Rev.
313
1/
01
ENFORCEMENT
RESOURCES
Departmefitof
Health
Environmental
Health
Administration
Lead­
Based
PaintAbatement
Program
APPENDIX
N
PROCESSES
UNDERTAKEN
BY
THE
OFFICE
OF
ENFORCEMENT,
COMPLIANCE
&
ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION
PREPARED
BY:
Doreen
Thompson,
Chief
Caroline
Burnett,
Legislative
Analyst,
Lead
Program
Kendolyn
Hodges­
Simons,
Environmental
Justice
Coordinator
James
Granger,
EnvironmentalReview
Coordinator
ENFORCEMENT
PROCESS
Objective:
To
ensure
compliance
with
District
of
Columbia
laws
affecting
air
water,
soil,
hazardous
and
toxic
substances,
underground
storage
lead,
food
drug
and
radiation
Point
of
Contact
__+
ALL
LEGAL
STAFF
Necessary
documents
include
the
following:
LOCAL
­
Authorizing
documents,
statutes,
regulations,
Mayor's
Orders
and
Organizational
Orders,
Standard
Operating
Procedures
for
each
program
FEDERAL­
Laws,
statutes,
regulations,
executive
orders
and
guidance
documents
FORMS
­
NOIs,
Forms
developed
by
OAH,
Forms
developed
by
EHA
TASK
A
Structure
Enforcement
Processfor
Each
Program
and
Draft
Standard
Operating
Procedures
1.
Review
legislation,
rules
and
assess
need
for
change/
updating
2.
Develop/
update
legislation,
rules;
schedule
of
fines
for
civil
infractionsschedules
andor
develop
policy
on
gravity
of
fines
for
non­
civil
infractions
enforcement;
3.
Review
enforcementoptions/
tools,
forms;
develop
forms;
4.
Prepare
Standard
Operating
Procedure,
reflecting
aspects
of
Steps
A­
F
of
this
outline;
5.
Training
Staff
as
to
enforcementprocess/
program
including
A­
F
of
this
outline.

TASK
B
Prepare
Models
and
Review
Notices
of
ViolationsDefects,
Stop
Work
Orders,
Cease
&
Desist
Orders
&
Train
Inspectors
on
Preparation
1.
Prepare
model
for
program
2.
Meet
with
staff
to
discuss
and
train
3.
Review
for
legal
sufficiency
(
See
Chart
#
1
for
NOV
process)

TASK
C
Train
Inspectors
on
How
to
Fill
Out
NOIS,
Review
and
Mail
NOIS,
Provide
evidence
of
service
and
documentation
in
default
hearings
:

1.
Train
inspectors
as
to
how
to
fill
out
NOI;
2.
Review
NO1
for
compliance
with
OAH
hearing
scheduling
requirement
3.
Review
NO1
for
legal
standards,
attach
relevant
documents
to
ensure
adequate
notice;
request
from
inspector
where
necessary;
return
where
necessary;
4.
Mail
legally
adequateNOIs
by
certified
mailto
respondent,
to
OAH,
copy
to
inspector
5.
Maintain
record
of
NOIs
and
evidence
of
service
6.
Review
OAH
orders
and
remind
staff
to
issue
2ndNO1
where
respondent
has
defaulted
7.
Process
2ndNO1
where
default­
repeat
2­
5
above
8.
Respond
to
default
hearing
order
­
compile
both
NOIs,
locate
certified
mail
delivery
evidence,
prepare
filing
withevidence
of
service
and
evidentiary
filings
TASK
D
Train
Inspectors
to
respond
to
OAH
Notice
of
Hearing
and
to
Appear
Before
OAH
in
Cases
WhereRespondent
is
not
Represented
by
Counsel
1.
Train
inspectors
on
how
to
fill
out
Witness
List
and
Exhibit
List
Form
2.
Train
inspectors
on
how
to
prepare
notes
and
to
submit
copy
of
notes
(
See
Chart
#
2
for
Civil
Infractions
Adjudication
Process)
L
TASK
E
Represent
Programs
Before
OAH
where
Respondent
is
Represented
by
Counsel
1.
Review
orders
to
determine
where
hearing
has
been
requested
2.
Contact
OAH
10
days
before
hearing
to
determine
if
respondent
will
be
represented
by
counsel
3.
Meet
with
inspector
and
other
relevant
staff
to
discuss
case
4.
Review
exhibit
list
and
witness
list
5.
Review
inspector s
notes
6.
Prepare
for
hearing
7.
Appear
at
hearing
(
See
Chart
#
2
for
Civil
Infractions
Adjudication
Process)

TASK
F
Represent
Programs
in
Major
Cases
not
initiated
by
Notices
of
Infractions
1.
Discuss
request
with
program
managers
2.
Prepare
Notices
of
Noncompliance,
Draft
Consent
Orders
and
Settlement
Agreement
3.
Meet
withRespondent,
Counsel
and
EHA
staff
to
negotiate
settlement
4.
Draft
final
documents
TASK
G
Respond
to
EPA,
other
Inquiries,
and
Prepare
Periodic
Reports
on
Enforcement
Statistics
1.
Develop
process
for
capturing
statistics
Distributeperiodic
requests
 or
statistics
to
programs
2.
3.
Collect
and
tabulating
statistics
4.
Prepare
quarterly
reports
and
annual
report
on
enforcement
program
PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE
FOR
TASKS­
EHA
inspectors,
managers
and
attorneys
PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE
FOR
REVIEWING­
Doreen
Thompson,
Chef,
OECEJ,
and
the
other
EHA
Bureau
Chiefs.
See
attached
Enforcement
Process
Charts
PROCESSES
UNDERTAKEN
BY
THE
OFFICE
OF
ENFORCEMENT
4%

ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
I.
ENFORCEMENT
PROCESS
A.
Structuring
Enforcement
Process
for
Each
Program
and
Drafting
Standard
Operating
Procedures:
1.
Reviewing
legislation,
rules
and
assessing
need
for
change/
updating
2.
Developinghpdating
legislation,
rules;
scheduling
fines
for
civil
infractions
schedules
andor
developingpolicy
on
gravity
of
fines
for
noncivil
infractions
enforcement;
3.
Reviewing
enforcement
options/
tools,
forms;
developing
forms;
4.
Preparing
Standard
Operating
Procedure,
reflecting
aspects
of
A­
F
of
ths
outline;
5.
Training
Staff
as
to
enforcementprocess/
prograrn
including
A­
F
of
this
outline.

B.
Training,
Preparing
and/
or
Reviewing
Notices
of
Violations/
Defects,
Stop
Work
Orders,
Cease
&
Desist
Orders
1.
Prepare
model
for
program
2.
Meet
with
staff
to
discuss
and
train
3.
Review
for
legal
sufficiency
C.
Training,
Reviewing
and
Mailing
of
Notices
of
Infractions
1.
Train
inspectors
as
to
how
to
fill
out
NOI;
2.
Review
NO1
for
compliance
with
OAH
hearing
scheduling
requirement
3. 
Review
NO1
for
legal
standards,
attach
relevant
documents
to
ensure
adequate
notice;
request
from
inspector
where
necessary;
return
where
necessary;
4.
Mail
legally
adequate
NOIs
by
certified
mail
to
respondent,
to
OAH,
copy
to
inspector
5.
Maintain
record
of
NOIs
and
evidence
of
service
6.
Review
OAH
orders
and
remind
staff
to
issue
2 
dNO1
where
respondent
has
defaulted
7.
Process
2 
dNO1
where
default
­
see
2­
5
above
8.
Respond
to
default
hearing
by
providing
evidence
of
service
and
Exhibits
D.
Training
Inspectors
to
respond
to
OAH
notice
of
Respondent
Request
for
hearing
and
in
Appearing
Before
OAH
in
Cases
Where
Respondent
is
not
Represented
by
Counsel
5
1.
Train
inspectors
on
how
to
fill
out
Witness
List
and
Exhibit
List
Form
2.
Train
inspectors
on
providing
copy
of
notes
E.
Representing
Programs
Before
OAH
where
Respondent
is
Represented
by
Counsel
1.
Review
orders
to
determine
where
hearing
has
been
requested
2.
Contact
OAH
10
days
before
hearing
to
determine.
if
respondent
will
be
represented
by
counsel
3.
Meet
with
inspector
and
other
relevant
staff
to
discuss
case
4.
Review
exhibit
list
and
witness
list
5.
Review
inspector s
notes
6.
Prepare
for
hearing
7.
Appear
at
hearing
F.
Representing
Program
in
Major
Cases
not
initiated
by
Notices
of
Infractions
1.
Discussion
and
request
from
program
managers
3.
Preparing
Notices
of
Noncompliance,
Draft
Consent
Orders
and
Settlement
agreements
4.
Meeting
with
Respondent
and
Counsel
5.
Negotizhg
settlements
G.
Responding
to
EPA,
other
Inquiries,
and
Preparing
Periodic
Reports
on
Enforcement
Statistics
1.
Developing
process
for
capturing
statistics
2.
Distributing
periodic
requests
for
statistics
to
programs
3.
Collecting
and
tabulating
statistics
4.
Preparing
quarterly
reports
and
annual
report
on
enforcement
program
6
ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW
PROCESS
Objective:
To
ensure
compliance
with
the
EnvironmentalPolicy
Act
of
1989
(
D.
C.
Code
6­
981
et
seq.)
and
its
enabling
regulations
(
20
DCMR,
Chapter
22).
The
statute
seeks
to
ensure
that
construction
projects
in
the
District
are
reviewed
far
potential
environmental
impacts
and
remediated
before
constructionpermits
are
issued.

Point
of
Contact:
Jim
Granger,
DOH
EnvironmentalReview
Coordinator
(
ERC),
5
1
N
Street,
NE,
Room
6040,
Washington,
D.
C.
20002.
(
202)
535­
2506.

Necessary
Paperwork:

The
necessary
paperwork
includes:
Laws
and
regulations
Forms/
documents:
EISF
application,
a
complete
and
comprehensive
EISF
that
is
submitted
by
the
applicant
and
the
DOH
recommendationthat
is
prepared
by
the
ERC.
The
ERC s
log
and
weekly
report
which
are
administrativetools
for
managing
the
process.

TASK
A
Get
Agencies
to
Comply
with
Process
under
Current
Regs
and
Legislation
1.
Prepare
copies
of
relevant
laws
and
regs
for
distribution.
2.
Prepare
guidance
documents
for
agencies:
How
to
comply
with
the
law
and
its
regs,
how
to
prepare
EISF
reports,
etc.
3.
Meet
with
agencies
and
provide
training
TASK
B
Update
Process
­
Revising
Forms,
Regs
and
Legislation
~.
1.
Meet
with
affected
agencies
2.
Draft
proposed
revisions
3.
Submit
to
agencies
for
review
and
input
TASK
C
Periodically
Train
Affected
Agencies
1.
Identify
affected
agencies
2.
3.
Request
that
they
identify
an
internal
review
coordinator
Meet
to
train
on
the
process
7
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
TASK
D
Coordinate
EHA
Environmental
Reviews
and
Preparing
Report
Applicants forpermits
for
major
projects
(
above
$
1
mil)
in
the
District
must
file
an
Environmental
Impact
ScreeningForm
(
EISF)
with
the
permitting
agency
such
as
the
Department
of
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs
(
DCRA).
This
permitting
agency
is
determined
to
be
the
lead
agency
The
lead
agency
or
DCRA
screens
the
EISFs
to
determine
if
the
proposed
project
is
exempt
from
the
requirement
to
undergo
an
environmental
assessment.
There
are
several
exemptions,
but
the
two
most
common
are:
(
1)
the
project
costs
less
than
$
1.
Omillion
in
1989
dollars;
and
(
2)
the
project
is
located
in
the
Central
Employment
District.
If
the
project
is
not
exempt,
the
lead
agency
forwards
a
copy
of
the
applicant s
EISF
to
Environmental
Review
Coordinators
(
ERC)
in
all
advisory
agencies
(
agencies
with
special
expertise
in
environmental
matters),
including
the
Department
of
Health
(
DOH).
Once
the
EISF
is
received
in
DOH,
the
ERC
logs
the
project
and
prepares
a
cover
memo,
which
identifies
the
project
by
nime
and
address
and
the
due
date
for
response.
The
ERC
then
forwards
that
memo
with
a
copy
of
the
EISF
to
the
various
offices
and
&
visions
involved
in
the
assessment.
These
offices
and
divisions
are
located
in
the
EnvironmentalHealth
AdnunisPation
and
include:

The
Office
of
Environmental
Justice
Bureau
of
Hazardous
Material
and
Toxic
Substances:
Toxic
Substance
Division,
Underground
Storage
Tank
Division
and
Hazardous
Waste
Division
Bureau
of
Environmental
Quality:
Water
Quality
Division,
Air
Quality
Division,
Fisheries
and
Wildlife
Division,
Watershed
Protection
Division
The
offices
and
divisions
identified
above
then
perform
their
respective
analysis
and
forward
their
written
reports
to
the
ERC.
The
ERC
then
conso!
idates
the
various
office
and
division
inputs
into
a
departmental
Environmental
Assessment
that
recommends
to
the
lead
agency
(
DCRA)
whether
anEnvironmental
Impact
Statement
is
required
of
the
applicant.
7.
Respond
to
citizen
communications
and
maintain
public
docket
Time
required
for
each
step:
The
critical
steps
within
DOH
(
items
4
through
6
above
under
the
Process
overview)
vary
significantly,
depending
on
the
sue
and
sensitivity
of
the
project,
as
well
as
the
quality
of
the
application.
Ranges
are
as
follows:

Receive,
log
and
distribute
EISF s:
2­
8
hours.
Preparation
of
environmental
assessments:
Three
calendar
weeks
are
allotted
(
elapsed
time).
The
actual
reviews
may
take
less,
depending
on
the
complexity
of
the
project
and
the
pertinence
to
a
particular
office s
or
division s
regulatory
purview.
Consolidation:
2­
3
days,
depending
on
the
complexity
of
the
project.

Persons
responsible
for
completing
each
step
of
the
task
The
ERC
is
responsible
for
steps
4
and
6
above.
The
Office
Chiefs
and
Division
Managers
of
the
offices
and
divisions
listed
above
are
responsible
for
Step
5.

Persons
responsible
for
reviewing
the
task:
The
Chef
of
the
Office
of
Enforcement,
Compliance
and
Environmental
Audits
has
overall
supervision
of
the
tasks.
EWVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
PROCESS
Objective:
To
modify
regulatory
processes
to
incorporate
environmentaljustice
principles
and
empowering
affected
communities
to
effectively
participate
in
decisionmaking
on
environmental
issues.

KENDOL
YN
HODGES­
SIMONS
Point
of
Contact
+
Environmental
Justice
Coordinator
I
I
Necessary
documents
include
the
following:

LOCAL­
Authorizing
documents,
statutes,
regulations,
Mayor s
Orders
and
OrganizationalOrders
FEDERAL­
Laws,
statutes,
regulations,
executiveorders
and
guidance
documents
OTHER­
Statistical,
geographical,
environmental
and
demographic
data.

INTERFACE
WITH
THE
COMMUNITY
ON
AN
ONGOING
BASIS
­
GUAGE
AND
RESPOND
TO
COMMUNITY
CONCERNS
REPRESENT
THE
DISTRICT
ON
EJ
ACTION
GROUPS
AND
COMMITTEES
REVIEW
AND
ASSESS
CURRENT
PROCEDURES
AND
DATA
(
One
to
Two
Months)
EJ
Communities
I
community
7
Stakeholders
INFORM
AND
TRAINON
EJ
PRINCIPLES
Regulatory
c
Stakeholders
­­+
DEVELOP
NEW
DECISION
­
MAKING
PROCEDURES
AND
PROCESSES
1­
FACILITATE
THE
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
NEW
PROCEDURES
AND
PROCESSES
TO
AVOID
DISPARATE
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS
PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE
FOR
REVIEWING­
Doreen
Thompson,
Chief,
OECEJ,
andthe
other
EHA
Bureau
Chiefs.

9
1
ENFORCEMENT
PROCESS
CHARTS
FOR
OFFICE
OF
ENFORCEMENT,
COMPLIANCE
&
ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
October
5,2000
Chart
No.
1
Enforcement
Procedure
beginning
with
INSPECTIONS
LEADING
TO
THE
ISSUANCE
OF
A
LETTER
OF
DEFECT/
NOTICE
OF
VIOLATION
ilRmmq­
pGxiiiqd
p­
mmq
Inspe
tor
P
LETTER
OF
DEFECT/
NOTICE
OF
VIOLATION/
CEASE
OR
DESIST
Respondent
to
cease
&
Desist
andior
Correct
violation
in
a
reasonable
period
of
time
lnspect
WAttorney
f
Can
seek
automatic
(
see
Chart
#
2
[
CORRECTION
I
/
Inspector/
Attorney
SEEK
FINESPENALTIES
FEDERAL
REFERAL
r
See
Chart
2
for
CIVIL
INFRACTION
(
SeeTask
F)
LEGISLATIVE
PENALTY
CIVIL
INFRACTION
ENFORCEMENT
PROCEDURES
CHART
2
INSPECTION
NO
Violation,

Violation
FINE
AND
CORRECTN
Fail
to
answer
notice
withn
15
calendar
days
If
Fine
not
paid
ASSESS
PENALTY
EQUAL
TO
AMOUNT
OF
CIVIL
FINE
FOR
Fail
to
answer
SECONDNOTICE
WITHIN
Failure
to
rep1
HEARING
BEFORE
ADMIN.
LAW
JUDGE
OR
ATTORNEY
EXAMINER,

Finding
of
Infraction
1
WRITTEN
ORDER
SETTING
FORTH
FINDINGS
OF
FACT,
CONCLUSIONS
I
If
respondent
fails
to
pay
Ties
penalties
or
costs
In
accordance
with
Admin
Judge
or
Attorney
Y
1
NO
FURTHER
ACTION
I
[
DEFAULT
PENALTY
]
I
ASSESS
PENALTY
EQUAL
TO
TWICE
AMOUNT
OF
CIVIL
FINE
FOR
INFRACTION
JUDGE
OR
EXAMINER
MAY
SUSPEND
ANY
PERMIT
OR
LICENSE
UNTIL
COMPLIANCE
1
/
MAYOR
MAY
CAUSE
TO
BE
ENTERED
ANY
FINAL
ORDER
REQUIRING
RESPONDENT
TO
PAY
FINES,
PENALTIES
OR
COSTS
AS
A
JUDGEMENT
AGAINST
THE
RESPONDENT
IN
THE
CIVIL
DIVISION
OF
THE
SUPERTOR
COURT
ts
GOVERNMENT
OF
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
Department
of
Health
9
F
Office
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings
***­
Memorandum
TO:
Cheryl
Amesial
FROM:
T.
J.
BeMent404
DATE:
June
5,2000
SUBJECT:
OAH
Information
to
Support
EHA
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
EPA
Application
As
per
your
request,
attached
please
find
a
copy
a
recent
memo
sent
to
the
Department s
General
Counsel.
This
memo
addresses
some
of
the
statutory
and
regulatory
provisions
affecting
OAH s
jurisdiction.
In
addition,
attached
is
the
most
recent
version
of
the
OAH
case
flow
process
for
Notices
of
Infraction.
As
the
adjudication
process
evolves
as
a
result
of
changes
in
enforcement
activities
and
best
practices,
there
will
continue
to
be
minor
adjustments
to
the
case
flow
structure.
You
will
also
find
copies
of
the
various
Notice
of
Infraction
tickets
and
forms,
as
well
as
drafts
of
the
revised
tickets.

OAH
Process
Flowchart
OAH
Current
Organizational
Structure
Notice
of
Ineaction
(
current)
Notice
of
Infraction
­
Revised
(
draft)
Fs3
ezs
Certificate
of
Service
(
current)
E
Certificate
of
Service
­
Revised
(
draft)
D2
%
z
NO1
SupplementalInfractions
Form
­­
4f­
q
70
Lost
or
Missing
Ticket
Form
Summary
Motion
for
Dismissal
of
Charge(
s)
or
Reduction
of
Fine
Legal
Authority
Regarding
Ow s
Jurisdiction
Memorandum
Reorganization
Plan
No.
4
of
1996
(
July
17,
1996)
­
Mayor s
Order
No.
97­
42
(
February
14,
1997)
a3
Mayor s
Order
No.
99­
68
(
May
7,
1999)
Department
of
Health
Organizational
Order
No.
99­
24
(
December
17,
1999)
Mattkews
v.
Eldridge,
424
U.
S.
3
19
(
1976)
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
397
U.
S.
254
(
1970)
16
DCMR,
Chapters
31­
32
I
hope
that
this
information
will
be
useful
to
you
in
providing
the
necessary
supplemental
documentation
for
renewing
your
program s
Environmental
Protection
Agency
application.
Please
call
me
on
442­
9097
should
you
have
any
questions
or
need
additional
information.

cc:
TedGordon
Doreen
Thompson
825
North
Capitol
Street,
NE,
Suite
5100,
Washington,
DC
20002
(
202)
442­
9094
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D
Q
I
I
NOTICE
OF
INFRACTION
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIAGOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEaTH
*

Issuing
Authority:
AEHAO
B.
LRAU
C.
PHSAO
D.
Other0
Bureau
Division
(
identify)

I
/
Date
of
InfractionlInfraction
Determined
Place
of
Infraction
(
Street
Address)

BusmesdCompany
Name
Respondent s
Full
Name
(
Last,
First,
Middle)

Respondent s
Street
Address
Respondent sCity
State
Notice
No.

/
I
Date
NO1
Issued
nAM
UPM
Time
of
Infraction/
InfractionDetermined
Ward
Number
TelephoneNumber
TelephoneNumber
Zip
Code
Picture
LD.
0Yes
No
II.
D.
Form
and
No.
Respondent s
Soc.
Sec.
No.(
Optional)
­­
Bus.
Lic.
Pennit
Type
Bus.
Lic./
PermitNo.

You
are
charged
with
violating
the
District
of
Columbia
laws
stated
below.
You
must
indicate
below
each
infraction
whether
you
admit
the
infraction,
admit
the
infraction
with
explanation,
or
deny
the
infraction.
.

If
you
deny
any
infraction(
s)
charged,
you
must
appear
in
person
for
a
hearing
before
an
AdministrativeLaw
Judge
on
the
day
of
at
AM
/
PM
at
the
followinglocation:

ORce
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings,
825
North
Capitol
Street,
NE,
Washington,
D.
C.
20002
TRIAL
ROOM
­

D.
C.
Code
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
FieAmount
$
1
YOU
REQTJIRED
TO
AYSWE.
P
Tim
NOTICE
OF
LXFXXTIOX
WITI~
ISDAYS
OF
rIiE
DATE
OFSER~
KETO
AVOID
BEING
.~
SSESSEDTI~
E
L.
IS~
KI)
ON
THF;
HEVBRSK
SYIMOF
'
pmsNC)
TICK.
YCX
H.~
VK'TEM
RIC;
F~
TO
mycjesr
A
HV;
A~~
K~
NC.
MONKI'ARY
YII.
SA.
L~
ES
AXSWKR
MI:
S"
I'BE
PQ>
ST~
I.~~
D
r3
ONEC~
POR
FILED
BY'miif."'
my
IFER
SERVI~.
YOC
MAY
XXSWER
EACBI.
NPR~~~
ION
TIIE
POLLOWI~
GWAYS.

TO
ADMIT
THE
INFRACTIONC9
AND
PAY
THE
FINUS):

On
this
Notice
and
within
15
days
of
the
date
of
service:

CHECK
the
"
ADMIT"
box
under
the
i&
action(
s)
listed
on
the
reverse
sidebf
this
Notice
and
sign
your
name
on
the
SIGNATURE
line(
s).

Make
a
personal
check,
cashier's
check,
or
money
order
payable
to
the
D.
C.
Treasurer
(
no
cash
accepted
by
mail)
for
the
total
amount
of
fines
due
(
see
reverse)
for
the
infraction(
s)
you
are
admitting.
Note:
There
will
be
a
$
30
fee
for
all
returned
checks.
WRITE
the
NOTICE
NUMBER
(
upper
right
comer
of
reverse
side)
on
the
fiont
of
your
check
or
money
order.

Provide
all
information
requested
below
in
SECTION
A
and
SECTION
B
and
complete
and
sign
the
declaration
in
SECTION
B.

Mer
providing
all
required
information,
enclose
full
payment
with
this
Notice
in
an
envelope
with
required
postage
and
mail
to:

Infraction
Clerk,
Office
of
Adjudication
&
Hearings,
825
North
Capitol
Street,
NE,
Lobby
Level,
Washington,
DC
20002
(
202)
442­
9091
Alternatively,
you
may
appear
in
person
to
submit
this
Notice
with
payment
and
required
information
at
the
above
address
on
weekdays
between
9:
OOAM.
and
3:
30P.
M
TO
ADMIT
THE
INFRACTION(
S)
WITH
EXPLANATION
AND
REQUEST
A
HEARING
BY
MAIL:

On
this
Notice
and
within
15
days
ofthe
date
of
service:

*
CHECK
the
"
ADMIT
WITH
EXPLANATION"
box
underthe
ihction(
s)
listed
onthe
reverse
side
of
this
Notice
and
sign
your
name
on
the
SIGNATURE
line(.?.).

Provide
all
the
information
requested
below
in
SECTION
A
and
SECTION
B
below
and
sign
the
declaration
in
SECTION
B.

Prepare
and
assemble
any
written
e.
uplanation,
affidavits,
or
other
evidence
you
believe
is
relevant
to
your
explanation
An
Administrative
Law
Judge
will
review
the
evidence
in
your
case
and
issue
a
ruling.
Failure
to
submit
sufficient
relevant
evidence
of
mitigating
circumstances
may
result
in
a
failure
to
obtain
any
reduction
or
suspension
ofthe
fine.
Write
the
NOTICE
NUMBER
on
the
kont
ofany
document
submitted
You
should
make
a
photocopy
ofthis
Notice
for
yourrecords.

After
providing
all
required
information,
enclose
this
Notice
together
with
any
explanation,
affidavits,
or
other
evidence
you
wish
to
submit
in
an
envelope
with
requued
postage
and
mail
to
following
address:

Infraction
Clerk,
Office
of
Adjudication
&
Hearings,
825
North
Capitol
Street,
NE,
Lobby
LeveL
Washington,
DC20002
(
202)
442­
9091
.4ltematively,
you
may
appear
in
person
to
submit
this
Notice
with
required
information
at
the
above
address
on
weekdays
between
9:
OOA.
M.
and
3:
30P.
M.
At
the
Same
time,
you
must
also
submit
any
explanation,
affidavits,
or
other
evidence
you
wish
to
have
considered
by
the
Administrative
Law
Judge.

TO
DENY
THE
INFR&
CTION(
S)
AND
REQUEST
TOAPPEAR
IN
PERSON
FOR
A
HEARING
On
this
Notice
and
within
15
days
of
the
date
of
service:

CHECK
the
"
DENY"
box
under
the
infraction
(
s)
listed
on
the
reverse
side
of
this
Notice
and
sign
your
name
onthe
SIGNATURE
line(
s).

Your
hearing
date
ispre­
scheduled
and
appears
on
the
reverse
side
of
this
Notice.
If
you
fail
to
appear
on
this
date
after
your
request
a
hearing
in
person,
you
will
be
subject
to
entry
of
a
default
order
and
the
hearing
may
proceed
to
a
fmljudgement
in
your
absence.
Bring
all
evidence
with
you
to
the
hearing.
YOUshould
make
a
photocopy
of
this
Notice
fog
your
records.

Provide
all
the
information
requested
below
in
SECTION
A.
You
need
not
fill­
in
and
sign
below
in
SECTION
B
unless
you
have
also
Admitted
or
Admitted
with
Explanation
one
of
the
charged
infractions.

.
Mer
providing
all
required
information,
enclose
this
Notice
in
an
envelope
with
required
postage
and
mailto
following
address:

Infraction
Clerk,
Office
of
Adjudication
&
Hearings,
825
North
Capitol
Streef
NE,
Lobby
Level,
Washington,
DC20002
(
202)
442­
9091
Alternatively,
you
may
appear
in
personto
submit
this
Notice
with
required
information
at
the
above
address
on
weekdays
between
9:
OOA.
M.
and
3:
30P.
M.

TO
BE
COMPLETED
BY
ALL
RESPONDENTS
Name
(
print)
Daytime
Phone:

TO
BE
COMPLETED
BY
ALL
RESPONDENTS
ADMITTING
OR
ADMITTING
WITH
EXPLANATION:
NOTICE
OF
INFRACTION
Notice
No.

DISTRICT
OF
COLUM@
IAGOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT
OFHEALTH
Issuing
Authority:
EHA
[
7
HRA0
PHSA
0
Other
0
I
I
Bureau
Division
Date
of
Service
Place
of
Innfraction
(
Street
Address
or
General
Location)

BusinesdCompany
Respondent
Name
Individual
Respondent's
Full
Name
(
Last,
First,
Middle)

Individual
or
Business
Respondent's
Street
Address
Respondent's
City
r
Picture
ID?
0Yes
0No
1
ID
Type
and
No.
Business
LicensdPermit
Type
D.
C.
Code
AND/
OR
D.
C.

Nature
of
Idtaction
Date
of
Infraction
Time
ofIdtaction
l'tNotice
0
zndNotice
o
Previous
NO1
No.

Ward
Number
TelephoneNumber
TelephoneNumber
State
Zip
Code
Respondent's
Soc.
Sa.
No.
­­
Business
Licendermit
No.

Fine
for
Infraction
Penalty
(
if
applicable)

$
$

Repeat
Offender
(
circle)
1'
2"
3"'
4"

ADMIT
(
Pay
Fine)
0
DENY
(
Request
Hearing)
c]
ADMIT
WITH
EXPLANATION
(
Request
Mal
Adjudication)
(
7
Signature
D.
C.
Code
AND/
OR
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
Citation
I
Fine
for
Infraction
I
Penalty
(
if
applicable)

Nature
of
Infraction
Date
of
Infraction
Tie
of
Infraction
Repeat
Offender
(
circle)
1'
2*
3'
d
4a
ADMIT
(
Pay
Fine)
DENY
(
Re
uest
Hearing)
0.~
~

ARmFJwADMIT
WITH
EXPLANATION
(
Request
Mail
Adjudication)
0
Signature
u
Total
fine
amount
due
for
infractionts)
$

WARNING:
Failure
to
answer
(
see
reverse)
to
each
infraction
on
thb
Notice
within
15
aays
of
the
date
of
service
will
result
in
assessment
of
a
penalty
equal
and
in
addition
to
the
amount
of
the
fue.
You
may
also
be
subject
to
other
penalties
and
actions
allowed
by
law
including
suspension
and
non­
renewal
of
your
license
or
permit,
the
sealing
of
your
business,
a
lien
being
placed
on
your
property,
and
attachment
of
your
equipment.
If
this
is
not
your
first
Notice
for
the
charges
above,
your
failure
to
answer
within
15
days
ofthe
date
of
service
will
result
in
assessment
ofanadditional
penalty
equal
to
twice
the
amount
ofthe
fine.
ForAdditional
Information
Call
(
202)
442­
9091
I
personally
observed
andor
determined
that
the
i&
action(
s)
charged
above
have
been
committed
and
served
this
Notice
in
accordance
with
law.

Inspector'dhvestigator's
Signature
Rint
Name
Date
Badge/
Identification
Number
I
sign
my
name
as
to
acknowledge
receipt
of
this
Notice
of
Infraction
and
not
as
an
admission
ofgilt
to
the
charges
listed
Respondent's
Signature
Print
Name
Date
OAH
(
WHITE)
RESPONDENT
(
YELLOW)
INSPECTOR
(
PINK)
ENFORCEMENT
(
GOLDENROD)
i
I
YOU
ARE
REQUIRED
TO
ANSWER
THIS
NOTICE
OF
INFRACTION
WITHIN
15DAYS
OF
THE
DATE
OF
SERVICE
TO
AVOID
BEING
ASSESSED
THE
ANY
PENALTIES
LISTED
ON
THE
REVERSE
SIDE
OFTHIS
NOTICE.
YOU
HAVE
THE
RIGHTTO
REQUEsT
A
HEARING.
YOUR
ANSWER
MUST
BE
POSTMARKED
OR
FILED
BY
THE
ISm
DAY
AnER
SERVICE.
YOU
MAY
AiSWER
EACH
INFRACTION
IN
ONE
OF
THE
FOLLOWING
WAYS.

TO
ADMIT
THE
INFRACTIONh
AND
PAY
THE
FINE(
9:

On
this
Notice
and
within
I5
days
of
the
date
of
service:

CHECK
the
"
ADMIT"
box
under
the
infraction(
s)
listed
on
the
reverse
side
of
this
Notice
and
sign
your
name
on
the
SIGNATURE
line(
s).

Make
a
personal
check,
cashier's
check,
or
money
order
payable
to
the
D.
C.
TREASURER
(
no
cash
accepted
by
mail)
for
the
total
amount
of
fines
and
penalties
due
(
see
reverse)
for
the
infraction(
s)
you
are
admitting.
Note
that
there
will
be
a
$
30
fee
for
all
returned
checks.
Write
the
NOTICE
NUMBER
(
upper
right
comer
of
reverse
side
of
this
Notice)
on
the
Eont
of
your
check
or
money
order.
Make
a
photocopy
ofthis
Notice
for
your
re
Complete
all
information
requested
below
in
SECTION
A
and
SECTION
B
and
complete
and
sign
a''
on
in
SECTION
B.

.
Aft;
completing
all
required
information,
enclose
full
payment
with
this
Notice
in
an
envelope
with
requ&
qp
to:

Infraction
Clerk,
Officeof
Adjudication
and
Hearings,
825
North
Capitol
Street,
N.
E.,
Washin,

Alternatively,
you
may
appear
in
person
to
submit
this
Notice
with
payment
and
required
information
at
the
above
address
in
the
~~~
~~~~~

TO
ADMIT
THE
INFRACTION(
S)
WITH
EXPLANATION
AND
REQUEST
A
HEARING
BY
MAIL:

On
this
Notice
and
within
15
days
of
the
date
of
service:

CHECK
the
"
ADMIT
WITH
EXPLANATION"
box
under
each
infiaction(
s)
listed
on
the
reverse
side
ofthis
Notice
and
sign
your
name
on
the
SIGNATURE
line(
s).

Complete
all
the
information
requested
below
in
SECTION
A
and
SECTION
B
below
and
sign
the
declaration
in
SECTION
B.

By
checking
this
box
you
waive
your
right
to
a
hearing.
Althoughthis
is
an
admission
of
liability,
you
have
the
right
to
prepare
any
written
explanation,
affidavits,
or
other
evidence
you
believe
is
relevant
to
your
explanation.
An
Administrative
Law
Judge
will
review
the
evidence
in
your
case
and
issue
a
ruling
by
mail.
Failure
to
submit
sufficient
relevant
evidence
of
mitigating
circumstances
may
result
in
a
failure
to
obtain
any
reduction
or
suspension
of
the
fme.
Write
the
NOTICE
NUMBER
on
the
Bent
of
any
document
submitted
Make
a
photocopy
of
this
Notice
for
your
records.

mer
providing
all
required
information,
enclose
this
Notice
together
with
any
e,
xplana!
ion,
affidavits,
or
other
evidence
you
wish
to
submit
in
an
envelope
with
required
postage
and
mail
to
following
address:

Jhfraction
Clerk,
Office
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings,
825
North
Capitol
Street,
N.
E.,
Washington,
DC
20002­
4210
(
2m)
442­
9091
Alternatively,
you
may
appear
in
person
to
submit
thi
above
address
in
the
Lobby
Level
on
weekdays,
9:
00kM.­
3:
30P.
M.
At
the
same
time,
you
must
also
submit
any
explanati
idered
by
the
Administrative
Law
Judge.

TO
DENY
THE
INFRkCTION(
f9
AND
REOUES
On
this
Notice
and
within
15
days
ofthe
date
of
service:

CHECK
the
"
DENY"
box
under
the
infiaction
(
s)
listed
on
the
reverse
side
of
this
Notice
and
sign
your
name
on
the
SIGNATURE
line(?.).

Your
hearing
date
and
time
are
pre­
scheduled
and
appears
on
the
reverne
side
of
this
Notice.
If
you
fail
to
appear
on
this
date
after
your
request
a
hearing
in
person,

YOU
will
be
subject
to
entry
of
a
default
order
and
the
hcming
may
proceed
to
a
final
judgement
in
your
absence.
Bring
all
evidence
with
YOU
to
the
hearing.
Make
a
photocopy
ofthis
Notice
for
your
records.

Provide
all
the
information
requested
below
in
SECTION
k
You
need
not
fill­
in
and
sign
below
in
SECTION
B
unless
you
have
also
Admitted
or
Admitted
with
Explanation
one
ofthe
charged
infractions.

Afterproviding
all
required
information,
enclose
this
Notice
in
an
envelope
with
required
postage
and
mail
to
following
address:

Infraction
Clerk,
OffIee
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings,
825
North
Capitol
Street,
NE,
Washington,
DC
20002­
4210(
202)
442­
9091
Alternatively,
you
may
appear
in
personto
submit
this
Notice
with
the
required
infomtion
at
the
above
address
in
the
Lobby
Level
on
weekdays,
9:
00AM.­
3:
30P.
M.

TO
BE
COMPLETED
BY
ALL
RESPONDENTS
Name
(
print)
Daytime
Telephone:

Street
Address
State
Zip
~

TO
BE
COMPLETED
BY
ALL
RESPONDENTS
ADMITTING
OR
ADMITTING
WITH
EXPLANATION
cated
on
the
reverse
side,
and
CORRECTED
orI
hereby
declare
under
penalty
of
perjury
that
I
have
received
0NOT
CORRECTED
(
check
only
one)
all
the
MieCion(
s)

Signature
WARXING:
SUBMISSION
OF
A
FALSE
STATEMEN
1s
A
C
ME
PUNISHABLE
UNDER
D.
C
CODE
5
22­

2511/
f
r
ADMITTED
WITH
EXPLANATION.

