested that the agencies include a definition of the term in the 
final rule. The agencies also requested comment on whether existing 
jurisdictional impoundments could become non-jurisdictional if they 
were no longer regulated as a separate category of ``waters of the 
United States.'' In response, some commenters raised a concern that, if 
impoundments are combined into a single category with lakes and ponds, 
adjacent wetlands that are impounded could lose their jurisdictional 
status.
    The agencies received comments stating that lakes and ponds should 
not constitute a separate category of jurisdictional waters because 
these features do not have a universally-accepted definition. Some 
commenters stated that the category of lakes and ponds may be redundant 
with other categories of waters, such as impoundments, and that the 
extent of wetland vegetation within a shallow pond can change over 
time, making it difficult to distinguish between wetland and pond 
boundaries in some cases. Other commenters agreed that lakes and ponds 
should comprise a separate category of jurisdictional waters to 
distinguish them from other features such as tributaries and 
impoundments. Commenters noted that a separate category could increase 
regulatory certainty, as jurisdictional requirements may be different 
for lakes and ponds as compared to other categories of waters.
    The agencies have considered these competing public comments and 
for the reasons provided below are finalizing the rule with a single 
category for lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters. 
The agencies agree with the commenters that stated lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments function similarly on the landscape. The final rule is 
consistent with the Corps' existing definition of ``lakes'' that 
includes impoundments, although its ``lakes'' definition is not for 
purposes of defining ``waters of the United States.'' See 33 CFR 
323.2(b). Like lakes and ponds, many impoundments are lentic systems 
(i.e., still waters) as opposed to tributaries, which are typically 
lotic systems (i.e., flowing waters). In many areas of the country, 
lakes and ponds exist only because rivers and other flowing features or 
wetlands have been impounded. Impounded features often provide similar 
commercial opportunities, water quality benefits, and wildlife habitat 
as compared with natural features. Similarly, both naturally occurring 
(but modified) and impounded waters and wetlands may have structures, 
such as culverts, weirs, or pumps, that are designed to manage the 
movement of water upstream and downstream of the structure. The 
agencies conclude that because lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters generally function similarly across the 
landscape, they should be regulated consistently.
    In the final rule, certain lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters are waters of the United States because these 
features are waters within the ordinary meaning of the term. As 
discussed in Section II.E, the plurality opinion in Rapanos stated that 
the term ``the waters'' is most commonly understood to refer to `` 
`streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, 
rivers, [and] lakes,' or `the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or 
floods, making up such streams or bodies.' '' 547 U.S. at 732 (quoting 
Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954) (emphasis 
added). The plurality also noted that its reference to ``relatively 
permanent'' waters did ``not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or 
lakes that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as 
drought.'' Id. at 732 n.5 (emphasis added).
    Under the final rule, lakes, ponds, and impoundments that meet the 
conditions to be a traditional navigable water are waters of the United 
States under paragraph (a)(1) of this final rule. These waters are 
discussed in more detail in Section III.B. It would be redundant to 
include additional regulatory text in the lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments category that declares such water features to be 
jurisdictional if they satisfy the paragraph (a)(1) standard, as the 
agencies had proposed for lakes and ponds. For clarity and simplicity, 
the agencies are not including that cross reference in the final rule.
    The final rule focuses in large part on the lake's, pond's, or 
impoundment's surface water connection to traditional navigable waters 
or the territorial seas so as to remain consistent with the overall 
structure and function of the CWA. See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 
n.3. This final rule presents a unifying legal theory for federal 
jurisdiction over waters and wetlands adjacent thereto that maintain a 
sufficient surface water connection to traditional navigable waters or 
the territorial seas and is supported by the legal precedent and 
principles articulated in this notice. As discussed in Section II, the 
agencies' authority to regulate ``the waters of the United

[[Page 22302]]

States'' is grounded in Congress' commerce power over navigation. Given 
the broad purposes of the CWA, the agencies can choose to regulate 
beyond waters more traditionally understood as navigable but must 
provide a reasonable basis for doing so. Lakes, ponds, and impoundments 
of jurisdictional waters that contribute surface water flow to 
traditional navigable waters or the territorial seas in a typical year 
fall within the statutory authorities delegated to the agencies by 
Congress. Federally regulating these features effectuates the 
objective, goals, and policies of the CWA. By contrast, the agencies 
conclude that when lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters do not contribute surface water flow to a traditional navigable 
water or the territorial seas in a typical year, such lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments have an insufficient connection to jurisdictional waters 
to warrant federal jurisdiction, unless they are inundated by flooding 
from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year. Regulating 
these features would push the outer limits of the agencies' delegated 
authorities and infringe on the powers of States to regulate their own 
land and water resources and therefore are not jurisdictional under 
this final rule. Through this combined category, the agencies are 
incorporating common principles from the Rapanos plurality and 
concurring opinions and respecting both the objective and the policy in 
CWA sections 101(a) and 101(b), respectively.
    Some commenters stated that only perennial lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments conveying perennial flow to a downstream paragraph (a)(1) 
water should be considered ``waters of the United States.'' Other 
commenters maintained that lakes, ponds, and impoundments conveying 
ephemeral flow to a downstream paragraph (a)(1) water should also be 
considered jurisdictional. The agencies proposed that perennial or 
intermittent flow from a lake or pond to a paragraph (a)(1) water 
either directly or indirectly through another jurisdictional water 
could establish jurisdiction. Some commenters expressed concern that it 
would be too difficult to determine the flow regime of features 
connecting lakes and ponds to waters of the United States. The agencies 
disagree that it would be too difficult to determine flow regime to 
establish jurisdiction for lakes and ponds as proposed, as the agencies 
have been using flow classifications to make jurisdictional 
determinations since the 2008 Rapanos Guidance was issued. However, 
upon further consideration, the agencies conclude that the proposed 
rule's requirement for perennial or intermittent flow from a lake or 
pond to a downstream paragraph (a)(1) water would have severed 
jurisdiction for certain relatively permanent lakes and ponds that are 
regularly ``connected to'' traditional navigable waters via surface 
water flow. Such regular surface water flows allow such waters to 
connect and become indistinguishable when flowing (i.e., they look like 
one water). In the final rule, the agencies have eliminated the flow 
classification requirement and instead have clarified the types of 
features that can provide a sufficient surface water connection between 
the lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water and a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year to warrant federal 
jurisdiction consistent with the CWA. This will simplify implementation 
of this category.
    As discussed in Section III.A.3, the agencies have determined that 
channelized non-jurisdictional ephemeral features are capable of 
providing a sufficient surface water connection and that they do not 
sever jurisdiction if they convey surface water flow between an 
upstream relatively permanent jurisdictional water and a downstream 
jurisdictional water in a typical year. In other words, an ephemeral 
feature between an upstream lake and a downstream jurisdictional water 
would not sever jurisdiction upstream if the ephemeral feature conveys 
channelized surface water flow sufficient to allow the upstream and 
downstream waters to mix in a typical year. By contrast, the agencies 
conclude that diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet flow 
over upland (non-jurisdictional features under paragraph (b)(4)) do not 
provide a sufficient surface water connection to downstream 
jurisdictional waters. Therefore, upstream lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments that are connected to downstream jurisdictional waters 
only by such flows are not jurisdictional. These types of connections 
do not satisfy the limiting principles articulated in SWANCC and the 
plurality and concurring opinions in Rapanos.
    Lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters often 
contribute surface water flow to other waters in a manner similar to a 
tributary. The agencies conclude that if these features contribute 
surface water flow to traditional navigable waters or the territorial 
seas in a typical year, they are jurisdictional for the same reasons 
that a tributary is jurisdictional. Lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters that do not contribute surface water flow to a 
paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year are not jurisdictional for the 
same reasons that streams are excluded if they do not contribute 
surface water flow to a paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year. See 
Section III.D of this notice for additional discussion on tributaries. 
The agencies do not explicitly define ``lakes and ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters'' in paragraph (c)(6) of the 
final rule to require those waters to be perennial and intermittent, as 
the agencies have required for tributaries in paragraph (c)(12). 
Nonetheless, ephemeral lakes, ponds, and impoundments are categorically 
excluded from jurisdiction under paragraph (b)(3) of the final rule. 
The key test for jurisdiction is that lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters must contribute surface water flow to a paragraph 
(a)(1) water in a typical year. Waters that flow only in direct 
response to precipitation do not satisfy the permanence element of the 
phrase ``relatively permanent bodies of water'' and are not 
jurisdictional under this final rule.
    The agencies conclude that the category of lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters in this final rule reflects the 
limits of the agencies' authority that the plurality and concurring 
opinions recognized in Rapanos. By requiring a contribution of surface 
water flow from a lake, a pond, or an impoundment of jurisdictional 
waters to a paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year, the agencies are 
establishing that a mere hydrologic connection cannot provide the basis 
for CWA jurisdiction; the connection must be a surface water connection 
that occurs in a typical year. Such connection to a paragraph (a)(1) 
water is sufficiently frequent to warrant federal jurisdiction. This 
requirement reflects the Rapanos plurality's description of a ``wate[r] 
of the United States'' as ``i.e., a relatively permanent body of water 
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.'' Id. at 742 
(emphasis added). It is also informed by the Rapanos plurality's 
rejection of the overly broad hydrologic connection theory that the 
Federal government had advanced in that case. The plurality concluded 
that the phrase ``the waters of the United States'' ``cannot bear the 
expansive meaning that the Corps would give it,'' id. at 732, and 
rejected the notion that ``even the most insubstantial hydrologic 
connection may be held to constitute a `significant nexus.' '' Id. at 
728. Justice Kennedy

[[Page 22303]]

further established that ``mere hydrologic connection should not 
suffice in all cases; the connection may be too insubstantial for the 
hydrologic linkage to establish the required nexus with navigable 
waters as traditionally understood.'' Id. at 784-85.
    An impoundment may lose its surface water connection to a 
downstream jurisdictional water due to any number of reasons, including 
consumptive use or evaporation or due to the structure that was 
constructed to impound the water. In the proposed rule, all 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters would be jurisdictional, 
regardless of any surface water connection to a downstream (a)(1) 
water. The agencies supported the proposed rule in part by citing the 
Supreme Court's decision in S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of 
Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370 (2006), for the proposition that 
impounding a jurisdictional water does not change its status as a 
``water of the United States.'' 84 FR 4154, 4172 (Feb. 14, 2019), 
citing S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 379 n.5. The agencies solicited 
comment on the category of ``impoundments'' in the proposed rule, 
including whether impoundments that release water downstream, but do so 
less than intermittently, should remain jurisdictional. Some commenters 
agreed that S.D. Warren Co. would authorize disconnected and isolated 
impounded waters to remain jurisdictional and supported the agencies' 
longstanding position that such impoundments of waters of the United 
States remain jurisdictional. Other commenters stated that impoundments 
that lack a surface connection to a downstream jurisdictional water 
should not be waters of the United States. The agencies conclude that 
an impounded water that lacks a sufficient surface water connection to 
a downstream paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year is not a water of 
the United States. This interpretation of federal regulatory authority 
over impoundments is most consistent with the scope of authority 
granted by Congress and the legal principles articulated in Section 
II.E of this notice. On further review and consideration, the agencies 
observe that S.D. Warren Co. analyzes the definition of ``discharge'' 
in CWA section 502(16) but does not grapple with or address the subject 
of this rulemaking--the definition of ``waters of the United States.'' 
The cited footnote in that case merely states that exerting private 
control over water flow (an everyday occurrence in many parts of this 
country) does not ``denationalize'' otherwise national waters. S.D. 
Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 379 n.5 (``[W]e [cannot] agree that one can 
denationalize national waters by exerting private control over 
them.''). The case did not address what happens when a water of the 
United States is so altered as to significantly modify its connection 
to traditional navigable waters, nor did the cases cited in that 
opinion. For example, waters of the United States are regularly 
defederalized under the section 404 permitting program--in some 
instances by transforming portions of traditional navigable waters for 
harbor development, and jurisdictional wetlands or small tributaries to 
fast land for communities and energy development, and in other 
instances by cutting off or separating part of jurisdictional waters 
that nonetheless remain waters, as is the case with certain causeway 
construction or application of the waste treatment exclusion for 
natural resource development projects. Furthermore, the agencies are 
aware of no decision of the Supreme Court that has ruled that the 
indelibly navigable principle applies to all waters of the United 
States, although the principle does apply to certain traditional 
navigable waters or any decision that would prohibit the United States 
from consenting to defederalization of a water by a lawfully issued 
section 404 permit. In this final rule, the agencies have defined 
``waters of the United States'' not to include a water--including an 
impoundment of a jurisdictional water--that lacks a sufficient surface 
water connection to a downstream traditional navigable water, 
consistent with the principles articulated in SWANCC. See SWANCC, 531 
U.S. at 168 n.3. Impoundments of traditional navigable waters that 
continue to meet the criteria in paragraph (a)(1) of this final rule 
would remain jurisdictional under the CWA. S.D. Warren is not to the 
contrary.
    The agencies recognize that many lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters may be connected to other jurisdictional waters 
by a variety of natural and artificial non-jurisdictional features. The 
agencies have specified under this final rule that lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters do not lose their jurisdictional 
status if they contribute surface water flow to a downstream 
jurisdictional water in a typical year through a channelized non-
jurisdictional surface water feature, through a culvert, dike, 
spillway, or similar artificial feature, or through a debris pile, 
boulder field, or similar natural feature. The agencies describe in 
Section III.A.3 of this notice that such non-jurisdictional features do 
not sever jurisdiction when surface water flow is conveyed in a typical 
year, and that such flow leads to mixing between an upstream relatively 
permanent jurisdictional water and a downstream jurisdictional water. 
Consistent with this discussion, a non-jurisdictional feature remains 
non-jurisdictional even if it provides a channelized surface water 
connection between jurisdictional waters in a typical year.
    Lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters that are 
inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a 
typical year are also waters of the United States under this final 
rule. See Rapanos, 474 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., plurality) (recognizing 
that the term ``the waters'' within ``the waters of the United States'' 
includes ``the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making 
up . . . streams or bodies'') (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted); id. at 770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (``the 
term `waters' may mean `flood or inundation' events that are 
impermanent by definition'') (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). During times of inundation by flooding from a paragraph 
(a)(1) through (3) water to a lake, pond, or impoundment of 
jurisdictional waters in a typical year, such a water is 
indistinguishable from the jurisdictional water from which the flooding 
originates.
    Inundation sufficient to establish jurisdiction occurs only in one 
direction, from the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water to the lake, 
pond or impoundment of jurisdictional waters, rendering the feature 
``itself a part of those waters'' ``that are `waters of the United 
States' in their own right.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740, 742 (Scalia, 
J., plurality). The agencies received a comment that the inundation 
requirement should create jurisdiction if it occurs in either or both 
directions, rather than just from a jurisdictional water to a lake, 
pond or impoundment. For the reasons discussed above, the agencies have 
concluded that in order to be considered part of the tributary system, 
the surface water flow from a lake, pond, or impoundment of 
jurisdictional waters to a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water needs to 
occur with sufficient frequency that the flow is channelized in a 
typical year. Non-channelized diffuse overland flow from an otherwise 
isolated waterbody lacks the indicia of permanence and sufficiency 
necessary to establish jurisdiction, as described in more detail in 
Section III.A.3. Mere hydrologic surface connection is not enough. Id. 
at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the

[[Page 22304]]

judgment). Flooding in a typical year from a paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) water to a lake, pond, or impoundment of jurisdictional waters 
(that is not otherwise jurisdictional under the tests described above) 
is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. That is because inundation by 
flooding in a typical year makes the lake, pond or impoundment of 
jurisdictional waters ``part of'' the jurisdictional water, as may 
occur, for example, when an oxbow lake is located in a former channel 
of a meandering river. The agencies note, however, that oxbow lakes are 
not categorically jurisdictional under the final rule; to be 
jurisdictional, they must satisfy one or more of the conditions of 
paragraph (c)(6).
    Some commenters expressed concern that, as proposed, lakes and 
ponds may be considered jurisdictional due to a single flood event in a 
typical year and suggested incorporating a flood duration requirement 
so that brief, infrequent floods from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
water would not cause a lake or pond to become jurisdictional. Under 
the final rule, inundation by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) water to a lake, pond, or impoundment of jurisdictional waters can 
occur as a result of seasonal or permanent flooding, for example, so 
long as flood waters connect such waters to a paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) water in a typical year and have as their source a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water. The agencies are not including a minimum number of 
flood events or duration of flooding that must take place in the course 
of a typical year, due to the need to accommodate regional hydrological 
differences. However, a mere hydrologic connection between a non-
navigable, isolated lake, pond, or impoundment and a jurisdictional 
water is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under this rule. For 
instance, a lake that may be connected to a water of the United States 
by flooding, on average, once every 100 years is not jurisdictional. To 
be jurisdictional, a lake, pond, or impoundment of jurisdictional 
waters that is otherwise physically separated from a water of the 
United States must be inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water at least once during a typical year. Oxbow lakes, for 
example, may be jurisdictional under this category via inundation where 
they otherwise may not satisfy the flow contribution elements of 
paragraph (c)(6) of the final rule.
    The agencies have determined that an ecological connection between 
physically separated lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters and other paragraph (a)(1) through (3) waters is insufficient to 
assert jurisdiction over such waters. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 741-42 
(Scalia, J., plurality) (``SWANCC found such ecological consideration 
irrelevant to the question whether physically isolated waters come 
within the Corps' jurisdiction.''). Some commenters requested that the 
agencies eliminate a case-specific ``significant nexus'' analysis for 
lakes and ponds, while other commenters supported maintaining a 
``significant nexus'' analysis and identifying jurisdictional lakes and 
ponds based on ecological connections to water features such as 
traditional navigable waters and the territorial seas. The agencies 
have concluded that the lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters category should replace existing procedures that 
may depend on a case-specific ``significant nexus'' analysis of the 
relationship between a particular water feature and downstream 
traditional navigable waters. Lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters constitute a category of ``waters of the United 
States'' that is more consistent and predictable for members of the 
public and regulatory agencies to implement than a case-specific 
``significant nexus'' analysis.
    The approach to lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters in this final rule is also intended to avoid ``impairing or in 
any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with 
respect to waters (including boundary waters) of such States.'' 33 
U.S.C. 1370. For example, lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters are not waters of the United States if they do 
not contribute surface water flow to a traditional navigable water in a 
typical year or are not inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water in a typical year. Rather, they are water resources 
of the States (or Tribes), and therefore States have an inherent 
interest in managing such features pursuant to the powers reserved to 
the States under the Constitution (and Tribes have analogous interests 
as well). See., e.g., North Dakota, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 1059. States and 
Tribes may therefore address such features under their own laws to the 
extent they deem appropriate.
    To address comments that combining the lakes and ponds category 
with impoundments could result in impounded adjacent wetlands losing 
jurisdiction, the agencies have made minor modifications to the final 
regulatory text from the proposal. Under the final rule, impoundments 
of wetlands are jurisdictional as ``impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters'' if the wetlands being impounded first meet the definition of 
``adjacent wetlands'' and then meet the conditions of the lakes, ponds, 
and impoundments of jurisdictional waters category. For example, under 
the final rule, impounded adjacent wetlands are jurisdictional as 
``impoundments of jurisdictional waters'' if they form a feature that 
meets the conditions of the lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters category. That is, adjacent wetlands that are 
impounded frequently become ponds and may lose their jurisdictional 
status as adjacent wetlands because they no longer satisfy all three 
factors of the ``wetlands'' definition. The final rule would ensure 
that these waters remain jurisdictional if they satisfy the elements of 
paragraph (c)(6). If those impounded wetlands, however, continue to 
satisfy the definition of ``adjacent wetlands,'' they would remain 
jurisdictional as adjacent wetlands. In the uncommon circumstance where 
an impoundment completely severs the surface water connection between 
an adjacent wetland and a jurisdictional water in a typical year, such 
that the feature no longer satisfies the definition of ``adjacent 
wetlands,'' the wetland would no longer be jurisdictional under this 
final rule. Section III.G of this notice provides additional discussion 
on adjacent wetlands.
    The agencies acknowledge that this final rule represents a change 
from the agencies' longstanding practice concerning impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters. Under the 2019 Rule, notwithstanding the 
principles of SWANCC, impoundments of jurisdictional waters would be 
jurisdictional under the separate impoundments category regardless of 
any surface water connection to a downstream jurisdictional water. The 
agencies now conclude that this prior interpretation is not supported 
by the text, structure, or legislative history of the CWA, Supreme 
Court precedent, or the foundational legal principles of this final 
rule. See Section II.E. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion also 
indicates that completely isolated waters are too remote to be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause powers. See 547 U.S. at 779 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (``Nevertheless, the word 
`navigable' in the Act must be given some effect. Thus, in SWANCC the 
Court rejected the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over isolated ponds 
and mudflats bearing no evident connection to navigable-in-fact 
waters.'' (internal citation omitted)). The

[[Page 22305]]

agencies conclude that this principle should be applied to all waters, 
whether they are impoundments or not. The final rule is also consistent 
with the agencies' longstanding practice that a jurisdictional water 
may be altered and made non-jurisdictional by obtaining a CWA section 
404 permit to place fill material in a wetland or other water, thereby 
converting that water to fast land.
    Some commenters requested the agencies define the terms ``lake'' 
and ``pond,'' but other commenters stated that there were deficiencies 
in the proposed alternatives for defining ``lakes'' and ``ponds'' such 
as the definitions based on size, depth, or the Cowardin classification 
system developed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Although 
regional naming conventions may vary, the agencies conclude that the 
terms ``lake'' and ``pond'' are well-understood and that additional 
regulatory definitions beyond what is included in the final rule are 
not necessary. Rather than defining ``lakes'' and ``ponds'' based on 
their geomorphology or artificial or natural status, the agencies have 
instead defined surface water characteristics and conditions in 
paragraph (c)(6) for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over lakes 
and ponds (i.e., standing bodies of open water that contribute surface 
water flow to traditional navigable waters or are inundated by flooding 
from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year). The same 
is true for the term ``impoundment,'' which some commenters suggested 
is unclear. The agencies intend the term ``impoundment,'' as it is used 
in this rule and as it is used in common parlance, to mean a standing 
body of open water that is formed by blocking or restricting the flow 
of a pre-existing river, stream, or tidal area or by blocking or 
restricting the water of a pre-existing wetland, lake, or pond. Compare 
Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary (1994) (defining 
``impound'' to mean to ``confine in'' or to ``accumulate (water) in a 
reservoir''). This is generally consistent with the Corps' current 
definition in 33 CFR 323.2(b) and should provide sufficient guidance 
for the public to understand the regulation. An impoundment that holds 
back, blocks, or restricts the flow of a water of the United States is 
considered ``constructed in'' that water for purposes of this final 
rule, even if portions of the impounded water also cover areas that 
were originally upland or non-jurisdictional waters.
3. How will the agencies implement the final rule?
    Lakes and ponds are naturally formed through a variety of events, 
including glacial, tectonic, and volcanic activity. Natural lakes and 
ponds can also be subsequently modified to change surface elevation, 
depth, and size. In some parts of the country these modified lakes and 
ponds are referred to as impoundments, whether they impound or enlarge 
an existing water of the United States or modify a non-jurisdictional 
water; in other areas, these may retain lake or pond nomenclature. 
Lakes, ponds, and impoundments can be man-made features constructed for 
industrial and agricultural uses, power generation, domestic water 
supply, or for aesthetic or recreational purposes. Many lakes, ponds, 
and impoundments have at least one outflow in the form of a river, 
stream, or drain which maintain a feature's surface water level or 
stage by allowing excess water to discharge. Some lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments do not have an outflow and lose water solely by 
evaporation, underground seepage, or consumptive use. Individual lakes, 
ponds and impoundments range in size. Ponds are generally smaller in 
size than lakes, but regional naming conventions vary. Lakes are also 
generally deeper than ponds. Like lakes and ponds, impoundments can be 
large or small, deep or shallow. Some of these waters are 
jurisdictional under paragraph (a)(3) of the final rule, as discussed 
above, while others are non-jurisdictional, particularly many 
artificial lakes and ponds pursuant to paragraph (b), as discussed in 
Section III.H.
    Lakes, ponds, and impoundments are familiar types of waters that 
can be easily identified by landowners; the agencies; local, State, and 
tribal governments; consultants; and others. The tools discussed in 
Section III.D of this notice to identify the presence of a potential 
tributary can also be helpful to establish the presence of a lake, 
pond, or impoundment. For example, indication of an enclosed body of 
water on a USGS topographic map or certain waterbody types in the NHD 
data may show that a lake, pond, or impoundment is present. USGS 
topographic maps often include different symbols to indicate perennial 
and intermittent lakes and ponds where such features are mapped. See 
``Topographic Map Symbols,'' available at https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/TopographicMapSymbols/topomapsymbols.pdf. Waterbodies such as perennial 
and intermittent lakes and ponds, and reservoirs are also represented 
in NHDWaterbody, where such features are mapped.\52\ The NHD portrays 
the spatial geometry and the attributes of the features. However, as 
the agencies recognize in Section IV, these tools were not designed to 
indicate the jurisdictional status of waters of the United States, and 
limitations associated with these maps and data sets may require field-
verification for accuracy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See ``Complete FCode list for NHD Hydrography Features,'' 
available at https://nhd.usgs.gov/userGuide/Robohelpfiles/NHD_User_Guide/Feature_Catalog/Hydrography_Dataset/Complete_FCode_List.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After identifying a lake, pond, or impoundment, the next step is to 
determine whether the lake, pond, or impoundment meets the conditions 
of a paragraph (a)(1) water under the final rule and would therefore be 
regulated under that category. Consistent with the agencies' 
longstanding regulation and practice, paragraph (a)(3) waters do not 
include impoundments of non-jurisdictional waters. If an impoundment 
does not meet the conditions of a paragraph (a)(1) water, then the 
agencies must establish whether the feature is an impoundment of a 
jurisdictional water. The agencies may use historical and current 
sources of information such as construction plans, permit records, 
aerial photography, maps, and remote sensing data, as well as 
topographic information or relevant field data from site visits, to 
determine whether an impoundment was created by impounding a 
jurisdictional water such as a tributary or adjacent wetland. In making 
a jurisdictional determination under this rule, the agencies would 
evaluate the open body of water or wetland.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ The agencies note that the construction of a physical 
structure that impounds a body of water (e.g., a dam, berm, or weir) 
may require a CWA section 404 permit (e.g., when a discharge of 
dredged or fill material into a jurisdictional water occurs during 
construction of the impounding structure), in addition to other 
authorizations which may be required, such as a RHA section 9 or 
section 10 permit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If a lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water does not 
meet the conditions of a paragraph (a)(1) water, then the agencies 
would determine whether the water directly or indirectly contributes 
surface water flow to a paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical year, or is 
inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a 
typical year. The agencies could use similar sources of information 
indicating the existence of a lake, pond, or impoundment to determine 
whether the water feature contributes surface water flow to a paragraph 
(a)(1) water in

[[Page 22306]]

a typical year. Many commenters requested that the agencies identify 
specific sources of information that would be used to determine whether 
lakes, ponds, and impoundments contribute surface water flow to a water 
of the United States. A combination of the tools and other resources 
described in Section III.D.3 may be used to establish jurisdiction of a 
lake, pond, or impoundment. For instance, if utilizing the NHD, 
waterbodies that are classified as a lake/pond or a reservoir in the 
dataset may have NHDFlowline artificial paths represented as flowing 
through them to complete a stream network and as a surrogate for 
general water flow direction. Combining this information with site 
visits, climate data, and surrounding hydrology data can yield greater 
certainty as to the presence of a lake, pond, or impoundment, and as to 
whether the feature contributes surface water flow to a downstream 
paragraph (a)(1) water in typical year. These tools may also be helpful 
in indicating whether a lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional 
water is part of the tributary network of a paragraph (a)(1) water. For 
example, the presence of a ``blue line stream'' on USGS topographic or 
NHD maps which extends from the feature may indicate that the lake, 
pond, or impoundment contributes surface water flow, directly or 
indirectly through a paragraph (a)(2) through (4) water, to a paragraph 
(a)(1) water in a typical year, which may indicate that the feature is 
jurisdictional. Other complementary data sources that can be used in 
conjunction with maps to determine the potential jurisdictional status 
of a lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water include gage 
data, bathymetry data, elevation data, spillway height, historic water 
flow records, flood predictions, statistical evidence, aerial 
photographs, remote sensing data, and hydrologic and non-hydrologic 
field observations.
    A lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water does not 
lose its jurisdictional status if it contributes surface water flow to 
a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through a 
channelized non-jurisdictional surface water feature; through a 
culvert, dike, spillway, or similar artificial feature; or through a 
debris pile, boulder field, or similar natural feature. Under the final 
rule, the agencies have determined that lakes, ponds, and impoundments 
of jurisdictional waters may be jurisdictional if they have a 
channelized surface water connection to a paragraph (a)(1) water in a 
typical year. To determine the existence of channelized non-
jurisdictional surface water features (e.g., ephemeral streams or non-
jurisdictional ditches), culverts, dikes, spillways, or similar 
artificial features, or debris piles, boulder field, or similar natural 
features, the agencies may use remote sensing data, aerial photography, 
and field observations. The agencies may also rely on elevation data, 
aerial photography, remote sensing data, hydrologic models, flow data, 
field indicators, operation records, and visual observations to 
determine whether flow likely occurs through these non-jurisdictional 
water features in a typical year.
    Lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters that are 
inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a 
typical year are also waters of the United States under this rule. 
Commenters noted that field observations, sometimes based on multiple 
site visits, may be necessary to determine that a surface water 
connection exists for lakes and ponds as a result of flooding from a 
traditional navigable water, tributary, or other jurisdictional lake or 
pond, or jurisdictional impoundment. Many commenters also stated that 
establishing a surface water connection based on inundation from a 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water to a lake or pond in a typical year 
may be difficult to implement. The agencies disagree with this 
suggestion as they are frequently asked to complete jurisdictional 
determinations when surface water connections are not present. In these 
cases, the agencies have used a variety of data sources that do not 
depend on visual observations of inundation, including but not limited 
to flood records, precipitation data, elevation data, aerial 
photography, remote sensing data, and hydrologic models. The agencies 
will complement remote tools with hydrologic and non-hydrologic field 
observations when necessary to determine the presence of a 
jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment due to inundation by flooding 
from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water.
    The agencies recognize that artificial features such as a dike or 
berm could prevent a lake or pond from releasing surface water 
downstream to a water of the United States in a typical year. 
Similarly, a dam could prevent an impounded water from releasing 
surface water downstream to a water of the United States in a typical 
year. Under the final rule, lakes, ponds, and impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters are jurisdictional if they meet the conditions of 
paragraph (c)(6), including contributing surface water flow to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year. Such contribution 
could occur through pumps, flood gates, reservoir releases, or other 
mechanisms. The agencies do not distinguish between natural and 
artificially-manipulated surface water flow that connects a lake, pond, 
or impoundment with another water of the United States in a typical 
year. Furthermore, if an artificial feature such as a dike or dam 
causes a channelized downstream perennial or intermittent feature to 
become ephemeral, that channelized ephemeral feature would be non-
jurisdictional under paragraph (b)(3) but would not sever jurisdiction 
of upstream features as long as it conveys surface water flow in a 
typical year to a downstream paragraph (a)(1) water.
    In Section III.A.1 of this notice, the agencies describe a variety 
of methods and data sources that could be used to determine whether 
conditions meet the definition of ``typical year.'' For instance, the 
agencies have developed and utilized a method for determining normal 
precipitation conditions. The agencies currently use professional 
judgment and a weight of evidence approach as they consider 
precipitation normalcy along with other available data sources. The 
agencies recognize the need to consider seasonality and timing of 
surface water connections in utilizing the data sources described above 
and determining whether lakes, ponds, and impoundments meet the 
conditions of paragraph (c)(6) in the final rule. For example, a lake, 
pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water may be inundated by 
flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water only during 
seasonally wet conditions. If the agencies complete a jurisdictional 
determination during seasonally dry conditions and do not visually 
observe inundation, they may use the multiple tools described above, 
including remote- and field-based hydrologic and non-hydrologic 
indicators, to determine whether inundation from flooding would 
typically occur during seasonally wet conditions.
    A few commenters discouraged the agencies from relying solely on 
one source of data and recommended that mapping sources should be 
paired with remote sensing and field verification data. As described 
above, the agencies encourage the use of multiple complementary data 
sources to establish the presence of lakes, ponds, and impoundments and 
to determine their jurisdictional status. For example, waterbody and 
flowline features in the NHD could be used to determine the

[[Page 22307]]

likelihood of an existing lake, pond, or impoundment that has a direct 
or indirect surface water connection to a paragraph (a)(1) water. A 
site visit could then confirm the existence of the lake, pond, or 
impoundment, and aerial photography and physical field indicators or 
local knowledge could establish the likelihood of recent inundation. 
Finally, the agencies could determine whether climatic conditions meet 
the definition of ``typical year'' using, for example, the method for 
determining normal precipitation conditions described in Section 
III.A.1 of this notice, combined with other relevant sources of 
information such as the Palmer Drought Severity Index. Many commenters 
noted that the availability of data records and tools may vary across 
the country. The agencies have determined that the information provided 
by the tools described herein and other available information will vary 
in availability and accuracy in different parts of the country, and 
will take that into account when utilizing their expert judgment in 
evaluating the information prior to determining the jurisdictional 
status of a lake, pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water.
    Some commenters asked whether features could simultaneously be 
excluded from regulation as artificial lakes and ponds, but also meet 
the definition of jurisdictional impoundments. As discussed in Section 
III.H of this notice, paragraph (b)(8) of the final rule specifies that 
the artificial lakes and ponds exclusion does not apply to 
jurisdictional impoundments. An artificial lake or pond will be 
excluded even if it satisfies the definition in paragraph (c)(6), so 
long as it was constructed or excavated in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters and is not a jurisdictional impoundment. In other 
words, paragraph (b)(8) is designed to exclude artificial lakes and 
ponds that are constructed in upland or non-jurisdictional waters, even 
where they may have a surface water connection to a downstream 
jurisdictional water in a typical year.

