            2014 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2014)
Compliance Application Review Documents (CARDs for Sections 194.14 & 194.15)
               Content of Compliance Certification Application,
             Content of Compliance Recertification Application(s)
                                       
15.0 Background (194.14 and 194.15)

	Section 194.15 states EPA's expectations for what should be in a compliance recertification application. Much of the information requirements parallel the requirements of Section 194.14, which applied primarily to the original application. Because of the related nature of sections 194.14 and 194.15, these sections are discussed together in this CARD. EPA's focus with this section is to require any compliance recertification application to include information on the changes to the disposal system and facilities since the previous certification or recertification. The information in this section is essentially updating the information in all aspects of the disposal system and waste related items. If items and assumptions have not changed, then EPA would not expect new information to be developed for those topics. It was EPA's intention that each Compliance Recertification Application (CRA) should clearly reference and/or summarize such unchanged information. 
      For each CRA, EPA expects DOE to identify all systems and program changes implemented during the preceding five-year period. Any activity or assumption that deviated from what was described in the most recent compliance application would be considered a change. EPA also expects each CRA to summarize all changes that EPA reviewed and approved in the preceding five-year period (through modification of the certification or other processes). We further expect each CRA to indicate where new baseline program elements have been established as a result of changes, and to show which parts of the application have been revised accordingly. These expectations were outlined in the Compliance Application Guidance (Docket A-93-02, Item II-B-29) and the Guidance to the U.S. Department of Energy on Preparation for Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant with 40 CFR Parts 191 and 194 (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B3-14). Recertification is defined in section 8(f) of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act as a determination "whether or not the WIPP facility continues to be in compliance with the final disposal regulations." Thus, recertification is a process that evaluates changes at WIPP to determine if the facility continues to meet the requirements of EPA's disposal regulations, using appropriately updated information. 

      EPA provided opportunities for public comment throughout the recertification process. All public comments received are listed, along with EPA's responses, in Appendix 15-B.  
      
      
15.1 Requirement (194.14)

	Section 194.14 requirements are listed in Appendix 14-A below. Baseline documentation for section 194.14 was established at the time of the original recertification and approved by EPA. Changes to section 194.14 topics areas since the original certification are required by section 194.15 and discussed below in this CARD.

	Section 194.14 requirements are listed in Appendix 14-A below. Baseline documentation for section 194.14 was established at the time of the original recertification and approved by EPA. Changes to section 194.14 topics areas since the original certification are required by section 194.15 and discussed below in this CARD. Appendix 15-A contains the recertification requirements of section 194.15.

15.1.1 1998 Certification Decision (194.14)

	EPA expected the CCA to include, at a minimum, basic information about the WIPP site and disposal system design. In general, DOE's characterization of the WIPP site and disposal system was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of the CCA (Appendices GCR, Hydro and MASS). Other characteristics, design, location and construction information was primarily provided in CCA Chapter 7 and Appendices BACK, DEL, PCS, and SEAL. EPA concluded that DOE adequately addressed geology, geophysics, hydrogeology, hydrology, meteorology, climatology, potential pathways, and effects of waste and geochemistry of the disposal system and its vicinity and how these conditions are expected to change and interact over the regulatory time frame. 

	EPA thoroughly reviewed DOE's CCA and the additional information submitted by DOE, and determined that DOE complied with each of the requirements of Section 194.14, conditioned upon DOE's implementation of the most robust panel closure system design (designated as Option D) with a slight modification (i.e., the use of Salado mass concrete instead of freshwater concrete). 

	A complete description of EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for Section 194.14 can be obtained from EPA Air Docket, A-93-02, Items V-A-1 and V-B-2.

15.1.2 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.14)

      Baseline documentation for section 194.14 was established at the time of the original certification and approved by EPA. See the CCA CARD 14 for details of EPA's review and EPA's approval. Changes to section 194.14 topic areas since the original certification (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49). Any changes since the CCA are documented in each CRA submitted by DOE and reviewed by EPA under section 194.15 requirements. 

15.1.3 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.14) 

	The intent for section 194.14, Content of compliance certification application, was to provide the baseline information for the compliance application. In the CCA and supplemental information and the compliance performance assessment (the performance verification test or PAVT), DOE provided the baseline information on WIPP and important features, events and processes that could affect the disposal system's containment capabilities. The Option D panel closure requirement identified by EPA as a condition in the certification has been incorporated into DOE's performance assessments as required (see 2004 CRA CARD 23). Since DOE complied with the sections of 194.14 in the original certification, EPA found that DOE complied with all sections of 194.14 for the 2004 CRA (see Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025).

15.1.4 2004 Recertification Decision (194.14)
	
	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determined that DOE continued to comply with the requirements for Section 194.14.

15.1.5 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.14)

      Changes to section 194.14 topics areas since the original certification are required by section 194.15 and discussed below in the 2009 CARD 15 (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49). Any changes since the CCA and the 2004 CRA are documented in the 2009 CRA submitted by DOE and reviewed by EPA under section 194.15 requirements. 

15.1.6 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.14) 

	Since DOE complied with the sections of 194.14 in the original certification and the subsequent 2004 and 2009 CRAs, EPA found that DOE complied with all sections of 194.14 for the 2009 CRA (Docket ID No. OAR-2009-0330).

15.1.7 2009 Recertification Decision (194.14)
	
	Based on EPA's review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determined that DOE complied with the requirements of Section 194.14.

15.1.8 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.14)

      Baseline documentation for section 194.14 was established at the time of the original certification and approved by EPA. See CCA CARD 14 for details of EPA's review and EPA's approval. Changes to section 194.14 topics areas since the original certification are required by section 194.15 and discussed below in this CARD. Any changes since the CCA and the 2004 and 2009 CRA are documented in the 2014 CRA submitted by DOE and reviewed by EPA under section 194.15 requirements.

15.1.9 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.14) 

	The intent for section 194.14, Content of Compliance Certification Application, was to provide the baseline information for the original compliance application. In the CCA and supplemental information and the compliance performance assessment (the performance verification test or PAVT), DOE provided the baseline information on WIPP and important features, events and processes (FEPs) that could affect the disposal system's containment capabilities. Since DOE complied with the sections of 194.14 in the original certification and the 2004 CRA, EPA finds that DOE complies with all sections of 194.14 for the 2014 CRA.

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance certification application requirements of Section 194.14.

15.1.10 2014 Recertification Decision (194.14)

      Based on EPA's review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609), EPA determined that DOE complied with the requirements of Section 194.14.


15.2 Requirements (194.15(a) (1))

	(a) "In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

 		(1) All additional geologic, geophysical, geochemical, hydrologic, and 				meteorological information."

15.2.1 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.15(a) (1))

Earthquake and Seismic Information, Natural Resource Conditions

EPA reviewed DOE's geologic, geophysical, geochemical, hydrologic, and meteorological information and updates in the 2004 CRA. The following briefly describes the review found in EPA's CARD 15 for the 2004 CRA (Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025).

Earthquake/Seismic Information
      DOE updated information on earthquakes within 150 miles of WIPP and identified, 14 earthquakes of Richter scale magnitude 3.0 or greater occurred between January 1, 1995 and September 30, 2002, the largest was a 5.3 magnitude earthquake in Brewster County, Texas. WIPP's design basis is for much larger earthquakes than those which have occurred in the immediate vicinity of WIPP (2004 CRA Chapter 2). A brief summary of DOE's updates for earthquake and seismic information can be found in EPA's 2004 CRA CARD 23, and EPA's Human Intrusion TSD located in Docket A-98-49, II-B2-38. 	
Natural Resources 
      DOE reported that the major natural resources considered at the WIPP site, as identified in the CCA, continue to be potash, oil, and natural gas. The potash zone is still considered barren above the repository (see 2004 CRA, Section 15.1.2). The probability range for encountering a Castile brine pocket is between 0.01 to 0.60 was used in DOE's 2004 CRA PABC. Deep drilling rate (intrusion rate), calculated by extrapolating the past 100 years of data increased from 46.8 boreholes per km[2], used in the CCA, to 52.2 in the 2004 CRA.
      DOE reported an increase in the number of salt water disposal and injection wells within the nine-township area between 1997 to 2003 as follows: 1997, Injection Wells-26; 2003, Injection Wells-39. The average reported average injection rate was about 1,250 BWPD. 
      A brief summary of DOE's updates for natural resources can be found in EPA's 2004 CRA CARD 23 and EPA's TSD Human Intrusion [Air Docket A-98-49 Item II-B1-10], and DOE's 2004 CRA Section 45).
      
Hydrologic Issues 

(Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025)

Geologic Model
	Included in DOE's 2004 CRA was a description of the formations that overlie WIPP, the Dewey Lake and the Santa Rosa. The Rustler Formation is the primary hydrologic unit of importance that overlies the Salado Formation and is considered the important because it contains the most transmissive units above the repository. The Culebra Dolomite is the most transmissive hydrostratigraphic unit within the Rustler and above the WIPP site. The Culebra transmissivity characteristics are zonal with higher transmissivity found in Nash Draw and lower transmissivity found to the east. DOE uses the observation variable transmissivity and the Culebra to development of the multiple transmissivity fields to calculate releases from the Culebra (2004 CRA Chapter 2.2.1.4 and Appendix PA Attachment TFIELD Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025). A general description of fluid flow in the Rustler, the five members of the Rustler and the properties of each unit are provided in Figure 15-1 and Table 15-1 of EPA's CARD 15 for the 2009 CRA (Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025). 

DOE's characterization that the Culebra as fractured dolomite unit with non-uniform properties, both horizontally and vertically (CCA CARD 14). The Culebra exhibits both matrix and fracture (micro to macro) porosity. Flow within the Culebra occurs primarily within fractures, although flow also occurs within vugs where they are connected by fractures and, to some extent, within interparticle porosity where this porosity is higher. Flow in the Culebra is dominantly lateral and southward. DOE identified that the Culebra transmissivity exhibits a bimodal distribution (2004 CRA Appendix PA, Attachment TFIELD). In areas where the Culebra dolomite has transmissivity less than 4 x 10[-6] m[2]/s (10-5.4 m[2]/s), the Culebra is considered to be dominated by single (matrix) porosity. Above this transmissivity the Culebra is believed to have dual porosity so that fractures and the dolomite matrix are important.
	DOE stated that the Culebra is the most transmissive hydrostratigraphic unit at the WIPP site. The Magenta is the second most transmissive unit. Since the CCA DOE had obtained new hydraulic data for the Culebra and the Magenta confirming the range for transmissivity used in the CCA. Magenta well H-19b1, located just southeast of the site center, had a higher transmissivity (0.38 ft[2]/ day or 4.1 x 10[-7] m[2]/s) than the previous "highest" transmissivity well, H-6a, located within the WIPP LWA boundary. The Magenta transmissivity at H-6a was reported in CCA Appendix Hydro to be 0.3 ft[2]/day (3.2 x 10[-7] m[2]/s). DOE tested well locations in both the Culebra and Magenta. These test indicate the transmissivity of the Magenta is much lower than that of the Culebra. 
	DOE's well tests indicate the Culebra transmissivity characteristics are zonal, with higher transmissivity found in Nash Draw and lower transmissivity found to the east of the WIPP site boundary. In between these areas the Culebra transmissivity is variable. DOE had postulated that this spatial transmissivity distribution is due to post-depositional processes and geologic controls (2004 CRA Chapter 2, p. 2-107) and claimed geologic controls are believed to include overburden thickness, dissolution of the upper Salado, and the occurrence of halite in the mudstone Rustler units above and below the Culebra (ibid). DOE uses the observation of a bimodal distribution of transmissivity and these geologic controls in the development of the transmissivity fields used to calculate releases from the Culebra (2004 CRA Chapter 2.2.1.4 and Appendix PA Attachment TFIELD).

Changes in Water Levels
	DOE monitored water levels in the Culebra in a network of over 30 wells. DOE also monitors a limited number of Magenta wells. In both units DOE recorded water level changes, but the source of the changes were unknown. DOE's investigation of the water level changes has focused on the Culebra because it is identified as the primary potential pathway for groundwater releases at WIPP. The water level has generally tended to increase, and was observed at the time of the CCA but became more widespread after DOE submitted the CCA. DOE reported the head distribution in the Culebra still indicated the flow is generally in the same direction as that of the CCA. There are several theories to explain the water level increases, including potash mining and petroleum industry brine injection. Water level changes as a response to precipitation [See Section 15.2.4 below for information in the 2009 CRA] is not considered to be a viable theory because wells do not respond to precipitation events.

Change in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time
	The 2004 CRA performance assessment longer particle travel times through the Culebra to the WIPP site boundary were predicted compared to those calculated for the CCA. DOE had attributed the longer travel times to a reduced hydraulic gradient from the north to the south across the site. (See EPAs 2004 CARD 15, Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025 for details). 

Retardation of Radionuclides (Distribution Coefficients or Kds)
	Brine bearing radionuclides may be introduced into the Culebra via a borehole that intersects the repository and transported to accessible environment the transport time is by retardation due to sorption along the transport pathway. DOE's radionuclide sorption distribution coefficients (Kds) is described in DOE 2004 CRA Chapter 6, Section 6.4.6.2.1. EPA's assessment of DOEs Kds used in the 2004 CRA is described in EPA's 2004 CRA CARD 15 (Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025). 
Water in the Air-Exhaust Shaft
      In 1995 DOE identified water in the WIPP exhaust shaft at a depth of about 80 feet and investigated the water source (2004 CRA Chapter 2.2.1.4.2.2). DOE drilled investigative wells and hand-augured wells around the site surface facilities to determine the cause. These efforts found that flow into the shaft was primarily due the following (1) runoff of rainfall into and infiltration from the retention ponds located to the south of the WIPP surface facilities, and (2) infiltration of saline waters from the salt storage area, the salt storage evaporation pond, and perhaps remnants of the drilling and tailings pit used during the construction of the WIPP salt s seepage from a salt water evaporation pond. More descriptive details are found in the EPA's 2004 CARD 24 (Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025). 

Karst
	Due to public concern DOE reanalyzed existing information related to karst in the 2004 CRA. DOE's study concluded that karst outside of Nash Draw is limited to the horizon of the Magenta Member. The report concludes that the evidence of karst in Nash Draw eastward to the WIPP site is unwarranted (Docket A-98-49 II-B2-53).  

Climatologic and meteorological conditions in the vicinity 
	Climate conditions included in the 2004 CRA were provided in the annual reports (2004 CRA Chapter 2.5.2) and Table 2-14 and Figures 2-49 through Figure 2-56 of the 2004 CRA (Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025). At the time of the 2004 CRA DOE did not alter the CCA assumptions about future climate in the performance assessment. (See EPA's 2004 CRA CARD 15 Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025 for more details)
	


15.2.2 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(a) (1))

Earthquake and Seismic Information, Natural Resource Conditions

      EPA found DOE's information provided in the 2004 CRA related to earthquake and seismic information and natural resource conditions to be adequate. Details can be found in EPA's 2004 CRA CARD 15, Air Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025.
Hydrologic Issues

Details of EPA's evaluation of DOE's hydrologic issues can be found in EPA 2004 CARD 15, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025. 

Geologic Model
	EPA reviewed DOE's development of the transmissivity (T) fields (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B1-16) and concluded these T fields were adequate/

Changes in Water Levels
	EPA agreed with DOE that the water levels in the Culebra and other units are most likely due to anthropogenic sources and natural recharge can be eliminated because there is no response in well data to precipitation events EPA finds DOE's approach to the water level changes to be adequate.


Change in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time
	EPA reviewed DOE's information in the 2004 CRA and supplemental information (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B2-35, response to comment G-7; Docket A-98-49, Item II-B2-59)/. EPA found that the longer travel times to be reasonable and based on appropriate data and modeling.

Retardation of Radionuclides (Distribution Coefficients or Kds)
	EPA concluded that the Kd values used in the 2004 CRA PABC were acceptable and adequate.
Water in the Air-Exhaust Shaft
	EPA accepted DOE's explanation of infiltration from the WIPP facility adequately accounts for the water movement.

Current climatologic and meteorological conditions in the vicinity 
	EPA's review determined DOE's updated meteorological conditions in the 2004 CRA were adequate.

Karst Summary
	EPA believes that, on a regional scale, the groundwater basin model done by DOE reasonably predicted the current ground water flow regime and the geochemistry of the site. Based on the DOE's documentation and EPA evaluation of Karst formation (see EPA's Karst Docket TSD (Docket. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49, and ID No.Item II-B1-15) EPA concluded that karst will not be a pervasive process at WIPP that would affect WIPP's ability to contain radionuclides. 

15.2.3 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (1))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA 
EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(A) (1).


15.2.4 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.15(a) (1))

Hydrologic Issues 

Geologic Model
	The geologic description and characteristics of the WIPP site did not change since the 2004 CRA. The Culebra freshwater hydraulic head contour map was updated with new well data annually (see Figure 15-6 of EPA 2009 CARD 15 (below). 
	DOE performed a well network optimization study in 2003 to select new well locations that would decrease transmissivity uncertainty the greatest, to guide future decisions to plug old wells and to select the best locations for new wells to be drilled (2009 CRA Appendix HYDRO-2009, Section HYDRO-2.0). DOE plugged 17 wells mainly because of borehole conditions, and modified others to monitor other geologic units such as the Magenta (2009 CRA Appendix HYDRO-2009, Section HYDRO-4.0). DOE located many new wells based on the optimization study prediction that identified areas were the wells would be most valuable. Eighteen new Culebra monitoring wells were added to the WIPP network from April 2003 to October 2006 (2009 CRA Appendix HYDRO-2009, Section HYDRO-3.0, Figures 15.5 and 15.6 of this CARD). Twelve of these wells were drilled in locations to confirm the correlations proposed between Culebra transmissivity and various geologic conditions. 	
 Update Culebra values only based on recent new well testing, lowest values from SNL-15 pump tests.

	The Culebra continues to be the most transmissive hydrostratigraphic unit above the Salado (salt) Formation (2009 CRA Appendix PA-09 Section PA 2.1.4). The transmissivities measured in wells drilled since the 2004 CRA continue to confirm the range of transmissivities used in the PA calculations with modifications to the lowest values for the Culebra (Table 15-2 above). SNL-15, drilled due east of the WIPP site boundary (see Appendix HYDRO-2009, Figure HYDRO-1, Figures 15-5 and 15-6), exhibited very low hydraulic conductivity and transmissivity (Appendix HYDRO-2009 Section HYDRO-8.0), lowering the range in Table 15-2. Culebra transmissivity characteristics continue to be zonal in nature (2009 CRA Appendix TFIELD-09 Section 3.0).

DOE performed a peer review of the revised Culebra Hydrogeology Conceptual Model (CHCM) used in the WIPP performance assessment modeling. The purpose and scope of the peer review was to determine the adequacy and conduct an independent review of the "Culebra hydrogeology conceptual model for the purpose of establishing T fields to be used in PA calculations of radionuclide transport through the Culebra."

 The new conceptual model uses information gained from the new monitoring wells drilled and tested (Burgess et al. 2008) since the 2004 CRA. The original CCA conceptual model peer review panel found that the CHCM failed to correlate the detailed hydrogeology of the Culebra with its tested hydrologic character but that adequate data existed from hydraulic testing to develop a numerical model for PA. Inclusion of recent well data into the new conceptual model allowed DOE to develop transmissivity fields that are geologically based, consistent with observed groundwater heads, consistent with groundwater responses in Culebra pump test, and consistent with water chemistry .

Changes in Water Levels
	DOE monitored water levels with a network of 66 groundwater wells. DOE's network contains 46 Culebra, 17 Magenta, 1 Dewey Lake, and 2 Bell Canyon water wells (2009 CRA Appendix HYDRO-2009 Section HYDRO-5.0). Since the 2004 recertification DOE has made significant changes in the groundwater monitoring program (See Figure 15.6). DOE performed a Culebra monitoring-network optimization study (DOE Section 15.6.1.4.2) to determine the optimum location for new wells to provide the best information and to select and remove (i.e., plug and abandon) wells that would have little impact on the quality of the data acquired. DOE has added 18 new wells and removed 17 wells since 2004 (CRA 2009 Appendix HYDRO Section HYDRO-4.0).