Date
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
GOVERNMENT
OF
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
The
undersigned
deciares
that
he
or
she
is
over
18years
of
age
and
personally
served
a
true
copy
of
this
notice
on:

0Respondent
0Respondent s
agenf
or
0
A
person
over
the
age
of
16,
who
resides
or
is
employed
at
the
last
known
home
or
business
addressof
the
respondent
or
the
respondent s
agent.

Time
and
Date
Name
of
Business
Served
(
if
applicable)

Name
of
Person
Served
Street
Address
of
BusinesslPerson
Served
City,
State,
Zip
The
undersigned
herein
best
describes
the
person
served
as
follows:

Gender
OMale
0
Female
Age
0
16­
20
years
021­
35
years
036­
50
years
05165
years
0Over65
years
Hair
0
Black
0
DarkBrown
0Light/
Blonde
0GrayNhite
0Red
e
~
a~
ding
Height
0
Under
5 
05 ­
5 
6 
0
5 
T ­
5 
11 
0
6 
0  
6 
6 
U
Over
6 
6 
Skin
Complexion
0
African
her.
0hiadPacific
0Hispanic
0
White
0unknown
Other
(
Please
Specify)

0
Mailed
or
caused
to
be
mailed
a
true
copy
of
this
notice
to
the
last
known
homehusinessaddress
of
the
respondent
or
respondent s
agent.

Name
of
Business
Served
(
if
applicable)

Name
of
Person
Served
Street
Address
of
Business/
PersonServed
City,
State,
Zip
The
undersigned
further
states
that
hdshe
is
an
employee
of
the
Government
of
the
District
of
Columbia,
the
District
of
Columbia
Department
of
Health(
DOH)
or
one
of
its
authorized
agents
and
knows
thisCertificate
of
Service
to
be
true
to
the
best
of
hidher
knowledge.

Date
of
Mailing
Mailer s
Name
and
Signature(
if
different
kom
inspector)

Inspector sIInvestigator sSignatme
Print
Name
Badgddentification
Number
Government
of
the
District
of
Columbia
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
Complete
Section
A
or
Section
B,
not
both.

SECTION
A.
FOR
PERSONAL
DELrVERY
~

The
undersigned
declaresthaf
he
or
she
is
over
18
years
of
age
and
persona
0Respondent
0Respondent s
agent,
or
U
A
person
over
the
age
of
16,
who
resides
or
is
employedat
the
business
addressof
the
respondent
or
the
respondent sagent.

Time
Served
Name
of
BusinessServed
(
if
applicable)

Name
of
Person
Served
Street
Address
of
Businesflerson
Served
City
The
undersignedherein
bestdescribes
the
person
served
as
Date
Served
State
Zip
s
OOver65years
0Balding
U
Hi
0unknown
Badgddentification
Number
Gender
OMale
Age
U
16­
20
years
Hair
UBlack
Height
0Under
5 
Skin
Complexion
Other
(
Please
Specify)
0
Female
021­
35
years
U
Dark/
Brown
n
5 ­
5 
6 
c1
African
her.
0
36­
50
years
0
LightBlonde
0
5 
7­
5 
1
1 
0Asidacific
Print
NameInspector dhvestigator s
Signature
SECTION
B.
FOR
MAIL
DELIVERY
U
Mailed
or
caused
to
be
mailed
a
true
copy
respondentandor
business
shown
below.

Name
of
Business
Served
(
if
applicable)

Name
of
Person
Served
fi
Street
Address
of
BusinesdPerson
Served
City,
State,
Zip
Date
of
Mailing
Mailer s
Signature
Print
Name
Badgddentification
Number
The
deliverer
or
mailer
further
states
that
by
signing
this
Certificate
of
Service
he/
she
is
over
18
years
of
age
and
knows
the
information
contained
herein
to
b;:
true
to
the
best
of
hisker
knowledge.

17
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
GOVERNMENT
D.
C.
Code
I
I
D.
C.
Code
ADMIT
0
DENY
0
ADMIT
WITH
EXPLANATION
0
D.
C.
Code
ADMIT
0
DENY
D
ADMIT
WITH
EXPLANATION
0
D.
C.
Code
ADMIT
D
DENY
0
ADMIT
WITH
EXPLANATION
0
D.
C.
Code
D.
C.
Code
Inspector'shvestigator's
Signature
I
hereby
acknowledge
receipt
of
this
Notice
of
Infraction
Respondent's
Signature
'
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
SIGNATURE
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
SIGNATURE
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
SIGNATURE
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
NUf
No.

DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
Fine
Amount
$
1I
J
Fie
Amount
$

Fie
Amount
$

­
Fie
Amount
$

Fie
Amount
$

Fine
Amount
$

BadgdIdentificationNumber
Date
­­
­­
LOST
OR
MISSING
TICKET
 
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
INSTRUCTIONS:

This
form
may
be
used
to
report
the
loss
of
a
Notice
of
Infraction
(
NOT),
Notice
of
Violation
(
NOV)
or
other
charging
document
issued
by
the
Department
of
Health.

Please
complete
the
information
below
to
the
best
of
your
knowledge.
Failure
to
complete
this
information
accurately
may
delay
the
processing
of
this
form
resulting
in
a
default
order
or
judgment
being
issued
against
you.

Filing
of
this
form
within
15
days
after
you
were
issued
a
Notice
of
Infraction
(
NOI),
Notice
of
Violation
(
NOW
or
other
charging
document
issued
by
the
Department
of
Health
enables
the
Administrative
Law
Judge
to
waive
the
assessment
of
a
late
response
penalty.

Once
you
have
completed
the
information
below,
sign
at
the
bottom
and
fdin
the
date.

Submit
this
form
and
a
Lost
Ticket
Fee
of
$
20.00
to
the
Infraction
Clerk
You
will
be
notified
by
mail
of
the
charges
pending
against
you
and
the
options
available
to
you
for
responding
to
them.

I
f
Date
of
InfkactionNiolatiodCharge
Place
of
Infraction
(
Street
Address)
Ward
Number
BusinesdCompany
Name
Telephone
Number
Respondent s
Full
Name
(
Last,
First,
Middle)
Telephone
Number
.
Respondent s
Street
Address
Respondent s
City
State
Zip
Code
Respondent s
SOC.
Sec.
Number
(
Optional)
­
Bus.
LicenseDermit
Type
Bus.
Licensepermit
Number
For
Additional
Information
Call
202­
442­
9091
I
hereby
acknowledge
that
all
information
is
true
and
correct
to
the
best
of
my
knowledge:

Signature
Date
OAH
(
WHITE)
RESPONDENT
CyELLOw)
ENFORCEMENT
(
PINK)
GOVERNMENT
OF
THEDISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
OFFICE
OF
ADJUDICATIONAND
HEARINGS
825
North
Capitol
Street,
N:
E.
Washington,
DC
20002
Summary
Motion
For
Dismissal
of
Charge(
s)
or
Reduction
of
Fine
TO
BE
COMPLETED
BY
REQUESTING
DOH
OFFICIAL:
Notice
of
Infraction
(
NOI)
Number:

Namemitle
Office/
Administration
Respondent's
Full
Name
(
First,
Middle,
Last)
or
Business
Name
Date
of
Infraction
CHECK
THEAPPROPRIATEBOX
Dismiss
Partial
Fine
0
Other:
0Suspend
A11
0
ReductionCharge
Fines
Please
indicate
the
charge(
s)
originally
cited,
proposed
suspensions
or
reductions
of
fines
and
an
explanation
to
jusQ
the
action
being
sought.
Explanation
must
include
the
on@
fine@)
cited
and
the
amended
total
to
be
collected.
Attach
additional
explanation
as
needed.
NewRevised
NO1
Issued?
0
Yes
No
NO1
Number
Date
Issued
D.
C.
Code
D.
C.
Municipal
Regulation
Fine
$

Nature
of
Infraction:
Emlanation:

D.
C.
Code
D.
C.
Municipal
Redation
Fine
$

~~
~~~
~

Nature
of
Infkaction:
Explanation:

Total
Fines(
Origmally
Cited)
New
Total
Fines
(
Proposed)

Approval:

Deputy
DirectorBureau
ChieEnforcement
Attorney
Print
Name
Date
SO
ORDERED:
GRANTED
0
DENIED
0
Administrative
Law
Judge
Date
OAH
(
WHITE)
RESPONDE3T
(
YELLOW)
~~
INSPECTOR
(
l'INK)
ENFORCEMENT(
GOLDENROD}
GOVERNMENT
OF
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
Department
of
Health***

­­
Office
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings
FROM:
T.
J.
BeMent,
Senior
Nlanagement
Analyst
DATE:
April
14,
2000
SUBJECT
Legal
Authority
Regarding
OAH's
Jurisdiction
In
response
to
your
request,
listed
below
are
some
statutory
and
regulatory
provisions
affecting
OM'Sjurisdiction.
With
a
few
exceptions,
0A"
s
jurisdiction
extends
to
the
adjudication
of
contested
matters
for
all
subject
areas
falling
under
the
Department
of
Health's
jurisdiction
within
the
District
of
Columbia
Government.

b
Reorganization
Plan
No.
4
of
1996
(
July
17,
1996)

0
Mayor's
Order
No.
97­
42
(
February
14,
1997)
Mayor's
Order
No.
99­
68
(
May
7,
1999)

0
Department
of
Health
Organizational
Order
No.
99­
24
(
December
17,
1999)

b
Matthews
v.
Eldridge,
424
U.
S.
3
19
(
1
976)

0
Goldberg
17.
Kelly,
397
U.
S.
254
(
1970)

The
Chief
Administrative
Law
Judge
has
also
issued
a
number
of
General
Orders
and
approved
guidelines
governing
internal
case
management,
filing,
and
operating
issues.
These
have
been
provided
previous1.
y
and
are
also
attached
for
your
reference.

Please
be
aware
that
there
are
also
numerous
regulatory
provisions
governing
hearings
in
particular
types
of
cases
covering
areas
under
DOH'S
and
therefore
OAH's
jurisdiction.
These
are
generally
scattered
throughout
the
appropriate
subject
titles
of
the
DCMR.
n
You
may
also
wish
to
consult
the
Medicaid
State
Plan
and
42
CFR,
Part
43
1.

There
are
currently
two
significant
areas
of
DOH­
related
administrative
litigatio'n
for
which
OM
does
not
currently
exercise
jurisdiction.
Matters
relating
to
patient
or
provider
challenges
of
Medicaid
"
level
of
care"
determinations
are
currently
litigated
before
the
DHS
Office
of
Fair
Hearings
(
OFH)
which
has
been
certified
to
perform
that
function
by
the
U.
S.
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services. 
Under
some
circumstances,
these
cases
may
instead
originate
in
the
Board
of
Appeals
and
Review.

OAH
is
authorized
to
hear
level
of
care
and
other
Medicaid
matters
but
cannot
begin
to
take
such
cases
until
OFH s
local
and
Medicaid
federal
matching
budget
and
its
position
authority
is
transferred
to
OM.
I
understand
that
the
District
is
currently
considering
such
a
change.
If
hnding
and
positions
are
put
in
place,
OAH
will
also
need
to
obtain
certification
from
U.
S.
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services,
but
that
reassignment
should
be
manageable.

A
second
health
area
in
which
OAH
does
not
presently
hear
cases
is
provider
challenges
to
annual
Notices
of
Program
Reimbursement
issued
by
the
Medical
Assistance
Administration
(
MAA).
These
are
heard
by
the
Board
of
Appeals
and
Review
( 
BAR )
as
a
surrogate
for
the
Mayor,
The
provider
community
has
expressed
some
interest
in
having
that
hearing
finction
transferred
to
OAH
because
of
delays
and
lack
of
expertise
in
the
BAR.
Such
a
change
would
require
approval
from
the
Mayor
and
the
Director
in
consultation
with
the
Corporation
Counsel.
It
would
also
require
the
transfer
of
appropriate
local
budget
authority
and
federal
matching
funds.
To
the
extent
that
such
a
change
might
happen,
it
would
not
likely
occur
before
FY
2002.

Please
call
me
on
442­
9097
should
you
need
any
additional
information.

cc:
Paul
Klein,
Chief
Administrative
Law
Judge
Theodore
J.
Gordon,
Senior
Deputy
Director
for
Operations
 
Medicaid
eligibility
determinations
arc
currcntly
made
by
the
DHS
Incomc
Mnintcnance
Administration
(
J. 
vIA).
and
challenges
to
those
detcrniinations
arc
also
adjudicated
by
DHS­
OFH.
­­
­­

9.
.....
___

ad
mOF
DISTRICT
84
UNCTIONS
:
emices
to
inmatee
in
Department
Bureau
of
Correctional
Services,
hereby
transfened
tothe
Depart­

ISFERS
jroperty
and
unexpendedbalances
funds
availabIe
or
to
be
made
inder
Section
II
above
are
hereby
8.

tions
trantifemd
in
Section
11We
Correctiom,
except
that
mental
accordance
with
the
Diatrict
of
,
f
1978,
effective
March
3,1979
.
I.
iTION
ione
is
authorized
to
organize
the
into
such
organizational
compood
ia
authorized
tu
develop
any
o
assem3
the
effectiveness
of
the
1
ikctmber
24.
1973
(
87
Stat.
790;
D.
C.
9
1­
227(
b)).
the
CounaI
hemin
reorgatha
Departmmt
of
Humrn
Sonices
to
ar
the
Bureau
of
Correctional
services
heDspartmant
of
Human
SerViwa
tothe
tmat
d~
omctionnas
sec
forth
in4
8
of
t.
ion
56)
of
D.
C.
Law
11­
214
prwided
that
:
ahallexpire
&
r
225days
of
ita
having
effect.
wpncy
*
dopHon
of
Reorg&
hatlaa
Ya
b
far
tbe
bapmeat
af
Hum
4e
and
Department
ofCorntiour.
temporary
sdoption
of
the
Xeoganiza.
the
Department
of
Humus
servicu,
8id
3
of
the
Reorganization
Pfsp
NO.
6
for
t­
nt
of
Human
Semaaa
and
Demt
of
Consdons
EmargencyM
of
1996
4ct
11.336,
August
8.
1996,
43
DCR
W
2­
3
of
the
Reorgaarzation
Plan
No.
6
:
Department
of
Human
Service8
and
ment
of
Cornctiona
Congreseional
RLmergeny
Act
of
1996
(
D.
C.
kt
11­
42?,
r
28,1996,
GDCR
6143).
46
2urd
3
of
,&
ation
Plnn
No.
5Tor
the
Def
Human
Servicae
and
Department
of
Secaad
CongFaaeiond
WCW
I_­_........
­...........

M
85
ACTS
RELATING
EBTAgUSHmEKT
OF
DISVICT
bdalatlve
history
ofLaw
1I.
UQ.
­
Law
11­
69.
tho
%
or~
tetjan
Plan
No.
1
of
1995
for
the
Department
of
Human
SenGcea
and
Department
of
Corrections
kporiuy
Act
d
1995, 
w(
u
introduced
In
Council
and
usrrigned
Sill
Na.
11­
381.
The
Bitl
was
ndopted
on
ht
and
second
madjsgs
on
July
11,1996,
mdJuly
29,
1985,
reqxct.
ivdy.
Signed
by
the
Mayor
OD
Augu8C
9,1995,
it
wa8
seoigncdAct
No.
11­
132
and
Panuismittad
toboth
Housea
of
Congresn
for
itu
rwiew.
D.
C.
hw
12­
69
became
et5edve
on
October
26,
1896.
baglidativohivtarp
of
Law
11­
214.
­
Law
11.214,
the
 
TborgmirationPlan
No.
5
for
the
Depmmant
of
Human
Services
and
Deparb
ment
of
Carrectione
hmpary
Art
of
1998..
was
introduced
b
Couocil
and
aseigned
Bill
No.
11­
805.
The
Bill
waa
adopted
on
fimt
and
second
eon
July
3,
1996.
and
Jq
17,.
1996.
~~
ap&
vely.
Shed
by
the
Mayor
on
Augurt
9.1996,
it
wan
au8ipdM
No.
11­
382
md
kaDsrnitecd
tobotb
IIOWCSforOfh­
68
ita
review.
U.
C.
Law
11.114
barnseRntive
on
Aad­­
r­­­­.
1897.
Reorgpnkatloo
Plan
No.
6
lor
tbe
De.
pnrtment
of
Runrma
Bervleer
orrd
Doput.
ment
ot
Corroctioar
Conpreariond
&.
view
Emcrpsocy
Dtclnrstioa
Rsrolution
of
1896.
­
Purwant
to
Raaolution
li­~
i,
effective
Octaber
1,
1996.
Council
declared
&
existence
of
M
emqency,
due
to
Coweional
review,
withrespect
totbe
tranmfw
ofthe
Bwau
of
Comctional
Services
from
the
DP
partmmt
of
Human
Seluican
to
the
Dopartmeat
of
Comectionr.

REORGANIZATION
NO.
2
OF
1996
TO
TltEANSFZR
TOTHE
MAYOR
CERTAIN
DlSCRlETTONARYAUTHORITYVESTED
INTHE
DEPARTMENT
OF
Emergency
adoption
of
Reorgaaiaation
No.
3of1996.
­
For
the
temporary
trader
to
the
Mayor
the
dircreticuwy
authority
Ebr
cres
ating
mobetary
obligrtioncr
and
app­
upenditurev
in
tbs
District
of
Colwbia e
hid
to
Families
with
Dependent
ChiIdren.
Medicaid,
md
child
abuse
knd
neglsNfootdr
cbn
programs
that
Rsorganisation
PhNo.
2
of
1979,
SERWCES
Reorganization
Plan
No.
3
of
1986.
and
the
ptcrvention
of
Child
MUMond
Neglect
kt
af
1977rested
iu
the
hpartmant
of
HumanSob
virne,
rag
$
2
of
tbc
Reorgmjration
No.
2
of
1995
(
a
*
fer
to
the
Mayor
Chtaia
Dbcra
ticnaryAuthority
Varted
in
the
Deprrtmmt
of
Hum=
&
mica
htrgbncy
&
of
139s
(
D.
C!.
M
uma.
JU~
Yzi,
iwi,
42
DCR
4012).

REORGANIZATION
PLAN
NO.
4
OF
1096
IEffective
Jdy
17,1996)

Prepared
by
the
Mayor
and
tranemitted
to
the
Council
of
the
District
of
Columbia
on
May
24,
1996,
pursuant
b
section
422U2)
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Self­
Chvernment
and
Governmental
Reorganization
Act
of
1973,
approved
December
24,
1973
(
87
Stat.
770;
D.
C.
Code,
mc.
1­
242(
12));
the
Governmental
Reorganization
Procedure5
Act
of
1981,
effective
October
17,
1981
(
D.
C.
Law
4­
42;
D.
C.
Code
see.
1­
299.1et
sq.
1
and
the
Department
of
Public
Health
EetablishmentAct
of
1992,
effective
March
13,
1993
(
D.
C.
Law
9­
182;
D.
C.
Code,
8ec.
6­
131et
se9.1.

I.
ESTABLISHMENT
These
is
hereby
established,
in
the
Executive
Branch
of
the
government
of
OM
the
bistrict
of
Columbia
( 
District ),
under
the
supervision
of
the
Director,
a
mcy
kct
of
1996(
D.
C.
Act
1141.
De
Department
of
Health
( 
Department?.
The
Director
ehd
have
Ml
authoritySO,
1996.
UDCR
1891,
and
90
2
and
3
borganizatim
P~
MNo.
6
foe
the
Da­
over
the
Department
and
all
ftlnctions
and
personnel
assigned
thereto,
nt
af
Human
Serviqs
M$
Daputment
including
the
power
to
re­
delegate
to
other
employees
and
oflidale
of
the
&
one
Congresriaaal
Rcvi~~
Emep
Department
euch
powers
and
authority
ae,
in
the
Director s
judgment,
arest
of
1997
m.
C.
Act
13­
57,
MMCb
31,
wananted
in
the
intereeta
of
efficiency
and
sound
adminiatration.
L
DCR
2226).

T
COPY
AVAIUBLE
._­.,.........

1,
i
TO
ESTABLISHMENTACTSREIATING
OF
DISs.­
cr
86
!.
!

11.
PURPOSE
I.

The
mission
of
the
Department
is
to
ensure
the
prdsion
of
high
quality
,
health
services
by
eetablishing
District­
wide
health
policy
and
ataadards
and
.
guidelines
for
safe
and
quality
health
service
delivery;
foster
and
promo&
'.
health
education
and
disease
prevention;
structure
an
efficient
and
cost­
effective
health
care
financingemtern;
implement,
monitor
and
evaluate
the
Department's
strategic
health
plan
and
the
District­
wide
health
plan:
and
undertake
activities
that
will
support
the
highest
quality
of
life
achievable
for
District
residents
and
visibrs.

LII.
ORGANIZATION
There
are
hereby
establiehed
in
the
Department:
(
1)
the
Office
af
the
Director,
with
such
subordinate
etaffoffices
as
are
required
to
carry
out
overall
management
responsibility
for
the
Department;
(
2)
the
Financeand
Adminiatration
Offices,
with
such
subordinatestaffofiicas
aa
are
requiredto
coordinate
and
manage
the
financial
and
adminietrative
functione
for
the
Department;
(
9)
the
HeaIth
Regulation
Administration,
to
develop
the
Districtwide
health
I
plan,
assum
qualiQ
management
and
compliance
with
applicable
federal
and
District
rules
that
govern
public
health
system,
liceme
hedth
care
and
social
service
professionals;
regulate
occupational
and
profeesional
conduct
and
standards,
health
care
and
eocid
service
facilities
andensure
compliancewith
applicable
federal
and
District
dea
that
govern
uses
and
practice8
that
affect
the
phyeicai
environment;
(
4)
the
StateHealth
Affairs
Administration,
tofulfiu
state
agency
functionsin
the
area
of
maternal
and
child
health,
ambulatory,
long
krm
and
preventive
health
care;
(
6)
the
Health
Care
Finance
Administration
to
administer
the
Medicaid
program,
MedicalCharitiesProgram
and
develop
service
coverage,
service
delivery
and
reimbursement
policies
for
the
District
government's
health
care
financing
program;
(
6)
the
Addiction,

I.
Prevention
and
Recovery
Admiaistratian,
to
coordimte
the
adminjster
drug
I­
and
substance
abuee
prevention
and
treatment
programs
and
services;
and
(
7)
the
HlV/
Aids
Administration,
to
coordinate
programs
and
support
eelvice8
for
Human
Immuno­
deficiency
Vie
(
HIV)
end
Acquired
Immune
Deflciency
Syadrome
(
AIDS).

W.
ACTIONS
The
fimctione
of
the
major
organizational
components
of
the
Department
shall
be
to:
Plan
and
evaluate
the
delivery
of
cornprehenaive
hedth
care
eenrices
for
District
reaidenta
and
visitors;
Pmvide
Bervices
to
promote
good
health,
reduce
morbidity
and
mortality
resulting
&
om
rncu'or
preventable
hazards
and
diseases;
Provide
treatment,
rehabilitation
and
eubstance
abme
prevention
services
to
residenta
of
the
Dietrict
and
services
to
identify
substance
abusers;
I
Rovide
nutritious
foods
and
nutrition
education
to
eligible
infanta,
childres,

I.
I.
'
mothers
and
the
elderly;
I
DeveloD
a
Districtwide
health
plan
and
issue
certScat436
of
need
for
new
87
Provi
combat
Admi
grams;
hgul
services
dee
th;
Admb
Admin
Detern
communi
Admini
Cam
Aide
Provide
vices;
Coordin
procedure:
etasdards;
Advocak
Wiuion
1
determinat
Establiak
participatio
hensive
hea
Monitor
i
within
the
I
Develop,
<
clients
of
th
The
funct
enaure
the
c
by
the
Depar
des
that
PE
istered
by
tl
following
sta
The
O5ce
pertaining
to
federal
or
loc
tion
and
d
representa
tio
The
O5ce
homiddea,
su
of
death.
The
State
(
the
District's
1
needs
assessr
research
and
t
The
Office
o
1
facilitie8­
and
services
in
accordanie
with
the
health
plan;
i
the
developm
OPY
AVAILAB~~
E~~*~~~'
82
.
....
..
.
...
..
..
..
.
..
86
be
provieion
of
high
quality
.
th
policy
and
standards
and
:
elivery;
foster
and
pmmoe
:
tme
an
efficient
and
cost
t,
monitor
and
evaluate
the
;
k&­
wide
health
plm;
and
quality
of
life
achievable
for
merit:
(
1)
the
Office
of
the
required
t~
carq
out
overdl
2)
theFinance
and
Add89
are
requid
tocoordinate
tione
for
the
Department;
(
3)
op
the
District­
wide
health
1
with
applicable
federal
and
iceme
healthcare
and
socisl
i
prafeesioad
conduct
and
ensure
compliance
with
iaea
and
practices
that
affect
&
a
Administration,
to
fulfiil
nd
child
health,
ambulatory,
dth
Care
Ficance
Adminisiical
Charities
Program
mbmement
poficiee
for
the
ograms;
(
6)
the
Addiction,
dinate
the
administer
drug
ograms
and
services;
and
(
7)
BL
~
and
support
servicesfor
:
quired
Immune
Deficiency
.
poneats
of
the
Department
ive
health
care
services
for
ce
morbidity
add
mortality
leases;
e
abuse
prevention 
se~~
s
y
substance
abusers;
WI
eligible
infants,
chi.
ld*
n.

certificates
of
need
for
Itb
plan;
Am
REUTINCTO
ESTMLISXM­
TOF
DLS~
ICT
Provide
educational
eehces
and
ovemee
the
delivery
of
medicalaervices
to
combat
the
spread
of
AIDS;
Administer
the
Dietrict
govement e
Medicaid
and
Medical
Charities
pmgrams
Regulate
occupationd
and
professional
conduct,
health
care
and
social
servicesfacilities,
and
eneure
compliance
With
applicable
federal
and
District
8
rules
that
govern
use8
and
practices
that
affect
the
physical
environment;
Administer
the
school
health
program
in
elementary
and
secondary
schools;
Administer
the
provision
of
long
term
care
services;
Determine
the
level
of
cme
for
placement
of
individuals
in
numing
homeand
community
residential
facilities;
Admhister
the
Diatrict
government s
Nurse
Aide
Program
and
Personal
Care
Aide
Training,
Competency,
Evaluation
and
Certidcate
Programs;
Provide
information
on
ae­
xually­
trawmitted
diaeaaer,
and
prevention
6eP
vices;
Coordinate
thedevelopment
and
implementation
of
health
care
polities
and
procedures
and
oversee
the
establishment
of
health
we
and
quality
amurance
6tmdMdB8;
Advocate
and
communicatebroad
health
policy
onbehalfaf
the
Executive
for
inciusion
in
legislation
and
to
serve
a~
a
guide
fat
reaource
allocation
determinations
and
service
delivery
decisions
by
private
ae~
tarprovident;
Establish
ad
promota
publidprivate
sector
partherships
and
consumer
participation
that
fosters
the
systematic
and
integrated
delivery
of
comprehendve
health
services;
Monitor
and
evaluate
operatiow
to
emure
management
accountability
within
the
Department;
and
Develop,
coordinate
and
monitor
the
delivery
ofquality
medical
services
to
clienta
ofthe
Departmentof
HumanDevelopment.
The
function6
of
the
office
of
the
Director
shall
be
to
provide
direction
and
ensure
the
coordination
of
operatingAdministration,
review
policy
developed
by
the
Department s
administrationand
Oversee
compliance
withstatutes
and
rules
that
pertsia
to
the
operations
of
the
Department
and
programs
administered
by
the
Department.
The
Office
of
the
Director
shd
eupervise
the
following
sM
o5ces:
The
Office
of
the
General
Comael,
which
shall
review
legal
matters
pertaining
to
the
Department
and
ita
programs,
analyze
& 
sting
or
proposed
federal
or
focal
legislation
and
dea,
manage
the
development
of
new
legislation
and
rules
and
coordinate
Iegai
eervices
to
the
Department
and
the
representation
of
the
Departmentwith
the
Office
of
the
CorporationCounsel.
The
Oace
of
the
Medical
Examiner,
which
shall
conduct
investigations
of
homicides,
euicides,
accidental
and
dntg­
related
deaths
to
determine
the
came
of
death.
The
State
Center
for
Health
Poiicy
and
Statistics,
which
ahall
administer
the
Diatrict e
government
vital
records
system,
provide
comprehenaive
health
needa
assessment,.
policy
development
and
implementation,
and
program
research
and
wduatioa.
The
Office
of
Emergency
Health
and
Medical
Services, 
whichshail
oversw
the
development
and
delivery
of
emergency
health
care
by
coordinating
gcvernment
and
community
resources.

.:.,

A5
The
functiom
of
the
Finance
and
Administration
Offices
are
to
coordinate
and
manage
the
financial
and
administrative
function
of
the
Departmebt
under
the
supervision
of
the
Director.
The
Office
of
the
Director
also
shall
I
supervise
the
following
three
offices:
The
Office
of
the
Controller,
which
shall
coordinate
the
analyois,
develop
ment,
and
preeentatioa
of
the
Department's
budget,
monitor
expenditurea
and
enter
all
financial
transactions
into
the
financial
management
syatem.
Office
of
Contracts,
Procurement
and
Grants,
which
shall
coordinate
and
effect
the
purchases
of
goods
and
services
of
the
Department,
by
reviewing
and
processing
contracts,
procurements
and
manta.
Office
of
Facilities
Managsment,
which
shall
asaure
that
tbDepartment
has
adequate,
efficient
and
cost­
effective
facilities,
administrative,
pri;;
thg
and
graphic
aervices.

V.
TRANSFER
OF
FUNCTIONS
The
foIlowing
functionsam
hereby
transferredta
the
Department
of
Health:
Each
of
the
functione
assigned,
and
authorities
delegated
to
the
Director
of
the
Department
of
HumanServices
as
set
forth
in
Sections
HI.(
K),
(
L),
and
(
PI,
of
Reorganization
Plan
No.
9
of
1986,
dated
Jenuary
3,
1987;
and
The
administrative
and
management
support
functione
in
the
Department
of
Human
Services
as
aet
forth
in
Sections
IIUA),
(
B),(
0,(
D).(
E),
and
(
F),
of
Reorganization
Planno.
3
of
1986,
dated
January
3,
1987,
that
relate
to
the
functions
set
forth
in
Section
V.(
AXI)
above.
[(
A)(
I)
of
tbb
section.]

VI.
OTHER
TRANSFERS
All
positione,
personnel,
property,
records
and
unexpended
balances
of
appropriations,
allocations,
and
other
funds
available
ro
to
be
made
available
that
relate
to
the
functions
eet
forth
undet
Section
V.
above,
am
hereby
transferred
to
the
Department.

VII.
REORGANIZATION
The
Director
of
the
Department
is
authorized
to
organize
the
pemonnel
rind
property
transferred
herein
within
any
organizational
unit
of
the
Department
as
the
Direcbr
deems
appropriate.
Until
such
establishment,
existingOrders
establishing
the
components
of
the
Commission
of
Public
Health
remain
in
force,
where
they
do
not
conflict
with
thia
Plan.

VIII.
EFFECTIVE
DATE
This
Reorganization
Plan
No.
4
in
all
its
parte
ehd
become
effective
pursuant
to
the
promulgation
of
an
executive
order
of
the
Mayor
estabbhing
the
same,
which
shall
be
ieaued
no
later
than
thirty
(
30)
calendar
days
after
this
plan
has
been
approved
in
accordance
with
the
requirements
of
Section
422(
12)
of
the
HomeRule
Act
(
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
1­
242(
12).

Emergency
mt
nmaadamentr
­
For
temporaay
rwrgaaication
of
the
Department
of
Hum­
Servic~
to
trsrrefar
the
Buraclu
of
Corructional
Services
&
om
the
Department
af
Human
&
Maa
to
the
Doprrtrnent
af
&
redona,
#
eo
23of
tha
Reorgmiration
PlanNo.
6
for
the
Department
of
Human
&
Mcsr
and
De
partmrnt
of
COe
EmergencyAct
of
1997
EST
COPY
AVAlWlE
?
B
are
to
coordinate
of
the
Department
Director
alao
shell
I
andysis,
develop
r
expenditures
and
rent
system.
all
coordinate,
and
:,
by
reviewing
and
It
the
Department
iatrative,
printing
utment
of
Health:
to
the
Director
of
X.
W,(
LAand
(
P),
7;
and
1
the
Department
11,
(
E),
and
(
FAof
:
hat
relate
to
the
ction.]

ad
balances
of
:
made
available
ove,
are
hereby
e
personnel
and
:
be
Department
existing
Orders
dth
remain
in
come
effective
or
gstablishing
:
dat
days
after
tnte
of
Section
tot
of
Carrectioas,
im
PlanNo.
6
for
woeema
DP
gepcr
Act
of
1997
(
D.
C.
Act
12­
201,
Datembr
10,
1987.
44
DCR
pmvi&
d
&
at
tbe
act
rhall
wire
rRu
221
16000).
dap
of
ita
ba*
taken
dkt.
Taolporvy
derripcion
oliclaatlop..
­
Raoqpalratiou
Plca
No.
4
d
laeS
for
For
emporary
pwvisioos
dederibhg
the
fuac­
the
DepMmoat
olHealth
App­
Raw
of
the
Department
of
Health,
rn
wteb
luffoar
ol
1Bp&
­
burnt
to
Raduti~
liehad
by
thir
RedgMiration
Pbn,
we
8
2
of
11.460,
effsctv*
July
17,
1896,
~~
r
apil
D.
C.
taw
12­
kt
12634).
prwed
hrg.
nizdtioa
Phrr
No.
4
for
1996
for
Section
4b)
of
D.
C.
TAW
12­
LM
12.830
the
Department
of
HoaIth.

REORGANIZATION
PLAN
NO.
7
OF
1996
CJ3ffective
December
13,1996)

I.
Purpose
(
A)
To
aboliah
the
International
Bueinees
Program
(
IBP)
in
the
O&
ice
of
Economic
Development
(
OED)
and
tramfar
ita
funetioaii
to
a
newly
established
Office
of
International
M&
s.
(
 3)
Tb
create
the
Office
of
International
Maire
(
OU)
as
a~
independent
subordinate
agency
within
the
Executive
Oace
of
the
Mayor.
(
C)'
It,
tranefer
the
foreign
protocol
functions
of
the
Aotocai
Office
(
PO),
in
the
office
of
the
Sam+­
of
the
District
of
Columbia
(
OSDC)
ta
the
OZA.
(
D)'
ib
designate
one
of
#
hetransferred
positions
118Director
of
the
OflSce
of
International
Affairs
which
ehalt
be
a
subordinateagency
head
appointed
by
the
Mayor
with
the
wnsent
of
the
Council.
(
E)
To
coordinatethe
in*
mational
activitiesof
the
Mce
of
'
Pourism
and
Promotions
(
OW)
and
the
Waahingeon
Conventionand
Viitora
Bureau,
and
other
Diatrict
agenciea
with
the
OU.

If.
Functions
I
(
A)
The
Office
of
Intarnational
Affairs
ahaUhave
the
followiag
functions:
(
1)
'
Ib
attract
and
bring
foreign
business
and
other
intsrnational
trade
and
investment
to
the
District.
(
2)
'
Xb
wardinate
the
international
dhire
activities
of
all
District
agentiea
end
to
provide
a
point
of
contact
with
OIA
liaison
from
other
agenciea
in
order
to
foster
cooperation
an
international
a&
nisiavolving
other
agencies.
(
3)
Ib
be
responsible
for
international
protocol
including
the
CDOrdiDatio
of
the
Districtla
activitiecl
with
visiting
international
dignitaria.
(
B)
AU
fuactione
ofthe
IBP
amociated
with
the
poeitione
transferred
from
the
ZBP,
and
the
internstianal
protaco1
functions
of
the
OSDC
we
hereby
transferred
to
the
OIA
UI.
Transfers
Two
rl3P
position8
and
one
position
from
the
OTP,
associated
property,
recorda
and
unexpended
balance8
of
appropriations,
allocations,
and
other
funde,
of
any,
that
related
to
the
positions
and
functions
aaaigned
herein,
ahall
be
transferred
to
the
Oh.
All
authority
for
administeringactivities
previougiy
authorized
or
delegated
to
the
OED
aad
tbe
OSDC,
directly
related
to
the
fbdi0~
8outlined
in
Section
II
above,
ie
hereby
transferred
to
the
Old.
GOVERNMENT
OF
THE
DI!
j'IlUCT
OF
C0LUhlBI.
A
.
UMlNIsIRATzyE
lssuANCE
SYSTEM
Mayor's
Order
97­
4
2
February
18,
1997
Implementation
of
Reorganization
Plan
No.
4
of
1996,
swnm'
Establishment
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Department
of
Health
ORIOINATINff
AQENCY:
Office
of
the
Mayor
By
virtue
of
the
authority
vested
in
me
as
Mayor
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
section
422(
12)
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Self­
Government
and
Governmental
Reorganization
Act
of
1973,
approved
December
24,
1973
(
87
Stat.
790;
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
1­
242
(
12));
the
Governmental
Reorganization
Procedures
Act
of
1981,
effective
October
17,
1981
(
D.
C.
Law
4­
42;
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
1­
299.1
gL
seq.);
the
Department
of
Public
Health
Establishment
Act
of
1992,
effective
March
13,
1993
(
D.
C.
Law
9­
182;
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
6­
131
et
seq.);
Reorganization
Plan
No.
4
of
1996
for
the
Department
of
Health
Approval
Resolution
of
1996,
effective
July
17,
1996
(
Res.
11­
450;
43
DCR
3974);
and
as
provided
in
paragraph
two
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Financial
Responsibility
and
Management
Assistance
Authority
letter,
dated
December
18,
1996,
approving
the
establishment
of
the
Department
of
Health,
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
that:

1.

2.

­

3.
Reorganization
Plan
No.
4
of
1996
("
Plan"),
establishing
the
District
of
Columbia
Department
of
Health
shall
be
effective
nunc
pro
tunc
to
January
13,
1997.

The
Director
of
the
Department
of
Health
shall
undertake
such
necessary
or
appropriate
steps
to
ensure
implementation
of
the
Plan,
a
copy
of
which
is
attached
to
and
incorporated
into
this
Order.
The
Director
of
the
Department
of
Health
is
hereby
delegated
authority
to
carry
out
the
functions
of
the
Department
of
Health
pursuant
to
sections
I,
111,
IY,
V,
VI
and
VI1
of
the
Plan
for
the
Department
of
Health.

The
heads
of
each
department
and
agency
responsible,
in
rJhole
or
in
part,.
for
transferring
to
the
Department
of
Health,
positions,
property,
records,
appropriations
or
other
funds,
or
for
providing
other
services
or
functions
shall
immediately
undertake
all
necessary
steps
to
implement
the
provisions
of
the
Plan.

1514­
7s
I
4.
The
functions
and
resources
set
forth
in
sections
I,
1x1,
IV,
V,
VX
and
VI1
of
the
Plan
are
hereby
transferred
to
the
Department
of
Health.

5.
FFFECTJVE
DATE:
This
Order
shall
become
effective
nunc
pro
tunc
to
January
13,
1997.

HAYOR
ATTEST:
\
KAT~
LEENE.
ARNOLD­
SECRETARY
OF
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLOMBIA
46
DC
REG
4234
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIAREGISTER
ISSUE:
Volume
46,
Number
19
ISSUE
DATE:
May
7,
1999
SUBJECT:
MAYOR'S
ORDERS
46
D.
C.
REG.
1334
GOVERNMENT
OF
THF.
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUANCE
SYSTEM
Mayor's
Order
99­
68
April28,
1999
SUBJECT:
Delegation
of
Authority
Pursuant
to
D.
C.
Law
6­
42,
the
"
Departmentof
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs
Civil
Infractions
Act
of
1985"

Office
of
the
Mayor
ORIGINATING
AGENCY:

By
virtue
of
the
authority
vested
in
me
as
Mayor
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
section
422(
6)
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Home
Rule
Act
of
1973,
as
amended,
87
Stat.
790,
Pub.
L.
No.
93­
198,
D.
C.
Code.
see.
1­
242(
6)
(
1997
Supp.),
and
the
Department
of
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs
Civil
Idfactions
Act
of
1983,
effective
October
5,
1985
@.
C.
Law
632;
D.
C.
Code.
sec.
6­
2701
et
seq.,
1997
Supp.
(
the
"
Act"),
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
that:

1.
The
Director,
Department
of
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs,
is
delegated
the
hkyor's
authority
pursuant
to
the
Act,
except
as
provided
in
paragraph
2
of
this
Order.

2.
The
Director,
Departmentof
Health,
is
delegated
the
Mayor's
authority
to
perforni
the
foIIowing
functions
under
the
Act
as
they
pertain
to
laws
administeredby
the
Department
of
Health:

(
a)
Appoint
1
or
more
attorneys
to
serve
as
administmtivelawjudges
or
attorney
esamincrs
to
implement
the
provisions
of
the
Act
pursuant
to
section
103
of
the
Act.
@.
C.
Code,
sec.
6­
2703);
@)
Prepare
and
periodically
amend
a
schedule
of
fines
to
be
imposed
under
the
Act.
pursuant
to
section
104
Of
the
Act.
(
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
6­
2704);
(
c)
Issue
rules
necessary
to
carry
out
section
105
of
the
Act
(
D.
C.
Code.
sec.
6­
2705):
purposes
of
the
Act
and
Departmentof
Health
prognms
pursuant
to
(
d)
Serve
notices
of
infractions
pursuant
to
section
201
of
the
Act.
@.
C.
Code,
sec.
6­
2711):
(
e)
Enter
final
orders
to
pay
fines,
penalties,
or
costs
as
a
judgment
against
and
enforce
thatjudgment
pursUaat
to
section
201of
the
Act.
(
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
6­
2713):
and
(
0
Impose
civil
fines,
penalties
and
costs
for
adjudicated
iRfnctions
pursuant
to
section
104
of
the
Act
(
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
6­
2704).

3.
For
the
purpose
of
this
Mayor's
Order,
the
laws
administered
by
the
Department
of
Health
include
the
following:
[*
42351
(
a)
The
Water
PoIIution
Control
Act
of
1984,
effective
March
16,1985
@.
e.
Law
5­
185;
D.
C.
Code,
sec.
6921
et
seq.);
(
b)
The
Phmqcist
and
Pharmacy
Regulation
Act
of
1980,
effectiveSeptember
16,
I980
@.,
C.
Law
3­
98:
D.
C.
Code,
see.
2­
2020
et
seq.);
(
c)
The
Smoking
Restriction
Act
of
1979,
effective
September28,
1979
@.
C.
Law
3­
22;
D.
C.
Code.
sec.
69
I1
et
seq.):
overstate
the
relevant
reversal
rate.
As
we
indicated
last
Term
in
Fusari
v.
Steinberg,
41.9­~­..
S.~­~_
7_
91.3s.~._
n.
6
(
1975),
in
order
fklly
fo
assess
the
reliability
and
fairness
of
a
system
of
procedure,
one
must
also
consider
the
overall
rate
of
error
for
all
denials
of
benefits.
Here
that
overall
rate
is
12.2%.
Moreover,
about
75%
of
these
reversals
occur
at
the
reconsideration
stage
of
the
administrative
process.
Since
the
median
period
between
a
request
for
reconsideration
review
and
decision
is
only
two
months,
Brief
for
AFL­
CIO
et
al.
as
Amici
Curiae
App.
4a,
the
deprivation
is
significantly
less
than
that
concomitant
to
the
lengthier
delay
before
an
evidentiary
hearing.
Netting
out
these
reconsideration
reversals,
the
overall
reversal
rate
falls
to
3.3%.
See
Supplemental
and
Reply
Brief
for
Petitioner
14.

bR.
JUSTICE
BRENNAN,
with
whom
MR.
JUSTICE
MARSHALL
concurs,
dissenting.

For
the
reasons
stated
in
my
dissenting
opinion
in
Richardson
v.
Wright,
4.~.
5_.
U.
SL.~~
8.,..
2.1­
2.­(
1972),
I
agree
with
the
District
Court
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
that,
prior
to
termination
of
benefits,
Eldridge
must
be
afforded
[.­!?.
II~,
s.
3
19;
.;%]
an
evidentiary
hearing
of
the
type
required
for
welfare
beneficiaries
under
Title
IV
of
the
Social
Security
Act,
42
U.
S.
C.
601
et
seq.
See
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
397
U.
S.
24
(
1970).
I
would
add
that
the
Court's
consideration
that
a
discontinuance
of
disability
benefits
may
cause
the
recipient
to
suffer
only
a
limited
deprivation
is
no
argument.
It
is
speculative.
Moreover,
the
very
legislative
determination
to
provide
disability
benefits,
without
any
prerequisite
determination
of
need
in
fact,
presumes
a
need
by
the
recipient
which
is
not
this
Court's
hnction
to
denigrate.
Indeed,
in
the
present
case,
it
is
indicated
that
because
disability
benefits
were
terminated
there
was
a
foreclosure
upon
the
Eldridge
home
and
the
family's
hrniture
was
repossessed,
forcing
Eldridge,
his
wife,
and
their
children
to
sleep
in
one
bed.
Tr.
of
Oral
Arg.
39,47­
48.
Finally,
it
is
also
no
argument
that
a
worker,
who
has
been
placed
in
the
untenable
position
of
having
been
denied
disability
benefits,
may
still
seek
other
forms
of
public
assistance.
u.
5.
3iti:
35i1
Cop,
vright
01994­
2000
FindLmv
Inc.

3/
Department
of
'~
alth
ORGANIZATION
ORDER
NO.
24
DATt:
12­
17­
99
ORlGlNATlNGAGLNCY:
Office
Of
the
Director
SUPeRStDCS/
AMENDS:

SUBJL~
CT:
Office
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings
By
virtue
of
the
authority
vested
in
me
by
Reorganization
Plan
No.
4
of
1996,
and
pursuant
to
Mayor's
Order
No.
97­
42,
effective
January
13,
1997,
and
Mayor's
Order
No.
99­
68,
effective
April
28,
1999,
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
that:

I.
ESTABLISHMENT:
There
is
established
in
the
Office
of
the
Director,
Department
of
Health,
the
Office
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings,
headed
by
a
Chief
Administrative
Law
Judge,
with
the
mission,
structure,
and
fbnctions
set
forth
below:

I1
IMISSION:
To
administer
adjudicative
functions
of
the
Department
of
Health
in
a
manner
that
is
efficient,
effective,
and
fair.

I1
STRUCTURE:
The
Office
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings
("
OA"'
or
"
Office")
is
structured
without
sub­
components.
The
Chief
Judge
shall
report
to
the
Director,
but
shall
create
and
maintain
a
system
in
which
judicial
fact
finding
and
legal
decisions
are
made
in
a
fair,
impartial
and
independent
manner
and
without
exparte
influence
From
other
organizational
elements
or
personnel.

IV
FUNCTIONS:
The
Office,
under
the
authority
of
the
Chief
Judge,
is
responsible
for
the
following:

A.
Developing
and
proposing
a
Code
of
Administrative
Judicial
Ethics
which,
upon
approval
by
the
Director,
shall
be
applied
throughout
OAH;

B.
Managing
a
system
for
scheduling
administrative
hearings
and
other
adjudicative
matters,
notifying
parties
and/
or
their
attorneys
of
all
orders,
judgments,.­
scheduling
decisions,
and
other
court
actions;

C.
Holding
required
adjudicative
hearings,
consistent
with
this
order
and
applicable
law,
for
ail
matters
falling
under
the
adjudicative
jurisdiction
of
organizational
units
within
the
Department
of
Health.
or
with
the
approval
of
the
Director,
other
agencies.
These
include,
without
limilstion.
the
following
administrations
and
organizational
units:

1.
Environmental
HeaIth
Administration;'
2.
Licensing
and
Regulation
Administration
3.
Medical
Assistance
Administration
4.
Preventive
Health
Services
Administration
Government
of
the
District
of
ColW
0.0.
NO.
24
OAH
Date:
12­
1
7­
99
­
2­
11­
3­
B­
24
Such
hearings
can
include,
without
limitation,
hearings
on:

1'
2
3
4
5.
6.
7.

8.
Notices
of
violation
and
proposed
compliance
orders;
Suspensions,
revocations
and
denials
of
licenses,
certifications
and
permits;
Patient
transfers;
Nurse­
aide
abuse
claims;
Dangerous
dog
and
animal
control
matters
Civil
infractions;
Matters
pertaining
to
Medicaid
payments
in
which
the
recipient
or
another
person
or
entity
is
entitled
to
an
oral
evidentiary
hearing
under
42
CFR
part
205
or
other
applicable
law;
Professional
licensing
and
discipline
matters
when
delegated
by
an
appropriate
authority
and
when
such
delegation
is
accepted
by
Order
of
the
Chief
Judge.

D.

E.

F.

G.

.­
H.

1.

J.
Managing
a
case
file,
calendar,
docketing,
and
scheduling
system
and
authorizing
forms
that
may
be
used
by
OM,
or
submitted
to
OAH
by
parties
appearing
before
it;

Assessing,
adjusting,
and
suspending
fines,
penalties,
and
fees,
and
suspending,
revoking
and
restoring
permits,
licenses,
and
other
regulatory
authorizations;

Issuing
written
and
oral
decisions
and
orders
and
discharging
other
powers
and
duties
granted
by
statute
or
other
law
or
authority;

Submitting
an
annual
proposed
budget
and
spending
plan
to
the
Director
and
conducting
procurement
activities
for
OAH
consistent
with
District
of
Columbia
law
and
with
support
and
assistance
of
appropriate
administrative
units
in
the
Department
of
Health;

Developing
ethical
and
proper
standards
for
employee
performance
accountability.
Hiring,
evaluating,
promoting,
separating
andlor
disciplining
employees
consistent
with
the
requirements
of
the
Comprehensive
Ment
Personnel
Act
and
other
District
of
Columbia
Law.

Developing
qualification
standards
for
Administrative
Law
Judges
and
other
OAH
employees
and
developiny
requircments
for
orientation.
training
and
continuing
legal
education
including
requirements
necessary
to
comply
with
statutory
mandates.

Adopting
operating
procedures,
practices.
and
policies
for
the
Office
and
proposing
to
the
Director
the
formal
promulgation
of
regulations
as
may
be
necessary
or
desirable
to
carry
out
the
mission
of
the
Office;

33
Government
of
the
District
of
ColUl
0.0.
NO.
24
Date:
12­
17­
99
­
3­

K.
Evaluating
adjudication
and
related
hnctions
canied
out
for
the
Department
of
Health
by
agencies
or
entities
other
than
OAH
under
agreements,
memoranda
of
understanding,
and
the
like
and,
with
the
approval
of
the
Director
and
the
Chief
Judge,
modifying
or
terminating
such
agreements,
with
OAH
then
assuming
responsibility
for
those
hctions.
Notwithstanding
the
above
provision,
OM
may
begin
hearing
dangerous
dog
and
animal
control
matters
upon
Order
of
the
Chief
Judge
and
upon
30
days
notice
to
the
Department
of
Human
Services.

L.
Beginning
November
1,2000,
with
the
approval
of
the
Director
and
the
Chief
Judge,
and
if
otherwise
authorized
by
law,
hearing
matters
pertaining
to
disputes
between
health
care
providers
and
the
Department
of
Health
concerning
Medicaid
payment
reconciliation
including
disputes
pertaining
to
Department
of
Health
final
decisions
on
notices
of
program
reimbursement;

M.
Reporting
judgments,
orders,
decrees,
and
other
decisions
to
legal
publishers
(
e.
g.
Westlaw
and
Lexis)
under
standards
and
circumstances
to
be
determined
by
the
Chief
Judge;

N.
Handling
payments
received
in
a
manner
consistent
with
law
and
clearly
established
policies
and
procedures.
Utilizing
revenues
collected
and
retained
by
OAH
consistent
with
D.
C.
Law
12­
283
or
other
law,
andor
with
the
Director's
approval,
utilizing
funds
collected
and
retained
by
other
units
of
the
Department
of
Health
receiving
services
fiom
OAH
consistent
with
D.
C.
Law
12­
283
or
other
law.

V.
STAFFING
PATTERN:
The
positions
in
the
Office
of
Adjudication
and
Hearings
are
listed
on
Attachment
A
to
this
order.

VI.
TRALYSFER
OF
POSITION:
None
VII.
RESOURCES:
Fiscal
Year
2000
budget,
grants,
indirect
cost
recovery,
intra­
District
or
.­
similar
transfers,
andor
other
mechanisms
providing
funding
support
from
Department
of
Health
and/
or
other
organizational
units
utilizing
services
provided
by
OM.
Except
as
otherwise
ordered
by
the
ChiefJudge,
OAH
shall
hear
matters
to
the
extent
that
one
of
the
above
funding
sources
has
been
identified
to
provide
adequate
hearing
and
adjudication
capacity,
or
to
the
extent
funds
are
lawfully
available
pursuant
to
paragraph
1V.
N
of
this
Order.

VIII.
MXSCELANEOUS:
Nothing
in'this
Order
shall
be
construed
as
conferring
upon
any
party
any
new
or
additional
right
to
a
hearing
or
other
adjudication.

Government
of
the
District
of
CdW
0.0.
NO.
24
OAH
Date:
12­
17­
99
­
4­
11­
3­
8­
24
IX.
EFFECTIVE
DATE:
This
order
shall
take
effect
immediately.

PL4LdCA­
Avan
C.
A.
Walks,
MD
I
Director
3s
i
.....
I.....­
MvFindLaw
­
Research
Faster
­
Great
Lawyer
JobsHome