G. Adjacent Wetlands

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    The agencies are finalizing a category of ``waters of the United 
States'' to include all adjacent wetlands to: The territorial seas and 
traditional navigable waters (paragraph (a)(1) waters); tributaries to 
those waters (paragraph (a)(2) waters); and lakes, ponds, and 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters (paragraph (a)(3) waters). In 
this final rule, the agencies define the term ``adjacent wetlands'' to 
mean wetlands that: (1) Abut a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water; (2) 
are inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in 
a typical year; (3) are physically separated from a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water only by a natural berm, bank, dune, or similar 
natural feature; or (4) are physically separated from a paragraph 
(a)(1) through (3) water only by an artificial dike, barrier, or 
similar artificial structure so long as that structure allows for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection between the wetlands and the 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year, such as through a 
culvert, flood or tide gate, pump, or similar artificial feature. Under 
the final rule, an adjacent wetland is jurisdictional in its entirety 
when a road or similar artificial structure (i.e., not naturally 
occurring) divides the wetland, as long as the structure allows for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection through or over that structure in 
a typical year.
    By retaining the term ``adjacent'' in the definition from the 
longstanding regulations, the agencies are continuing to use 
terminology that is familiar to the agencies and the regulated public. 
As proposed, however, the agencies are not including the terms 
``bordering, contiguous, or neighboring'' from the previous regulations 
to reduce the potential confusion associated with using three seemingly 
similar terms in the same definition. See, e.g., U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Waters and Wetlands, GAO-04-297, at 10 (Feb. 2004) 
(``The regulations specify that adjacent means `bordering, contiguous, 
or neighboring'. . . . This definition of adjacency leaves some degree 
of interpretation to the Corps districts.''); see also id. at 3 
(``Districts apply different approaches to identify wetlands that are 
adjacent to other waters of the United States and are subject to 
federal regulation.''). Instead, the agencies use the term ``abut'' to 
clearly identify those waters that are inseparably bound up with other 
jurisdictional waters, in addition to the other clear tests for 
adjacency in this final rule.
    The final rule adopts categorical tests for adjacency that are like 
those included in the proposal, but upon consideration of the public 
comments received, the agencies have enhanced the final definition to 
improve its clarity and ease of implementation, and to include 
additional wetlands that, upon further consideration, the agencies 
conclude should be subject to federal jurisdiction. Like the proposal, 
adjacent wetlands are those that abut or otherwise have a direct 
hydrologic surface connection to other covered waters in a typical 
year. But the agencies have modified the test to maintain jurisdiction 
over wetlands separated from other jurisdictional waters only by 
natural berms, banks, or dunes as those natural separations are 
evidence of a dynamic and regular direct hydrologic surface connection 
between the resources based on the agencies' technical expertise and 
experience. The agencies have also simplified and expanded the type of 
surface water connections that are not jurisdictional themselves but 
can nevertheless maintain jurisdictional connectivity between wetlands 
and other waters of the United States that are separated only by 
artificial dikes and other barriers. The agencies have also expanded 
jurisdiction, as compared to the proposal, over wetland complexes that 
are crossed by roads and similar structures if those structures allow 
for a surface water connection between the segregated wetland portions 
(such as through a culvert through a roadway) in a typical year.
    Many commenters supported the proposal as establishing an 
appropriate balance between Federal and State jurisdiction over 
wetlands. Others stated that the proposal regulated too broadly. Still 
others asserted that the proposal too narrowly interpreted the 
agencies' CWA authorities and restricted jurisdiction over many 
ecologically important wetlands. The agencies have considered the 
diverse range of comments and are finalizing a rule that results in a 
balance of these competing views while adhering to the agencies' 
delegated authorities under the CWA and avoiding the outer limits of 
such authority.
    Like the proposed rule, this final rule maintains the longstanding 
regulatory definition of ``wetlands'' in paragraph (c)(16) to mean 
``those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground 
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under 
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically 
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally 
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.'' This is a well-
established definition that is familiar to regulators, environmental 
consultants, and the scientific community. The agencies received many 
public comments urging them to maintain this definition, while certain 
other commenters suggested the agencies adopt different formulations. 
In this final rule, the agencies have retained the longstanding 
definition unchanged, as proposed.

[[Page 22308]]

    Consistent with the proposal, the agencies are finalizing a 
definition of ``upland'' to mean any land area above the ordinary high 
water mark or high tide line that does not satisfy all three wetland 
factors (i.e., hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, and hydric soils 
\54\) under normal circumstances, as described in the Corps' 1987 
Wetlands Delineation Manual. Features that were once wetlands but have 
been naturally transformed or lawfully converted to upland (e.g., in 
compliance with a CWA section 404 permit) are considered upland under 
the final rule. For convenience, the agencies are including the 
existing Corps definitions for ``ordinary high water mark'' and ``high 
tide line'' from 33 CFR 328.3 in the EPA's regulations, as those terms 
are used in the final definition of ``upland.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See Corps' 1987 Wetlands Delineation Manual at 9-10 
(``Wetlands have the following general diagnostic environmental 
characteristics: (1) Vegetation. The prevalent vegetation consists 
of macrophytes that are typically adapted to areas having hydrologic 
and soil conditions . . . Hydrophytic species, due to morphological, 
physiological, and/or reproductive adaptation(s), have the ability 
to grow, effectively compete, reproduce, and/or persist in anaerobic 
soil conditions. . . . (2) Soil. Soils are present and have been 
classified as hydric, or they possess characteristics that are 
associated with reducing soil conditions. . . . (3) Hydrology. The 
area is inundated either permanently or periodically at mean water 
depths <=6.6 ft. or the soil is saturated to the surface at some 
time during the growing season of the prevalent vegetation.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comments
    Under the final rule, the ``adjacent wetlands'' definition is based 
on the text, structure, and legislative history of the CWA and on the 
core principles and concepts set forth in the three Supreme Court cases 
addressing the scope of the phrase ``the waters of the United States,'' 
as discussed at length in Section II.E.2. Adjacent wetlands form part 
of the waters of the United States if they are ``inseparably bound up 
with the `waters' of the United States.'' Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 
at 134. Non-adjacent wetlands, on the other hand, are isolated from 
waters of the United States and are non-jurisdictional for the reasons 
discussed below and in Section III.A of this notice. This rule's 
categorical treatment of adjacent wetlands balances the objective in 
CWA section 101(a) to ``restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the nation's waters,'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), 
and the clear policy direction in CWA section 101(b) to ``recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States 
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution [and] to plan for the 
development and use (including restoration, preservation, and 
enhancement) of land and water resources . . . .'' 33 U.S.C. 1251(b); 
see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., plurality). Under this 
final rule, wetlands that do not abut a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
water, are not inundated in a typical year by a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water, or are physically separated from a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water by more than a natural barrier and lack a direct 
hydrologic surface connection to a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water 
in a typical year, as described in paragraph (c)(1), are not 
inseparably bound up with the ``waters of the United States.'' Such 
non-adjacent wetlands are more appropriately regulated by States and 
Tribes pursuant to their own authorities. This final rule establishes a 
clear, predictable regulatory framework that can be implemented in the 
field.
    Some commenters supported the agencies' proposed definition of 
``adjacent wetlands'' and stated that it adheres to the key Supreme 
Court decisions, the CWA, and the Constitution. Other commenters stated 
that the proposal struck an appropriate balance between retaining 
federal jurisdiction over wetlands that are truly adjacent to, and 
therefore inseparably bound up with, jurisdictional waters and leaving 
isolated and disconnected wetlands subject to the laws of States and 
Tribes. Other commenters opposed the agencies' proposed definition 
because it included wetlands that abut more than traditional navigable 
waters, wetlands that may not physically touch other jurisdictional 
waters, and wetlands that lack a continuous hydrologic surface 
connection to such waters. Several commenters, for example, interpreted 
the plurality opinion in Rapanos as requiring a constant surface water 
connection to reach beyond the water's edge.
    Some commenters recommended that all wetlands be deemed 
jurisdictional. Other commenters stated that the agencies' proposal was 
arbitrary and capricious, was inconsistent with the CWA, and that 
narrowing CWA jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands should be based more 
on scientific considerations than on legal ones. Other commenters 
stated that the agencies' proposed definition was inconsistent with the 
Riverside Bayview and Rapanos decisions, particularly Justice Kennedy's 
concurring opinion in Rapanos. Some commenters stated that the direct 
hydrologic surface connection requirement in the proposed rule would 
not sufficiently protect certain wetlands with hydrological, chemical, 
and biological connections that the commenters believed are important 
to restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the nation's waters and was therefore incompatible with 
section 101(a) of the CWA.
    The agencies do not view the scope of their authority as limited to 
wetlands that abut traditional navigable waters, nor do they view their 
authorities as limited to wetlands that physically touch other 
jurisdictional waters. The agencies also do not view the Rapanos 
plurality opinion as narrowly as some commenters suggest. However, 
classifying all wetlands as jurisdictional is clearly inconsistent with 
the CWA and Supreme Court guidance, and such expansive federal 
jurisdiction would not allow for the appropriate delineation between 
federally-regulated waters and State and tribal land and water 
resources. The same is true for asserting federal authority over 
isolated wetlands that lack hydrological surface connection to other 
jurisdictional waters, or that connect hydrologically only 
infrequently. The agencies agree with commenters who said that the 
revised definition should be based on the law and science; however, the 
agencies recognize that science cannot dictate where to draw the line 
between Federal and State or tribal waters, as those are legal 
distinctions that have been established within the overall framework 
and construct of the CWA.
    In short, the agencies recognize that the scope of CWA jurisdiction 
over wetlands has confounded courts, members of the regulated 
community, regulators, and the public for decades. There are widely 
varying views as to which wetlands should be covered, and why. The 
different views in Rapanos and of Rapanos highlight the complexity of 
the issue. In this final rule, the agencies have considered the law, 
the science, and the multiple perspectives that have been offered over 
the years and in response to the agencies' proposal. The agencies 
believe that the proposal was a lawful and appropriate interpretation 
of agency authority under the CWA, but as described further below, the 
agencies have made some modifications in the final rule to better 
incorporate common principles from the Rapanos plurality and concurring 
opinions and to strike a better balance that furthers both the 
objective and the policy in CWA sections 101(a) and 101(b), 
respectively. The agencies also recognize that the definition of 
``adjacent wetlands'' in the final rule differs from the regulatory 
definition that the Supreme Court addressed in Riverside Bayview, but 
as

[[Page 22309]]

discussed in Section II.E.2.a of this notice, a court's deference to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute does not foreclose an agency from 
adopting alternative interpretations. This final rule adopts an 
alternative interpretation, but it is based on the text, structure, and 
legislative history of the CWA, additional Supreme Court instruction 
developed since Riverside Bayview, the reasoned policy choices of the 
executive branch agencies authorized by Congress to implement the Act, 
and the agencies' technical and scientific expertise administering the 
CWA over nearly five decades.
    ``In determining the limits of [their] power to regulate discharges 
under the Act,'' the agencies according to the Supreme Court in 
Riverside Bayview, ``must necessarily choose some point at which water 
ends and land begins.'' 474 U.S. at 132. ``Where on this continuum to 
find the limit of `waters' is far from obvious[,]'' but the Court has 
subsequently identified some additional limiting principles to help 
guide the agencies. In SWANCC, the Supreme Court held that the agencies 
do not have authority to regulate nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate 
waters that lack a sufficient connection to a traditional navigable 
water, as regulation of those waters would raise constitutional 
questions regarding the scope of CWA authority. 531 U.S. at 172. The 
plurality opinion in Rapanos added that it did not consider certain 
wetlands to be jurisdictional under the Act, specifically, wetlands 
with only an ``intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to 
`waters of the United States,' '' as those ``do not implicate the 
boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview.'' 547 U.S. at 742. 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Rapanos adds that in some 
instances, as exemplified by the ``ponds and mudflats that were 
isolated in the sense of being unconnected to other waters covered by 
the Act,'' ``there may be little or no connection'' ``between a 
nonnavigable water or wetland and a navigable water,'' and jurisdiction 
under the Act may be lacking. Id. at 766-67.
    The final rule is consistent with SWANCC and the Rapanos plurality 
and concurring opinions in that it would exclude isolated wetlands with 
only physically remote hydrologic connections to jurisdictional waters. 
Ecological connections likewise do not provide an independent basis for 
including physically isolated wetlands within the phrase ``the waters 
of the United States.'' See, e.g., id. at 741-42 (Scalia, J., 
plurality) (``SWANCC rejected the notion that the ecological 
considerations upon which the Corps relied in Riverside Bayview--and 
upon which the dissent repeatedly relies today . . . [-] provided an 
independent basis for including entities like `wetlands' (or `ephemeral 
streams') within the phrase `the waters of the United States.' SWANCC 
found such ecological considerations irrelevant to the question whether 
physically isolated waters come within the Corps' jurisdiction.'' 
(emphasis in original)); see also, e.g., id. at 778 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (``[E]nvironmental concerns provide no 
reason to disregard limits in the statutory text.'').
    In this rule, wetlands adjacent to paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
waters are categorically jurisdictional. The agencies adopt this 
position based on the rationale that an adjacent wetland is 
``inseparably bound up with'' the jurisdictional water; if the water is 
jurisdictional, so is the adjacent wetland. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 
at 134; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740 (Scalia, J., plurality) (`` `Faced 
with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory 
authority,' we held, the agency could reasonably conclude that a 
wetland that `adjoin[ed]' waters of the United States is itself a part 
of those waters.'') (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132, 135 & 
n.9). The Riverside Bayview Court also acknowledged ``that a definition 
of `waters of the United States' encompassing all wetlands adjacent to 
other bodies of water over which the [agencies have] jurisdiction is a 
permissible interpretation of the Act,'' 474 U.S. at 135, and Justice 
Kennedy added in Rapanos that ``the assertion of jurisdiction for those 
wetlands is sustainable under the Act by showing adjacency alone.'' 547 
U.S. at 780. The balance of this subsection describes the four ways in 
which the agencies will assert categorical jurisdiction over adjacent 
wetlands under this final rule.
    Consistent with the proposal, under this final rule, wetlands are 
considered indistinguishable from other jurisdictional waters, and 
therefore are adjacent, when they abut such waters. The agencies 
clarify in the final rule that the term ``abut'' means ``to touch at 
least at one point or side.'' See Webster's II, New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1994) (defining ``abut'' to mean ``to touch at 
one end or side of something''). ``Abut'' as used in this final rule is 
also consistent with the common understanding of the term ``adjacent,'' 
which means ``next to,'' ``adjoining,'' ``to lie near,'' or ``close 
to.'' See id. The term ``abut'' is therefore intended to provide 
members of the regulated community with clear, predictable and 
understandable guidance as to which wetlands lie in such close 
proximity to jurisdictional waters that they are considered 
categorically jurisdictional under the CWA.
    As discussed in Section II.E.2, the plurality in Rapanos 
characterized the scope of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands as 
encompassing wetlands, like those at issue in Riverside Bayview, with a 
``continuous surface connection'' or a ``continuous physical 
connection'' to a navigable water. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742, 751 n.13 
(Scalia, J., plurality). Justice Kennedy's concurrence recognized that 
``the connection between a nonnavigable water or wetland and a 
navigable water may be so close, or potentially so close, that the 
Corps may deem the water or wetland a `navigable water' under the 
Act.'' Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Wetlands 
that abut another jurisdictional water have a continuous surface or 
physical connection to those waters and are therefore inseparably bound 
up with them. See, e.g., id. at 740 (Scalia, J., plurality).
    Wetlands that abut other jurisdictional waters are adjacent under 
this final rule even absent evidence of a hydrologic surface connection 
occurring between the two, as not all abutting wetlands display surface 
water as the wetland hydrology factor but rather may have saturated 
soils, a high water table, or other indicators of hydrology. In this 
final rule, an abutting wetland is ``adjacent'' regardless of where 
``the moisture creating the wetlands . . . find[s] its source.'' 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135), so long as the wetland 
touches the jurisdictional water at one point or side. In other words, 
while a surface water exchange between a wetland and a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water under this final rule is evidence that the wetland is 
abutting, such an exchange is not required under the definition for 
wetlands that abut. The inclusion of abutting wetlands without a 
surface water exchange with a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water 
adheres to Justice Kennedy's statement that ``[g]iven the role wetlands 
play in pollutant filtering, flood control, and runoff storage, it may 
well be the absence of a hydrologic connection (in the sense of 
interchange of waters) that shows the wetlands' significance for the 
aquatic system.'' Id. at 786.
    The agencies recognize that the categorical inclusion of adjacent 
wetlands beyond wetlands that ``actually abut[ ]'' navigable-in-fact 
waters, like those addressed in Riverside

[[Page 22310]]

Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135, is dependent on the relationship between the 
other categories of ``waters of the United States'' and waters more 
traditionally understood as navigable. The agencies believe that the 
definition of ``tributary'' in this final rule, as described in Section 
III.D, appropriately limits federal jurisdiction to those rivers and 
streams that due to their relatively permanent flow regime and 
contribution of surface water flow to navigable waters in a typical 
year are ``significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are 
likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an 
aquatic system incorporating navigable waters.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Because the 
``tributary'' definition as finalized ``rests upon a reasonable 
inference of ecological interconnection'' with navigable waters, and 
adjacent wetlands must abut, be inundated by flooding from, or be 
physically separated from tributaries only by certain natural features 
or by artificial structures that allow for a direct hydrologic surface 
connection and are thus ``inseparably bound up with'' tributaries, the 
agencies conclude that the assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands 
adjacent to tributaries ``is sustainable under the Act by showing 
adjacency alone.'' Id. at 780 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 
134). The ``tributary'' definition in this final rule--which is 
appropriately limited to address the ``breadth of [the] standard'' 
about which Justice Kennedy was concerned in Rapanos, id. at 781, is 
consistent with and finds support in the Court's conclusion in 
Riverside Bayview ``that a definition of `waters of the United States' 
encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which 
the Corps has jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the 
Act.'' 474 U.S. at 135.
    In assessing the appropriate ``limits of `waters' '' on the 
continuum between open waters and dry land, this rule's definition 
balances the inclusion of certain wetlands beyond those that merely 
abut jurisdictional waters with the fact that ``mere hydrologic 
connection should not suffice in all cases.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 784 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The Rapanos plurality 
questioned the Corps' broad interpretation of its regulatory authority 
to ``conclude that wetlands are `adjacent' to covered waters if they 
are hydrologically connected through directional sheet flow during 
storm events or if they lie within the 100-year floodplain of a body of 
water.'' Id. at 728 (plurality opinion) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). The plurality also declared that ``[w]etlands with 
only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to 
`waters of the United States' do not implicate the boundary-drawing 
problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus lack the necessary connection to 
covered waters that we described as a `significant nexus' in SWANCC.'' 
Id. at 742. Similarly, Justice Kennedy stated that ``the connection may 
be too insubstantial for the hydrologic linkage to establish the 
required nexus with navigable waters as traditionally understood.'' Id. 
at 784-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy 
also believed that ``possible flooding'' could be an unduly speculative 
basis for a jurisdictional connection between wetlands and other 
jurisdictional waters. Id. at 786.
    In this final rule, wetlands are not adjacent simply because a 
hydrologic connection between jurisdictional waters and wetlands is 
possible or if, for example, wetlands are connected by flooding once 
every 100 years or by directional sheet flow during or following storm 
events. Instead, wetlands are considered ``adjacent'' if they are 
inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a 
typical year. The typical year requirement, described further in 
Section III.A.1, ensures that a sufficient surface water connection 
occurs and that the connection is not merely ``possible'' or 
``speculative.'' Riverside Bayview held that flooding was not necessary 
to assert jurisdiction over wetlands that abut jurisdictional waters, 
but it also indicated that wetlands created by flooding from a 
jurisdictional water could be jurisdictional. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
773-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing 
Riverside Bayview to find that jurisdiction may be appropriate ``even 
for wetlands that are not the result of flooding or permeation''). The 
agencies conclude in this final rule that wetlands that are inundated 
by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year 
are inseparably bound up with and are part of the jurisdictional water. 
That is because flooding in a typical year creates a continuous surface 
connection with another jurisdictional water during the flood event, 
or, in the terminology of the agencies' proposal, a direct hydrologic 
surface connection.
    Wetlands can be inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water in a typical year when, for example, a tributary's 
flow overtops its banks. Inundation sufficient to establish adjacency 
occurs only in one direction, from the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
water to the wetland, which provides a direct hydrologic surface 
connection from a jurisdictional water to a wetland, thereby rendering 
the wetland ``itself a part of those waters'' ``that are `waters of the 
United States' in their own right.'' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740, 742 
(Scalia, J., plurality). Inundation can occur as a result of 
infrequent, seasonal, or permanent flooding, for example, so long as 
inundation occurs in a typical year and has as its source a paragraph 
(a)(1) through (3) water. The typical year requirement ensures that the 
hydrologic surface connection occurs regularly and is not ``unduly 
speculative.'' Although ``flood or inundation events . . . are 
impermanent by definition,'' id. at 770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment), when a jurisdictional water inundates a wetland by flooding 
on a regular basis, those waterbodies are part of the same aquatic 
system.
    The agencies received comments that the inundation requirement 
should create jurisdiction over a wetland if it occurs in either or 
both directions, rather than only from a jurisdictional water to the 
wetland as proposed. The agencies disagree and conclude in this final 
rule that it is the inundation of water from the paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water to a wetland, and not vice versa, that indicates the 
wetland is inseparably bound up with the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
water. Flooding from a nearby wetland to a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
water is more like diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet 
flow over upland, which the agencies have concluded are not sufficient 
to create or maintain federal jurisdiction. See Section III.A.3 for 
more information on this topic. Wetlands connected to jurisdictional 
waters by only such means are more appropriately regulated by the 
States and Tribes under their sovereign authorities. If the surface 
water communication from a wetland to a jurisdictional water is more 
frequent, for example as regular groundwater elevation rise expressed 
through the wetland similar to groundwater intersecting the bed of 
perennial or intermittent stream), then that flow from the wetland will 
likely channelize and form a jurisdictional tributary to a downstream 
water which the wetland would then abut (because it would be touching 
the tributary at a single point where the tributary left the wetland). 
If the flow is not channelized, it suggests a more attenuated 
connection. Alternatively, if the overland flow frequently reaches a 
jurisdictional water

[[Page 22311]]

but does not channelize, it likely will form wetland characteristics in 
the flow path that could meet the definition of wetland that abuts the 
jurisdictional water.
    Some commenters requested clarification on the frequency and amount 
of inundation required to establish adjacency. The agencies have 
clarified in the final rule that inundation occurs via flooding. 
Inundation need only occur at least once in a typical year to establish 
adjacency for wetlands with no particular requirement for the volume or 
duration of inundation. See Section III.A.1 for additional discussion 
of the ``typical year,'' which allows for flexibility in determining 
when the precipitation and other climatic variables are within the 
normal periodic range. Others commented that bankfull flow, which 
describes the flow that just fills the channel, most commonly occurs 
every 1.5 years, and therefore higher magnitude flows which cause 
inundation from a river or stream to a riverine wetland may not occur 
in every calendar year or in every ``typical year.'' The agencies note 
that an event that may occur under ``typical year'' conditions does not 
necessarily occur in every calendar year. This is because the typical 
year is based on a rolling 30-year period of record, which necessarily 
includes variability from year to year over that 30-year period. One 
method for calculating ``normal precipitation'' requires comparing 
precipitation totals for a given period to the 30th to 70th percentiles 
of precipitation totals from the same dates over the 30-year period, as 
described in Section III.D.3. This range could correspond to a variety 
of flood recurrence intervals and flow magnitudes depending on the 
geographic area, time of year, climate, and other factors. Some typical 
years will be more wet, and others will be more dry, but the ``typical 
year'' definition in this final rule is intended to reflect the 
characteristics of a waterbody at times that are not abnormally wet or 
dry based on the specific historical characteristics of the water or 
wetland. The agencies expect that bankfull discharge flows will occur 
in a typical year in many riverine systems such that those flooded 
wetlands will be jurisdictional under the final rule. Additionally, the 
bankfull discharge flow conditions--and sediments carried in those 
flood waters and deposited landward--commonly create a natural river 
berm between the active channel and nearby wetlands. As described 
below, wetlands separated from paragraph (a)(1) through (3) waters only 
by a natural berm, bank, dune, or similar natural feature are 
jurisdictional without regard to a specific hydrologic surface 
connection in a typical year.
    In this final rule, wetlands are categorically adjacent if they are 
physically separated from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water only by 
a natural berm, bank, dune or similar natural feature. Such wetlands do 
not require a hydrologic surface connection to a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water to be ``adjacent wetlands'' in the final rule, nor is 
this provision of the ``adjacent wetlands'' definition tied to the 
``typical year'' construct. This is a change from the proposal that 
reflects the agencies' further consideration and conclusion that 
certain wetlands that were excluded from jurisdiction by the proposed 
rule are in fact regularly connected to jurisdictional waters such that 
they are inseparably bound up with such waters, as many commenters 
noted. In this final rule, the agencies conclude that the presence of a 
natural berm, bank, dune, or similar natural feature indicates that a 
sufficient surface water connection occurs between the jurisdictional 
water and the wetland. For example, a natural river berm can be created 
by repeated flooding and sedimentation events when a river overtops its 
banks and deposits sediment between the river and a wetland.\55\ The 
wetland could have been formed at the same time as or after the 
formation of the natural river berm due to repeated flooding and the 
impeded return flow created by the berm. Adjacent wetlands separated 
only by a bank from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water can also occur 
when there is an elevation difference between the wetland and the 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water (e.g., when the stream is incised). 
The surface water flow of the tributary over time can erode a channel 
to contain the tributary which separates itself from the adjacent 
wetland by a bank. As with berms, these banks are indicators of a 
regular surface water connection and being inseparably bound up with 
the tributary's aquatic system. The agencies clarify that while natural 
barriers may at times occur within a floodplain, the existence of a 
floodplain generally (and other land masses similar to a floodplain, 
such as a riparian area or fluvial terrace) is not sufficient to 
indicate a direct hydrological surface connection. The agencies also 
clarify that wetlands separated from jurisdictional waters by cliffs, 
bluffs, or canyon walls are not adjacent on the basis of being 
separated from a jurisdictional water only by a natural barrier because 
such features prohibit regular surface water communication between 
jurisdictional waters and such wetlands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See, for example, Connectivity of Stream and Wetlands to 
Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific 
Evidence, p. A-7, defining a ``levee (natural)'' as a ``broad, low 
ridge or embankment of coarse silt and sand that is deposited by a 
stream on its floodplain and along either bank of its channel. 
Natural levees are formed by reduced velocity of flood flows as they 
spill onto floodplain surfaces and can no longer transport the 
coarse fraction of the suspended sediment load.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters said that a wetland must immediately abut a 
jurisdictional water to be adjacent. Other commenters recommended that 
wetlands perched atop the riverbank of an incised stream be considered 
adjacent. The agencies have modified the final rule to include wetlands 
as ``adjacent'' when they are separated only by a natural berm, bank, 
dune, or similar feature. Some commenters recommended that natural 
berms not sever adjacency because such features form naturally in 
undisturbed rivers as a result of sediment deposits associated with 
routine flooding. The agencies agree that natural berms and similar 
natural features are indicators of a direct hydrologic surface 
connection as they are formed through repeated hydrologic events. It 
follows that wetlands separated from paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
waters only by such berms and similar natural features should not sever 
adjacency. The formation of dunes between wetlands and connected waters 
often occurs, for example, in interdunal wetlands in coastal areas or 
around parts of the Great Lakes. These wetlands are often formed 
through wind erosion which results in the sand surface interacting with 
the water table, providing enough hydrology to create wetlands. They 
may also be formed when water levels drop in lakes or from historic 
glacial retreat. Many interdunal wetlands have seasonally variable 
hydroperiods where they may be dry during periods of low rainfall. 
These processes and the resulting natural berm, bank, dune or similar 
natural feature indicate that the wetlands are integrated and 
``inseparably bound up'' with the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) waters 
to which they are adjacent. Accordingly, the agencies conclude in this 
final rule that wetlands are adjacent wetlands if they are physically 
separated from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water only by a natural 
berm, bank, dune, or similar natural feature. While this category of 
``adjacent wetlands'' differs from the proposed rule, these types of 
adjacent wetlands have been included in prior regulations defining 
``waters of the United States,'' and their inclusion