	DOE modified how water level data was acquired from the well monitor network. DOE continued to manually measure the water level at each well monthly, and has equipped most of the wells with instruments called TROLLs (downhole programmable pressure gauges that record pressure fluctuations that can be calibrated to water level changes) that generally records hourly measurements rather than monthly. One outgrowth of the use of TROLLs is that, for the first time, DOE found a few wells in Nash Draw responsd to rainfall events (CRA 2009 Appendix HYDRO, page HYDRO-16); see the section below.

	Generally the Culebra and Magenta continue to exhibit rising water levels around the WIPP site (CRA 2009 Appendix HYDRO Section HYDRO-5.5). TROLL data indicated that water levels respond to oil and gas drilling activities nearby (CRA 2009 Appendix HYDRO page HYDRO-31) as well as to rainfall events in Nash Draw. DOE also performed model studies to attempt to understand possible sources that may cause the water level increases (CRA 2009 Appendix HYDRO Section HYDRO-9.0), and concluded that poorly plugged oil, gas, and/or potash characterization wells are plausible sources for the water level increases. 

Nash Draw Rainfall Impact on Culebra Water Levels

	DOE added instrumentation in all Culebra monitoring wells that are not used for water quality. TROLL(R) instruments installed in monitoring wells measure pressure changes in the water column and transmit real-time data to a computer at the surface at pre-programmed intervals. These monitoring wells are able to provide virtually continuous data, in this case hourly (DOE 2009 CRA, Section 15.6.1.4.2).

	The higher temporal resolution of hydraulic head measurements enhanced understanding of water level changes in the Culebra. Many Culebra water-level changes previously considered unpredictable and anthropogenic in origin were demonstrated to be responses to rainfall in Nash Draw, while others can be conclusively linked to well drilling activities. Comparing daily rainfall measured at the WIPP weather station to the TROLL[(R)] pressure data reveals spikes in pressure that correlate with rainfall events of approximately 0.4 inches or more in 24 hours in Nash Draw which originate in Nash Draw creating a pressure pulse that propagates under Livingston Ridge and west to east across the WIPP site, decreasing in magnitude, over periods of days to months which is not an observation of rapid recharge of rainwater at the WIPP site, but a communication of pressure response across the WIPP site from Nash Draw and confirm previous suspicions that the Culebra is unconfined in portions of Nash Draw (Section 15.2.1 of this CARD, last paragraph). This understanding enhanced the development of the revised Culebra Hydrology Conceptual Model, which was peer reviewed in 2008 (2009 CRA Appendix HYDRO-2009 Section HYDRO-5.1).

Production Brine Well Cavity Collapse
	Oil and gas drillers who drill through the Salado (primarily salt) and Castile (salt and anhydrite) Formations are required to use salt saturated drilling fluid to assure a stable borehole through the salt. The is salt laden brine is produced by drilling, or converting, a well drilled into the shallow salt mainly on the Northwestern Platform north of the Delaware Basin. Salt saturated brine is produced by injecting fresh water into the salt, pumping the resultant salt saturated brine to the surface, and trucking it to oil and gas drilling locations that need the brine to drill through salt bearing strata in the Delaware Basin. This process of brine production creates a brine filled cavity that increases in size as saturated brine is produced. These brine filled brine production cavities are generally located close to the surface, on the order of 500 feet deep, in shallow salt, and near low cost sources of fresh water, such as the Capitan Reef. If the size of the cavity is not controlled and regulated, it may grow too large for the surface rock formations to support the cavity roof and collapse, thus creating a sink hole potentially expressing itself on the surface as a sink hole. 

	In 2008 two brine production wells experienced cavity collapsed resulting in sink holes on the surface north of the Delaware Basin on the Northwest Platform These specific occurrences were not discussed in the 2009 CRA. Therefore, in its July 16, 2009 completeness letter (EPA 2009c), comment 2-33-2, EPA requested that DOE discuss the potential impact of such an event near WIPP. DOE's response is examined in Section 15.2.5 below. 

Change in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time
	The 2009 PABC calculations predict shorter travel time for a particle to travel through the Culebra to the WIPP site boundary than did the 2004 PABC. Three main changes contributed to these changes in flow time; BLM redefined the definition of minable potash in 2009 in particular within the WIPP site near the waste disposal panels, matrix distribution coefficients (Kds) decreased several orders of magnitude for most radionuclides when the increase in the organic ligand inventory was included, and SNL-14 confirmed the existence of the high-transmissivity zone in the southeastern portion of the WIPP site which creates a pathway for radionuclides to leave the Land Withdrawal Boundary. These changes make the travel time closer to that predicted in the original compliance certification.

Retardation of Radionuclides (Distribution Coefficients or Kds)
	DOE's method for determining retardation of radionuclides, Kds, in the 2009 recertification performance assessment calculations has not changed, but the Kds were recalculated for the 2009 PABC. EPA noted in completeness comment 3-C-25 that, "...increased concentrations of organic ligands indicates that the Kds...are potentially too high and overestimate the potential retardation in the Culebra."(EPA 2009c). DOE recalculated the Kds in response to EPA's comment using the new inventory data which, "...decreased several orders of magnitude..." (DOE 2010a page 52, item 2). These new Kds were used in the 2009 PABC calculations.   

Water in the Air-Exhaust Shaft
	DOE reported in the 2004 CRA water, first reported in 1995 continues to flow in the WIPP exhaust shaft at a depth of about 80 feet. DOE drilled three additional shallow wells, PZ-13, PZ-14, and PZ-15, to evaluate the potential impact of the decommissioned and covered Site and Preliminary Design Validation (SPDV) mine tailing pile east of the WIPP air exhaust shaft 2009 CRA Section 15.6.1.4.1). Evaluation of these wells showed that the SPDV pile may not contribute to shallow brine that continues to impact the exhaust shaft. 

	In 2004 and 2005 DOE installed numerous infiltration controls to mitigate the impact of surface runoff on the shallow water found in the exhaust shaft. DOE installed a number of lined storm water ponds to capture run off from the various surface salt piles and surface facilities at WIPP. In 2008 some of the 15 shallow monitoring wells water level measurements declined for the first time, possibly indicating the first sign of the effectiveness of the infiltration controls.


Current climatologic and meteorological conditions in the vicinity 
	As noted in the 2004 CRA Section 15.2.1 WIPP is located in the desert southwest with limited annual precipitation. Limited precipitation continues to be the norm since the retreat of the last ice sheet around 10,000 years ago. DOE provided updated information on recent climatic conditions in WIPP Annual Site Environmental Reports (DOE 2008d Chapter 5.3). The 2009 CRA Table 15-3 and Figures 15-1 through 15-5 provide recent meteorological information (2009 CRA Section 15.6.1.5). DOE notes in the 2009 CRA Section 15.6.1.5 that no changes in climatic conditions occurred during 2002-2006 therefore, CCA assumptions about future climate in the performance assessment have not changed for this recertification.

Karst
      DOE reviewed and updated geologic data in Section 15.6.1 of the 2009 CRA. Since the 2003 data cutoff for the 2004 CRA, DOE undertook a monitoring well optimization program under which it expanded its monitoring well network, conducted extensive hydrologic testing, and added instrumentation that allowed more precise analysis of Culebra water levels. The resultant data, described in the 2009 CRA Section 15.6.1.4, Hydrologic Information, and 2009 CRA Appendix HYDRO reinforced and enhanced the conceptual understanding of the Culebra hydrogeology, and allowed the integration of the tested hydrologic characteristics of the Culebra with its observed geologic characteristics.

      As a part of its recertification review in 2006, EPA required DOE to conduct additional investigations into the issue of karst because of public comments along with any the new hydrogeologic findings based on the Culebra Hydrology Conceptual Model Peer Review Panel conducted in in August 2008.  

  
15.2.5 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (1))

Earthquake/Seismic Information
	DOE provided information on recent seismic activity in the 2009 CRA Section 15.6.1.2 and Appendix DATA-2009 Section DATA-2.2. The analysis indicated an increase in seismic events, but concluded that "no significant or anomalous seismic events have occurred in the vicinity of the WIPP since the CRA-2004," and concluded these seismic events do not necessitate additional calculations need be made to the 2009 CRA. EPA found DOE's reporting and conclusions to be complete and adequate.

Natural Resources
      DOE monitored drilling activities in the Delaware Basin Monitoring Program and appropriately captured the drilling events that would affect the drilling rate used for the PA. The drilling rate had increased to 59.8 boreholes/km[2] in the 2009 PABC. EPA reviewed changes to the DBR parameter MAXFLOW and finds them to be reasonable. 
      DOE's FEPs screening of the fluid injection parameters did not changed since the 2004 CRA and EPA considered the reported impact on injection activities to that CRA as adequate. Salt water disposal and injection wells within the nine-township area increased from 26 in 1997, to 39 in 2003, to 54 in 2008. The reported average injection rate was about 1,480 barrels of water per day (BWPD), compared to 1,250 BWPD average injection in 2003, with a 75% increase in total injection volume.  EPA reviewed DOE's analysis and finds information related to natural resources to be adequate.
                               Hydrologic Issues

Geologic Model
	In the 2009 PABC calculations DOE's conceptual model for the Culebra Hydrology Conceptual was modified by making the model-derived transmissivity fields more geologically based on new well data and testing. The model changes were based on extensive new hydrological investigations and testing conducted by the Department and DOE Contractors. The new T-field estimates were consistent with the T-geology correlation used in CRA-2004.

      EPA examined DOE's conceptual model peer review (Burgess et al. 2008) findings and model changes and found DOE's approach was adequate and reasonably documented. See the 2009 CRA CARD 27, Section 27.4.1, for additional detail.

Changes in Water Levels
	EPA agreed that the primary origin of water level changes was probably anthropogenic. Since the 2004 CRA, DOE has significantly improved the water well monitoring network and improved over all system understanding. EPA examined DOE's work and documentation since the 2004 CRA and found DOE's approach and conclusions to be adequate.

Nash Draw Rainfall Impact Culebra Water Levels
	The 2009 CRA Appendix-HYDRO Section HYDRO-5.1 described the characteristics of rainfall on Culebra Water levels. Hours to days after a rainfall event in Nash Draw some monitoring wells in Nash Draw show a variation in water level, specifically an increase in hydrostatic head (i.e., water pressure) in the vicinity of Nash Draw. This pressure increase slowly propagated east into the monitor well network around WIPP over weeks and months. The monitoring well network did not show any impact due to rainfall events east of Nash Draw at or near the Land Withdrawal Boundary. Therefore, this propagation eastward of rainfall in Nash Draw did not indicate infiltration from the surface near the WIPP but is an expression of the increase in water pressure in Nash Draw due to local rainfall events. EPA concurs that the rainfall event data in Nash Draw do not 1) indicate rapid infiltration is occurring at the WIPP site proper and 2) do not challenge the Culebra hydrology conceptualization.

Production Brine Well Cavity Collapse  	
      EPA asked DOE to evaluate the impact of a production brine well cavity. DOE's evaluation noted that this scenario is similar to potash mining taking place in the upper Salado Formation near WIPP; the applicable effects of the potash mining were included in DOE's 2009 CRA documentation. EPA examined DOE's response to completeness comments and relevant documentation in the 2009 CRA and found them to be adequate.

Change in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time
	EPA examined the information DOE supplied in the 2009 CRA and determined that the decrease in travel times, compared to the 2004 CRA, are appropriate and reasonable. Particle travel time presumes particles are not retarded due to diffusion, sorption or adsorption. For the 2009 CRA median particle travel times (averaged over all simulations) decreased presuming three mining assumption; one assumed all Salado potash is mined within the LWB, and the other two assumed either no Salado potash is mined or only a portion i mined within the LWB. For the non-mining presumption travel times were 7,374 years; for the partially mined assumption travel times were 22,376, for the fully mine assumption travel times were 5,084. EPA found that the decreased travel time for the 2009 CRA to be reasonable and based on appropriate data and modeling done by DOE.

Retardation of Radionuclides (Distribution Coefficients or Kds)
	EPA noted in the October 19, 2009 completeness letter (EPA 2009c), comment 3-C-25 (EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330), that the impact of higher organic ligand concentrations on Kds in the updated WIPP inventory had not been included in the WIPP performance assessment by DOE. DOE agreed with EPA's comment and included new KD values in the 2009 PABC. EPA examined DOE's response and verified that these changes are included in the 2009 PABC and found them to be adequate.
	
Water in the Air-Exhaust Shaft
	EPA reviewed various 2009 CRA documents and evaluated DOE's proactive approach attempting to mitigate the potential surface sources of water in the air exhaust shaft. It appeared that the origin of this near surface water was derived from anthropogenic sources. EPA finds DOE's discussion of this issue to be adequate.

Current climatologic and meteorological conditions in the vicinity 
	EPA examined 2009 CRA documentation and DOE's conclusions related to these topics and found that there are no expected changes in climate conditions and no significant changes in meteorological conditions have taken place in the vicinity of WIPP. EPA find DOE's conclusion to be adequate.

                           Karst in 2009 CRA Review

Karst-Background
      Concerns that active karst processes occur at the WIPP site were raised and addressed during the previous two certifications. During the 2004 recertification EPA conducted an exhaustive review of the issue. EPA found that karst did not impact the Land Withdrawal Area. 

Karst and Hydrologic Data
      As part of its recertification review in 2006, EPA required that DOE conduct additional investigations into the karst issue and led to the Lorenz Report (2006a). Starting in 2003 DOE started to update the water monitor well program by first optimizing its monitoring well network, eventually generating data that enhanced the conceptual understanding of Culebra. The revised conceptual model, recalibrated T-fields, and karst studies were presented to the Revised Culebra Hydrogeology Peer Review Panel in August 2008. The panel concluded that arguments made by Lorenz (2006) and Powers (2008) have convinced the Panel that significant karst features are not present at the WIPP site. 

      EPA found that in the 2009 CRADOE had appropriately excluded the effects of karst from the performance assessment calculations. 
      
15.2.6 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (1))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (1).

15.2.7 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.15(a) (1)) 

Meteorological Conditions 
	Meteorological conditions (wind, temperature, humidity precipitation) are included in the DOEs yearly Annual Site Environmental Reports which are updated through December 2011 and included in 2014 CRA Section 15.8.1.5. DOE did not record any significant or anomalous meteorological conditions. 

Earthquake/Seismic Information
      DOE updated information on earthquakes within an approximate 187 miles of the WIPP site and within the Delaware Basin. In Section 15.8.1.2 of the 2014 CRA. DOE reported 543 seismic events recorded within approximately 187 miles of the WIPP. One event that stood out had a magnitude of 2.4 and occurred on March 18, 2012 approximately 9.36 miles from the WIPP site. This was associated with a potash mine roof fall and caused no observable damage at the WIPP.	

Natural Resources

      Major natural resources considered at the WIPP site continue to be potash, oil, and natural gas. The potash zone is still considered barren above the repository (see 2014 CRA, Section 15.1.2). Oil, natural gas, and fluid injection wells remain part of future WIPP scenarios. Exploration of those resources has affected future drilling rate predictions. DOE has continued to monitor drilling activities through the Delaware Basin Monitoring Program and has appropriately captured the drilling events that would affect the drilling rate used for the PA. Based on DOE monitoring, predicted drilling rates have increased to 67.3 boreholes/km[2] in the 2014 PA. 
       
Hydrologic Issues

Geologic Model
	The Geologic model used by DOE in the 2009 CRA remains unchanged in the 2014 CRA (see Section 15.2.5 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (1)).

Hydrogeologic Model 
      Since the CRA-2009 DOE reported no new monitoring well locations, however several old monitoring wells were plugged or abandoned. DOE has reported steel-cased wells that were aging and needed to be re-drilled and replaced with non-steel-cased to withstand saline environment. EPA raised a question related to eliminating monitoring well SNL-13 to the Culebra groundwater analysis due to a sudden head increase. DOE responded that this well plug had to be pulled due to an oil-field truck hitting the well head requiring surface casing to be repaired and nearby oil and gas wells development. The rise and fall in other nearby Culebra wells were not observed. DOE updated the Culebra monitoring network optimization study and reported no significant modifications since the 2009 CRA.  

Change in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time
      DOE adopted the same Culebra transmissivity fields developed in the CRA-2009 PABC for the 2014-CRA during. Therefore, the particle travel time simulations for the 2014 CRA were the same as those reported in the 2009-CRA. For the non-mining assumption travel times were 7,374 years; for the partially mined assumption travel times were 22,376, for the fully mine assumption travel times were 5,084. EPA found that these particle travel times adopted in the 2009 CRA and adopted in the 2014-CRA as reasonable. 



Retardation of Radionuclides (Distribution Coefficients or Kds)
      DOE re-evaluated the range of Kd values used to assess retardation of actinides during transport through the Culebra (Moody 2010) and the upper bound should be changed. DOE reduced the lower bounds to account for the possibility of higher organic ligand concentrations. 
Water in the Air-Exhaust Shaft
	DOE has no new information or issues have been reported related to water in the air-exhaust shaft. 

15.2.8 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.15(a) (1))

Meteorological Conditions 
      EPA's evaluation of DOE's updated meteorological conditions were deemed as adequate and does on affect the WIPP PA predicted climate model. 

Change in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time
      DOE has not significantly modified the Culebra transmissivity fields during the CRA-2009 PABC. For the CRA-2014 these transmissivity fields remained unchanged. 

Retardation of Radionuclides (Distribution Coefficients or Kds)
      Distribution coefficients used to model actinide transport through the Culebra for the CRA-2014 PA are consistent with the estimated organic ligand concentrations based on the CRA-2014 PA inventory for these compounds and are likely to provide a conservative assessment of actinide transport through the Culebra. 
Water in the Air-Exhaust Shaft
      EPA has not identified any additional issues related water in the air exhaust shaft. 

15.2.9 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (1))

Meteorological Conditions 
      EPA determined that DOE's updated meteorological conditions continue to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (1).

Geologic Model, Hydrogeologic Model, Change in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time, and Changes in Culebra Radionuclide Travel Time
      EPA agreed that the DOE's assumption that the Geologic and Hydrologic models need not be modified. EPA agreed that Culebra transmissivity fields and predicted travel times continue to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (1).

Retardation of Radionuclides (Distribution Coefficients or Kds)
      EPA determined that DOE's approach to determining Culebra dolomite Kds as implementation of continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (1).

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609), EPA determined that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (1).

15.3 Monitored Parameters - Background (194.15 (a) (2))

	DOE monitors ten parameters selected during the CCA to verify predicted performance of the WIPP repository. The monitored parameters are listed in Table 15.3 below. EPA keeps abreast of DOE's monitoring during annual inspections of the parameter monitoring program to verify that DOE's process and monitoring programs are adequate. EPA continues to evaluate DOE's parameter monitoring program and their response to changes in parameters to be in compliance with this requirement. 

15.3.1 Requirements (194.15(a) (2)

	(a) "In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

		(2) All additional monitoring data, analyses and results

                      Table 15.3  -  Monitored Parameters
Geomechanical Parameters-			Waste Activity Parameter*-
      -Creep closure, 					-Waste Activity
	-Extent of deformation, 
	-Initiation of brittle deformation, and 	Subsidence Parameter-
	-Displacement of deformation features.		-Subsidence measurements

Hydrological Parameters*-				Drilling Related Parameters*-
      -Culebra groundwater composition and 		-Drilling rate and 
	-Change in Culebra groundwater flow 		-The probability of encountering a 
	 direction.						 Castile brine reservoir.
            *Parameters exhibiting changes since the CCA approval.