......................................................................................................................................................
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Findtaw
1.
Cases­&
Codeq~[
Canstitu ic&
f
Law
Center
1
Cawt
Briefs
1
Supreme
C~
rtMesswe
Board
1
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teaat
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Business
Crimina1
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aw
arid
Procedure
Decisions
of
the
1998­
99
SirDrerne
Court
Term
­
Summary
and
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from
Solomon
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of
Ross,
Dixon
&
Bell,
L.
L.
P.

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arid
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OrMons
....................................................................................
.........................................................................
US
SupremeCourt.............................................

http:
I/
laws.
findlaw.
comlusl­
12­
1/
319.
html
U.
S.
Supreme
Court
MATHEWS
v.
ELDRIDGE,
424
U.
S.
319
(
1976)

424
U.
S.
319
MATHEWS,
SECRETARY
OF
HEALTH,
EDUCATION,
AND
WELFARE
v.
ELDRKDGE.
CERTIORARI
TO
THE
UNITED
STATES
COURT
OF
APPEALS
FOR
THE
FOURTH
CIRCUIT.

NO.
74­
204.

Argued
October
6,
1975.
Decided
February
24,
1976.

In
order
to
establish
initial
and
inued
entitlement
to
disability
benefits
under
the
Social
Security
Act
.

(
Act),
a
worker
must
demonstrate
that,
inter
alia,
he
is
unable
"
to
engage
in
any
substantial
gainhi
activity
by
reason
of
any
medically
determinable
physical
or
mental
impairment
...
."
The
worker
bears
the
continuing
burden
of
showing,
by
means
of
"
medically
acceptable
...
techniques"
that
his
impairment
is
of
such
severity
that
he
cannot
perform
his
previous
work
or
any
other
kind
of
gainhi
work.
A
state
agency
'

makes
the
continuing
assessment
of
the
worker's
eligibility
for
benefits,
obtaining
information
from
the
worker
and
his
sources
of
medical
treatment.
The
agency
may
arrange
for
an
independent
medical
examination
to
resolve
conflicting
information.
If
the
agency's
tentative
assessment
of
the
beneficiary's
condition
differs
from
his
own,
the
beneficiary
is
informed
that
his
benefits
may
be
terminated,
is
provided
a
summary
of
the
evidence,
and
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
agency's
evidence.
The
state
agency
then
makes
a
final
determination,
which
is
reviewed
by
the
Social
Security
Administration
(
SSA).
If
the
SSA
accepts
the
agency
determination
it
gives
written
notification
to
the
beneficiary
of
the
reasons
for
the
'
decision
and
of
his
right
to
de
novo
state
agency
reconsideration.
Upon
acceptance
by
the
SSA,
benefits
are
terminated
effective'two
months
after
the
month
in
which
recovery
is
found
to
have
occurred.
If,
after
reconsideration
by
the
state
agency
and
SSA
review,
the
decision
remains
adverse
to
the
recipient,
he
is
notified
of
his
right
to
an
evidentiary
hearing
before
an
SSA
administrative
law
judge.
If
an
adverse
decision
results,
the
recipient
may
request
discretionary
review
by
the
SSA
Appeals
Council,
and
finally
may
obtain
judicial
review.
If
it
is
determined
after
benefits
are
terminated
that
the
claimant's
disability
extended
beyond
the
date
of
cessation
initially
established,
he
is
entitled
to
retroactive
payments.
Retroactive
adjustments
are
also
made
for
overpayments.
A
few
years
after
respondent
was
first
awarded
disability
benefits
he
received
and
completed
a
questionnaire
~­
121L7.
S
31Y.
3201
from
the
monitoring
state
agency.
Mer
considering
the
information
contained
therein
and
obtaining
reports
from
his
doctor
and
an
independent
medical
consultant,
the
agency
wrote
respondent
that
it
had
tentatively
determined
that
his
disability
had
ceased
in
May
1972
and
advised
him
that
he
might
request
a
reasonable
time
to
hrnish
additional
information.
In
a
reply
letter
respondent
disputed
one
characterization
of
his
medical
condition
and
indicated
that
the
agency
had
enough
evidence
to
establish
his
disability.
The
agency
then
made
its
final
determination
reaffirming
its
tentative
decision.
This
determination
was
accepted
by.
the
SSA,
which
notified
respondent
in
July
that
his
benefits
would
end
after
that
month
and
that
he
had
a
right
to
state
agency
reconsideration
within
six
months.
Instead
of
requesting
such
reconsideration
respondent
brought
this
action
challenging
the
constitutionality
of
the
procedures
for
terminating
disability
benefits
and
seeking
reinstatement
of
benefits
pending
a
hearing.
The
District
Court,
relying
in
part
on
Goldberg
V.
Kelly,
397
...._._.._._.__.
U.
S.
253
,
held
that
the
termination
procedures
violated
procedural
due
process
and
concluded
that
prior.....__.
to
termination
of
benefits
respondent
was
entitled
to
an
evidentiary
hearing
of
the
type
provided
welfare
beneficiaries
under
Title
IV
of
the
Act.
The
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed.
Petitioner
contends,
inter
alia,
that
the
District
Court
is
barred
from
considering
respondent's
action
by
Weinberger
v.
Salfi,
$
22­­­
U:
SJ!
9­­,
which
held
that
district
courts
are
precluded
from
exercising
jurisdiction
over
an
action
seeking
a
review
of
a
decision
of
the
Secretary
of
Health,
Education,
and
Welfare
regarding
benefits
under
the
Act
except
as
provided
in
42
U.
S.
C.
405
(
g),
which
grants
jurisdiction
only
to
review
a
"
final"
decision
of
the
Secretary
made
after
a
hearing
to
which
he
was
a
party.
Held:

I.
The
District
Court
had
jurisdiction
over
respondent's
constitutional
claim,
since
the
denial
of
his
request
for
benefits
was
a
final
decision
with
respect
to
that
claim
for
purposes
of
405
(
g)
jurisdiction.
Pp.
326­
332.

(
a)
The
405
(
g)
finality
requirement
consists
of
the
waivable
requirement
that
the
administrative
remedies
prescribed
by
the
Secretary
be
exhausted
and
the
nonwaivable
requirement
that
a
claim
for
benefits
shall
have
been
presented
to
the
Secretary.
Respondent's
answers
to
the
questionnaire
and
his
letter
to
the
state
agency
specifically
presented
the
claim
that
his
benefits
should
not
be
terminated
because
he
was
still
disabled,
and
thus
satisfied
the
nonwaivable
requirement.
Pp.
328­
330.
[.
mu.
5.?;?,
32i1
(
b)
Although
respondent
concededly
did
not
exhaust
the
Secretary's
internal­
review
procedures
and
ordinarily
only
the
Secretary
has
the
power
to
waive
exhaustion,
this
is
a
case
where
the
claimant's
interest
in
having
a
particular
issue
promptly
resolved
is
so
great
that
deference
to
the
Secretary's
judgment
is
inappropriate.
The
facts
that
respondent's
constitutional
challenge
was
collateral
to
his
substantive
claim
of
entitlement
and
that
(
contrary
to
the
situation
in.
Salfi)
he
colorably
claimed
that
an
erroneous
termination
would
damage
him
in
a
way
not
compensable
through
retroactive
payments
warrant
the
conclusion
that
the
denial
of
his
claim
to
continued
benefits
was
a
sufficiently
"
final
decision"
with
respect
to
his
constitutional
claim
to
satistjr
the
statutory
exhaustion
requirement.
Pp.

3
3
0­
3
3
2.

2
An
evidentiary
hearing
is
not
required
prior
to
the
termination
of
Social
Security
disability
37
payments
and
the
administrative
procedures
prescribed
under
the
Act
filly
comport
with
due
process:
Pp.
332­
349.

(
a)
"[
Dlue
process
is
flexible
and
calls
for
such
procedural
protections
as
the
particular
situation
demands,"
Morrissey
v.
Brewer,
~­
08~­
U..
S,..
C7_!,..
4.!_.
Resolution
of
the
issue
here
involving
the
constitutional
sufficiency
of
administrative
procedures
prior
to
the
initial
termination
of
benefits
and
pending
review,
requires
consideration
of
three
factors:
(
1)
the
private
interest
that
will
be
affected
,

by
the
official
action;
(
2)
the
risk
of
an
erroneous
deprivation
of
such
interest
through
the
procedures
used,
and
probable
value,
if
any,
of
additional
procedural
safeguards;
and
(
3)
the
Government's
interest,
including
the
fiscal
and
administrative
burdens
that
the
additional
or
substitute
procedures
would
entail.
Pp.
332­
335.

(
b)
The
private
interest
that
will
be
adversely
affected
by
an
erroneous
termination
of
benefits
is
likely
to
be
less
in
the
case
of
a
disabled
worker
than
in
the
case
of
a
welfare
recipient,
like
the
claimants
in
Goldberg,
supra.
Eligibility
for
disability
payments
is
not
based
on
financial
need,
and
although
hardship
may
be
imposed
upon
the
erroneously
terminated
disability
recipient,
his
need
is
likely
less
than
the
welfare
recip'ient.
In
view
of
other
forms
of
government
assistance
available
to
the
terminated
disability
recipient,
there
is
less
reason
than
in
Goidberg
to
depart
from
the
ordinary
principle
that
something
less
than
an
evidentiary
hearing
is
sufficient
prior
to
adverse
administrative
action.
Pp.
339­
343.

(
c)
The
medical
assessment
of
the
worker's
condition
implicates
pE4
r_
j%
31'?.
32i]
a
more
sharply
focused
and
easily
documented
decision
than
the
typical
determination
of
welfare
entitlement.
The
decision
whether
to
discontinue
disability
benefits
will
normally
turn
upon
"
routine,
standard,
and
unbiased
medical
reports
by
physician
specialists,"
Richardson
v.
Perales,
402
U.
S.
389.
404
.
In
a
disability
situation
the
potential
value
of
an
evidentiary
hearing
is
thus
substantially
less
than
in
the
welfare
context.
Pp.
343­
345.

(
d)
Written
submissions
provide
the
disability
recipient
with
an
effective
means
of
communicating
his
case
to
the
decisionmaker.
The
detailed
questionnaire
identifies
with
particularity
the
information
relevant
to
the
entitlement
decision,
Information
critical
to
the
decision
is
derived
directly
from
medical
sources.
Finally,
prior
to
termination
of
benefits,
the
disability
recipient
or
his
representative
is
afforded
full
access
to
the
information
relied
on
by
the
state
agency,
is
provided
the
reasons
underlying
its
tentative
assessment,
and
is
given
an
opportunity
to
submit
additional
arguments
and
evidence.
Pp.
345­
346.

I
(
e)
Requiring
an
evidentiary
hearing
upon
demand
in
all
cases
prior
to
the
termination
of
disability
benefits
would
entail
fiscal
and
administrative
burdens
out
of
proportion
to
any
countervailing
benefits.
The
judicial
model
of
an
evidentiary
hearing
is
neither
a
required,
nor
even
the
most
effective,
method
of
decisionmaking
in
all
circumstances,
and
here
where
the
prescribed
procedures
not
only
provide
the
claimant
with
an
effective
process
for
asserting
his
claim
prior
to
any
administrative
action
but
also
assure
a
right
to
an
evidentiary
hearing
as
well
as
subsequent
judicial
review
before
the
denial
of
his
claim
becomes
final,
there
is
no
deprivation
of
procedural
due
process.
Pp.
347­
349.

493
F.
2d
1230,
reversed.

POWELL,
J.,
delivered
the
opinion
of
the
Court,
in
which
BURGER,
C.
J.,
and
STEWART,
WHITE,
DLACKMUN,
and
REHNQUIST,
JJ.,
joined.
BRENNAN,
J.,
filed
a
dissenting
opinion,
in
which
MARSHALL,
J.,
joined,
post,
p.
349.
STEVENS,
J.,
took
no
part
in
the
consideration
or
decision
of
the
38
Findraw:
United
States
Case
Law:
Supreme
Court
case.

Solicitor
General
Bork
argued
the
cause
for
petitioner.
With
him
on
the
briefs
were
Deputy
Solicitor
General
Jones,
Acting
Assistant
Attorney
General
Jaffe,
Gerald
P.
Norton,
William
Kanter,
and
David
M.
Cohen.
[~
24'~
1.
s.
3
19,323;

Donald
E.
Earls
argued
the
cause
for
respondent.
With
him
on
the
briefs
was
Carl
E.
McAfee.
_
T_

[
F.
O.
gtnotg..*._]
3.
Albert
Woll,
Laurence
Gold,
and
Stephen
P.
Berzon
filed
a
brief
for
the
American
Federation
of
Labor
and
Congress
of
Industrial
Organizations
et
al.
as
amici
curiae
urging
affirmance.

David
A.
Webster
filed
a
brief
for
Caroline
Williams
as
amicus
curiae.

iMR.
JUSTICE
POWELL
delivered
the
opinion
of
the
Court.

The
issue
in
this
case
is
whether
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fifth
Amendment
requires
that
prior
to
the
termination
of
Social
Security
disability
benefit
payments
the
recipient
be
afforded
an
opportunity
for
an
evidentiary
hearing.

Cash
benefits
are
provided
to
workers
during
periods
in
which
they
are
completely
disabled
under
the
disability
insurance
benefits
program
created
by
the
1956
amendments
to
Title
I1
of
the
Social
Security
Act.
70
Stat.
815,
42
U.
S.
C.
423.
LRespondent
Eldridge
was
first
awarded
benefits
in
June
1968.
In
March
1972,
he
received
a
questionnaire
from
the
state
agency
charged
with
monitoring
his
medical
condition.
Eldridge
completed
j42­
t
U.
S.
319,3241
the
questionnaire,
indicating
that
his
condition
had
not
improved
and
identifyingthe
medical
sources,
including
physicians,
from
whom
he
had
received
treatment
recently.
The
state
agency
then
obtained
reports
from
his
physician
and
a
psychiatric
consultant.
After
considering
these
reports
and
other
information
in
his
file
the
agency
informed
Eldridge
by
letter
that
it
had
made
a
tentative
determination
that
his
disability
had
ceased
in
May
1972.
The
letter
included
a
statement
of
reasons
for
the
proposed
termination
of
benefits,
and
advised
Eldridge
that
he
might
request
reasonable
time
in
which
to
obtain
and
submit
additional
information
pertaining
to
his
condition.

In
his
written
response,
Eldridge
disputed
one
characterization
of
his
medical
condition
and
indicated
that
the
agency
already
had
enough
evidence
to
establish
his
disability.
&
The
state
agency
then
made
its
final
determination
that
he
had
ceased
to
be
disabled
in
May
1972.
This
determination
was
accepted
by
the
Social
Security
Administration
(
SSA),
which
notified
Eldridge
in
July
that
his
benefits
would'terminate
after
that
month.
The
notification
also
advised
him
of
his
right
to
seek
reconsideration
by
the
state
agency
of
this
initial
determination
within
six
months.

Instead
of
requesting
reconsideration
Eldridge
commenced
this
action
challenging
the
constitutional
validity
:­
I?,:
11,
s.;:
9,32jj
of
the
administrative
procedures
established
by
the
Secretary
of
Health,
Education,
and
Welfare
for
assessing
whether
there
exists
a
continuing
disability.
He
sought
an
immediate
reinstatement
of
benefits
pending
a
hearing
on
the
issue
of
his
disability.
3­.
361F.
Supp.
520
(
WD
Va.
1973).
The
Secretary
moved
to
dismiss
on
the
grounds
that
Eldridge's
benefits
had
been
terminated
in
accordance
with
valid
administrative
regulations
and
procedures
and
that
he
had
failed
to
exhaust
available
remedies.
In
support
of
his
contention
that
due
process
requires
a
pretermination
hearing,
Eldridge
relied
exclusively
upon
this
Court's
decision
in
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
397
U.
S.
254
(
1970),
which
established
a
right
to
an
"
evidentiary
hearing"
prior
to
termination
of
welfare
benefits.
&
The
Secretary
contended
that
Goldberg
was
not
controlling
since
eligibility
for
disability
benefits,
unlike
eligibility
for
welfare
benefits,
is
39
not
based
on
financial
need
and
since
issues
of
credibility
and
veracity
do
not
play
a
significant
role
in
the
disability
entitiement
decision,
which
turns
primarily
on
medical
evidence.

The
District
Court
concluded
that
the
administrative
procedures
pursuant
to
which
the
Secretary
had
terminated
Eldridge's
benefits
abridged
his
right
to
procedural
t4i­
i
1.1
s
3
:
3,3;
3]
due
process.
The
court
viewed
the
interest
of
the
disability
recipient
in
uninterrupted
benefits
as
indistinguishable
from
that
of
the
welfare
recipient
in
Goldberg.
It
hrther
noted
that
decisions
subsequent
to
Goldberg
demonstrated
that
the
due
process
requirement
of
pretermination
hearings
is
not
limited
to
situations
involving
the
deprivation
of
'

vital
necessities.
See
Fuentes
v.
Shevin,
Qo7­~~.~
sl~
67,.
88..­
89(
1
972);
Bell
v.
Burson,
~@­~.­
U­~
S.~..
S..~..~­~­
(
1971).
Reasoning
that
disability
determinations
may
involve
subjective
judgments
based
on
conflicting
medical
and
nonmedical
evidence,
the
District
Court
held
that
prior
to
termination
of
benefits
Eldridge
had
to
be
afforded
an
evidentiary
hearing
of
the
type
required
for
welfare
beneficiaries
under
Title
IV
of
the
Social
Security
Act.
361
F.
Supp.,
at
528.
LRelying
entirely
upon
the
District
Court's
opinion,
the
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Fourth
Circuit
affirmed
the
injunction
barring
termination
of
Eldridge's
benefits
prior
to
an
evidentiary
hearing.
493
F.
2d
1230
(
1974).
&
We
reverse,

At
the
outset
we
are
confronted
by
a
question
as
to
whether
the
District
Court
had
jurisdiction
over
this
suit.
The
Secretary
contends
that
our
decision
last
Term
in
Weinberger
v.
Salfi,
422
U.
S.
749
(
1975),
bars
the
District
Court
ii­
om
considering
Eldridge's
action.
Salfi
was
an
action
challenging
the
Social
Security
Act's
1424
LT.
S.
3
19,3271
duration­
of­
relationship
eligibility
requirements
for
surviving
wives
and
stepchildren
of
deceased
wage
earners.
We
there
held
that
42
U.
S.
C.
405
(
h)
Lprecludes
federal­
question
jurisdiction
in
an
action
challenging
denial
of
claimed
benefits.
The
only
avenue
for
judicial
review
is
42
U.
S.
C.
405
(
g),
which
requires
exhaustion
of
the
administrative
remedies
provided
under
the
Act
as
a
jurisdictional
prerequisite.

Section
405
(
g)
in
part
provides:

"
Any
individual,
after
any
final
decision
of
the
Secretary
made
after
a
hearing
to
which
he
was
a
party,
irrespective
of
the
amount
in
controversy,
may
obtain
a
review
of
such
decision
by
a
civil
action
commenced
within
sixty
days
after
the
mailing
to
him
of
notice
of
such
decision
or
within
such
further
time
as
the
Secretary
may
allow."
8.­.
[+,
z
I..!

s
3
19,
?
t8]

On
its
face
405
(
g)
thus
bars
judicial
review
of
any
denial
of
a
claim
of
disability
benefits
until
after
a
"
final
decision"
by
the
Secretary
after
a
"
hearing."
It
is
uncontested
that
Eldridge
could
have
obtained
full
administrative
review
of
the
termination
of
his
benefits,
yet
failed
even
to
seek
reconsideration
ofthe
initial
determination.
Since
the
Secretary
has
not
"
waived"
the
finality
requirement
as
he
had
in
Salfi,
supra,
at
767,
he
concludes
that
Eldridge
cannot
properly
invoke
405
(
g)
as
a
basis
for
jurisdiction.
We
disagree.

Salfi
identified
several
conditions
which
must
be
satisfied
in
order
to
obtain
judicial
review
under
405
(
8).
Of
these,
the
requirement
that
there
be
a
final
decision
by
the
Secretary
after
a
hearing
was
regarded
as
"
central
to
the
requisite
grant
of
subject­
matter
jurisdiction
.
.
.
,"
322
U.
S..
at
7N1.
%
Implicit
in
Salk
however,
is
the
principle
that
this
condition
consists
of
two
elements,
only
one
of
which
is
purely
"
jurisdictional"
in
the
sense
that
it
cannot
be
"
waived"
by
the
Secretary
in
a
particular
case.
The
waivable
element
is
the
requirement
that
the
administrative
remedies
prescribed
by
the
Secretary
be
exhausted.
The
nonwaivabte
element
is
the
requirement
that
a
claim
for
benefits
shall
have
been
presented
to
the
Secretary.
Absent
such
a
claim
there
can
be
no
"
decision"
of
any
type.
And
some
decision
by
the
Secretary
is
clearly
required
by
the
statute.
1.
t~
3
i
5)~??
cij~
J.
s.
That
this
second
requirement
is
an
essential
and
distinct
precondition
for
405
(
g)
jurisdiction
is
evident
from
the
different
conclusions
that
we
reached
in
Salfi
with
respect
to
the
named
appellees
and
the
unnamed
members
of
the
class.
As
to
the
latter
the
complaint
was
found
to
be
jurisdictionally
deficient
since
it
"
contain[
ed]
no
allegations
that
they
have
even
filed
an
application
with
the
Secretary
.
.
.
.
I'
422
U.:
S.
l,..
at­
7fi3...
With
respect
to
the
named
appellees,
however,
we
concluded
that
the
complaint
was
sufficient
since
it
alleged
that
they
had
"
hlly
presented
their
claims
for
benefits
'
to
their
district
Social
Security
Office
and,
upon
denial,
to
the
Regional
Ofice
for
reconsideration."'
Id.,
at
764­
765.
Eldridge
has
hlfilled
this
crucial
prerequisite.
Through
his
answers
to
the
state
agency
questionnaire,
and
his
letter
in
response
to
the
tentative
determination
that
his
disability
had
ceased,
he
specifically
presented
the
claim
that
his
benefits
should
not
be
terminated
because
he
was
still
disabled.
This
claim
was
denied
by
the
state
agency
and
its
decision
was
accepted
by
the
SSA.

The
fact
that
Eldridge
failed
to
raise
with
the
Secretary
his
constitutional
claim
to
a
pretermination
hearing
is
not
controlling.
BAS
construed
in
Salfi,
405
(
g)
requires
only
that
there
be
a
"
final
decision"
by
the
Secretary
with
respect
to
the
claim
of
entitlement
to
benefits.
Indeed,
the
named
appellees
in
Salfi
did
not
present
their
constitutional
claim
to
the
Secretary.
Weinberger
v.
Salfi,
0.
T.
1974,
No.
74­
214,
App.
11,
17­
21.
The
situation
here
is
not
identical
to
Salfi,
for,
while
the
E.
S.
3
I!?,
3:
QJ
Secretary
had
no
power
to
amend
the
statute
alleged
to
be
unconstitutional
in
that
case,
he
does
have
authority
to
determine
the
timing
and
content
of
the
procedures
challenged
here.
42
U.
S.
C.
405
(
a).
We
do
not,
however,
regard
this
difference
as
significant.
It
is
unrealistic
to
expect
that
the
Secretary
would
consider
substantial
changes
in
the
current
administrative
review
system
at
the
behest
of
a
single
aid
recipient
raising
a
constitutional
challenge
in
an
adjudicatory
context.
The
Secretary
would
not
be
required
even
to
consider
such
a
challenge.

As
the
ndnwaivable
jurisdictional
element
was
satisfied,
we
next
consider
the
waivable
element.
The
question
is
whether
the
denial
of
Eldridge's
claim
to
continued
benefits
was
a
sufficiently
"
final"
decision
with
respect
to
his
constitutional
claim
to
satisfy
the
statutory
exhaustion
requirement.
Eldridge
concedes
that
he
did
not
exhaust
the
full
set
of
internal­
review
procedures
provided
by
the
Secretary.
See
20
CFR
404.910,
404.916,
404.940
(
1975).
As
Salfi
recognized,
the
Secretary
may
waive
the
exhaustion
requirement
if
he
satisfies
himself,
at
any
stage
of
the
administrative
process,
that
no
hrther
review
is
warranted
either
because
the
internal
needs
of
the
agency
are
hlfilled
or
because
the
relief
that
is
sought
is
beyond
his
power
to
confer.
Salfi
suggested
that
under
405
(
g)
the
power
to
determine
when
finality
has
occurred
ordinarily
rests
with
the
Secretary
since
ultimate
responsibility
for
the
integrity
of
the
administrative
program
is
his.
But
cases
may
arise
where
a
claimant's
interest
in
having
a
particular
issue
resolved
promptly
is
so
great
that
deference
to
the
agency'sjudgment
is
inappropriate.
This
is
such
a
case.

Eldridge's
constitutional
challenge
is
entirely
collateral
to
his
substantive
claim
of
entitlement.
Moreover,
there
[
4ti
li
S
3
19.53
l]
is
a
crucial
distinction
between
the
nature
of
the
constitutional
claim
asserted
here
and
that
raised
in
Salfi.
A
claim
to
a
predeprivation
hearing
as
a
matter
of
constitutional
right
rests
on
the
proposition
that
hfl
relief
cannot
be
obtained
at
a
postdeprivation
hearing.
See
Regional
Rail
Reorganization
Act
Cases,
419
U
S.
102.
J
56
(
1974).
In
light
of
the
Court's
prior
decisions,
see,
e.
g.,
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
397..
Ul.
Sl...
z.
S4..(
1970);
Fuentes
v.
Shevin,
4.0.7.
U,.
7,.
67.(
1972),
Eldridge
has
raised
at
least
a
colorable
claim
that
because
of
his
physical
condition
and
dependency
upon
the
disability
benefits,
an
erroneous
termination
would
damage
him
in
a
way
not
recompensable
through
retroactive
payments.
II
Thus,
unlike
the
situation
in
Salfi,
denying
Eldridge's
substantive
r42.
ii
1.1
S.
3':
3.337_
j
claim
"
for
other
reasons"
or
upholding
it
"
under
other
provisions"
at
the
post­
termination
stage,
412
U.
S..
at
763,
would
not
answer
his
constitutional
challenge.

We
conclude
that
the
denial
of
Eldridge's
request
for
benefits
constitutes
a
final
decision
for
purposes
of
405
(
g)
jurisdiction
over
his
constitutional
claim.
We
now
proceed
to
the
merits
of
that
claim.
1,
FindLaw:
United
States
Case
taw:
Supreme
Court
Procedural
due
process
imposes
constraints
on
governmental
decisions
which
deprive
individuals
of
8
"
liberty"
or
"
property"
interests
within
the
meanirig
of
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fifth
or
Fourteenth
Amendment.
The
Secretary
does
not
contend
that
procedural
due
process
is
inapplicable
to
terminations
of
Social
Security
disability
benefits.
He
recognizes,
as
has
been
impli.
cit
in
our
prior
decisions,
e.
g.,
kchardson
v.
Belcher,
404
1J.
S.
78.
80
­
81
(
1971);
Richardson
v.
Perales,
402
L.
S.
380<
401
­
402
(
1971);
Fiemming
v.
Nestor,
363
U.
S.
603,
6
I
1
(
1960),
that
the
interest
of
an
individual
in
continued
receipt
of
these
benefits
is
a
statutorily
created
"
property"
interest
protected
by
the
Fifth
Amendment.
Cf.
Arnett
v.
Kennedy,
416
U.
S.
134,
166
(
POWELL,
J.,
concurring
in
part)
(
1974);
Board
of
Regents
v.
Roth,
ili)
y
I!.
S.
564,
576
­
578
(
1972);
Bell
v.
Burson,
402
US..
at
539
;
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
397
U.
S.,
at
'
761
­
262.
Rather,
the
Secretary
contends
that
the
existing
administrative
procedures,
detailed
below,
provide
all
the
process
[
iCX
i1.
S.
315>.
33:;:
that
is
constitutionally
due
before
a
recipient
can
be
deprived
of
that
interest.

This
Court
consistently
has
held
that
some
form
of
hearing
is
required
before
an
individual
is
finally
deprived
of
a
property
interest.
Wolff
v.
McDonnelf,
318
U.
S.
539.
557
­
558
(
1974).
See,
e.
g.,
Phillips
v.
Commissioner,
ZS­
3J­
J:
S.
589.
596­­
597
(
I93
1).
See
also
Dent
v.
West
Virginia,
_
1.~_
9U­
S_
1­~~­.
12~­­
125
(
1
S9).
The
"
right
to
be
heard
before
being
condemned
to
suffer
grievous
loss
of
any
kind,
even
though
it
may
not
involve
the
stigma
and
hardships
of
a
criminal
conviction,
is
a
principle
basic
to
our
society."
Joint
Anti­
Fascist
Corn.
v.
McGrath,
3Ls~
ULS,..
l­
2­~,.
lo~­(
1951)
(
FrankfUrter,
J.,
concurring).
The
hndamental
requirement
of
due
process
is
the
opportunity
to
be
heard
"
at
a
rneaningkl
time
and
in
a
meaningfil
manner."
Armstrong
v.
Manzo,
380
G.
S.
545.
552
(
1965).
See
Grannis
v.
Ordean,
234
CJ.
S.
385.
394
(
1914).
Eldridge
agrees
that
the
review
procedures
available
to
a
claimant
before
the
initial
determination
of
ineligibility
becomes
final
would
be
adequate
if
disability
benefits
were
not
terminated
until
after
the
evidentiary
hearing
stage
of
the
administrative
process.
The
dispute
centers
upon
what
process
is
due
prior
to
the
initial
termination
of
benefits,
pending
review.

in
recent
years
this
Court
increasingly
has
had
occasion
to
consider
the
extent
to
which
due
process
requires
an
evidentiary
hearing
prior
to
the
deprivation
of
some
type
of
property
interest
even
if
such
a
hearing
is
provided
thereafter.
In
only
one
case,
GoIdberg
v.
Kelly,
397
C.
J.
S.,
at
266
­
271,
has
the
Court
held
that
a
hearing
closely
approximating
a
judicial
trial
is
necessary.
In
other
cases
requiring
some
type
of
pretermination
hearing
as
a
matter
of
constitutional
right
the
Court
has
spoken
sparingly
about
the
requisite
procedures.
Sniadach
p.
12r:
U.
S.
3i~,
j3.1]
v.
Family
Finance
Corp.,
195
0,
s.
337
(
1969),
involving
garnishment
of
wages,
was
entirely
silent
on
the
matter.
In
Fuentes
v.
Shevin,
407
U.
S..
at
96
­
97,
the
Court
said
only
that
in
a
replevin
suit
between
two
private
parties
the
initial
determination
required
something
more
than
an
ex
parte
proceeding
before
a
court
clerk.
Similarly,
Bell
v.
Burson,
supra,
at
540,
held,
in
the
context
of
the
revocation
of
a
state­
granted
driver's
license,
that
due
process
required
only
that
the
prerevocation
hearing
involve
a
probable­
cause
determination
as
to
the
fault
of
the
licensee,
noting
that
the
hearing
"
need
not
take
the
form
of
a
hi1
adjudication
of
the
question
ofliability."
See
also.
North
Georgia
Finishing,
Inc,
v.
Di­
Chem,
Inc.,
419
U.
S.
601.
607
(
1975).
More
recently,
in
Arnett
v.
Kennedy,
supra,
we
sustained
the
validity
of
procedures
by
which
a
federal
employee
could
be
dismissed
for
cause.
They
included
notice
of
the
action
sought,
a
copy
of
the
charge,
reasonable
time
for
filing
a
written
response,
and
an
opportunity
for
an
oral
appearance.
Following
dismissal,
an
evidentiary
hearing
was
provided.
416
US.,
at
142
­
146.

'
these
decisions
underscore
the
truism
that
"'[
d]
iie
process,'
unlike
some
legal
rules,
is
not
a
technical
conception
with
a
fixed
content
unrelated
to
time,
place
and
circumstances.
I'
Cafeteria
Workers
v.
McElroy,
;­
6~
U­
S..
S86,~
89S­~(
1961).
"[
Dlue
process
is
flexible
and
calls
for
such
procedural
protections
as
the
particular
situation
demands."
Morrissey
v.
Brewer,
408
U.
S.
471,
48
1
(
1972).
Accordingly,
resolution
of
the
issue
whether
the
administrative
procedures
provided
here
are
constitutionally
sufficient
requires
analysis
of
the
governmental
and
private
interests
that
are
affected.
Arnett
v.
Kennedy,
supra,
at
167­
168
(
POWELL,
J.,
concurring
in
part);
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
supra,
at
263­
266;
Cafeteria
Workers
v.
McElroy,
supra,
at
895.
More
precisely,
our
prior
decisions
1431I;.$
:
I<),
33J
indicate
that
identification
of
the
specific
dictates
of
due
process
generally
requires
consideration
of
three
distinct
factors:
First,
the
private
interest
that
will
be
affected
by
the
official
action;
second,
the
risk
of
an
erroneous
deprivation
of
such
interest
through
the
procedures
used,
and
the
probable
value,
if
any,
of
additional
or
substitute
procedural
safeguards;
and
finally,
the
Government's
interest,
including
the
hnction
involved
and
the
fiscal
and
administrative
burdens
that
the
additional
or
substitute
procedural
requirement
would
entail.
See,
e.
g.,
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
supra,
at
263­
271.

We
turn
first
to
a
description
of
the
procedures
for
the
termination
of
Social
Security
disability
benefits,
and
thereafter
consider
the
factors
bearing
UPOR
the
constitutional
adequacy
of
these
procedures.

The
disability
insurance
program
is
administered
jointly
by
state
and
federal
agencies.
State
agencies
make
the
initial
determination
whether
a
disability
exists,
when
it
began,
and
when
it
ceased.
42
U.
S.
C.
421
(
a).

~

13
The
standards
applied
and
the
procedures
followed
are
prescribed
by
the
Secretary,
see
42
1
(
b),
who
has
delegated
his
responsibilities
and
powers
under
the
Act
to
the
SSA.
See
40
Fed.
Reg.
4473
(
1975).
[
a24
L.
S.
319,
3361
In
order
to
establish
initial
and
continued
entitlement
to
disability
benefits
a
worker
must
demonstrate
that
he
is
unable
"
to
engage
in
any
substantial
gainkl
activity
by
reason
of
any
medically
determinable
physical
or
mental
impairment
which
can
be
expected
to
result
in
death
or
which
has
lasted
or
can
be
expected
to
last
for
a
continuous
period
of
not
less
than
12
months
.
.
.
.
If
42
U.
S.
C.
423
(
d)
(
1)
(
A).

TO
satisfjl
this
test
the
worker
bears
a
continuing
burden
of
showing,
by
means
of
"
medically
acceptable
clinical
and
laboratory
diagnostic
techniques,"
423
(
d)
(
3),
that
he
has
a
physical
or
mental
impairment
of
such
severity
that
"
he
is
not
only
unable
to
do
his
previous
work
but
cannot,
considering
his
age,
education,
and
work
experience,
engage
in
any
other
kind
of
substantial
gainfid
work
which
exists
in
the
national
economy,
regardless
of
whether
such
work
exists
in
the
immediate
area
in
which
he
lives,
or
whether
a
specific
job
vacancy
exists
for
him,
or
whether
he
would
be
hired
if
he
applied
for
work."
423
(
d)
(
2)
(
A).
14
The
principal
reasons
for
benefits
terminations
are
that
the
worker
is
no
longer
disabled
or
has
returned
to
work.
As
Eldridge's
benefits
were
terminated
because
he
was
determined
to
be
no
longer
disabled,
we
,

consider
only
the
sufficiency
of
the
procedures
involved
in
such
cases.
!/.
l:
ri
US.
3;').
3371
The
continuing­
eligibility
investigation
is
made
by
a
state
agency
acting
through
a
"
team"
consisting
of
a
physician
and
a
nonmedical
person
trained
in
disability
evaluation.
The
agency
periodically
communicates
with
the
disabled
worker,
usually
by
mail
­
in
which
case
he
is
sent
a
detailed
questionnaire
­
or
by
telephone,
and
requests
information
concerning
his
present
condition,
including
current
medical
restrictions
and
sources
of
treatment,
and
any
additional
information
that
he
considers
relevant
to
his
continued
93
entitlement
to
benefits.
CM
6705.1;
Disability
Insurance
State
Manual
(
DISM)
353.3
(
TL
No.
137,
Mar.
5,
1975).
16
­

Information
regarding
the
recipient s
current
condition
is
also
obtained
from
his
sources
of
medical
treatment.
DISM
353.4.
If
there
is
a
conflict
between
the
information
provided
by
the
beneficiary
and
that
obtained
from
medical
sources
such
as
his
physician,
or
between
two
sources
of
treatment,
the
agency
may
arrange
for
an
examinationby
an
independent
consuiting
physician.
UIbid.
Whenever
the
agency s
tentative
assessment
of
the
beneficiary scondition
differs
from
his
t4.4
fJ.
S.
3
1?.
3?
Pj
own
assessment,
the
beneficiary
is
informed
that
benefits
may
be
terminated,
provided
a
summary
of
the
evidence
upon
which
the
proposed
determination
to
terminate
is
based,
and
afforded
an
opportunity
to
review
the
medical
reports
and
other
evidence
in
his
case
file.
EHe
also
may
respond
in
writing
and
submit
additional
evidence.
Id..
353.6.

The
state
agency
then
makes
its
final
determination,
which
is
reviewed
by
an
examiner
in
the
SSA
Bureau
of
Disability
Insurance.
42
U.
S.
C.
421
(
c);
CM
6701
(
b),
(
c).
EIf,
as
is
usually
the
case,
the
SSA
accepts
the
agency
determination
it
notifies
the
recipient
in
writing,
informing
him
of
the
reasons
for
the
decision,
and
of
his
right
to
seek
de
novo
reconsideration
by
the
state
agency.
20
CFR
404.907,404.909
(
1975).
30
Upon
acceptance
by
the
SSA,
benefits
are
terminated
effective
two
months
after
the
month
in
which
medical
recovery
is
found
to
have
occurred.
42
U.
S.
C.
423
(
a)
(
1970
ed.,
Supp.
111).
($
24
1j.
S.
316.3331
If
the
recipient
seeks
reconsideration
by
the
state
agency
and
the
determination
is
adverse,
the
SSA
reviews
the
reconsideration
determination
and
notifies
the
recipient
of
the
decision.
He
then
has
a
right
to
an
evidentiary
hearing
before
an
SSA
administrative
law
judge.
20
CFR
404.917,
404.927
(
1975).
The
hearing
is
nonadversary,
and
the
SSA
is
not
represented
by
counsel.
As
at
all
prior
and
subsequent
stages
of
the
administrative
process,
however,
the
claimant
may
be
represented
by
counsel
or
other
spokesmen.
404.934.
If
this
hearing
results
in
an
adverse
decision,
the
claimant
is
entitled
to
request
discretionary
review
by
the
SSA
Appeals
Council,
404.945,
and
finally
may
obtainjudicial
review.
42
U.
S.
C.
405
(
8);
20
CFR
404.95
1
(
1975).
21
Should
it
be
determined
at
any
point
after
termination
of
benefits,
that
the
claimant sdisability
extended
beyond
the
date
of
cessation
initially
established,
the
worker
is
entitled
to
retroactive
payments.
42
U.
S.
C
404.
Cf.
423
(
b);
20
CFR
404.501,
404.503,
404.504
(
1975).
If,
on
the
other
hand,
a
beneficiary
receives
any
payments
to
which
he
is
later
determined
not
to
be
entitled,
the
statute
authorizes
the
Secretary
to
attempt
to
recoup
these
hnds
in
specified
circumstances.
42
U.
S.
C,
404.
22­

C
Despite
the
elaborate
character
of
the
administrative
procedures
provided
by
the
Secretary,
the
courts
[/
t .
i
I,­
I9,
Mil
below
held
them
to
be
constitutionally
inadequate,
concluding
that
due
process
requires
an
evidentiary
hearing
prior
to
termination.
In
light
of
the
private
and
governmental
interests
at
stake
here
and
the
nature
of
the
existing
procedures,
we
think
this
was
error.

Since
a
recipient
whose
benefits
are
terminated
is
awarded
full
retroactive
relief
if
he
ultimately
prevails,
his
sole
interest
is
in
the
uninterrupted
receipt
of
this
source
of
income
pending
final
administrative
decision
on
his
claim.
His
potential
injury
is
thus
similar
in
nature
to
that
of
the
welfare
recipient
in
Goldberg,
see
B7
L!.
S.,
at
26.3
­
264,
the
nonprobationary
federal
employee
in
Amett,
see
416
L!,
S.,
at
146
,
and
the
wage
earner
in
Sniadach.
See
.~ 
LS.­
U_
S,~­
at.~
4!­­
342.23
Only
in
Goldberg
has
the
Court
held
that
due
process
requires
an
evidentiary
hearing
prior
to
a
temporary
deprivation.
It
was
emphasized
there
that
welfare
assistance
is
given
to
persons
on
the
very
margin
of
FindLaw:
United
States
Case
Law:
Supreme
Court
subsistence:

"
The
crucial
factor
in
this
context
­
a
factor
not
present
in
the
case
of.
.
.
virtually
anyone
else
whose
governmental
entitlements
are
ended
­
is
that
termination
of
aid
pending
resolution
of
a
controversy
over
eligibility
may
deprive
an
eligible
recipient
of
the
very
means
by
which
to
live
while
he
waits."
397
U.
S..
at
264
(
emphasis
in
original).

Eligibility
for
disability
benefits,
in
contrast,
is
not
based
upon
financial
need.
=
Indeed,
it
is
wholly
unrelated
to
[~
LJ
i
j:­
J
S
jI
9,
?­
i
the
worker's
income
or
support
from
many
other
sources,
such
as
earnings
of
other
family
members,
workmen's
compensation
awards,
=
tort
claims
awards,
savings,
private
insurance,
public
or
private
pensions,
veterans'
benefits,
food
stamps,
public
assistance,
or
the
"
many
other
important
programs,
both
public
and
private,
which
contain
provisions
for
disability
payments
affecting
a
substantial
portion
of
the
work
force
.
.
.
.
I'
Richardson
v.
Belcher,
404
U.
S.,
at
85
­
87
(
Douglas,
J.,
dissenting).
See
Staff
of
the
House
Committee
on
Ways
and
Means,
Report
on
the
Disability
Insurance
Program,
93d
Cong.,
2d
Sess.,
9­
10,
419­
429
(
1974)
(
hereinafter
Staff
Report).

As
Goldberg
illustrates,
the
degree
of
potential
deprivation
that
may
be
created
by
a
particular
decision
is
a
factor
to
be
considered
in
assessing
the
validity
of
any
administrative
decisionmaking
process.
Cf
Morrissey
v.
Brewer,
408
U.
S.
371
(
1972).
The
potential
deprivation
here
is
generally
likely
to
be
less
than
in
Goldberg,
although
the
degree
of
difference
can
be
overstated.
As
the
District
Court
emphasized,
to
remain
eligible
for
benefits
a
recipient
must
be
''
unable
to
engage
in
substantial
gainful
activity."
42
U.
S.
C.
423;
361
F.
Supp.,
at
523.
Thus,
in
contrast
to
the
discharged
federal
employee
in
Amett,
there
is
little
possibility
that
the
terminated
recipient
will
be
able
to
find
even
temporary
employment
to
ameliorate
the
interim
loss.

As
we
recognized