[[Page 22312]]

in the final rule is consistent with the agencies' longstanding 
practice. See 42 FR 37129; see also 51 FR 41251 (``Wetlands separated 
from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, 
natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are `adjacent wetlands.' 
'') (emphasis added).
    Under the final rule, wetlands may be separated from a paragraph 
(a)(1) through (3) water by only one natural feature, such as a single 
river berm or dune, in order to be considered adjacent. The agencies 
intend for wetlands separated by several natural features, such as a 
series of natural berms or a foredune and a backdune, from the 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water to be too remote from the 
jurisdictional water and therefore non-adjacent. In another example, 
where there is a paragraph (a)(1) water, then a dune landward of the 
paragraph (a)(1) water, followed by a wetland, followed by another dune 
and then another wetland, the first wetland is an ``adjacent wetland'' 
but the second distant wetland is not.
    Wetlands are not ``adjacent wetlands'' if they are adjacent merely 
to another wetland; rather under the final rule, wetlands are 
jurisdictional only if they are adjacent to paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) waters. This position is consistent with the agencies' longstanding 
regulations. See 51 FR 41206, 41250 (Nov. 13, 1986) (defining ``waters 
of the United States as including ``wetlands adjacent to'' other 
jurisdictional ``waters (other than waters that are themselves 
adjacent)''). For example, if there is an intervening wetland between 
the subject wetland and a tributary, and the intervening wetland is 
adjacent to the tributary but is not part of the same wetland as the 
subject wetland (e.g., they are separated by upland), the subject 
wetland is not adjacent to the tributary unless it satisfies the 
conditions of paragraph (c)(1) in its own right (e.g., if it is 
inundated by flooding from the tributary in a typical year). In 
addition, this final rule does not allow for a ``chain'' of wetlands 
which may be connected hydrologically via groundwater, shallow 
subsurface flow, overland sheet flow, or non-wetland swales to be 
considered adjacent to each other or to a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
water simply because one of the wetlands in the chain is adjacent to 
the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water. Wetlands that exhibit this type 
of ``fill and spill'' scenario are not ``adjacent wetlands'' under this 
final rule if the wetlands can be delineated separately from each 
other, with upland or non-jurisdictional waters or wetlands between 
them.
    Under this final rule, the definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' also 
encompasses wetlands that are physically separated from a paragraph 
(a)(1) through (3) water only by an artificial dike, barrier, or 
similar artificial structure, so long as that structure allows for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection between the wetlands and the 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year, such as through a 
culvert, flood or tide gate, pump, or similar artificial feature. 
Although this final rule differs from the proposal in this respect, 
these types of adjacent wetlands have been defined as ``waters of the 
United States'' in prior regulations (although those prior regulations 
did not require the direct hydrologic surface connection that this 
final rule requires to occur in a typical year). See 42 FR 37129 (July 
19, 1977). Some commenters recommended that tide gates, as well as 
pumps in managed aquatic systems, be allowed to maintain sufficient 
surface water connections for purposes of determining adjacency. The 
agencies agree and have modified the final rule to include wetlands 
with a direct hydrologic surface connection through or over such 
structures to a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year. A 
flood gate may be designed to restrict water flow other than in times 
of high water. Under the final rule, a flood gate, culvert, pump, or 
similar structure that allows for and is used to maintain a direct 
hydrologic surface connection between a jurisdictional water and a 
wetland at any point in a typical year satisfies the definition of 
``adjacent wetlands.''
    Some artificial structures may allow for frequent direct hydrologic 
surface connections between the wetland and the paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water, while others may not. Under the final rule, a direct 
hydrologic surface connection through an artificial structure must 
occur at least once in a typical year to establish adjacency. When an 
artificial structure separating a wetland from a paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water does not allow for a direct hydrologic surface 
connection in a typical year, the wetland is not adjacent. For example, 
although some artificial structures (e.g., a levee) may have subsurface 
connections through porous soils, this final rule requires the 
structure to allow for direct hydrologic surface connection between a 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water and a wetland in a typical year for 
the wetland to be adjacent. Similarly, if a culvert or a pump conveys 
water from a wetland to a jurisdictional water only during a 100-year 
storm, such features would not allow for a direct hydrologic surface 
connection between the wetland and jurisdictional water in a typical 
year, and those wetlands would not be adjacent.
    In this section of the final rule, the agencies retained the 
concept of direct hydrologic surface connection from the proposed rule, 
but modified it for ease of implementation. The proposed rule would 
have required that for such wetlands, a direct hydrologic surface 
connection occurs as a result of inundation from a jurisdictional water 
to a wetland or via perennial or intermittent flow between a wetland 
and a jurisdictional water in a typical year. Some commenters supported 
the use of perennial or intermittent flow classifications to establish 
a direct hydrologic surface connection from a wetland to a 
jurisdictional water in a typical year. Other commenters stated that 
the concept was confusing and that the requirement to identify a 
perennial or intermittent connection could create implementation 
challenges. The agencies have been using flow classifications to make 
jurisdictional determinations since the 2008 Rapanos Guidance was 
issued, and are familiar with and can manage existing implementation 
challenges. However, to provide additional clarity and to improve and 
streamline implementation, the agencies have simplified the proposal's 
approach to establishing adjacency and have eliminated the requirement 
that a wetland maintain a perennial or intermittent connection to the 
jurisdictional water in a typical year. In the final rule, a direct 
hydrologic surface connection in a typical year, regardless of the flow 
classification, is sufficient to demonstrate that the wetland and 
jurisdictional water are inseparably bound up.
    By not including a flow classification requirement for direct 
hydrologic surface connections in paragraph (c)(1), the agencies 
anticipate that more wetlands will be regulated as ``adjacent 
wetlands'' under the final rule as compared to the proposal. The final 
rule will also be easier to implement, as landowners and regulators can 
easily discern if an artificial structure exists and whether that 
structure likely allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection to 
occur in a typical year. See Section III.G.3 for additional discussion 
on implementation.
    Under this final rule, an adjacent wetland is jurisdictional in its 
entirety when a road or similar artificial structure divides the 
wetland, as long as the structure allows for a direct hydrologic 
surface connection through or over that structure in a typical year.

[[Page 22313]]

This aspect of the final rule was modified from the proposal but is 
consistent with establishing jurisdiction over wetlands physically 
separated by artificial structures that provide a direct hydrologic 
surface connection in a typical year. A road that divides one wetland 
into two parts (or multiple roads that divide one wetland into multiple 
parts) does not change the jurisdictional status of an ``adjacent 
wetland'' under this final rule so long as a direct hydrologic surface 
connection is maintained through a culvert or similar feature or over 
the structure (e.g., water overtopping the road at an engineered low 
point) which enables a direct hydrologic surface connection in a 
typical year between the otherwise separated portions of the adjacent 
wetland. With a direct hydrologic surface connection, the bisected 
wetland is still functioning as one wetland and is jurisdictional as 
one adjacent wetland. But for the road, the wetland portions would be 
one intact adjacent wetland, and thus the agencies have determined that 
it is appropriate to treat the separated portions as one adjacent 
wetland, so long as the structure allows for a direct hydrologic 
surface connection through or over that structure in a typical year. 
Where more than one road crosses a wetland, and the first allows for 
continued direct hydrologic surface water connection to a 
jurisdictional water but the second does not, the wetlands on the far 
side of the second road are not part of the adjacent wetland. This 
modification to the final rule addresses comments that stated that 
prior road construction activities may not have fully mitigated for the 
loss of jurisdictional wetlands.
    Commenters raised questions about the jurisdictional status of 
wetland complexes under the proposed rule. Consistent with the 
proposal, the final rule establishes that if a wetland can be 
delineated from another wetland by upland or other separation (other 
than a road or similar artificial structure dividing a wetland that 
allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection through or over that 
structure in a typical year) then each wetland will be considered 
separately for purposes of determining adjacency. These separate 
wetlands are not adjacent to each other even if a hydrologic surface 
connection is present between them. Where wetlands in a complex of 
wetlands have a continuous physical surface connection to one another 
such that upland boundaries or dikes, barriers, or other structures 
cannot distinguish or delineate them as physically separated, the 
entire area is viewed as one wetland for consideration as to whether 
the wetland meets the terms of adjacency. If any portion of a wetland, 
including these physically interconnected wetlands, is adjacent to a 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water, the entire wetland is adjacent. See 
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135 (``Because respondent's property is 
part of a wetland that actually abuts on a navigable waterway, 
respondent was required to have a permit in this case.'') (emphasis 
added). Physically remote isolated wetlands are not adjacent wetlands 
under this rule.
    Some commenters expressed concern that allowing artificial barriers 
to sever jurisdiction of a wetland that would otherwise be adjacent to 
a jurisdictional water would create incentives for the illegal 
construction of such barriers. The agencies note that construction of 
an artificial barrier such as a berm may not sever jurisdiction under 
the final rule, depending on the circumstances. For example, if the 
barrier allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection in a typical 
year, jurisdiction is not severed. Alternatively, a CWA section 404 
permit may be issued with applicable mitigation requirements for a 
structure that does not allow for a direct hydrologic surface 
connection in a typical year and therefore severs jurisdiction of the 
wetland. In addition, although the agencies recognize that relevant 
factual issues bear on the legality of construction at any particular 
site, the agencies do not intend this rule to allow artificial barriers 
illegally constructed under the CWA to sever jurisdiction of a wetland 
that would otherwise be adjacent to a jurisdictional water. To be 
clear, this final rule does not modify the CWA prohibition on 
unauthorized discharges, such as the unlawful construction of a barrier 
in a jurisdictional wetland. Construction that is unlawful under the 
CWA remains subject to the agencies' enforcement authorities. See 
Section III.A.3 of this notice for further discussion of what does or 
does not sever jurisdiction.
    Some commenters stated that adjacent wetlands should include 
constructed and restored wetlands. The agencies agree and do not view a 
wetland's status as constructed, restored, rehabilitated, modified, or 
natural as affecting its jurisdictional status if it meets the 
definitions of both ``wetlands'' and ``adjacent wetlands'' under the 
final rule.
    Several commenters stated that groundwater and subsurface 
connections between a wetland and a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water 
should be sufficient to establish adjacency. Other commenters stated 
that the proposal appropriately required a regular surface water 
connection to create jurisdictional ``adjacent wetlands.'' Given that 
the focus of this rule's definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' is on the 
ordinary meaning of the term ``waters,'' common principles from Supreme 
Court guidance, and balancing the policy in CWA section 101(a) with the 
limitations on federal authority embodied in CWA section 101(b), the 
agencies are finalizing the definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' that 
does not include subsurface hydrologic connectivity as a basis for 
determining adjacency, consistent with the proposed rule. The agencies 
believe that implementation of subsurface connections as a basis for 
CWA jurisdiction would be overinclusive and would encroach on State and 
tribal authority over land and water resources. See Section II.E.2.a. 
for further discussion of the legal principles underlying the agencies' 
interpretation of the surface connection requirement. A groundwater or 
subsurface connection could also be confusing and difficult to 
implement, including in the determination of whether a subsurface 
connection exists and to what extent. The categorical inclusion of 
``adjacent wetlands'' as defined in the final rule will include some 
wetlands that connect to other jurisdictional waters through subsurface 
flow, such as some that abut or are separated by natural berms and 
related features. However, these wetlands must meet one of the four 
criteria established in paragraph (c)(1) to be ``adjacent wetlands'' 
and are not adjacent based simply on a subsurface hydrologic connection 
to jurisdictional waters. Physically remote wetlands and other wetlands 
that do not meet the final rule's definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' 
are reserved to regulation by States and Tribes as land and water 
resources of those States and Tribes.
    A few commenters recommended that the agencies establish an 
administrative boundary for adjacency, such as a linear distance from a 
jurisdictional water to provide clarity. Other commenters stated that 
establishing distance thresholds or limits would be inappropriate and 
arbitrary. After considering these comments, the agencies are not 
including any distance thresholds or limits to determine adjacency in 
the final rule, consistent with the proposal. Indeed, the agencies 
believe that it would be difficult to select a boundary that is not 
arbitrary for a rule that applies to so many diverse situations 
nationwide. In addition, it can be difficult to identify a starting 
point from which to measure

[[Page 22314]]

an administrative boundary. While distance thresholds for establishing 
CWA jurisdiction over wetlands may be too arbitrary and difficult to 
establish, however, the same is likely not true for determining lead 
permitting responsibility when States or Tribes assume section 404 
permitting authority under 33 U.S.C. 1344(g). In assumed programs, the 
question for adjacent wetlands is which regulatory authority is 
responsible for permitting, not whether the wetlands themselves are 
waters of the United States.
    Some members of the public commented that adjacent wetlands should 
include all wetlands within the 100-year floodplain. Other commenters 
disagreed and stated that wetlands with a one percent annual chance of 
flooding should not be considered waters of the United States. Under 
the final rule, although not all wetlands in the 100-year floodplain 
are jurisdictional, many adjacent wetlands will be located within the 
100-year floodplain of a jurisdictional water. In addition to the other 
tests for adjacency, flooding in a typical year may occur in portions 
of the 100-year floodplain. For example, wetlands which are inundated 
by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year 
may be floodplain wetlands, or wetlands which are physically separated 
from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water only by a natural berm or 
dune may be floodplain wetlands. The agencies also recognize that it 
can be difficult to measure a floodplain's extent as floodplains are 
not mapped everywhere in the country. In any event, the agencies 
believe that including wetlands as adjacent due solely to their 
presence in the 100-year floodplain goes beyond the scope of the 
agencies' legal authority under the CWA and contravenes Supreme Court 
guidance. See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J., plurality) 
(``the Corps' definition of `adjacent,' . . . has been extended beyond 
reason to include, inter alia, the 100-year floodplain of covered 
waters''). Consistent with the proposal, the agencies are not including 
a floodplain criterion (e.g., a general floodplain requirement or a 
specific floodplain interval requirement) to determine adjacency in the 
final rule.
    Some commenters recommended that the agencies include wetlands with 
a significant nexus to navigable waters as jurisdictional while others 
supported the agencies' proposed approach to remove the case-specific 
significant nexus analysis from the determination of jurisdiction. This 
final rule ends the agencies' practice of conducting case-specific 
significant nexus evaluations for determining whether wetlands are 
jurisdictional as adjacent. Under the agencies' Rapanos Guidance, this 
evaluation required individual analyses of the relationship between a 
particular wetland (or group of wetlands aggregated together with its 
nearest tributary) with traditional navigable waters. Importantly, 
Justice Kennedy's ``significant nexus'' test for wetlands adjacent to 
non-navigable tributaries was only needed ``absent more specific 
regulations,'' id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), 
because ``the breadth of [the then-existing tributary] standard . . . 
seems to leave wide room for regulations of drains, ditches, and 
streams remote from any navigable-in-fact water and carrying only minor 
water volumes towards it'' and thus ``precludes its adoption as a 
determinative measure of whether adjacent wetlands are likely to play 
an important role in the integrity of an aquatic system comprising 
navigable waters as traditionally understood.'' Id. at 781. In light of 
the ``more specific [tributary] regulations'' in this final rule, the 
agencies are eliminating the case-specific significant nexus analysis 
through categorical treatment of all adjacent wetlands, as defined by 
this rule, as ``waters of the United States.'' The agencies recognize 
that this is a new position and modifies prior agency positions on 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Rapanos. The agencies also 
recognize that several courts have adopted the significant nexus 
standard as a test for jurisdiction for both adjacent wetlands and 
tributaries. For all the reasons described in Section II.E, the 
agencies are finalizing a rule that is more consistent with the body of 
Supreme Court guidance, including the origins of the significant nexus 
standard, and their authority under the Act, than were previous 
regulations. The agencies believe that this final rule achieves the 
goals of the Act and provides better clarity for the regulators and the 
regulated community alike, while adhering to the basic principles 
articulated in Rapanos, SWANCC, and Riverside Bayview.
    Some commenters recommended including as waters of the United 
States specific waters based solely on ecological importance, such as 
prairie potholes. Other commenters urged the agencies to finalize a 
rule consistent with Supreme Court guidance which directs that 
ecological considerations do not provide an independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction. As noted above, under the final rule's 
definition, ecological connections alone are not a basis for including 
physically isolated wetlands within the phrase ``the waters of the 
United States.'' See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 741-42 (Scalia, J., 
plurality); see also id. at 778 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
    Some commenters recommended the agencies incorporate more 
scientific analysis in their interpretation of the proper scope of 
``adjacent wetlands''. The definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' and the 
categorical treatment of jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to other 
jurisdictional waters is informed by science, though it is not dictated 
by science alone. For example, the EPA's SAB noted when reviewing the 
Draft Connectivity Report in 2014, that ``[s]patial proximity is one 
important determinant of the magnitude, frequency and duration of 
connections between wetlands and streams that will ultimately influence 
the fluxes of water, materials and biota between wetlands and 
downstream waters.'' SAB Review at 60. ``Wetlands that are situated 
alongside rivers and their tributaries are likely to be connected to 
those waters through the exchange of water, biota and chemicals. As the 
distance between a wetland and a flowing water system increases, these 
connections become less obvious.'' Id. at 55 (emphasis added). The 
Connectivity Report also recognizes that ``areas that are closer to 
rivers and streams have a higher probability of being connected than 
areas farther away.'' Connectivity Report at ES-4. The agencies 
considered these and other scientific principles described above in 
crafting this final rule; however, as discussed in Section II.E of this 
notice, the line between Federal and State waters is a legal 
distinction, not a scientific one, that reflects the overall framework 
and construct of the CWA. This rule's definition draws the legal limit 
of federal jurisdiction in a clear and implementable way that adheres 
to established legal principles, while being informed by the policy 
choices and scientific expertise of the executive branch agencies 
charged with administering the CWA.
    Consistent with the proposal, the agencies are retaining the 
longstanding definition of ``wetlands'' in this final rule. Some 
commenters expressed support for this approach. Some commenters 
requested that the agencies clarify that a wetland must satisfy all 
three wetland delineation factors to be considered a wetland under the 
rule. Other commenters requested that the agencies clarify the term 
``normal circumstances'' as used in the definition of ``wetlands,'' and 
suggested that the term should not apply when higher than normal 
rainfall conditions are present.

[[Page 22315]]

Commenters also requested clarification on whether human alteration 
affects ``normal circumstances.''
    The agencies have clarified that the presence and boundaries of 
wetlands are determined based upon an area satisfying all three of the 
definition's factors (i.e., hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, and 
hydric soils) under normal circumstances. This is evident in the final 
definition of ``upland'' in paragraph (c)(14). The agencies have also 
clarified that certain elements of the ``adjacent wetlands'' definition 
include a ``typical year'' requirement to ensure that the 
jurisdictional status of wetlands is being assessed under conditions 
that are not too wet and not too dry. In addition, the agencies 
consider climatic conditions when delineating wetlands, for example, 
whether there are drought conditions or conditions of unusually high 
rainfall. The term ``typical year'' is not intended to modify the 
agencies' current implementation of normal circumstances.
    The agencies recognize that there have been questions over time 
about the jurisdictional status of ditches that are not maintained. 
Under this final rule, as discussed in more detail in Section III.E, 
when a ditch constructed in an adjacent wetland contributes less than 
perennial or intermittent flow to a paragraph (a)(1) water in a typical 
year and yet, due to lack of maintenance, gains wetland 
characteristics, that ditch may be viewed as an adjacent wetland if it 
meets the definition of both ``wetlands'' under paragraph (c)(16) and 
``adjacent wetlands'' under paragraph (c)(1).
3. How will the agencies implement the final rule?
    If a wetland satisfies this rule's definition of ``wetlands'' and 
``adjacent wetlands'' it is considered a water of the United States 
without need for further analysis. This categorical inclusion, however, 
does not alleviate the need for site-specific verification of 
jurisdiction, such as confirmation of wetland characteristics, whether 
the wetlands meet the final rule's definition of ``adjacent wetlands,'' 
and other issues typically addressed during a jurisdictional 
determination process.
    This rule provides a definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' that 
includes wetlands that abut, meaning to touch at least at one point or 
side of, a water identified in paragraph (a)(1), (2), or (3). Such 
abutting wetlands need not abut the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water 
along the entire length of a delineated wetland boundary to be 
considered adjacent. Rather, the wetlands need only touch the paragraph 
(a)(1) through (3) water at one point. In addition, and consistent with 
the proposal and Riverside Bayview, the final rule does not require 
surface water exchange between wetlands and the jurisdictional waters 
they abut to create the jurisdictional link. 474 U.S. at 134.
    Abutting occurs when the wetland delineated boundary touches the 
delineated boundary of the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water, which 
does not require a direct hydrologic surface connection because not all 
wetlands have standing or flowing surface water as their wetland 
hydrology factor. For example, some wetlands may have saturated soils 
or a high water table, and these are also indicators of wetland 
hydrology. Abutting occurs at the interface between the adjacent 
wetland and the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water. In the field, the 
agencies would identify the presence of a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) 
water and delineate the boundary of such water at the lateral extent 
identified by the ordinary high water mark or high tide line, depending 
on which is appropriate. See 33 CFR 328.4. The agencies would then 
delineate the wetlands within the review area to determine whether the 
wetland boundary touches the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water 
boundary at any point or side. The wetlands need not abut for a 
specific duration in order to be considered abutting. For example, 
wetlands that abut a tributary only during the wet or rainy season 
remain adjacent under this final rule. Similarly, if a wetland abuts an 
intermittent tributary it remains abutting even when water is not 
present in the tributary. Wetlands abutting an ephemeral stream or 
other non-jurisdictional feature are non-jurisdictional even if the 
non-jurisdictional feature maintains jurisdiction between upstream and 
downstream waters.
    Some commenters stated that surface connections may not be present 
or identifiable year-round. Many commenters questioned whether the use 
of remote tools could identify the necessary connections and stated 
that field indicators and site-specific verification for wetland 
connections may be needed. In addition, commenters requested 
clarification on systems with modifications, such as dikes, levees, and 
other man-made structures.
    The agencies modified the final rule language from the proposal in 
response to many of these comments to provide additional clarity and 
ease of implementation, while remaining faithful to the overall text, 
structure, and legislative history of the CWA and the legal principles 
outlined in Section II.E. Culverts or other structures conveying water 
through an artificial barrier, such as a levee or a road, can maintain 
jurisdiction in the final rule if they provide a direct hydrological 
surface connection between a wetland and a jurisdictional water in a 
typical year. Where a wetland is physically separated from a tributary 
by a manmade levee and such artificial structure has a culvert 
connection through the levee, the culvert is visibly apparent and can 
be easily observed for efficiency in identifying it as potentially 
providing a direct hydrologic surface connection. In other locations, 
pumps may be used to control water levels. In some scenarios, the pumps 
are continually operating to maintain flow conditions, and in other 
scenarios, they are turned on only when flood conditions are present. 
Pumps can move water through the artificial structure or over it. A 
pump can create a direct hydrologic surface connection in a typical 
year between paragraph (a)(1) through (3) waters and their adjacent 
wetlands. Tide gates can also allow for a direct hydrologic surface 
connection in a typical year between wetlands and the paragraph (a)(1) 
through (3) water to which they are adjacent under the final rule. As 
long as a feature present within the artificial structure allows for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection between the wetland and a 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year, the wetland is an 
adjacent wetland even if flow is not present at the time of 
observation. The agencies may not assume the presence of such 
artificial features; rather they may identify such artificial features 
via on-site observations or remotely using construction design plans, 
permitting data, state and local information, or levee or drainage 
district information. As is the case with jurisdictional determinations 
made under any regulatory regime, site-specific verification may be 
required in certain instances where remote tools may not be readily 
available or accurate or in other, often more complex site scenarios.
    A wetland flooded by a navigable water, on average, once every 100 
years would not satisfy the final rule's ``adjacent wetlands'' 
definition. Such inundation via flooding must occur from a paragraph 
(a)(1) through (3) water at least once in a typical year for purposes 
of adjacency. The agencies may determine that inundation by flooding or 
a direct hydrologic surface connection exists during a typical year 
using, for example, USGS stream gage records, recurrence intervals of 
peak flows, wetland surface water level

[[Page 22316]]

records, visual observation, aerial imagery, flood records, inundation 
modeling techniques and tools (e.g., Hydrologic Engineering Centers 
River System Analysis System, or HEC-RAS, or tools available from USGS 
through their Flood Inundation Mapping program), or engineering design 
records. The agencies may also need to complete one or more site visits 
to collect field indicators of inundation. For example, the presence of 
water marks, sediment and drift deposits, water-stained leaves, or 
algal mats may indicate that an inundation event has recently occurred. 
The agencies believe that it is also important to consider weather and 
climatic conditions, i.e., to review recent precipitation and climate 
records, to ensure the feature is not being assessed during a period of 
drought or after a major precipitation or infrequent flood event. Tools 
for determining whether climatic conditions meet the definition of 
``typical year'' are described in Section III.A.1 of this notice.
    In addition, under this final rule an adjacent wetland divided by 
an artificial structure, such as a road or railroad line, is treated as 
a single wetland and is jurisdictional in its entirety as long as the 
structure allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection through or 
over that structure in a typical year. The direct hydrologic surface 
connection can occur through or over the artificial structure, such as 
through a culvert, or as is present in some areas, over roads designed 
to overtop during certain conditions. Without a direct hydrologic 
surface connection in a typical year, only that wetland (i.e., that 
portion of the original wetland) which meets the terms of the 
definition of ``adjacent wetlands'' under paragraph (c)(1) would be an 
adjacent wetland, even if there is a subsurface hydrologic connection 
(e.g., shallow subsurface flow or aquifer) between the wetlands present 
on either side of the road or other artificial structure. To identify 
the direct hydrologic surface connection through or over a road or 
other artificial structure, the agencies may use tools similar to those 
that are used to identify a direct hydrologic surface connection 
through an artificial structure, such as a dike.
    To implement this aspect of the rule as applied to a particular 
wetland, the agencies will first need to determine whether the wetland 
is adjacent to a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water. The agencies will 
then need to consider the conditions on the ground in order to 
determine whether the divided parts of the wetland should be considered 
one adjacent wetland, where it otherwise meets the terms of the 
definition. For example, if a wetland is present on either side of a 
road which has a direct hydrologic surface connection via a culvert 
connecting both parts of the wetland in a typical year, the agencies 
need not recreate the history of the road construction and what the 
conditions on the ground were at time of road construction. Rather, the 
agencies will observe the artificial structure and will note whether 
the artificial structure allows for a direct hydrologic surface 
connection such that the wetlands on both sides of the road can connect 
via surface hydrology in a typical year. If so, then the wetlands are 
considered one wetland.
    As a general matter and consistent with longstanding practice, the 
agencies take a physical separation as they find it. The physical 
separation will be evaluated in its current form (unless normal 
circumstances are not present or where there is evidence of unlawful 
activity or efforts to circumvent jurisdiction, in which case, the 
separation will be evaluated using other tools to approximate normal 
circumstances). If a dike is originally designed not to allow for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection between a paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) water and wetlands on the other side of the dike, but later a 
culvert is added to provide adequate drainage in a typical year or a 
pump is added to provide flood protection in a typical year, these 
features create a direct hydrologic surface connection between the 
jurisdictional water and the wetlands. In this scenario, the wetlands 
become adjacent wetlands. If a natural feature is modified or changes 
over time (as when a berm develops over time separating a wetland from 
a paragraph (a)(1) water) the agencies intend to take the feature as 
they find it, determine whether it is a natural physical separation, 
and then consider whether the wetland is adjacent. Pumps are considered 
to be the ``normal'' circumstances of the hydrology when they are 
permanently present and are serviceable. Pumps create adjacency under 
the final rule when they are permanent features which allow for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection in a typical year through an 
artificial structure between a wetland and the paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) water.
    Temporary structures are not subject to the ``take it as they find 
it'' principle. Their presence is intended to modify the relationship 
between the paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water and a wetland for only a 
limited duration of time. For example, a temporary culvert in place for 
three months during construction would not allow for a wetland to 
become adjacent under this rule. Such temporary structures are not 
considered normal circumstances when considering whether a wetland may 
be adjacent.
    For purposes of adjacency under the rule, the entire wetland is 
considered adjacent if any portion of the wetland meets the terms of 
the definition under paragraph (c)(1), regardless of the size and 
extent of the wetland. For example, if a portion of one side of a 
wetland physically touches a tributary, then the wetland is 
jurisdictional in its entirety. Determining the entire wetland to be 
adjacent if any portion of it satisfies the ``adjacent wetlands'' 
definition is consistent with longstanding practice. The agencies have 
found this approach to be simpler and easier to implement in the field 
than establishing a means of administratively bifurcating wetlands. An 
adjacent wetland that changes classification (e.g., as defined in 
Cowardin et al. 1979) within the overall wetland delineated boundary 
due to landscape position, hydrologic inundation, or other factors, 
such as changing from salt marsh to brackish to freshwater wetland, is 
jurisdictional as one adjacent wetland.
    Certain wetland indicators may not be present year-round in a 
typical year due to normal seasonal or annual variability. Adjacent 
wetlands under this final rule include wetlands with alternating 
hydroperiods and seasonal wetlands with vegetation shifts. Consistent 
with the agencies' longstanding practice, the delineated boundary of a 
seasonal wetland remains constant, even though all three delineation 
factors may not be apparent year-round. This approach acknowledges 
seasonal variation in visible wetland factors as well as the variation 
in hydrology and climatic conditions across the country. For example, 
seasonal wetlands with vegetation shifts may display hydrophytic 
vegetation abutting another water of the United States throughout the 
year except during the dry season. Also, wetlands with alternating 
hydroperiods that abut another water of the United States in the arid 
West may have hydrology present only for three months while otherwise 
similar wetlands in the Southeast may have hydrology present for nine 
months. Wetland hydrology indicators that require direct observation of 
surface water or saturated soils are often present only during the 
normal wet portion of the growing season and may be absent during the 
dry season. The wetland hydrology factor is often much more variable on 
short time scales than the hydrophytic vegetation and hydric soil 
factors, especially in seasonal wetlands

[[Page 22317]]

like some bottomland hardwood forests which can lack flooding or 
saturation.
    Some commenters noted that a ditch constructed in an adjacent 
wetland can drain water and create a zone of influence which may render 
the entire wetland non-jurisdictional under the proposed rule. Under 
this final rule, a wetland must first be considered adjacent to a 
paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water before a ditch constructed in it may 
be considered a tributary. Therefore, the wetland may still be 
jurisdictional as an adjacent wetland to the paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) water under (c)(1) even if the ditch's zone of influence reduces 
the extent of the wetland around the ditch, as the wetland's 
jurisdictional status is not directly tied to the ditch. Historical and 
current aerial photographs, NWI maps, NRCS soils maps, and other 
similar resources may indicate whether a ditch was constructed in an 
adjacent wetland. There may also be certain instances where a ditch has 
lawfully drained a wetland.