15.3.2 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.15(a) (2)

	DOE documented monitoring relevant changes since the CCA in Wagner 2003, 2004 CRA Chapters 2 and 7.2, 2004 CRA Appendix DATA, 2004 CRA Appendix MON 2004, and other parameter monitoring related documents.

15.3.3 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(a) (2))

      EPA reviewed Wagner 2003, 2004 CRA Chapters 2 and 7.2, 2004 CRA Appendix DATA, 2004 CRA Appendix MON 2004, and other parameter monitoring related documents. EPA also confirmed that DOE has not modified any of the parameter selection arguments or conclusions since the original CCA, nor have the parameter monitoring programs been changed. 
      
	DOE determined that even though some monitored parameters have changed, no new parameters need to be added nor did the parameter monitoring programs need to be modified. DOE did not change any argument or conclusion that justified why a parameter was considered significant or insignificant for the 2004 CRA, nor did DOE change their pre-closure or post-closure program plans or activities.

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a) (2).

15.3.4 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (2))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49) as well as 2004 CRA CARDs 23 and 42, EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (2).

15.3.5 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.15(a) (2)

	DOE documented monitoring relevant changes since the 2004 CRA in Wagner 2008a and 2008b, 2009 CRA Sections 15 and 42, 2009 CRA Appendix DATA-2009, 2009 CRA Appendix MON-2009, and other parameter monitoring related documents.

15.3.6 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (2))

      EPA reviewed Wagner 2008a and 2008b, 2009 CRA Sections 15 and 42, 2009 CRA Appendix DATA-2009, 2009 CRA Appendix MON-2009, and other parameter monitoring related documents. EPA also confirmed that DOE has not modified any of the parameter selection arguments or conclusions since the original CCA and the 2004 CRA nor have the parameter monitoring programs been changed. 
      
	DOE continues to conclude that even though some monitored parameters have changed, no new parameters need to be added nor did the parameter monitoring programs need to be modified. DOE did not change any argument or conclusion that justified why a parameter was considered significant or insignificant for the 2009 CRA nor did DOE change their pre-closure or post-closure program plans or activities.

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a) (2).

15.3.7 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (2))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49) as well as 2004 CRA CARDs 23 and 42, EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (2).

15.3.8 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.15(a) (2)

	DOE documented monitoring relevant changes since the 2009 CRA in Wagner and Kullman 2010, Wagner et al. 2011, Wagner et al., 2012, and Wagner 2013, and the 2014 CRA Sections 15 and 42, 2014 CRA Appendix DATA-2014, 2014 CRA Appendix MON-2014, and other parameter monitoring related documents.

15.3.9 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.15(a) (2))

      EPA reviewed Wagner and Kullman 2010, Wagner et al. 2011, Wagner et al., 2012, and Wagner 2013, and the 2014 CRA Sections 15 and 42, 2014 CRA Appendix DATA-2014, 2014 CRA Appendix MON-2014, and other parameter monitoring related documents. EPA also confirmed that DOE has not modified any of the parameter selection arguments or conclusions since the original CCA and the 2004 CRA nor have the parameter monitoring programs been changed. 
      
	DOE continues to conclude that even though some monitored parameters have changed, no new parameters need to be added nor did the parameter monitoring programs need to be modified. DOE did not change any argument or conclusion that justified why a parameter was considered significant or insignificant for the 2014 CRA nor did DOE change their pre-closure or post-closure program plans or activities.

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a) (2).

15.3.10 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (2))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609) as well as 2014 CRA CARDs 23 and 42, EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (2).

15.4 Requirements (194.15(a) (3))

	(a) "In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

	(3) All additional analyses and results of laboratory experiments conducted by the Department or its contractors as part of the WIPP program 

15.4.1 Changes in The 2004 CRA (194.15(a) (3))

Supercompacted Waste
	DOE requested (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B2-15) EPA's approval for the disposal of supercompacted waste from INL. EPA required DOE to conduct several analyses of the effect of the denser waste form and higher amounts of cellulosic, plastic, and rubber materials (CPR) (see Docket A-98-49, Items II-B2-22 to B2-26 and Items II-B2-28 and II-B2-29). EPA's review of the subject culminated in an approval of the emplacement of the supercompacted waste in the WIPP and a requirement to keep the magnesium oxide safety factor at least 1.67 for the remainder of the panels (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B3-68).

STTP Experiments
	DOE conducted source term test plan (STTP) experiments to provide data on the concentrations of actinides, actinide-containing colloids, complexing agents, and other chemical reactants in simulated WIPP brine in contact with candidate backfill materials and actual transuranic (TRU) wastes (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B1-3). DOE indicated that the results of experiments had no relevance to WIPP conditions, because of the high carbon dioxide overpressure and relatively low pH (2004 CRA Appendix PA Attachment SOTERM-4.8). The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) contended that the experiments were relevant and indicated the presence of nesquehonite, a form of magnesium oxide that would have contributed to higher actinide solubility than DOE used in PA. The Agency reviewed the results of the STTP experiments and EEG's concerns and determined that the experiment with MgO was not relevant to repository conditions because of the high carbon dioxide partial pressure (See Docket A-98-49, Item II-B1-3 for a summary and additional references). 

15.4.2 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(a)(3))

	EPA approved the supercompacted waste in a previous action (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B3-68), and the STTP experimental results were not applicable at WIPP, and therefore were not used in the WIPP performance assessment.

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a)(3).

15.4.3 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (3))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determined that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (3).


15.4.4 Changes in The 2009 CRA (194.15(a) (3))

	Experiments "analyses and results of laboratory experiments conducted" by DOE since the 2004 CRA include the following (from 2009 CRA Section 15.6.3 and DOE 2010f):

 Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ) Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.1) 
 Waste Shear Strength Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.1) 
 Characterization and Qualification of MgO Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.2) 
 MgO Hydration and Carbonation Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.2) 
 Solubility of Neodymium (Nd) (III) Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.3) 
 Reduction of Higher Valent Pu (V/VI) by Iron Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.3) 
 Solubility of U (VI) in Carbonate-free WIPP Brine Experiments (15.6.3.3) 
 Iron and Lead Corrosion Studies 


15.4.5 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (3))

      During EPA's review of the 2009 CRA EPA specifically examined DOE's 2009 CRA Section 15.6.3 and 2009 CRA Appendix DATA-2009 Section Data-9.0 and was unable to easily trace the information provided by DOE. EPA requested that DOE clarify the information and link reports to the appropriate experiments (Email dated March 12, 2010). DOE response (DOE 2010f includes EPA's email text) is summarized below:

Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ) Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.1) 
      No changes were made in WIPP repository conditions or subsurface processes used in PA to establish compliance since the 2004 CRA based on these experiments. The DRZ analyses referenced in the 2009 CRA Section 15.6.3.1 under AP-133 are complete and documented in the report referenced in Appendix DATA-2009 Section DATA-9.0 (Park et al. 2007). Additional 2009 CRA information concerning the DRZ can be found in Appendix SOTERM-2009 SOTERM-2.2.5, Appendix DATA-2009 Section DATA-9.0; Park et al., 2007; ERMS 546370, Ismail 2007; ERMS 545755, Holcomb and Hardy 2001; ERMS 545575.
Waste Shear Strength Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.1) 
      No changes were made to the WIPP repository conditions used in PA to establish compliance since the 2004 CRA based on these experiments.
       The Waste Shear Strength analysis referenced in 2009 CRA Section 15.6.3.1 under AP-131 were completed and documented in the report referenced in 2009 CRA Appendix DATA-2009 Section DATA-9.0; Herrick et al., 2007; ERMS 546343. Planned Waste shear strength experiments under test plans TP 09-01 and TP 08-01 have not been started. 
Characterization and Qualification of MgO Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.2) 
      No changes were made in PA as a result of MgO characterization studies. The specific analyses referenced in Section 15.6.3.2 were complete and documented in Appendix MgO-2009 Section MgO-3.2.3 (Results since the CRA-2004 in Characteristics of MgO) and Appendix DATA-2009 Section DATA-9.0. MgO Characterization, hydration and carbonation experiments were performed under AP-108, TP 00-07 and TP 06-03. Additional MgO characterization and qualification of vendor-provided MgO analyses were discussed in response to EPA's comments 1-C-1 and 1-C-2 (EPA 2009a). The MgO excess factor stands at 1.2 which EPA approved in 2008 (Reyes 2008) with conditions to calculate and track MgO on a room-by-room basis and verify that the reactivity of MgO is maintained 96 (mol) % (Appendix MgO-2009).
MgO Hydration and Carbonation Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.2) 
      No changes were made in PA as a result of MgO hydration analyses. MgO hydration and carbonation experiments are performed under AP-108, TP 00-07 and TP 06-03 and are ongoing. Completed MgO hydration analyses results are discussed in 2009 CRA Appendix MgO-2009 Section MgO-4.1.2 (Results since the 2004 CRA Regarding Hydration of MgO). 
Solubility of Neodymium (Nd) (III) Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.3) 
      These data were summarized in Appendix SOTERM-2009 Section 3.6.2. A more detailed report entitled "Actinide (III) Solubility in WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations," and designated as report LCO-ACP-08 (Borkowski et al. 2009), was provided to the EPA. Although some of the actinide data were used indirectly for the development of uncertainties in solubility, these data supported existing PA assumptions and did not result in any changes (see Summary Report for 2009 CRA PABC, Section 2.2 (Clayton et al. 2009)). 
Reduction of Higher Valent Pu (V/VI) by Iron Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.3) 
      These data were summarized in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section 3.5.2. A more detailed report entitled "Reduction of Higher-Valent Plutonium by Iron Under Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-Relevant Conditions: Data Summary and Recommendations," and designated as report LCO-ACP-09 (Reed et al. 2010), was provided to the EPA via email on March 12, 2010. No changes were made in PA as a result of these analyses. 
Solubility of U (VI) in Carbonate-free WIPP Brine Experiments (15.6.3.3) 
      These data were summarized in 2009 CRA Appendix SOTERM-2009 Section 3.3.2. A more detailed report entitled "Actinide (VI) Solubility in Carbonate-free WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations," and designated as report LCO-ACP-10 (Lucchini et al. 2010), was provided to the EPA via email on February 8, 2010. No changes were made in PA as a result of these analyses. 
Iron and Lead Corrosion Studies 
      Iron and lead corrosion studies were initiated under TP 06-02 and TP 08-02. Iron and lead chemistry long-term experiments are in progress. The first six-month report for this activity was completed in late 2009 after submittal of the 2009 CRA (Roselle 2009). No changes were made in PA as a result of these analyses.
	EPA examined DOE's response to our comments (DOE 2010f) and found that DOE adequately documented experiments performed and ongoing since the 2004 CRA and that they have not been used in the 2009 CRA PAs. 
	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a) (3).

15.4.6 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (3))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (3).

15.4.7 Changes in The 2014 CRA (194.15(a) (3))

      Experiments "analyses and results of laboratory experiments conducted" by DOE since the 2009 CRA include the following:

 Waste shear strength
 MgO hydration
 Hydromagnesite solubility
 Iron and lead corrosion
 H2 gas generation through radiolysis
 Actinide investigations
 Colloids

15.4.8 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.15(a) (3))

Waste Shear Strength Experiments (DOE Section 15.6.3.1) 
      In the 2014 compliance recertification application, DOE updated the mean and lower bound of the sampled values used in the sampled distribution for the TAUFAIL parameter. In the 2009 compliance recertification application the lower bound value was 0.05 Pa, while for the 2014 compliance recertification application the lower bound was increased to 2.22 Pa. The upper bound, 77 Pa, remained the same. An increase in the sampled lower value also increased the sample mean. DOE developed the TAUFAIL probability distribution using a suite of laboratory flume tests specifically designed to represent the range of values for WIPP waste.
      
      EPA agreed with DOE's upper `bounding' range value but had concerns with the derivation of DOE's lower `bounding' range value. The Agency was concerned that three of the five low shear-strength tests had highly scattered results. DOE attributed the scatter to pre-test sample damage and/or a high degree of variability in sample preparation, rather than testing an equivalent suite of samples. As a result, the low shear strength test results may not be truly representative of low shear strength samples. However, the EPA considers the use of DOE's lower bound value, which is higher than the 0.05 Pa (representative of bay muds) as more credible, despite the data scatter, than what had been used in prior performance assessments. 
      
MgO Hydration 
	Since the 2009-CRA, DOE has performed experiments to determine brucite and Phase 5 hydration rates using brines with the MgO engineered barrier. These rates have been incorporated into the geochemical modeling database. EPA finds these rates adequate but would also like to see rates reflective of the combination of the different brands of MgO being used in the repository see (EPA 201711 for more details).
Hydromagnesite solubility
      DOE has also examined hydromagnesite solubility in various experiments to update solubility values in the database. EPA's review identified that the measurements used in this experiment underestimated CO2 concentrations from the closed-system experimental conditions (see EPA 2017). Because of this concern, DOE should instead use hyrdomagnesite solubility values like those in Robie and Hemingway (1973). 
Iron and Lead Corrosion Studies 
	DOE updated the corrosion rates for both iron and lead inundated in brine based on experiments conducted at a range of CO2 concentrations. These experiments provided a new distribution of corrosion rates which, on average, resulted in a decreased corrosion rate. However, based on environmental conditions at the WIPP, EPA would like to see the lower bound values for these rates increased to account for nonzero CO2 concentrations in the repository, and to see corrosion rates that would account for rates affected by higher repository pressures[11]. 
H2 Gas Generation Through Radiolysis
      DOE has performed H2 (g) monitoring in WIPP Panels 3 and 4 and concluded that radiolytic H2 (g) generation is occurring. Because corrosion and microbial gas generation are thought to produce more gas than radiolysis, DOE has not included the contribution of radiolysis to overall gas generation. However, since microbial gas generation has been decreased for the 2014-CRA, radiolysis should be considered.
Actinide Investigations
	Since the 2009-CRA and 2009-PABC, DOE has conducted numerous investigations on thorium and uranium actinide solubility e.g., Borkowski et al. 2012 and Lucchini et al. 2013 in WIPP-relevant conditions. DOE has also investigated actinide complexation with organic ligands, borate, and other agents such as with Borkowski et al. 2012 and Borkowski et al. 2010. They have also examined actinide oxidation states in the WIPP such as with Reed et al. 2010. Results of the actinide solubility experiments have been included in determining actinide uncertainty distributions while actinide complexation experiments have been used to update the geochemical database. EPA accepts these experiments to be used as updates to the uncertainty distribution and database. However, data beyond DOE experiments should also be included in both the uncertainty distribution and the database so EPA can accept these items in future CRAs. 
      DOE's plutonium oxidation experiments are fundamental to understanding WIPP geochemical conditions. Given experiments performed in similar conditions as WIPP, such as with Altmaier and Geckeis (2011), EPA concludes that Pu (III) will be a more dominant oxidation state than Pu (IV). 
Colloids
	DOE has performed experiments to update the intrinsic and microbial colloid parameters. For example, DOE has performed experiments to understand Nd (III), Pu (III), Th (IV), and U (VI) intrinsic colloid formation in WIPP brines. They have also studied microbial colloid formation using native WIPP microorganisms20. EPA appreciates DOE's willingness to update these parameters. However, several key experimental parameters, such as filter sizes in intrinsic colloid experiments or experimental time in microbial colloids, introduce uncertainty into the updated values. As a result, EPA has identified that the values from the 2009-CRA are more appropriate to use in performance assessment than the 2014-CRA values. 

15.4.9 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (3))

      Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609), such as sensitivity studies requested by the Agency, EPA determines that DOE complies with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (3) related to incorporating experimental results into the WIPP program. Please refer to the various technical support documents (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609) for details on EPA's evaluation.
      
15.5 Requirements (194.15(a) (4))

(a) "In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

	(4) An identification of any activities or assumptions that deviate from the 	most recent compliance application

15.5.1 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.15(a) (4))

      DOE made changes to several specific activities and assumptions, and to several categories of items. These items are outlined grouped in Table 15-4 of 2009 Recertification CARD 15 and Technical Support Documents (Docket A-98-49).

15.5.2 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(a) (4))

	EPA's review of these changes is presented in multiple CARDs and Technical Support Documents. In addition, the changes were incorporated in the 2004 PABC (see CARDs 23 and 24; FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49, Items II-B1-3, II-B1-10, II-B1-11, II-B1-15, II-B1-16, II-B1-17). EPA found DOE changes adequate and appropriately implemented in the CRA performance assessments. 

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.14(a) (4).

15.5.3 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (4))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (4). 

15.5.4 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.15(a) (4))

      DOE made changes to several specific activities and assumptions, and to several categories of items. These items are grouped in Table 15-5 of 2009 Recertification CARD 15 and Technical Support Documents (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49).

15.5.5 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (4))

	EPA's review of these changes is presented in multiple 2009 CARDs and Technical Support Documents (TSDs). In addition, some changes were incorporated in the 2009 PABC (see 2009 CARDs 23 and 24; EPA 2010b-PABC review, EPA 2010g-Parameter report). EPA found DOE changes adequate and appropriately implemented in the 2009 PABC calculations. 

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.14(a) (4).

15.5.6 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (4))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA, 2009 PABC, and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (4).

15.5.7 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.15(a) (4))

      DOE made changes to several specific activities and assumptions, and to several categories of items. These items are grouped in the table below and found in 2014 CRA Content of Compliance Recertification Application 40 CFR § 194.15 and Appendix PA-2014. They are also discussed in other CARDs as well as Technical Support Documents (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609).

Item
DOE
EPA Decision

Underground excavation
Panels 1 through 7 mined completely as of December 31, 2012. Panels 1 to 5 completely filled with waste as of December 28, 2012. 
EPA has approved of mined waste panels.
Remote-handled TRU waste emplacement
RH waste emplaced in panels 4, 5, and 6. No waste in panels 1, 2, and 3.
EPA has approved of RH waste in Panels 4, 5 and 6.
RH-TRU waste container modifications
DOE planned change request for RH-TRU waste emplacement in shielded containers which can be handled as CH-TRU waste. Containers will continue to be recorded as RH-TRU waste.
EPA approved of the request on August 8, 2011 with the condition that DOE demonstrate procedures to ensure containers remain below dose rate of 200 mrem per hour.
Experiments in the repository
Detectors for the EXO project installed and data being collected. DOE also installed a dark matter time projection chamber and has started the LBRE. 
EPA approved in 2009 and prior.
Salt disposal investigations
Planned change notice to initiate the Salt Disposal Investigations project and the additional Salt Defense Disposal Investigation. 
EPA approved.
Neutron shielded canisters
Planned change notice to employ polyethylene lined containers for some RH-TRU waste.
Planned change notice not requiring EPA approval but included in inventory. 
Magnesium oxide
Planned change notice to change MgO emplacement process to every other row of waste containers. 
EPA approved in an email from Peake to Franco, July 13, 2012.
Repository Reconfiguration
Planned change request to relocate Panels 9 and 10 south of existing Panels 4 and 5.
EPA did not approve of repository reconfiguration. 
Panel closure redesign
Planned change request for redesign using run-of-mine panel closure.
EPA submitted first set of questions and comments on this (Perrin 2011).
Update to drilling rate and borehole plugging patterns
Drilling rate increased from over 10,000 years and borehole plugging patterns changed.
Approved.
Modeling of open areas in repository
Additional volume was added to the WIPP experimental region. 
Addressed in SEN2 study. Approved, but EPA believes there should be an independent technical review as well. 
Revised estimate of probability of encountering pressurized brine
Revised distribution of probabilities associated with encountering brine created based on drilling data.
EPA rejected revision and provided an updated distribution. Updated probability addressed in SEN4 study and approved[23]. 
Revised corrosion rate of steel
Corrosion rate of steel updated based on new experimental results.
Approved for this CRA after addressing issues of decreased corrosion rates due to metal passivation on the SEN4 study[23]. 
Revised effective shear strength of WIPP waste
Revised lower bound for the waste shear strength based on experiments.
Suggested using the lower bound value from experiments instead of the experimental mean value. Addressed in SEN4 study and accepted[23]. 
Waste inventory update
Updated to include information collected since December 2011.
Accepted inventory update.
Revised repository water balance
New accounting for repository water balance and repository saturation as a result of updated corrosion rates.
Addressed in SEN4 study[23][,] Accepted but needs updating for next CRA.
Variable brine volume
Actinide solubility and organic ligand concentrations calculated as a function of potential volumes of brine released.
Accepted.
Revised colloid parameters
Updated colloid parameters based on new experimental data.
2009-CRA colloid parameter values are a better representation of the data than what was used for 2014-CRA[11][,]
Actinide solubility code
Solubility calculations performed using EQ3/6 for CRA-2014 instead of FMT code.
Accepted.
Culebra transmissivity fields
Updated based on revised hydrogeologic factors for the Culebra, carried over from CRA-2009 PABC.
Accepted[11].
Culebra matrix partition coefficients
Updated to account for higher organic ligand concentrations in WIPP waste inventory.
Accepted[11].
Radionuclide solubility
Baseline actinide solubility updated to reflect organic ligand content in the CRA-2014 waste inventory and for several brine volumes.
Accepted for this CRA. However, database used to calculate solubility needs additional updating[11].
Solubility uncertainty
Updated based on recently available results in published literature.
EPA found issues with how studies were chosen for the uncertainty distribution[11]. New distribution provided for SEN4 study showing the EPA provided distribution will increase releases, but releases will still remain below limits. 