last
Term
in
Fusari
v.
Steinberg,
419
U.
S.
379.
389
(
1975),
"
the
possible
length
of
wrongful
deprivation
of.
.
.
benefits
[
also]
is
an
important
factor
in
assessing
the
impact
of
official
action
on
the
private
interests."
The
Secretary
concedes
that
the
delay
between
:
42US.
3
i9.3121
a
request
for
a
hearing
before
an
administrative
law
judge
and
a
decision
on
the
claim
is
currently
between
10
and
1
1
months.
Since
a
terminated
recipient
must
first
obtain
a
reconsideration
decision
as
a
prerequisite
to
invoking
his
right
to
an
evidentiary
hearing,
the
delay
between
the
actual
cutoff
of
benefits
and
final
decision
after
a
hearing
exceeds
one
year.

In
view
of
the
torpidity
of
this
administrative
review
process,
cf.
id.,
at
383­
384,
386,
and
the
typically
modest
resources
of
the
family
unit
of
the
physically
disabled
worker,
athe
hardship
imposed
upon
the
erroneously
terminated
disability
recipient
may
be
significant.
Still,
the
disabled
worker's
need
is
likely
to
be
less
than
that
of
a
welfare
recipient.
In
addition
to
the
possibility
of
access
to
private
resources,
other
forms
of
government
assistance
will
become
available
where
the
termination
of
disability
benefits
places
a
worker
or
his
family
below
the
subsistence
level.
ZSee
Arnett
v
Kennedy,
416
U.
S.,
[­
t?
J
ii
S
319.1­!
3j
at
169
(
POWELL,
J
,
concurring
in
part);
id.,
at
201­
202
(
WHITE,
J.,
concurring
in
part
and
dissenting
in
part).
In
view
of
these
potential
sources
of
temporary
income,
there
is
less
reason
here
than
in
Goldberg
to
depart..
from
the
ordinary
principlk,
established
by
our
decisions,
that­
something
less
than
an
evidentiary
hearing
IS
sufficient
prior
to
adverse
administrative
action
D
An
additional
factor
to
be
considered
here
is
the
fairness
and
reliability
of
the
existing
pretermination
procedures,
and
the
probable
value,
if
any,
of
additional
procedural
safeguards.
Central
to
the
evaluation
of
any
administrative
process
is
the
nature
of
the
relevant
inquiry.
See
Mitchell
v.
W.
T.
Grant
Co.,
4
16
II
S..
OO?,.
i<
I?(
1974);
Friendly,
Some
Kind
of
Hearing,
123
U.
Pa.
L.
Rev.
1267,
128
I
(
1975).
In
order
to
fidiaw.
comwscripts/
Qetcase.
pllcourtius&
vol=
j2Jhinvol=
jiindtav:
United
States
Case
Law:
Supreme
Court
~
si~
yg:~/
6/
http:!/
caselaw.

remain
eligible
for
benefits
the
disabled
worker
must
demonstrate
by
means
of
"
medically
acceptable
clinical
and
laboratory
diagnostic
techniques,"
42
U.
S.
C.
423
(
d)
(
3),
that
he
is
unable
"
to
engage
in
any
substantial
gainhl
activity
by
reason
of
any
medically
determinable
physical
or
mental
impairment
.
.
.
.
I'

423
(
d)
(
1)
(
A)
(
emphasis
supplied).
In
short,
a
medical
assessment
of
the
worker's
physical
or
mental
condition
is
required.
This
is
a
more
sharply
focused
and
easily
documented
decision
than
the
typical
determination
of
welfare
entitlement.
In
the
latter
case,
a
wide
variety
of
information
may
be
deemed
relevant,
and
issues
of
witness
credibility
and
[,::,­
I
~
J.
s.
7
1::
I.
34­
11
veracity
often
are
critical
to
the
decisionmaking
process.
Goldberg
noted
that
in
such
circumstances
"
written
submissions
are
a
wholly
unsatisfactory
basis
for
decision."
_
3.97­.
U:
S.,,.
at_~
O9...

By
contrast,
the
decision
whether
to
discontinue
disability
benefits
will
turn,
in
most
cases,
upon
"
routine,
standard,
and
unbiased
medical
reports
by
physician
specialists,"
Richardson
v.
Perales,
402..
U..
Sl.,..
at.­­.,
concerning
a
subject
whom
they
have
personally
examined.
=
In
Richardson
the
Court
recognized
the
"
reliability
and
probative
worth
of
written
medical
reports,"
emphasizing
that
while
there
may
be
"
professional
disagreement
with
the
medical
conclusions"
the
"
specter
of
questionable
credibility
and
veracity
is
not
present."
Id.,
at
405,
407.
To
be
sure,
credibility
and
veracity
may
be
a
factor
in
the
ultimate
disability
assessment
in
some
cases.
But
procedural
due
process
rules
are
shaped
by
the
risk
of
error
inherent
in
the
truthfinding
process
as
applied
to
the
generaiity
of
cases,
not
the
rare
exceptions.
The
potential
value
of
an
evidentiary
hearing,
or
even
oral
presentation
to
the
decisionmaker,
i423
T.
r
S
?
i9,3$
5]
is
substantially
less
in
this
context
than
in
Goldberg.

The
decision
in
Goldberg
also
was
based
on
the
Court's
conclusion
that
written
submissions
were
an
inadequate
substitute
for
oral
presentation
because
they
did
not
provide
an
effective
means
for
the
recipient
to
communicate
his
case
to
the
decisionmaker.
Written
submissions
were
viewed
as
an
unrealistic
option,
for
most
recipients
lacked
the
"
educational
attainment
necessary
to
write
effectively"
and
could
not
afford
professional
assistance.
In
addition,
such
submissions
would
not
provide
the
"
flexibility
of
oral
presentations"
or
"
permit
the
recipient
to
mold
his
argument
to
the
issues
the
decision
maker
appears
to
regard
as
important."
397
U.
S..
at
269
.
In
the
context
of
the
disability­
benefits­
entitlement
assessment
the
,

administrative
procedures
under
review
here
fully
answer
these
objections.

The
detailed
questionnaire
which
the
state
agency
periodically
sends
the
recipient
identifies
with
particularity
the
information
relevant
to
the
entitlement
decision,
and
the
recipient
is
invited
to
obtain
assistance
from
the
local
SSA
ofice
in
completing
the
questionnaire.
More
important,
the
information
critical
to
the
entitlement
decision
usually
is
derived
from
medical
sources,
such
as
the
treating
physician.
Such
sources
are
likely
to
be
able
to
communicate
more
effectively
through
written
documents
than
are
welfare
recipients
or
the
lay
witnesses
supporting
their
cause.
The
conclusions
of
physicians
often
are
supported
by
X­
rays
and
the
results
of
clinical
or
laboratory
tests,
information
typically
more
amenable
to
written
than
to
oral
presentation.
Cf
W.
Geflhorn
&
C.
Byse,
Administrative
Law
­
Cases
and
Comments
860­
863
(
6th
ed.
1974).

A
hrther
safeguard
against
mistake
is
the
policy
of
allowing
the
disability
recipient's
representative
full
access
13.:~:
i
s
71.)
3:
6j
to
all
information
relied
upon
by
the
state
agency.
In
addition,
prior
to
the
cutoff
of
benefits
the
agency
informs
the
recipient
of
its
tentative
assessment,
the
reasons
therefor,
and
provides
a
summary
of
the
evidence
that
it
considers
most
relevant.
Opportunity
is
then
afforded
the
recipient
to
submit
additional
evidence
or
arguments,
enabling
him
to
challenge
directly
the
accuracy
of
information
in
his
file
as
well
as
the
correctness
of
the
agency's
tentative
conclusions.
These
procedures,
again
as
contrasted
with
those
before
the
Court
in
Goldberg,
enable
the
recipient
to
"
mold"
his
argument
to
respond
to
the
preiise
issues
which
the
decisionmaker
regards
as
crucial.

Despite
these
carefully
structured
procedures,
amici
point
to
the
significant
reversal
rate
for
appealed
cases
as
clear
evidence
that
the
current
process
is
inadequate.
Depending
upon
the
base
selected
and
the
line
of
analysis
followed,
the
relevant
reversal
rates
urged
by
the
contending
parties
vary
from
a
high
of
58.6%
for
appealed
reconsideration
decisions
to
an
overall
reversal
rate
of
only
3.3%.
DBare
statistics
rarely
provide
a
satisfactory
measure
of
the
fairness
of
a
decisionmaking
process.
Their
adequacy
is
especially
suspect
here
since
~
324U.
S.
3
io,
3471
the
administrative
review
system
is
operated
on
an
openfile
basis.
A
recipient
may
always
submit
new
evidence,
and
such
submissions
may
result
in
additional
medical
examinations.
Such
fresh
examinations
were
held
in
approximately
30%
to
40%
of
the
appealed
cases
in
fiscal
1973,
either
at
the
reconsideration
or
evidentiary
hearing
stage
of
the
administrative
process.
Staff
Report
238.
In
this
context,
the
value
of
reversal
rate
statistics
as
one
means
of
evaluating
the
adequacy
of
the
pretermination
process
is
diminished.
Thus,
although
we
view
such
information
as
relevant,
it
is
certainly
not
controlling
in
this
case.

E
In
striking
the
appropriate
due
process
balance
the
final
factor
to
be
assessed
is
the
public
interest.
This
includes
the
administrative
burden
and
other
societal
costs
that
would
be
associated
with
requiring,
as
a
matter
of
constitutional
right,
an
evidentiary
hearing
upon
demand
in
all
cases
prior
to
the
termination
of
disability
benefits.
The
most
visible
burden
would
be
the
incremental
cost
resulting
from
the
increased
number
of
hearings
and
the
expense
of
providing
benefits
to
ineligible
recipients
pending
decision.
No
one
can
predict
the
extent
of
the
increase,
but
the
fact
that
full
benefits
would
continue
until
after
such
hearings
would
assure
the
exhaustion
in
most
cases
of
this
attractive
option.
Nor
would
the
theoretical
right
of
the
Secretary
to
recover
undeserved
benefits
result,
as
a
practical
matter,
in
any
substantial
offset
to
the
added
outlay
of
public
hnds.
The
parties
submit
widely
varying
estimates
of
the
probable
additional
financial
cost.
We
only
need
say
that
experience
with
the
constitutionalizing
of
government
procedures
suggests
that
the
ultimate
additional
cost
in
terms
of
money
and
administrative
burden
would
not
be
insubstantial.
[
421
L:
S
3
i
9,1481
Financial
cost
alone
is
not
a
controlling
weight
in
determining
whether
due
process
requires
a
particular
procedural
safeguard
prior
to
some
administrative
decision.
But
the
Government's
interest,
and
hence
that
of
the
public,
in
conserving
scarce
fiscal
and
administrative
resources
is
a
factor
that
must
be
weighed.
At
some
point
the
benefit
of
an
additional
safeguard
to
the
individual
affected
by
the
administrative
action
and
to
society
in
terms
of
increased
assurance
that
the
action
is
just,
may
be
outweighed
by
the
cost.
Significantly,
the
cost
of
protecting
those
whom
the
preliminary
administrative
process
has
identified
as
likely
to
be
found
undeserving
may
in
the
end
come
out
of
the
pockets
of
the
deserving
since
resources
available
for
any
particular
program
of
social
welfare
are
not
unlimited.
See
Friendly,
supra,
123
U.
Pa.
L.
Rev.,
at
1276,
1303.

But
more
is
implicated
in
cases
of
this
type
than
ad
hoc
weighing
of
fiscal
and
administrative
burdens
against
the
interests
of
a
particular
category
of
claimants.
The
ultimate
balance
involves
a
determination
as
to
when,
under
our
constitutional
system,
judicial­
type
procedures
must
be
imposed
upon
administrative
action
to
assure
fairness.
We
reiterate
the
wise
admonishment
of
Mr.
Justice
Frankhrter
that
differences
in
the
origin
and
knction
of
administrative
agencies
"
preclude
wholesale
transplantation
of
the
rules
of
procedure,
trial,
and
review
which
have
evolved
from
the
history
and
experience
of
courts."
FCC
v.
Pottsville
Broadcasting
Co.,
309
I!.
S.
134.
143
(
1940).
The
judicial
model
of
an
evidentiary
hearing
is
neither
a
required,
nor
even
the
most
effective,
method
of
decisionmaking
in
all
circumstances.
The
essence
of
due
process
is
the
requirement
that
"
a
person
in
jeopardy
of
serious
loss
[
be
given]
notice
of
the
case
against
him
and
opportunity
to
meet
it."
Joint
Anti­
Fascist
Comm.
v.
McGrath,
341
1I.
S..
at
171
­
172
(
Frankhrter,
(
424
[
G.
S
31Y.:
j­
iq
J.,
concurring).
AI1
that
is
necessary
is
that
the
procedures
be'tailored,
in
light
of
the
decision
to
be
made,
to
"
the
capacities
and
circumstances
of
those
who
are
to
be
heard,"
Goidberg
v.
Kelly,
397
U.
S..
at
265
­
269
(
footnote
omitted),
to
insure
that
they
are
given
a
meaningfill
opportunity
to
present
their
case.
In
assessing
what
process
is
due
in
this
case,
substantial
weight
must
be
given
to
the
goo$­
faith
judgments
of
the
individuals
charged
by
Congress
with
the
administration
of
social
welfare
programs
that
the
procedures
they
have
provided
assure
fair
consideration
of
the
entitlement
claims
of
individuals.
See
Arnett
v.
Kennedy,
116
[
J.
S..
at.
202
(
WHITE,
J.,
concurring
in
part
and
dissenting
in
part).
This
is
especially
so
where,
as
here,
the
prescribed
procedures
not
only
provide
the
claimant
with
an
effective
process
for
asserting
his
claim
prior
to
any
administrative
action,
but
also
assure
a
fight
to
an
evidentiary
hearing,
as
well
as
to
subsequent
judicial
review,
before
the
denial
of
his
claim
becomes
final.
Cf.
Boddie
v.
Connecticut,
401
C.
S.
371.
378
(
1971).

We
conclude
that
an
evidentiary
hearing
is
not
required
prior
to
the
termination
of
disability
benefits
and
that
the
present
administrative
procedures
fidly
comport
with
due
process.

The
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
Reversed
RIR
JUSTICE
STEVENS
took
no
part
in
the
consideration
or
decision
of
this
case.

Footnotes
[
Footnote
1
]
The
program
is
financed
by
revenues
derived
from
employee
and
employer
payroll
taxes.
26
U.
S.
C.
3
101
(
a),
3
111
(
a);
42
U.
S.
C.
401
(
b).
It
provides
monthly
benefits
to
disabled
persons
who
have
worked
sufficiently
long
to
have
an
insured
status,
and
who
have
had
substantial
work
experience
in
a
specified
intervaf
directly
preceding
the
onset
of
disability.
42
U.
S.
C.
423
(
c)
(
1)
(
A)
and
(
B).
Benefits
also
are
provided
to
the
worker's
dependents
under
specified
circumstances.
402
(
b)­(
d).
When
the
recipient
reaches
age
65
his
disability
benefits
are
automatically
converted
to
retirement
benefits.
416
(
i)
(
2)
(
D),
423
(
a)
(
1).
In
fiscal
1974
approximately
3,700,000
persons
received
assistance
under
the
program.
Social
Security
Administration,
The
Year
in
Review
2
1
(
1
974).

[
Footnote
2
]
EIdridge
originally
was
disabled
due
to
chronic
anxiety
and
back
strain.
He
subsequently
was
found
to
have
diabetes.
The
tentative
determination
letter
indicated
that
aid
would
be
terminated
because
available
medical
evidence
indicated
that
his
diabetes
was
under
control,
that
there
existed
no
limitations
on
his
back
movements
which
would
impose
severe
hnctional
restrictions,
and
that
he
no
longer
suffered
emotional
problems
that
would
preclude
him
from
all
work
for
which
he
was
qualified.
App.
12­
13.
In
his
reply
letter
he
claimed
to
have
arthritis
of
the
spine
rather
than
a
strained
back.

[
Footnote
3
]
The
District
Court
ordered
reinstatement
of
Eldridge's
benefits
pending
its
final
disposition
on
the
merits,

[
Footnote
3
]
In
Goldberg
the
Court
held
that
the
pretermination
hearing
must
include
the
following
elements:
(
1)
"
timely
and
adequate
notice
detailing
the
reasons
for
a
proposed
termination";
(
2)
"
an
effective
opportunity
[
for
the
recipient]
to
defend
by
confronting
any
adverse
witnesses
and
by
presenting
his
own
arguments
and
evidence
orally";
(
3)
retained
counsel,
if
desired;
(
4)
an
"
impartial"
decisionmaker;
(
5)
a
decision
resting
"
solely
on
the
legal
rules
and
evidence
adduced
at
the
hearing";
(
6)
a
statement
of
reasons
for
the
decision
and
the
evidence
relied
on.
397
U.
S..
ill
266
­
271.
In
this
opinion
the
term
"
evidentiary
hearing"
refers
to
a
hearing
generally
of
the
type
required
in
Goldberg.

[
Footnote
5
1
The
HEW
regulations
direct
that
each
state
plan
under
the
federal
categorical
assistance
programs
must
provide
for
pretermination
hearings
containing
specified
procedural
safeguards,
which
include
all
of
the
Goldberg
requirements.
See
45
CFR
205.10
(
a)
(
1975);
n.
4,
supra.
Findlaw:
United
States
C3se
Law:
SupremeCourt
[
Footnote
6
]
The
Court
'
of
Appeals
for
the
Fifth
Circuit,
simply
noting
that
the
issue
had
been
correctly
decided
by
the
District
Court
in
this
case,
reached
the
same
conclusion
in
Williams
v.
Weinberger,
494
F.
2d
1191
(
1974),
cert.
pending,
No.
74­
205.

[
Footnote
7
3
Title
42
U.
S.
C.
405
(
h)
provides
in
full:

"(
h)
Finality
of
Secretary's
decision.

"
The
findings
and
decisions
of
the
Secretary
after
a
hearing
shall
be
binding
upon
all
individuals
who
were
parties
to
such
hearing.
No
findings
of
fact
or
decision
of
the
Secretary
shall
be
reviewed
by
any
person,
tribunal,
or
governmental
agency
except
as
herein
provided.
No
action
against
the
United
States,
the
Secretary,
or
any
officer
or
employee
thereof
shall
be
brought
under
section
41
of
Title
28
to
recover
on
any
claim
arising
under
this
subchapter."

F.
oQtE~
t:­
8­]
Section
405
(
g)
hrther
provides:

"
Such
action
shall
be
brought
in
the
district
court
of
the
United
States
for
the
judicial
district
in
which
the
plaintiff
resides,
or
has
his
principal
place
of
business,
or,
if
he
does
not
reside
or
have
his
principal
place
of
business
within
any
such
judicial
district,
in
the
United
States
District
Court
for
the
District
of
Columbia.
.
.
.
The
court
shall­
havepower
to
enter,
upon
the
pleadings
and
transcript
of
the
record,
ajudgment
affirming,
modifjring,
or
reversing
the
decision
of
the
Secretary,
with
or
without
remanding
the
cause
for
a
rehearing.
The
findings
of
the
Secretary
as
to
any
fact,
if
supported
by
substantial
evidence,
shall
be
conclusive.
.
.
.
I'

[
Footnote
9
]
The
other
two
conditions
are
(
1)
that
the
civil
action
be
commenced
within
60
days
after
the
mailing
of
notice
of
such
decision,
or
within
such
additional
time
as
the
Secretary
may
permit,
and
(
2)
that
the
action
be
filed
in
an
appropriate
district
court.
These
two
requirements
specify
a
statute
of
limitations
and
appropriate
venue,
and
are
waivable
by
the
parties.
Salfi,
422
U.
S.,
at
763
­
764.
As
in
Salfi
no
question
as
to
whether
Eldridge
satisfied
these
requirements
was
timely
raised
below,
see
Fed.
Rules
Civ.
Proc.
8
(
c),
12
(
h)
(
l),
and
they
need
not
be
considered
here.

[
Footnote
10
]
If
Eldridge
had
exhausted
the
hll
set
of
available
administrative
review
procedures,
failure
to
have
raised
his
constitutional
claim
would
not
bar
him
from
asserting
it
later
in
a
district
court.
Cf
Flemming
v.
Nestor,
363
U.
S.
603,
607
(
1960).

[
Footnote
1
1
]
Decisions
in
different
contexts
have
emphasized
that
the
nature
of
the
claim
being
asserted
and
the
consequences
of
deferment
ofjudicial
review
are
important
factors
in
determining
whether
a
,
statutory
requirement
of
finality
has
been
satisfied.
The
role
these
factors
may
play
is
illustrated
by
the
intensely
''
practical''
approach
which
the
Court
has
adopted,
Cohen
v.
Beneficial
Ind.
Loan
Corp.,
337
I;
S.
511,
546
(
1949),
when
applying
the
finality
requirements
of
28
U.
S.
C.
1291,
which
grants
jurisdiction
to
courts
of
appeals
to
review
all
"
final
decisions"
of
the
district
courts,
and
28
U.
S.
C.
1257,
which
empowers
this
Court
to
review
only
"
finaljudgments"
of
state
courts.
See,
e.
g.,
Harris
v.
Washington,
404
U.
S.
55
(
1971);
Construction
Laborers
v.
Curry,
371
U.
S.
542,
549
­
550
(
1963);
Mercantile
Nat.
Bank
v.
Langdeau,
371
U.
S.
555.
5.57
­
558
(
1963);
Cohen
v.
Beneficial
Ind.
Loan
Corp.,
supra,
at
545­
546.
TObe
sure,
certain
of
the
policy
considerations
implicated
in
1257
and
1291
cases
are
different
from
those
that
are
relevant
here.
Compare
Construction
Laborers,
supra,
at
550;
Mercantile
Nat.
Bank,
supra,
at
558,
.

with
McKart
v.
United
States,
395
U.
S.
185,
193
­
195
(
1969);
L.
Jaffe,
Judicial
Control
of
Administrative
Action
424­
426
(
1
965).
But
the
core
principle
that
statutorily
created
finality
requirements
should,
if
possible,
be
construed
so
as
not
to
cause
crucial
collateral
claims
to
be
lost
and
potentially
irreparable
Findl­
av.:
Unitcd
States
C3se
Law:
Supreme
Courp
injuries
to
be
suffered
remains
applicable.

[
Footnote
12
3
Given
our
conclusion
that
jurisdiction
in
the
District
Court
was
proper
under
405
(
g),
we
find
it
unnecessary
to
consider
Eldridge's
contention
that
notwithstanding
405
(
h)
there
was
jurisdiction
over
his
claim
under
the
mandamus
statute,
28
U.
S.
C.
1361,
or
the
Administrative
Procedure
Act,
5
U.
S.
C.
701
et
seq.

[
Footnote
13
]
In
all
but
six
States
the
state
vocational
rehabilitation
agency
charged
with
administering
the
state
plan
under
the
Vocational
Rehabilitation
Act
of
1920,
41
Stat.
735,
as
amended,
29
U.
S.
C.
701
et
seq.
(
1970
ed.,
Supp.
III),
acts
as
the
"
state
agency"
for
purposes
of
the
disability
insurance
program.
Staff
of
the
House
Committee
on
Ways
and
Means,
Report
on
the
Disability
Insurance
Program,
93d
Cong.,
2d
Sess.,
148
(
1974).
This
assignment
of
responsibility
was
intended
to
encourage
rehabilitation
contacts
for
disabled
workers
and
to
utilize
the
well­
established
relationships
of
the
local
rehabilitation
agencies
with
the
medical
profession.
H.
R.
Rep.
No.
1698,
83d
Cong.,
2d
Sess.,
23­
24
(
1954).

[
F.
O.~
rngte.­
l4]
Work
which
"
exists
in
the
national
economy"
is
in
turn
defined
as
''
work
which
exists
in
significant
numbers
either
in
the
region
where
such
individual
lives
or
in
several
regions
of
the
country."
423
(
d)
(
2)
(
A).

[
F.
g.
01.0.0tn...
l5]
Because
the
continuing­
disability
investigation
concerning
whether
a
claimant
has
returned
to
work
is
usually
done
directly
by
the
SSA
Bureau
of
Disability
Insurance,
without
any
state
agency
involvement,
the
administrative
procedures
prior
to
the
post­
termination
[;
t
2.
t
tj.
s.
3
19,3371
evidentiary
hearing
differ
from
those
involved
in
cases
of
possible
medical
recovery.
They
are
similar,
however,
in
the
important
respect
that
the
process
relies
principally
on
written
communications
and
there
is
no
provision
for
an
evidentiary
hearing
prior
to
the
cutoff
of
benefits.
Due
to
the
nature
of
the
relevant
inquiry
in
certain
types
of
cases,
such
as
those
involving
self­
employment
and
agricultural
employment,
the
SSA
office
nearest
the
beneficiary
conducts
an
oral
interview
of
the
beneficiary
as
part
of
the
pretermination
process.
SSA
Claims
Manual
(
CM)
6705.2
(
c).

[
Footnote
16
3
Information
is
also
requested
concerning
the
recipient's
belief
as
to
whether
he
can
return
to
work,
the
nature
and
extent
of
his
employment
during
the
past
year,
and
any
vocational
services
he
is
receiving.

[
F.
u.~
rt.
0­
ot.
n..
l.
7..]
All
medical­
source
evidence
used
to
establish
the
absence
of
continuing
disability
must
be
in
writing,
with
the
source
properly
identified.
DISM
353.4C.

[
Footnote
1S
]
The
disability
recipient
is
not
permitted
personally
to
examine
the
medical
reports
contained
in
his
file.
This
restriction
is
not
significant
since
he
is
entitled
to
have
any
representative
of
his
choice,
inciuding
a
lay
friend
or
family
member,
examine
all
medical
evidence.
CM
7314.
See
also
20
CFR
40
1.3
(
a)
(
2)
(
1975).
The
Secretary
informs
us
that
this
curious
limitation
is
currently
under
review.

[
F~.
o~.
n.
ot.~..
l.
9.]
The
SSA
may
not
itself
revise
the
state
agency's
determination
in
a
manner
more
favorable
to
the
beneficiary.
If,
however,
it
believes
that
the
worker
is
still
disabled,
or
that
the
disability
lasted
longer
than
determined
by
the
state
agency,
it
may
return
the
file
to
the
agency
for
hrther
consideration
in
light
of
the
SSAs
views.
The
agency
is
free
to
reaffirm
its
original
assessment.

[
Eootnote
20
]
The
reconsideration
assessment
is
initially
made
by
the
state
agency,
but
usually
not
by
the
same.
persons
who
considered
the
case
originally.
R.
Dixon,
Social
Security
Disability
and
Mass
Justice
32
(
197.3)
Both
the
recipient
and
the
agency
may
adduce
new
evidence.
1,'
i:
idLaw:
United
States
Case
Law:
Supreme
Court
wy,~
wyg:!/
6,
http:
i!
caselaw.
findlaw.
corn/
scripts!
getcase.
pi"
court­
us&~
Ol
­~
J:.;&
invol=!

[
F.
ootn~
tg­~.
l­
JUnlike
all
prior
levels
of
review,
which
are
de
novo,
the
district
court
is
required
to
treat
findings
of
facjt
as
conclusive
if
supported
by
substantial
evidence.
42
U.
S.
C.
405
(
8).

[
Footnote
22
]
The
Secretary
may
reduce
other
payments
to
which
the
beneficiary
is
entitled,
or
seek
the
payment
of
a
refund,
unless
the
beneficiary
is
"
without
fault"
and
such
adjustment
or
recovery
would
defeat
the
purposes
of
the
Act
or
be
"
against
equity
and
good
conscience."
42
U.
S.
C.
404
(
b).
See
generally
20
CFR
404.501­
404.515
(
1975).

[
F.
o9tngte.
k.
3.­]
This,
of
course,
assumes
that
an
employee
whose
wages
are
garnished
erroneously
is
subsequently
able
to
recover
his
back
wages.

[
Fg.
ot.
n.
ot.
g..
Z~­]
The
level
of
benefits
is
determined
by
the
worker's
average
monthly
earnings
during
the
period
prior
to
disability,
his
age,
and
other
factors
not
directly
related
to
financial
need,
specified
in
42
U.
S.
C.
415
(
1970
ed.,
Supp.
III).
See
423
(
a)
(
2).

[
F.
ootnote..
25..
J
Workmen's
compensation
benefits
are
deducted
in
part
in
accordance
with
a
statutory
formula.
42
U.
S.
C.
424a
(
1970
ed.,
Supp.
111);
20
CFR
404.408
(
1975);
see
Richardson
v.
Belcher,
30.1
I!.?,.
78
(
1971).

[
F.
g.~
Ioot.
g..
Z~­]
Amici
cite
statistics
complied
by
the
Secretary
which
indicate
that
in
1965
the
mean
income
of
the
family
unit
of
a
disabled
worker
was
$
3,803,
while
the
median
income
for
the
unit
was
$
2,836.
The
mean
liquid
assets
­
i.
e.,
cash,
stocks,
bonds
­
of
these
family
units
was
$
4,862;
the
median
was
$
940.
These
statistics
do
not
take
into
account
the
family
unit's
nonliquid
assets
­
i.
e.,
automobile,
real
estate,
and
the
like.
Brief
for
AFL­
CIO
et
al.
as
Amici
Curiae
App.
4a.
See
n.
29,
infra.

[
Footnote
27
]
Amici
emphasize
that
because
an
identical
definition
of
disability
is
employed
in
both
the
Title
I1
Social
Security
Program
and
in
the
companion
welfare
system
for
the
disabled,
Supplemental
Security
Income
(
SSI),
compare
42
U.
S.
C.
423
(
d)
(
1)
with
1382c
(
a)
(
3)
(
1970
ed.,
Supp.
111),
the
terminated
disability­
benefits
recipient
will
be
ineligible
for
the
SSI
Program.
There
exist,
however,
state
and
local
welfare
programs
which
may
supplement
the
worker's
income.
In
addition,
the
worker's
household
unit
can
qualify
for
food
stamps
if
it
meets
the
financial
need
requirements.
See
7
U.
S.
C.
2013
(
c),
2014
(
b);
7
CFR
271
(
1975).
Finaiiy,
in
1974
480,000
of
the
approximately
2,000,000
disabled
workers
receiving
Social
Security
benefits
also
received
SSI
benefits.
Since
financial
I.
it2.1
Ij.
S.
3
19,
?­!
3j
need
is
a
criterion
for
eligibility
under
the
SSI
program,
those
disabled
workers
who
are
most
in
need
will
in
the
majority
of
cases
be
receiving
SSI
benefits
when
disability
insurance
aid
is
terminated.
And,
under
the
SSI
program,
a
pretermination
evidentiary
hearing
is
provided,
if
requested.
42
U.
S.
C.
1383
(
c)
(
1970
ed.,
Supp.
111);
20
CFR416.1336
(
c)
(
1975);
40
Fed.
Reg.
1512
(
1975);
see
StaffReport
346.

[
Footnote
78
]
The
decision
is
not
purely
a
question
of
the
accuracy
of
a
medical
diagnosis
since
the
ultimate
issue
which
the
state
agency
must
resolve
is
whether
in
light
of
the
particular
worker's
"
age,
education,
and
work
experience''
he
cannot
"
engage
in
any
.
,
.
substantial
gainful
work
which
exists
in
the
nationai
economy
.
.
.
."
42
U.
S.
C.
423
(
d)
(
2)
(
A),
Yet
information
concerning
each
of
these
worker
characteristics
is
amenable
to
effective
written
presentation.
The
value
of
an
evidentiary
hearing,
or
even
a
limited
oral
presentation,
to
an
accurate
presentation
of
those
factors
to
the
decisionmaker
does
not
appear
substantial.
Similarly,
resolution
of
the
inquiry
as
to
the
types
of
employment
opportunities
that
exist
in
the
national
economy
for
a
physically
impaired
worker
with
a
particular
set
of
skills
would
not
necessarily
be
advanced
by
an
evidentiary
hearing.
Cf.
1
K.
Davis,
Administrative
Law
Treatise
7.06,
p.
429
(
1958).
The
statistical
information
relevant
to
this
judgment
is
more
amenable
to
written
than
to
oral
presentation.

[
F"
o.
t!
lote
29
1
By
focusing
solely
on
the
reversal
rate
for
appealed
reconsideration
determinations
amici
overstate
the
relevant
reversal
rate.
As
we
indicated
last
Term
in
Fusari
v.
Steinberg,
41.9..
rL.
S.:_;
7_
9,..~
g.~..
n.
6
(
1975),
in
order
fidly.
to
assess
the
reliability
and
fairness
of
a
system
of
procedure,
one
must
also
consider
the
overall
rate
of
error
for
all
denials
of
benefits.
Here
'
that
overall
rate
is
12.2%.
Moreover,
about
75%
of
these
reversals
occur
at
the
reconsideration
stage
of
the
administrative
process.
Since
the
median
period
between
a
request
for
reconsideration
review
and
decision
is
only
two
months,
Brief
for
AFL­
CIO
et
al.
as
Amici
Curiae
App.
4a,
the
deprivation
is
significantly
less
than
that
concomitant
to
the
lengthier
delay
before
an
evidentiary
hearing.
Netting
out
these
reconsideration
reversals,
the
overall
reversal
rate
falls
to
3.3%.
See
Supplemental
and
Reply
Brief
for
Petitioner
14.

?
VIR.
JUSTICE
BRENNAN,
with
whom
iw1.
JUSTICE
MARSKALL
concurs,
dissenting
For
the
reasons
stated
in
my
dissenting
opinion
in
Richardson
v.
Wright,
40S.~.­
S~­.~.
O8,..
21.2..(
1972),
I
agree
with
the
District
Court
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
that,
prior
to
termination
of
benefits,
Eldridge
must
be
afforded
132.1{
i.
s.
3
19::
jcj]
an
evidentiary
hearing
of
the
type
required
for
welfare
beneficiaries
under
Title
IV
of
the
Social
Security
Act,
42
U.
S.
C.
601
et
seq.
See
Goldberg
v.
Kelly,
397
U.
S.
254
(
1970).
I
would
add
that
the
Court's
consideration
that
a
discontinuance
of
disability
benefits
may
cause
the
recipient
to
suffer
only
a
limited
deprivation
is
no
argument.
It
is
speculative.
Moreover,
the
very
legislative
determination
to
provide
disability
benefits,
without
any
prerequisite
determination
of
need
in
fact,
presumes
a
need
by
the
recipient
which
is
not
this
Court's
fknction
to
denigrate.
Indeed,
in
the
present
case,
it
is
indicated
that
because
disability
benefits
were
terminated
there
was
a
foreclosure
upon
the
Eldridge
home
and
the
family's
hrniture
was
repossessed,
forcing
Eldridge,
his
wife,
and
their
children
to
sleep
in
one
bed.
Tr.
of
Oral
Arg.
39,
47­
48.
Finally,
it
is
also
no
argument
that
a
worker,
who
has
been
placed
in
the
untenable
position
of
having
been
denied
disability
benefits,
may
still
seek
other
forms
of
public
assistance.
[
J:
L~
us.
3i9.3ji~

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397/
254.
html
Cases
citing
this
case:
Supreme
Court
Cases
citing
this
case:
Circuit
Courts
U.
S.
Supreme
Court
GOLDBERG
v.
KELLY,
397
U.
S.
254
(
1970)

397
US.
254
GOLDBERG,
COMMISSIONER
OF
SOCIAL
SERVICES
OF
THE
CITY
OF
NEW
YORK
v.
KELLY
ET
AL.
APPEAL
FROM
THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
THE
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
NEW
YORK
No.
62.
Argued
October
13,1969
Decided
March
23,
1970
Appellees
are
New
York
City
residents
receiving
financial
aid
under
the
federally
assisted
Aid
to
Families
with
Dependent
Children
program
or
under
New
York
State's
general
Home
Relief
program
who
allege
that
officials
administering
these
programs
terminated,
or
were
about
to
terminate,
such
aid
without
prior
notice
and
hearing,
thereby
denying
them
due
process
of
law.
The
District
Court
held
that
only
a
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearing
would
satis3
the
constitutional
command,
and
rejected
the
argument
of
the
welfare
officials
that
the
combination
of
the
existing
post­
termination
"
fair
hearing"
and
informal
pre­
termination
review
was
sufficient.
Held:

1.
Welfare
benefits
are
a
matter
of
statutory
entitlement
for
persons
qualified
to
receive
them
and
procedural
due
process
is
applicable
to
their
termination.
Pp.
261­
263.

2.
The
interest
of
the
eligible
recipient
in
the
uninterrupted
receipt
of
public
assistance,
which
provides
him
with
essential
food,
clothing,
housing,
and
medical
care,
coupled
with
the
State's
interest
that
his
payments
not
be
erroneously
terminated,
clearly
outweighs
the
State's
competing
53
concern
to
prevent
any
increase
in
its
fiscal
and
administrative
burdens.
Pp.
264­
266.

3.
A
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearing
is
necessary
to
provide
the
welfare
recipient
with
procedural
due
process.
Pp.
264,
266­
271.

(
a)
Such
hearing
need
not
take
the
form
of
a
judicial
or
quasi­
judicial
trial,
but
the
recipient
must
be
provided
with
timely
and
adequate
notice
detailing
the
reasons
for
termination,
and
an
effective
opportunity
to
defend
by
confronting
adverse
witnesses
and
by
presenting
his
own
arguments
and
evidence
orally
before
the
decision
maker.
Pp.
266­
270.
[
397
E.?.
254,2551
(
b)
Counsel
need
not
be
hrnished
at
the
pre­
termination
hearing,
but
the
recipient
must
be
allowed
to
retain
an
attorney
if
he
so
desires.
P.
270.

(
c)
The
decisionmaker
need
not
file
a
full
opinion
or
make
formal
findings
of
fact
or
conclusions
of
law
but
should
state
the
reasons
for
his
determination
and
indicate
the
evidence
he
relied
on.
P.
271.

(
d)
The
decisionmaker
must
be
impartial,
and
although
prior
involvement
in
some
aspects
of
a
case
will
not
necessariiy
bar
a
welfare
official
from
acting
as
decision
maker,
he
should
not
have
participated
in
making
the
determination
under
review.
P.
27
1.

294
F.
Supp.
893,
affirmed.

John
J.
Loflin,
Jr.,
argued
the
cause
for
appellant.
With
him
on
the
briefs
were
J.
Lee
Rankin
and
Stanley
Buchsbaum.

Lee
A.
Albert
argued
the
cause
for
appellees.
With
him
on
the
brief
were
Robert
Borsody,
Martin
Garbus,
and
David
Diamond.

Briefs
of
amici
curiae
were
filed
by
Solicitor
General
Griswold,
Assistant
Attorney
General
Ruckelshaus,
and
Robert
V.
Zener
for
the
United
States,
and
by
Victor
G.
Rosenblum
and
Daniel
Wm.
Fessler
for
the
National
Institute
for
Education
in
Law
and
Poverty.

MR.
JUSTICE
BRENNAN
delivered
the
opinion
of
the
Court.

The
question
for
decision
is
whether
a
State
that
terminates
public
assistance
payments
to
a
particular
recipient
without
affording
him
the
opportunity
for
an
evidentiary
hearing
prior
to
termination
denies
the
recipient
procedural
due
process
in
violation
of
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
hendment.

This
action
was
brought
in
the
District
Court
for
the
Southern
District
of
New
York
by
residents
of
New
I;
27
I,
S
2%.
2jtjl
York
City
receiving
financial
aid
under
the
federally
assisted
program
of
Aid
to
Families
with
Dependent
Children
(
AFDC)
or
under
New
York
State's
general
Home
Relief
program.
LTheir
complaint
alleged
that
the
New
York
State
and
New
York
City
officials
administering
these
programs
terminated,
or
were
about
to
terminate,
such
aid
without
prior
notice
and
hearing,
thereby
denying
them
due
process
of
law
2At
the
time
(
3w[
I
s
35.1.
ZYJ
the
suits
were
filed
there
was
no
requirement
of
prior
notice
or
hearing
of
any
kind
before
termination
of
financial
aid.
However,
the
State
and
city
adopted
procedures
for
notice
and
hearing
after
the
suits
were
brought,
and
the
plaintiffs,
appellees
here,
then
challenged
the
constitutional
adequacy
ofthose
procedures.

The
State
Commissioner
of
Social
Services
amended
the
State
Department
of
Social
Services'
Official
Regulations
to
require
that
local
social
services
officials
proposing
to
discontinue
or
suspend
a
recipient's
financial
aid
do
so
according
to
a
procedure
that
conforms
to
either
subdivision
(
a)
or
subdivision
(
b)
of
35
1.26
of
the
rewlations
as
amended.
ZThe
City
of
New
York
f3?
7
u.
s.
75­
5.
ES]
elected
to
promulgate
a
local
procedure
according
to
subdivision
(
b).
That
subdivision,
so
far
as
here
pertinent,
provides
that
the
local
procedure
must
include
the
giving
of
notice
to
the
recipient
of
the
reasons
for
a
proposed
discontinuance
or
suspension
at
least
seven
days
prior
to
its
effective
date,
with
notice
also
that
upon
request
the
recipient
may
have
the
proposal
reviewed
by
a
local
welfare
official
holding
a
position
superior
to
that
of
the
supervisor
who
approved
the
proposed
discontinuance
or
suspension,
and,
hrther,
that
the
recipient
may
submit,
for
purposes
of
the
review,
a
written
statement
to
demonstrate
why
his
grant
should
not
be
discontinued
or
suspended.
The
decision
by
the
reviewing
official
whether
to
discontinue
or
suspend
aid
must
be
made
expeditiously,
with
written
notice
of
the
decision
to
the
recipient.
The
section
hrther
expressly
provides
that
"[
alssistance
shall
not
be
discontinued
or
suspended
prior
to
the
date
such
notice
of
decision
is
sent
to
the
recipient
and
his
representative,
if
any,
or
prior
to
the
proposed
effective
date
of
discontinuance
or
suspension,
whichever
occurs
later."

Pursuant
to
subdivision
(
b),
the
New
York
City
Department
of
Social
Services
promulgated
Procedure
No.
68­
18.
A
caseworker
who
has
doubts
about
the
recipient's
continued
eligibility
must
first
discuss
them
with
the
recipient.
If
the
caseworker
concludes
that
the
recipient
is
no
longer
eligible,
he
recommends
termination
IZcjS
U.
S.
25.1.
ijgj
of
aid
to
a
unit
supervisor.
If
the
latter
concurs,
he
sends
the
recipient
a
letter
stating
the
reasons
for
proposing
to
terminate
aid
and
notifling
him
that
within
seven
days
he
may
request
that
a
higher
official
review
the
record,
and
may
support
the
request
with
a
written
statement
prepared
personally
or
with
the
aid
of
an
attorney
or
other
person.
If
the
reviewing
official
affirms
the
determination
of
ineligibility,
aid
is
stopped
immediately
and
the
recipient
is
informed
by
letter
of
the
reasons
for
the
action.
Appellees'
challenge
to
this
procedure
emphasizes
the
absence
of
any
provisions
for
the
personal
appearance
of
the
recipient
before
the
reviewing
official,
for
oral
presentation
of
evidence,
and
for
confrontation
and
cross­
examination
of
adverse
witnesses.
$
However,
the
letter
does
inform
the
recipient
that
he
may
request
a
post­
termination
"
fair
hearing."
_
SThis
is
a
proceeding
before
an
independent
I337
17.3.
25;,
36.3)
state
hearing
officer
at
which
the
recipient
may
appear
personally,
offer
oral
evidence,
confront
and
cross­
examine
the
witnesses
against
him,
and
have
a
record
made
of
the
hearing.
If
the
recipient
prevails
at
the
"
fair
hearing"
he
is
paid
all
hnds
erroneously
withheld.
&
HEW
Handbook,
pt.
IV,
6200­
6500;
18
NYCRR
84.2­
84.23.
A
recipient
whose
aid
is
not
restored
by
a
"
fair
hearing"
decision
may
have
judicial
review.
N.
Y.
Civil
Practice
Law
and
Rules,
Art.
78
(
1
963).
The
recipient
is
so
notified,
18
NYCRR84.16.

I
The
constitutional
issue
to
be
decided,
therefore,
is
the
narrow
one
whether
the
Due
Process
Clause
requires
that
the
recipient
be
afforded
an
evidentiary
hearing
before
the
termination
of
benefits.
LThe
District
Court
held
[
397
U.
S.
ijq,~;
that
only
a
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearing
would
satisfy
theJ
constitutional
command,
and
rejected
the