H. Waters and Features That Are Not Waters of the United States

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    In paragraph (b) of the final rule, the agencies are codifying 
twelve exclusions from the definition of ``waters of the United 
States.'' Many of the exclusions reflect longstanding agency practice 
and are expressly included in the final rule to ensure predictability, 
as the agencies continue to implement them in the future. Two of the 
exclusions (waste treatment systems and prior converted cropland) have 
been expressly included in regulatory text for decades, but the 
agencies are defining them for the first time to enhance implementation 
clarity. The majority of paragraph (b) has been finalized as proposed, 
but as discussed in the next subsection, the agencies have made some 
changes to what they proposed in response to public comments and 
additional analysis of the proposed regulatory text. For example, in 
the final rule the agencies split ephemeral surface features and 
diffuse stormwater runoff and overland sheet flow into separate 
exclusions for added clarity.
    Waters and features that are excluded under paragraph (b) of the 
final rule cannot be determined to be jurisdictional under any of the 
categories in the rule under paragraph (a). Any water not enumerated in 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) is not a ``water of the United States.'' 
In addition to this overarching exclusion, the final rule includes 
additional exclusions to provide more specificity for certain common 
landscape features and land uses that are more appropriately regulated, 
if at all, under the sovereign authorities of States and Tribes. For 
example, the final rule excludes groundwater from the definition of 
``waters of the United States,'' including groundwater drained through 
subsurface drainage systems, reflecting the agencies' longstanding 
practice. The rule creates a new exclusion for ephemeral features, 
including ephemeral streams, swales, gullies, rills, and pools, and 
excludes diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet flow over 
upland. Adhering more closely to the agencies' original interpretation 
of the CWA, the rule excludes ditches from the definition of ``waters 
of the United States'' except those ditches identified as 
jurisdictional under paragraph (a)(1) or (2) and those ditches 
constructed in adjacent wetlands that do not meet the flow conditions 
of the definition of ``tributary'' but that meet the conditions of 
paragraph (a)(4). The agencies are retaining an exclusion for prior 
converted cropland but are defining it for the first time in regulatory 
text. The agencies are also retaining an exclusion for waste treatment 
systems.
    The final rule also excludes artificially irrigated areas, 
including fields flooded for agricultural production, that would revert 
to upland should application of irrigation water to that area cease. In 
addition, the rule excludes artificial lakes and ponds, including water 
storage reservoirs and farm, irrigation, stock watering, and log 
cleaning ponds, constructed or excavated in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters, so long as those artificial lakes and ponds are 
not impoundments of jurisdictional waters that meet the conditions of 
paragraph (c)(6). The final rule excludes water-filled depressions 
constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters 
incidental to mining or construction activity, and pits excavated in 
upland or in non-jurisdictional waters for the purpose of obtaining 
fill, sand, or gravel. The agencies also have excluded stormwater 
control features constructed or excavated in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store stormwater 
run-off. Also excluded in the final rule are groundwater recharge, 
water reuse, and wastewater recycling structures, including detention, 
retention, and infiltration basins and ponds, constructed or excavated 
in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters.
    As discussed in Section III.G, the agencies have defined ``upland'' 
in paragraph (c)(14) and specify in the regulatory text that certain 
water features constructed or excavated in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters are excluded from the definition of ``waters of 
the United States.'' In the final rule, ``upland'' means any land area 
that under normal circumstances does not satisfy all three wetland 
characteristics identified in the definition of ``wetlands'' 
(hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, hydric soils) and does not lie 
below the ordinary high water mark or the high tide line of a 
jurisdictional water. The term is used in six of the exclusions listed 
in paragraph (b), and the definition is intended to provide additional 
clarity as the agencies implement the exclusions while also informing 
the application of the ``adjacent wetlands'' definition. See Section 
III.G of this notice.
    The agencies received a broad range of comments on the proposed 
rule's list of exclusions, some stating that the exclusions provide 
necessary clarity while allowing the regulated community to plan 
investments in infrastructure and other projects with increased 
regulatory certainty and predictability. Others expressed support for 
the new exclusion in paragraph (b)(1), stating that it clarified that 
if a water is not jurisdictional under paragraph (a), it is not subject 
to CWA jurisdiction. Other commenters supported the inclusion of 
definitions for prior converted cropland and waste treatment systems, 
acknowledging that the new definitions help clarify those longstanding 
exclusions. Some commenters opposed many of the exclusions, arguing 
that they restrict CWA jurisdiction over too many ecologically 
important waters. Some commenters argued that prior converted cropland 
and waste treatment systems should not be excluded from CWA 
jurisdiction, stating that nothing in the CWA supports the agencies' 
longstanding positions. The agencies have considered these diverse 
comments and have generally adhered to the approach set forth in the 
proposed rule, while making some adjustments to the regulatory text to 
address certain questions that were raised and to improve the clarity 
of the regulatory text, as discussed in the next subsection.
2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comment
    Many of these exclusions generally reflect the agencies' current 
and historic practice, and their inclusion in the final rule furthers 
the agencies' goal of providing greater clarity over which waters are 
and are not regulated under

[[Page 22318]]

the CWA. Just as the categorical assertions of jurisdiction over 
tributaries, lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters, 
and adjacent wetlands simplify the jurisdictional determination 
process, the categorical exclusions likewise simplify the process. In 
certain circumstances, they also reflect the agencies' determinations 
of the limits of their jurisdiction under the CWA based on the text of 
the statute, Supreme Court guidance, and the agencies' longstanding 
practice and technical judgment that certain waters and features are 
not subject to regulation under the CWA. These waters are or could be 
subject to State or tribal jurisdiction, as the CWA recognizes that 
States and Tribes can regulate more broadly than the Federal 
government.
    Some State comments on the proposed exclusions indicated that the 
exclusions uphold State sovereignty to administer and allocate water 
resources and preserve traditional State and local authority over 
private property. Some commenters also stated that the proposed 
exclusions are consistent with the principles of cooperative federalism 
under the CWA. For example, a commenter asserted that the types of 
waters proposed for exclusion are all waters that would traditionally 
fall under State jurisdiction and should remain subject to State 
regulation under the framework for cooperative federalism set forth in 
the CWA. The agencies agree that the CWA's cooperative federalism 
approach to protecting water quality is important and continue to 
reflect that approach in the exclusions finalized in this rule.
    Importantly, the agencies' final rule clarifies that all waters and 
features identified in paragraph (b) as non-jurisdictional would not be 
waters of the United States. As stated in paragraph (b)(1) of the final 
rule, waters or water features not enumerated in paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (4) would not be a water of the United States. The agencies 
have taken this approach to avoid suggesting that but for an applicable 
exclusion, such features could be jurisdictional. This approach in the 
final rule comprehensively excludes all waters and features that the 
agencies have not included as waters of the United States under 
paragraph (a) of the rule. Different features are called different 
names in different parts of the country, so this approach is also 
intended to eliminate the risk of confusion. The agencies note that the 
examples of features in each exclusion are illustrative of the types of 
features covered under each exclusion.
Groundwater
    In paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule, the agencies exclude 
groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface drainage 
systems. The agencies have never interpreted waters of the United 
States to include groundwater, and they continue that practice through 
this final rule by explicitly excluding groundwater. The agencies also 
note that groundwater, as opposed to subterranean rivers or tunnels, 
cannot serve as a connection between upstream and downstream 
jurisdictional waters. For example, a losing stream that flows to 
groundwater without resurfacing does not meet the definition of 
``tributary'' because it does not contribute surface water flow to a 
downstream jurisdictional water. However, a subterranean river does not 
sever jurisdiction of the tributary if it contributes surface water 
flow in a typical year to a downstream jurisdictional water, as 
described in Section III.A.3, even though the subterranean river itself 
is not jurisdictional.
    Many commenters cited legislative history in the development of the 
Act, the agencies' implementing regulations, and case law as evidence 
of Congressional intent in support of the groundwater exclusion. 
Commenters noted that CWA legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress clearly did not intend to include groundwater as ``waters of 
the United States,'' because Congress did not support a proposed 
amendment to include groundwater as waters of the United States. Many 
commenters stated that all subsurface water should be non-
jurisdictional. Other commenters stated that groundwater is not a 
``navigable water'' or a ``channel of interstate commerce'' and 
therefore should be excluded. Conversely, several commenters stated 
that groundwater is important to commerce, because it is essential as a 
source of drinking water for much of the population. Other commenters 
stated that groundwater should be jurisdictional, based on concerns 
regarding pollution moving to or from shallow subsurface waters. Some 
commenters stated that groundwater, including shallow subsurface water, 
could serve as a conduit for discharge of pollutants to surface water.
    The agencies agree with those commenters who stated that nothing in 
the language of the CWA or its legislative history, Supreme Court 
interpretations, or past agency practices support the inclusion of 
groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface drainage 
systems, in the definition of ``waters of the United States.'' The 
agencies disagree with other commenters' assertion that groundwater 
should be included in the definition of ``waters of the United 
States.'' The agencies acknowledge the importance of groundwater as a 
resource and its role in the hydrologic cycle. But its regulation is 
most appropriately addressed by other Federal, State, tribal, and local 
authorities. Therefore, consistent with the agencies' longstanding 
practice, the final rule clarifies that groundwater is non-
jurisdictional. This includes shallow subsurface water and groundwater 
that is channelized in subsurface systems, like tile drains used in 
agriculture. The agencies acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, 
pollutants released to groundwater can reach surface water resources. 
However, the statutory reach of ``waters of the United States'' must be 
grounded in a legal analysis of the limits on CWA jurisdiction that 
Congress intended by use of the term ``navigable waters,'' and an 
understanding and application of the limits expressed in Supreme Court 
opinions interpreting that term. This final rule does that, while also 
supporting the agencies' goals of providing greater clarity, certainty, 
and predictability for the regulated public and regulators.
    While the final rule excludes groundwater from regulation, many 
States include groundwater in their definitions of ``waters of the 
State'' and therefore may subject groundwater to State regulation. 
Indeed, the CWA incentivizes State protection of groundwater; for 
example, grants under CWA section 319 may implement management programs 
which will carry out groundwater quality protection activities as part 
of a comprehensive nonpoint source pollution control program. 33 U.S.C. 
1329(h)(5)(D). CWA section 319(i) directs the EPA Administrator to make 
grants to States for the purpose of assisting States in carrying out 
groundwater quality protection activities which the Administrator 
determines will advance the State toward implementation of a 
comprehensive nonpoint source pollution control program. Such 
activities include research, planning, groundwater assessment, 
demonstration programs, enforcement, technical assistance, education, 
and training to protect the quality of groundwater and to prevent 
contamination of groundwater from nonpoint sources of pollution. 33 
U.S.C 1329(i). In addition, groundwater quality is regulated and 
protected through several other legal mechanisms, including the Safe

[[Page 22319]]

Drinking Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and 
various State and local laws.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ For additional description of these programs, see https://www.epa.gov/npdes/interpretative-statement-releases-pollutants-point-sources-groundwater.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral Features and Diffuse Stormwater Run-Off
    In paragraph (b)(3), the final rule excludes ephemeral features, 
including ephemeral streams, swales, gullies, rills, and pools. In 
paragraph (b)(4), the rule excludes diffuse stormwater run-off and 
directional sheet flow over upland. Such features are not 
jurisdictional under the terms of paragraph (a) in the final rule or 
its definitions in paragraph (c). They are specifically excluded in the 
final rule for additional clarity. The final rule differs from the 
proposed rule, as (b)(3) and (b)(4) were combined into one category of 
exclusions in the proposal. The agencies believe that separating the 
exclusions into two categories, as they have done for the final rule, 
provides greater clarity. The separation does not have a practical 
effect on or substantively change the types of waters and features that 
the final rule excludes compared to the proposed rule. As described in 
detail in Section III.A.3, the agencies have revised the proposed rule 
to clarify that while ephemeral features are not waters of the United 
States, a tributary does not lose its jurisdictional status if it 
contributes surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in 
a typical year through a channelized ephemeral feature, such as an 
ephemeral stream or gully. However, if an upstream reach is connected 
to the downstream reach only by diffuse stormwater runoff or 
directional sheet flow over upland, the upstream reach is not 
jurisdictional under the final rule. Providing additional clarity in 
the paragraph (b) exclusions helps to highlight that only some excluded 
features are capable of providing a channelized surface water 
connection between upstream and downstream perennial or intermittent 
waters. Under the final rule, ephemeral features are not jurisdictional 
and do not become jurisdictional even if they maintain jurisdiction of 
relatively permanent upstream waters by conveying surface water from 
those waters to downstream jurisdictional waters in a typical year.
    Some commenters supported the ephemeral features exclusion as being 
consistent with the CWA, Commerce Clause, and case law, particularly 
the plurality opinion in Rapanos. For example, one commenter indicated 
that the proposed exclusion aligned with CWA section 101(b) and, by 
avoiding jurisdiction over primarily dry features, did not 
significantly alter the Federal-State framework. Other commenters 
expressed concern that if they are not jurisdictional, ephemeral 
features could be subject to uncontrolled pollution or filled, and some 
commenters emphasized the potential adverse impacts to downstream 
jurisdictional waters into which ephemeral features flow.
    By defining perennial and intermittent tributaries of traditional 
navigable waters as jurisdictional and defining ephemeral features as 
non-jurisdictional, and by including (b)(3) and (b)(4) exclusions 
explicitly emphasizing the non-jurisdictional status of ephemeral 
features and diffuse stormwater run-off, the agencies are balancing 
Congress' intent to interpret the term ``navigable waters'' more 
broadly than the classical meaning of that term and the notion that 
nothing in the legislative history of the Act ``signifies that Congress 
intended to exert anything more than its commerce power over 
navigation.'' SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3. The exclusions in paragraphs 
(b)(3) and (b)(4) and the final rule's limitation of jurisdiction to 
perennial and intermittent rivers and streams most appropriately 
balances the Federal government's interest in regulating the nation's 
navigable waters with respecting State and Tribal land use authority 
over features that are only episodically wet during and/or following 
precipitation events. See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734 (Scalia, J., 
plurality) (identifying ``ephemeral streams'' and ``directional sheet 
flow during storm events'' as beyond the scope of CWA jurisdiction).
    Some commenters raised concerns with potential adverse impacts to 
downstream jurisdictional waters from discharges to non-jurisdictional 
ephemeral features. The agencies believe that a CWA section 402 
permittee currently discharging to a jurisdictional water that becomes 
non-jurisdictional under this final rule would likely remain subject to 
the requirements of the Act. This specific concern was raised in 
Rapanos, that enforcement of section 402 could be frustrated by 
``polluters . . . evad[ing] permitting requirement . . . by discharging 
their pollutants into noncovered intermittent watercourses that lie 
upstream of covered waters.'' Id. at 742-43. In the words of Justice 
Scalia, ``That is not so.'' Id. New or continuing discharges, whether 
illicit or not, could be subject to sections 301 and 402 of the Act if 
the discharge is conveyed from a point source to a ``water of the 
United States.'' The agencies view ephemeral features, such as arroyos 
or ditches, as potential conveyances of discharges of pollutants from 
point sources subject to NPDES permitting requirements. So too, the 
agencies believe, did Justice Scalia. He referred to ``channels''--a 
term used in the definition of ``point source'' at 33 U.S.C. 1362(14)--
as ``ephemeral streams,'' ``dry arroyos in the middle of the desert,'' 
and ``manmade drainage ditches'' when characterizing the types of 
features that he believed stretched the meaning of the ``term `waters 
of the United States' beyond parody.'' Id. at 734. Additional 
discussion of the final rule's treatment of ephemeral features is 
provided in Section III.A.3 of this notice.
Ditches
    The final rule's ditch exclusion in paragraph (b)(5) is intended to 
provide greater clarity for the regulated public and to be more 
straightforward for agency staff to implement than current practice. 
The agencies have incorporated a clear statement in the final rule that 
all types of ditches would be excluded except where they meet the 
conditions of paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of the final rule or where, in 
limited instances, they meet the conditions of paragraph (c)(1). 
Further, as discussed in Section III.D and Section III.E of this 
notice, the final rule clarifies that ditches are tributaries under 
paragraph (a)(2) where they relocate a tributary, are constructed in a 
tributary, or are constructed in an adjacent wetland, so long as the 
ditch satisfies the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' definition. 
Many States, regional groups, and national associations that commented 
during the Federalism consultation as part of development of the 
proposed rule and during the agencies' general outreach efforts noted 
that the definition of ``waters of the United States'' should exclude 
ditches. The agencies received further comments on the proposed rule's 
category of jurisdictional ditches and the exclusion for all other 
ditches. Some commenters argued that all ditches should be 
jurisdictional if they convey any volume of water to a covered water, 
however infrequent or insubstantial, while others took the opposite 
view. As discussed in Sections III.D. and III.E., the approach adopted 
in this final rule reasonably balances the exclusion of features that 
are fundamental to State, tribal, and local land use planning while 
respecting the need to preserve jurisdiction over certain ditches.

[[Page 22320]]

Prior Converted Cropland
    The agencies are finalizing the prior converted cropland exclusion 
in paragraph (b)(6) and adding a definition of ``prior converted 
cropland'' in paragraph (c)(9). The definition of ``prior converted 
cropland'' clarifies that the exclusion is no longer applicable when 
the cropland is abandoned and the land has reverted to wetlands, as 
that term is defined in paragraph (c)(16). Under this final rule, prior 
converted cropland is considered abandoned if it is not used for, or in 
support of, agricultural purposes at least once in the immediately 
preceding five years. Agricultural purposes include land use that makes 
the production of an agricultural product possible, including but not 
limited to grazing and haying. Additional discussion on agricultural 
purposes is provided below. This final rule also clarifies that 
cropland that is left idle or fallow for conservation or agricultural 
purposes for any period or duration of time remains in agricultural use 
(i.e., it is used for, or in support of, agriculture purposes), and 
therefore maintains the prior converted cropland exclusion. The 
agencies conclude that this clarification will ensure that cropland 
enrolled in long-term and other conservation programs administered by 
the Federal government or by State and local agencies that prevents 
erosion or other natural resource degradation does not lose its prior 
converted cropland designation as a result of implementing conservation 
practices.
    In 1993, the agencies categorically excluded prior converted 
cropland from the definition of ``waters of the United States.'' 58 FR 
45034-36 (August 25, 1993). As further explained below, in keeping with 
the Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA), the 1993 preamble defined prior 
converted cropland as ``areas that, prior to December 23, 1985, were 
drained or otherwise manipulated for the purpose, or having the effect, 
of making production of a commodity crop possible [and that are] 
inundated for no more than 14 consecutive days during the growing 
season.'' 58 FR 45031. As explained in detail in the 1993 preamble, due 
to the degraded and altered nature of prior converted cropland, the 
agencies determined that such lands should not be treated as 
jurisdictional wetlands for purposes of the CWA because regulating such 
lands does not further the objective of the Act. 58 FR 45032. The 1993 
preamble also set out a mechanism to ``recapture'' prior converted 
cropland into the section 404 program when the land has been abandoned 
and wetland features return. 58 FR 45034. This approach is consistent 
with the principles in the 1990 Corps Regulatory Guidance Letter 90-7. 
Although included in the 1993 preamble and Regulatory Guidance Letter 
90-7, these principles have not been incorporated into the text of any 
promulgated rule until now. This rule therefore represents the first 
time the agencies are promulgating regulatory language to clarify the 
meaning of ``prior converted cropland'' for CWA purposes, the 
application of the exclusion, and a recapture mechanism based on 
abandonment and reversion to wetlands.
    Historically, the agencies have attempted to create consistency 
between the CWA and the FSA wetlands conservation provisions for prior 
converted cropland. The agencies continue to believe that consistency 
across these programs is important for the regulated community (see 58 
FR 45033), and therefore are continuing to exclude prior converted 
cropland from the definition of ``waters of the United States.'' By 
incorporating the abandonment principles from the 1993 preamble and 
providing examples of ``agricultural purposes,'' this final rule 
remains consistent with the concepts underlying the FSA but differs in 
implementation from certain aspects of USDA's current wetlands 
compliance authority. Incorporating the abandonment principle, as 
opposed to a pure ``change in use'' policy (described below), is 
important for the agencies to appropriately manage certain wetland 
resources while providing better clarity to the agricultural community.
    When the 1993 preamble was published, the abandonment principle was 
consistent with USDA's implementation of the FSA. Three years later, 
the 1996 FSA amendments modified the abandonment principle and 
incorporated a ``change in use'' policy. See Public Law 104-127, 110 
Stat. 888 (1996). Under the new policy, prior converted cropland would 
continue to be treated as such even if wetland characteristics returned 
because of lack of maintenance of the land or other circumstances 
beyond the owner's control, ``as long as the prior converted cropland 
continues to be used for agricultural purposes.'' H.R. 2854, Conf. Rep. 
No. 104-494, at 380 (1996). In 2005, the Corps and NRCS issued a joint 
``Memorandum to the Field'' (the 2005 Memorandum) in an effort to again 
align the CWA section 404 program with the FSA by adopting the amended 
FSA's change in use policy. The 2005 Memorandum provided that, a 
``certified [prior converted] determination made by [USDA] remains 
valid as long as the area is devoted to an agricultural use. If the 
land changes to a non-agricultural use, the [prior converted cropland] 
determination is no longer applicable, and a new wetland determination 
is required for CWA purposes.'' \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Memorandum to the Field on Guidance on Conducting Wetland 
Determinations for the Food Security Act of 1985 and section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act, February 25, 2005, available at https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll11/id/2508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2005 Memorandum did not clearly address the abandonment 
principle that the agencies had been implementing since the 1993 
rulemaking. The change in use policy articulated in the 2005 Memorandum 
was also never promulgated as a rule and was declared unlawful by one 
district court because it effectively modified the 1993 preamble 
language without any formal rulemaking process. See New Hope Power Co. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 
2010). Implementing the 2005 Memorandum created other challenges for 
the agencies and the regulated community. For example, because the 2005 
Memorandum did not clearly address whether or how the abandonment 
principles should be applied in prior converted cropland cases, neither 
the agencies nor the regulated community could be certain which 
approach would be applied to a specific case.
    The agencies received many public comments on the prior converted 
cropland exclusion, with some commenters noting that the exclusion will 
provide clarification needed to protect prior converted cropland that 
may be subject to flooding and to other natural occurrences that result 
in wet or saturated fields. The agencies also received public comments 
on both the abandonment principle and the change in use analysis. Some 
commenters supported the abandonment principle, stating, for example, 
that prior converted cropland should lose its status only when the land 
is abandoned and the area reverts back to wetland. Other commenters 
requested that the agencies finalize the change in use analysis, as 
articulated in the 2005 Memorandum. The agencies have considered these 
comments and for the reasons provided herein are finalizing the 
abandonment principle as proposed and are not adopting the change in 
use approach.
    The agencies received many comments in support of the term ``for or 
in support of, agricultural purposes'' and recommendations as to how 
the term should be interpreted. Commenters