15.5.8 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.15(a) (4))

      EPA found many issues with the changes, and these issues which have been detailed in the supporting TSDs. As a means to address some of these issues, DOE implemented the Agency requested sensitivity studies which show continued compliance.

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.14(a) (4).

15.5.9 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (4))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (4).

15.6 Requirements (194.15(a) (5))

	(a) "In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

		  (5) A description of all waste emplaced in the disposal system since the most 		recent compliance certification or re-certification application. Such 			description shall consist of a description of the waste characteristics and waste 		components identified in §§194.24(b)(1) and 194.24(b)(2)

15.6.1 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.15(a) (5)

	DOE updated this information for emplaced waste at the WIPP, waste stored at the waste generator sites, and waste anticipated to go to WIPP. This is discussed in multiple locations in the 2004 CRA, including Chapter 4, Appendix DATA, and Attachment F: Transuranic Waste Inventory Update Report, 2003, and Appendix TRU Waste. This information is further updated for the PABC in the PABC Inventory Report (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B2-60).

15.6.2 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(a) (5))

	In DOE's updated waste inventory information (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B2-60), DOE kept the same categories of waste used in the CCA, so that the major changes were changes to waste volumes. The radioactivity of the waste was estimated to decrease from the CCA, the contact-handled TRU waste volume is greater than in the CCA, while DOE estimates that there is more remote-handled waste in the inventory than there is allowable space in WIPP. Prior to the submission of the 2004 CRA, DOE requested to dispose of supercompacted waste. After a thorough analysis, EPA allowed this waste in the performance assessment. 

	In addition, DOE proposed to dispose of some wastes from the Hanford waste site tank farms and what is known as K-Basin sludges. EPA allowed this material in the performance assessment since DOE may be able to demonstrate that it is TRU waste. DOE has proposed a public process to address the classification of the Hanford tank waste before DOE requests approval for disposal at WIPP. EPA identified that DOE appropriately provided the waste information and that the waste inventory is adequately included in the 2004 PABC. EPA's inventory review is discussed, at length, in 2004 CRA CARD 24 and the Technical Support Document for 194.24: Review of the Baseline Inventory used in the Compliance Recertification Application and the Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B1-9).

15.6.3 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (5))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49) as well as EPA's review discussed CRA CARD 24, EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (5).

15.6.4 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.15(a) (5)

	DOE updated information for emplaced waste at the WIPP, waste stored at the waste generator sites, and waste anticipated to go to WIPP for the 2009 PABC. This is discussed in the 2009 CRA, including Appendix DATA-2009 Section DATA-7.0, and the Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report-2008 (ATWIR 2008). This information is further updated for the 2009 PABC in the Performance Assessment Inventory Report-2008 (PAIR 2008) and the Radionuclide Inventory Screening Analysis Report for the PABC-2009 (Fox et al. 2009). DOE has emplaced a total of 52,000m[3] of CH waste and 88m[3] of RH waste (ATWIR-2008 Section 3.1.1).

15.6.5 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (5))

	DOE generally kept the same categories of waste for the 2009 PABC. The major changes were changes to waste volumes and radioactive content since the 2004 CRA. The radioactivity of the waste was estimated to decrease since the 2004 CRA principally because of the removal of Hanford tank waste from the WIPP bound waste category (EPA 2010f). This change also decreased the volume of both contact-handled and remote-handled waste in the inventory. EPA examined DOE's documentation to verify that the approach was adequate and reasonable (EPA 2010f Section 3.0). EPA found DOE's inventory estimates of waste projected to be emplaced at WIPP to be reasonable and adequate. EPA expects any changes in projected inventory by DOE, such as waste presently listed as not WIPP bound in the future inventory estimates, to be fully explained, justified, and confirmed by the use of a new compliant performance assessment calculation.

15.6.6 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (5))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49) as well as EPA's review discussed CRA CARD 24, EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (5).

15.6.7 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.15(a) (5)

	DOE updates for emplaced waste at the WIPP repository, waste stored at the waste generator sites, and waste anticipated to go to WIPP for the 2014 are discussed in the 2014 CRA, Appendix DATA-2014 Section DATA-7.0, and the Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report-2012 (ATWIR 2012). This information is further updated in the Performance Assessment Inventory Report-2013 (PAIR 2013) and the Radionuclide Inventory Screening Analysis Report for the PA-2014 (Van Soest 2012). DOE has emplaced a total of 55,200 m[3] of CH waste and 236 m[3] of RH waste (ATWIR-2012 Section 3.1.1). The projected volume of CH waste is 68,000 m[3] and of RH waste is 357m[3] (ATWIR-2012 Section 3.1.1)

      Total activity (Ci) is reported in the Section 3.3.2 of the ATWIR-2012, Table 3-13 of the ATWIR reported a decrease in both CH- and RH-TRU waste activity. The largest contributing waste stream to this net reduction from Hanford and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory waste. These reductions, among others, are countered by less significant gains in other waste stream inventories to achieve the overall net decrease in activity. Total Activity in converted into EPA units and included in the CRA-2014 PA.

15.6.8 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.15(a) (5))
	
      DOE generally kept the same categories of waste for the 2014 PA. The major changes were changes to waste volumes and radioactive content since the 2009 CRA. The projected radioactivity of the waste was estimated decreased since the 2009 CRA and is attributed primarily due to removal of a portion of Savannah River waste. This change also decreased the volume of final projection of both contact-handled and remote-handled waste in the inventory. EPA found DOE's inventory estimates of waste projected to be emplaced at WIPP to be reasonable and adequate. EPA expects any changes in projected inventory by DOE presently listed as not WIPP bound waste, will be included in future inventory estimates. The increase needs to be fully explained, justified, and confirmed by the use of a new compliant performance assessment calculation.

15.6.9 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (5))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609) as well as EPA's review discussed CRA CARD 24, EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (5).

15.7 Requirements (194.15(a) (6))

	(a) "In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

		(6) Any significant information not previously included in a compliance certification or re-certification application related to whether the disposal system continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations

15.7.1 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.15(a) (6))

	As part of the completeness review, EPA realized that the 2004 CRA PA calculations did not meet regulatory requirements that addressed uncertainty (40 CFR Part 194.34). EPA therefore required DOE to conduct another performance assessment. DOE conducted this additional performance assessment, termed the performance assessment baseline calculations (PABC-2004). This PA replaced the 2004 CRA PA for compliance purposes. A summary of the 2004 PABC review, including changes in the 2004 PABC from the 2004 CRA PA, is described in depth in Technical Support Document for Section 194.23: Review of the 2004 Compliance Recertification Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (2004 PABC Review TSD, Docket A-98-48 Item II-B2-15). The changes can be grouped into two major categories: waste inventory and modeling assumptions. The waste inventory was updated to address discrepancies and changed situations in the baseline inventory. Modeling assumptions included addressing rates of microbial CPR degradation, reexamining different microbial processes in the repository that would affect geochemistry, actinide solubility and uncertainty distribution, organic ligand inventories, Culebra transmissivity, and updates to the BRAGFLO code. 

	The Agency concluded that changes to the computer codes for modeling Salado Formation flow and transport have been properly implemented, as have changes in conceptual models and model parameters. The Agency finds that the approach taken by DOE for the modeling the Salado is acceptable. 
	DOE made changes in the WIPP parameters for the 2004 PABC to accommodate the changes discussed above. The Agency reviewed the procedural adequacy of changes made to the parameter database for the 2004 PABC as well as the technical adequacy of all parameter database changes made since the PAVT. The review (Docket A-98-49, Item II-B1-16) show that the parameters used in the 2004 PABC were technically acceptable and appropriately documented. 
15.7.2 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(a) (6))

	DOE adequately responded to EPA's requests by including EPA requirements in the 2004 PABC. EPA's main review of the 2004 PABC is provided in the 2004 PABC review document (A-98-49, Item II-B1-16) with additional discussion in 2004 CARDs 23 and 24. Based on our review, EPA finds that DOE adequately implemented EPA's required changes in the 2004 PABC. The 2004 PABC calculations show that the repository meets the numerical standards at 40 CFR 191.13 as well as the compliance assessment requirements for the undisturbed case. 

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a) (6).

15.7.3 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (6))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (6).

15.7.4 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.15(a) (6))

	During EPA's initial completeness review of DOE's 2009 CRA documents EPA determined that the 2009 CRA PA calculations were incomplete because of recent changes in the waste inventory, in particular the significant changes in the quantities of some organic ligands. EPA directed DOE to conduct another performance assessment. DOE conducted this additional performance assessment, termed the 2009 performance assessment baseline calculations (2009 PABC). The 2009 PABC replaces the 2009 CRA performance assessment (PA) for compliance purposes and is described in depth in 2009 Technical Support Document for Section 194.23: Review of the 2009 Compliance Recertification Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49). The changes can be grouped into two major categories: waste inventory and modeling assumptions. 2009 PABC parameters were changed to accommodate these changes. Issues with waste inventory included changes to quantities of organic ligands. Modeling assumptions included changes to the Culebra Hydrogeology conceptual model and changes to various physical and chemical model parameters (e.g., CPR degradation rates, and drilling rate and borehole plugging patterns). 

	EPA reviewed the changes incorporated into the 2009 CRA PA and the 2009 PABC concluding that the parameter, conceptual model, and other changes have been properly documented and implemented.

	DOE made changes in the WIPP parameters for the 2009 PABC to accommodate the changes discussed above. The Agency reviewed the procedural adequacy of changes made to the parameter database for the 2009 PABC as well as the technical adequacy of all parameter database changes made since the 2004 PABC. EPA 2010g shows that the parameters used in the 2009 PABC were technically acceptable and appropriately documented. 

15.7.5 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (6))

	DOE adequately responded to EPA's requests by including EPA requirements in the 2009 PABC. EPA's main review of the 2009 PABC is provided in the 2009 PABC review document with additional discussion in 2009 CRA CARDs 23 and 24 (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49). Based on our review, EPA finds that DOE adequately implemented EPA's required changes in the 2009 PABC. The 2009 PABC calculations show that the repository meets the numerical standards at 40 CFR 191.13 as well as the compliance assessment requirements for the undisturbed case. 

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a) (6).

15.7.6 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (6))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (6).

15.7.7 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.15(a) (6))

      During EPA's review of DOE's 2014 CRA documents, the Agency identified several technical concerns that, if addressed in WIPP PA, had the potential to increase calculated repository releases. At EPA's request, the DOE performed sensitivity studies to help evaluate the effect of those concerns on predictions of WIPP performance. The Agency's evaluations of the results of those studies are presented in Technical Support Document in Support of Sections 194.23 and 194.55: Analysis of EPA's Sensitivity Analysis Calculations That Support Recertification of the WIPP CRA-2014. (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609). While some of the Agency's concerns were found to increase calculated repository releases, the total mean releases, the upper 95% confidence limit on those means, and all individual vectors remained below the EPA's WIPP release limits in all sensitivity studies. EPA therefore concludes that although some of changes made to the performance calculations resulted in higher calculated releases, none of the increases exceeded regulatory limits. EPA has identified several technical concerns that fit in three broad categories: the probability of hitting a brine pocket, actinide solubility, and modeling repository conditions. 
      
The probability of hitting a brine pocket 
      Large volumes of pressurized brine may underlie the Castile Formation. If a borehole encounters a pocket of pressurized brine that also intrudes a waste panel, a release may occur. For 2014, DOE updated the parameter representing the probability of encountering a pressurized brine ("PBRINE") by basing the probability on voluntary drilling reports. EPA found technical concerns with this approach and provided an alternative approach utilizing geophysical data DOE previously collected. DOE incorporated this new PBRINE in the SEN4 study resulting in a slight increase in releases[23]. 

Actinide solubility 
      EPA found inconsistencies in DOE's actinide uncertainty distribution used to address the difference between model calculations and experimental values. Experimental values for this uncertainty distribution are chosen using prescribed criteria, which DOE did not consistently follow[9]. EPA provided DOE with a new uncertainty distribution which was utilized in the SEN4 study. The new distribution contributed to a slight increase in releases, though still below regulatory limits[23].
      
      Actinide bearing colloids comprise a large fraction of total mobile actinides and are important due to their rapid movement in the subsurface. DOE has updated the colloid model using recently collected experimental data. The result of this update was a decrease in releases[11]. EPA has several issues with the experiments DOE chose to update this parameter as well as the calculations used to update it. As discussed in Section 194.15(A)(3) above, EPA has identified that the values from the 2009-CRA are more appropriate to use in performance assessment than the 2014-CRA values. 
      DOE's plutonium oxidation experiments are fundamental to understanding WIPP geochemical conditions. Given experiments performed in similar conditions as WIPP, such as with Altmaier and Geckeis (2011), EPA concludes that Pu (III) will be a more dominant oxidation state than Pu (IV). DOE considers that the literature is contradictory  on this issue and does not support the technical argument presented by EPA justifying changing the proportions of Pu III/IV oxidation states. Thus, DOE continues to support the current oxidation state distribution as 50/50 and documented in Appendix SOTERM.

Modeling repository conditions
      The properties of the WIPP halite allow for the repository to encapsulate (i.e., creep close) the waste over the 10,000-year regulatory period and decrease permeability (i.e., heal). Currently, DOE models excavated areas in the WIPP underground only to partially creep close and heal in order to maximize brine flow into the repository in the models. EPA finds that a better interpretation of future repository conditions would be to model an end state that is less porous and permeable than what DOE used. Thus, EPA  requested DOE to analyze repository performance in the SEN3 study using different salt properties than the CRA-2014 PA. Results of the study did show a small increase in mean total calculated low probability releases[5].
      
      The parameter TAUFAIL represents waste shear strength and is used in calculating potential releases of waste materials from the WIPP repository when a drilling operator drills a borehole through the waste. Understanding waste shear strength is particularly important if a future borehole intersects a waste panel with consolidated waste and causes the transport of radionuclides into the surface. DOE has updated this parameter by collecting data using novel flume experiments. The EPA believes the DOE's overall approach of using experimental data to revise the TAUFAIL parameter is reasonable; however, the EPA had concerns with the DOE's lower "bounding" range value derived from the experiments. The Agency was concerned that three of the five low shear-strength tests had highly scattered results. The DOE attributed the scatter to pre-test sample damage and/or a high degree of variability in sample preparation, rather than testing an equivalent suite of samples. As a result, the mean of the low shear strength test results may not be truly representative of low shear strength samples. DOE addressed this in the SEN4 with results suggesting this change only provided a minor change to releases[23,25].
      
      Additional repository conditions EPA found issues with include DOE's corrosion model and the related repository water balance calculation. The corrosion model has been updated to incorporate new data from experiments. However, this update does not consider a decrease in corrosion rates due to metal passivation. These rates would further affect repository water balance, which is a byproduct of corrosion reactions. These concerns were addressed in the SEN4 study and showed minor contributions to releases[23,25].
      
	These technical concerns are outlined in the EPA's Technical Support Documents (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609). EPA reviewed the changes incorporated into the 2014 CRA PA and found DOE had not included all parameter or technical information available since the 2009 CRA. However, based on the results of EPA's requested suite of sensitivity studies that included some of these omissions, the Agency concludes that DOE's parameter values adopted in the 2014 CRA were adequate. Additionally, the Agency concludes those parameters DOE did not use in their 2014-CRA were adequately documented. 

15.7.8 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.15(a) (6))

      DOE adequately responded to EPA's requests by including EPA requirements in the 2014 sensitivity studies. EPA's main review of the 2014-CRA and sensitivity studies is provided in the TSDs with additional discussion in 2014 CRA CARDs 23 and 24 (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609). Based on our review, EPA finds that DOE adequately implemented EPA's required changes. The calculations show that the repository meets the numerical standards at 40 CFR 191.13 as well as the compliance assessment requirements for the undisturbed case. 

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(a) (6).

15.7.9 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (6))

      Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (6).

15.8 Requirements (194.15(a) (7))

      During the course of the completeness and technical review of each recertification, the Agency submits numerous requests to DOE for additional information. The docket categories in which these can be found are listed below. 
       
	(a) "In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

			(7) Any additional information requested by the Administrator or the 			Administrator's authorized representative."

15.8.2 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.15(a) (7)

	During the course of the completeness and technical review of the 2004 CRA, the Agency submitted numerous requests to DOE for additional information. The docket categories in which these can be found are listed below.  

	The information submitted by DOE and commenters, and developed by EPA can be found in the following categories for EPA Air Docket A-98-49.

1. 	QA Audits/Inspections, and their approvals -- Category II-A1.
2. 	WC Audits/Inspections, and their approvals -- Category II-A4.
3. 	Background/support documents (i.e., TSD's, fact sheets) -- Category II-B1.
4. 	Correspondence/information submitted by DOE (including responses to EPA requests, e.g., 2004 CRA completeness and technical issues) -- Category II-B2.
5. 	Correspondence/information sent to DOE by EPA (including completeness and technical requests for additional information) -- Category II-B3.
6. 	2004 CRA CARDs -- Category V-B2.

15.8.3 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(a) (7)

	The information provided by DOE is reviewed by EPA in the CARD and Technical Support Documents related to the particular topic. DOE responded to all requests for information made by EPA.

15.8.4 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (7))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (7).

15.8.5 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.15(a) (7))

	The Agency submitted numerous requests to DOE for additional information during the completeness and technical review of the 2009 CRA. The docket categories in which these can be found are listed below.  

	The information submitted by DOE and commenters, and developed by EPA can be found in the following categories for EPA Air Docket A-98-49.

1. 	QA Audits/Inspections, and their approvals -- Category II-A1.
2. 	WC Audits/Inspections, and their approvals -- Category II-A4.
3. 	Background/support documents (i.e., 2009 TSD's, fact sheets) -- Category II-B1.
4. 	Correspondence/information submitted by DOE (including responses to EPA requests, e.g., 2009 CRA completeness and technical issues) -- Category II-B2.
5. 	Correspondence/information sent to DOE by EPA (including completeness and technical requests for additional information) -- Category II-B3.
6. 	2009 CRA CARDs -- Category V-B2.

15.8.6 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(a) (7))

	The information provided by DOE was reviewed by EPA in the CARDs and Technical Support Documents related to the particular topic. DOE responded to all requests for information made by EPA.

15.8.7 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (7))

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (7).

15.8.8 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.15(a) (7)

      The Agency submitted numerous requests to DOE for additional information during the completeness and technical review of the 2014 CRA EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609. The docket categories in which these can be found are listed below.  