argument
of
the
state
and
city
officials
that
the
combination
of
the
post­
termination
"
fair
hearing"
with
the
informal
pre­
termination
review
disposed
of
all
due
process
claims.
The
court
said:
"
While
post­
termination
review
is
relevant,
there
is
one
overpowering
fact
which
controls
here.
By
hypothesis,
a
welfare
recipient
is
destitute,
without
fbnds
or
assets.
.
.
.
Suffice
it
to
say
that
to
cut
off
a
welfare
recipient
in
the
face
of.
.
.
'
brutal
need'
without
a
prior
hearing
of
some
sort
is
unconscionable,
unless
overwhelming
considerations
justifi
it."
Kelly
v.
Wyman,
294
F.
Supp.
893,
899,
900
(
1968).
The
court
rejected
the
argument
that
the
need
to
protect
the
public's
tax
revenues
supplied
the
requisite
"
overwhelming
consideration,'
I
"
Against
the
justified
desire
to
protect
public
hnds
must
be
weighed
the
individuaI's
over­
powering
need
in
this
unique
situation
not
to
be
wrongfdly
deprived
of
assistance
.
.
.
.
While
the
problem
of
additional
expense
must
be
kept
in
mind,
it
does
not
justify
denying
a
hearing
meeting
the
ordinary
standards
of
due
process.
Under
all
the
circumstances,
we
hold
that
due
process
requires
an
adequate
hearing
before
termination
of
welfare
benefits,
and
the
fact
that
there
is
a
later
Findl­
aw.

constitutionally
fair
proceeding
does
not
alter
the
result."
Id.,
at
901.
Although
state
officials
were
party
defendants
in
the
action,
only
the
Commissioner
of
Social
Services
of
the
City
of
New
York
appealed.
We
noted
probable
jurisdiction,
394
IJ.
S.
971
(
1969),
to
decide
important
issues
that
have
been
the
subject
of
disagreement
in
principle
between
the
three­
judge
court
in
the
present
case
and
that
convened
in
Wheeler
v.
Montgomery,
No.
14,
post,
p.
280,
also
decided
today.
We
affirm.

Appellant
does
not
contend
that
procedural
due
process
is
not
applicable
to
the
termination
of
welfare
benefits.
1337
17,
s.
2.
i4,~:)
Such
benefits
are
a
matter
of
statutory
entitlement
for
persons
qualified
to
receive
them.
S..
Their
termination
involves
state
action
that
adjudicates
important
rights.
The
constitutional
challenge
cannot
be
answered
by
an
argument
that
public
assistance
benefits
are
"
a
'
privilege'
and
not
a
'
right."'
Shapiro
v.
Thompson,
394
U.
S.
618.
627
n.
6
(
1969).
Relevant
constitutional
restraints
apply
as
much
to
the
withdrawal
of
public
assistance
benefits
as
to
disqualification
for
unemployment
compensation,
Sherbert
v.
Verner,
374
U.
S.
398
(
1963);
or
to
denial
of
a
tax
exemption,
Speiser
v.
Randall,
357
U.
S.
513
(
1958);
or
to
discharge
fiom
public
employment,
Slochower
v.
Board
of
Higher
Education,
350
IJ.
S.
'
551
(
1
956).
%
The
extent
to
which
procedural
due
process
1397
11
S.
2%.
2631
must
be
afforded
the
recipient
is
influenced
by
the
extent
to
which
he
may
be
"
condemned
to
suffer
grievous
loss,"
Joint
Anti­
Fascist
Rehgee
Committee
v.
McGrath,
341
LJ.
S.
123,
IPS
(
1951)
(
FrankfUrter,
J.,
concurring),
and
depends
upon
whether
the
recipient's
interest
in
avoiding
that
loss
outweighs
the
governmental
interest
in
summary
adjudication.
Accordingly,
as
we
said
in
Cafeteria
&
Restaurant
Workers
Union
v.
McElroy,
367
U.
S.
856,
89.$..(
196I),
"
consideration
of
what
procedures
due
process
may
require
under
any
given
set
of
circumstances
must
begin
with
a
determination
of
the
precise
nature
of
the
government
knction
involved
as
well
as
of
the
private
interest
that
has
been
affected
by
governmental
action."
See
also
Hannah
v.
Larche,
253
U.
S.
420.
440,
442
(
1960).

It
is
true,'
of
course,
that
some
governmental
benefits
may
be
administratively
terminated
without
affording
the
recipient
a
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearing.
10
1397
u.~.
LM,
26.11
But
we
agree
with
the
District
Court
that
when
welfare
is
discontinued,
only
a
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearing
provides
the
recipient
with
procedural
due
process,
Cf.
Sniadach
v.
Family
Finance
Corp.,
395
U.
S.
337
(
1969).
For
qualified
recipients,
welfare
provides
the
means
to
obtain
essential
food,
clothing,
housing,
and
medical
care.
LCf.
Nash
v.
Florida
Industrial
Commission,
389
U.
S.
235.
239
(
1967).
Thus
the
crucial
factor
in
this
context
­
a
factor
not
present
in
the
case
of
the
blacklisted
govpmment
contractor,
the
discharged
government
employee,
the
taxpayer
denied
a
tax
exemption,
or
virtually
anyone
else
whose
governmental
entitlements
are
ended
­
is
that
termination
of
aid
pending
resolution
of
a
controversy
over
eligibility
may
deprive
an
eligible
recipient
of
the
very
means
by
which
to
live
while
he
waits.
Since
he
lacks
independent
resources,
his
situation
becomes
immediately
desperate.
His
need
to
concentrate
upon
finding
the
means
for
daily
subsistence,
in
turn,
adversely
affects
his
ability
to
seek
redress
from
the
welfare
bureaucracy.
13
Moreover,
important
governmental
interests
are
promoted
by
affording
recipients
a
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearing.
From
its
founding
the
Nation's
basic
13'
171;
S.
m,
x5j
commitment
has
been
to
foster
the
dignity
and
well­
being
of
all
persons
within
its
borders.
We
have
come
to
recognize
that
forces
not
within
the
control
of
the
poor
contribute
to
their
poverty.
UThis
perception,
against
the
background
of
our
traditions,
has
significantly
influenced
the
development
of
the
contemporary
public
assistance
system.
Welfare,
by
meeting
the
basic
demands
of
subsistence,
can
help
bring
within
the
reach
of
the
poor
the
same
opportunities
that
are
available
to
others
to
participate
meaningfully
in
the
life
of
the
community.
At
the
same
time,
welfare
guards
against
the
societal
malaise
that
may
flow
from
a
widespread
sense
of
unjustified
fmstration
and
insecurity.
Public
assistance,
then,
is
not
mere
charity,
but
a
means
to
"
promote
the
general
Welfare,
and
secure
the
Blessings
of
Liberty
to
ourselves
and
our
Posterity."
The
same
governmental
interests
that
counsel
the
provision
of
welfare,
counsel
as
well
its
uninterrupted
provision
to
those
eligible
to
receivc
it,
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearings
are
indispensable
to
that
end.
i%
v.
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United
States
Case
Law:
Supreme
Court
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Appellant
does
not
challenge
the
force
of
these
considerations
but
argues
that
they
are
outweighed
by
countervailing
govermbental
interests
in
conserving
fiscal
and
administrative
resources.
These
interests,
the
argument
goes,
justify
the
delay
of
any
evidentiary
hearing
until
after
discontinuance
of
the
grants.
Summary
adjudication
protects
the
public
fisc
by
stopping
payments
promptly
upon
discovery
of
reason
to
believe
that
a
recipient
is
no
longer
eligible.
Since
most
terminations
are
accepted
without
challenge,
summary
adjudication
also
conserves
both
the
fisc
and
administrative
time
and
energy
by
reducing
the
I
number
of
evidentiary
hearings
actually
held.
[.?
1'
7
C.
S.
25.1;
~
CG]

.
We
agree
with
the
District
Court,
however,
that
these
governmental
interests
are
not
overriding
in
the
welfare
context.
The
requirement
of
a
prior
hearing
doubtless
involves
some
greater
expense,
and
the
benefits
paid
to
ineligible
recipients
pending
decision
at
the
hearing
probably
cannot
be
recouped,
since
these
recipients
are
likely
to
be
judgment­
proof.
But
the
State
is
not
without
weapons
to
minimize
these
increased
costs.
Much
of
the
drain
on
fiscal
and
administrative
resources
can
be
reduced
by
developing
procedures
for
prompt
pre­
termination
hearings
and
by
skillfbl
use
of
personnel
and
facilities.
Indeed,
the
very
provision
for
a
post­
termination
evidentiary
hearing
in
New
York's
Home
Relief
program
is
itself
cogent
evidence
that
the
State
recognizes
the
primacy
of
the
public
interest
in
correct
eligibility
determinations
and
therefore
in
the
provision
of
procedural
safeguards.
Thus,
the
interest
of
the
eligible
recipient
in
uninterrupted
receipt
of
public
assistance,
coupled
with
the
State's
interest
that
his
payments
.
not
be
erroneously
terminated,
clearly
outweighs
the
State's
competing
concern
to
prevent
any
increase
in
its
fiscal
and
administrative
burdens.
As
the
District
Court
correctly
concluded,
"[
tlhe
stakes
are
simply
too
high
for
the
welfare
recipient,
and
the
possibility
for
honest
error
or
irritable
misjudgment
too
great,
to
allow
termination
of
aid
without
giving
the
recipient
a
chance,
if
he
so
desires,
to
be
hlly
informed
of
the
case
against
him
so
that
he
may
contest
its
basis
and
produce
evidence
in
rebuttal."
294
F.
Supp.,
at
904­
905.

I1
We
also
agree
with
the
District
Court,
however,
that
the
pre­
termination
hearing
need
not
take
the
form
of
a
judicial
or
quasi­
judicial
trial.
We
bear
in
mind
that
the
statutory
"
fair
hearing"
will
provide
the
recipient
1337
Li.
S.
254.
m)
with
a
full
administrative
review.
HAccordingly,
the
pre­
termination
hearing
has
one
function
only:
to
produce
an
initial
determination
of
the
validity
of
the
welfare
department's
grounds
for
discontinuance
of
payments
in
order
to
protect
a
recipient
against
an
erroneous
termination
of
his
benefits.
Cf.
Sniadach
v.
Family
Finance
Corp.,
39.
XJS.:..
3.37,..
34j­.(
1969)
(
HARLAN,
J.,
concurring).
Thus,
a
complete
record
and
a
comprehensive
opinion,
which
would
serve
primarily
to
facilitate
judicial
review
and
to
guide
future
decisions,
need
not
be
provided
at
the
pre­
termination
stage..
We
recognize,
too,
that
both
.
welfare
authorities
and
recipients
have
an
interest
in
relatively
speedy
resolution
of
questions
of
eligibility,
that
they
are
used
to
dealing
with
one
another
informally,
and
that
some
welfare
departments
have
very
burdensome
caseloads.
These
considerations
justi&
the
limitation
of
the
pre­
termination
hearing
to
minimum
procedural
safeguards,
adapted
to
the
particular
characteristics
of
welfare
recipients,
and
to
the
limited
nature
of
the
controversies
to
be
resolved.
We
wish
to
add
that
we,
no
less
than
the
dissenters,
recognize
the
importance
of
not
imposing
upon
the
States
or
the
Federal
Government
in
this
developing
field
of
law
any
procedural
requirements
beyond
those
demanded
by
rudimentary
due
process.

"
The
fimdamental
requisite
of
due
process
of
law
is
the
opportunity
to
be
heard."
Grannis
v.
Ordean,
E.
1.
U.
S.
385.
394
(
1914).
The
hearing
must
be
"
at
a
meaningfbl
time
and
in
a
meaning&[
manner.''
Armstrong
v.
Manzo,
380
U.
S.
545,
553
(
1965).
In
.
the
present
context
these
principles
require
that
a
recipient
have
timely
and
adequate
notice
detailing
the
reasons
for
a
[
337
U.
S.
2%.
2631
proposed
termination,
and
an
effective
opportunity
to
defend
by
confronting
any
adverse
witnesses
and
by
presenting
his
own
arguments
and
evidence
orally.
These
rights
are
important
in
cases
such
as
those
before
us,
where
recipients
have
challenged
proposed
terminations
as
resting
on
incorrect
or
57
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Case
Law:
Supreme
Court
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misleading
factual
premises
or
on
misapplication
of
rules
or
policies
to
the
facts
of
particular
cases
­
15
We
are
not
prepared
to
say
that
the
seven­
day
notice
currently
provided
by
New
York
City
is
constitutionally
insufficient
per
se,
although
there
may
be
cases
where
fairness
would
require
that
a
longer
time
be
given.
Nor
do
we
see
any
constitutional
deficiency
in
the
content
or
form
of
the
notice.
New
York
employs
both
a
letter
and
a
personal
conference
with
a
caseworker
to
inform
a
recipient
of
the
precise
.
questions
raised
about
his
continued
eligibility.
Evidently
the
recipient
is
told
the
legal
and
factual
bases
for
the
Department's
doubts.
This
combination
is
probably
the
most
effective
method
of
communicating
with
recipients.

The
city's
procedures
presently
do
not
permit
recipients
to
appear
personally
with
or
without
counsel
before
the
official
who
finally
determines
continued
eligibility.
Thus
a
recipient
is
not
permitted
to
present
evidence
to
that
official
orally,
or
to
confront
or
cross­
examine
adverse
witnesses.
These
omissions
are
fatal
to
the
constitutional
adequacy
of
the
procedures.

The
opportunity
to
be
heard
must
be
tailored
to
the
[?!
E
U.
S.
24.2691
capacities
and
circumstances
of
those
who
are
to
be
heard.
UIt
is
not
enough
that
a
welfare
recipient
may
present
his
position
to
the
decision
maker
in
writing
or
secondhand
through
his
caseworker.
Written
submissions
are
an
unrealistic
option
for
most
recipients,
who
lack
the
educational
attainment
necessary
to
write
effectively
and
who
cannot
obtain
professional
assistance.
Moreover,
written
submissions
do
not
afford
the
flexibility
of
oral
presentations;
they
do
not
permit
the
recipient
to
mold
his
argument
to
the
issues
the
decision
maker
appears
to
regard
as
important.
Particularly
where
credibility
and
veracity
areat
issue,­
as
they
must
be
in
many
termination
proceedings,
written
submissions
are
a
wholly
unsatisfactory
basis
for
decision.
The
secondhand
presentation
to
the
decisionmaker
by
the
caseworker
has
its
own
deficiencies;
since
the
caseworker
usually
gathers
the
facts
upon
which
the
charge
of
ineligibility
rests,
the
presentation
of
the
recipient's
side
of
the
controversy
cannot
safely
be
!
eft
to
him.
Therefore
a
recipient
must
be
allowed
to
state
his
position
orally.
informal
procedures
will
suffice;
in
this
context
due
process
does
not
require
a
particular
order
of
proof
or
mode
of
offering
evidence.
Cf
HEW
Handbook,
pt.
IV,
6400
(
a).

In
almost
every
setting
where
important
decisions
turn
or!
cjiiestions
of
fact,
due
process
requires
an
opportunity
to
confront
and
cross­
examine
adverse
witnesses.
E.
g.,
ICC
v.
Louisville
&
N.
R.
Co.,
227
U.
S.
88,
93
­
94
(
19.13);
Willner
v.
Committee
on
Character
&
Fitness,
373
U.
S.
96,
103
­
104
(
1963).
What
we
said
in
(
397
[
J.
S.
2%.
27i:
j
Greene
v.
McElroy,
.~
60.
r;:
lS1­.
7i~~~..
490­
497(
1959),
is
particularly
pertinent
here:,

"
Certain
principles
have
remained
relatively
immutable
in
our
jurisprudence.
One
of
these
is
that
where
governmental
action
seriously
injures
an
individual,
and
the
reasonableness
of
the
action
depends
on
fact
findings,
the
evidence
used
to
prove
the
Government's
case
must
be
disclosed
to
the
individual
so
that
he
has
an
opportunity
to
show
that
it
is
untrue.
While
this
is
important
in
the
case
of
documentary
evidence,
it
is
even
more
important
where
the
evidence
consists
of
the
testimony
of
individuals
whose
memory
might
be
faulty
or
who,
in
fact,
might
be
perjurers
or
persons
motivated
by
malice,
vindictiveness,
intolerance,
prejudice,
or
jealousy.
We
have
formalized
these
protections
in
the
requirements
of
confrontation
and
cross­
examination.
They
have
ancient
roots.
They
find
expression
in
the
Sixth
Amendment
,
.
.
,
This
Court
has
been
zealous
to
protect
these
rights
from
erosion.
It
has
spoken
out
not
onIy
in
criminal
cases,
.
.
.
but
also
in
all
types
of
cases
where
administrative
.
.
.
actions
were
under
scrutiny."

Welfare
recipients
must
therefore
be
given
an
opportunity
to
confront
and
cross­
examine
the
witnesses
relied
on
by
the
department.
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States
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"
The
right
to
be
heard
would
be,
in
many
cases,
of
little
avail
if
it
did
not
comprehend
the
right
to
be
heard
by
counsel."
Powell
v.
Alabama,
387
U.
S.
45,
68
­
69
(
1932).
We
do
not
say
that
counsel
must
be
provided
at
the
pre­
termination
hearing,
but
only
that
the
recipient
must
be
allowed
to
retain
an
attorney
if
he
so
desires.
Counsel
can
help
delineate
the
issues,
present
the
factual
contentions
in
an
orderly
manner,
conduct
cross­
examination,
and
generally
safeguard
the
1535
U
S.
254,3:
11
interests
of
the
recipient.
We
do
not
anticipate
that
this
assistance
will
unduly
prolong
or
otherwise
encumber
the
hearing.
Evidently
HEW
has
reached
the
same
conclusion.­
See45
CFR
205.10,
34
Fed.
Reg.
1144
(
1969);
45
CFR
220.25,
34
Fed.
Reg.
13595
(
1969).

Finally,
the
decisionmaker's
conclusion
as
to
a
recipient's
eligibility
must
rest
solely
on
the
legal
rules
and
evidence
adduced
at
the
hearing.
Ohio
Bell
Tel.
Co.
v.
PUC,
­~­~~­­.
U..
S~.­.~.~~~­(
1937);
United
States
v.
Abilene
&
S.
R.
Co.,
265
U.
S.
274,
288
­
289
(
1924).
To
demonstrate
compliance
with
this
elementary
requirement,
the
decision
maker
should
state
the
reasons
for
his
determination
and
indicate
the
evidence
he
relied
on,
cf.
Wichita
R.
&
Light
Co.
v.
PUC,
260
U.
S.
48.
57
­
59
(
1922),
though
his
statement
need
not
amount
to
a
full
opinion
or
even
formal
findings
of
fact
and
conclusions
of
law.
And,
of
course,
an
impartial
decision
maker
is
essential.
Cf.
In
re
Murchison,
349
U.
S.
133
(
1955);
Wong
Yang
Sung
v.
McGrath,
339
U.
S.
33.
45
­
46
(
1950).
We
agree
with
the
District
Court
that
prior
involvement
in
some
aspects
of
a
case
will
not
necessarily
bar
a
welfare
official
from
acting
as
a
decision
maker.
He
should
not,
however,
have
participated
in
making
the
determination
under
review.

Affirmed.

[
For
dissenting
opinion
of
MR.
CHIEF
JUSTICE
BURGER,
see
post,
p.
282.1
[
For
dissenting
opinion
of
h4R.
JUSTICE
STEWART,
see
post,
p.
285.1
Footnotes
[
Footnote
1
]
AFDC
was
established
by
the
Social
Security
Act
of
1935,49
Stat.
627,
as
amended,
42
U.
S.
C.
601­
610
(
1964
ed.
and
Supp.
IV).
It
is
a
categorical
assistance
program
supported
by
federal
grants­
in­
aid
but
administered
by
the
States
according
to
regulations
of
the
Secretary
of
Health,
Education,
and
Welfare.
See
N.
Y.
Social
Welfare
Law
343­
362
(
1966).
We
considered
other
aspects
of
AFDC
in
King
v.
Smith,
392
U.
S.
309
(
1968),
and
in
Shapiro
v.
Thompson;
394
1i.
S.
618
(
1969).
Home
Relief
is
a
general
assistance
program
financed
and
administered
solely
by
New
York
state
and
local
governments.
N.
Y.
Social
Welfare
Law
157­
165
(
1966),
since
July
1,
1967,
Social
Services
Law
157­
166.
It
assists
any
person
unable
to
support
himself
or
to
secure
support
from
other
sources.
Id.,
158.

[
btnote
2
]
Two
suits
were
brought
and
consolidated
in
the
District
Court.
The
named
plaintiffs
were
20
in
number,
including
intervenors.
Fourteen
had
been
or
were
about
to
be
cut
off
from
AFDC,
and
six
from
Home
Relief.
During
the
course
of
this
litigation
most,
though
not
all,
of
the
plaintiffs
either
received
a
"
fair
hearing"
(
see
infra,
at
259­
260)
or
were
restored
to
the
rolls
without
a
hearing.
However,
even
in
many
of
the
cases
where
payments
have
been
resumed,
the
underlying
questions
of
eligibility
that
resulted
in
the
bringing
of
this
suit
have
not
been
resolved.
For
example,
Mrs.
Altagracia
Guzman
alleged
that
she
was
in
danger
of
losing
AFDC
payments
for
failure
to
cooperate
with
the
City
Department
of
Social
Services
in
suing
her
estranged
husband.
She
contended
that
the
departmental
policy
requiring
such
cooperation
was
inapplicable
to
the
facts
of
her
case.
The
record
shows
that
payments
to
Mrs.
Guzman
.
have
not
been
terminated,
but
there
is
no
indication
that
the
basic
dispute
over
her
duty
to
cooperate
has
been
resolved,
or
that
the
alleged
danger
of
termination
has
been
removed.
Home
Relief
payments
to
Juan
IkJesus
were
terminated
because
he
refixed
to
accept
counselling
and
rehabilitation
for
drug
addiction.
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Mr.
DeJesus
maintains
that
he
[?
Y:
L!
S.
254,2571
does
not
use
drugs.
His
payments
were
restored
the
day
after
his
complaint
was
filed.
But
there
is
nothing
in
the
record
to
indicate
that
the
underlying
factual
dispute
in
his
case
has
been
settled.

[
F~
etn.
gt.
c­
3­
1The
adoption
in
February
1968
and
the
amendment
in
April
of
Regulation
35
1.26
coincided
with
or
followed
several
revisions
by
the
Department
of
Health,
Education,
and
Welfare
of
its
regulations
implementing
42
U.
S.
C.
602
(
a)
(
4),
which
is
the
provision
of
the
Social
Security
Act
that
requires
a
State
to
afford
a
"
fair
hearing"
to
any
recipient
of
aid
under
a
federally
assisted
program
before
termination
of
his
aid
becomes
final.
This
requirement
is
satisfied
by
a
post­
termination
"
fair
hearing"
under
reylations
presently
in
effect.
See
HEW
Handbook
of
Public
Assistance
Administration
(
hereafter
HEW
Handbook),
pt.
IV,
6200­
6400.
A
new
HEW
regulation,
34
Fed.
Reg.
1144
(
1969),
now
scheduled
to
take
effect
in
July
1970,
34
Fed.
Reg.
13595
(
1969),
would
require
continuation
of
AFDC
payments
until
the
final
decision
after
a
"
fair
hearing"
and
would
give
recipients
a
right
to
appointed
counsel
at
"
fair
hearings."
45
CFR
205.10,34
Fed.
Reg.
1144
(
1969);
45
CFR
220.25,
34
Fed.
Reg.
1356
(
1969).
For
the
safeguards
specified
at
such
"
fair
hearings"
see
HEW
Handbook,
pt.
IV,
6200­
6400.
Another
recent
regulation
now
in
effect
requires
a
local
agency
administering
AFDC
to
give
"
advance
notice
of
questions
it
has
about
an
individual'seligibility
so
that
a
recipient
has
an
opportunity
to
discuss
his
situation
before
receiving
formal
written
notice
of
reduction
in
payment
or
termination
of
assistance."
Id.,
pt.
IV,
2300
(
d)
(
5).
This
case
presents
no
issue
of
the
validity
or
construction
{.;
3?
tr
S.
2.
j4,?
581
of
the
federal
regulations.
It
is
only
subdivision
(
b)
of
35
1.26of
the
New
York
State
regulations
and
implementing
procedure
68­
18
of
New
York
City
that
pose
the
constitutional
question
before
us.
Cf
Shapiro
v.
Thompson,
394
U.
S.
618.
641
(
1969).
Even
assuming
that
the
constitutional
question
might
be
avoided
in
the
context
of
AFDC
by
construction
of
the
Social
Security
Act
or
of
the
present
federal
regulations
thereunder,
or
by
waiting
for
the
new
reguIations
to
become
effective,
the
question
must
be
faced
and
decided
in
the
context
of
New
York's
Home
Relief
program,
to
which
the
procedures
also
apply.

[
F~.
Ot~.
ot.
c..$]
These
omissions
contrast
with
the
provisions
of
subdivision
(
a)
of
35
1.26,
the
validity
of
which
is
not
at
issue
in
this
Court.
That
subdivision
also
requires
written
notification
to
the
recipient
at
least
seven
days
prior
to
the
proposed
effective
date
of
the
reasons
for
the
proposed
discontinuance
or
suspension.
However,
the
notification
must
krther
advise
the
recipient
that
if
he
makes
a
request
therefore
he
will
be
afforded
an
opportunity
to
appear
at
a
time
ad
place
indicated
before
the
official
identified
in
the
notice,
who
will
review
his
case
with
him
and
allow
him
to
present
such
written
and
oral
evidence
as
the
recipient
may
have
to
demonstrate
why
aid
should
not
be
discontinued
or
suspended.
The
District
Court
assumed
that
subdivision
(
a)
would
be
construed
to
afford
rights
of
confrontation
and
cross­
examination
and
a
decision
based
solely
on
the
record.
294
F.
Supp.
893,
906­
907
(
1968).

[
Footriole
S
]
I?.
Y.
Social
Welfare
Law
353
(
2)
(
1
966)
provides
for
a
post­
termination
"
fair
hearing"
pursuant
to
42
U.
S.
C.
602
(
a)
(
4).
See
n.
3,
supra.
Although
the
District
Court
noted
that
HEW
had
raised
some
objections
to
the
New
York
"
fair
hearing"
procedures,
294
F.
Supp.,
at
898
n.
9,
these
objections
are
not
at
issue
in
this
Court.
Shortly
before
this
suit
was
filed,
New
York
State
adopted
a
similar
provision
for
a
"
fair
hearing"
in
terminations
[;
wt:,
s
3~.
2ti(;
1
of
Home
Relief
18
NYCRR
84.2­
84.23.
In
both
AFDC
and
Home
Relief
the
"
fair
hearing"
must
be
held
within
10
working
days
of
the
request,
84.6,
with
decision
within
12
working
days
thereafter,
84.15.
It
was
conceded
in
oral
argument
that
these
time
limits
are
not
in
fact
observed.

[
Footnote
6
]
Current
HEW
regulations
require
the
States
to
make
full
retroactive
payments
(
with
federal
matching
fbnds)
whenever
a
"
fair
hearing"
results
in
a
reversal
of
a
termination
of
assistance.
I­
IEW
Handbook,
pt.
IV,
6200
(
k),
6300
(
g),
6500
(
a);
see
18
NYCRR
358.8.
Under
New
York
State
regulations
retroactive
payments
can
also
be
made,
with
certain
limitations,
to
correct
an
erroneous
termination
discovered
before
a
"
fair
hearing"
has
been
held.
I8
NYCRR
35
1.27.
HEW
regulations
also
authorize,
but
t'indl.
aw:
United
States
Case
Law:
Supreme
Court
wysiwyg::/
11/
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tp://
caselaw
.
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etcuse.
pilcourt­
us&
vo~~

do
not
require,
the
States
to
continue
AFDC
payments
without
loss
of
federal
matching
hnds
pending
completion
of
as"
fairhearing."
HEW
Handbook,
pt.
IV,
6500
(
b).
The
new
HEW
regulations
presently
scheduled
to
become
effective
July
1,
1970,
will
supersede
all
of
these
provisions.
See
n.
3,
supra.

[
F­
1oLii.
ot.~­.
7­]
Appellant
does
not
question
the
recipient's
due
process
right
to
evidentiary
review
after
termination.
For
a
general
discussion
of
the
provision
of
an
evidentiary
hearing
prior
to
termination,
see
Comment,
The
Constitutional
Minimum
for
the
Termination
of
Welfare
Benefits:
The
Need
for
and
Requirements
of
a
Prior
Hearing,
68
Mich.
L.
Rev.
1
12
(
1
969).

[
Footnote
8
]
It
may
be
realistic
today
to
regard
welfare
entitlements
as
more
like
"
property"
than
a
"
gratuity."
Much
of
the
existing
wealth
in
this
country
takes
the
form
of
rights
that
do
not
fall
within
traditional
common­
law
concepts
of
property.
It
has
been
aptly
noted
that
"[
slociety
today
is
built
around
entitlement.
The
automobile
dealer
has
his
franchise,
the
doctor
and
lawyer
their
professional
licenses,
the
worker
his
union
membership,
contract,
and
pension
rights,
the
executive
his
contract
and
stock
options;
all
are
devices
to
aid
security
and
independence.
Many
of
the
most
important
of
these
entitlements
now
flow
from
government:
subsidies
to
farmers
and
businessmen,
routes
for
airlines
and
channels
for
television
stations;
long
term
contracts
for
defense,
space,
and
education;
social
security
pensions
for
individuals.
Such
sources
of
security,
whether
private
or
public,
are
no
longer
regarded
as
luxuries
or
gratuities;
to
the
recipients
they
are
essentials,
hlly
deserved,
and
in
no
sense
a
form
of
charity.
It
is
only
the
poor
whose
entitlements,
although
recognized
by
public
policy,
have
not
been
effectively
enforced."
Reich,
Individual
Rights
and
Social
Welfare:
The
Emerging
Legal
Issues,
74
Yale
L.
J.
1245,
1255
(
1965).
See
also
Reich,
The
New
Property,
73
Yale
L.
J.
733
(
1964).

[
Footnote
9
]
See
also
Goldsmith
v.
United
States
Board
of
Tax
Appeals,
270
U.
S.
117
(
1926)
(
right
of
a
certified
public
accountant
to
practice
before
the
Board
of
Tax
Appeals);
Hornsby
v.
Allen,
326
F.
2d
605
/
397
2%;
2.531
(
C.
A.
5th
Cir.
1964)
(
right
to
obtain
a
retail
liquor
store
license);
Dixon
v.
Alabama
State
Board
of
Education,
294
F.
2d
150
(
C.
A.
5th
Cir.),
cert.
denied,
.~
6S­~
1S.,.
9~­~.­(
1961)(
right
to
attend
a
public
college).

[
Footnote
10
]
One
Court
of
Appeals
has
stated:
"
In
a
wide
variety
of
situations,
it
has
long
been
recognized
that
where
harm
to
the
public
is
threatened,
and'the
private
interest
infringed
is
reasonably
deemed
to
be
of
less
importance,
an
official
body
can
take
summary
action
pending
a
later
hearing."
R.
A.
Holman
&
Co.
v.
SEC,
112
U.
S.
App.
D.
C.
43,
47,
299
F.
2d
127,
131,
cert.
denied,
370
1J.
S.
91
1
(
1962)
(
suspension
of
exemption
from
stock
registration
requirement).
See
also,
for
example,
Ewing
v.
Mytinger
&
Casselberry,
Inc.,
339
U.
S.
594
(
1950)
(
seizure
of
mislabeled
vitamin
product);
North
American
Cold
Storage
Co.
v.
Chicago,
21
1
U.
S.
306
(
1908)
(
seizure
of
food
not
fit
for
human
use);
Yakus
v.
United
States,
321
L.
S.
414
(
1944)
(
adoption
of
wartime
price
regulations);
Gonzalez
v.
Freeman,
118
U.
S.
App.
D.
C.
180,
334
F.
2d
570
(
1964)
(
disqualification
of
a
contractor
to
do
business
with
the
Government).
In
Cafeteria
&
Restaurant
Workers
Union
v.
McElroy,
supra,
at
896,
summary
dismissal
of
a
public
employee
was
upheld
[
j!
j7
1,:
S.
35.1.
zi;/­
ij
because
"[;
In
[
its]
proprietary
military
capacity,
the
Federal
Government
.
.
.
has
traditionally
exercised
unfettered
control,"
and
because
the
case
involved
the
Government's
"
dispatch
of
its
own
internal
affairs."
Cf.
Perkins
v.
Lukens
Steel
Co.,
.~~.~­.
U~
S.~­.
l.
l.­~­­(
1940).

[
Footnote
1
I
]
Administrative
determination
that
a
person
is
ineligible
for
welfare
may
also
render
him
ineligible
for
participation
in
state­
financed
medical
programs.
See
N.
Y.
Social
Welfare
Law
366
(
1966).

[
btnote
I2
]
His
impaired
adversary
position
is
particularly
telling
in
light
of
the
welfare
bureaucracy's
difficultiesi'n
reaching
correct
decisions
on
eligibility.
See
Comment,
Due
Process
and
the
Right
to
a
Prior
1leal­
ing
in
Welfare
Cases,
37
Ford.
L.
Rev.
604,
6
10­
6
1
1
(
1969).
[
F.
ootnote.
l­~]
See,
e.
g.,
Reich,
supra,
n.
8,
74
Yale
L.
J.,
at
1255.

[
Footnote
14
1Due
process
does
not,
of
course,
require
two
hearings.
If,
for
example,
a
State
simply
wishes
to
continue
benefits
until
after
a
"
fair"
hearing
there
will
be
no
need
for
a
preliminary
hearing.

[
Footnote
15
1
This
case
presents
no
question
requiring
our
determination
whether
due
process
requires
only
an
opportunity
for
written
submission,
or
an
opportunity
both
for
written
submission
and
oral
argument,
where
there
are
no
factual
issues
in
dispute
or
where
the
application
of
the
rule
of
law
is
not
intertwined
with
factual
issues.
See
FCC
v.
WJR,
.7.~
7..
r;
r,.
S_
26S~..~~
j­­
277(
1
949).

[
Footnote
16
J
"[
Tlhe
prosecution
of
an
appeal
demands
a
degree
of
security,
awareness,
tenacity,
and
ability
which
few
dependent
people
have."
Wedemeyer
&
Moore,
The
American
Welfare
System,
54
Calif.
L.
Rev.
326,
342
(
1966).

MR.
JUSTICE
BLACK,
dissenting.

In
the
last
half
century
the
United
States,
along
with
many,
perhaps
most,
other
nations
of
the
world,
has
moved
far
toward
becoming
a
welfare
state,
that
is,
a
nation
that
for
one
reason
or
another
taxes
its
most
~

[
WtT.
S.
254,7­
72]
affluent
people
to,
help
support,
feed,
clothe,
and
shelter
its
less
fortunate
citizens.
The
result
is
that
today
more
than
nine
million
men,
women,
and
children
in
the
United
States
receive
some
kind
of
state
or
federally
financed
public
assistance
in
the
form
of
aliowances
or
gratuities,
generally
paid
them
periodically,
usually
by
the
week,
month,
or
quarter.
LSince
these
gratuities
are
paid
on
the
basis
of
need,
the
list
of
recipients
is
not
static,
and
some
people
go
off
the
lists
and
others
are
added
from
time
to
time.
These
ever­
changing
lists
put
a
constant
administrative
burden
on
government
and
it
certainly
could
not
have
reasonably
anticipated
that
this
burden
would
include
the
additional
procedural
expense
imposed
by
the
Court
today,

The
dilemma
of
the
ever­
increasing
poor
in
the
midst
of
constantly
growing
affluence
presses
upon
US
and
must
inevitably
be
met
within
the
framework
of
our
democratic
constitutional
government,
if
our
system
is
to
survive
as
such.
it
was
largely
to
escape
just
such
pressing
economic
problems
and
attendant
government
repression
that
people
from
Europe,
Asia,
and
other
areas
settled
this
country
and
formed
our
Nation.
Many
of
those
settlers
had
personally
suffered
from
persecutions
of
various
kinds
and
wanted
to
get
away
from
governments
that
had
unrestrained
powers
to
make
life
miserable
for
their
citizens.
It
was
for
this
reason,
or
so
i
believe,
that
on
reaching
these
new
lands
the
early
settlers
undertook
to
curb
their
governments
by
confining
their
powers
i397
US.
25;.
2731
within
written
boundaries,
which
eventually
became
written
constitutions.
LThey
wrote
their
basic
charters
as
nearly
as
men's
collective
wisdom
could
do
SO
as
to
proclaim
to
their
people
and
their
officials
an
emphatic
command
that:
"
Thus
far
and
no
farther
shall
you
go;
and
where
we
neither
delegate
powers
to
you,
nor
prohibit
your
exercise
of
them,
we
the
people
are
left
free."
2
Representatives
of
the
people
of
the
Thirteen
Original
Colonies
spent
long,
hot
months
in
the
summer
of
1787
in
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania,
creating
a
government
of
limited
powers.
They
divided
it
into
three
departments
­
Legislative,
Judicial,
and
Executive.
The
Judicial
Department
was
to
have
no
part
whatever
in
making
any
laws.
In
fact
proposals
looking
to
vesting
some
power
in
the
Judiciary
to
take
part
in
the
legislative
process
and
veto
laws
were
offered,
considered,
and
rejected
by
the
Constitutional
Convention.
4­
Inmy
(
397
E.
S.
251,274]
judgment
there
is
not
one
word,
phrase,
or
sentence
from
the
beginning
to
the
end
of
the
Constitution
from
which
it
can
be
inferred
that
judges
were
granted
any
such
legislative
power.
'
True,
Marbury
v.
Madison,
1
Cranch
137
(
18031,
held,
and
properly,
I
think,
that
courts
must
be
the
final
interpreters
of
the
Constitution,
and
I
recognize
that
the
holding
can
provide
an
opportunity
to
slide
imperceptibly
into
constitutional
amendment
and
law
making.
But
when
federal
judges
use
this
judicial
power
for
legislative
purposes,
I
think
they
wander
out
of
their
field
of
vested
powers
and
transgress
into
the
area
constitutionally
assigned
to
the
Congress
and
the
people.
That
is
precisely
what
I
believe
the
Court
is
doing
in
this
case.
Hence
my
dissent.

The
more
than
a
million
names
on
the
relief
rolls
in
New
York,
.5_
andthe
more
than
nine
million
names
on
the
rolls
of
all
the
50
States
were
not
put
there
at
random.
The
names
are
there
because
state
welfare
officials
believed
that
those
people
were
eligible
for
assistance.
Probably
in
the
officials'
haste
to
make
out
the
lists
many
names
were
put
there
erroneously
in
order
to
alleviate
immediate
suffering,
and
undoubtedly
some
people
are
drawing
relief
who
are
not
entitled
under
the
law
to
do
so.
Doubtless
some
draw
relief
checks
from
time
to
time
who
know
they
are
not
eligible,
either
because
they
are
not
actually
in
need
or
for
some
other
reason.
Many
of
those
who
thus
draw
undeserved
gratuities
are
without
sufficient
property
to
enable
the
government
to
collect
back
from
them
any
money
they
wronghlly
receive.
But
the
Court
today
holds
that
it
would
violate
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
to
stop
paying
those
people
weekly
or
monthly
allowances
unless
the
government
first
affords
them
a
full
"
evidentiary
hearing"
even
[
347
1:
s
2%.
2751
though
welfare
officials
are
persuaded
that
the
recipients
are
not
rightfully
entitled
to
receive
a
penny
under
the
law
In
other
words,
although
some
recipients
might
be
on
the
lists
for
payment
wholly
because
of
deliberate
fraud
on
their
part,
the
Court
holds
that
the
government
is
helpless
and
must
continue,
untii
after
an
evidentiary
hearing,
to
pay
money
that
it
does
not
owe,
never
has
owed,
and
never
could
owe.
I
do
not
believe
there
is
any
provision
in
our
Constitution
that
should
thus
paralyze
the
government's
efforts
to
protect
itself
against
making
payments
to
people
who
are
not
entitled
to
them.

Particularly
do
I
not
think
that
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
should
be
given
such
an
unnecessarily
broad
construction.
That
Amendment
came
into
being
primarily
to
protect
Negroes
from
discrimination,
and
while
some
of
its
language
can.
and
does
protect
others,
all
know
that
the
chief
purpose
behind
it
was
to
protect
ex­
slaves.
Cf.
Adamson
v.
California,
332
U.
S.
36,
71
­
72,
and
n.
5
(
1947)
(
dissenting
opinion).
The
Court,
however,
relies
upon
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
and
in
effect
says
that
failure
of
the
government
to
pay
a
promised
charitable
installment
to
an
individual
deprives
that
individual
of
his
own
property,
in
violation
of
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
It
somewhat
strains
credulity
to
say
that
the
government's
promise
of
charity
to
an
individual
is
property
belonging
to
that
individual
when
the
government
denies
that
the
individual
is
honestly
entitled
to
receive
such
a
payment.

I
would
have
little,
if
any,
objection
to
the
majority's
decision
in
this
case
if
it
were
written
as
the
report
of
the
House
Committee
on
Education
and
Labor,
but
as
an
opinion
ostensibly
resting
on
the
language
of
the
Constitution
I
find
it
woehlly
deficient.
Once
the
verbiage
is
pared
away
it
is
obvious
that
this
Court
today
adopts
the
views
of
the
District
Court
"
that
to
cut
off
a
welfare
recipient
in
the
face
of.
.
.
'
brutal
need'
without
a
prior
1397
~
J.
s.
2j:
i.
276;
hearing
of
some
sort
is
unconscionable,"
and
therefore,
says
the
Court,
unconstitutional.
The
majority
reaches
this
result
by
a
process
of
weighing
"
the
recipient's
interest
in
avoiding"
the
termination
of
welfare
benefits
against
"
the
governmental
interest
in
summary
adjudication."
Ante,
at
263.
Today's
balancing
act
requires
a
"
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearing,"
yet
there
is
nothing
that
indicates
what
tomorrow's
balance
will
be.
Although
the
majority
attempts
to
bolster
its
decision
with
limited
quotations
from
prior
cases,
it
is
obvious
that
today's
result
does
not
depend
on
the
language
of
the
Constitution
itself
or
the
principles
of
other
decisions,
but
solely
on
the
collective
judgment
of
the
majority
as
to
what
would
be
a
fair
and
humane
procedure
in
this
case.

This
decision
is
thus
only
another
variant
of
the
view
often
expressed
by
some
members
of
this
Court
that
the
Due
Process
Clause
forbids
any
conduct
that
a
majority
of
the
Court
believes
"
unfair,"
"
indecent,"
or
"
shocking
to
their
consciences."
See,
e.
g.,
Rochin
v.
California,
332
U.
S.
165.
172
(
1
952).
Neither
these
words
nor
any
like
them
appear
anywhere
in
the
Due
Process
Clause.
If
they
did,
they
would
leave
the
niajority
of
Justices
free
to
hold
any
conduct
unconstitutional
that
they
should
concludeaon
their
own
to
be
tinfair
or
shocking
to
them.
&
Had
the
drafters
of
the
Due
Process
Clause
meant
to
leave
judges
such
I­
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States
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ambulatory
power
to
declare
[
W
US.
2~.
277]
laws
unconstitutional,
the
chief
value
of
a
written
constitution,
as,
the
Founders
saw
it,
would
have
been
lost.
In
fact,
if
that
view
of
due
process
is
correct,
the
Due
Process
Clause
could
easily
swallow
up
all
other
parts
of
the
Constitution.