[[Page 22321]]

requested that the agencies provide additional examples of agricultural 
purposes, including, but not limited to, idling land for conservation 
uses (e.g., habitat; pollinator and wildlife management; and water 
storage, supply, and flood management); irrigation tailwater storage; 
crawfish farming; cranberry bogs; nutrient retention; and idling land 
for soil recovery following natural disasters like hurricanes and 
drought. The uses listed above, in addition to crop production, haying, 
and grazing, fall within the term ``agricultural purposes'' and, if 
documented, may maintain the prior converted cropland exclusion. 
Conservation practices, including those required or supported by USDA, 
State, and local programs (including recognized private sector programs 
that partner with government programs or that can provide verifiable 
documentation of participation) are critical to the success of 
agricultural systems across the country. Conservation practices and 
programs also are conducted ``for or in support of agricultural 
purposes'' and are appropriate to maintain the prior converted cropland 
exclusion.
    The agencies also received public comment on the type of 
documentation that a landowner should maintain to demonstrate that 
cropland has been used ``for or in support of, agricultural purposes.'' 
Commenters suggested the use of aerial photographs, topographical maps, 
cultivation maps, crop expense or receipt records, field- or tract-
specific grain elevator records, and other records generated and 
maintained in the normal course of doing business. The agencies agree 
that these types of documents and other documentation reasonably 
establishing ``agricultural purposes'' are appropriate to demonstrate 
that the prior converted cropland exclusion applies to a certain field 
or tract of land.
    Finally, the agencies received public comments on whether the five-
year timeframe for maintaining agricultural purposes is appropriate. 
Some commenters supported the five-year timeframe. Other commenters 
thought that five years was too long to avoid federal jurisdiction if 
wet cropland was providing some ecological or habitat benefit that 
should be maintained. Other commenters thought that the five-year 
timeframe was too short to account for unforeseen circumstances that 
could leave cropland idle for longer periods of time (e.g., bankruptcy, 
the probate and estate administration process, natural disasters), and 
recommended that the agency adopt a seven, ten, or twenty-year 
timeframe. Some commenters specifically requested that the agencies 
allow more than five years when drought or flood conditions prevent 
cultivation, planting or harvest. The agencies have considered these 
comments and conclude that a five-year timeframe for maintaining 
agricultural purposes is reasonable and consistent with the 1993 
preamble (58 FR 45033) and with the five-year timeframe regarding 
validity of an approved jurisdictional determination (2005 Corps 
Regulatory Guidance Letter (RGL) 05-02). The five-year timeframe is 
longstanding in the CWA section 404 program and will be familiar to 
landowners and regulators alike, increasing clarity in implementation. 
The agencies are finalizing the rule with the five-year timeframe, as 
proposed, but as described in the next subsection, the agencies will 
work closely with USDA, and will consider documentation from USDA, 
NOAA, FEMA, or other Federal or State agencies to determine if the land 
was used for or in support of agricultural purposes in the immediately 
preceding five years to evaluate whether cropland has in fact been 
abandoned.
    The agencies consider rulemaking to be appropriate here in order to 
clarify the definition of ``prior converted cropland'' and to provide 
regulatory certainty over when such lands are no longer eligible for 
the CWA exclusion. This final rule provides much needed clarity about 
the prior converted cropland exclusion and how wetlands can be 
recaptured into CWA jurisdiction through the abandonment test. In 
addition to finalizing the exclusion as proposed, the Corps will 
withdraw the 2005 Memorandum simultaneous with the effective date of 
this rule.
Artificially Irrigated Areas, Artificial Lakes and Ponds, and Water-
Filled Depressions
    Paragraph (b) also excludes from waters of the United States under 
this final rule:
     Artificially irrigated areas, including fields flooded for 
agricultural production, that would revert to upland should application 
of irrigation water to that area cease (paragraph (b)(7));
     Artificial lakes and ponds, including water storage 
reservoirs and farm, stock watering, and log cleaning ponds, 
constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters, so 
long as those artificial lakes and ponds are not impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters that meet the conditions of paragraph (c)(6) 
(paragraph (b)(8)); and
     Water-filled depressions constructed or excavated in 
upland or in non-jurisdictional waters incidental to mining or 
construction activity, and pits excavated in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters for the purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or 
gravel (paragraph (b)(9)).
    Paragraphs (b)(7), (8), and (9) of the final rule identify features 
and waters that the agencies have generally excluded from the 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' in previous preambles 
since 1986 (see, e.g., 51 FR 41206, 41217 (November 13, 1986) and 53 FR 
20764-65 (June 6, 1988)). The agencies have codified these longstanding 
exclusions to further the agencies' goals of providing greater clarity 
and predictability for the regulated public and the regulators.
    Several of these exclusions use the phrase ``upland.'' In keeping 
with the goal of providing greater clarity, the agencies have included 
in the final rule a definition of ``upland'' in paragraph (c)(14). It 
is important to note that a water of the United States is not 
considered ``upland'' just because it lacks water at a given time. 
Similarly, an area may remain ``upland'' even if it is wet sporadically 
or after a rainfall or flood event. In addition, the agencies recognize 
that excluded water features may be constructed or excavated in non-
jurisdictional ponds, wetlands, or other non-jurisdictional features. 
Therefore, the agencies added the phrase ``non-jurisdictional waters'' 
to some of these exclusions to provide greater clarity and to confirm 
that these features can be constructed or excavated in a non-
jurisdictional water, such as an isolated pond or wetland, while 
continuing to be excluded from federal jurisdiction.
    The upland requirement does not apply to all exclusions under 
paragraph (b). For those waters or features in paragraph (b) of this 
final rule that do contain the stipulation that they must be 
constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters to 
be excluded, the agencies intend that these features be constructed or 
excavated wholly in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters. For 
example, construction activities that enlarge a water of the United 
States beyond its current boundaries are not constructed wholly in 
upland. Where portions of a new or modified water feature are built in 
a jurisdictional water, the agencies would not view the new or modified 
feature as having been constructed or excavated wholly in upland or in 
non-jurisdictional waters, and therefore not subject to the exclusion. 
But where a stock watering pond, for example, is developed in a spring 
that is non-jurisdictional under this final rule, that pond will be 
considered by the agencies to have been constructed wholly in

[[Page 22322]]

upland and/or non-jurisdictional waters. Even if a feature is not 
constructed or excavated wholly in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters and meets the definition of ``waters of the United States,'' it 
may be otherwise excluded under another part of paragraph (b). The 
agencies note, however, that the mere interface between the excluded 
feature constructed or excavated wholly in upland and a jurisdictional 
water does not make that feature jurisdictional. For example, a ditch 
constructed or excavated wholly in upland that connects to a tributary 
would not be considered a jurisdictional ditch. The connection to a 
jurisdictional water does not eliminate applicability of a paragraph 
(b) exclusion conditioned by the upland or non-jurisdictional waters 
language. To avoid any confusion in implementation, this is why the 
agencies have not included the term ``wholly'' in the final regulatory 
text. Finally, an excluded feature under the final rule that develops 
wetland characteristics within the confines of the non-jurisdictional 
water or feature remains excluded from the definition of ``waters of 
the United States,'' with the exception in limited circumstances of 
wetlands that develop in ditches constructed in adjacent wetlands, as 
discussed in Section III.G.
    Many commenters were in favor of the proposed exclusion under 
(b)(6) of the proposed rule, now under (b)(7), for artificially 
irrigated areas. A few commenters were opposed to the exclusion 
entirely, and some commenters were opposed to expanding the exclusion 
for other crops and/or aquaculture. Some commenters cited the need for 
clarity as to whether the listed crops were the only ones covered under 
the exclusion. After considering the comments received, the agencies 
have modified this exclusion in the final rule to clarify their intent 
that it is not limited to rice and cranberry production and applies 
more generally to ``agricultural production.'' The references to 
cranberries and rice in the proposed rule were examples and were not an 
exhaustive list of crops to which the exclusion would apply. When 
evaluating an area to determine whether it meets the exclusion, the 
focus should be on whether the area is artificially irrigated or 
flooded for the purpose of agricultural production and on whether it 
would revert to upland if the irrigation ceases.
    Paragraph (b)(8) of the final rule provides that artificial lakes 
and ponds, including water storage reservoirs and farm, irrigation, 
stock watering, and log cleaning ponds, are excluded from the 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' so long as these features 
are constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters, 
and so long as these features are not impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters meeting the conditions of paragraph (c)(6). Many commenters 
provided edits and additions to the list of water features included in 
paragraph (b)(8). However, the agencies did not intend to provide an 
exhaustive list of features that are excluded under paragraph (b)(8) 
and have determined that any feature that meets the conditions of 
paragraph (b)(8) will be non-jurisdictional under this rule.
    The agencies modified the proposed exclusion for artificial lakes 
and ponds to clarify their intent. As drafted in the proposed rule, the 
exclusion unintentionally would have been narrower than under the 1980s 
regulations. For example, when a farm pond is constructed in upland and 
connected via a ditch also constructed in upland to divert flow from a 
tributary and the farm pond does not connect back into the tributary 
system, it has been longstanding agency practice that the farm or stock 
pond is non-jurisdictional, similar to irrigation ditches which do not 
connect back into the tributary network. The pond's source of water is 
the tributary and serves to provide water for irrigation, livestock, 
and other agricultural uses. Because such ponds do not contribute 
surface water flow to a downstream paragraph (a)(1) water, they have 
not been jurisdictional under historic practice and are not 
jurisdictional under this final rule. Another example involves a stock 
watering pond developed in a non-jurisdictional spring. If that pond 
has a spillway that creates a potential surface water connection to a 
nearby stream, the pond has traditionally been excluded from CWA 
jurisdiction. This final rule adopts that longstanding position.
    In the final rule, the agencies are clarifying that artificial 
features including water storage reservoirs and farm, irrigation, stock 
watering, and log cleaning ponds are not jurisdictional unless they are 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters meeting the conditions of 
paragraph (c)(6), as discussed in Section III.F of this notice. The 
agencies acknowledge that many artificial lakes and ponds may have been 
created by impounding other waters. The text of the final rule 
clarifies that artificial lakes and ponds that also meet the conditions 
of a jurisdictional impoundment under paragraph (c)(6) are not excluded 
under paragraph (b)(8). However, consistent with longstanding practice, 
when an applicant receives a permit to impound a water of the United 
States in order to construct a waste treatment system (as excluded 
under paragraph (b)(12)), under this final rule the agencies are 
affirmatively relinquishing jurisdiction over the resulting waste 
treatment system as long as it is used for this permitted purpose. Also 
consistent with longstanding practice, waters upstream of the waste 
treatment system are still considered jurisdictional where they meet 
the final rule's definition of ``waters of the United States.''
    The (b)(8) exclusion for artificial lakes and ponds uses the term 
``constructed or excavated'' in the final rule, while the proposed rule 
used the term ``constructed.'' The agencies do not intend for this 
change to alter the meaning of the exclusion from proposal. The 
agencies believe that this edit provides clarity to the public about 
how excluded artificial lakes and ponds can be created--some are 
constructed through dams, dikes, or barriers, while some are excavated 
pits. Excavation can entail construction, and construction can entail 
excavation, but the agencies have decided to use both terms in the 
final rule for added clarity.
    Several commenters stated that artificial lakes and ponds should be 
excluded regardless of whether they are located either wholly or 
partially in upland, and that the (b)(8) exclusion should extend to 
artificial lakes and ponds not constructed or excavated in upland. A 
few commenters noted that farmers and ranchers often determine the 
location of farm and stock ponds based on topography, which will 
typically result in the construction of such features in low areas that 
may have some characteristics of wetlands or a natural ephemeral 
feature. One commenter noted that many artificial lakes or ponds are 
isolated features, and that their connectivity to waters of the United 
States rather than their relationship to upland should be the primary 
factor in determining jurisdiction.
    The final rule continues to require an artificial lake or pond to 
be constructed or excavated wholly in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters to be considered excluded under (b)(8). This reflects the 
agencies' longstanding policy, as discussed above with the stock 
watering pond example. Artificial lakes and ponds constructed or 
excavated partially in uplands or in non-jurisdictional waters and 
partially in jurisdictional waters are jurisdictional if such lakes and 
ponds meet the conditions of paragraph (c)(6). The agencies are 
concerned that if only

[[Page 22323]]

part of an artificial lake or pond need be in upland, the exclusion 
could be inappropriately applied to waters where just a small portion 
is constructed in upland. The agencies again note that the mere 
interface between the excluded lake or pond otherwise constructed or 
excavated wholly in upland and a jurisdictional water does not make 
that feature jurisdictional. For example, an artificial lake or pond 
that meets the conditions of paragraph (b)(8) and that connects to a 
tributary would not be considered jurisdictional. With respect to 
artificial lakes and ponds that are constructed in isolated or 
ephemeral features, the agencies modified the exclusion to make clear 
that artificial lakes or ponds constructed or excavated in non-
jurisdictional features are excluded.
    Paragraph (b)(9) of the final rule excludes water-filled 
depressions constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters incidental to mining or construction activity, and pits 
excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters for the purpose of 
obtaining fill, sand, or gravel. In this final rule, the agencies have 
modified this exclusion from the proposal. In the proposed rule, such 
depressions would have been excluded where they are ``created in 
upland,'' but in the final rule such depressions are excluded where 
they are ``constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters.'' The change from ``created'' to ``constructed or excavated,'' 
as discussed above, is not meant to change the meaning or applicability 
of the exclusion from the proposed rule, but rather is intended to add 
clarity to the regulated public about how such excluded water-filled 
depressions can be created.
    Aside from this clarifying change, the agencies are finalizing this 
exclusion as it was proposed. In the final rule, this exclusion 
clarifies longstanding practice reflected in the agencies' 1986 and 
1988 preambles, 51 FR 41206, 41217 (November 13, 1986); 53 FR 20764-65 
(June 6, 1988) and includes several refinements to the language in 
those preambles. In addition to construction activity, the agencies 
have also reflected in the final rule an exclusion for water-filled 
depressions created in upland incidental to mining activity. This is 
consistent with the 1986 and 1988 preambles, which generally excluded 
pits excavated for obtaining fill, sand, or gravel, and the agencies 
believe there is no need to distinguish between features based on 
whether they are created by construction or mining activity.
    Several commenters supported the (b)(9) exclusion, because such 
water-filled depressions are often needed for facility management but 
are not part of the tributary system and are not natural waters. Some 
commenters opposed the exclusion, stating that the exclusion benefited 
mining companies and would allow mining activities to negatively impact 
water quality. Other commenters stated that the exclusion should be 
expanded to include water-filled depressions constructed or excavated 
incidental to other activities such as silviculture, or incidental to 
all activities, asserting that the agencies should not have singled out 
specific industries in the exclusion. With respect to expanding the 
exclusion to encompass additional industries or activities, the 
agencies note that the (b)(9) exclusion is not the only one that 
addresses artificial waters. Paragraph (b) of the final rule excludes a 
number of artificial features not limited to specific industries. In 
addition, CWA section 404(f) exempts a number of discharges associated 
with certain activities in jurisdictional waters from the requirement 
to obtain a section 404 permit, including normal farming, ranching, and 
silviculture activities as part of an established operation. 33 U.S.C. 
1344(f)(1)(A).
    Some commenters wanted the (b)(9) exclusion to be expanded so that 
once a water-filled depression was excluded, it remained excluded for 
CWA section 404 purposes. The 1986 and 1988 preambles stated that these 
depressions were excluded ``unless and until the construction or 
excavation operation is abandoned and the resulting body of water meets 
the definition of waters of the United States.'' (51 FR 41206, 41217 
(November 13, 1986); 53 FR 20764-65 (June 6, 1988)). The agencies 
proposed that such water-filled depression would remain excluded, which 
represented a change from the 1986 and 1988 preamble language. After 
further consideration, and after considering comments received, the 
agencies have concluded that once a feature subject to the (b)(9) 
exclusion is no longer used for the original purpose for which it was 
excluded, it no longer qualifies for the (b)(9) exclusion. This is 
consistent with the approach to other exclusions, such as waste 
treatment systems and artificially irrigated areas, and reaffirms the 
agencies' longstanding practice regarding this exclusion. In many 
cases, even if the (b)(9) exclusion may no longer apply to a feature, 
the feature may still remain non-jurisdictional because it does not 
meet the conditions of paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) and thus is 
excluded under paragraph (b)(1).
Stormwater Control Features
    In paragraph (b)(10) of the final rule, the agencies exclude 
stormwater control features constructed or excavated in upland or in 
non-jurisdictional waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store 
stormwater runoff. Although stormwater control features are not 
specifically included in the list of waters that the agencies consider 
to be generally non-jurisdictional per the 1986 and 1988 preamble 
language, 51 FR 41206 (November 13, 1986) and 53 FR 20764 (June 6, 
1988), the agencies' longstanding practice is to view stormwater 
control features that are not built in waters of the United States as 
non-jurisdictional. Conversely, the agencies view some relatively 
permanent bodies of water, such as channelized streams with 
intermittent or perennial flow, as jurisdictional even when used as 
part of a stormwater management system. Nothing in this final rule 
changes the agencies' longstanding practice. Rather, this exclusion 
clarifies the appropriate limits of jurisdiction relating to these 
systems.
    A key element of the exclusion is whether the feature or control 
system was built wholly in upland or in a non-jurisdictional water. As 
discussed above and as further clarified below, the agencies recognize 
that upland features may be connected to jurisdictional waters and that 
such a connection does not preclude application of the exclusion. 
Another key element is that the feature must convey, treat, infiltrate, 
or store stormwater. Stormwater control features have evolved 
considerably over time, and their nomenclature is not consistent, so in 
order to avoid unintentionally limiting the exclusion, the agencies 
have not included a list of excluded features in the final rule. The 
rule excludes the diverse range of stormwater control features that are 
currently in place and may be developed in the future. However, the 
agencies note that excluded stormwater control features when they have 
channelized surface water may provide a connection between the upstream 
reach of a relatively permanent water and a downstream jurisdictional 
water such that the upstream reach is jurisdictional. Even in this 
circumstance, the stormwater control feature would remain non-
jurisdictional under this final rule. See Section III.D of this notice 
for further discussion. The agencies also note that while excluded from 
the definition of ``waters of the United States,'' stormwater control 
features may function as a conveyance of a discharge of pollutants from 
a point source to a water of the United States.

[[Page 22324]]

    Traditionally, stormwater controls were designed to direct runoff 
away from people and property as quickly as possible. Cities built 
systems to collect, convey, or store stormwater, using structures such 
as curbs, gutters, and sewers. Retention and detention stormwater ponds 
were built to store excess stormwater until it could be more safely 
released. More recently, use of stormwater controls to remove 
pollutants before the stormwater is discharged has become more 
prevalent. Even more recently, cities have turned to green 
infrastructure, using existing natural features or creating new 
features that mimic natural hydrological processes that work to 
infiltrate, evaporate, or transpire precipitation, to manage stormwater 
at its source and keep it out of the conveyance system. These 
engineered components of stormwater management systems can address both 
flood control and water quality concerns, as well as provide other 
benefits to communities. This final rule is designed to avoid 
disincentives to this environmentally beneficial trend in stormwater 
management practices.
    Many commenters supported the proposed rule's exclusion for 
stormwater control features constructed or excavated in upland, 
asserting that environmentally beneficial solutions to manage 
stormwater could be discouraged if such features were designated as 
``waters of the United States.'' Several commenters noted concerns that 
an exclusion dependent on an upland location could potentially deter 
stormwater system operators from installing beneficial green 
infrastructure and suggested that jurisdictional waters incorporated 
into the stormwater system should be excluded. Many commenters 
suggested that the final rule should define ``stormwater control 
features'' that would be excluded.
    The agencies' longstanding practice is to view stormwater control 
features as non-jurisdictional when built outside of waters of the 
United States. The agencies do not agree with commenters who stated 
that jurisdictional waters that are incorporated into a drainage or 
stormwater conveyance system should be excluded by virtue of the fact 
that they are part of the larger stormwater control system. A water 
does not lose its jurisdictional status if it is modified for use as a 
stormwater control measure. The agencies recognize that highly 
engineered municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) that may have 
replaced natural drainage features may therefore have jurisdictional 
waters within their systems, but this does not represent a change from 
longstanding practice. For example, the Los Angeles River is a 
traditional navigable water highly engineered for stormwater control, 
and it still meets the requirements of a paragraph (a)(1) water. 
Regarding comments related to defining the term ``stormwater control 
features,'' the agencies do not name specific stormwater control 
features that would fall under the stormwater control feature 
exclusion, as they do not want the final rule to be perceived as 
limiting the exclusion, particularly given differences among regional 
naming conventions and the likelihood that technologies and 
nomenclature will evolve in the future.
Groundwater Recharge, Water Reuse, and Wastewater Recycling Structures
    In this final rule under paragraph (b)(11), the agencies exclude 
from the definition of ``waters of the United States'' groundwater 
recharge, water reuse, and wastewater recycling structures constructed 
or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters. While such 
features are not explicitly listed in the categories of waters that the 
agencies generally consider to be non-jurisdictional in the 1986 and 
1988 preamble language, 51 FR 41206 (November 13, 1986) and 53 FR 20764 
(June 6, 1988), this exclusion clarifies the agencies' longstanding 
practice that waters and water features used for water reuse and 
recycling are not jurisdictional when constructed in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters. The agencies recognize the importance of water 
reuse and recycling, particularly in the arid West where water supplies 
can be limited and droughts can exacerbate supply issues. This 
exclusion is intended to avoid discouraging or creating barriers to 
water reuse and conservation practices and projects. Detention and 
retention basins can play an important role in capturing and storing 
water prior to beneficial reuse. Similarly, groundwater recharge basins 
and infiltration ponds are becoming more prevalent tools for water 
reuse and recycling. These features are used to collect and store 
water, which then infiltrates into groundwater via permeable soils. 
Though these features are often created in upland, they are also often 
located in close proximity to tributaries or other larger bodies of 
water. The exclusion in paragraph (b)(11) of the final rule codifies 
the agencies' longstanding practice and encourages water management 
practices that the agencies recognize are important and beneficial.
    Many commenters expressed support for the proposed rule's exclusion 
for wastewater recycling structures. Some commenters stated that the 
exclusion would encourage water reuse and other innovative approaches 
to water management. A few commenters supported the exclusion because 
they said wastewater recycling structures should be regulated at the 
State level. Some commenters stated that considering a wastewater 
recycling structure a water of the United States could create 
unnecessary regulatory and economic burdens, while providing no 
additional water quality protection. Several commenters stated that the 
exclusion of groundwater recharge basins and similar structures was 
consistent with Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Rapanos, as 
groundwater recharge basins do not discharge to any navigable waters, 
are filled only during part of the year, and do not otherwise 
constitute a traditional navigable water within the meaning of the 
plurality's jurisdictional test. A number of commenters suggested that 
the qualifying language in the proposed rule's wastewater recycling 
structures exclusion, which would have limited the exclusion to 
wastewater recycling structures ``constructed in upland,'' could create 
barriers to water reuse and conservation.
    For the reasons described above, the agencies believe that the 
(b)(11) exclusion reflects an appropriate balance among CWA policies 
and encouraging water reuse and effective water management. As a 
result, this final rule includes the (b)(11) exclusion largely 
unchanged from the proposal. The agencies did modify the exclusion in 
response to comments to add the term ``water reuse'' to the exclusion 
as it is commonly used in water and wastewater management. The agencies 
also added ``or non-jurisdictional waters'' to the exclusion to ensure 
that it is not narrowly restricted to construction in upland only. As 
discussed above, the agencies will apply the qualifier ``constructed or 
excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters'' consistently 
across four exclusions that use the term.
Waste Treatment Systems
    Paragraph (b)(12) of the final rule excludes waste treatment 
systems. The waste treatment system exclusion has existed since 1979 
(44 FR 32854), and the agencies are continuing the exclusion under this 
final rule. The agencies are also for the first time providing in the 
final rule a definition of ``waste treatment system'' under paragraph 
(c)(15), so as to clarify which waters and features are considered part 
of a waste treatment system and therefore excluded. Continuing the 
agencies' longstanding practice, any

[[Page 22325]]

entity with a waste treatment system would need to comply with the CWA 
by obtaining a section 404 permit for new construction in a water of 
the United States, and a section 402 permit for discharges from the 
waste treatment system into waters of the United States. Consistent 
with the proposal, the agencies intend for this exclusion to apply only 
to waste treatment systems constructed in accordance with the 
requirements of the CWA and to all waste treatment systems constructed 
prior to the 1972 CWA amendments. One ministerial change in the final 
rule from the 2019 Rule is the deletion of a cross-reference to a 
regulatory definition of ``cooling ponds'' that no longer exists in the 
Code of Federal Regulations.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See 47 FR 52290, 52291, 52305 (Nov. 19, 1982) (deleting 
definition of cooling ponds at 40 CFR 423.11(m)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters supported the waste treatment system exclusion and 
definition as proposed and agreed that the proposed exclusion would 
codify the agencies' longstanding practice. Some commenters requested 
that the exclusion be expanded to include all ancillary systems, 
channels, appurtenances, conveyances, and diversion ditches associated 
with the waste treatment system. Other commenters stated that the 
proposed exclusion was unlawful and that it should be eliminated 
entirely. Some commenters suggested that there may be confusion 
concerning the agencies' intent to apply the exclusion to waste 
treatment systems constructed prior to the 1972 CWA amendments and 
requested that this concept be explicitly included in the final 
regulatory text.
    The agencies have considered these public comments and have 
finalized the waste treatment exclusion as it was proposed. As noted 
above, the agencies agree with commenters that this final rule codifies 
the longstanding exclusion that was first included in regulation in 
1979. The agencies disagree with suggestions to expand or eliminate the 
exclusion and have finalized the definition as proposed. The agencies 
also disagree with the suggestion that the exclusion is unlawful and 
that there is confusion over the agencies' intent to apply this 
exclusion to all waste treatment systems constructed prior to the 1972 
CWA amendments. The agencies clearly stated their intent to do so in 
the notice of proposed rulemaking and in this final rule, and do not 
believe it is necessary to repeat this intent in the regulatory text. 
The regulatory text applies to all waste treatment systems that meet 
the definition set forth therein, including systems constructed prior 
to the 1972 CWA amendments, and there is no basis for construing the 
exclusion not to apply to such systems.
    The agencies also considered other exclusions recommended by 
stakeholders prior to the proposed rule and suggested in comments on 
the proposed rule. The agencies did not include these additional 
proposed exclusions in the final rule. Some of the suggested exclusions 
were so broadly characterized that they would have introduced confusion 
and potentially excluded waters that the agencies have consistently 
determined should be covered as waters of the United States. Other 
suggested exclusions were so site-specific or activity-based that they 
did not warrant inclusion in the nationally-applicable definition. 
Still other suggested exclusions were covered by another exclusion in 
the rule, and thus would have been superfluous, in whole or in part.
3. How will the agencies implement the final rule?
    To determine whether a water meets the final rule's exclusions in 
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(12), the agencies will first evaluate 
whether the water meets the definition of ``waters of the United 
States'' under paragraphs (a)(1) through (4). If the water does not 
satisfy any of the paragraph (a)(1) through (4) conditions, it is non-
jurisdictional under paragraph (b)(1). If the water does satisfy one or 
more of the conditions to be a paragraph (a)(1) through (4) water, the 
agencies will evaluate if the water is identified in any of the 
categories of excluded waters and features under paragraphs (b)(2) 
through (12) of this final rule. If the water meets any of these 
exclusions, the water is excluded even if the water satisfies one or 
more of the conditions to be a paragraph (a)(1) through (4) water.
    As discussed above, the agencies' final rule includes an exclusion 
for groundwater under paragraph (b)(2), including groundwater drained 
through subsurface drainage systems. The final rule clarifies that even 
when groundwater is channelized in subsurface systems, like tile drains 
used in agriculture, it remains subject to the exclusion. However, the 
exclusion does not apply to surface expressions of groundwater, such as 
where groundwater discharges to the channel bed and becomes baseflow in 
intermittent or perennial streams. The agencies' exclusion for 
groundwater in the final rule is consistent with longstanding agency 
practice.
    Some commenters requested that the agencies provide guidance as to 
how to implement the exclusion for ephemeral features. For example, a 
commenter stated that a blanket exclusion of ephemeral streams without 
regard to flow quantity could increase the difficulty in delineating 
such features and could limit activities to certain time periods. Some 
commenters suggested the agencies consider certain ephemeral features 
to be jurisdictional on a situational or regional basis, while other 
commenters supported a case-by-case determination of ephemeral features 
that would fall under the exclusion, rather than excluding ephemeral 
features categorically. One commenter requested implementation tools, 
including visual aids or benchmarks to identify excluded features, 
observing that distinguishing between ephemeral and intermittent waters 
may be challenging.
    This final rule is intended to establish categorical bright lines 
that provide clarity and predictability for regulators and the 
regulated community. Consistent with that goal, the final rule 
eliminates the case-specific application of Justice Kennedy's 
significant nexus test, and instead establishes clear categories of 
jurisdictional waters and non-jurisdictional waters and features that 
adhere to the basic principles articulated in the Riverside Bayview, 
SWANCC, and Rapanos decisions, including key principles expressed in 
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion in that case, as discussed at length in this preamble, while 
respecting the overall structure and function of the CWA. The agencies 
have existing field and remote tools and additional implementation 
tools and methods under development that will help distinguish flow 
classifications of streams and other waterbodies. The agencies can use 
many tools and remote and field-based methods described in Section 
III.D.3 to distinguish between paragraph (b)(3) ephemeral streams, 
swales, gullies, rills, and pools and paragraph (b)(4) areas with 
diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet flow over upland, 
while comparing both against waters subject to jurisdiction under 
paragraph (a). Under past and existing practice, the agencies have 
substantial experience using remote tools and field observations to 
distinguish between channelized and non-channelized features, and the 
agencies expect that many landowners can distinguish between these 
features using visual observations. Under this final rule, landscapes 
with non-channelized, diffuse stormwater and overland sheet flow are 
excluded regardless of the flow regime characteristics, because under