	The information submitted by DOE and commenters, and developed by EPA can be found in the following categories for EPA Air Docket A-98-49.

1. 	QA Audits/Inspections, and their approvals --  Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR 2014 CRA EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-06092. 	
2. 	Background/support documents (i.e., 2009 TSD's, fact sheets)  --  Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609.
3. 	Correspondence/information sent to DOE by EPA (including completeness and technical requests for additional information)  --  These are provided on the docket with the following ID Numbers: EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0005; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0006; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0009; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0010; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0024; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0025; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0028; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0029;EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0037. 
4. 	Correspondence/information submitted by DOE (including responses to EPA requests, e.g., 2014 CRA completeness and technical issues)  --  These are provided on the docket with the following ID Numbers: EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0005; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-004; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0006; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0011; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0030; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0031; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0032; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0034; EPA-HQ-OAR 2014-0609-0038. 


15.8.9 Evaluation of Compliance for 2014 Recertification (194.15(a) (7))

      The information provided by DOE is reviewed by EPA in the CARDs and Technical Support Documents related to the particular topic. DOE responded to all requests for information made by EPA.

15.8.10 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(a) (7))

      Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609) EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(a) (7).


15.9 Requirements (194.15(b))

	(b) "To the extent that information required for a re-certification of compliance remains valid and has been submitted in previous certification or re-certification application(s), such information need not be duplicated in subsequent applications; such information may be summarized and referenced."

15.9.1 Changes in the 2004 CRA (194.15(b))

	DOE provided information in a format similar to that provided for the CCA. This included a main volume with appendices. DOE did summarize topics and provided new information where appropriate. DOE did consolidate some appendices relative to the CCA and did not submit appendices which did not change (e.g., the Geological Characterization Report of Appendix GCR). 

15.9.2 Evaluation of Compliance for 2004 Recertification (194.15(b))

	DOE provided relevant information from the CCA and updated information in the 2004 CRA and in response to EPA's requests, including a new performance assessment. 

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(b).

15.9.3 2004 Recertification Decision (194.15(b)) 

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2004 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2004-0025, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.194.15(b).

15.9.4 Changes in the 2009 CRA (194.15(b))

	DOE provided information in a modified format compared to the original CCA and the 2004 CRA to make the review by EPA and others generally simpler. DOE adopted the same format that EPA uses to document compliance with regulation 40 CFR 194, EPA's compliance application review documents (CARDs). Rather than use one main document with chapters that describe particular technical topics as done in the CCA and 2004 CRA DOE followed the EPA CARD format where each section of the rule requirements has a specific section dedicated to that requirement. This included a DOE rule section with supporting appendices. DOE continued to summarize topics and provided new information where appropriate. DOE did consolidate some appendices and remove some appendices in the 2009 CRA, especially for information that did not change.

15.9.5 Evaluation of Compliance for 2009 Recertification (194.15(b))

	DOE provided relevant information from the CCA, the 2004 CRA, and updated information in the 2009 CRA and in response to EPA's requests, including a new performance assessment. 
	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(b).

15.9.6 2009 Recertification Decision (194.15(b)) 

	Based on a review and evaluation of the 2009 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0330, Air Docket A-98-49), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(b). 

15.9.7 Changes in the 2014 CRA (194.15(b))

      DOE adopted the same format that EPA uses to document compliance with regulation 40 CFR 194, EPA's compliance application review documents (CARDs). Rather than use one main document with chapters that describe particular technical topics as done in the CCA and 2004 CRA DOE followed the EPA CARD format where each section of the rule requirements has a specific section dedicated to that requirement. This included a DOE rule section with supporting appendices. DOE continued to summarize topics and provided new information where appropriate. DOE did remove some appendices and add new ones in the 2014 CRA.

15.9.8 Evaluation of the 2014 Recertification (194.15(b))

      DOE provided relevant information from the CCA, the 2004 CRA, and the 2009 CRA and updated information in the 2014 CRA and in response to EPA's requests, including a sensitivity study to address issues related to the 2014 CRA PA. 

	EPA did not receive any public comments on DOE's continued compliance with the content of compliance recertification application(s) requirements of Section 194.15(b).

15.9.9 2014 Recertification Decision (194.15(b))

      Based on a review and evaluation of the 2014 CRA and supplemental information provided by DOE (FDMS Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609), EPA determines that DOE continues to comply with the requirements for Section 194.15(b).






Appendix 14-A
Requirements (194.14)

§ 194.14 Content of compliance certification application.

Any compliance application shall include: 

(a) A current description of the natural and engineered features that may affect the performance of the disposal system. The description of the disposal system shall include, at a minimum, the following information:

      (1) The location of the disposal system and the controlled area;
      (2) A description of the geology, geophysics, hydrogeology, hydrology, and geochemistry of the disposal system and its vicinity and how these conditions
      are expected to change and interact over the regulatory time frame.
      Such description shall include, at a minimum:

      (i) Existing fluids and fluid hydraulic potential, including brine pockets, in
      and near the disposal system; and
      (ii) Existing higher permeability anhydrite interbeds located at or near the
      horizon of the waste.
      (3) The presence and characteristics of potential pathways for transport of
      waste from the disposal system to the accessible environment including, but
      not limited to: Existing boreholes, solution features, breccia pipes, and
      other potentially permeable features, such as interbeds.
      (4) The projected geophysical, hydrogeologic and geochemical conditions of the disposal system due to the presence of waste including, but not limited to, the effects of production of heat or gases from the waste. 

(b) A description of the design of the disposal system including: 

      (1) Information on materials of construction including, but not limited to: Geologic media, structural materials, engineered barriers, general arrangement, and approximate dimensions; and
      (2) Computer codes and standards that have been applied to the design
      and construction of the disposal system.

(c) Results of assessments conducted pursuant to this part.

(d) A description of input parameters associated with assessments conducted
pursuant to this part and the basis for selecting those input parameters.

(e) Documentation of measures taken to meet the assurance requirements of
this part. 

(f) A description of waste acceptance criteria and actions taken to assure adherence
to such criteria.

(g) A description of background radiation in air, soil and water in the vicinity
of the disposal system and the procedures employed to determine such
radiation.

(h) One or more topographic map(s) of the vicinity of the disposal system.
The contour interval shall be sufficient to show clearly the pattern of surface
water flow in the vicinity of the disposal system. The map(s) shall include
standard map notations and symbols, and, in addition, shall show boundaries
of the controlled area and the location of any active, inactive, and abandoned
injection and withdrawal wells in the controlled area and in the vicinity of
the disposal system.

(i) A description of past and current climatologic and meteorologic conditions
in the vicinity of the disposal system and how these conditions are
expected to change over the regulatory time frame.

(j) The information required elsewhere in this part or any additional information,
analyses, tests, or records determined by the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative to be necessary for determining compliance with this part.
 
Appendix 14-A
Requirements (194.14)

§ 194.14 Content of compliance certification application.

Any compliance application shall include: 

(a) A current description of the natural and engineered features that may affect the performance of the disposal system. The description of the disposal system shall include, at a minimum, the following information:

      (1) The location of the disposal system and the controlled area;
      (2) A description of the geology, geophysics, hydrogeology, hydrology, and geochemistry of the disposal system and its vicinity and how these conditions
      are expected to change and interact over the regulatory time frame.
      Such description shall include, at a minimum:

      (i) Existing fluids and fluid hydraulic potential, including brine pockets, in
      and near the disposal system; and
      (ii) Existing higher permeability anhydrite interbeds located at or near the
      horizon of the waste.
      (3) The presence and characteristics of potential pathways for transport of
      waste from the disposal system to the accessible environment including, but
      not limited to: Existing boreholes, solution features, breccia pipes, and
      other potentially permeable features, such as interbeds.
      (4) The projected geophysical, hydrogeologic and geochemical conditions of the disposal system due to the presence of waste including, but not limited to, the effects of production of heat or gases from the waste. 

(b) A description of the design of the disposal system including: 

      (1) Information on materials of construction including, but not limited to: Geologic media, structural materials, engineered barriers, general arrangement, and approximate dimensions; and
      (2) Computer codes and standards that have been applied to the design
      and construction of the disposal system.

(c) Results of assessments conducted pursuant to this part.

(d) A description of input parameters associated with assessments conducted
pursuant to this part and the basis for selecting those input parameters.

(e) Documentation of measures taken to meet the assurance requirements of
this part. 

(f) A description of waste acceptance criteria and actions taken to assure adherence
to such criteria.

(g) A description of background radiation in air, soil and water in the vicinity
of the disposal system and the procedures employed to determine such
radiation.

(h) One or more topographic map(s) of the vicinity of the disposal system.
The contour interval shall be sufficient to show clearly the pattern of surface
water flow in the vicinity of the disposal system. The map(s) shall include
standard map notations and symbols, and, in addition, shall show boundaries
of the controlled area and the location of any active, inactive, and abandoned
injection and withdrawal wells in the controlled area and in the vicinity of
the disposal system.

(i) A description of past and current climatologic and meteorologic conditions
in the vicinity of the disposal system and how these conditions are
expected to change over the regulatory time frame.

(j) The information required elsewhere in this part or any additional information,
analyses, tests, or records determined by the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative to be necessary for determining compliance with this part.

Appendix 15-A
Requirements (194.15)

§ 194.15 Content of compliance re-certification application(s).

(a) In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

 All additional geologic, geophysical, geochemical, hydrologic, and meteorologic information;
         
 All additional monitoring data, analyses and results;

         
 All additional analyses and results of laboratory experiments conducted by the Department or its contractors as part of the WIPP program;
         
 An identification of any activities or assumptions that deviate from the most recent compliance application;

         
 A description of all waste emplaced in the disposal system since the most recent compliance certification or re-certification application. Such description shall consist of a description of the waste characteristics and waste components identified in §§ 194.24(b)(1) and 194.24(b)(2);
         
 Any significant information not previously included in a compliance certification or re-certification application related to whether the disposal system continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations; and 

         
      (7) Any additional information requested by the Administrator or the
      
            (b) To the extent that information required for a re-certification of compliance remains valid and has been submittedin previous certification or recertification application(s), such information need not be duplicated in subsequent applications; such information may be summarized and referenced.





                                 Appendix 15-B
                                       
                        Responses to CRA-2014 Comments 

Issue 1:	Inadvertent drilling intrusion into the repository and pressurized brine

L. Chaturvedi (7/14/2015):
The comments in this document are an expansion of the verbal comments presented by
the author at the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) public meeting on the 2014
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Recertification Application (CRA) in
Albuquerque on June 17, 2015.

Many parameters are used in the 10,000 year probabilistic risk assessment (formally
known as "performance assessment" or P.A.) to demonstrate compliance with the EPA
standards (40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194) for the WIPP nuclear waste repository. One of
these parameters is PBRINE which specifies the probability that an inadvertent drilling
intrusion into the excavated region of the repository encounters pressurized brine in the
Castile Formation located about 227 meter (750 feet) below the repository. The original
1996 WIPP Compliance Certification Application (CCA) used a uniform distribution
between 0.01 and 0.60 with a mean value of 0.305 for this parameter. In other words,
the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that the probability of encountering a
pressurized brine reservoir underlying the WIPP repository was between 1 and 60%.
Performance assessment calculations were performed using this range for this
parameter in 1996 P.A. While the values of other parameters were revised in the 2004
and 2009 CRA, the value of PBRINE was not changed. In the 2014 CRA, however, the
DOE has proposed changing the value of PBRINE to a range of 0.063 to 0.19, with a
mean (and default value) of 0.127. In other words, DOE has reduced the probability of
brine encounter from a mean of 30% from CCA until now, to 12.7% in the 2014 CRA.
(Kirchner et al., 2012).

In response to questions/comments from EPA regarding this change, the DOE has
repeated the arguments given by Kirchner et al. (2012). This document analyses the
DOE position and makes a recommendation.

Recommendation
The justifications provided for changing the numerical value distribution for this
parameter, that has been used for the past 18 years in the WIPP P.A., are invalid. If the
issue is to be reopened, however, closer attention needs to be paid to the data from the
deepening and testing of WIPP-12 well in 1982. That data indicates higher rather than
lower probability (compared to that used in the CCA and two CRAs) of pressurized
Castile brine encounter under the WIPP repository. Based on the data from the testing
of WIPP-12 and the results of the Time Domain Electro-Magnetic (TDEM) geophysical
survey (The Earth Technologies Corporation,1988), the New Mexico Environmental
Evaluation Group (EEG) recommended a fixed value of 0.6 (60%) for this parameter.
(Neill et al., 1998, Section 2.11). It is recommended that this value be used instead of
the value proposed by DOE.

A General Observation
A general observation appears pertinent here. A case can be made that most, if not all,
the changes proposed by DOE since the EPA's certification decision in 1998, and
accepted by EPA and New Mexico NMED, have been in the direction of less
conservatism. These changes have generally been made in the name of cost-saving,
efficiency, or removal of redundancy. These changes include the value/range of P.A.
parameters, other assumptions in the P.A., frequency and rigor of inspections, criteria
for waste acceptance and documentation, monitoring, and materials and design used
for closing and sealing the underground openings. There was much discussion at the
public meeting on June 17, 2015 regarding the connection between the Valentine Day
2014 accident/incident at WIPP and the CRA. While both DOE and EPA correctly
pointed out that the CRA is for post-closure long-term safety, whereas the accident was
during operational period, perhaps the connection between the two lies in this trend
towards less conservatism. While the bad decisions that reduce the operational safety
may result in an accident in our lifetime and thus allow us to take remedial measures,
the impact of decisions made for long-term P.A. may not be apparent for many
generations in the future and therefore require more care now.

Discussion
The case for using the lower probability for the parameter PBRINE in the 2014 CRA is
outlined in Kirchner et al. (2012). This Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) memorandum
bases its recommendation for the lower probability on three factors:
      :: Additional drilling of oil and gas wells in the vicinity of WIPP and reported encounters with Castile brine.
      :: Re-examination of Time Domain Electro-Magnetic (TDEM) geophysical survey data from 1987.
      :: Assumption of occurrence of brine only in vertical fractures in the upper Castile
      anhydrite Formation (which implies that the volume in a given "brine pocket" would be limited.)
There are a number of problems in the Kirchner et al. (2012) analysis and these are
discussed below.

Additional Drilling Data
During the 1980s and 90s, the EEG repeatedly pointed out in published reports, papers,
and presentations (Chaturvedi, et al., 1997) that WIPP is located in a resource rich area
and the 4 mile by 4 mile WIPP site would be a conspicuous island essentially without
wells in the middle of thousands of oil and gas wells occupying the land surrounding it.
This outcome has come sooner than expected and one only has to take a look at Fig.1
of Kirchner et al. (2012) to be convinced that WIPP is situated in the middle of a prolific
oil and gas field, which may attract the attention of future drillers to the relatively virgin
land in the middle, the 4 mile by 4 mile WIPP site. The few gaps remaining in the
immediate vicinity of the WIPP site boundary are due to shallower potash resources set
aside by New Mexico and federal authorities. Now, the DOE has turned this negative
aspect of the WIPP site to calculate a lower probability of encountering the Castile brine
by a future driller into the WIPP area, by stating that very few of the new wells have
encountered brine. It is important to note that neither Kirchner et al. (2012) nor the
recent DOE response to EPA's questions on this subject, have outlined any systematic
process of collecting the brine encounter data from the commercial drillers. It is a well-known fact that the commercial oil and gas drillers aim for a much deeper zone and that
an encounter with pressurized brine at a shallower zone is only a nuisance that they
would try to overcome as soon as possible without making a fuss and publicizing it.
Even if the DOE had an understanding with some operators, it would be a serious
economic hardship for them to stop drilling and let DOE observe or test the brine. They
are only interested in getting to the target horizon at depth as soon as possible and
would avoid getting a government agency involved in the operation, unless absolutely
required with stiff penalties for not complying, or incentives to do so. No such
requirement or incentives appear to be in place.

Kirchner et al. (2012) has skirted this issue by repeating an argument used by Powers
et al.(1996), who argued that:
"pressurized brine pockets of a size sufficient to impact the repository would produce a
large enough flow as to threaten overflow of the surface storage pits, and hence require
measurement and intervention by the drillers. Therefore, such "non-reported" brine
intercepts are of no consequence to WIPP performance."
The argument does not make sense, because while the driller would have to deal with
such an encounter, why would they inform the WIPP folks or another government
agency? And wouldn't this un-reported encounter influence the probability calculation?
Also, an estimate of the probability of encountering brine should include lower artesian
pressure encounters that may not be a major nuisance to the driller.

The TDEM Data
The second argument in favor of decreasing the probability is the unreliability of the
TDEM data. As a geophysical method, TDEM survey is inherently qualitative and was
used only to get an indication whether high conductivity zones indicating the potential
presence of brine reservoir may exist under the WIPP repository. This survey was
undertaken after the major brine encounter by WIPP-12, the amount of uncontrolled
flow and the calculated volume of which indicated a strong possibility that this brine
reservoir may extend under the WIPP repository. The survey showed that high
conductivity zones indicating the presence of brine exist under the WIPP repository.

WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 Testing Data
The primary source of information about the brine reservoir under the WIPP site comes
from the deepening of WIPP-12 borehole in 1982 and subsequent testing of WIPP-12
and ERDA-6 wells. The information is contained in the DOE contractor's report,
Popielak, et al. (1983), that DOE, including Kirchner et al. (2012), cite but ignore the
critical information contained in it. It is therefore necessary to review the history of the
WIPP project's encounter with the pressurized brine in upper Castile Formation at the
WIPP site.

The original site selected for WIPP was northeast of the current site. An exploratory
borehole, named ERDA-6, was drilled in 1975 at the center of that site to understand
the general stratigraphy and to determine the thickness of the Salado salt, the planned
host rock formation for the repository. Unexpectedly, ERDA-6 encountered pressurized
brine at a depth of 2708 to 2711 feet at the top of the Castile Formation. The U.S.
Geological Survey geologist in charge, C.L. Jones, described this encounter as follows:
"Near the base of the banded anhydrite unit, at 2,708-2,711 feet, an influx of geopressured brine displaced the 2,710+--foot column of salt-base drilling fluid (weight=10.2 Ibs/gal) from the well-bore in about 12 minutes, and the discharge of brine at the wellhead was accomplished with much bubbling and evolution of H2S, C02 and other gases. The brine was derived from a 3-foot section (2,708-2,711feet) of fractured,
brecciated reservoir rock." (Jones, 1983).

The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), DOE's predecessor,
plugged ERDA-6 and abandoned the site after this encounter and selected the present
site for WIPP (after relaxing the criterion of minimum distance from an existing
borehole). A borehole, ERDA-9, was drilled at the center of the present site, but it was
drilled only to the lower part of the Salado Formation and stopped just short of the
projected Salado/Castile boundary, where the brine was encountered in ERDA-6.
Perhaps this was intentional, to avoid another ERDA-6 type situation, in which this site
would also have to be rejected. Another exploratory borehole, WIPP-12, located one
mile north of ERDA-9, was drilled in 1978, but that too was stopped short of penetrating
the Castile Formation. In 1981, the State of New Mexico negotiated a settlement of a
lawsuit with DOE that included reopening and deepening of WIPP-12 to the upper
Castile Formation. The EEG acted as technical advisors to the N.M. Attorney General in
this lawsuit and settlement, and had suspected that brine reservoir lies under WIPP-12
(Correspondence between L. Chaturvedi of EEG and R.P. Snyder of U.S.G.S., 1980).
WIPP-12 was re-entered and drilled deeper, hitting pressurized brine in November 1981
at a depth of approximately 3000 ft. ERDA-6 was also re-entered after removing the
plug and was used as an observation well in conjunction with pumping of WIPP-12.
Popielak et al. (1983) report that pressurized artesian brine from WIPP-12 flowed to the
surface at the rate of approximately 350 gallons per minute (22 liters per second) and
more than 1.14 million gallons (4.3 million liters) of brine "unavoidably" flowed to the
surface, and was collected in a large pond that had to be excavated in a hurry, before
the well was brought under control. Popielak et al. (1983) calculated the volume of brine
encountered by WIPP-12 to be at least 17 million barrels (535 million gallons, or 2 billion liters). The volume of ERDA-6 brine reservoir was calculated to be at least 440,000 barrels. Simultaneous hydrologic testing in the two wells concluded that the two
reservoirs were not interconnected, however, this conclusion can be applied to these
two reservoirs only. Kirchner et al. (2012) treat each brine encounter as a separate
"pocket", an assumption for which no evidence has been provided. Just because
WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 brine reservoirs were found to be not connected does not mean
that the three encounters in an east west line NE of WIPP (Fig. 5 of Kirchner et al.,
2012), for example, are not connected. The two wells that encountered brine
immediately outside the southwest corner of the site (Belco Hudson and another) may
also have tapped the same reservoir.

