Attachment
F:
Conceptual
Proposal
For
Re­
Allocation
of
the
Tribal
Set­
Aside
The
hex
provides
that,
upon
the
implementation
of
the
trading
program,
20,000
tons
per
year
will
be
 
established
as
a
general
tribal
allocation, 
to
be
distributed
as
determined
by
the
tribes
in
the
region.
In
order
to
insure
that
all
tribes
in
the
region
have
a
fair
and
meaningful
opportunity
to
take
part
in
this
determination,
it
must
be
done
in
the
context
of
government­
togovernment
consultationbetween
EPA
and
the
tribes,
during
the
rule
making
process
to
amend
Regional
HaLe
Rule
5
309.
This
Attachment
describes
the
parameters
governing
the
tribal
reallocation
(
distribution),
and
presents
a
preliminary
conceptual
proposal,
in
order
to
facilitate
tribal
comment.

This
Is
not
a
consensus
document.
In
general
terms,
the
members
and
participants
in
the
WRAP
have
agreed
that
the
re­
allocation
of
the
tribal
set­
aside
is
a
matter
internal
to
the
tribes.
However,
to
the
extent
the
methodology
affects
other
aspects
of
the
program,
other
members
and
participants
reserve
their
right
to
comment.

I.
Parameters
and
Principles
Governing
Re­
Allocation
Methodology
A.
Provision
for
Late
(
Post
2003)
Opt­
in
by
Tribes
The
re­
allocation
scheme
should
provide
for
the
possibility
that
some
tribes
will
opt
to
participate
in
the
program
after
the
2003
deadline
applicable
to
states
for
their
SIPS.

1.
Policy
Rationale
Several
factors
point
to
the
need
to
allow
tribes
to
make
the
decision
to
participate
in
the
program
after
the
2003
deadline
applicable
to
states.
The
more
than
200
tribes
in
the
GCVTC
region
will
 ace
a
formidable
task
in
deciding
whether
to
 
opt
in 
to
6
309
over
the
next
three
years.
The
 
backstop 
emission
trading
program
described
in
the
Annex
is
in
many
ways
an
innovative
and
even
experimental
program.
The
program
marks
the
first
time
tribes
will
be
integrated
into
a
multi­
state
regional
trading
scheme,
raising
new
issues
regarding
tribal
sovereignty,
federalism,
and
relationships
to
states.
Additionally,
a
fhdamental
difference
between
it
and
existing
emission
trading
programs
is
the
concept
that
voluntary
measures
will
initially
be
relied
on
to
meet
emissions
goals,
with
the
actual
trading
program
serving
as
a
contingency
measure.
By
design,
it
is
structured
to
minimize
,
thelikelihood
of
 
triggering 
the
trading
program
until
well
after
2003.
Because
most
tribes
will
likely
not
be
affected
until
the
actual
trading
program
is
triggered,
the
relevance
of
the
program
to
a
particular
tribe
may
be
hard
to
gauge
in
2003.

F­
I
To
these
complicating
regulatory
factors
are
added
the
inherent
uncertainty
of
future
trends
in
technology,
energy
use,
and
economic
development,
both
within
the
region
as
a
whole
and
on
particular
tribal
lands.
In
this
regard,
tribes
face
a
different
situation
than
states.
States
comprise
larger
geographic
areas,
which
lessens
the
need
for
accuracy
in
predicting
exactly
where
economic
development
may
occm
­
simpliflmg
assumptions,
averaging,
and
other
 
smoothing 
functions
can
be
used.
Moreover,
tribes
will
more
often
than
states
have
a
proprietary
interest
in
development
projects
within
their
jurisdiction,
and
thus
have
more
at
stake
in
insuring
that
the
regulatory
strategy
they
employ
is
complementaryto
their
development
strategy.