[[Page 22326]]

these circumstances, flow is occurring only in direct response to 
precipitation over areas that meet the definition of ``upland.'' As 
explained by the Rapanos plurality, regulating these features as waters 
of the United States extends beyond the rational meaning of the term. 
547 U.S. at 734.
    With respect to implementing the final rule's paragraph (b)(5) 
exclusion for certain ditches, the reach of a ditch that meets 
paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of the final rule is considered a water of the 
United States, with ``reach'' interpreted similarly to how it is used 
for tributaries in Section III.D of this notice (i.e., a section of a 
ditch along which similar hydrologic conditions exist, such as 
discharge, depth, area, and slope). The jurisdictional status of other 
reaches of the same ditch must be assessed based on the specific facts 
and under the terms of the final rule to determine the jurisdictional 
status of those reaches. For example, a ditch that is constructed in a 
tributary is not an excluded ditch under paragraph (b)(5) so long as it 
satisfies the flow conditions of the ``tributary'' definition or the 
conditions of the ``adjacent wetlands'' definition as further described 
in Section III.D and Section III.E. Further, the ditch exclusion does 
not affect the possible status of a ditch as a point source. Also, a 
ditch constructed in an adjacent wetland that satisfies the conditions 
of paragraph (a)(4) is not excluded. The agencies believe that the 
final rule's ditch exclusion encompasses most irrigation and drainage 
ditches, including most roadside and other transportation ditches, as 
well as most agricultural ditches.
    In paragraph (b)(6) of this final rule, the agencies are 
reconfirming the longstanding prior converted cropland exclusion. This 
final rule also codifies the abandonment principle as applied to the 
prior converted cropland exclusion, as first articulated in the 1993 
preamble (58 FR 45033), and provides additional clarification regarding 
what constitutes ``agricultural purposes.'' As a result of this final 
rule, the change in use analysis will no longer be used to evaluate 
whether the prior converted cropland exclusion applies. Under the final 
rule, when cropland has been abandoned (i.e., the cropland has not been 
used for or in support of agricultural purposes for a period of greater 
than five years), and wetlands have returned, any prior converted 
cropland designation for that site will no longer be valid for purposes 
of the CWA.
    The USDA is responsible for making determinations as to whether 
land is prior converted cropland for its FSA purposes, whereas the 
agencies are responsible for determining applicability of the exclusion 
for CWA purposes, consistent with the government's longstanding 
interpretation of the agencies' authority under the CWA. See 33 CFR 
328.3(a)(8) (``Notwithstanding the determination of an area's status as 
prior converted cropland by any other Federal agency, for the purposes 
of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction remains with EPA.''); CWA Regulatory Programs, 58 FR 
45,008, 45,036 (Aug. 25, 1993); Administrative Authority to Construe 
Sec.  404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (``Civiletti 
Memorandum''), 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 197 (1979). The agencies will defer to 
USDA for purposes of establishing whether a parcel or tract of land has 
received a prior converted cropland determination and is therefore 
eligible for the prior converted cropland exclusion under this rule. A 
landowner without an existing prior converted cropland determination 
may seek a new determination from the USDA.\59\ The USDA is subject to 
specific statutes designed to protect landowner privacy and, as such, 
is prohibited from making certain parcel-specific information available 
without the landowner's consent. To ensure that the agencies can rely 
on a USDA prior converted cropland determination, the landowner will 
need to either provide a copy of the determination or provide the 
agencies with a signed consent form to allow the agencies access to the 
relevant information for the limited purpose of verifying USDA's prior 
converted cropland determination. The agencies recognize that privacy 
and confidentiality issues concerning certain producer information is 
addressed at section 1619 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 
2008 (7 U.S.C. 8791(b)) and section 1244(b) of the Food Security Act of 
1985, as amended (16 U.S.C. 3844(b)). If a parcel is found to be prior 
converted cropland, as defined in this rule, it is not a water of the 
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ The agencies note that the USDA's regulatory definition of 
``prior converted cropland'' in the FSA and the definition being 
established in this final rule have different purposes and they are 
substantively different. Based on the FSA's statutory requirements, 
the USDA definition of ``prior converted cropland'' requires that 
agricultural commodity crop production be made possible prior to 
1985. See 7 CFR 12.2(a)(8); 16 U.S.C. 3801 (defining converted 
wetland) and 16 U.S.C. 3822(b)(1)(A) (establishing the pre-1985 
exemption). If commodity crop production was made possible on a 
particular parcel or tract of land prior to 1985, that land is 
eligible for the prior converted cropland exclusion in this final 
rule. Once eligibility is determined, the agencies will evaluate the 
land to determine if the exclusion currently applies, or if the land 
has been abandoned, as described in this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Once a threshold determination has been made that certain lands are 
prior converted cropland, the EPA and the Corps are responsible for 
implementing the prior converted cropland exclusion for CWA purposes 
and identifying (as further explained below) whether the lands have 
been abandoned and whether wetlands conditions have returned such that 
they are no longer eligible for the prior converted cropland exclusion 
in this rule and thus may be waters of the United States. In addition 
to working closely with the USDA, the agencies will consider 
documentation from NOAA and FEMA when evaluating whether a parcel of 
land may no longer be eligible for the CWA prior converted cropland 
exclusion. In all cases, the burden to prove that such parcel is a 
water of the United States remains on the agencies. The agencies' 
implementation of the prior converted cropland exclusion for CWA 
regulatory purposes does not affect the USDA's administration of the 
FSA or a landowner's eligibility for benefits under FSA programs.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 84 FR 4193 for a 
summary of how the agencies historically implemented and enforced 
this exclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the final rule, to determine the continuing applicability of 
the prior converted cropland exclusion, the Corps must first determine 
whether the land has been ``abandoned.'' As described previously, prior 
converted cropland will be considered abandoned if it is not used for, 
or in support of, agricultural purposes at least once in the 
immediately preceding five years. In making an abandonment 
determination, the Corps will work with the landowner and USDA, as 
appropriate, to determine whether the land is currently or has been 
used for or in support of agricultural purposes at least once in the 
immediately preceding five years. As noted above, there are many uses 
that may fall within this category, including but not limited to, 
grazing; haying; idling land for conservation purposes (e.g., habitat; 
pollinator and wildlife management; and water storage, water supply, 
and flood management); irrigation tailwater storage; crawfish farming; 
cranberry bogs; nutrient retention; and idling land for soil recovery 
following natural disasters like hurricanes and drought. Some of those 
land uses may not be obvious to Corps field staff, so the agencies may 
rely on public or private documentation to demonstrate that the land is 
enrolled in a conservation program or is otherwise

[[Page 22327]]

being used for or in support of agricultural purposes. Such information 
may include aerial photographs, topographical maps, cultivation maps, 
crop expense or receipt records, field- or tract-specific grain 
elevator records, and other records generated and maintained in the 
normal course of doing business, including government agency records 
documenting participation in a conservation program, and other 
documentation reasonably establishing one or more ``agricultural 
purposes.''
    The final rule requires that the land be used for or in support of 
agricultural purposes within the immediately preceding five years. In 
implementing this requirement, the agencies will consider documentation 
from USDA, NOAA, FEMA, and other Federal and State agencies to 
determine whether the land was used for or in support of agricultural 
purposes in the immediately preceding five years. For example, USDA 
administers multiple programs that track whether fields have been 
planted or harvested in the normal course, or enrolled in long-term 
conservation rotations, and the agency provides crop insurance for 
years where those activities were halted for reasons covered under 
their insurance policies; NOAA tracks long- and short-term weather 
patterns and can provide information and data concerning flood or 
drought conditions that may cause or contribute to idling land in 
support of agricultural purposes; and FEMA administers emergency 
response programs for natural disasters, including hurricanes, 
wildfires, and other events that could also require idling land for 
soil recovery and other agricultural purposes. The agencies will take 
into account this information, and additional documentation reasonably 
establishing ``agricultural purposes'' when evaluating whether cropland 
has been used for or in support of agricultural purposes in the 
immediately preceding five years.
    If the Corps determines that the land is abandoned, then it must 
evaluate the current condition of the land to determine whether wetland 
conditions have returned. If wetlands are currently present on the 
property, the agencies will determine whether the wetlands are 
``adjacent wetlands'' and therefore ``waters of the United States,'' 
consistent with this final rule. As the term ``prior converted 
cropland'' suggests, and as stated in the preamble to the 1993 Rule, 
land properly designated as prior converted cropland has typically been 
so extensively modified from its prior condition that it no longer 
exhibits wetland hydrology or vegetation, and no longer performs the 
functions it did in its natural and original condition as a wetland. 58 
FR 45032. It is often altered and degraded, with long-term physical and 
hydrological modifications that substantially reduce the likelihood of 
reestablishment of hydrophytic vegetation. Consistent with longstanding 
agency policy and wetland delineation procedures, if a former wetland 
has been lawfully manipulated to the extent that it no longer exhibits 
wetland characteristics under normal circumstances, it would not be 
jurisdictional under the CWA. The altered nature of prior converted 
cropland and its conditions constitute the ``normal circumstances'' of 
such areas. The agencies expect the majority of prior converted 
cropland in the nation to fall into this category and not to be subject 
to CWA regulation, even after it is abandoned. However, at least some 
abandoned prior converted cropland may, under normal circumstances, 
meet the definition of ``wetlands'' under paragraph (c)(16).
    In paragraph (b)(7), the agencies clarify their longstanding view 
that the artificial irrigation exclusion applies only to the specific 
land being artificially irrigated, including fields flooded for 
agricultural production, including but not limited to rice or cranberry 
growing, which would revert to upland should artificial irrigation 
cease. Historically, the agencies have taken the position that ponds 
for rice growing are generally not considered waters of the United 
States, as reflected in the 1986 and 1988 preambles. See 51 FR 41206, 
41217 (November 13, 1986) and 53 FR 20764-65 (June 6, 1988). In the 
past, the agencies have considered those under the artificial lakes or 
ponds category of waters that are generally non-jurisdictional, but 
this final rule includes them in the artificial irrigation exclusion 
category as any wetland crop species, such as rice and cranberry 
operations, that is typically supplied with artificial flow irrigation 
or similar mechanisms.
    A number of commenters addressed the difficulty in proving that 
land would revert to upland when irrigation ceased and suggested 
clarification as to whether documentation was needed as proof. The 
agencies agree that proving that land would revert to upland may be 
challenging in some circumstances. The agencies have developed 
strategies and guidance to assist with determining if wetland 
conditions will persist when irrigation ceases. This includes, but is 
not limited to, utilizing aerial photography, soil maps, LiDAR, remote 
sensing, and field assessments to determine if wetland conditions are 
the result of irrigation or are naturally occurring.
    Commenters also raised concern about whether the exclusion is only 
available for rice and cranberry growing areas. The inclusion of rice 
and cranberries in the proposed rule were simply examples and not 
intended to be exhaustive. In this final rule, the agencies conclude 
that it is not necessary to list all crops potentially eligible for the 
exclusion, and therefore simply reference ``agricultural production.'' 
The relevant factor in determining the application of the exclusion is 
not what type of crop may be planted or cultivated, but whether the 
area is artificially irrigated and would revert to upland should 
irrigation cease.
    Under the final rule, the exclusion for waters meeting the 
conditions of paragraph (b)(8) applies to artificial lakes and ponds 
created through construction or excavation in upland or in non-
jurisdictional features. Such artificial lakes and ponds would not be 
jurisdictional under the final rule even if they maintain a hydrologic 
surface connection to waters of the United States or are inundated by 
waters of the United States. Conveyances created in upland that are 
physically connected to and are a part of the excluded feature also are 
excluded.
    A commenter inquired as to whether the artificial waterbody created 
by impounding a jurisdictional tributary would be jurisdictional. The 
agencies note that under the final rule, impoundments are considered 
jurisdictional if they impound a paragraph (a)(1) through (4) water, 
which includes jurisdictional tributaries, and contribute surface water 
flow in a typical year to a paragraph (a)(1) water or are inundated by 
flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical year. 
Impounding a jurisdictional tributary does not create a non-
jurisdictional lake or pond that would be excluded under paragraph 
(b)(8), but rather creates a jurisdictional impoundment so long as it 
meets the conditions of paragraph (a)(3) as defined in paragraph 
(c)(6). The agencies note that artificial lakes and ponds that are 
excluded from the definition of ``waters of the United States'' could, 
in some circumstances, be point sources of pollutants subject to 
sections 301 and 402 of the Act.
    Under paragraph (b)(9), water-filled depressions constructed or 
excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters that are incidental 
to mining or construction activity, and pits excavated in upland or in 
non-jurisdictional waters for the purpose of obtaining fill,

[[Page 22328]]

sand, or gravel are excluded from the definition of ``waters of the 
United States.'' To determine whether a water or feature meets this 
exclusion, the agencies will evaluate whether the water feature is 
constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters as 
part of these industrial activities. In addition, such water-filled 
depressions and pits could become waters of the United States once 
construction or mining activities have permanently ceased and the 
depressions or pits meet the conditions of a paragraph (a)(1) through 
(4) water.
    The final rule excludes in paragraph (b)(10) stormwater control 
features constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store stormwater run-off. As 
stated previously, the rule excludes a diverse range of stormwater 
control features that are currently in place and that may be developed 
in the future. To determine if such a water or feature meets the 
exclusion, the agencies will evaluate whether the stormwater feature is 
constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters.
    Paragraph (b)(11) of the final rule clarifies that groundwater 
recharge, water reuse, and wastewater recycling structures constructed 
or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters are excluded. To 
determine whether a such a structure meets this exclusion, the agencies 
will evaluate whether the water or feature is constructed or excavated 
in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters. This exclusion includes 
detention and retention basins as well as groundwater recharge basins 
and infiltration ponds excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters for wastewater recycling. The exclusion also covers water 
distributary structures that are built in upland or in non-
jurisdictional waters for water recycling. These features often connect 
or carry surface water flow to other water recycling structures, for 
example, a channel or ditch that carries water to an infiltration pond. 
Consistent with longstanding practice, the agencies do not consider 
these water distributary systems jurisdictional.
    As discussed previously, the agencies are not changing the 
longstanding approach to implementing the waste treatment system 
exclusion. As a result, the agencies will continue to apply the 
exclusion to systems that are treating water to meet the requirements 
of the CWA. Discharges from these systems to waters of the United 
States would continue to be subject to regulation by the CWA section 
402 permitting program. Similarly, if a waste treatment system is 
abandoned or otherwise ceases to serve the treatment function for which 
it was designed, it does not continue to qualify for the exclusion.
    Some commenters suggested the agencies clarify the way in which the 
waste treatment system exclusion is currently implemented. Many 
comments inquired as to whether stormwater systems and wastewater reuse 
facilities are considered part of a complete waste treatment system for 
purposes of the waste treatment system exclusion. To enhance clarity, 
the agencies have provided in the final rule two related exclusions in 
paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(11) and have added settling basins and 
cooling ponds to the definition of ``waste treatment system'' in 
paragraph (c)(15). The agencies note that cooling ponds that are 
created under CWA section 404 in jurisdictional waters and that have 
CWA section 402 permits are subject to the waste treatment system 
exclusion under the 2019 Rule and will also be excluded under the final 
rule. Cooling ponds created to serve as part of a cooling water system 
with a valid State or Federal permit constructed in waters of the 
United States prior to enactment of the 1972 amendments of the CWA and 
excluded from jurisdiction under the 2019 Rule also remain excluded 
under the final rule. Some commenters on the proposed rule's waste 
treatment system exclusion expressed confusion regarding whether 
stormwater treatment features would be excluded under the exclusion for 
stormwater control features or under the waste treatment exclusion. 
Such determinations will depend on the specific attributes of the 
control and the water feature and thus need to be made on a case-by-
case basis. It is possible that a stormwater feature could qualify for 
both the stormwater control features exclusion and the waste treatment 
systems exclusion. This same principle applies to other exclusions that 
may have similar cross-over features, like certain ditches used in 
stormwater management systems.
    It is important to reiterate that while the waters and features 
listed in the final rule's exclusions are not waters of the United 
States, some of them may convey surface water flow to a downstream 
jurisdictional water, so that reaches of a water upstream and 
downstream of the excluded water or feature may meet the definition of 
``tributary'' in paragraph (c)(12). For example, when some water from a 
tributary is moved into a downstream jurisdictional water through an 
excluded ditch, the ditch itself is excluded from jurisdiction under 
the final rule but the tributary upstream of the ditch is 
jurisdictional if the non-jurisdictional ditch conveys surface water 
flow in a typical year to the downstream jurisdictional reach.

I. Placement of the Definition of ``Waters of the United States'' in 
the Code of Federal Regulations

1. What are the agencies finalizing?
    The definition of ``waters of the United States'' has historically 
been placed in eleven locations in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR). For the sake of simplicity, in this final rule, the agencies are 
codifying the definition of ``waters of the United States'' in only two 
places in the CFR--once in Title 33 (which implements the Corps' 
statutory authority) and once in Title 40 (which generally implements 
the EPA's statutory authority).
2. Summary of Final Rule Rationale and Public Comment
    The agencies proposed to maintain the definition of ``waters of the 
United States'' at 33 CFR 328 and in ten locations in Title 40. The 
agencies solicited comment on an alternative approach under which the 
definition would be codified in just two locations within the CFR, 
rather than in the eleven locations in which it has previously 
appeared. Most commenters recommended that the definition of ``waters 
of the United States'' be codified twice, once in Title 33 of the CFR 
and once in Title 40 of the CFR. These commenters recommended limiting 
codification to two locations in order to clarify that there is a 
single definition of ``waters of the United States'' applicable to the 
entire CWA, to reduce confusion and conflicting interpretations under 
different programs, and to promote ease of use for the regulated 
community and for laypersons. Many of these commenters suggested 
including a cross-reference in the original ten locations of Title 40 
of the CFR. Some commenters recommended continuing the agencies' 
practice of codifying the definition of ``waters of the United States'' 
in eleven locations within the CFR.
    The agencies agree with commenters that stated that codifying the 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' in two locations within 
the CFR will reduce confusion and promote ease of use for States, 
Tribes, local government, the regulated community, and the general 
public. With this final rule, the agencies are codifying the definition 
of ``waters of the United States'' in Title 33 of the CFR, which 
implements the Corps' statutory authority, at 33 CFR 328.3, and in 
Title 40, which generally implements

[[Page 22329]]

the EPA's statutory authority, at 40 CFR 120.2. In the sections of the 
CFR where the EPA's regulatory definition previously existed, 40 CFR 
110.1, 112.2, 116.3, 117.1, 122.2, 230.3, 232.2, 300.5, 302.3, 401.11, 
and Appendix E to 40 CFR part 300, this final rule cross-references the 
newly created section of the regulations containing the definition of 
``waters of the United States.'' The agencies have placed the EPA's 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' in a previously 
unassigned part of 40 CFR. The change in placement has no implications 
on CWA program implementation; it is made for the sole purpose of 
enhancing the clarity of the federal regulations. Placing the 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' in a single section in 
the part of the regulations that implements the EPA's authority and 
once again in the part of the regulations that implements the Corps' 
authority makes clearer to members of the public that there is a single 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' applicable to the CWA and 
its implementing regulations.

IV. State, Tribal, and Federal Agency Datasets of Waters of the United 
States

    During the extensive pre-proposal outreach to the general public 
and focused engagement with States and Tribes, the agencies heard from 
a number of States about their familiarity with waters within their 
borders and their expertise in aquatic resource mapping. As co-
implementers of CWA programs, they also emphasized the potential 
benefit of greater State and tribal involvement in jurisdictional 
determinations. For these reasons, several States suggested that the 
agencies consider their knowledge and increase the role of States and 
Tribes in identifying those waters that are waters of the United 
States. Stakeholders also indicated that maps could increase certainty 
and transparency regarding the data and methods used to determine which 
waters are jurisdictional and which waters are not.
    In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for this rule, the agencies 
solicited comment as to how to create a regulatory framework that would 
authorize interested States, Tribes, and other Federal agencies to 
develop for the agencies' approval geospatial datasets representing 
waters of the United States, as well as waters excluded from the 
definition, ``waters of the State'' or ``waters of the Tribe'' within 
their respective borders. 84 FR 4154, 4198-4200 (February 14, 2019). 
This concept was not part of the proposed regulatory text; the agencies 
utilized the notice to solicit input and suggestions from the regulated 
public, States, Tribes, and other stakeholders.
    Some commenters raised concerns regarding the limitations of data 
currently available for creating geospatial datasets of jurisdictional 
waters, particularly commenting on the limitations of national datasets 
such as the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) and the National 
Wetlands Inventory (NWI). Some commenters expressed concerns about the 
resolution, completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of publicly-
available data, with some stating that geospatial datasets cannot 
accurately assess the details needed to remotely determine or delineate 
jurisdictional waters. Other commenters noted that, despite the 
limitations in the available data, the agencies should attempt to 
quantify changes in the jurisdictional status of specific waterbody 
categories as a result of the final rule.
    The agencies agree that there are significant limitations to the 
extent to which currently available data can be used to identify the 
scope of all or even a subset of jurisdictional waters. There are 
currently no comprehensive datasets through which the agencies can 
depict the universe of federally-regulated waters under the CWA. For 
example, the agencies attempted to use the NHD at high resolution and 
NWI to assess the potential change in CWA jurisdiction as a result of 
the proposed rule to revise the definition of ``waters of the United 
States,'' but ultimately concluded that the limitations of these 
datasets precluded their use for quantifying the extent of waters whose 
jurisdictional status could change under the proposed rule, as 
discussed in Section V and in the Resource and Programmatic Assessment 
for the final rule. Due to these limitations, which were confirmed 
during the public comment period for the proposed rule and an 
evaluation by the agencies, the agencies also did not use the NHD or 
NWI to assess potential changes in jurisdiction as a result of the 
final rule.
    While the NHD and NWI are the most comprehensive hydrogeographic 
datasets mapping waters and wetlands in the United States and are 
useful resources for a variety of Federal programs, including CWA 
programs, they currently have technical limitations that present 
significant challenges for use as standalone tools to determine the 
full scope of CWA jurisdiction and for creating geospatial datasets of 
jurisdictional waters, regardless of the regulatory definition of 
``waters of the United States.'' Importantly, the NHD and NWI were not 
created for regulatory purposes, so their limitations as comparative 
tools for CWA jurisdiction are not surprising.
    Due in part to the resolution of the data, limitations of the NHD 
for purposes of accurately mapping the scope of jurisdictional waters 
under the CWA include errors of omission (e.g., failure to map streams 
that exist on the ground); errors of commission (e.g., mapping streams 
that do not exist on the ground); horizontal positional inaccuracies; 
misclassification of stream flow condition, particularly in headwaters; 
and inconsistent mapping in different parts of the country. The NWI 
presents similar challenges for identifying federally-regulated waters, 
including the foundational obstacle of having a ``wetlands'' definition 
that differs from the federal regulatory ``wetlands'' definition. The 
NWI also contains errors of omission (e.g., failure to map wetlands 
that exist on the ground), errors of commission (e.g., mapping wetlands 
that do not exist on the ground), and potentially inaccurate wetland 
boundary identification. The limitations identified herein are examples 
and do not represent an exhaustive list of challenges faced by the 
agencies in potentially using them to identify the scope of CWA 
jurisdiction. For a more detailed discussion of the NHD and NWI 
datasets and their limitations for use as standalone tools to determine 
the full scope of waters that are and are not waters of the United 
States, see Chapter II of the Resource and Programmatic Assessment 
supporting this final rule.
    It has been the consistent position of the agencies that the NHD 
and the NWI do not represent the scope of waters subject to CWA 
jurisdiction.\61\ Indeed,

[[Page 22330]]

as part of the 2015 rulemaking, the agencies stated that they ``do not 
have maps depicting waters of the United States under either present 
regulatory standards or those in the final [2015] rule.'' \62\ This 
remains true today; the agencies do not have maps of waters of the 
United States under the 2015 Rule, under the 2019 Rule, or under this 
final rule. For this reason, and to provide the public and the agencies 
with more information on which waters are or are not waters of the 
United States, the agencies sought public comment on a possible 
framework for developing geospatial datasets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See, e.g., Letter from Nancy Stoner, Acting Assistant 
Adm'r, EPA Office of Water, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, Comm. on 
Science, Space, and Tech., U.S. House of Representatives (July 28, 
2014) (emphasis added), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20180919173837/https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/epa_releases_maps_letter.pdf. (``[N]o national or statewide maps 
have been prepared by any agency, including EPA, showing the scope 
of waters subject to the Clean Water Act. . . . To develop maps of 
jurisdictional waters requires site-specific knowledge of the 
physical features of water bodies, and these data are not 
available[.]'') (emphasis added); see also Letter from Nancy Stoner, 
Deputy Assistant Adm'r, EPA Office of Water, to Lamar Smith, 
Chairman, Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech., U.S. House of 
Representatives (August 6, 2014), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20180919173837/https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/epa_releases_maps_letter.pdf); U.S. EPA, Mapping the Truth, The EPA 
Blog (Aug. 28, 2014), available at https://blog.epa.gov/2014/08/28/mapping-the-truth/ (``While these [U.S. Geological Survey and Fish & 
Wildlife Service] maps are useful tools for water resource managers, 
they cannot be used to determine Clean Water Act jurisdiction--now 
or ever.''); Letter from Kenneth J. Kopocis, Deputy Assistant Adm'r, 
EPA Office of Water, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, Comm. on Science, 
Space, and Tech., U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 8, 2015) 
(``These [USGS] maps were not prepared for the purpose of, nor do 
they represent, a depiction of the scope of waters protected under 
the Clean Water Act.''); Impact of the Proposed ``Waters of the 
United States''' Rule on State and Local Governments Before the H. 
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure and the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. 
Works, 114th Cong. (2015)(testimony of Gina McCarthy, Adm'r, 
EPA)(stating that the NHD and NWI maps were ``not used to determine 
jurisdiction and not intended to be used for jurisdiction,'' ``are 
not relevant to the jurisdiction of the `waters of the U.S.','' 
``are not consistent with how we look at the jurisdiction of the 
Clean Water Act,'' and have ``nothing to do, as far as I know, with 
any decision concerning jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act'').
    \62\ See Response to Comments for the Clean Water Rule, Clean 
Water Rule Comment Compendium Topic 8: Tributaries, Docket ID. No. 
EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20872, p. 442, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20872.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies acknowledge that they have previously taken the 
position that ``maps of all the jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional 
waters are not feasible,'' \63\ and that maps ``cannot be used to 
determine Clean Water Act jurisdiction--now or ever,'' see U.S. EPA, 
Mapping the Truth, The EPA Blog (August 28, 2014). Rather than 
declaring the task too difficult, the agencies have decided to initiate 
development of state-of-the-art geospatial data tools through Federal, 
State, and tribal partnerships to provide an enhanced, publicly-
accessible platform for critical CWA information, such as the location 
of federally jurisdictional waters, the applicability of State and 
tribal water quality standards, permitted facility locations, impaired 
waters, and other significant features. Such mapped features would make 
it easier for agency field staff, the general public, property owners, 
permit-holders and others to understand the relationship between 
familiar geographical features and the overlay of CWA jurisdictional 
waters. For Federal, State, and tribal agencies, such geospatial 
datasets could improve the administration of CWA programs and 
attainment of water quality goals. Geospatial datasets and resulting 
future maps that indicate waters likely subject to federal jurisdiction 
could allow members of the regulated community to more easily and 
quickly ascertain whether they may want to contact a government agency 
regarding the potential need for a CWA permit. These datasets, when 
fully developed, would promote greater regulatory certainty, relieve 
some of the regulatory burden associated with determining the need for 
a permit, and play an important part in helping to attain the goals of 
the CWA. In the future, the agencies and States could use geospatial 
datasets to identify waters with applicable water quality standards, 
total maximum daily loads, water quality monitoring data, and other 
beneficial information in one layered geospatial map.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Id. at p. 593.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since the proposed rule was published, the agencies have been 
engaging with other Federal agencies to discuss existing geospatial 
datasets and discuss opportunities to build upon them to map the 
nation's aquatic resources, including both waters of the United States 
and non-jurisdictional waters. To align the agencies' waters of the 
United States mapping interests with the U.S. Department of Interior's 
(DOI) established and ever-improving aquatic resource mapping efforts, 
including the NHD, NWI, and other datasets, the EPA and the Corps are 
engaging with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) and have established a technical working group 
to develop strategies that can address their CWA mapping needs.\64\ The 
agencies believe the most efficient way to address their regulatory 
needs is to better align their efforts with DOI's existing processes 
and national mapping capabilities. The EPA, USGS, and FWS have a long 
history of working together to map the nation's aquatic resources. As 
the agencies pursue this mapping effort, they will continue to 
collaborate with DOI to enhance the NHD, NWI, and other products to 
better map the nation's water resources and the waters of the United 
States while enhancing their utility to other CWA programs that the EPA 
and the Corps implement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See Letter from David Ross, Asst. Adm'r, EPA Office of 
Water, and Ryan Fisher, Principal Deputy Asst. Sec. of the Army 
(Civil Works), U.S. Army, to Dr. Tim Petty, Asst. Sec. for Water and 
Science, U.S. DOI, and Rob Wallace, Asst. Sec. for Fish, Wildlife, 
and Parks, U.S. DOI (September 17, 2019); see also Letter from Dr. 
Jim Reilly, Director, U.S. Geological Survey, to David Ross, Asst. 
Adm'r, EPA Office of Water, and Ryan Fisher, Principal Deputy Asst. 
Sec. of the Army (Civil Works), U.S. Army (October 1, 2019); see 
also Letter from Gary Frazer, Asst. Dir. for Ecological Services, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to David Ross, Asst. Adm'r, EPA 
Office of Water, and Ryan Fisher, Principal Deputy Asst. Sec. of the 
Army (Civil Works), U.S. Army (December 4, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the EPA's Office of Research and Development (ORD) has 
established an ``Improved Aquatic Resource Mapping'' research area, 
which will be implemented in coordination with the Corps and EPA's 
Office of Water. This research area could build upon longstanding EPA 
aquatic resource research and leverage existing research partnerships 
with other Federal agencies, States, and Tribes to improve mapping of 
aquatic resources. This research effort is intended to support the 
agencies' need for improved data to inform CWA jurisdictional 
determinations, to support other regulatory and non-regulatory needs, 
and to contribute to ongoing and new EPA research. In the long-term, 
the agencies anticipate that this effort will yield improved methods of 
verifying aquatic resources to support CWA jurisdictional 
determinations and other programmatic needs. In the short-term, ORD 
intends to produce three primary products to begin to advance this 
goal: A review of the existing aquatic resource mapping methodologies, 
development of novel geospatial datasets in select watersheds, and 
development of calibration and validation datasets. All three products 
can incorporate outreach efforts to communicate and transfer results to 
stakeholders.
    The agencies also believe that any future efforts they pursue to 
work with States, Tribes, and Federal agencies to create geospatial 
datasets of jurisdictional waters will improve the data and information 
that is available to the public about the jurisdictional scope of the 
CWA, recognizing that data limitations may always exist. Many 
commenters supported the development of geospatial datasets or a 
mapping system of waters of the United States to provide a clear 
understanding of the presence or absence of jurisdictional waters. Many 
such commenters provided caveats and anticipated challenges. Other 
commenters suggested that creating such datasets posed too many 
challenges to be worthwhile. Many of these commenters considered the 
development of geospatial datasets of jurisdictional waters to be 
infeasible or inappropriate based on the need for field verification 
and maintenance to keep the datasets up-to-date, and the concern that 
potentially incomplete lists could be inaccurately perceived as a 
definitive list of all waters of the United States. These commenters 
stated that any datasets established should be used

[[Page 22331]]

only as a planning tool to inform jurisdictional determinations or to 
provide guidance on the location of potential waters of the United 
States.
    The agencies solicited comment on potential approaches to 
establishing a framework to allow States, Tribes, or Federal agencies 
to create geospatial datasets of jurisdictional waters. Some commenters 
supported deferring this effort to a future rulemaking. Several 
commenters recommended using existing technology to prioritize mapping 
traditional navigable waters prior to attempting to map jurisdictional 
tributaries or wetlands. A few commenters suggested engaging in several 
pilot projects or a phased approach before rolling out a dataset 
nationwide. Some commenters suggested that data in the geospatial 
datasets should either expire or be updated every five years, to 
reflect the timeframe for approved jurisdictional determinations or to 
ensure that the datasets effectively represent current conditions.
    The agencies solicited comment on appropriate features and 
attributes of the website that would publish this information, as well 
as any privacy considerations the agencies should understand. A few 
commenters opposed making public the details of jurisdictional 
determinations or expressed privacy concerns regarding the creation of 
geospatial datasets of jurisdictional waters. Some commenters stated 
that jurisdictional determinations or geospatial datasets of 
jurisdictional waters should be made available to the public.
    As the agencies work to pursue improved geospatial mapping of 
waters in the future, they intend to also work to enhance information 
that is already available to the public on jurisdictional 
determinations. The Corps maintains a website at https://permits.ops.usace.army.mil/orm-public that presents information on the 
Corps' approved jurisdictional determinations and CWA section 404 
permit decisions. Similarly, the EPA maintains a website at https://watersgeo.epa.gov/cwa/CWA-JDs/ that presents information on approved 
jurisdictional determinations made by the Corps and the EPA under the 
CWA since August 28, 2015. These websites will incorporate approved 
jurisdictional determinations made under the revised definition of 
``waters of the United States'' that the agencies are finalizing in 
this notice.
    In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the agencies expressed 
interest in learning about experiences States, Tribes, and other 
Federal agencies have had with mapping aquatic resources and using this 
information for program implementation. A few State and tribal 
commenters expressed interest in working as partners with the agencies 
on mapping jurisdictional waters. Some State and local governments 
offered to share existing geospatial data with the agencies. Other 
State commenters were less supportive of an effort to map 
jurisdictional waters, with some raising concerns about the regulatory 
implications of mapping based on experiences in their States. Several 
State commenters raised concerns about costs of a mapping effort, with 
some commenters pointing to their own costly past mapping efforts. One 
commenter cited a State study that found that the State's best attempt 
at mapping wetlands was only 56 percent successful at classifying 
wetlands compared to field delineations. The agencies will consider the 
comments and concerns raised and coordinate closely with States, 
Tribes, and other Federal agencies in future efforts to develop 
geospatial datasets. The agencies do not anticipate developing a 
regulatory framework for geospatial datasets that would impose 
requirements on States and Tribes to develop geospatial datasets of 
jurisdictional waters; the option would simply be available for 
interested States and Tribes.
    The agencies believe that pursuing the development of geospatial 
datasets of waters of the United States could provide for greater 
regulatory certainty and provide important information to States, 
Tribes, the regulated community, and the public. The agencies are in 
the early stages of this effort, and they will be informed by public 
comments and suggestions received in response to this rulemaking as 
they move forward.