The volume of brine encountered by WIPP-12 was so large and WIPP-12 was located
so close to the repository that the WIPP repository layout was changed, placing the
repository in the southern part of the site and the experimental rooms in the north,
closer to WIPP-12. EEG (Spiegler, 1982; Chaturvedi et al., 1997; Neill et al., 1998,
Appendix 8.1) calculated that using WIPP-12 pressure recovery data, rock
compressibility, and thickness of the brine reservoir calculated by Popielak et al. (1983),
one can easily draw a circle around WIPP-12 that incorporates the entire WIPP
repository footprint. The TDEM survey was conducted in 1987, also at the request of
EEG, to confirm the presence of higher conductivity zones at that depth under the WIPP
repository. The results of TDEM survey showed that such zones exist under the
repository. After the experience with pressurized brine encounter in WIPP-12, there is a
very strong possibility that pressurized brine in the Castile Formation exists at the WIPP
site. A given well may miss it if it misses the interconnected fractures in which brine
exists, and that is why it is reasonable to assume the probability as less than 100%.

Fracture Orientation and Deformation Belt
The opening paragraph of Kirchner et al. (2012) states:
"The penetration of brine pockets during drilling intrusions of the WIPP repository can
have significant consequences with respect to releases. The term "brine pocket" seems
to imply that pools of pressurized brine exist in the Castile. However, Popielak et al.
(1983) reviewed the geologic data acquired during the WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 well
testing and other information related to the occurrences of pressurized brine in the
Castile formation and concluded that pressurized brine is associated with near-vertical
fractures. Borns (1983) confirms the near-vertical orientation of brine-producing
fractures through study of core from the WIPP-12 borehole. Furthermore, they stated
that these fractures are associated with a belt of deformation that parallels the Capitan
reef."

The term "brine pocket" actually downgrades the importance of the size of brine
reservoirs, particularly that intercepted by WIPP-12. That is why the WIPP project has
traditionally called them "brine reservoirs". As calculated by Popielak et al. (1983, p.
H-54), the volume of brine contained in the reservoir intersected by WIPP-12 is between
17 million and 86 million barrels, i.e., between 535 million and 2.7 billion gallons (@31.5 gallons to a barrel). That certainly is a large "pool of pressurized brine in the Castile" right under the WIPP site! Because it is pressurized, WIPP-12 "unavoidably" yielded 1.14 million gallons to the surface before the flow could be stopped.

It is not clear what Kirchner et al. (2012) intend to imply by emphasizing the near vertical
fractures association with WIPP-12 brine encounter. Fractures between 70 degree and vertical orientation were seen in the WIPP-12 cores and through a downhole camera, but the relevant point is the total calculated volume of water that most likely occurs in interconnected fractures. For the interconnected fractures to contain hundreds of millions of gallons of water in one brine reservoir, the reservoir has to extend laterally for a long distance under the WIPP site. (Chaturvedi, et al., 1997). With respect to the brine reservoirs association with "belt of deformation that parallels the Capitan Reef", that indeed was the hypothesis put forward by SNL and U.S.G.S.
scientists after the unexpected encounter of pressurized brine at ERDA-6, but was
abandoned after encountering brine in Belco Hudson well just outside the southwest
corner of the WIPP site, and later when WIPP-12 exploded with brine at the WIPP site.

Recommendation
It is recommended that if the DOE wishes to reopen the issue of the probability of brine
encounter, i.e. the parameter PBRINE, then a closer examination of the result of
WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 testing, as reported by Popielak et al. (1983) be used as a
primary guide. TDEM Survey data may be used as a supplementary guide. Recognizing
that some wells may miss the interconnected fractures in which the brine exists, and
guided by the results of TDEM survey, the EEG (Neill et al., 1998, Section 2.11)
recommended a fixed value of 0.6 (60%) for this parameter that still is a reasonable
value.

EPA Response to 7/14/2015 L. Chaturvedi Comment:
The EPA agrees with the commenter that the DOE's revised approach raises concerns. In particular, the EPA does not agree with the DOE's conclusions regarding the geophysical data. However, after reviewing the data again, the EPA disagrees with the commenter that a fixed probability of 60% is necessary. The EPA notes that 60% was the high end of the probability distribution used in performance assessments prior to 2014, with a mean probability of 30.5%, as recognized by the commenter. The updated approach developed by the EPA uses the geophysical data, but also incorporates newer drilling information into the probability distribution. The EPA believes this approach is sound and is acceptable for use in future performance assessments. The EPA will evaluate future proposals by the DOE to update the method for determining PBRINE. The EPA's review is discussed further in the technical support document Probability of Encountering Castile Brine Beneath the WIPP Waste Panels Using the TDEM Block Method, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609.

Issue 2	:	Issues related to whether DOE is disposing of spent nuclear fuel 
      and high-level radioactive waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

G. Anastas (3/5/2015):




EPA (J. Edwards) response to March 3, 2015 letter from to G. Anastas): (Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609-0007)

Dear Mr. Anastas: 

Thank you for your letter dated March 3, 2015. We have considered your questions which are based on your assertion that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), has transported and disposed of high-level radioactive waste (HL W) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP). We agree that Section 12 of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (PL 102-579, as amended by PL 104-201) (WIPP LWA) prohibits the transportation to and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP. However, we disagree with your contention that the DOE has disposed of HLW and SNF at the WIPP.
 
As part of its waste characterization inspections and its WIPP compliance recertification process, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reviews the DOE waste characterization information on an ongoing basis to make sure that HLW and SNF are not disposed at the repository. Our reviews of ANL's remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste characterization documentation, documented in the Agency's multiple ANL waste characterization inspection reports (see the list of docket citations included in response to question 2 in the accompanying enclosure), have found that no waste disposed at the WIPP violates the WIPP LWA prohibition on the transportation and disposal of HLW and SNF at the facility. Instead, based on the EPA's review of DOE documents. the Agency believes that the WIPP is only receiving and disposing of TRU waste, as allowed under Section 7 of the WIPP LWA. Also, there are several prescribed checks and balances (as outlined in DOE Order No. 435.1) that each TRU waste site must formalize; therefore. inclusion of HLW or SNF in TRU waste containers would not go unnoticed and unchecked. In addition, required compliance with regulations of external federal and state entities and associated penalties minimizes the potential for such an unlawful action.

Our enclosure to this letter addresses each of the questions outlined in your March 2015 correspondence. Although these comments were submitted as a public submission related to the DOE's WIPP 2014 Compliance Recertification Application, the EPA considers your letter as an inquiry specific to TRU waste characterization activities at ANL. Hence, we decided to respond to your letter in advance of our June 2015 informal public meetings, as you requested. We will also include this correspondence in the docket associated with the 2014 WIPP Recertification (EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609).

Responses to specific comments from George Anastas - March 3, 2015 Letter
 
Question 1. What actions will EPA take regarding the transport and disposal of HL W and spent nuclear fuel at WIPP consistent with other actions by the EPA where an organization violated EPA Permit/Regulatory Requirements?
 
Response: To date, after conducting more than 100 TRU waste characterization site inspections at TRU waste sites within the DOE complex, the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of HLW and SNL at the WIPP. Hence, no action has been necessary. 

Question 2. EPA inspected Argonne National Laboratory prior to September 2013. Did the EPA inspection(s) uncover the fact that Argonne was planning to ship comingled TRU with HLW and SNF to WIPP?

Response: In accordance with the 40 CFR 194.8 regulatory changes that were finalized in 2004, the EPA performed a baseline site inspection at ANL in September 2006, and approved ANL's RH TRU waste characterization program in January 2007 (see www.regulations.gov, EPAHQ-OAR-2006-0881). Per 2004 regulatory changes, the site-specific baseline approval must identify Tier 1 (Tl) changes as the type of modifications that the Agency must approve prior to their implementation by an approved site. These may include characterization of new waste stream(s), use of a new or modification to an existing piece of characterization equipment and/or changes to approved procedures. As such, since the 2007 baseline approval at ANL, the EPA has approved ten T1 changes including the following five approvals of ANL's remote-handled (RH) waste stream, Argonne East Remote Handled Debris Mix (AERHDM, from K Wing Analytical Laboratory glove boxes):  1. September 2010 approval of K Wing AERHDM Debris (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-200 1-00 12-0449); 2. September 2010 approval to add additional containers of the same waste stream to the previously approved lot (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0340); 3. September 2010 approval of addition of 100 containers in October 2008 (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0450); 4. November 2010 approval of FEW debris (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0451); and 5. February 2012 approval of K-Wing FEW waste stream (see www.regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-0312) All the above approvals required an EPA inspection/review of DOE-prepared supporting documentation describing the origin and radiological contents of the waste material packaged in containers for WIPP disposal. None of the documents reviewed indicate that HLW and SNF has been handled when analyzing test material in ANL's K Wing Analytical Laboratory glove boxes.
Question 3. What are EPA procedures to assure that comingled TRU, HLW and SNF are not shipped to, nor emplaced, at WIPP?

Response: When TRU waste is being approved for WIPP disposal, the EPA routinely evaluates acceptable knowledge (AK) documents and interviews AK and radiological characterization experts to verify that no HLW or SNL fuel has been comingled with TRU waste. TRU sites must provide up to date AK documents and radiological characterization records specific to every T1 change approval request. EPA pursues this verification step every time the Agency reviews revised AK documents (necessary to record what is being added to an approved RH waste stream) and radiological characterization records. For the five above listed T1 change requests, the EPA followed the above verification steps and evaluated accompanying radiological data to confirm that the ANL RH waste stream being proposed for WIPP disposal meets the definition of RH TRU waste. The Agency believes that ANL appropriately adhered to the DOE Order 435.1-1 when generating WIPP-compliant RH TRU AEHRDM waste resulting from analysis of test material consisting of fuel pin fines and debris not originating or associated with power or plutonium production.

Question 4. What volume and mass of SNF and of HL W from each DOE Generating Site has been transported and disposed at WIPP?

Response: The EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of HLW and SNF at the WIPP.
 
Question 5. What analysis of any criticality considerations has EPA conducted because of the emplacement of containers of SNF at WIPP?

Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of HLW and SNF at the WIPP, there has been no need for the Agency to evaluate any SNF-related criticality issues. 

Question 6. Identify each container of HLW and SNF (any spent nuclear fuel, commercial, advanced United States reactor SNF, SNF originating from any foreign reactor, from any research reactor, any defense related SNF, any critical facility) disposed at WIPP by, at least, Generator site, Waste Stream Profile, Container Type, Container TRUCON Code, Container Disposal Date and Container Location (at least Panel and Room).
 
Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP, there are no waste containers in this category to identify.
 
Question 7. Under what authority were these materials packaged, transported and disposed at WIPP? 

Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP, there is no need for any federal or state entity to authorize the stated activities. 

Question 8. Were the containers of HLW and SNF approved for the transport of these materials from Argonne to WIPP? If yes, by what agency and when? 

Response: Because the EPA has not seen any evidence of the transport and disposal of SNF or HLW at the WIPP, there is no need for any federal or state entity to authorize the stated activities. 

Question 9. What are the EPA procedures to prohibit DOE from implementing internal guidance, directives or orders that circumvent EPA regulatory requirements? 

Response: The Agency's review and concurrence are necessary prior to DOE implementing any waste characterization-specific changes to its previously-approved procedures (e.g., Waste Acceptance Criteria, Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan) that incorporate the EPA's regulatory requirements. The DOE's procedures implement various DOE Orders that cover the TRU waste management program. In addition, the EPA can review applicable DOE internal guidance, directives or orders to confirm that the DOE continues to ship only TRU waste to the WIPP for disposal in accordance with the WIPP LWA.



G. Anastas (5/28/15):













G. Anastas (6/17/15):























G. Anastas (1/12/17):
United States Environmental Protection Agency WEBINAR Regarding the Completeness Determination for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 2014 WIPP Compliance Recertification Application (CRA)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

I thank EPA for making it abundantly clear and unambiguous that its role in the Recertification Process is defined by the Land Withdrawal Act. (Reference: Page 3 of EPA Handout for the Webinar, WIPP Recertification Review and Process)

There is an apparent significant omission in the DOE material submitted to EPA in support of the CRA. That omission is that at least once DOE transported and then disposed of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste at WIPP. EPA should not issue a completeness determination until DOE provides full and accurate information about the waste emplaced at WIPP. 

I think most of us here today believe that Federal Law should take precedence over any organizational internal guidance that patently circumvents Federal Law. Federal Law states that "The Secretary (of Energy) shall not transport high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel to WIPP or emplace or dispose of such waste or fuel at WIPP." Section 12: BAN ON HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL. : WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, P.L. 102-579, as amended by P.L. 104-201

The United States Department of Energy transported from Argonne National Laboratory commercial, research and foreign nuclear reactor fuel and high-level radioactive waste to WIPP and disposed of the fuel and the waste at WIPP. The shipment left Argonne on September 13, 2013, was received at WIPP on September 15, 2013 and was placed in Panel 6, Room 2 on September 18, 20 and 21, 2013. The DOE basis for transporting and disposing of these materials at WIPP is DOE Radioactive Waste Manual 435.1-1 that purports to allow DOE to comingle spent nuclear fuel or high-level waste with transuranic waste and call the mixture transuranic waste. 

The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act was approved by Congress and signed into Federal Law in 1992. DOE Order 435.1 was approved by DOE on July 9, 1999, years after the LWA was signed into law.
















F. Marcinowski (reply to G. Anastas/HLW comments) (2/3/17):












G. Anastas (4/6/17):

ACTION: Notice of completeness of recertification application and
announcement of end of public comment period. (March 10, 2017 EPA Federal Register Notice: Federal Register Volume 82, Number 46 (Friday, March 10, 2017)] [Pages 13282-13285]

The EPA Completeness Review of the DOE Compliance Recertification Application is in error because of the issues stated below.

The WIPP inventory must be amended to include all spent nuclear fuel and high level waste disposed at the WIPP. The omission of these items from the WIPP Inventory materially impacts the WIPP Performance Assessment and begs the following questions: "what other prohibitions have EPA and DOE ignored" and "what is the total quantity of spent nuclear fuel and high level reprocessing waste has EPA allowed DOE to dispose at WIPP"?

The EPA allowed the DOE to transport and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste at WIPP in patent violation of EPA statements made at he WIPP January 12, 2017 WEBINAR, EPA Statements in the March 10, 2017 Federal Register Notice and statutory prohibitions in the Land Withdrawal Act. The WIPP inventory must be amended to include all spent nuclear fuel and high level waste disposed at the WIPP.

1) EPA Statements during the January 12, 2017 WEBINAR are (partially) as follows.
Statement by EPA: What is EPA' s Role? Defined by the Land Withdrawal Act.
EPA has ignored the LWA prohibitions on the transport and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste at WIPP. EPA has even encouraged such transport and disposal.

Statement by EPA: EPA's Goals and Agenda. "provide general information on the recertification process-specifically, completeness issues ... "
The inventory at WIPP includes commercial and research spent nuclear fuel and UREX reprocessing high level waste. These materials are not identified by EPA and DOE as violations of the LWA even though both EPA and Argonne/DOE acknowledge that these materials were knowingly transported
and disposed at W IPP.

2) An Extract from Part II of the March 10, 2017 EPA Federal Register Notice: Federal Register Volume 82, Number 46 (Friday, March 10, 2017)] [Pages 13282-13285]
Page 13283
"The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was authorized in 1980, under section 213 of the DOE National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-164, 93 Stat. 1259, 1265), "for the express purpose of providing a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the defense activities and programs of the United States. The WIPP is a disposal system for transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste."

"The 1992 WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (L WA; Pub. L. 102-579) limits radioactive waste disposal in the WIPP to TRU radioactive wastes generated by defense-related activities."

"The WIPP L WA further stipulates that radioactive waste shall not be TRU waste if such waste also meets the definition of high-level radioactive waste,"

"The TRU radioactive waste proposed for disposal in the WIPP consists of materials such as rags, equipment, tools, protective gear and sludges that have become contaminated during atomic energy defense activities."

3) Federal Law states that "The Secretary (of Energy) shall not transport high level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel to WIPP or emplace or dispose of such waste or fuel at WIPP." Section 12: BAN ON HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL.: WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, P.L. 102-579, as amended by P.L. 104-201

EPA knowingly allowed the DOE to transport from Argonne National Laboratory commercial, research and foreign nuclear reactor fuel and UREX reprocessing high-level radioactive waste to WIPP and dispose of the fuel and the waste at WIPP.

The shipment left Argonne on September 13, 2013, was received at WIPP on September 15, 2013 and was placed in Panel 6, Room 2 on September 18, 20 and 21, 2013. 
The EPA and DOE basis for allowing the transport and disposal of these materials at WIPP is DOE Radioactive Waste Manual 435.1-1 that purports to allow DOE to comingle spent nuclear fuel or high-level waste with transuranic waste and call the mixture transuranic waste.

The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act was approved by Congress and signed into Federal Law in 1992. DOE Order 435.1 was approved by DOE on July 9, 1999, years after the L WA was signed into law.

When does an internal organization document supersede a Federal Statute? No organization, including the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Department of Energy, is above the law.


EPA Response to issues related to whether DOE is disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant:
Under the WIPP LWA, the focus of the EPA's present recertification determination is whether the WIPP continues to comply with the final disposal regulations. Although -- as the commenter notes and the DOE acknowledges -- the WIPP LWA bans disposal at the WIPP of spent nuclear fuel, the disposal regulations, themselves, currently do not expressly address disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The WIPP LWA incorporates the definition of spent nuclear fuel found in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982: "fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not been separated by reprocessing." 42 U.S.C. § 10101(23) (as incorporated by WIPP LWA § 2(15)). There seems to be no dispute that waste from the Argonne Lab includes some quantity of material that is not presently in the intact physical form of fuel withdrawn from a reactor following irradiation, but is fragments of or particulates from fuel pins withdrawn from a reactor following irradiation. The DOE states that the fragments or particulates resulted from research and development activities on test specimens from fuel pins withdrawn from a reactor following irradiation and claims that treatment of such material as other than spent nuclear fuel is consistent with the intent of the WIPP LWA. The DOE also asserts that attempting to segregate the fuel pin fragments and particulates from other debris shipped to the WIPP is infeasible and cost prohibitive and would increase worker exposure.