Finally,
tribes
are
faced
with
these
decisions
at
a
time
when
most
tribes
are
in
the
early
stages
of
establishing
air
programs
through
such
activities
as
creating
emissions
inventories,
implementing
ambient
monitoring
programs,
and
adopting
basic
air
quality
codes.
Tribal
government
resources
are
generally
not
available
for
dedication
to
the
type
of
economidair
quality
policy
analysis
required
to
assess
prospectively
the
ultimate
implications
of
the
decision
whether
to
opt
into
5
309.

Allowing
tribes
to
opt
into
the
program
after
2003
will
not
compromise
the
environmental
goals.
of
the
program.
In
fact,
it
would
be
environmentallybeneficial
to
encourage
the
inclusion
of
new
tribal
sources
in
the
program,
in
order
to
insure
the
integrity
of
the
regional
cap.
If
tribes
lose
the
option
of
opting
into
the
program
after
2003,
new
sources
on
tribal
lands
would
be
regulated
under
$
308
of
the
haze
rule.
This
means
they
would
be
subject
to
control
requirements,
but
their
emissions
would
not
be
mitigated
by
corresponding
reductions
elsewhere,
as
would
occur
under
the
trading
program.
(
A
different
analysis
may
apply
to
tribes
with
existing
sources.
As
noted
below,
EPA
has
the
authority
to
utilize
federal
implementation
where
necessary
to
ensure
reasonable
progress
with
respect
to
such
sources).

2.
Legal
Rationale
For
the
reasons
explained
below,
allowing
tribes
to
opt­
in
to
the
trading
program
after
2003
is
consistent
with
the
framework
provided
by
the
Clean
Air
Act
and
implementing
regulations.

a.
Tribes
are
expressly
exempt
from
visibility
implementation
deadlines
under
the
Tribal
Authority
Rule.

The
Tribal
Authority
Rule
(
TAR),
40
CFR
$
49.1
­
49.11,
delineates
the
CAA
sections
for
which
it
is
appropriate
to
treat
tribes
in
the
same
manner
as
states.
Under
the
general
approach
of
the
TAR,
tribes
which
meet
certain
eligibility
criteria
may
apply
for
and
receive
treatment
in
the
same
manner
states
for
all
CAA
provisions
except
those
specifically
identified
as
inappropriate.
Among
provisions
identified
as
inappropriate
for
tribes
are
 [
s]
pecific
visibility
implementation
plan
submittal
deadlines
established
under
169A
of
the
Act. 
40
CFR
0
49.4(
e).
,
..

F­
2
This
exemption
applies
to
the
deadlines
contained
in
the
RHR
sections
308
and
309.
Although
the
Regional
Haze
Rule
originated
from
a
process
prescribed
in
CAA
0
169B,
4
169B
requires
that
IEPA
respond
to
reports
fiom
Visibility
Transport
Commissions
by
carrying
out
its
regulatory
duties
under
169A.
See
42
U.
S.
C.
07492(
e).
Therefore
the
deadlines
in
the
RHR
are
established
under
9
169A
of
the
Act
and
are
not
applicable
to
tribes
under
the
TAR.

EPA
recognized
this
in
the
preamble
to
the
RHR:
 
Section
49.4(
f)
of
the
TAR
provides
that
deadlines
related
to
SIP
submittals
under
section
169(
B)(
e)(
2)
do
not
apply
to
Tribes. 
64
Fed.
Reg.
35 
714,
35759.
July
1,
1999.

b.
Nothing
in
the
structure
or
language
of
the
TAR
or
RHR
suggests
that
the
RHR
0309
option
would
disappear
for
tribes
upon
the
passing
of
the
state­
applicable
deadline.

The
provisions
of
the
TAR
firmly
establish
that
the
RHR
implementation
deadlines
are
not
applicable
to
tribes.
Nevertheless,
an
argument
could
be
made
that
a
tribes 
failure
to
submit
a
TIP
by
the
:
statedeadline
of
December
31,2003
would
preclude
a
tribe
from
submitting
a
0309
TIP
at
a
later
date,
even
though
the
date
is
not
a
deadline
in
the
sense
that
failure
to
meet
it
would
invoke
sanctions.
Such
a
reading
would
be
counter
to
the
spirit
of
the
TAR
and
the
RHR.