And
truly
the
Constitution
would
always
be
"
what
the
judges
say
it
is''
at
a
given
moment,
not
what
the
Founders
wrote
into
the
document.
2­
A
written
constitution,
designed
to
guarantee
protection
against
governmental
abuses,
including
those
of
judges,
must
have
written
standards
that
mean
something
definite
and
have
an
explicit
content.
I
regret
very
much
to
be
compelled
to
say
that
the
Court
today
makes
a
drastic
and
dangerous
departure
fiom
a
Constitution
written
to
control
and
limit
the
government
and
the
judges
and
moves
toward
a
constitution
designed
to
be
no
more
and
no
less
than
what
the
judges
of
a
particular
social
and
economic
philosophy
declare
on
the
one
hand
to
be
fair
or
on
the
other
hand
to
be
shocking
and
unconscionable.

The
procedure
required
today
as
a
matter
of
constitutional
law
finds
no
precedent
in
our
legal
system.
Reduced
to
its
simplest
terms,
the
problem
in
this
case
is
similar
to
that
frequently
encountered
when
two
parties
have
an
ongoing
legal
relationship
that
requires
one
party
to
make
periodic
payments
to
the
other.
Often
the
situation
arises
where
the
party
''
owing''
the
money
stops
paying
it
and
justifies
his
conduct
by
arguing
that
the
recipient
is
not
legally
entitled
to
payment.
The
recipient
can,
of
course,
disagree
and
go
to
court
to
compel
payment.
But
I
know
of
no
situation
in
our
legal
system
in
which
the
person
alleged
to
owe
money
to
[
337
G.
S.
254,2781
another
is
required
by
law
to
continue
making
payments
to
a
judgment­
proof
claimant
without
the
benefit
of
any
security
or
bond
to
insure
that
these
payments
can
be
recovered
if
he
wins
his
legal
argument.
Yet.
today's
decision
in
no
way
obligates
the
welfare
recipient
to
pay
back
any
benefits
wrongfblly
received
during
the
pre­
termination
evidentiary
hearings
or
post
any
bond,
and
in
all
"
fairness"
it
could
not
do
so.
These
recipients
are
by
definition
too
poor
to
post
a
bond
or
to
repay
the
benefits
that,
as
the
majority
assumes,
must
be
spent
as
received
to
insure
survival.

The
Court
apparently
feels
that
this
decision
will
benefit
the
poor
and
needy.
In
my
judgment
the
eventual
result
will
be
just
the
opposite.
While
today's
decision
requires
only
an
administrative,
evidentiary
hearing,
the
inevitable
logic
of
the
approach
taken
will
lead
to
constitutionally
imposed,
time­
consuming
delays
of
a
full
adversary
process
of
administrative
and
judicial
review.
In
the
next
case
the
welfare
recipients
are
bound
to
argue
that
cutting
off
benefits
before
judicial
review
of
the
agency's
decision
is
also
a
denial
of
due
process.
Since,
by
hypothesis,
termination
of
aid
at
that
point
may
still
"
deprive
an
eligible
recipient
of
the
very
means
by
which
to
live
while
he
waits,:'
ante,
at
264,
I
would
be
surprised
if
the
weighing
process
did
not
compel
the
conclusion
that
termination
without
fill
judicial
review
would
be
unconscionable.
Mer
all,
at
each
step,
as
the
majority
seems
to
feel,
the
issue
is
only
one
of
weighing
the
government's
pocketbook
against
the
actual
survival
of
the
recipient,
and
surely
that
balance
must
always
tip
in
favor
of
the
individual.
Similarly
today's
decision
requires
only
the
opportunity
to
have
the
benefit
of
counsel
at
the
administrative
hearing,
but
it
is
difficult
to
believe
that
the
same
reasoning
process
would
not
require
the
appointment
of
counsel,
for
otherwise
the
right
to
counsel
is
a
meaningless
one
since
these
C347
U.
S.
3,
17Oj
people
are
too
poor
to
hire
their
own
advocates.
Cf
Gideon
v.
Wainwright,
372
U.
S.
335,
344
(
1963).
Thus
the
end
result
of
today's
decision
may
well
be
that
the
government,
once
it
decides
to
give
welfare
benefits,
cannot
reverse
that
decision
until
the
recipient
has
had
the
benefits
of
full
administrative
and
judicial
review,
including,
of
course,
the
opportunity
to
present
his
case
to
this
Court.
Since
this
process
will
usually
entail
a
delay
of
several
years,
the
inevitable
result
of
such
a
constitutionally
imposed
burden
will
be
that
the
government
will
not
put
a
claimant
on
the
roIIs
initially
until
it
.
has
made
an
exhaustive
investigation
to
determine
his
eligibility.
While
this
Court
will
perhaps
have
insured
that
no'
needy
person
will
be
taken
off
the
rolls
without
a
full
"
due
process"
proceeding,
it
will
also
have
insured
that
many
will
never
get
OR
the
rolls,
or
at
least
that
they
will
remain
destitute
during
the
lengthy
proceedings
followed
to
determine
initial
eligibility.

For
the
foregoing
reasons
I
dissent
from
the
Court's
holding.
The
operation
of
a
welfare
state
is
a
new
.~
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States
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Court
wysiwyg://
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1ihnp:
iicase~
aw
experiment
for
our
Nation,
For
this
reason,
among
others,
I
feel
that
new
experiments
in
carrying
out
a
welfare
program
should
not
be
frozen
into
our
constitutional
structure.
They
should
be
left,
as
are
other
legislative
determinations,
to
the
Congress
and
the
legislatures
that
the
people
elect
to
make
our
laws.

[
F0.~
tfiOt­~­
ll]
This
figure
includes
all
recipients
of
Old­
age
Assistance,
Aid
to
Families
with
Dependent
Ckildren,
Aid
to
the
Blind,
Aid
to
the
Permanently
and
Totally
Disabled,
and
general
assistance.
In
this
case
appellants
are
AFDC
and
general
assistance
recipients.
In
New
York
State
alone
there
are
95
1,000
AFDC
recipients
and
108,000
on
general
assistance.
In
the
Nation
as
a
whole
the
comparable
figures
are
6,080,000
and
391,000.
U.
S.
Bureau
of
the
Census,
Statistical
Abstract
of
the
United
States:
1969
(
90th
ed.),
Table
435,
p.
297.

[
F.
g.
Oj.
n.
ote.
2.]
The
goal
of
a
written
constitution
with
fixed
limits
on
governmental.
power
had
long
been
desired.
Prior
to
our
colonial
constitutions,
the
closest
man
had
come
to
realizing
this
goal
was
the
political
movement
of
the
Levellers
in
England
in
the
1640'
s.
J.
Frank,
The
Levellers
(
1955).
In
1647
the
Levellers
proposed
the
adoption
of
An
Agreement
of
the
People
which
set
forth
written
limitations
on
the
English
Government.
This
proposal
contained
many
of
the
ideas
which
later
were
incorporated
in
the
constitutions
of
this
Nation.
Id.,
at
135­
147.

[
Footnote
3
J
This
command
is
expressed
in
the
Tenth
Amendment:
"
The
powers
not
delegated
to
the
United
States
by
the
Constitution,
nor
prohibited
by
it
to
the
States,
are
reserved
to
the
States
respectively,
or
to
the
people."

[
Footnotg4­]
It
was
proposed
that
members
of
the
judicial
branch
would
sit
on
a
Council
of
Revision
which
would
consider
legislation
and
have
the
power
to
veto
it.
This
proposal
was
rejected.
J.
Elliot,
1
Elliot's
Debates
160,
164,
214
(
Journal
of
the
Federal
Convention);
395,
398
(
Yates'
Minutes);
vol.
5,
pp.
151,
164­
166,
344­
349
(
Madison's
Notes)
(
Lippincott
ed.
1876).
It
was
also
suggested
that
The
Chief
Justice
would
serve
as
a
member
of
the
President's
executive
council,
but
this
proposal
was
similarly
rejected.
Id.,
vol.
5,
pp.
442,
445,
446,
462.

[
Footnote
5
3
See
n.
1,
supra.

[
Footnote
6
J
I
am
aware
that
some
feel
that
the
process
employed
in
reaching.
today's
decision
is
not
dependent
on
the
individual
views
of
the
Justices
involved,
but
is
a
mere
objective
search
for
the
"
collective
conscience
of
mankind,"
but
in
my
view
that
description
is
only
a
euphemism
for
an
individual'sjudgment.
Judges
are
as
human
as
anyone
and
as
likely
as
others
to
see
the
world
through
their
own
eyes
and
find
the
"
collective
conscience"
remarkably
similar
to
their
own.
Cf
Griswold
v.
Connecticut,
381
U.
S.
479.
5
18
­
519
(
1965)
(
BLACK,
J.,
dissenting);
Sniadach
v.
Family
Finance
Corp.,
395
U.
S.
337.
350
­
351
(
1969)
(
BLACK,
J.,
dissenting).

[
Footnote
7
]
To
realize
how
uncertain
a
standard
of
"
fundamental
fairness"
wouid
be,
one
has
only
to
reflect
for
a
moment
on
the
possible
disagreement
if
the
"
fairness"
of
the
procedure
in
this
case
were
propounded
to
the
head
of
the
National
Welfare
Rights
Organization,
the
president
of
the
national
Chamber
of
Commerce,
and
the
chairman
of
the
John
Birch
Society.
1397
f>.
S.
254,2Ycj]

Copyrighl
01994­
2000FindLaw
Inc.
P
3,

Office
of
Government
Operations
Legal
Counsel
Division
MEMORANDUM
TO:

FROM:

DATE:

SUBJECT:
Robert
R.
Rigsby
Corporation
Counsel
Darryl
G.
Gorman
Senior
Deputy
Corporation
Counsel
for
Government
Operations
Legal
Counsel
Division
October
31,2000
Statutory
Functions
of
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
(
AL­
00­
534)

Pursuant
to
your
request,
this
is
to
provide
you
with
a
list
of
mandatory
and
discretionary
statutory
functions
of
the
Ofice
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
(
OCC). 
In
addition,
I
have
attached
a
copy
of
the
December
9,1598
memorandum
fiom
Judge
John
M.
Ferren,
then­
Corporation
Counsel,
which
references
OCC s
obligations
as
set
forth
in
Reorganization
Order
No.
50,
as
amended,
effective
June
26,
1953,
and
which
fully
discusses
OCC s
role
as
chief
litigator
for
the
District
government.
Judge
Ferren s
memorandum
also
contains
an
appendix
containing
a
table
that
lists
agencies
and
their
statutory
authority
with
respect
to
whether
the
agency
does,
or
does
not,
have
independent
authority
to
represent
itself.

Every
effort
has
been
made
to
list
all
references
to
the
statutory
duties
of
the
OCC.
However,
it
is
possible
that
a
particular
statute,
or
statutes,
has
been
inadvertently
omitted?
Accordingly,
I
will
continue
to
update
this
list
as
omissions
are
discovered.

I
These
functions
are
distinguished
fiom
functions
performed
by
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
which,
while
they
are
not
statutory,
are
necessary
in
order
for
the
Office
to
successfully
meet
its
statutory
obligations.
Further,
the
performance
of
the
statutory
duties
referenced
in
this
memorandum
may
require
the
OCC
to
perform
ancillary
functions,
not
referenced
herein,
in
the
furtheranceof
its
mandatory
or
permissive
duties.

*
This
is
especially
true
of
those
laws
which
have
not
yet
been
codified.
STATUTORY
FUNCTIONS
A.
Mandatory3
1.
D.
C.
Code
6
1­
263
(
d)
(
3)
(
A)
­
The
Mayor
shall
provide
assistance
to
the
Advisory
Neighborhood
Commissions
in
the
following
areas:
(
A)
Legal
interpretations
of
statutes
concerning
or
affecting
the
Commissions,
or
of
issues
or
concerns
affecting
the
Commissions.
These
interpretations
are
to
be
obtained
from
the
Corporation
Counsel
and
may
be
requested
directly
by
the
Commission.

2.
D.
C.
Code
6
1­
361
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
...
have
charge
and
conduct
of
all
law
business
of
the
said
District,
and
all
suits
instituted
by
and
against
the
government
thereof.
He
shall
furnish
opinions
in
writing
to
the
Mayor,
whenever
requested
to
do
so
...
He
shall
perform
such
other
duties
as
may
be
required
of
him
by
the
Mayor.

3.
D.
C.
Code
9
1­
363
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
and
Assistant
Corporation
Counsels
are
hereby
authorized
to
administer
oaths
and
affirmations
in
the
discharge
of
their
official
duties
with
the
District
of
Columbia.

4.
D.
C.
Code
3
1­
609.55
(
a)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
exercise
authority
over
other
subordinateagency
attorneys....(
D.
C.
Code
5
1­
609.55
(
b)
­
Corporation
Counsel
may
delegate
the
direction,
supervision
and
control
of
attorneys
to
a
subordinate
agency
head
as
follows
....)

5.
D.
C.
Code
3
1­
609.57
(
a)
and
(
b)
­­(
a)
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
establish
an
annual
mandatory
program
of
continuing
legal
education
for
attorneys
in
the
Legal
Service....
(
b)
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
develop
and
establish
a
performance
management
system
that
includes
accountability
standards
and
individual
accountability
plans
for
all
attorneys
....

6.
D.
C.
Code
9
1­
1188.15
(
a)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
investigate,
with
such
assistance
from
other
District
agencies
as
may
be
required,
violations
pursuant
to
0
11188.144involving
District
funds.
If
the
Corporation
Counsel
finds
that
a
person
has
.
The
term
 
mandatory 
as
used
herein
generally
means
that
the
OCC
is
required
to
take
the
action.
However,
in
some
instances
it
means
that
if
any
action
is
taken,
it
must
be
taken
by
the
OCC.

D.
C.
Code
9
1­
1188.14
generally
penalizes
those
who:
(
1)
present,
or
cause
to
be
presented,
false
claims
to
the
District;
(
2)
unlawfully
possess
or
have
custody
of
District
property;
(
3)
create
a
false
record
to
procure
District
property;
or,
(
4)
are
the
unlawful
beneficiary
of
District
property
or
money.

2
violated
or
is
violating
the
provisions
of
3
1­
1188.14,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
a
civil
action
against
that
person
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

7.
D.
C.
Code
0
1­
1188.19
(
j)
(
1)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
designate
a
false
claims
investigator
to
serve
as
custodian
of
documentary
material,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
transcripts
of
oral
testimony
received
pursuant
to
this
section,
and
shall
designate
such
additional
false
claims
law
investigators
as
the
Corporation
Counsel
determines
from
time
to
time
to
be
necessary
to
serve
as
deputies
to
the
custodian.

8.
D.
C.
Code
tj
1­
1612
(
3)
­
The
Administrator
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Office
of
Documents
shall...
(
3)
With
the
assistance
of
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel,
the
officer
designated
by
the
Chairman
of
the
Council,
or
legal
counsels
to
agencies
and
other
governmental
entities,
certifLthe
promulgation,
adoption,
or
enactment
of
documents
to
be
published
in
accordance
with
this
subchapter.
(
The
subchapter
concerns
the
publication
of
official
District
government
documents
such
as
laws
and
regulations.)

9.
D.
C.
Code
fj1­
2547
(
re:
human
rights)
­
If,
at
any
time
after
a
complaint
has
been
filed,
the
OEce
[
of
Human
Rights]
believes
that
appropriate
civil
action
to
preserve
the
status
quo
or
to
prevent
irreparable
harm
appears
advisable,
the
Office
shall
certify
that
matter
to
the
Corporation
Counsel,
who
shall
bring,
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia,
any
action
necessary
to
preserve
such
status
quo
or
to
prevent
such
harm
....

10.
D.
C.
Code
$
1­
2555
(
a)
and
(
b)
(
re:
human
rights)
­­(
a)
...
the
Commission
[
of
Human
Rights]
will
certify
the
matter
to
the
Corporation
Counsel,
and
to
such
other
agencies
as
may
be
appropriate
for
enforcement.
(
b)
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
institute,
in
the
name
of
the
District,
civil
proceedings
including
the
seeking
of
such
restraining
order
and
temporary
or
permanent
injunctions,
as
are
necessary
to
obtain
'
complete
compliance
with
the
Commission's
orders.
In
the
event
that
successful
civil
proceedings
do
not
result
in
securing
such
compliance,
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
institute
criminal
action.

11.
D.
C.
Code
$
1­
2573
(
7)
­
Receive
certified
complaints
from
the
Office
of
Human
Rights
for
appropriate
legal
a~
tion.~

12.
D.
C.
Code
$
2­
505
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
chapter
[
Bonding
of
Home
Improvement
Business],
or
of
the
regulations
made
pursuant
thereto,
shall
be
conducted
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
or
any
of
his
assistants.

13.
D.
C.
Code
$
2­
712
(
b)
and
(
c)
(
re:
charitable
solicitations)
­­(
b)
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
chapter
...
shall
be
conducted
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel....
(
c)
The
This
provision,
which
is
not
yet
codified,
is
0
204
(
7)
of
the
Office
of
Human
Rights
Establishment
Act
of
1999,
effective
October
20,
1999
(
D.
C.
Law
13­
38;
46
D.
C.
Register
6378).

3
3
Corporation
Counsel
...
is
hereby
empowered
to
maintain
an
action
...
to
enjoin
any
person
from
soliciting
in
violation
of
this
chapter
....

14.
D.
C.
Code
5
2­
1001
(
a)
­
The
Council
on
Law
Enforcement
in
the
District
of
Columbia
...
is
hereby
created.
The
Council
shall
be
composed
of
the
following
members
...
(
5)
The
Corporation
Counsel
....

15.
D.
C.
Code
8
2­
2315
(
a)
and
(
c)
­­(
a)
All
violations
of
laws
relating
to
the
practice
of
engineering
in
the
District
of
Columbia
shall
be
prosecuted
by
...
the
Corporation
Counsel.
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
render
such
other
legal
services
as
may
from
time
to
time
be
required
by
the
Board
[
of
Registration
for
Professional
Engineers].
(
c)
The
Corporation
Counsel
is
hereby
authorized
to
apply
for
relief
by
injunction
....
In
such
proceedings
it
shall
not
be
necessary
for
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
allege
or
prove
....

16.
D.
C.
Code
5
2­
2506
(
a)
­
The
[
Lottery
Board]
shall
have
power
generally
to
do
whatever
is
reasonably
necessary
for
the
carrying
out
of
[
its
duties]
and
is
empowered
to
call
upon
other
administrative
departments
and
agencies
of
the
City
government,
as
well
as
the
Police
Department
and
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel,
for
such
information
and
assistance
as
it
deems
necessary
to
the
performance
of
its
duties.

17.
D.
C.
Code
8
3­
213.5
(
concerning
public
assistance)
­
Whenever
a
responsible
relative
fails
to
provide
informationnecessary
to
determine
his
ability
to
support,
or
when
it
has
been
determined
that
he
is
financially
able
to
but
has
not
contributed
to
the
person
in
need
of
assistance,
the
case
shall
be
evaluated
for
appropriate
action
including
referral
to
Corporation
Counsel.

18.
D.
C.
Code
5
3­
424
(
c)
­
The
[
Crime
Victims
Compensation
Advisory]
Commission
shall
be
composed
of:
(
1)
The
Chairperson
of
the
Committee
on
the
Judiciary
of
the
Council
of
the
District
of
Columbia
...
(
2)
One
representative
from
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

19.
D.
C.
Code
5
4­
143
(
a)
­
In
accordance
with
regulations
prescribed
by
the
Council
of
the
District
of
Columbia,
the
Corporation
Counsel
...
shall
represent
any
officer
or
member
of
the
Metropolitan
Police
Department,
if
he
so
requests,
in
any
civil
action
for
damages
resulting
from
an
alleged
wrongful
arrest
by
such
officer
or
member.

20.
D.
C.
Code
5
5­
1305.1
(
b)
­
The
Director
[
of
the
Department
of
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs]
may
enforce
the
regulations
issued
pursuant
to
this
act
by
means
of
covenants
or
agreements
between
the
Department
of
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs
and
an
affected
party.
Where
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
determines
that,
under
District
law,
a
covenant
or
agreement
may
require
the
review
and
approval
of
other
District
agencies,
it
shall
so
notify
such
agencies
and
establish
an
inter­
agency
process
for
review
and,
if
required,
under
District
law,
approval.
The
Director
shall
coordinate
with
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
the
time
required
for
the
review
and
4'
4
recommendations
by
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
any
covenant
or
agreement
proposed
pursuant
to
this
act.

21.
D.
C.
Code
8
6­
205.1
­
The
Social
Security
account
number
shall
be
collected
by
the
Register
of
Vital
Records
and
made
available
only
to
the
Department
of
Human
Services
Office
of
Paternity
and
Child
Support
Enforcement,
and
the
Child
Support
Section
of
the
Civil
Division
of
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
for
the
enforcement
of
child
support
orders
....

22.
D.
C.
Code
5
6­
711
(
a)
(
2)
(
B)
(
concerns
hazardous
waste
management)
­
The
Mayor
may
recover
the
costs
of
corrective
action
incurred
by
the
District
of
Columbia
government
from
any
person
responsible
by
requesting
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
commence
appropriate
civil
action
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

23.
D.
C.
Code
0
6­
964
(
a)
(
concerns
health
and
safety/
environmental
controls)
­
Any
person
who
violates
any
provision
of
this
subchapter
or
the
rules
...
shall
be
liable
for
a
civil
fine
not
exceeding
$
10,000
for
each
day
during
which
each
violation
continues,
and
shall
be
required
to
perform
any
other
action
needed
to
correct
any
harm
caused
by
any
violation
or
to
ensure
that
future
violations
do
not
occur.
All
prosecutions
under
this
provision
shall
be
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia,
and
shall
be
instituted
by
the
Corporation
Counsel.

24.
D.
C.
Code
0
6­
2506
(
a)
and
(
b)
(
concerning
adult
protective
orders)
­­(
a)
If
requested
by
the
Department
[
of
Human
Services]...
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
promptly
conduct
a
factual
inquiry,
and
if
legally
supportable,
file
a
petition
in
court
for
a
provisional
protection
order
....
(
b)
...
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
ensure
that,
at
least
10
days
...
before
the
hearing,
notice
of
the
hearing
date
and
a
copy
of
the
petition
are
served
on
the
adult
in
need
of
protective
services....

25.
D.
C.
Code
8
6­
2507
(
a)
(
concerning
exparte
temporary
protection
orders)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
ensure
that,
within
48hours
after
the
issuance
of
such
an
order,
notice
of
the
hearing
date
and
copies
of
the
petition,
supporting
affidavit(
s),
and
order
are
served
on
the
same
parties
and
in
the
same
manner
as
described
in
9
6­
2606
(
b).

26.
D.
C.
Code
3
6­
2602
(
b)
­
Prosecution
for
violations
ofthis
chapter
[
concerning
the
buying
and
selling
of
human
body
parts]
and
regulations
made
pursuant
to
this
chapter
shall
be
brought
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
upon
information
by
the
Corporation
Counsel.

27.
D.
C.
Code
6
6­
3304
(
c)
(
2)
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
subsection
[
concerninghazardous
materials
transportation]
shall
be
brought
by
the
Corporation
Counsel.

28.
D.
C.
Code
5
6­
3460
(
b)
(
concerning
solid
waste
management)
­
If
the
Mayor
finds
that
any
person
is
constructing
or
operating
a
solid
waste
facility
in
a
manner
which
endqngers
human
health,
the
public
welfare,
or
the
environment
...
the
Mayor
may
(
A)

5
5
request
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
commence
appropriate
civil
action
...
to
secure
a
temporary
restraining
order,
a
preliminary
injunction,
a
permanent
injunction,
or
other
appropriate
relief,
or
(
B)
issue
a
cease
and
desist
order.

 
29.
D.
C.
Code
$
11­
1731
­
The
Executive
Officer
or
the
chiefjudge
may
request
such
reports
as
may
be
necessary
to
the
efficient
administration
of
the
courts
from
...
(
2)
the
.

Corporation
Counsel.

30.
D.
C.
Code
8
16­
916.1
(
0)(
2)
­
Every
3
years,
in
cases
being
enforced
under
Part
D
of
Title
IV
of
the
Social
Security
Act,
approved
January
4,1975
(
88
Stat.
2351;
42
U.
S.
C.
0
65
1
et
seq.)
( 
IV­
D
program ),
the
Department
of
Human
Services
Office
of
Paternity
and
Child
Support
Enforcement
and
the
Child
Support
Section
of
the
Civil
Division
of
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
notify
both
the
noncustodial
and
custodial
parent
of
the
right
to
seek
a
modification
of
their
child
support
order
under
the
guidelines.
The
Department
of
Human
Services
Office
of
Paternity
and
Child
Support
Enforcement
and
the
Child
Support
Section
of
the
Civil
Division
of
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
establish
a
procedure
for
idorming
the
noncustodial
and
custodial
parent
if
a
modification
is
warranted
under
the
guideline.

31.
D.
C.
Code
5
16­
1002
(
b)
(
concerns
proceedings
regarding
intrafamily
offenses)
­
The
United
States
attorney
may
also
(
1)
file
a
criminal
charge
based
upon
the
conduct
and
may
consult
with
the
Director
of
Social
Services
concerning
appropriate
recommendations
for
conditions
of
release
taking
into
account
the
intrafamily
nature
of
the
offense;
or
(
2)
refer
the
matter
to
the
Corporation
Counsel
for
the
filing
of
a
petition
for
civil
protection
in
the
Family
Division
....

32.
D.
C.
Code
8
16­
1025
­
Prosecutions
under
this
subchapter
[
parental
kidnapping]
shall
be
brought
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
in
[
the]
name
of
the
District
by
the
Corporation
Counsel.

33.
D.
C.
Code
$
16­
2305
(
a)
­
Complaints
alleging
delinquency,
need
of
supervision,
or
neglect
shall
be
referred
to
the
Director
of
Social
Serviceswho
shall
conduct
a
preliminary
inquiry
to
determine
whether
the
best
interests
of
the
child
or
the
public
require
that
a
petition
be
filed.
If
judicial
action
appears
warranted,
under
intake
criteria
established
by
rule
of
the
Superior
Court,
the
Director
shall
recommend
that
a
petition
be
filed.
If
the
Director
decides
not
to
recommend
the
filing
of
a
petition,
the
complainant
in
a
delinquency
or
neglect
case
shall
have
a
right
to
have
that
decision
reviewed
by
the
Corporation
Counsel,
and
the
Director
shall
notie
the
complainant
of
such
right
of
review.
Complaints
alleging
neglect
submitted
by
the
Child
Protective
Services
Division
of
the
Department
of
Human
Services
shall
be
referred
directly
to
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

34.
D.
C.
Code
$
16­
2305
(
c)
­
Each
petition
shall
be
prepared
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
after
an
inquiry
into
the
facts
and
a
determination
of
the
legal
basis
for
the
petition.
If
the
Director
of
Social
Services
has
refused
to
recommend
the
filing
of
a
delinquency
or
neglect
petition,
the
Corporation
Counsel,
on
request
of
the
complainant,

6
6
shall
review
the
facts
presented
and
shall
prepare
and
file
a
petition
if
he
believes
such
action
is
necessary
to
protect
the
community
or
the
interests
of
the
child.
Any
decision
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
on
whether
to
file
a
petition
shall
be
final.

35.
D.
C.
Code
tj
16­
2305
(
d)
­
A
petition
shall
be
filed
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
within
seven
days
(
excluding
Sundays
and
legal
holidays)
after
the
complaint
has
been
referred
to
the
Directo;
of
Social
Services,
except
as
otherwise
provided
in
section
162312
....

36.
D.
C.
Code
9
16­
2305.2
(
b)
­
Where
the
Director
of
Social
Services
recommends,
after
a
preliminary
inquiry
is
conducted
pursuant
to
D.
C.
Code
tj
16­
2305
(
a),
that
it
is
not
in
the
best
interests
of
the
child
or
public
to
recommend
the
filing
of
a
delinquency
or
persons
in
need
of
supervision
petition,
the
Director
of
Social
Services
shall
so
recommend
to
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel,
and
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
make
a
determinationof
the
suitability
of
the
case
for
adjustment,
which
may
include
diversion.

37.
D.
C.
Code
tj
16­
2305.2
(
c)
­
In
order
to
determine
whether
the
case
is
suitable
for
adjustment,
the
Director
of
Social
Services,
in
consultation
with
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel,
shall
consider
the
following
circumstances,
among
others
....

38.
D.
C.
Code
tj
16­
2306
(
b)
­
Upon
request
of
the
Corporation
Counsel,
the
Division
may
endorse
upon
the
summons
an
order
directing
the
parent,
guardian,
or
other
custodian
of
the
child
to
appear
personally
at
the
hearing
and
directing
the
person
having
physical
custody
or
control
of
the
child
to
bring
the
child
to
the
hearing.

39.
D.
C.
Code
5
16­
2307
(
a)
­
Within
twenty­
one
days
(
excluding
Sundays
and
legal
holidays)
of
the
filing
of
a
delinquency
petition,
or
later
for
good
cause
shown,
and
prior
to
a
fact
finding
hearing
on
the
petition,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
file
a
motion,
supported
by
a
statement
of
facts,
requesting
transfer
of
the
child
for
criminal
prosecution,
if
....

40.
D.
C.
Code
!$
16­
2310
(
e)
(
2)
­
Upon
motion
of
the
Corporation
Counsel,
for
good
cause
shown,
or
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
child
consistent
withthe
Rules
of
the
Superior
Court,
the
fact
finding
hearing
of
a
child
securely
detained
may
be
continued,
and
the
child
continued
in
secure
detention
for
additional
periods
not
to
exceed
30
days
each.

41.
D.
C.
Code
tj
16­
2312
(
c)
­
At
the
commencement
of
the
[
detention]
hearing
the
judge
shall
advise
the
parties
of
the
right
to
counsel
...
and
shall
appoint
counsel
if
required.
He
shall
also
inform
them
of
the
contents
of
the
petition
and
shall
afford
the
child,
or
in
a
neglect
case,
the
parent,
guardian,
or
custodian,
anopportunity
to
admit
or
deny
the
allegations
in
the
petition.
He
shall
then
hear
from
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
determine
whether
the
child
should
be
placed
or
continued
in
detention
or
shelter
care
....

42.
D.
C.
Code
3
16­
2312
(
e)
­
When
a
judge
finds
that
a
child s
detention
or
shelter
care
is
required
...
he
shall
then
hear
evidence
presented
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
7
7
determine
whether
there
is
probable
cause
to
believe
the
allegations
in
the
petition
are
true
....

43.
D.
C.
Code
0
16­
2314
(
a)
­
At
any
time
after
the
filing
of
a
delinquency
or
need
of
supervision
petition
and
prior
to
adjudication
at
a
fact
finding
hearing,
the
Division,
may,
on
motion
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
or
counsel
for
the
child,
suspend
the
proceedings
and
continue
the
child
under
supervision,
without
commitment,
under
terms
and
conditions
established
by
rules
of
the
Superior
Court.
Such
a
consent
decree
shall
not
be
entered
unless
the
child
is
represented
by
counsel
and
has
been
informed
of
the
consequences
of
the
decree;
nor
shall
it
be
entered
over
the
objection
of
the
child
or
the
Corporation
Counsel.

44.
D.
C.
Code
0
16­
2314
(
c)
­
If
prior
to
the
expiration
of
the
decree
or
discharge
by
.
theDirector
of
Social
Services,
the
child
fails
to
fulfill
the
express
conditions
of
the
decree
or
a
new
delinquency
or
need
of
supervision
petition
is
filed
concerning
the
child,
the
original
petition
under
which
the
decree
was
filed
may,
in
the
discretion
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
following
consultation
with
the
Director
of
Social
Services,
be
reinstated
....

45.
D.
C.
Code
0
16­
2316
(
a)
­
The
Division
shall,
without
a
jury,
hear
and
adjudicate
cases
involving
delinquency,
need
of
supervision,
or.
neglect.
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
present
evidence
in
support
of
all
petitions
arising
under
this
subchapter
and
otherwise
represent
the
District
of
Columbia
in
all
proceedings.

46.
D.
C.
Code
3
16­
2327(
a)
­
A
proceeding
to
revoke
probation
[
injuvenile
cases]
shall
be
commenced
by
the
filing
of
a
revocation
petition
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

 
47.
D.
C.
Code
3
16­
2336
­
Whoever
willfully
discloses,
receives,
makes
use
of,
or
knowingly
permits
the
use
of
information
concerning
a
child
or
other
person
in
violation
of
sections
16­
2331
through
16­
2335,
shall
be
guilty
of
a
misdemeanor
and,
upon
conviction,
thereof,
shall
be
fined
not
more
than
$
250
or
imprisoned
not
more
than
ninety
days,
or
both.
Violations
of
this
section
shall
be
prosecuted
by
the
Corporation
counsel
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

48.
D.
C.
Code
3
16­
2348
(
b)
­
No
person
shall
disclose,
receive,
or
use
records
in
violation
of
this
section.
Whoever
willfully
discloses,
receives,
makes
use
of,
or
knowingly
permits
the
use
of
information
in
violation
of
this
section
shall
be
guilty
of
a
misdemeanor
and,
upon
conviction
thereof,
shall
be
fined
not
more
than
$
250
or
imprisoned
not
more
than
ninety
days,
or
both.
Violations
of
this
section
shall
be
prosecuted
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

49.
D.
C.
Code
9
16­
5007
(
a)
and
(
b)
­­(
a)
An
individual
who
discloses
confidential
information
in
violation
of
6
16­
5005
[
concerning
criminal
record checks]
is
guilty
of
a
criminal
offense
and,
upon
conviction,
is
subject
to
a
fine
not
to
exceed
$
1,000
or
a
term
of
incarceration
of
not
more
than
180
days,
or
both.
(
b)
Prosecutions
for
violation
of
this
8
chapter
shall
be
brought
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
upon
information
by
the
Corporation
Counsel.

50.
D.
C.
Code
8
22­
3315
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
chapter
[
concerning
panhandling
control]
shall
be
conducted
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
the
Corporation
Counsel.

51.
D.
C.
Code
9
24­
121
1
­(
a)
There
is
established
as
an
independent
agency
of
the
District
of
Columbia
a
District
of
Columbia
Truth
in
Sentencing
Commission...
which
shall
consist
of
....
(
b)
A
representative
of
the
Federal
Bureau
of
Prisons
and
a
representative
of
the
[
Olffice
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District
of
Columbia
shall
each
serve
as
a
nonvoting,
ex
officio
member.

52.
D.
C.
Code
0
24­
1232
(
g)
­
Subject
to
subparagraph
(
B)
of
this
paragraph,
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District
of
Columbia
shall
provide
litigation
services
to
the
Trustee
[
of
the
Pretrial
Services,
Parole,
Adult
Probation
and
Offender
Supervision],
except
that
the
Trustee
may
instead
elect,
either
generally
or
in
relation
to
particular
cases
or
classes
of
cases,
to
hire
necessary
staff
and
personnel
or
enter
into
contracts
for
the
provision
of
litigation
services
at
the
Trustee s
expense.

53.
D.
C.
Code
5
24­
1233
(
e)
(
4)
­
Subject
to
subparagraph
(
B),
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District
of
Columbia
shall
provide
litigation
services
to
the
District
of
Columbia
Pretrial
Services
Agency,
except
that
the
District
of
Columbia
Pretrial
Services
Agency
may
instead
elect,
either
generally
or
in
relation
to
particular
cases
or
classes
or
cases,
to
hire
necessary
staff
and
personnel
or
enter
into
contracts
for
the
provision
of
litigation
services
at
such
agency s
expense.

54.
D.
C.
Code
3
25­
104
(
b)
(
1)
­
The
Mayor
of
the
District
of
Columbia
shall
appoint
an
Assistant
Corporation
Counsel
as
a
permanent
full­
time
staff
counsel
to
the
Alcoholic
Beverage
Control
Division
of
the
Department
of
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs,
established
by
Reorganization
Plan
No.
1
of
1983,
who
shall
be
an
attorney
admitted
to
the
practice
of
law
in
the
District
of
Columbia
and
who
shall
advise
the
Alcoholic
Beverage
Control
Division
regarding
all
legal
matters.

55.
D.
C.
Code
6
26­
707
(
a)
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
chapter
[
concerning
.
money
lenders;
licenses]
or
any
rules
issued
pursuant
to
this
chapter
shall
be
conducted
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
or
any
of
his
or
her
assistants
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

56.
D.
C.
Code
026­
802.1
(
b­
1)
­
The
Superintendent
shall,
upon
a
finding
of
a
violation
of
this
subchapter
[
regional
interstate
banking]
or
3
26­
103
[
banks
and
financial
institutions
to
be
organized
pursuant
to
District
or
federal
law],
refer
the
matter
to
the
Corporation
Counsel
or
United
States
Attorney
for
civil
or
cfiminal
enforcement,
as
the
case
may
warrant.

9
9
57.
D.
C.
Code
$
28­
4505
(
k)
(
see
item
#
41
in
discretionary)
­
Any
procedure,
other
than
an
action
to
enforce
a
demand
pursuant
to
subsection
(
h)
of
this
section,
or
testimony
taken
or
material
produced
under
this
section
or
voluntarily
in
the
course
of
an
investigation
shall
be
...
kept
confidential
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
before
bringing
an
action
against
a
person
under
this
chapter
for
the
violation
under
investigation
...
except
that
testimony
taken
or
material
or
information
produced
under
this
section
may
be
disclosed
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
any
officer
or
employee
or
any
federal
or
state
law
enforcement
agency
,...

58.
D.
C.
Code
5
28­
4507
(
c)
(
1)
(
see
item
#
41
in
discretionary)
­
In
any
action
brought
under
subsection
(
b)
of
this
section,
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall,
at
all
times,
in
such
manner,
and
with
such
content
as
the
court
may
direct,
cause
notice
to
be
given
by
publication
....

59.
D.
C.
Code
$
29­
399.49
­
All
civil
actions
under
this
chapter
[
business
corporations]
which
the
Mayor
is
authorized
to
commence,
and
all
prosecutions
for
violations
of
the
provisions
of
this
chapter,
shall
be
brought
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District
of
Columbia
....

60.
D.
C.
Code
$
3
1­
603
(
c)
­
All
prosecutions
for
violations
of
$
5
31­
602to
31­
606
[
falsificationof
information
concerning
requirement
to
pay
nonresident
tuition
in
public
schools],
shall
be
conducted
inthe
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
or
any
of
his
assistants.

61.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
551
(
5)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
is
entrusted
by
common
law
to
bring
actions
on
behalf
of
the
public
in
the
event
of
a
breach
of
the
charitable
trust
of
healthcare
entity
and
to
represent
the
public
in
the
sale
or
other
transfer
of
the
assets
of
a
healthcare
entity.

62.
D.
C.
Code
5
32­
551
(
7)
­
The
approval
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
any
transfer
of
assets
or
operations
is
necessary
to
ensure
the
protection
of
these
trusts
[
for
charitable
healthcare
entities].

63.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
553
(
a)
­
Notwithstanding
any
other
provisions
of
the
law,
a
healthcare
entity
shall
not
execute
a
conversion
to
a
for­
profit
entity
without
the
approval
of
the
Corporation
Counsel.

64.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
553
(
b)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
review
the
conversion
to
determine
whether
charitable
assets
are
adequately
protected.
A
conversion
shall
not
be
approved
unless
necessary
and
appropriate
steps
have
been
taken
by
the
healthcare
entity,
to
safeguard
the
value
of
its
charitable
assets.

65.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
553
(
c)
(
1)­(
13)
­
In
determining
whether
charitable
assets
have
been
adequately
protected,
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
consider
the
following....

10
66.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
553
(