Reasonable contentions may be made that fragments and particulates resulting from research and development activities on specimens from fuel withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation ("pieces of pieces" of fuel pins) do not meet the statutory definition of spent nuclear fuel. The practical considerations of feasibility, cost, and worker safety associated with attempting to segregate such particulates from other waste shipped to the WIPP bear consideration. It is not essential, however, to the EPA's present recertification decision to attempt to definitively resolve this issue, because the current disposal regulations do not expressly address disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

On an on-going basis, aside from the periodic recertification of the WIPP, the EPA communicates with the DOE concerning the characterization of WIPP waste. The DOE provides the EPA with documentation relating to WIPP waste streams, including but not limited to, waste from the Argonne National Laboratory, and including documentation for both contact handled and remote handled TRU waste streams. The relevant information is confirmed by analyzing individual waste containers using the EPA approved processes, procedures and equipment. These steps allow the DOE to demonstrate that waste containers for WIPP disposal meet the EPA's WIPP waste limits for physical and radiological contents of the waste. So, concerning the waste shipped from Argonne National Laboratory, the EPA evaluated the waste characteristic information prepared for remote handled waste. The DOE provided historical information to document that waste generated from laboratory experiments at Argonne was defense related, and through radiological assay concluded that the waste in question met the definition of TRU waste and was appropriate for disposal at the WIPP. Following this determination, Argonne provided this waste for characterization. Radiological and physical characterization confirmed that the TRU waste in question (a) is remote handled waste; (b) exhibits the characteristics of debris waste; and (c) meets the regulatory limits of the EPA's WIPP waste acceptance requirements at 40 CFR 194.24.

The EPA thoroughly inspects and approves the waste characterization processes in place at all waste characterization sites including Argonne National Laboratory. As part of the waste characterization inspections and approvals, the EPA is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of characterization methods used to identify and measure radiological and physical contents of the TRU waste that affect the long term containment and isolation of waste at the WIPP and for ensuring that the WIPP-bound waste meets the disposal requirements under 40 CFR 194.24.


Issue 3	:	WIPP will be safe for the next 10,000 years

Anonymous Public Comment (6/22/15):
My family has been in the mining industry since the early 1900's. My father worked in both coal and potash (similar to WIPP salt) for over 42 years, and I also worked in a potash mine. The community of Carlsbad, New Mexico is very familiar with operating a mining operation in salt, and has learned more about TRU Waste than any community in the world. We are proud to safely operate the WIPP and even though we are very much aware of the release of radiation from a container placed underground, we know that the facility performed the way it was designed to operate. There is continuous monitoring of the workers exposure in the mine as well as the air flowing into and out of the mine. We are working very hard to reopen WIPP in order to continue to resolve a much greater nation wide risk of accidental contamination. All citizens of New Mexico and even the entire US should be very thankful that the container that released the radiation because of error at Los Alamos, already was placed 2100 ft. underground in a facility that was designed to protect the environment. I believe that WIPP is safe to operate, and that the geology and precautions make WIPP the perfect place to put the waste, and that is will be safe for the next 10,000 years and beyond.

Response to 6/22/15 Anonymous Public Comment (7/11/17):
EPA thanks the commenter for their statement and will continue to provide oversight to the WIPP to ensure its continual safe operation.

Issue 4	:	Multiple issues in support of WIPP recertification

J. Heaton (7/14/15):




Response to 7/14/15 J. Heaton Comment
We thank the commenter for their support in our efforts to continue to provide oversight to the WIPP.

Issue 5	:	Multiple points against WIPP recertification
D. Reade (7/9/15):
Introduction
WIPP has failed. As a pilot plant it's over. What has been demonstrated is that under the
conditions and attitudes that exist in this country and specifically in the DOE, EPA and NMED today, it is impossible to demonstrate the safe deep geologic disposal of transuranic waste. There is not the competence, the creative thinking or the right attitude toward safety to bring that about.

During the recent meetings here in Santa Fe, both DOE and EPA representatives stated that WIPP's failure and release during the operational phase has nothing to do with whether it can contain the waste after closure and need not be considered at all. This shows the continuing problems with the project because an attitude like this virtually guarantees that the project will fail after closure as well.

During the WIPP RCRA hearings, DOE was told that their risk assessment was inadequate because it did not give enough weight to human error and did not take into consideration that problems caused by human error increase after 10 or 15 years of error-free operations. This is exactly what has happened at WIPP although I wouldn't say that the last 15 years have really been error-free - there just wasn't a major release before.

In fact, to see if WIPP can be re-certified, EPA must re-do their risk assessments for the
project because they too have not taken human error into enough account even from the
beginning and now, with the failure of the operational stage - caused by massive human error at multiple points in the system and multiple locations - an even larger factor for human error must be included. Even if DOE had straightened up their act (totally unlikely as shown simply by their statements at this meeting), closure will come again in 10 years or more - just when another big peak of human error is likely to occur.

It is almost criminal to ignore the operational history of the entity that will be responsible for closure, especially when this entity has shown themselves to be completely incompetent both in operations at the mine as well as at some of the generating sites. When they have ignored their own safety procedures, in my opinion committed criminal acts just to move waste to WIPP that isn't acceptable there, and have made mistakes over and over again for years. It is obvious that they don't learn from their mistakes, but why should they, when the overseeing agency - EPA - doesn't care how bad they are at all?

Total Lack of Interest in Public Participation and Public Comment
There was virtually no notice of the EPA meetings in New Mexico. I don't consider putting the meetings in the federal register to be notice, nor is an article in the newspaper that appears on the day of the meeting, adequate notice. However, this doesn't surprise me. Clearly, EPA is uninterested in hearing comments from the public and is simply going through the motions. You, in fact, do not want the public to participate. Your actions and notice do not meet even the most minimum requirements of the law. If you cared to hear what the public had to say, you would make a good faith effort to inform them of these meetings, but you did not. Even worse, you have made absolutely no effort to include Spanish speakers in the process. Where are the Spanish fact sheets? Why did you not advertise the meetings on Spanish radio, in Spanish newspapers and make other good faith efforts to include this segment of New Mexico's population? I was told that in previous meetings some Spanish speakers said they didn't want information in Spanish. However, this opinion from some Spanish speakers does not relieve you from your obligation to inform others for whom Spanish is a first or only language. you have utterly dropped the ball here and this is a discriminatory act. 

I have included with these comments, a copy of the Title VI Complaint that we filed on the Triassic Park Hazardous Waste Dump which is sited near Roswell and WIPP. This complaint is currently under review by EPA's office of Civil Rights. You couldn't even be bothered to check your own agency to see if there was a need for Spanish information and notice. Yet folks in SE New Mexico stated in recent interviews supplementing our complaint that they were so happy to hear at first that information was going to be presented to them in their language so they could understand what was being proposed on Triassic Park, and then were so very disappointed when they found out that the promised translations and interpretation wasn't actually going to happen. With EPA, this pattern of discrimination is repeated again and you don't even seem to see what a serious problem this is.

Decision Already Made
It was clear at the meeting that EPA has already made their decision to recertify WIPP. When asked if the possibility of not recertifying WIPP was greater than zero, the EPA
representatives had a really hard time coming around to stating that there was even a .01% chance that they wouldn't recertify. When asked what the procedure would be if WIPP were not recertified, they were at a complete loss. Obviously, this was never thought of because not recertifying WIPP is unthinkable for EPA - no matter how likely the site is to fail. Finally the representatives scrambled around and came up with some answers, but it was clear that this had never been considered as a possibility.

In addition, EPA representatives were either being disingenuous (to use a charitable word) or had no understanding of the history of WIPP or of at least some of the risks to containing the waste. One representative tried to reassure a commenter not to worry because WIPP had been so thoroughly studied scientifically that they really knew everything about it. However, as I pointed out, much of this study was bogus as serious risks were simply eliminated from the assessment. In addition, EPA simply repeated running DOE's formulas with DOE's data and guess what? They came up with the same answers DOE did. This is not scientific inquiry or oversight.

The same representative stated mistakenly that the "worst case scenario was having another lid pop off." In fact, the lid did not "pop off." There was an explosion in the drum with a massive heat flash. And the worst case scenario is not even such an explosion, but having such an explosion or something else set off a massive waste fire underground. This is most likely to occur soon after closure when there is still oxygen in the mine. But if the mine is not properly closed, oxygen could continue to seep into the mine after closure through the shafts or through fractures. Proper closure is still experimental and will need cutting edge technology to make sure that all pathways are completely sealed (virtually impossible to do in the salt layer). EPA seems to see no problem with entities that have shown such a massive level of incompetence as led to the mine fire and drum explosion, trying to do something equivalent to landing on the moon. Such an attitude, again, almost guarantees a loss of containment before 10,000 years.

Containment Compromised by Waste That Isn't Supposed to be in WIPP
We now have many hundreds of drums of waste in WIPP that should never have been there. In addition to the extremely dangerous recent nitrate drums, LANL was putting organics into additional nitrate drums of waste back in 2012. How many of those drums are at WIPP? Also,
because DOE has slyly re-defined the WIPP waste, going against the requirements of the
Land Withdrawal Act, high-level waste has magically become transuranic waste. This doesn't really change its nature, however, and high-level waste is not supposed to be in WIPP. Again, inquiry needs to be done on how many "unacceptable" drums have actually been accepted and emplaced at WIPP. A new risk assessment including these dangerous drums needs to be done.

WIPP as a System
WIPP is not just the mine, but an entire system. Every part of that system has to work
perfectly for the waste to be contained for 10,000 years. Considering the myriad of places
where fatal mistakes can occur throughout this system, even if WIPP were a beacon of
scientific, engineering and planning excellence, it's doubtful that it could have gotten through the entire 35 years without a release - let alone 10,000 years. But the WIPP project is not a beacon of any of those things. Instead it is run on the principle of "good enough for government work." And frankly, such a description would be a compliment because the WIPP project, certainly in New Mexico, doesn't rise even to that level.

EPA and NMED were told about many of the potential problems that have occurred 15 or
more years ago. I personally testified at the RCRA hearings that DOE's risk assessments did not take human error seriously enough. Clearly, no one listened, as instead they got rid of the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) - our only independent safety oversite group - because EPA, DOE and NMED felt they weren't needed anymore. Clearly that was a huge mistake. When the explosion and release occurred DOE kept saying how surprised they were because such an accident wasn't supposed to happen. However in their own EISs they themselves stated that the lid coming off a drum was one of, if not the most likely type of accident to occur.

And the EEG in their report EEG 48: An Assessment of the Flammability and Explosion
Potential of Transuranic Waste discussed nitrate contaminated TRU waste in detail,
describing the dangers and giving multiple examples that had already occurred in the
inventory before WIPP even opened. Indeed, the biggest nuclear release before Chernobyl was caused by nitrate-contaminated radioactive waste when the nitrates exploded and burned, causing a massive radioactive release in the Urals. Of course, these are the same people at WIPP who "lost" a well in their records (which were also supposed to last for what, hundreds or thousands of years?) within years of starting their documentation - a well that they could see every day as they drove to the site. Frankly, if the EEG had been continued, the situation would not have degenerated to where it is today. Unfortunately, at this point even if the EEG were reinstated, the problems in the WIPP project are too huge to be fixed.

And where are we today? In a total mess. First there was the fire which revealed total
incompetence in how the mine was run. Safety was clearly the last concern. The mine had not been properly inspected for years - The Mine Safety and Health Administration failed to conduct the legally required 4x year regular safety inspections. In fact the mine was hardly inspected at all. If it had been, perhaps they would have caught the inoperable phones, emergency lights and obscured evacuation reflectors; Perhaps they would have seen that the automatic fire detection and suppression system was disabled, the chaining open of ventilation doors, the combustible buildup, the discontinued use of the vehicle wash station, the inoperable ventilation fans, the out of service regulator/damper. Perhaps they would have found out that there was almost no safety training or drills including no donning of selfrescuers or hands-on training with portable fire extinguishers. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

When the fire occurred ventilation was manual and shifted around causing some ventilation to be shut off, filling some areas with smoke and damaging workers in the underground. People had to go into various areas of the mine to get people out because the PA system and alarms didn't work. Workers weren't trained to use fire suppression equipment properly and some of it didn't even work. Maintenance wasn't performed on a regular basis and this led directly to the fire. Carlsbad officials and even WIPP advocates in Carlsbad had been asking for more money for maintenance and repairs for years prior to the accident. DOE's reaction: Cut funding even more. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

And what about the situation in the mine when the radioactive release occurred? After the fire, from February 6 through February 10th the ventilation was unfiltered and all the radiation monitors were shut off. When the release did occur, only one CAM was actually working; all the others had been broken for months or longer. Fortunately that one CAM was turned on before the release but how could anyone think it was okay to run this facility with only 1 radiation detection device? The ventilation system had to be switched to the HEPA filters manually because the automatic switch had been turned off years ago. And then guess what? They had forgotten for 15 years to plug the holes in the HEPA filter housing so radiation just went right out into the environment. How stupid is that? Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years? 

Then WIPP delayed for days to inform NMED about the accident. NMED compounded the problem by not getting someone down to the site to monitor the release for additional days. After the release, DOE obstructed NMED's investigation by refusing to cooperate and share information. Not a good situation.

And what about LANL where the drum originated? LANL was under a deadline to get the WIPP waste off the mesa because of the danger of fire. The Cerro Grande fire came within 300 yards of TA 54 where the WIPP waste was stored. But again, how stupid is it to keep 40,000 drums of flammable mixed TRU-waste in fabric tents outside on the mesa in the first place in a known wild fire zone? Only in New Mexico would this be considered acceptable RCRA storage. Instead of rushing to get it off the mesa, they should have built a bunker for the waste as we asked for years ago. The deadline pressure led the Lab to ignore safety almost completely - pushing employees to ignore obvious safety problems in the push to meet their June deadline. Even after the explosion and before they had any clue as to why it had occurred, LANL insisted on continuing to ship this unstable waste to WCS so we now have an even bigger mess with unstable drums at WIPP, WCS and LANL. Shipping after an accident like this when you don't know what happened shows a total disregard for science and safety. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000
years?

LANL itself is a portrait of incompetence and has been for years. These are the same people whose security folks shot their own people some years ago during a training exercise because they forgot to put blanks in their guns. The same people who have had 11 electrical incidents since 2003 and more before - some resulting in serious injury and death; the same people who have been cited for radiation and beryllium exposures in 2009 and 2012 including an incident when the Neutron Science Center and 9 homes were contamination in 2012.
They did not follow their own safety procedures when dealing with drums that were especially acidic and full of nitrates - it would have slowed things down, after all to have a safety review.

So they treated corrosive waste outside of their environmental permit by adding neutralizers and absorbents. This led to obvious problems, but again, it would have slowed things down to listen to workers complaining that organics were incompatible with nitrates or that smoke and foam were coming out of the drums. Then, I believe, they compounded the problem by lying on the documentation for the drum because it was obvious that the drum did not meet shipping or acceptance criteria at WIPP. It's hard to believe the drum labeling was only incompetence though there is precedent for that as at the RCRA hearing itself, DOE's most perfect drum was shown to be obviously mis-characterized by Don Hancock. They couldn't even get it right in their best first example. EPA and NMED should have seen right then what the future would bring. My suspicions are compounded by DOE's refusal to allow NMED to inspect the inside of the waste treatment facility for two years preceding the release during their annual permitting audits. However, some responsibility must go to NMED for not making themselves able to do that inspection and insisting on it. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

And in fact, the problem is not limited solely to LANL and WIPP. In fact the whole system is flawed and those who should be monitoring it including EPA and NMED have also dropped the ball. DOE should never have been allowed to reduce and then virtually eliminate characterization to verify AK. It has been known from the very beginning and was testified to at the RCRA hearing that there was virtually no AK on the hazardous component of the waste for the RH waste and not much better AK for the CH-waste, including the nitrate drums. We were told 15 years ago that data on non-VOC hazardous waste was usually not available or data was only available for listed waste. Yet just a year before the release, testing was made "voluntary" which means the generator sites stopped characterizing the waste completely.

Again, if they hadn't gotten rid of the EEG, many of these problems would have been reduced or eliminated. DOE headquarters refused to fund WIPP adequately to do proper maintenance and repair in the mine and when WIPP officials were getting incomplete manifests from generator sites and complained to DOE, they were told to "...just keep taking the waste and shut up." 

Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years? And I'm not the only one that thinks there's a problem with the LANL, WIPP and the system. In 2012 there was an organic mixture concern at LANL with some nitrate waste and organics were eliminated. However, the WIPP accident report said lessons were clearly not learned from this. In fact over and over again, year after year after year, reports delineate the same problems at the facilities. The accident report blasted WIPP and LANL just as the fire accident report blasted WIPP. House panels, federal safety reports and other studies continue to criticize the labs and WIPP. The answer seems to be various versions of "We made some mistakes in the past but now we know what we're doing." Yet the mistakes continue over and over again. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

A recent GAO report says the NNSA oversight of contractors at LANL and WIPP is lacking. In fact, DOE allows most of the contractors to self-report any problems instead of checking up on them. The same problems occurred in 1990, 2000, 2013 and 2014. In 2015 they said there was little or no progress toward improvement. LANL has had serious problems not only with the accidents listed above which occur over and over again but also with losing classified information. A recent federal study said that WIPP and LANL were unprepared to respond to emergencies, which should be obvious by now. Does this sound like an agency that can make sure WIPP will contain the waste for 10,000 years?

And what is the situation now? We are left with unstable drums at WIPP, WCS and LANL and believe me I don't feel safe with these things sitting in standard waste boxes that can be breached with the pressure in your truck tire, inside essentially plastic bags in fabric tents on the mesa. LANL and WIPP seem completely unrepentant and want to get back to "normal" as quickly as possible. They have plans to increase pit production at LANL, creating more WIPP waste and want to open WIPP by the end of the year. Their so-called decontamination of WIPP is ridiculous - especially when they say the porous salt floor will contain the water spray runoff. The definition of porous is "Having minute spaces or holes through which liquid may pass." So containment is not in the salt floor but possible in some undefined layer below. And if this de-contamination works so well, why did they say that increased radiation readings were caused by radioactive dust kicked up during work on the panel closures?

And what about the panel closures? These are not seals and it's questionable if they actually will contain another explosion. Again, they have been weakened by changes WIPP wanted to save money. DOE seems to think that moving a few personnel around and having a few training programs and re-writing safety procedures will change things in a year that have been going on for decades and are totally embedded in the system. This is not happening. And not only are there additional plans for LANL but there are all kinds of new plans for WIPP, as if it is perfectly okay. Some of these plans are:
1. Expanding to receive more TRU waste
2. Bringing Hanford high level waste to WIPP
3. Bringing greater than class C waste to WIPP
4. Bringing West Valley commercial waste to WIPP
5. Bringing surplus plutonium to WIPP
6. Brining mercury surface storage to WIPP
7. Bringing TRU-waste surface storage to WIPP
8. Doing heater tests for possible high level waste disposal at WIPP

WIPP is not ready for any of this and frankly, I don't think it ever will be. What a waste of time and money to continue trying to make this failed project work. Much of what I have described above, including these new projects are not included in DOE's application to EPA. For that
reason alone the application should be rejected. However, let's just stop this for good now. It will be many many years before DOE, LANL and WIPP could solve the problems and retrain their personnel in a completely different way of thinking - a safety way of thinking. Based on their record and history, there is nothing to show that they have actually made significant changes in their approach so far. In fact, it isn't logical to think that they could in such a short period of time. The problems are too serious and too entrenched. They have made some mistakes in the past - many of them - but they clearly do not know what they are doing now. If they did, they would not be pushing for all these new projects for WIPP. Instead, they would be concentrating completely on finding a way to deal safely with the nitrate drums that they have spread around the State, which are a constant danger to us all, and on true safety measures at the mine.

I know there are many political pressures on the EPA to go along with the program. It's likely your own jobs are on the line if you don't agree to continue WIPP. But how bad does it have to get before you stop it? Are you going to be responsible for another Chernobyl or Fukushima? What if these nitrate drums at WIPP or LANL explode again and set off another even bigger explosion? Accident investigators said they could not rule out another explosion. Really, considering the incompetence and deception, the pressures to hurry up to get that deadline met and get that bonus, the WIPP project is practically written as a plan to create a disaster.