V. Overview of the Effects of the Rule and Supporting Analyses

    This section provides an overview of the potential effects of the 
final rule on federal and state regulatory programs and potential 
economic impacts of the final rule. Additional detail on these analyses 
are contained in and described more fully in the Resource and 
Programmatic Assessment for the Navigable Waters Protection Rule: 
Definition of ``Waters of the United States'' and in the Economic 
Analysis for the Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of 
``Waters of the United States.'' Copies of these documents are 
available in the docket for this action.
    In defining the term ``waters of the United States'' under the CWA, 
Congress gave the agencies discretion to articulate reasonable limits 
on the meaning of that term, confined of course by the statutory text 
and Supreme Court guidance recognizing the outer limits of the 
agencies' authorities. See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (``Given the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but 
nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the Clean Water 
Act, the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate 
in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their 
authority.'') (emphasis in original). With this action, the agencies 
are finalizing a new definition of ``waters of the United States.''
    As discussed in Section II.E, the agencies conclude that this final 
rule clearly establishes the scope of jurisdictional waters under the 
CWA consistent with the legislative history and text of the statute and 
Supreme Court case law and provides greater regulatory predictability 
than the 2019 Rule regulatory text as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
and implemented through agency guidance. This final rule replaces the 
2019 Rule.
    With respect to the CWA section 404 permitting program for the 
discharge of dredged and fill material, the agencies recognize that 
this final rule could affect approved jurisdictional determinations 
(AJDs) issued before the 2015 Rule or in States where the 2015 Rule was 
not in effect due to litigation, under the 2015 Rule, or under the 2019 
Rule. An AJD is a document issued by the Corps stating the presence or 
absence of waters of the United States on a parcel. See 33 CFR 331.2. 
As a matter of policy, AJDs are valid for a period of five years from 
the date of issuance unless new information warrants revision before 
the expiration date or a District Engineer identifies specific 
geographic areas with rapidly changing environmental conditions that 
merit re-verification on a more frequent basis. See U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 05-02, Sec.  1(a), p. 1 (June 
2005) (RGL 05-02). The possessor of a valid AJD may request that the 
Corps reassess a parcel and grant a new AJD before the five-year 
expiration date. An AJD constitutes a final agency action pursuant to 
the agencies' definition of ``waters of the United States'' at the time 
of its issuance. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1814. This final rule does 
not invalidate an AJD that was issued before the 2015 Rule or in States 
where the 2015 Rule was not in effect due to litigation, under the 2015 
Rule, or under the 2019 Rule. As such, these AJDs will remain valid 
until the expiration date unless one of the criteria for revision is 
met under RGL 05-02, or the recipient

[[Page 22332]]

of such an AJD requests that a new AJD be issued pursuant to this final 
rule.
    Preliminary jurisdictional determinations (PJDs) issued by the 
Corps, however, are merely advisory in nature, make no legally binding 
determination of jurisdiction, and have no expiration date. See 33 CFR 
331.2; see also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance 
Letter No. 16-01 (October 2005). PJDs do not definitively state whether 
waters of the United States are present on a parcel. See Hawkes, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1812. However, as with AJDs, a recipient of a PJD may request a 
new PJD or an AJD be issued under this final rule.
    This final rule should not significantly affect the scope of waters 
over which the Corps retains permitting authority in States that have 
assumed the CWA section 404 dredged or fill material permit program 
pursuant to section 404(g), or the waters over which the Corps would 
retain permitting authority should States and Tribes assume the program 
in the future. When States or Tribes assume administration of the 
section 404 program, the Corps retains administration of permits in 
certain waters. 33 U.S.C. 1344(g). The scope of CWA jurisdiction as 
defined by ``waters of the United States'' is distinct from the scope 
of waters over which the Corps retains authority following State or 
tribal assumption. The Corps-retained waters are identified during 
approval of a State or tribal section 404 program, and any 
modifications are approved through a formal EPA process. 40 CFR 233.36. 
The way in which the Corps identifies waters to be retained was most 
recently addressed on July 30, 2018, in a memorandum from R.D. James, 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works).\65\ The EPA also intends 
to clarify the issue in a separate ongoing rulemaking process designed 
to facilitate State and tribal assumption of the section 404 program. 
The scope of waters assumed by States or Tribes that are granted 
permitting authority under section 404(g) is dependent on the 
definition of ``waters of the United States,'' and will change with 
this final rule. For the States that already have section 404 programs 
(Michigan and New Jersey), those States have corresponding State 
wetland permitting programs that may apply in State waters that will no 
longer be jurisdictional under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ The memorandum is available at https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/525981.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the proposed rule, the agencies conducted a series of analyses 
to better understand the potential effects across CWA programs 
associated with a revised definition of ``waters of the United 
States.'' The agencies solicited comment on all aspects of the analyses 
performed and published in support of the proposed rule, including the 
assumptions made, information used, and the three case studies 
presented in the economic analysis. The agencies further requested that 
commenters provide any data that could assist the agencies in 
evaluating and characterizing potential effects of the proposed rule. 
The agencies have incorporated additional information on tribal 
programs, updated the aquatic resource analysis, and have made other 
changes, particularly in light of the final rule repealing the 2015 
Rule and recodifying the pre-existing regulations (the 2019 Rule). The 
2019 Rule was finalized between the proposed and final rulemaking 
phases of this rule and changed the baseline for the analyses and 
discussion of potential effects on aquatic resources, CWA programs, and 
costs. The agencies note that the final rule is not based on the 
information in the agencies' economic analysis or resource and 
programmatic assessment. See, e.g., NAHB, 682 F.3d at 1039-40. This 
information was not used to establish the new regulatory text for the 
definition of ``waters of the United States.''
    As discussed in Section IV and in the proposed rule preamble (84 FR 
4200), the agencies are not aware of any map or dataset that accurately 
or with any precision portrays the scope of CWA jurisdiction at any 
point in the history of this complex regulatory program. Establishing a 
mapped baseline from which to assess regulatory changes is likewise 
impracticable at this time, just as it was when the agencies finalized 
the 2015 Rule.\66\ The challenge of identifying an accurate baseline is 
further complicated by a long history of an evolving definition of 
``waters of the United States.'' As summarized in Section II, what was 
understood about the potential scope of CWA jurisdiction changed in the 
1970s following National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 
392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), in the mid-1980s with Riverside Bayview 
and regulatory updates, in 2001 with the landmark SWANCC decision, in 
2006 with the fractured Rapanos decision, in 2007 and 2008 with the 
agencies' attempts to discern the meaning of the Rapanos decision 
through guidance and throughout the ensuing decade of litigation that 
tested those interpretations, in 2015 with a major rulemaking to 
redefine the operative phrase ``waters of the United States'' and 
throughout the complex litigation following that rulemaking, and in 
2019 with a rule to repeal the 2015 Rule and recodify pre-existing 
regulations. As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court succinctly 
observed in 2016, ``[i]t is often difficult to determine whether a 
particular piece of property contains waters of the United States . . . 
.'' Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. at 1812. Given the 
complicated history of ``waters of the United States,'' the agencies 
are not aware of any means to quantify changes in CWA jurisdiction with 
any precision that may or may not occur as a result of this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See U.S. EPA and Department of the Army, Response to 
Comments of the EPA-Army Clean Water Rule at Topic 8: Tributaries p. 
442 (May 20, 2015) (``2015 Rule RTC'') (Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OW-2011-
0880-20872), available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20872.(``The agencies do not have 
maps depicting waters of the United States under either present 
regulatory standards or those in the final rule.''); see also id. at 
593 (`[M]aps of all the jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional waters 
are not feasible[.]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies acknowledge that they faced criticism from many 
commenters regarding the accuracy and assumptions they made when 
attempting to estimate changes in jurisdiction for the 2015 Rule's 
economic analysis (EA), which was then utilized for a portion of the 
proposed rule EA and the 2019 Rule EA. For the 2015 Rule EA, the 
agencies reviewed Corps approved jurisdictional determinations made 
under pre-2015 Rule practice to evaluate how the jurisdictional status 
of those waters might change under the 2015 Rule. Other commenters on 
the proposed rule critiqued the agencies for not repeating the analysis 
used to support the 2015 Rule's EA. The agencies have determined that 
the analysis of approved jurisdictional determinations conducted for 
the 2015 Rule EA may have incorrectly assumed that the 2015 Rule would 
affect entities regulated under the CWA in direct proportion to the 
percent change in positive jurisdictional determinations. This 
proportional assumption could have yielded overestimates of costs and 
benefits of the rule. Thus, the agencies have determined that 
conducting such an analysis for this final rule would not be 
appropriate.
    In addition, some commenters questioned the adequacy of the 
agencies' Resource and Programmatic Assessment (RPA) analyses for the 
proposed rule, primarily because the agencies did not use the NHD or 
NWI, even heavily caveated. Other commenters raised concerns about the 
lack of the quantification of potential changes in jurisdiction and 
asserted that the agencies overestimated the ability of

[[Page 22333]]

States to regulate additional non-jurisdictional waters. Other 
commenters noted that even though the NHD and the NWI have limitations, 
the errors associated with the datasets would underestimate, not 
overestimate, the scale of resources likely to be identified as non-
jurisdictional under the proposed rule.
    As discussed in the RPA for the final rule, the agencies attempted 
to use publicly available data from national datasets (i.e., the NHD 
and the NWI) to estimate the potential extent of aquatic resources 
across the country before publishing the proposed rule. The agencies 
ultimately concluded that the limitations of the datasets (e.g., errors 
of omission, errors of commission, positional inaccuracies, 
misclassification of flow regime, different definitions compared to 
both existing and proposed regulations) precluded using the NHD and the 
NWI to quantify the potential extent of waters whose CWA jurisdictional 
status could change under the proposed revised definition. Because 
these limitations still exist, the agencies decided to qualitatively 
describe the potential effects of this final rule relative to the 
baseline of the 2019 Rule as implemented.
    Some commenters stated that the RPA and the EA for the proposed 
rule thoroughly addressed the potential impacts of the proposed revised 
definition, correctly acknowledged the technical limitations of the 
analysis and datasets, accurately noted that the avoided costs of the 
proposal far outweighed any foregone benefits it may have, and agreed 
with the agencies' decision not to rely on flawed data to perform 
comparative analyses of the proposed regulatory changes. Other 
commenters expressed support for the RPA's comprehensive analysis of 
the potential implications of the revised definition for all relevant 
CWA programs and the interplay between relevant State and federal 
regulations.
    Recognizing that there will be limitations with any approach, in 
the RPA and EA for the final rule the agencies describe how the revised 
definition compares to the baseline of the 2019 Rule as implemented 
(i.e., the pre-2015 regulations that were recodified in 2019, and as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court and implemented consistent with those 
decisions and informed by agency guidance). See 84 FR 56626 (Oct. 22, 
2019). The documents outline the agencies' assessment of the potential 
effects of the revised definition on types of aquatic resources (e.g., 
wetlands, tributaries, impoundments) across the country and on CWA 
programs, and the RPA provides further information on programs 
addressing aquatic resource quality under other Federal statutes. To 
further inform the final rule and in an effort to respond to comments 
received on the proposed rule analyses, the agencies conducted 
additional research on current State and tribal laws and programs to 
better understand how States and Tribes already regulate waters within 
their borders. Descriptions of State programs are in Appendix A of the 
RPA, and descriptions of tribal programs are in Appendix B of the RPA.
    To assess the potential effects of the rule on aquatic resources, 
the agencies examined data records in the Corps' Operation and 
Maintenance Business Information Link, Regulatory Module (ORM2) 
database that documents Corps decisions regarding the jurisdictional 
status of various aquatic resource types (i.e., jurisdictional 
determinations). The aquatic resource types used in ORM2 generally 
track the Rapanos Guidance (e.g., ``relatively permanent waters,'' 
``non-relatively permanent waters'') but do not directly correlate with 
the terms used in the final rule, with limited exceptions. For the 
final rule, the agencies updated their analysis from the proposal RPA 
and EA to reflect data from ORM2 for fiscal years 2013-2018. Because of 
various limitations in accurately estimating a change in CWA 
jurisdiction, as described in Section IV of this notice, and 
uncertainties regarding the way States and Tribes might respond 
following a change in the definition of ``waters of the United 
States,'' many of the potential effects of the final rule are discussed 
qualitatively, and some are discussed quantitatively where possible.
    As discussed in the RPA and the EA for the final rule, the agencies 
also evaluated potential effects of the final rule across CWA 
regulatory programs. The RPA and EA describe certain potential short-
term effects for CWA regulatory programs; however, the potential long-
term effects will depend on whether or how States and Tribes choose to 
modify their existing regulatory programs. For example, States may 
elect to make changes to their statutes or regulations to regulate 
waters that are no longer jurisdictional under the final rule. As 
discussed more fully in the EA, complete State ``gap-filling'' could 
result in a zero-net impact in the long-run.
    Regarding the permitting programs under sections 402 and 404 of the 
CWA, the final rule will reduce the scope of waters subject to CWA 
permitting compared with the baseline of the 2019 Rule as implemented. 
For instance, the 2019 Rule, as implemented, would regulate certain 
ephemeral streams found to have a significant nexus with traditional 
navigable waters according to the 2008 Rapanos Guidance, whereas the 
revised definition in this final rule categorically excludes ephemeral 
features. Because fewer waters and wetlands are federally regulated 
under this rule relative to the 2019 Rule as implemented, the agencies 
anticipate that the regulated public would need to prepare fewer CWA 
permit applications. Additionally, some facilities currently 
discharging under a CWA section 402 permit may no longer be required to 
obtain permit coverage under federal law where there is a 
jurisdictional change to the receiving water and the receiving water 
does not convey pollutants from a point source to a water of the United 
States. The agencies note that they retain section 402 permitting 
authority over discharges that reach jurisdictional waters through 
conveyances, such as non-jurisdictional waters. In some section 402 
permits, water quality-based effluent limitations may be modified, 
subject to applicable anti-backsliding permit requirements, where a 
facility discharges to a water that is non-jurisdictional under the 
final rule, but the pollutants discharged still reach a jurisdictional 
water. Any permittee with questions about the effects of this rule 
should consult their permitting authority, as State law may be broader 
than federal authority under the CWA. A reduction in jurisdictional 
waters under the final rule may reduce the number of federal permits 
that require a section 401 certification and may reduce the 
applicability of the section 311 program and associated Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund, as discussed in more detail in the EA and RPA.
    A change in the scope of CWA jurisdiction could affect existing and 
future State or tribal CWA section 303(d) lists and Total Maximum Daily 
Load (TMDL) restoration plans under section 303(d). For example, some 
States or Tribes may not assess non-jurisdictional waters, and thus may 
identify fewer waters as impaired and may develop fewer TMDLs. States 
may continue to apply their own State law-based programs to identify 
and restore impaired waters, although this activity would not be 
required under the CWA for waters that are not jurisdictional under the 
final rule. The agencies expect that States will, however, be able to 
focus their section 303(d) financial resources on a more targeted range 
of waters and could accelerate adoption of plans and standards on 
waters that may

[[Page 22334]]

have more ecological value. If Western States, for example, do not need 
to assess dry washes in the desert and establish CWA water quality 
standards for those typically dry ``waters,'' they can focus their 
research and restoration resources on waters with more substantial 
aquatic habitat. For additional discussion of potential effects on 
State and tribal water quality standards and section 303(d) programs, 
see the RPA.
    Some commenters on the proposed rule raised concerns about its 
potential effects on CWA financial assistance programs. The agencies do 
not anticipate that the final rule will affect the EPA's current CWA 
financial assistance programs. With respect to CWA sections 106 and 319 
grant programs, the authorizing language and the range of programmatic 
activities are sufficiently broad that they have long addressed both 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional waters, so it is unlikely that a 
change in the definition of ``waters of the United States'' will affect 
the programs and funding allocations.
    Other commenters raised concerns about potential effects of the 
proposed rule on sources of drinking water. Drinking water regulations 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) will continue to apply to 
water delivered by public water systems, with the goal of protecting 
public health. The Drinking Water State Revolving Fund is available to 
help fund State source water protection programs and finance 
improvements to drinking water utilities. Overall, the potential 
effects of a change in CWA jurisdiction on drinking water quality will 
depend on whether activities affecting non-jurisdictional waters also 
affect the quality of the water at a drinking water utility's water 
intake, and the capabilities of individual drinking water utilities to 
respond to a potential change in source water quality.
    In the EA for the proposed rule, the agencies applied a two-stage 
analysis to make the best use of limited local and national level water 
resource information in their effort to assess the potential 
implications of the proposal. When the proposed rule was published, the 
agencies determined that the outputs of this two-stage analysis were 
the best way to illustrate the potential overall impact of the proposed 
rule compared to the 2015 Rule being in effect nationwide (i.e., the 
sum effect of both stages) and the 2015 Rule not being in effect (i.e., 
second stage only). In the ``Stage 1'' analysis in the EA for the 
proposed rule, the agencies used the EA for the 2015 Rule as a starting 
point, made several updates, and developed a quantitative assessment 
limited to Stage 1. Because the 2015 Rule was repealed (84 FR 56626) 
between the proposed and final rule stages of this rulemaking, the EA 
for this final rule does not contain the Stage 1 quantitative analysis 
comparing the 2015 Rule with the pre-existing regulations.
    The EA for the final rule incorporates an updated analysis 
depicting how States may respond to a change in CWA jurisdiction. This 
analysis of State authorities and programs was initially presented in 
the EA for the related rulemaking effort, Economic Analysis for the 
Final Rule: Definition of ``Waters of the United States''--
Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules. Potential State responses to a 
change in the definition of a ``water of the United States'' fall along 
a continuum and depend on legal and other constraints. Some States rely 
on the federal CWA to regulate impacts to wetlands and other aquatic 
resources. These States may be affected by this action; however, 
nothing in the CWA or this final rule prevents or precludes states from 
regulating more stringently than federal requirements. Some States, 
based on limitations established in State law, cannot currently 
regulate a more expansive set of waters than those subject to the 
federal CWA definition of ``waters of the United States.'' In contrast, 
States that regulate surface waters and wetlands as broadly as or more 
broadly than the 2019 Rule as implemented, independently of the scope 
of the federal CWA, may not be affected by this action. Complete State 
``gap-filling'' could result in no change in compliance costs to the 
regulated community and no change in environmental benefits (that is, 
neither avoided costs nor forgone benefits would occur), suggesting a 
zero-net impact in the long-run. States that fall between these 
extremes are evaluated by either including or excluding them from the 
estimates of cost savings and forgone benefits. In reality, some States 
may regulate only a subset of affected waters, but the agencies did not 
have sufficient information to incorporate that level of detail into 
the analysis.
    Another potential outcome of the change in CWA jurisdiction is that 
State governments may be able to find more efficient ways of managing 
local resources than the Federal government, consistent with the theory 
of ``environmental federalism'' as described in the EA for the final 
rule. Depending on the value of a newly characterized non-
jurisdictional water, States may or may not choose to regulate that 
water and the compliance costs and environmental benefits of its 
regulation could increase or decrease, respectively. In either case, 
however, net benefits would increase, assuming that a State can more 
efficiently allocate resources towards environmental protection due to 
local knowledge of amenities and constituent preferences. As effective 
regulation requires political capital and fiscal resources, however, 
the likely best indication of the way in which States will exercise 
their authority as the Federal government changes the scope of CWA 
jurisdiction is the way in which they have exercised authority in the 
past and whether the infrastructure to manage the regulatory programs 
already exists. The qualitative analysis is intended to provide 
information on the likely direction of the potential effects of the 
final rule on CWA regulatory programs.
    In addition, the agencies conducted case studies in three major 
watersheds (Ohio River basin, Lower Missouri River basin, and Rio 
Grande River basin) to provide information for a quantitative 
assessment of the potential effects of the final rule. The case studies 
considered potential ecological effects, and their accompanying 
potential economic effects for programs implemented pursuant to 
sections 311, 402, and 404 of the CWA. Because of data limitations, the 
agencies were able to provide national-level estimates of the potential 
avoided permit and mitigation costs and forgone benefits for only the 
CWA section 404 program. The agencies developed several scenarios to 
estimate the national annual avoided costs and foregone benefits of the 
CWA section 404 program under the final rule using different 
assumptions about potential State dredged and fill regulation of 
waters. Using the same methodologies employed in the case studies, 
under scenarios assuming State regulation of dredged and fill 
activities in newly non-jurisdictional waters, the agencies estimate 
that the final rule would produce annual avoided costs ranging between 
$109 million to $264 million and annual forgone benefits ranging 
between from $55 million to $63 million. Under the scenario that 
assumes that no States will regulate dredged and fill activities in 
newly non-jurisdictional waters, an outcome the agencies believe is 
unlikely, the agencies estimate the final rule would produce annual 
avoided costs ranging from $245 million to $513 million, and annual 
forgone benefits are estimated at $173 million.

[[Page 22335]]

VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review; Executive 
Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review

    This action is an ``economically significant regulatory action'' 
that was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for 
review. Any changes made in response to OMB recommendations have been 
documented in the docket for this action. In addition, the agencies 
prepared an analysis of the potential costs and benefits associated 
with this action. This analysis is contained in the Economic Analysis 
for the Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of ``Waters of the 
United States,'' which is available in the docket and briefly 
summarized in Section V. Additional analysis can be found in the 
Resource and Programmatic Assessment for the Navigable Waters 
Protection Rule: Definition of ``Waters of the United States'' which is 
also available in the docket.
    While the economic analysis is informative in the rulemaking 
context, the agencies are not relying on the economic analysis 
performed pursuant to Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and related 
procedural requirements as a basis for this final rule. See, e.g., 
NAHB, 682 F.3d at 1039-40 (noting that the quality of an agency's 
economic analysis can be tested under the APA if the ``agency decides 
to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking'').

B. Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs

    Pursuant to Executive Order 13771 (82 FR 9339, February 3, 2017), 
this final rule is a deregulatory action. Details on the estimated cost 
savings of this rule can be found in the Economic Analysis in the 
docket for this rule.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This action does not impose any new information collection burden 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. OMB has 
previously approved the information collection activities contained in 
the existing regulations and has assigned OMB control numbers 2050-0021 
and 2050-0135 for the CWA section 311 program and 2040-0004 for the CWA 
section 402 program. For the CWA section 404 program, the current OMB 
approval number for information requirements is maintained by the Corps 
(OMB approval number 0710-0003). However, there are no new approval or 
application processes required as a result of this rulemaking that 
necessitate a new Information Collection Request (ICR).

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires an agency 
to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis of any rule subject to 
notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the Administrative 
Procedure Act or any other statute unless the agency certifies that the 
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. Small entities include small businesses, 
small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions.
    For purposes of assessing the impacts of this final rule on small 
entities, ``small entity'' is defined as: (1) A small business that is 
a small industrial entity as defined in the U.S. Small Business 
Administration's size standards (see 13 CFR 121.201); (2) a small 
governmental jurisdiction that is a government of a city, county, town, 
school district, or special district with a population of less than 
50,000; or (3) a small organization that is any not-for-profit 
enterprise that is independently owned and operated and is not dominant 
in its field.
    The purpose of the RFA is ``to fit regulatory and informational 
requirements to the scale of the businesses, organizations and 
governmental jurisdictions subject to the regulation.'' 5 U.S.C. 601. 
Small entities subject to this final rule are largely those entities 
whose activities are directly covered by the CWA sections 402, 404, and 
311 programs. The final rule is expected to result in fewer entities 
subject to these programs, and a reduced regulatory burden for many of 
the entities that will still be subject to these programs. As a result, 
small entities subject to these regulatory programs are unlikely to 
suffer adverse impacts as a result of regulatory compliance.
    As addressed in the Economic Analysis for the final rule, narrowing 
the scope of CWA regulatory jurisdiction over waters may result in a 
reduction in the ecosystem services provided by some waters, and as a 
result, some entities may be adversely impacted. Some business sectors 
that depend on habitat, such as those catering to hunters or anglers, 
or that require water treatment to meet production needs, could 
experience a greater impact relative to other sectors. Potential 
changes in ecosystem services are likely to be small, infrequent, and 
dispersed over wide geographic areas, thereby limiting the significance 
of these impacts on these business sectors. In addition, States and 
Tribes may already address waters potentially affected by a revised 
definition, thereby reducing forgone benefits.
    The sectors likely to be most impacted by the rule are mitigation 
banks and companies that provide aquatic resource restoration services. 
Because fewer waters would be subject to the CWA regulation under the 
final rule than are subject to regulation under the 2019 Rule, there 
may be a reduction in demand for mitigation and restoration services 
under the section 404 permitting program. Assessing impacts to this 
sector is problematic, however, because this sector lacks a precise SBA 
small business definition, and many of the businesses that fall within 
this sector are also classified under various other North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) categories. Furthermore, impacts 
to this sector would not be the direct result of these businesses 
complying with the final rule, rather, they would be the indirect 
result of other entities no longer being required to mitigate for 
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters that would no longer 
be jurisdictional under the final rule. In addition, potential impacts 
would be lessened when accounting for State and tribal dredged and fill 
programs that would necessitate the purchase of mitigation credits or 
through the actions of States and Tribes that choose to regulate their 
wetlands under State or tribal law. For a more detailed discussion see 
the RFA section of the Economic Analysis for the final rule.
    The agencies certify that this action will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the 
RFA. In making this determination, the impact of concern is any 
significant adverse economic impact on small entities. An agency may 
certify that a rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities if the rule relieves regulatory 
burden, has no net burden, or otherwise has a positive economic effect 
on the small entities subject to the rule. As documented in the 
Economic Analysis for the final rule, the agencies do not expect the 
cost of the rule to result in adverse impact to a significant number of 
small entities, since the rule is expected to result in net cost 
savings for all entities affected by this rule. The agencies have 
therefore concluded that this action will relieve regulatory burden to 
small entities.

[[Page 22336]]

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    This final rule does not contain any unfunded mandate as described 
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, 
and does not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. The 
definition of ``waters of the United States'' applies broadly to CWA 
programs. The final action imposes no enforceable duty on any State, 
local, or tribal governments or the private sector, and does not 
contain regulatory requirements that significantly or uniquely affect 
small governments.

F. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    Consulting with State and local government officials, or their 
representative national organizations, is an important step in the 
process prior to proposing regulations that may have implications for 
State and local governments under the terms of Executive Order 13132 
(64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999). State and local governments were 
engaged in a 60-day Federalism consultation at the outset of rule 
development starting on April 19, 2017. All letters received by the 
agencies during Federalism consultation may be found on in the docket 
at EPA Docket Id No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-0088, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-0088.
    The agencies held nineteen Federalism meetings between April 19 and 
June 16, 2017. Seventeen intergovernmental associations, including nine 
of the ten organizations identified in EPA's 2008 E.O. 13132 Guidance, 
attended the initial Federalism consultation meeting, as well as 
several associations representing State and local governments. 
Organizations in attendance included: The National Governors 
Association, the National League of Cities, the National Association of 
Counties, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the Council of State 
Governments, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the County 
Executives of America, the National Association of Towns and Townships, 
the Environmental Council of the States, the Western Governors 
Association, the National Association of Clean Water Agencies, the 
Association of Clean Water Administrators, the National Association of 
State Departments of Agriculture, the Association of State Wetlands 
Managers, the Association of State Floodplain Managers, the National 
Water Resources Association, the State/Local Legal Center, and several 
members of EPA's Local Government Advisory Committee (LGAC).
    The LGAC met 10 times during this period to address the charge 
given to its members by the EPA Administrator on a revised rule and 
completed a report addressing the questions outlined in their charge. 
The July 14, 2017, final report can be obtained here: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-07/documents/lgac-final-wotusreport-july2017.pdf and in the docket as attachment to EPA Docket 
Id No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-0088, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-0088.
    The agencies then conducted additional outreach to States prior to 
proposing the rule to ensure that the agencies could hear the 
perspectives on how the agencies might revise the definition of 
``waters of the United States'' from State co-regulators. The agencies 
held two additional webinars, the first for Tribes, States, and local 
governments on December 12, 2017; and one for States on February 20, 
2018. In addition, one in-person meeting to seek technical input on the 
development of the proposed rule was held with a group of nine states 
(Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming) on March 8 and 9, 2018.
    These meetings and the letters provided by representatives provided 
a wide and diverse range of interests, positions, comments, and 
recommendations to the agencies. The agencies have prepared a report 
summarizing their consultation and additional outreach to State and 
local governments and the results of this outreach. A copy of the final 
report is available in the docket (Docket Id. No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149) 
for this final rule.
    Following publication of the proposed rule, the agencies held four 
additional in-person meetings with State representatives to answer 
clarifying questions about the proposal, and to discuss implementation 
considerations and State interest in working with the agencies to 
develop geospatial datasets of water resources as articulated in the 
preamble to the proposed rule.
    Under the technical requirements of Executive Order 13132, agencies 
must conduct a federalism consultation as outlined in the Executive 
Order for regulations that (1) have federalism implications, that 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on state and local 
governments, and that are not required by statute; or (2) that have 
federalism implications and that preempt state law. This rule does not 
impose any new costs or other requirements on states, preempt state 
law, or limit states' policy discretion; rather, it provides more 
discretion for states as to how best to manage waters under their sole 
jurisdiction. Executive Order paras. (6)(b) and (6)(c). As discussed in 
the earlier sections of the notice, this final rule establishes a clear 
boundary between waters subject to federal regulatory requirements 
under the CWA and those that States may solely manage under their 
independent authorities. This action will not have substantial direct 
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. The rule 
preserves State authority to choose whether or not to regulate waters 
that are not waters of the United States under the CWA. The agencies 
believe that the requirements of the Executive Order have been 
satisfied in any event.

G. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments

    Executive Order 13175, entitled ``Consultation and Coordination 
with Indian Tribal Governments'' (65 FR 67249, Nov. 9, 2000), requires 
the agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful 
and timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory 
policies that have tribal implications.'' This action has tribal 
implications. However, it will neither impose substantial direct 
compliance costs on federally recognized tribal governments, nor 
preempt tribal law.
    During tribal consultation and engagement efforts and in tribal 
comments on the proposed rule, many Tribes expressed concern that the 
proposed rule would or could adversely impact tribal waters. Two tribes 
supported the proposed rule and noted that it would increase the 
tribes' ability to manage and regulate their own Reservation lands. The 
agencies acknowledge that because they generally implement CWA programs 
on tribal lands, a reduced scope of CWA jurisdiction will affect Tribes 
differently than it will affect States. Currently, of the Tribes that 
are eligible, most have not received treatment in a manner similar to a 
state (TAS) status to administer CWA regulatory programs. While some 
Tribes have established tribal water programs under tribal law or have 
the authority to establish tribal programs under tribal law, many 
Tribes may lack the capacity to create a tribal water program under 
tribal law, to

[[Page 22337]]

administer a program, or to expand programs that currently exist. Other 
Tribes may rely on the Federal government for enforcement of water 
quality violations. Nonetheless, the rule preserves tribal authority to 
choose whether or not to regulate waters that are not covered under the 
CWA. Any decision by the Tribes to protect beyond the limits of the CWA 
is not compelled by the statute or by this final rule.
    The EPA consulted with tribal officials under the EPA Policy on 
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribes early in the process 
of developing this action to permit them to have meaningful and timely 
input into its development. The Department of the Army participated in 
the consultation process and further engagement with Tribes. All 
letters received by the agencies during tribal consultation may be 
found in the docket for this action, Docket Id. No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-
0149.
    The EPA initiated a tribal consultation and coordination process 
before proposing this rule by sending a ``Notification of Consultation 
and Coordination'' letter on April 20, 2017, to all of the 567 Tribes 
federally recognized at that time. The letter invited tribal leaders 
and designated consultation representatives to participate in the 
tribal consultation and coordination process. The agencies held two 
identical webinars concerning this matter for tribal representatives on 
April 27 and May 18, 2017. Tribes and tribal organizations sent 44 pre-
proposal comment letters to the agencies as part of the consultation 
process. Of those Tribes requesting consultation, the agencies met with 
nine Tribes at a staff-level and with three Tribes at a leader-to-
leader level pre-proposal. The agencies continued engagement with 
Tribes after the end of the formal consultation, including at national 
update webinars on December 12, 2017, and February 20, 2018, and an in-
person tribal co-regulators workshop on March 6 and 7, 2018.
    Following the publication of the proposed rule, the agencies held 
four in-person meetings with tribal representatives to answer 
clarifying questions about the proposal, and to discuss implementation 
considerations and tribal interest in working with the agencies to 
develop geospatial datasets of water resources as articulated in the 
preamble to the proposed rule. In addition, the agencies continued to 
meet with individual Tribes requesting consultation or engagement 
following publication of the proposed rule, holding staff-level 
meetings with four Tribes and leader-to-leader level meetings with 
eight Tribes post-proposal. The agencies also continued engaging with 
Tribes and tribal organizations via listening sessions at regional and 
national tribal meetings. In total, the agencies met with 21 individual 
Tribes requesting consultation, holding leader-to-leader level 
consultation meetings with 11 individual tribes and staff-level 
meetings with 13 individual tribes (the agencies met with some tribes 
more than once). The agencies have prepared a report summarizing the 
consultation and further engagement with tribal nations. This report, 
Summary Report of Tribal Consultation and Engagement for the Navigable 
Waters Protection Rule: Definition of ``Waters of the United States'' 
(Docket Id. No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149), is available in the docket for 
this final rule.
    As required by section 7(a), the EPA's Tribal Consultation Official 
has certified that the requirements of the executive order have been 
met in a meaningful and timely manner. A copy of the certification is 
included in the docket for this action.

H. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental 
Health and Safety Risks

    This action is not subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, 
April 23, 1997) because the environmental health or safety risks 
addressed by this action do not present a disproportionate risk to 
children.

I. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

    This action is not a ``significant energy action'' as defined in 
Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001) because it is not 
likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy.

J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    This action is not subject to the National Technology Transfer and 
Advancement Act of 1995 because the rule does not involve technical 
standards.

K. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations

    This action is not subject to Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, 
February 11, 1994) because there is no significant evidence of 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects on minority populations, low-income populations, and/or 
indigenous peoples, as specified in Executive Order 12898.

L. Congressional Review Act

    This action is subject to the Congressional Review Act, and the 
agencies will submit a rule report to each House of the Congress and to 
the Comptroller General of the United States. OMB has concluded that 
this action is a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

List of Subjects

33 CFR Part 328

    Navigation (water), Water pollution control, Waterways.

40 CFR Part 110

    Oil pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

40 CFR Part 112

    Oil pollution, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

40 CFR Part 116

    Hazardous substances, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Water pollution control.

40 CFR Part 117

    Hazardous substances, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Water pollution control.

40 CFR Part 120

    Environmental protection, Water pollution control, Waterways.

40 CFR Part 122

    Administrative practice and procedure, Confidential business 
information, Environmental protection, Hazardous substances, Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements, Water pollution control.

40 CFR Part 230

    Water pollution control.

40 CFR Part 232

    Intergovernmental relations, Water pollution control.

40 CFR Part 300

    Air pollution control, Carbon monoxide, Chemicals, Environmental 
protection, Greenhouse gases, Hazardous substances, Hazardous waste, 
Intergovernmental relations, Lead, Natural resources, Occupational 
safety and health, Oil pollution, Ozone, Penalties, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Sulfur Dioxide, Superfund, Volatile organic 
compounds, Water pollution control, Water supply.

[[Page 22338]]

40 CFR Part 302

    Air pollution control, Chemicals, Hazardous substances, Hazardous 
waste, Intergovernmental relations, Natural resources, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Superfund, Water pollution control, Water 
supply.

40 CFR Part 401

    Waste treatment and disposal, Water pollution control.

    Dated: January 23, 2020.
Andrew R. Wheeler,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.

    Dated: January 23, 2020.
R.D. James,
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), Department of the Army.

Title 33--Navigation and Navigable Waters

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, title 33, chapter II of 
the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 328--DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

0
1. Authority: The authority citation for part 328 is revised read as 
follows: 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.

0
2. Section 328.3 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) through (c) and 
removing paragraphs (d) through (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  328.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (a) Jurisdictional waters. For purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. 1251 et seq. and its implementing regulations, subject to the 
exclusions in paragraph (b) of this section, the term ``waters of the 
United States'' means:
    (1) The territorial seas, and waters which are currently used, or 
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or 
foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide;
    (2) Tributaries;
    (3) Lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and
    (4) Adjacent wetlands.
    (b) Non-jurisdictional waters. The following are not ``waters of 
the United States'':
    (1) Waters or water features that are not identified in paragraph 
(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section;
    (2) Groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface 
drainage systems;
    (3) Ephemeral features, including ephemeral streams, swales, 
gullies, rills, and pools;
    (4) Diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet flow over 
upland;
    (5) Ditches that are not waters identified in paragraph (a)(1) or 
(2) of this section, and those portions of ditches constructed in 
waters identified in paragraph (a)(4) of this section that do not 
satisfy the conditions of paragraph (c)(1) of this section;
    (6) Prior converted cropland;
    (7) Artificially irrigated areas, including fields flooded for 
agricultural production, that would revert to upland should application 
of irrigation water to that area cease;
    (8) Artificial lakes and ponds, including water storage reservoirs 
and farm, irrigation, stock watering, and log cleaning ponds, 
constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters, so 
long as those artificial lakes and ponds are not impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters that meet the conditions of paragraph (c)(6) of 
this section;
    (9) Water-filled depressions constructed or excavated in upland or 
in non-jurisdictional waters incidental to mining or construction 
activity, and pits excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters 
for the purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or gravel;
    (10) Stormwater control features constructed or excavated in upland 
or in non-jurisdictional waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store 
stormwater run-off;
    (11) Groundwater recharge, water reuse, and wastewater recycling 
structures, including detention, retention, and infiltration basins and 
ponds, constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters; and
    (12) Waste treatment systems.
    (c) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions apply:
    (1) Adjacent wetlands. The term adjacent wetlands means wetlands 
that:
    (i) Abut, meaning to touch at least at one point or side of, a 
water identified in paragraph (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section;
    (ii) Are inundated by flooding from a water identified in paragraph 
(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section in a typical year;
    (iii) Are physically separated from a water identified in paragraph 
(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section only by a natural berm, bank, dune, 
or similar natural feature; or
    (iv) Are physically separated from a water identified in paragraph 
(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section only by an artificial dike, 
barrier, or similar artificial structure so long as that structure 
allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection between the wetlands 
and the water identified in paragraph (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this 
section in a typical year, such as through a culvert, flood or tide 
gate, pump, or similar artificial feature. An adjacent wetland is 
jurisdictional in its entirety when a road or similar artificial 
structure divides the wetland, as long as the structure allows for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection through or over that structure in 
a typical year.
    (2) Ditch. The term ditch means a constructed or excavated channel 
used to convey water.
    (3) Ephemeral. The term ephemeral means surface water flowing or 
pooling only in direct response to precipitation (e.g., rain or snow 
fall).
    (4) High tide line. The term high tide line means the line of 
intersection of the land with the water's surface at the maximum height 
reached by a rising tide. The high tide line may be determined, in the 
absence of actual data, by a line of oil or scum along shore objects, a 
more or less continuous deposit of fine shell or debris on the 
foreshore or berm, other physical markings or characteristics, 
vegetation lines, tidal gages, or other suitable means that delineate 
the general height reached by a rising tide. The line encompasses 
spring high tides and other high tides that occur with periodic 
frequency but does not include storm surges in which there is a 
departure from the normal or predicted reach of the tide due to the 
piling up of water against a coast by strong winds, such as those 
accompanying a hurricane or other intense storm.
    (5) Intermittent. The term intermittent means surface water flowing 
continuously during certain times of the year and more than in direct 
response to precipitation (e.g., seasonally when the groundwater table 
is elevated or when snowpack melts).
    (6) Lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters. The 
term lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters means 
standing bodies of open water that contribute surface water flow to a 
water identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section in a typical year 
either directly or through one or more waters identified in paragraph 
(a)(2), (3), or (4) of this section. A lake, pond, or impoundment of a 
jurisdictional water does not lose its jurisdictional status if it 
contributes surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in 
a typical year through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface water 
feature, through a culvert, dike, spillway, or similar artificial 
feature, or through a debris pile, boulder field, or similar natural 
feature. A lake or pond, or impoundment of a jurisdictional water

[[Page 22339]]

is also jurisdictional if it is inundated by flooding from a water 
identified in paragraph (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section in a 
typical year.
    (7) Ordinary high water mark. The term ordinary high water mark 
means that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water 
and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line 
impressed on the bank, shelving, changes in the character of soil, 
destruction of terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter and 
debris, or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of 
the surrounding areas.
    (8) Perennial. The term perennial means surface water flowing 
continuously year-round.
    (9) Prior converted cropland. The term prior converted cropland 
means any area that, prior to December 23, 1985, was drained or 
otherwise manipulated for the purpose, or having the effect, of making 
production of an agricultural product possible. EPA and the Corps will 
recognize designations of prior converted cropland made by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. An area is no longer considered prior 
converted cropland for purposes of the Clean Water Act when the area is 
abandoned and has reverted to wetlands, as defined in paragraph (c)(16) 
of this section. Abandonment occurs when prior converted cropland is 
not used for, or in support of, agricultural purposes at least once in 
the immediately preceding five years. For the purposes of the Clean 
Water Act, the EPA Administrator shall have the final authority to 
determine whether prior converted cropland has been abandoned.
    (10) Snowpack. The term snowpack means layers of snow that 
accumulate over extended periods of time in certain geographic regions 
or at high elevation (e.g., in northern climes or mountainous regions).
    (11) Tidal waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide. The terms tidal waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of 
the tide mean those waters that rise and fall in a predictable and 
measurable rhythm or cycle due to the gravitational pulls of the moon 
and sun. Tidal waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide end where the rise and fall of the water surface can no longer be 
practically measured in a predictable rhythm due to masking by 
hydrologic, wind, or other effects.
    (12) Tributary. The term tributary means a river, stream, or 
similar naturally occurring surface water channel that contributes 
surface water flow to a water identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section in a typical year either directly or through one or more waters 
identified in paragraph (a)(2), (3), or (4) of this section. A 
tributary must be perennial or intermittent in a typical year. The 
alteration or relocation of a tributary does not modify its 
jurisdictional status as long as it continues to satisfy the flow 
conditions of this definition. A tributary does not lose its 
jurisdictional status if it contributes surface water flow to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through a channelized 
non-jurisdictional surface water feature, through a subterranean river, 
through a culvert, dam, tunnel, or similar artificial feature, or 
through a debris pile, boulder field, or similar natural feature. The 
term tributary includes a ditch that either relocates a tributary, is 
constructed in a tributary, or is constructed in an adjacent wetland as 
long as the ditch satisfies the flow conditions of this definition.
    (13) Typical year. The term typical year means when precipitation 
and other climatic variables are within the normal periodic range 
(e.g., seasonally, annually) for the geographic area of the applicable 
aquatic resource based on a rolling thirty-year period.
    (14) Upland. The term upland means any land area that under normal 
circumstances does not satisfy all three wetland factors (i.e., 
hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, hydric soils) identified in 
paragraph (c)(16) of this section, and does not lie below the ordinary 
high water mark or the high tide line of a jurisdictional water.
    (15) Waste treatment system. The term waste treatment system 
includes all components, including lagoons and treatment ponds (such as 
settling or cooling ponds), designed to either convey or retain, 
concentrate, settle, reduce, or remove pollutants, either actively or 
passively, from wastewater prior to discharge (or eliminating any such 
discharge).
    (16) Wetlands. The term wetlands means areas that are inundated or 
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration 
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, 
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil 
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and 
similar areas.
* * * * *

Title 40--Protection of Environment

    For reasons set out in the preamble, title 40, chapter I of the 
Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 110--DISCHARGE OF OIL

0
3. The authority citation for part 110 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., 33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(3) and 
(b)(4) and 1361(a); E.O. 11735, 38 FR 21243, 3 CFR parts 1971-1975 
Comp., p. 793.


0
4. Section 110.1 is amended by revising the definition of ``Navigable 
waters'' and removing the definition of ``Wetlands'' to read as 
follows:


Sec.  110.1  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Navigable waters means waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas, as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.
* * * * *

PART 112--OIL POLLUTION PREVENTION

0
5. The authority citation for part 112 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
6. Section 112.2 is amended by revising the definition of ``Navigable 
waters'' and removing the definition of ``Wetlands'' to read as 
follows:


Sec.  112.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Navigable waters means waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas, as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.
* * * * *

PART 116--DESIGNATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

0
7. The authority citation for part 116 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
8. Section 116.3 is amended by revising the definition of ``Navigable 
waters'' to read as follows:


Sec.  116.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Navigable waters means ``waters of the United States,'' including 
the territorial seas, as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.
* * * * *

PART 117--DETERMINATION OF REPORTABLE QUANTITIES FOR HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCES

0
9. The authority citation for part 117 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., and Executive Order 11735, 
superseded by Executive Order 12777, 56 FR 54757.


[[Page 22340]]



0
10. Section 117.1 is amended by revising paragraph (i) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  117.1   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (i) Navigable waters means ``waters of the United States, including 
the territorial seas,'' as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.
* * * * *

0
11. Add part 120 to read as follows:

PART 120--DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Sec.
120.1 Purpose and scope.
120.2 Definitions.

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


Sec.  120.1  Purpose and scope.

    Part 120 contains the definition of ``navigable waters'' and 
``waters of the United States'' for purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. 1251 et seq. and its implementing regulations.


Sec.  120.2  Definitions.

    For the purposes of this part, the following terms shall have the 
meanings indicated:
    Navigable waters means waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.
    Waters of the United States means:
    (1) Jurisdictional waters. For purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. 1251 et seq. and its implementing regulations, subject to the 
exclusions in paragraph (2) of this section, the term ``waters of the 
United States'' means:
    (i) The territorial seas, and waters which are currently used, or 
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or 
foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide;
    (ii) Tributaries;
    (iii) Lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; 
and
    (iv) Adjacent wetlands.
    (2) Non-jurisdictional waters. The following are not ``waters of 
the United States'':
    (i) Waters or water features that are not identified in paragraph 
(1)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this definition;
    (ii) Groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface 
drainage systems;
    (iii) Ephemeral features, including ephemeral streams, swales, 
gullies, rills, and pools;
    (iv) Diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet flow over 
upland;
    (v) Ditches that are not waters identified in paragraph (1)(i) or 
(ii) of this definition, and those portions of ditches constructed in 
waters identified in paragraph (1)(iv) of this definition that do not 
satisfy the conditions of paragraph (3)(i) of this definition;
    (vi) Prior converted cropland;
    (vii) Artificially irrigated areas, including fields flooded for 
agricultural production, that would revert to upland should application 
of irrigation water to that area cease;
    (viii) Artificial lakes and ponds, including water storage 
reservoirs and farm, irrigation, stock watering, and log cleaning 
ponds, constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters, so long as those artificial lakes and ponds are not 
impoundments of jurisdictional waters that meet the conditions of 
paragraph (3)(vi) of this definition;
    (ix) Water-filled depressions constructed or excavated in upland or 
in non-jurisdictional waters incidental to mining or construction 
activity, and pits excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters 
for the purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or gravel;
    (x) Stormwater control features constructed or excavated in upland 
or in non-jurisdictional waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store 
stormwater run-off;
    (xi) Groundwater recharge, water reuse, and wastewater recycling 
structures, including detention, retention, and infiltration basins and 
ponds, constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional 
waters; and
    (xii) Waste treatment systems.
    (3) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions apply:
    (i) Adjacent wetlands. The term adjacent wetlands means wetlands 
that:
    (A) Abut, meaning to touch at least at one point or side of, a 
water identified in paragraph (1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this 
definition;
    (B) Are inundated by flooding from a water identified in paragraph 
(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this definition in a typical year;
    (C) Are physically separated from a water identified in paragraph 
(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this definition only by a natural berm, bank, 
dune, or similar natural feature; or
    (D) Are physically separated from a water identified in paragraph 
(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this definition only by an artificial dike, 
barrier, or similar artificial structure so long as that structure 
allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection between the wetlands 
and the water identified in paragraph (1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this 
definition in a typical year, such as through a culvert, flood or tide 
gate, pump, or similar artificial feature. An adjacent wetland is 
jurisdictional in its entirety when a road or similar artificial 
structure divides the wetland, as long as the structure allows for a 
direct hydrologic surface connection through or over that structure in 
a typical year.
    (ii) Ditch. The term ditch means a constructed or excavated channel 
used to convey water.
    (iii) Ephemeral. The term ephemeral means surface water flowing or 
pooling only in direct response to precipitation (e.g., rain or snow 
fall).
    (iv) High tide line. The term high tide line means the line of 
intersection of the land with the water's surface at the maximum height 
reached by a rising tide. The high tide line may be determined, in the 
absence of actual data, by a line of oil or scum along shore objects, a 
more or less continuous deposit of fine shell or debris on the 
foreshore or berm, other physical markings or characteristics, 
vegetation lines, tidal gages, or other suitable means that delineate 
the general height reached by a rising tide. The line encompasses 
spring high tides and other high tides that occur with periodic 
frequency but does not include storm surges in which there is a 
departure from the normal or predicted reach of the tide due to the 
piling up of water against a coast by strong winds, such as those 
accompanying a hurricane or other intense storm.
    (v) Intermittent. The term intermittent means surface water flowing 
continuously during certain times of the year and more than in direct 
response to precipitation (e.g., seasonally when the groundwater table 
is elevated or when snowpack melts).
    (vi) Lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters. 
The term lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters 
means standing bodies of open water that contribute surface water flow 
to a water identified in paragraph (1)(i) of this definition in a 
typical year either directly or through one or more waters identified 
in paragraph (1)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this definition. A lake, pond, 
or impoundment of a jurisdictional water does not lose its 
jurisdictional status if it contributes surface water flow to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through a channelized 
non-jurisdictional surface water feature, through a culvert, dike, 
spillway, or similar artificial feature, or through a debris pile, 
boulder field, or similar natural feature. A lake or pond, or 
impoundment of a jurisdictional water is also jurisdictional if it is 
inundated by flooding from a water identified in paragraph (1)(i), 
(ii), or (iii) of this definition in a typical year.

[[Page 22341]]

    (vii) Ordinary high water mark. The term ordinary high water mark 
means that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water 
and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line 
impressed on the bank, shelving, changes in the character of soil, 
destruction of terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter and 
debris, or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of 
the surrounding areas.
    (viii) Perennial. The term perennial means surface water flowing 
continuously year-round.
    (ix) Prior converted cropland. The term prior converted cropland 
means any area that, prior to December 23, 1985, was drained or 
otherwise manipulated for the purpose, or having the effect, of making 
production of an agricultural product possible. EPA and the Corps will 
recognize designations of prior converted cropland made by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. An area is no longer considered prior 
converted cropland for purposes of the Clean Water Act when the area is 
abandoned and has reverted to wetlands, as defined in paragraph 
(3)(xvi) of this definition. Abandonment occurs when prior converted 
cropland is not used for, or in support of, agricultural purposes at 
least once in the immediately preceding five years. For the purposes of 
the Clean Water Act, the EPA Administrator shall have the final 
authority to determine whether prior converted cropland has been 
abandoned.
    (x) Snowpack. The term snowpack means layers of snow that 
accumulate over extended periods of time in certain geographic regions 
or at high elevation (e.g., in northern climes or mountainous regions).
    (xi) Tidal waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide. The terms tidal waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of 
the tide mean those waters that rise and fall in a predictable and 
measurable rhythm or cycle due to the gravitational pulls of the moon 
and sun. Tidal waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide end where the rise and fall of the water surface can no longer be 
practically measured in a predictable rhythm due to masking by 
hydrologic, wind, or other effects.
    (xii) Tributary. The term tributary means a river, stream, or 
similar naturally occurring surface water channel that contributes 
surface water flow to a water identified in paragraph (1)(i) of this 
definition in a typical year either directly or through one or more 
waters identified in paragraph (1)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this 
definition. A tributary must be perennial or intermittent in a typical 
year. The alteration or relocation of a tributary does not modify its 
jurisdictional status as long as it continues to satisfy the flow 
conditions of this definition. A tributary does not lose its 
jurisdictional status if it contributes surface water flow to a 
downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through a channelized 
non-jurisdictional surface water feature, through a subterranean river, 
through a culvert, dam, tunnel, or similar artificial feature, or 
through a debris pile, boulder field, or similar natural feature. The 
term tributary includes a ditch that either relocates a tributary, is 
constructed in a tributary, or is constructed in an adjacent wetland as 
long as the ditch satisfies the flow conditions of this definition.
    (xiii) Typical year. The term typical year means when precipitation 
and other climatic variables are within the normal periodic range 
(e.g., seasonally, annually) for the geographic area of the applicable 
aquatic resource based on a rolling thirty-year period.
    (xiv) Upland. The term upland means any land area that under normal 
circumstances does not satisfy all three wetland factors (i.e., 
hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, hydric soils) identified in 
paragraph (3)(xvi) of this definition, and does not lie below the 
ordinary high water mark or the high tide line of a jurisdictional 
water.
    (xv) Waste treatment system. The term waste treatment system 
includes all components, including lagoons and treatment ponds (such as 
settling or cooling ponds), designed to either convey or retain, 
concentrate, settle, reduce, or remove pollutants, either actively or 
passively, from wastewater prior to discharge (or eliminating any such 
discharge).
    (xvi) Wetlands. The term wetlands means areas that are inundated or 
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration 
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, 
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil 
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and 
similar areas.

PART 122--EPA ADMINISTERED PERMIT PROGRAMS: THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT 
DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM

0
12. The authority citation for part 122 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
13. Section 122.2 is amended by:
0
a. Lifting the suspension of the last sentence of the definition of 
``Waters of the United States'' published July 21, 1980 (45 FR 48620).
0
b. Revising the definition of ``Waters of the United States''.
0
c. Removing the definition of ``Wetlands''.
    The revision reads as follows:


Sec.  122.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Waters of the United States or waters of the U.S. means the term as 
it is defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.
* * * * *

PART 230--SECTION 404(b)(1) GUIDELINES FOR SPECIFICATION OF 
DISPOSAL SITES FOR DREDGED OR FILL MATERIAL

0
14. The authority citation for part 230 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
15. Section 230.3 is amended by:
0
a. Removing paragraph (b) and reserved paragraphs (f), (g), (j), and 
(l);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e) as paragraphs (b) through 
(d);
0
c. Redesignating paragraphs (h) and (i) as paragraphs (e) and (f)
0
d. Redesignating paragraph (k) as paragraph (g);
0
e. Redesignating paragraphs (m) through (q) as paragraphs (h) through 
(l);
0
f. Redesignating paragraph (q-1) as paragraph (m);
0
g. Redesignating paragraph (r) as paragraph (n);
0
h. Redesignating paragraph (s) as paragraphs (o);
0
i. Revising newly designated paragraph (o); and
0
j. Removing paragraph (t).
    The revision reads as follows:


Sec.  230.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (o) Waters of the United States means the term as it is defined in 
Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.

PART 232--404 PROGRAMS DEFINITIONS; EXEMPT ACTIVITIES NOT REQUIRING 
404 PERMITS

0
16. The authority citation for part 232 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
17. Section 232.2 is amended by revising the definition of ``Waters of 
the United States'' and removing the definition of ``Wetlands'' to read 
as follows:


Sec.  232.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Waters of the United States means the term as it is defined in 
Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.

[[Page 22342]]

PART 300--NATIONAL OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES POLLUTION 
CONTINGENCY PLAN

0
18. The authority citation for part 300 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
19. Section 300.5 is amended by revising the definition of ``Navigable 
waters'' to read as follows:


Sec.  300.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Navigable waters means the waters of the United States, including 
the territorial seas, as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.
* * * * *

0
20. In appendix E to part 300, section 1.5 Definitions is amended by 
revising the definition of ``Navigable waters'' to read as follows:

Appendix E to Part 300--Oil Spill Response

* * * * *
    1.5 Definitions. * * *
    Navigable waters means the waters of the United States, 
including the territorial seas, as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this 
chapter.
* * * * *

PART 302-- DESIGNATION, REPORTABLE QUANTITIES, AND NOTIFICATION

0
21. The authority citation for part 302 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
22. Section 302.3 is amended by revising the definition of ``Navigable 
waters'' to read as follows:


Sec.  302.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Navigable waters means the waters of the United States, including 
the territorial seas, as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.
* * * * *

PART 401-- GENERAL PROVISIONS

0
23. The authority citation for part 401 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.


0
24. Section 401.11 is amended by revising paragraph (l) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  401.11  General definitions.

* * * * *
    (l) Navigable waters means ``waters of the United States, including 
the territorial seas,'' as defined in Sec.  120.2 of this chapter.

[FR Doc. 2020-02500 Filed 4-20-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