d)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
assess
the
for­
profit
entity
the
reasonable
costs
related
to,
and
shall
expend
such
amounts
for,
the
review
of
the
proposed
conversion
determined
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
be
necessary
or
appropriate
....

67.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
554
(
a)
and
(
b)
­­(
a)
If
the
Corporation
Counsel
determines...
that
the
charitable
assets
of
a
healthcare
entity
have
not
been
placed
in
a
charitable
trust
controlled
independently
of
the
for­
profit
entity...
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
ensure
that
a
charitable
trust
is
established.
(
b)
The
governance
of
any
charitable
trust
established
to
safeguard
assets
subject
to
the
provisions
of
this
chapter
shall
be
subject
to
review
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

68.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
556
(
a),
(
b)
and
(
c)
­­(
a)
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
approve
or
disapprove
a
conversion
within
60
days
....
(
b)
Prior
to
issuing
a
decision,
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
publish
the
request
in
at
least
two
newspapers
of
general
publication
...
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
hold
a
public
hearing
....
(
c)
The
Corporation
Counsel
shall
employ
the
services
of
an
independent
expert
to
assess
the
value
of
the
charitable
assets
....

69.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
559
(
a)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
seek
injunctive
relief
if
the
Corporation
Counsel
determines
that
a
person
is
offering,
developing,
or
operating
a
[
sic]
entity
in
violation
of
the
chapter
[
healthcare
entity
conversion].

70.
D.
C.
Code
$
32­
1413
(
a)
­[
Tlhe
Corporation
Counsel
may
...
petition
the
court
to
appoint
a
receiver
for
any
facility
[
nursing
home].

71.
D.
C.
Code
$
35­
603
(
a)
­
The
Commissioner
[
Department
of
Insurance
and
Securities
Regulation]
shall
submit
the
proposed
articles
and
other
papers
so
filed
with
him
[
for
domestic
life
companies]
to
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District,
who
shall
examine
the
same,
and,
if
he
finds
the
same
in
accordance
with
law,
he
shall
so
certifl
and
return
the
same
to
the
Commissioner,
who
shall
cause
the
articles
....

72.
D.
C.
Code
$
35­
1257
(
e)
­
No
action
brought
under
this
section
[
fraternal
benefit
societies]
shall
be
recognized
in
any
court
of
the
District
unless
brought
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
upon
request
of
the
Commissioner
[
Department
of
Insurance
and
SecuritiesRegulation]....

73.
D.
C.
Code
$
35­
3723
(
a)
­(
concerning
holding
companies)
­
The
articles
of
incorporation
and
any
amendments
...
shall
be
subject
to
approval
of
the
Commissioner
[
Department
of
Insurance
and
Securities
Regulation]
and
Corporation
Counsel
...
in
the
same
manner
as
those
of
an
insurance
company.
The
...
Corporation
Counsel
shall
promptly
examine
the
articles
of
incorporation
...

74.
D.
C.
Code
9
35­
4702
(
b)
(
1)
and
(
2)
(
concerning
insurance)
­­(
b)
(
1)
A
conversion
or
management
or
service
contract
with
a
for­
profit
entity
shall
not
be
approved
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
unless
charitable
assets,
if
any,
have
been
11
adequately
protected.
In
determining
whether
charitable
assets
have
been
adequately
protected,
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
apply
the
standard
enumerated
in
8
32­
553
(
c).
(
b)
(
2)
The
Commissioner
of
Insurance
and
Securities,
in
consultation
with
the
Corporation
Counsel,
shall
assess
the
for­
profit
entity
the
necessary
or
appropriate
costs
related
to,
and
shall
expend
such
amounts
for,
the
review
of
the
conversion
or
management
or
service
contract
with
a
for­
profit
entity
....

75.
D.
C.
Code
8
36­
323
­
In
any
court
proceedings
instituted
under
the
provisions
of
this
chapter,
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District
of
Columbia
shall
appear
as
attorney
or
counsel
on
behalf
of
the
Mayor
whether
the
Mayor
is
a
party
to
the
case
or
interested,
and
shall
represent
the
Mayor
in
any
court
in
which
such
case
may
be
carried
on
appeal.

76.
D.
C.
Code
5
36­
524
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
...
this
chapter
[
employment
of
minors]
...
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

77.
D.
C.
Code
8
40­
613
(
a)
­
Such
person
shall
be
subject
to
criminal
prosecution
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
for
such
offense
[
related
to
motor
vehicles]
....

78.
D.
C.
Code
8
40­
613
(
b)
­
The
Director
[
DMV]
shall
promptly
inform
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
an
infraction
by
any
person
who
has
accumulated
12
or
more
traffic
points
....

79.
D.
C.
Code
5
42­
104
(
b)
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
section
[
false
statements
re:
financing
statements
or
other
paper
filed
with
Recorder
of
Deeds]
shall
be
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

80.
D.
C.
Code
8
43­
605
(
b)
­
And
the
said
Commission
[
Public
Service
Commission]
is
hereby
given
power
to
call
on
...
the
Corporation
Counsel
...
to
enforce
the
provisions
of
Chapters
1­
10
of
this
title
[
Public
Utilities]
in
the
proper
courts
of
the
United
States
...
and
on
such
call
it
shall
be
the
duty
of
the
said
...
Corporation
Counsel
...
to
enforce
the
provisions
of
this
section
....

81.
D.
C.
Code
8
45­
940
­
Whoever
violates
any
provision
of
this
subchapter
[
Recordation
Tax
on
Deeds]
for
which
no
specific
penalty
is
provided...
shall
be
subject
to
a
fine
...
or
to
imprisonment
....
Prosecutions
...
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

82.
D.
C.
Code
0
45­
1877
(
a)
­
Any
person
who
willfully
violates
any
provision
of
this
chapter
[
Condominiums]....
shall
be
fined
....
imprisoned
....
Prosecution
for
violations
...
shall
be
brought
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel....

83.
D.
C.
Code
5
47­
340.3
(
a)
­
For
each
individual
project
for
which
there
is
a
proposed
bond
series
issuance,
the
Mayor
shall
submit
to
the
Council
a
resolution
of
project
approval
accompanied
by
a
summary
description
of
the
proposed
project...
the
preliminary
legal
sufficiency
determinations
of
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
and
bond
counsel
....

12
84.
D.
C.
Code
6
47­
2030
­
All
prosecutions
under
this
chapter
[
gross
sales
tax]
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

85.
D.
C.
Code
6
47­
2312
­
All
prosecutions
for
violations
of
the
provisions
of
$
9
472301
to
47­
2315
[
motor
fuel
tax]
...
upon
information
filed
by
the
Corporation
Counsel...
and
all
suits
for
the
collection
of
any
taxor
penalty
...
shall
be
instituted
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

86.
D.
C.
Code
6
47­
2605
­
All
prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
chapter
[
insurance
companies]
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

87.
D.
C.
Code
$
47­
2707
­
All
prosecutions
under
this
subchapter
[
Public
Auction
Permits]
shall
be
...
upon
information
by
the
Corporation
Counsel....

88.
D.
C.
Code
$
47­
2845
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
any
of
the
provisions
of
this
chapter
[
General
License
Law]
...
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel....

B.
Discretionary6
1.
D.
C.
Code
5
1­
357
(
e)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
is
authorized
to
institute
actions
at
law
in
equi?
for
the
recovery
of
all
amounts
owed
to
the
District
as
set
forth
in
subsection
(
d)
of
this
section,
including
the
Corporation
Counsel s
own
litigation
expenses
and
attorneys
fees.
In
the
event
the
Corporation
Counsel
elects
not
to
exercise
his
or
her
authority
under
this
subsection,
any
person
who,
or
entity
that,
renders
the
collection
services
provided
for
in
subsection
(
c)*
of
this
section
shall
have
the
authority
to
institute
actions
at
law
or
equity
for
the
recovery
of
the
amounts
represented
by
any
dishonored
or
unpaid
check,
in
addition
to
any
amounts
charged
by
the
collector
for
.
collecting
a
dishonored
or
unpaid
check
and
any
litigation
expenses
and
attorneys
fees
incurred
by
the
collector
for
such
collection.

2.
D.
C.
Code
5
1­
624.24
(
b)
and
(
d)
(
regarding
disability
compensation)
­­(
b)
...
At
the
hearing,
the
claimant
and
the
Corporation
Counsel
are
entitled
to
present
evidence....
(
d)
Within
30
days
after
the
hearing,
the
Mayor
or
his
or
her
designee
shall
notify
the
claimant,
the
Corporation
Counsel,
and
the
Benefits
Administration
Ofice
of
the
The
word
 
discretionary 
as
used
herein
means
that
the
OCC
is
not
required
by
statute
to
take
the
referenced
action.
However,
the
OCC
may
a
matter
of
sound
legal
practice,
professional
ethics,
or
policy
be
required
to
take
the
referenced
action.

 
Subsection(
d)
permits
the
Mayor,
in
addition
to
any
dishonored
check
fee,
to
collect
any
costs
or
expenses
incurred
to
recover
or
collect
the
amount
represented
by
the
dishonored
check
including
applicable
litigation
expenses
and
attorneys
fees.

Subsection
(
c)
permits
the
Mayor
to
enter
into
contracts
for
the
collection
of
the
amounts
represented
by
dishonored
checks
proffered
in
payment
for
sums
due
the
District
.
government.
Any
such
contract
would
be
prepared
by
the
OCC.

13
Department
of
Employment
Services
in
writing
of
his
or
her
decision
and
the'basis
of
the
decision.
The
claimant
and
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
have
the
right
to
seek
review
of
the
decision
under
0
1­
624.28
within
30
days
of
the
issuance
of
the
decision.

3.
D.
C.
Code
0
1­
1153.4
(
f)
(
concerns
small
business
enterprises)
­
In
addition
to
the
penalties
provided
in
subsection
(
e)
of
this
section,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
a
civil
action
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
against
a
business
enterprise
and
the
directors,
officers,
or
principals
that
is
reasonably
believed
to
have
obtained
certification
by
fraud
or
deceit
or
have
furnished
substantially
inaccurate
or
incomplete
ownership
information
to
the
[
District
of
Columbia
Local
Business
Opportunity
Commission].

4.
D.
C.
Code
0
1­
1188.15
(
a)
(
see
item
#
6
in
the
mandatory
section)
­
If
the
Corporation
Counsel
finds
that
a
person
has
violated
or
is
violating
the
provisions
of
0
11188.14
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
a
civil
action
against
that
person
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

5.
D.
C.
Code
5
1­
1183.16
­(
a),
(
b),
and
(
c)
(
re:
procurement)
­­(
a)
A
business
which
enters
into
a
contract
with
the
District
government
after
engaging
in
collusion
with
another
business
for
the
purpose
of
defrauding
the
District
government
is
liable
in
a
suit
brought
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
in
the
appropriate
court
for
damages
equal
...(
b)
If
there
is
a
reasonable
basis
for
believing
that
collusion
has
occurred...
the
Director
shall
send
a
written
notice
of
this
belief
to
the
Corporation
Counsel
....
(
c)
All
documents
involved
in
any
procurement
in
which
collusion
is
suspected
shall
be
retained
until
the
Corporation
Counsel
gives
notice
that
they
may
be
destroyed.
All
documents
shall
be
made
available
to
the
Corporation
Counsel.

6.
D.
C.
Code
01­
1188.19(
a)
(
see
item
##
7
in
the
mandatory
section)
­
Whenever
the
Corporation
Counsel
has
reason
to
believe
that
any
person
may
be
in
possession,
custody,
or
control
of
any
documentary
material
or
information
relevant
to
a
false
claims
law
investigation,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may,
in
order
to
determine
whether
to
commence
a
civil
proceeding
...
issue
in
writing
and
cause
to
be
served
upon
such
person
a
civil
investigative
demand
requiring
that
such
person
do
the
following:
(
A)
Produce
documentary
material
relevant
to
the
false
claims
law
investigationfor
inspection
and
copying;
(
B)
Answer
in
writing
written
interrogatories
with
respect
to
any
documentary
material
or
information
relevant
to
the
false
claims
law
investigation;
(
C)
Provide
oral
testimony
concerning
any
documentary
material
or
information
relevant
to
the
false
claims
law
investigation;
or
(
D)
Furnish
any
combination
of
such
material,
answers,
or
testimony.'
J
D.
C.
Code
5
1­
1188.19
(
a)
(
2)
states
that
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
not
issue
a
civil
investigative
demand
in
order
to
conduct,
or
assist
in
the
conducting
of,
a
criminal
I
investigation.

14
7.
D.
C.
Code
fs
1­
1188.19
(
k)
(
1)
(
see
items
#
3
and
7
in
the
mandatory
and
discretionary
sections,
respectively)
­
Whenever
any
person
fails
to
comply
with
any
civil
investigative
demand,
or
whenever
satisfactory
copying
or
reproduction
of
any
material
requested
in
such
demand
cannot
be
done
and
such
person
refuses
to
surrender
such
material,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
file
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
and
serve
upon
such
person
a
petition
for
an
order
of
such
court
for
the
enforcement
of
the
civil
investigative
demand.

8.
D.
C.
Code
fs
1­
1188.20
(
a)
and
(
b)
(
re:
procurement)
­­(
a)
There
is
hereby
established
an
Antifraud
Fund
...
to
be
operated
as
a
proprietary
fund
with
assets
not
to
exceed
....
The
fund
shall
consist
of
...
(
b)
Amounts
in
the
Fund
shall
be
available
for
use
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
carry
out
the
enforcement
of
this
chapter...

9.
D.
C.
Code
fs
1­
1189.1(
c)
­
The
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
provide
for
the
[
Contract
Appeals]
Board
those
supplies,
materials,
and
administrative
services
the
chairpersonrequests,
on
a
basis
....

10.
D.
C.
Code
fs
2­
33
10.10
(
a)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
an
action
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
to
enjoin
the
unlawful
practice
of
any
health
occupation
or
any
other
action
which
is
grounds
for
the
imposition
of
a
criminal
penalty
or
disciplinary
action
under
this
chapter.

11.
D.
C.
Code
fs
2­
33
10.10
(
b)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
an
action
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
to
enjoin
the
unlawful
sale
of
drugs
or
the
unlawful
trade
practice
or
unlawful
operation
of
a
pharmacy,
nursing
home,
community
residential
facility,
or
any
other
establishment
purporting
to
provide
health
services.

12.
D.
C.
Code
fs
3­
218.4
(
a),
(
d),
and
(
e)
(
re:
public
assistance)
­­(
a)
In
addition
to
any
power
to
bring
criminal
or
civil
action
or
otherwise
carry
out
the
duties
under
this
chapter,
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
have
the
authority
to
issue
subpoenas
for
a
witness
to
appear
and
testifl
or
to
produce
all
books,
records
....(
d)
If
any
witness,
who
has
been
personally
summoned,
neglects
or
refuses
to
obey
the
subpoena,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
report
this
fact
to
the
Superior
Court
....
(
e)
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
administer
oaths
to
any
witness
summoned
in
any
investigation
under
subsection
(
a)
of
this
section.

13.
D.
C.
Code
8
3­
704
(
a),
(
b),
(
e),
(
f),
and
(
g)
(
re:
medicaid
fraud)
­­(
a)
Criminal
prosecution
under
8
3­
702
and
civil
actions
brought
under
9
3­
703
(
e)
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel.
(
b)
...[
Tlhe
Corporation
Counsel
shall
have
the
authority
to
investigate
all
alleged
violations
of
this
chapter,
and
in
exercising
this
power,
may
issue
subpoenas
....(
e)
...[
Tlhe
Corporation
Counsel
may
report
that
fact
[
summoned
witness
not
appearing]
to
the
Superior
Court
....
(
f)
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
administer
oaths
to
witnesses
summoned
in
any
investigation
under
subsection
(
b)
of
this
section.
(
g)
No
person
holding
records
required
to
be
maintained
by
the
Medicaid
legislation
or
regulations
...
may
refbe
to
provide
the
Corporation
Counsel
with
access
to
the
records
on
the
basis
that
release
would
violate
any
recipient s
right
of
privacy
....
14.
D.
C.
Code
9
6­
405
(
f)
­
Prosecutions
under
the
provisions
of
this
subsection
[
concerning
drainage
of
lots]
shall
be
...
by
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel.

15.
D.
C.
Code
9
6­
995.9
(
h)
­
Any
action
[
concerning
environmental
controls]
under
4
this
subsection
shall
...
be
instituted
by
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel.

16.
D.
C.
Code
9
6­
995.11
(
c)
­
No
action
may
be
commenced
under
this
subsection
(
a)
[
Concerning
underground
storage
tank
management]
...
until
30
days
after
the
plaintiff
has
given
notice
of
the
violation
to
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

17.
D.
C.
Code
9
6­
1507
­
An
emergency
executive
order
issued
by
the
Mayor
may
provide
for
a
fine
of
not
more
than
$
1,000
for
each
violation.
The
Corporation
Counsel...
may
bring
an
action
...
against
anyone
who
has
violated
the
provisions
of
an
emergency
executive
order
....

18.
D.
C.
Code
9
6­
2510
(
a)
and
(
b)
(
concerning
adult
protective
orders)
­­(
a)
...
The
Corporation
Counsel
may,
either
as
part
of
a
proceeding
for
a
protection
order
or
in
an
independent
court
action,
seek
an
order
directing
the
adult
in
need
of
protective
services
or
person(
s)
legally
responsible
for
those
servicesto
pay
or
reimburse
the
District
for
so
much
of
the
cost
of
providing
protective
services
...
as
he
or
she
is
reasonably
able
to
afford
....
(
b)
The
Corporation
Counsel
may,
either
as
part
of
a
proceeding
for
a
protection
order
or
in
an
independent
court
action,
seek
an
order
directing
the
person(
s)
responsible
for
an
adult s
abuse,
neglect,
or
exploitation
to
pay
or
reimburse
the
District
for
all
or
part
of
the
costs
associated
with
conducting
the
investigation,
appointing
counsel,
and
providing
protective
services
in
that
particular
case....

19.
D.
C.
Code
3
6­
3460
(
f)
and
(
g)
­­(
f)
An
action
to
enjoin
any
public
nuisance
[
solid
waste
facility
not
in
compliance]
...
may
be
brought
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....
(
g)
In
the
case
of
the
violation
of
any
temporary
or
permanent
injunction
rendered
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
this
section,
proceedings
for
punishment
for
contempt
may
be
commenced
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

20.
D.
C.
Code
3
16­
1003
(
a)
­
Upon
referral
by
the
United
States
attorney,
or
upon
application
of
any
person
or
agency
for
a
civil
protection
order
with
respect
to
an
intrafmily
offense
committed
or
threatened,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
file
a
petition
for
civil
protection
in
the
Family
Division.

21.
D.
C.
Code
9
16­
1004(
a)
and
(
b)
(
concerning
intrafamily
offenses)
­­(
a)
Upon
a
filing
of
a
petition
for
civil
protection
by
the
Corporation
Counsel...
the
Family
Division
shall
set
the
matter
for
hearing
....(
b)
With
respect
to
a
petition
for
civil
protection
filed
by
the
Corporation
Counsel,
the
Family
Division
shall
cause
notice
of
the
hearing
to
be
served
on
the
respondent
...
and
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

22.
D.
C.
Code
0
16­
1005
(
a)
(
concerningintrafamily
offenses)
­
Members
of
the
family
receiving
notice
shall
appear
at
the
hearing.
In
addition
to
the
parties,
the
16
Corporation
Counsel
...
may
present
evidence
at
the
hearing
in
cases
where
the
petition
was
filed
by
the
CorporationCounsel.

23.
D.
C.
Code
Q
16­
2315
(
a)
(
proceedingregarding
delinquency,
neglect,
or
need
of
supervision)­
At
any
time
followingthe
filing
of
a
petition,
on
motion
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
...
the
Division
may
order
a
child
to
be
examined
to
aid
in
determininghis
physical
or
mental
condition.

24.
D.
C.
Code
5
16­
2339
(
b)
­
The
CorporationCounsel
may
request
an
order
under
subsection
(
c)
of
this
section
when
the
testimony
or
other
informationmay
be
necessary
to
the
public
interest,
and
the
child
called
as
a
witness
has
refused
or
is
likely
to
refuse
to
testify
or
provide
other
informationon
the
basis
of
the
privilege
against
self­
incrimination.

25.
D.
C.
Code
9
16­
2341
­
Where
a
public
support
burden
has
been
incurred
or
is
threatened,
or
where
an
individual
seeks
assistancepursuant
to
Part
D
in
Title
IV
of
the
Social
Security
Act
approved
January
4,
1975
(
88
Stat.
2351;
42
U.
S.
C.
Q
651
et
seq.),
the
Corporation
Counsel
or
an
assistant
may
bring
a
civil
action
in
the
Family
Division
to
enforce
support
of
any
parent
or
child
against
an
absent
parent.

26.
D.
C.
Code
Q
16­
3522
­
The
United
States
attorney
or
the
CorporationCounsel
may
institute
[
anex
rel.]
proceeding
pursuant
to
this
subchapteron
his
own
motion,
or
on
the
relation
of
a
third
person.

27.
D.
C.
Code
0
22­
1
119
­
It
shall
be
unlawful
for
any
person
or
persons
to
willfully
or
knowingly
give
a
false
alarm
of
fire
....
Prosecutionsfor
violation
of
the
provisions
of
this
section
shall
be
on
informationfiled
...
by
the
CorporationCounsel
....

28.
D.
C.
Code
9
22­
1631
(
b)
­
Prosecutionsfor
violations
of
this
chapter
[
game
and
fish
laws]
...
shall
be
conducted
...
by
the
CorporationCounsel....

29.
D.
C.
.
Code
5
22­
2714
­
Whenever
a
nuisance
is
kept,
maintained
or
exists
...
the
Corporation
Counsel
...
may
maintain
an
action
in
equity
...
to
perpetually
enjoin
said
nuisance
....

30.
D.
C.
Code
Q
22­
3305
­
All
prosecutions
[
for
vagrancy]
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

31.
D.
C.
Code
0
22­
3420
­
Prosecutionsfor
violations
of
the
provisions
of
[
the
sale
of
unwholesome
food]
shall
be
...
by
the
CorporationCounsel
....

32.
D.
C.
Code
Q
22­
3425
­
All
prosecutions
for
violations
of
[
the
use
of
 
District
of
Columbia 
or
similar
designation
by
private
detective
or
collection
agency]
shall
be
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

17
33.
D.
C.
Code
9
23­
101
(
a)
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
all
police
or
municipal
 
ordinances
or
regulations
and
for
violations
of
all
penal
statutes
in
the
nature
of
police
or
municipal
regulations,
where
the
maximum
punishment
is
a
fine
only,
or
imprisonment
not
exceeding
one
year,
shall
be
conducted
in
the
name
of
the
District
of
Columbia
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

34.
D.
C.
Code
5
23­
101
(
b)
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
...
relating
to
disorderly
conduct,
and
for
violations
...
relating
to
lewd,
indecent,
or
obscene
acts,
shall
be
conducted
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

35.
D.
C.
Code
3
23­
104
(
a)
­
The
United
States
or
the
District
of
Columbia
may
appeal
an
order,
entered
before
the
trial
of
a
person
charged
with
a
criminal
offense,
which
directs
the
return
of
seized
property,
suppresses
evidence,
or
otherwise
denies
the
prosecutor
the
use
of
evidence
at
trial,
if
the
United
States
attorney
or
the
Corporation
Counsel
conducting
the
prosecution
for
such
violation
certifies
to
the
judge
who
granted
such
motion
that
the
appeal
is
not
taken
for
purpose
of
delay
and
the
evidence
is
a
substantial
proof
of
the
charge
pending
against
the
defendant.

36.
D.
C.
Code
6
26­
81
1
(
e)
(
concerning
regional
interstate
banking)
­(
e)
If,
in
the
opinion
of
the
Superintendent
[
of
Banking]
a
violation
or
practice
or
threatened
violation
or
practice
...
is
likely
to
cause
insolvency,
substantial
prejudice
to
the
interests
of
the
depositors
or
customers
of
the
bank
or
person,
the
Superintendent,
through
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
petition
the
Court
to:
(
1)
issue
a
restraining
order
...;
(
2)
appoint
a
receiver
...;
(
3)
freeze
or
seize
the
assets
of
the
bank
or
person
...;
or
(
4)
impose
an
order
for
the
involuntary
dissolution
of
a
corporation
....

37.
D.
C.
Code
0
26­
915
(
a)
­
The
Superintendent
[
of
Banking]
shall
report
violations
.
of
any
provision
of
this
chapter
to
the
Corporation
Counsel.
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
institute
a
civil
action
on
behalf
of
the
District
for
equitable
or
any
other
appropriate
relief,
including
the
imposition
of
civil
fines
...
unless
different
procedures
or
means
of
obtaining
relief
are
specified
in
this
chapter....

38.
D.
C.
Code
0
26­
1018
(
c)
(
concerning
mortgage
lenders
and
brokers)
­
The
Superintendent
[
of
Banking]
may
request
the
Corporation
Counsel
...
to
take
appropriate
action
in
the
Superior
Court
...
for
the
enforcement
of
an
order
issued
under
this
section.
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
also
seek
...
damages
and
such
other
relief
allowed
by
law,
including
restitution...
In
any
action
brought
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
...
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
be
entitled
to
seek
attorney s
fees
and
costs.

39.
D.
C.
Code
8
28­
3909
­
Notwithstanding
any
provision
of
laws
to
the
contrary,
if
the
Corporation
Counsel
has
reason
to
believe
that
any
person
is
using
or
intends
to
use
any
method,
act,
or
practice
in
violation
of
[
the
consumer
protection
laws]
and
if
it
is
in
the
public
interest,
the
Corporation
Counsel...
may
petition
the
Superior
Cod
...
to
issue
a
temporary
or
permanent
injunction
against
the
use
of
the
method,
act....
The
Corporation
Counsel,
on
behalf
of
any
identifiable
person,
may
recover
restitution
for
property
lost
or
damages
suffered
as
a
consequence
of
the
unlawfid
act
or
practice.

18
40.
D.
C.
Code
9
28­
4505
(
a)
­
Whenever
the
Corporation
Counsel
has
reason
to
believe
that
any
person
may
be
in
possession,
custody,
or
control
of
any
documentary
material,
or
may
have
any
information,
relevant
to
a
civil
antitrust
investigation,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may,
prior
to
the
institution
of
a
proceeding
thereon,
issue
in
writing,
and
cause
to
be
served
upon
such
person,
a
civil
investigative
demand
requiring
such
person
to
produce
such
documentary
material
for
inspection
and
copying
or
reproduction,
to
answer
written
interrogatories,
to
give
oral
testimony
concerning
documentary
material
or
information,
or
to
furnish
any
combination
of
such
material,
answers,
or
testimony.

41.
D.
C.
Code
8
28­
4505
(
g)
(
7)
­
If
such
person
refuses
to
answer
any
question,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
petition
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
pursuant
to
this
section
for
an
order
compelling
such
person
to
answer
such
question....

42.
D.
C.
Code
fj
28­
4505
(
h)
(
see
items
#
58­
59
in
mandatory)
­
Whenever
any
person
fails
to
comply
with
any
civil
investigative
demand
duly
served
upon
that
person
under
this
section
or
whenever
satisfactory
copying
or
reproduction
of
any
such
material
cannot
be
done
and
such
person
refuses
to
surrender
such
material,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
file,
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia
and
serve
upon
such
person
a
petition
for
an
order
of
such
court
for
the
enforcement
of
this
chapter.

43.
D.
C.
Code
9
28­
4512
(
a)
­
In
enforcing
this
chapter
[
restraints
of
trade],
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
accept
an
assurance
of
discontinuance
of
an
act
or
practice
considered
in
violation
of
this
chapter
from
any
person
engaged
in
the
act
or
practice.

44.
D.
C.
Code
0
28­
45
13
­
Except
as
provided
in
section
28­
4505
(
k),
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
cooperate
with
the
federal
government
and
the
states
in
the
enforcement
of
this
chapter
[
restraints
of
trade].

45.
D.
C.
Code
fj
29­
599.7
(
concerning
nonprofit
corporations)
­
All
civil
actions
under
this
chapter,
which
the
Mayor
is
authorized
to
commence,
and
all
prosecutions
for
violation
of
the
provisions
of
this
chapter
...
shall
be
brought
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel....

.
46.
D.
C.
Code
5
29­
1359
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
an
action
to
restrain
a
foreign
limited
liability
company
from
transacting
business
in
the
District
in
violation
of
this
chapter.

47.
D.
C.
Code
!
j32­
356
(
b)
(
8)
(
concerning
health
services
planning)
­
The
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
seek
injunctive
relief
from
a
court
of
competentjurisdiction
if
it
determines
that
a
person
is
operating
a
[
health
care
facility]
in
violation
of
the
certificationsmade
under
this
subsection.

48.
D.
C.
Code
9
32­
366
(
b)
­
The
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
seek
injunctive
relief
from
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
when
it
determinesthat
a
person
is
/
P
19
offering,
developing,
or
operating
a
[
health
care
facility]
or
service
in
violation
of
this
chapter.

49.
D.
C.
Code
5
32­
560
­(
see
item
#
61
in
mandatory)
...
In
its
discretion,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
issue
emergency
or
proposed
rules
to
implement
the
provisions
of
this
act.

50.
D.
C.
Code
5
32­
1309
(
a)
­
Any
...
officer,
administrator,...
who
willfully
and
knowingly
participates
in
the
unlawful
operation
of
[
a
health
care
and
community
residence
facility]
shall
be
guilty
....
Prosecution
shall
be...
by
information
signed
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

51.
D.
C.
Code
3
32­
1309
(
b)
(
see
item
#
69
in
mandatory)
­[
Tlhe
Corporation
Counsel
...
may
maintain
...
an
action
...
to
enjoin
any
person,
agency,
corporation,...
from
operating
a
facility
or
agency
in
violation
of
the
terms
of
its
license,
provisions
of
this
subchapter,
or
any
rule
issued
pursuant
to
this
subchapter.

52.
D.
C.
Code
5
32­
1413
(
b)
(
see
item
#
70
in
mandatory)
­...
a
resident,
resident s
representative...
may
...
submit
a
written
request
asking
the
Corporation
Counsel
to
petition
the
court
to
appoint
a
receiver
for
any
facility.

53.
D.
C.
Code
6
32­
1451
­...
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
an
action
in
court
for
a
temporary
restraining
order,
preliminary
injunction,
or
permanent
injunction
to
enjoin
a
facility
[
nursing
home]
from
violating
any
provision
in
subchapter
I11
[
Discharge,
Transfer,
and
Relocation
of
Residents]
of
this
chapter,
any
rule
issued
by
the
Mayor
pursuant
to
that
subchapter,
or
any
standard
or
resident s
right
....

54.
D.
C.
Code
3
40­
622
(
b)
­
The
Director
[
of
the
Department
of
Transportation]
shall
promptly
inform
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
an
infiaction
by
any
person
who
has
accumulated
in
excess
of
$
750
in
frnes
....
If
the
Corporation
Counsel
assertsjurisdiction
over
such
person,
he
may
be
prosecuted
without
respect
to
the
provisions
of
this
chapter;
provided,
that
if
the
Corporation
Counsel
affirmatively
declines
to
take
jurisdiction
over
such
offender
within
15
calendar
days
of
his
receipt
of
notification
by
the
Director
of
a
violation
by
such
person,
such
violation
shall
be
adjudicated
as
a
civil
infraction
pursuant
to
this
subchapter.

55.
D.
C.
Code
5
40­
716
(
b)
(
5)
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
...
shall
prosecute
violations
of
this
subsection
....
The
Corporation
Counsel
if
authorized
to
request
that
a
person
who
is
charged
with
a
violation
of
any
provision
of
paragraph
(
1)
of
this
subsection
agree,
as
a
condition
of
acceptance
into
a
diversion
program
in
lieu
of
prosecution,
to
pay
the
District
of
Columbia...
a
reasonable
fee
for
the
costs
to
the
District
of
the
person s
participation
in
the
diversion
program;
provided
that
the
Corporation
Counsel
shall
set
the
fee
by
rule
and
at
a
level
which
the
Corporation
Counsel
determines
will
not
unreasonably
discourage
persons
from
entering
the
diversion
program.
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
reduce
or
waive
the
fee
if
it
finds
that
the
person
is
indigent....

20
20
56.
D.
C.
Code
$
40­
1
108
­
Prosecutions
for
violations
of
this
chapter
[
installment
sales
of
motor
vehicles]
...
shall
be
conducted
...
by
the
Corporation
Counsel....

57.
D.
C.
Code
$
41­
161.5
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
...
may
maintain
an
action
restrain
a
foreign
limited
liability
partnership
from
transacting
business
in
the
District
of
Columbia
in
violation
of
this
subchapter
[
Uniform
Partnership
Act
of
19961.

58.
D.
C.
Code
8
41­
499.24
­
The
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
an
action
on
behalf
of
the
District
for
violations
of
any
provision
of
this
chapter
[
Uniform
Limited
Partnership
Act
of
19871.

59.
D.
C.
Code
9
42­
234
(
a)
­
At
the
request
of
a
state,
the
Corporation
Counsel
may
bring
an
action
in
the
name
of
the
administrator
of
the
requesting
states,
in
any
court
of
appropriatejurisdiction
to
enforce
the
unclaimed
property
laws
of
the
requesting
state
against
a
holder
in
the
District
of
property
subject
to
escheat
or
claim
of
abandonment
by
that
state,
if
that
state
has
agreed
to
pay
expenses
incurred
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
in
bringing
the
action.

60.
D.
C.
Code
§
45­
1660
­
Any
person
who
willfully
violates
any
provision
of
this
chapter
[
rental
housing
conversion
and
sale]
...
shall
be
fined...
or...
imprisoned
....
Prosecution
for
violations
...
shall
be
brought
...
by
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
....

While
the
foregoing
list
is
substantially
complete
with
respect
to
statutory
references,
and
thus
workload
requirements,
of
the
OCC,
it
must
be
recognized
that
some
matters
which
add
to
the
workload
of
the
Office
are
not
referenced
in
a
statute.
Certain
matters
which
have
a
statutory
basis
are
required
to
be
performed
by
the
OCC,
although
the
OCC
is
not
actually
referenced
in
the
statute.
For
example,
D.
C.
Code
$
36­
1216
(
b)
states,
in
part,
 ...
the
Mayor
may
apply
to
the
Superior
Court
to
enforce
any
abatement
requirement
prescribed
.... 
While
the
statute
uses
the
word
 
Mayor 
the
actual
function
is
performed
by
OCC
on
behalf
of
the
Mayor.

Another
example,
of
a
law
which
does
not
specifically
reference
OCC
even
though
its
resources
are
required
is
the
Adoption
and
Safe
Families
Amendment
Act
of
2000
(
Act),
effective
June
27,2000
(
D.
C.
Law
13­
136;
not
yet
codified).
Section
201
(
d)
(
a)
(
2)
of
the
Act,
which
amends
section
201
of
the
Prevention
of
Child
Abuse
and
Neglect
Act
of
1977,
effective
September23,
1977(
D.
C.
Law
2­
22;
D.
C.
Code
6
6­
2123)
requires
the
Chief
of
the
[
Child
Protective
Services
Division
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Department
of
HumanServices]
(
DHS):

[
wlithin
90
days
of
taking
a
child
into
custody
pursuant
to
section
304
(
c)
(
l),
[
to]
return
the
child
to
the
home
or
to
request
the
filing
of
a
neglect
petition
in
the
Family
Division
of
the
Superior
Court
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

21
While
OCC
is
not
referenced
in
the
legislative
language,
pursuant
to
its
duties
to
represent
the
legal
interests
of
District
(
D.
C.
Code
9
1­
361),
OCC
must
represent
DHS
within
a
timely
manner
should
DHS
seek
to
file
the
referenced
neglect
petition.
However,
other
sections
of
the
Act
do
specifically
reference
OCC.
Section
301
(
f)
amends
D.
C.
Code
0
16­
1623
(
d)
(
4)
(
C)
to
provide,
that
at
least
10
days
prior
to
each
review
or
permanency
hearing
for
a
child
who
has
been
adjudicated
neglected,
the
department
responsible
for
the
supervision
services
to
the
child
and
his
parent,
guardian,
or
other
custodian
shall
submit
a
report
to
[
DHS]
which
contains
certain
enumerated
information
including
 [
wlhether
the
agency
has
initiated
or
intends
to
initiate
the
filing
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
a
motion
requesting
the
termination
of
the
parent
and
child
relationship
and
any
reasons
why
it
does
not
intend
to
initiate
the
filing
of
such
a
motion. 
In
addition,
5
404
(
d)
of
the
Act,
part
of
the
Interstate
Compact
on
Adoption
and
Medical
Assistance,
provides:

[
tlhe
submission
of
any
claim
for
payment
or
reimbursement
for
services
or
benefits
pursuant
to
this
section
or
the
making
of
any
statement
in
connection
therewith,
which
claim
or
statement
the
m&
er
knows
or
should
know
to
be
false,
misleading
or
fi­
audulent
shall
be
punishable
as
perjury
and
shall
also
be
subject
to
a
fine
not
to
exceed
$
10,000
or
imprisonment
for
not
to
exceed
30
days,
or
both.
A
violation
of
this
subsection
shall
be
prosecuted
by
the
Corporation
Counsel
of
the
District
of
Columbia.

Still
other
obligationswhich
affect
the
workload
of
the
OCC
emanate
from
court
decisions
founded
upon
one
or
more
statutes
and
case
law.
For
example,
in
Lashawn
A.
et
al.
v.
Anthony
Williams,
et
al.,
United
States
District
Court
for
the
District
of
Columbia
(
C.
A.
No.
89­
1754),
the
Court
approved
a
Consent
Decree
which,
among
other
things,
affects
the
obligations
and
staffing
of
the
OCC.
The
Consent
Decree
states,
inter
alia:

Defendants
[
District]
shall
provide
adequate
legal
staff
to
CFSA
to
enable
the
agency
to
meets
[
sic]
its
legal
obligations
under
the
MFO....
A
specific
legal
unit
within
the
Office
of
the
Corporation
Counsel
will
be
created
to
provide
legal
services
to
CFSA.
This
unit
will
provide
training
and
witness
preparation
services
to
assist
CFSA
staffto
effectivelypresent
their
cases
in
court....
 

In
addition,
there
are
various
Court
Rules
(
see
selected
samples
attached)
which
either
impose
additional
requirements
upon
the
OCC
or
expand
upon
those
set
forth
in
statute.
Finally,
there
are
regulatory
provisions
(
which
have
not
been
researched
for
this
memorandum)
which
impose
obligations
on
the
OCC.
For
example,
9
F­
3
107.2
of
the
District
of
Columbia
Fire
Prevention
Code
Supplement
of
1999
DCMR
12
D
(
46
D.
C.
Register
9631)
provides:

23
22
[
n]
o
permit
shall
be
issued
to
any
persons
to
engage
in
the
business
of
the
display
or
discharge
of
fireworksuntil
the
applicationfor
that
permit
has
been
approved
by:
1.
The
Fire
Chief;
2.
The
Director
of
the
Office
of
Emergency
Preparedness;
3.
The
Corporation
Counsel;
and
4.
The
Director
of
Consumer
and
Regulatory
Affairs.

Should
you
have
questions
regarding
this
memorandum,
please
contact
either
Pollie
H.
Goff,
Assistant
CorporationCounsel,
Legal
Counsel
Division,
at
724­
5562
or
me
at
7245495

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phg
Attachments
(
2)

23