Currently, WIPP has a shaft that needs to be re-constructed. Instead of recertifying WIPP,
let's take this as an opportunity to see if that shaft can actually be closed and sealed - to
practice their experimental closure technology. That would give EPA some idea if closure is actually possible. Meanwhile, EPA could be re-studying and re-assessing risk assessments and other scientific studies. I believe it's possible that EPA does not have the money or trained personnel (as evidenced by some of the statements of the EPA representatives at the meeting) right now to properly assess recertification. There is nothing wrong with going to Congress and telling them that you don't have enough resources to properly evaluate recertification. If that is the case, however, you cannot just rubber stamp WIPP because you don't have enough resources to look into all the problems properly. And if you did go to Congress saying you can't recertify because of this, believe me, money would be coming your way very quickly.

I expect a lot from my government officials when they are regulating such dangerous and
important projects, but with WIPP I have been consistently disappointed. Money and politics are all that are considered. Safety is almost a dirty word, to be ignored and swept under the rug. However, you are in a position now to do what's right and to point out that the emperor has no clothes. I want you to refuse simply to re-certify WIPP without being assured through extensive investigation that it really can contain the waste. At this point I believe any true scientific study of the project will show that WIPP cannot yet prove containment for 10,000 years. I want you to protect us and do what's right - despite the admittedly enormous political pressures on you to just go along with the plan. And I want you to demand the resources you need to do your job properly. Unfortunately, I expect that you will not do the right thing and will simply rubber stamp the recertification. Please prove me wrong.

Response to 7/9/15 D. Reade Comment:
EPA appreciates the points made here. Our recertification of the repository is based on a thorough evaluation of a highly technical, peer reviewed, probabilistic risk assessment that incorporates the latest peer reviewed models, experiments, and monitoring data on the WIPP. The model addresses multiple features, events, and processes that account for possibilities of a release, including the probability of a pressurized brine encounter. Please refer to EPA's various support documents for further information on our evaluation process, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609. 

Additionally, EPA believes it has provided multiple ample opportunities for public engagement on the WIPP, through public comment periods and webinars. The comment period for the recertification application closed on April 10, 2017, approximately two years and six months after it initially opened. This closing date was 30 days after the EPA's announcement in the Federal Register that the recertification application was complete.

Resumption of waste emplacement after the 2014 incidents at the WIPP is unrelated to the EPA's recertification decision, which is primarily concerned with compliance with the EPA's long-term disposal requirements. However, the DOE has acknowledged that recovery from the radiological release will result in design changes to the repository, which will need to be considered from that longer-term perspective. The EPA recognizes that the current recertification decision is based on a repository design that is likely to change, but the current application contains the information necessary to reach a decision without knowing the details of the future changes.
























Issue 6: 	Several points on considering releases from WIPP, including an intrusion into a pressurized brine pocket

J. Radford (8/3/15):








EPA Response to 8/3/15 J. Radford Comment:
The EPA certified WIPP in 1998 based on thorough of site characteristics and potential processes and events that could be expected to occur at the WIPP site. In the undisturbed condition, the salt will encapsulate the waste and there is no realistic method for contaminants to escape the repository. The only possible mechanism identified for any radioactive material to be released at WIPP is via human intrusion into the repository. DOE has considered the potential for humans to inadvertently drill into the repository as required by EPA's radioactive waste disposal regulations. EPA has had comments on DOE's approach to calculating releases from human intrusion, but those comments have been generally resolved such that EPA has a reasonable expectation that WIPP will comply with the radioactive waste disposal regulations over the 10,000-year regulatory period.

The EPA agrees that there is an increased probability of a pressurized brine encounter due to drilling. Because of this, EPA has provided DOE with an approach to determine this parameter in future performance assessments. The updated approach uses the geophysical data, but also incorporates newer drilling information into the probability distribution. The EPA believes this approach is sound and is acceptable for use in future performance assessments. For further information on our determination of potential intrusions into the repository, please refer to the discussion above responding to the comment by L. Chaturvedi and the technical support document Probability of Encountering Castile Brine Beneath the WIPP Waste Panels Using the TDEM Block Method as well as the various supporting documents, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609.


Issue 7	: 	General supporting comments

K. Gettz (10/15/15):
This comment addresses the proposed re-opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).  The position of this comment is in support of the re-opening, due to the fact that WIPP has continued to meet EPA disposal standards even after the 2014 radiation release, transuranic (TRU) waste is still being generated and requires specific disposal to avoid adverse health and environmental effects, and the Department of Energy has a rigorous Recovery Plan outlined, as well as received suggestions by EPA to further preventative measures.

D. Leri (10/15/15):
Due to the radiation release at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant on February 14, 2014 in Carlsbad, New Mexico, the Environmental Protection Agency is evaluating whether or not the plant should reopen. Operation and filtration systems in the plant seem to be operating efficiently. Proper quality assurance methods are in place. The radiation release in 2014 did not cause any harmful consequences to the health of the environment or personnel. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant plays large role in the economic growth and success of the challenging desert setting of Carlsbad. After careful research and consideration of these filtration systems, health effects, and economic benefit, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is a positive attribute to Carlsbad, New Mexico and should reopen.

Response to 10/15/15 K. Gettz  and D. Leri Comments
EPA thanks the commenter for their statement and will continue to provide oversight to the WIPP to ensure its continual safe operation.

J. Heaton (1/18/17):
On behalf of the citizens of Carlsbad and the members of our nuclear task force, thank you for this update on the EPA's review of WIPP's 2014 Compliance Recertification Application. We understand this update is related to the pending completeness determination, which will then provide the Agency with six months to make its official recertification decision.

While we appreciate the EPA's public outreach during this period, we do have concerns about the organization's apparent unwillingness to keep the focus of these meetings on the CRA.

During our January web meeting, several individuals from northern New Mexico ignored
disclaimers insisting that the conversation remain on the CRA and used the time for lengthy diatribes on unrelated issues. This was disrespectful to your organization and to other stakeholders who wanted to utilize this time discussing the CRA.

It would be helpful to explain to the folks in northern NM what the certification represents, and that your focus is on the long-term performance of the repository. They seem to think EPA is responsible for day to day operations, and the fact that a 6 month or year delay in your certification has some impact on the 10,000 year performance. We know you want to be respectful of anyone's questions and want to try to answer them, but we would encourage you to not engage individuals attempting to derail the intended discussion.

This has, undoubtedly, been a historically lengthy process, in part due to a redirection of focus following the 2014's incidents at WIPP. We participated in informal meetings with the EPA, as well as an opportunity for official public comment, back in 2014. While we certainly understand the need to be thorough, we feel this particular effort has been examined in detail and recertification should happen soon. We also recognize that the next application is due in March of 2019, just over two years from now.

Acting on behalf of the Carlsbad Mayor's Nuclear Task Force, I submitted comments in 2014 and believe a reiteration of several key points is important.
 There are no conceivable long term impacts caused by the 2014 breach. WIPP's ability to do its job during the 10,000 years after closure has not been challenged.
 Based on the nature of long-term modeling, it is difficult to conceive of any new
      conditions which could impact certification.
 The conceptual models on which WIPP performance assessment is based are extremely conservative. WIPP PA intentionally over-estimates all potential cause for alarm, and there is still significant margin between predicted releases and the EPA-imposed release limits.
 The CRA, as it has in past re-certifications, captures the technical issues, features, events and processes that could possibly affect long-term performance. We appreciate allowing the residents of Carlsbad and Southeastern New Mexico the opportunity to participate in this discussion. We hope an announcement of recertification will be made soon.
      
We appreciate allowing the residents of Carlsbad and Southeastern New Mexico the
opportunity to participate in this discussion. We hope an announcement of recertification will be made soon.

EPA Response to generally supportive comments:
We thank the commenters for their support in our efforts in the recertification process. Based on our evaluation of the 2014-CRA, we have determined that there is a reasonable expectation that the WIPP will comply with the EPA's radioactive waste disposal regulations for the 10,000 regulatory period. For the Agency's full evaluation of the application, please refer to the Federal Register and supplemental technical support documents, Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0609.



Issue 8	:	Comments on multiple recertification issues

D. Hancock (1/18/17):
Dear People, 

Following are additional comments from Southwest Research and Information Center (SRIC) regarding completeness and accuracy of the Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2014) submitted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that was received by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on March 26, 2014. SRIC submitted written comments on October 24, 2014; and oral comments on June 17, 2015 at the Albuquerque meeting and the January 12, 2017 webinar. SRIC expects EPA to fully consider, and respond to, those comments as well as those that follow. 

Once again, SRIC emphasizes that EPA regulations require: "Information provided to the Administrator in support of any compliance application shall be complete and accurate." 40 CFR 191.11. Both DOE and EPA must assure compliance with that requirement. 

1. The CRA-2014 was incomplete when it was submitted. 
SRIC believes that because of the incidents in the WIPP underground  -  truck fire and radiation release  -  in February 2014, the appropriate action would have been for either DOE to withdraw the CRA-2014 or for EPA to have required the submission of a new CRA that included an analysis of the errors in the CRA-2009 that were incorporated into the November 18, 2010 recertification decision (75 Federal Register 41421-41424). Neither DOE nor EPA took those actions. 

EPA response: We agree that the CRA-2014 was incomplete when it was submitted and made comments to DOE to address the items where the Agency needed additional information. The Agency received enough information to declare the application complete on January 13, 2017. 

The EPA also monitors air emissions from the repository to assure releases are below the regulatory limit of 10 mrem/year, per 40 CFR 61.92 and whether they exceed the 0.1 mrem/year periodic confirmatory trigger value as specified in 40 CFR 61.93 (b) (4) (i).  The EPA did evaluate the releases, per NESHAP requirements, from the repository during the February 14, 2014 incident. No violation was detected, which indicated the DOE remained within the Agency's air emissions requirements.

The EPA's purview is to assure the repository meets the regulatory requirements post-closure with a performance assessment. For the 2014-CRA PA, the DOE had a data cut-off date of March December 31, 2012. Based on this cut-off date, the EPA requested information related to any drums from LANL that may be a mixture of the nitrate products and organic kitty litter that could have been placed in the repository prior December 31, 2012. The DOE provided that information and the Agency has determined there is insignificant quantities of the nitrate waste/ organic material mixture emplace in the repository that would trigger a violation of our certification requirements. The EPA's evaluation of the WIPP waste and chemical conditions are provided in the following document; Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24 Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term, Gas Generation, Backfill Efficacy, Water Balance, and Culebra Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609). 
      
2. A completeness determination and recertification decision must be specifically limited in time. 
EPA clearly indicated at the January 12, 2017 webinar that it will soon issue a completeness determination. DOE's representative specifically reaffirmed during the webinar that the data cutoff for the CRA-2014 is December 31, 2012. Both EPA and DOE stated during the webinar that the data cutoff for the next application (CRA-2019) is December 31, 2017. Thus, the completeness determination and recertification decision must clearly acknowledge those dates so that it is clear to the public what the time parameters of the current RCA are and what the data cutoff for the CRA-2019 is. 

EPA response: In order to plan, organize, run calculation, and generate final reports, the DOE has a self-imposed data cut-off date of approximately14 months prior to the five-year cycle for their CRA submittals to the EPA. This is self-imposed by the DOE and not a regulatory component. 

3. There were inaccuracies in the CRA-2009 that DOE has not identified and analyzed in the CRA-2014. 
The CRA-2009 did not state, among many other things, that the site would not receive and emplace waste for most of 2014, all of 2015, and all of 2016. The CRA-2009 stated that wastes that did not comply with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) would not be emplaced at WIPP, but has subsequently admitted to NMED (though not in the CRA-2014) that hundreds of containers that did not comply with the WIPP WAC were emplaced at WIPP. The CRA-2009 stated that WIPP met the Quality Assurance (QA) compliance criteria, but has subsequently admitted in the Accident Investigation Board reports (though not in the CRA-2014) that among the reasons for the radiation release was inadequate QA. Those and other inaccuracies must be included in the CRA-2019 which will include data from that time period that is not included in the CRA-2014.
 
EPA response: The EPA's purview is to assure the repository meets the regulatory requirements during the 10,000 year post-closure period as provided using a suite of performance assessment (PA) calculations. Each PA is a projection of the waste emplaced in the repository, updated in each 5-year recertification cycle, based on the current emplaced waste and the projected waste from the various waste streams and the expected future condition of the repository. However, the DOE, as the operator of the facility, may make changes for future facility operations. No one could foresee the February 2014 incidents and the subsequent halt in operations. The Department will need to address the change in the facility operation in future recertification applications. The Agency will evaluate the adequacy of the projected final inventory and other changes at the appropriate time as part of a planned change request or a recertification. 

4. There are inaccuracies in the 2010 recertification decision that must be acknowledged in the 2017 recertification decision. 
EPA repeatedly states that in each RCA DOE need submit only new information and that the certification decision and subsequent recertifications are not revisited. Technical inaccuracies include that WIPP did not receive and emplace waste for most of 2014, all of 2015, and all of 2016 and that hundreds of containers that did not comply with the WIPP WAC were emplaced. That is the reality, despite the fact that the 2010 recertification decision states: "Recertification will ensure that WIPP is operated using the most accurate and up-to-date information available and provides documentation requiring DOE to operate to these standards." 75 FR 70588. The 2010 decision further states: "All wastes must meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and all requirements of EPA's waste characterization program, and EPA must officially notify DOE before the Department is allowed to ship waste to WIPP." 75 FR 70592. On the contrary, not all wastes met the WIPP WAC. EPA also had stated that the recertification: "will set the parameters for how WIPP will be operated by DOE over the following five years." 75 FR 41424. EPA must acknowledge those inaccuracies. EPA should describe how it has ensures that the 2017 recertification corrected those errors so that they are not continued in future recertifications. 

EPA response: The Agency's focus for recertification reviews is on what has changed since the last recertification; the DOE is only required to submit information that has changed since previous information is already part of the record. WIPP wastes are expected to meet the waste acceptance criteria. The recertification does set the parameters for how the WIPP will be operated, such as with the compliance recertification applications limits on the inventory expected for the following five years. The EPA reviews the adequacy of the processes the DOE uses to characterize the components important to long-term performance, but it is the Department's responsibility to appropriately implement the day to day activities. Even with the incidents of 2014 that affected the operation of the facility, the long-term performance of the system to contain waste is relatively unaffected. 

The EPA's evaluation of the DOE's waste characterization activities is discussed in CARD 8, CARD 24 and in the Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24  Review of the Baseline Inventory Used in the Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2014) (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609).  

5. EPA should fulfill its commitment to discuss with DOE and stakeholders how to improve the RCA-2019 and the review process. 
The 2010 recertification stated: "EPA believes that with continued experience, future recertifications should become less lengthy. The Agency intends to continue to work with DOE and interested stakeholders to discuss and work on improving future recertification applications and processes." 75 FR 70594. In fact, the time from submittal of the CRA-2014 to the recertification decision is much longer than either of the two previous recertifications. EPA's information flyer at the June 2015 meeting stated: "While EPA is still conducting its completeness review, and additional information from DOE is forthcoming, the Agency does expect to complete the completeness review sometime in fall/winter 2015." There was disagreement between EPA and DOE officials at the January 12 webinar as to why the expected completeness determination was delayed for more than a year. As part of the discussion and improvement process, there should be further clarification of the views of EPA and DOE about that matter. SRIC also believes that EPA should begin a policy of having DOE respond to comments, such as those submitted by SRIC on October 10, 2014, that relate to the RCA. 

EPA response: The Agency's statement made in 2010 related to future CRA reviews was an expectation on the experiences with the 2004 and 2009 Compliance Recertification Applications. With EPA's delayed review of the 2014 CRA (due to responding to the 2014 radiological incident at WIPP and the number of technical changes made by the DOE during this recertification process), it took longer than in the past to conduct thorough review. An overview of issues can be found in the EPA's Technical Support Document (TSD) Overview of Change Between PABC-2009 and CRA-2004 WIPP Performance Assessment (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609) and other technical support documents in the docket. The Agency will consider suggestions from the public on how to improve the recertification process.

6. The CRA-2014 continues to incorrectly calculate the volume of RH waste emplaced at WIPP and in the Inventory. This issue is discussed in detail in the October 24, 2014 SRIC comments.

EPA response: The Agency agrees that the DOE needs to realistically how it will address the issue of RH waste emplacement at the WIPP. Given the reduction in space for emplacing the RH waste, the DOE will need to determine what RH volume of waste can be put into WIPP in the future. The Agency approved the DOE's use of shielded containers as an alternative to emplacing waste in the walls. In calculating the volume of RH waste in the containers, the approach that DOE takes needs to be clear and technically sound.

The EPA's evaluation of the DOE-projected and current waste emplaced in WIPP is characterization is discussed in EPA's two TSDs; Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24 Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term, Gas Generation, Backfill Efficacy, Water Balance, and Culebra Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values and Technical Support Document in Support of Section 194.24  Review of the Baseline Inventory Used in the Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2014)  (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ- OAR-2014-0609). We anticipate this issue to be raised in the 2019-CRA PA.
 
7. The completeness determination and recertification decision cannot be used to allow a substantial increase in the WIPP inventory.
The CRA-2014, including the Performance Assessment is based on the 2012 Inventory (DOE/TRU-12-3425), which has a total inventory of activity decayed through 2003 of 2,980,000 curies (Table 3-13). The current WIPP Inventory  -  2016 (DOE/TRU-16-3425) has a total inventory of activity decayed through 2033 of 5,190,000 curies (Table 3-11). That's an increase of more than 70 percent. DOE has not provided a PA based on such increased activity caused primarily by the addition of 6 metric tons of plutonium from the Savannah River Site (SRS). Thus, EPA cannot approve that new waste stream through the recertification process. That fact should be explicitly stated in the recertification decision. 

EPA response: Each PA is a projection of the waste emplaced in the repository, updated in each 5-year recertification cycle, based on the current emplaced waste and the projected waste from the various waste streams. In the DOE's 2019-CRA the Agency expects the DOE to update the waste inventory incorporated into the 2019-PA based on the current emplaced waste and the projected waste; the Savannah River Site waste will need to be incorporated in that PA. 

8. The recertification decision must detail why WIPP's re-opening was not contingent upon a recertification decision. 
At the June 2015 public meetings, dozens of people stated that EPA should not recertify WIPP because of the radiation release. DOE's Recovery Plan states that recertification was required for re-opening (page 16). When asked repeatedly at the June 2015 public meetings as to whether recertification must be decided before re-opening, EPA officials stated that had not been determined. However, WIPP is now re-opened, so clearly some EPA official(s) made that determination. When asked who made the EPA decision, on what basis, and where the decision was posted on the EPA website at the January 12, 2017 webinar, EPA officials said it was made internally in consultation with EPA attorneys. That is not a satisfactory answer to the question, so the recertification must provide that requested detail and documentation. 

Thank you for your consideration of, and response to, these comments.

EPA response: After implementing numerous corrective actions, the DOE resumed limited waste emplacement on January 4, 2017, and shortly thereafter also resumed limited shipments from waste generator sites. Page 16 of the DOE's Recovery Plan inaccurately stated that recertification was required for re-opening. As stated in the Federal Register notice for this recertification decision, "Resumption of waste emplacement at the WIPP is unrelated to the EPA's recertification decision, which is primarily concerned with compliance with the EPA's long-term disposal requirements." At the time of the first public meetings, the Agency had not had time to fully review and comprehend the February 2014 incidents and what affect they may or may not have had. With time the Agency was able to conclude that the incident was primarily an operational phase issue. The New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) is the primary regulator for operations at the WIPP via the hazardous waste permit, and as such, they had the primary responsibility for determining when operations could restart. The EPA did conduct an inspection of the WIPP facility in November 2016 (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0012-469), prior to the resumption of waste emplacement in January 2017. Any non-compliance issues related to the operational phase are addressed by the state and it is the state that has the authority to close the WIPP based on any operational violations. Any mine safety issues are addressed by the Mine Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor. However, the DOE has acknowledged that recovery from the radiological release will result in design changes to the repository, which will need to be considered from a long-term perspective. 