The
MtR
itself
is
silent
on
this
question.
The
only
language
addressing
tribal
implementation
of
3
309
is
found
in
9
309(
d)(
12):

Tribal
implementation.
Consistent
with
40
CFR
Part
49,
tribes
within
the
Transport
Region
may
implement
the
required
visibility
programs
for
the
16
Class
I
areas,
inthe
same
manner
as
States,
regardless
of
whether
such
tribes
have
participated
as
members
of
a
visibility
transport
commission.

One
might
argue
that
phrase
 
in
the
same
manner
as
States 
implies
that
the
tribes
are
also
subject
to
the
same
restrictions
as
states.
However,
the
preamble
discussion
of
ths
language
makes
it
clear
that
the
purpose
of
this
language
is
to
emphasize
the
tribes
independence
from
states.
In
fact,
the
preamble
erroneously
states
that
this
provision
is
not
included
in
the
final
rule
because
it
would
be
superfluous
in
light
of
the
TAR:

The
WGA
called
for
EPA s
final
rule
topermit
tribes
within
the
GCVTC
Transport
Region
to
implement
visibilityprograms,
or
reasonably
severable
elements,
in
the
same
manner
as
States,
regardless
of
whether
such
tribes
have
participated
as
members
of
a
visibility
transport
GCVTC
[
sic].
The
EPA
has
not
included
the
WGA s
recommended
rule
provision
in
today s
action
because
the
necessary
authority
for
tribal
organizationshas
already
been
provided
in
a
previ.
ous
EPA
rulemaking
.
FN133
The
EPA
does,
however,
agree
with
the
position
expressed
in
the
WGA
recommendation.
The
EPA
wishes
to
clarify
that
F­
3
tribes
may
directly
implement
the
requirements
of
this
section
of
the
regional
haze
rule
in
the
same
manner
as
States.
The
Tribal
Authority
Rule
provides
for
this,
as
discussed
further
in
unit
V
of
today s
notice.
The
independence
of
tribes
means
that
a
tribal
visibility
program
is
not
dependent
on
strategies
selected
by
the
State
or
States
in
whch
the
tribe
is
located.

64
Fed.
Reg.
At
35756
(
emphasis
added).
Section
309(
d)(
12)
was
in
fact
included
in
the
final
rule,
notwithstanding
the
explanation
in
the
preimble
of
why
it
was
not.
In
any
case,
it
is
clear
that
EPA
interpreted
the
language
of
3
309(
d)(
12)
to
be
merely
redundant
to
the
provisions
of
the
TAR,
and
not
in
any
way
limiting
the
options
available
to
tribes
under
the
TAR.

Moreover,
elsewhere
in
the
preamble,
the
non­
applicability
of
visibility
implementation
plan
deadlines
to
tribes
is
discussed
at
some
length,
concluding
with
the
following
paragraph:

In
order
to
encourage
tribes
to
develop
self­
sufficient
programs,
the
TAR
provides
tribes
with
the
flexibilityof
submitting
programs
as
they
are
developed,
rather
than
in
accordance
with
statutory
deadlines.
27zis
means
that
tribes
that
choose
to
develop
programs,
where
necessavy
may
take
additional
time
to
submit
implementationplansfor
regional
haze
over
and
above
the
deadlines
in
the
TEA21
legislation
as
codfled
in
today
 
S
rule.
.
.
.
We
encourage
tribes
choosing
to
develop
implementation
plans
to
make
every
effort
to
submit
by
the
deadlines
to
ensure
that
the
plans
are
integrated
with
and
coordinated
with
regional
planning
efforts.
In
the
interim,
EPA
will
work
with
the
States
and
tribes
to
ensure
that
achlevement
of
reasonable
progress
is
not
delayed.

64
Fed.
Re?.
35714,35759,
Julv
1.
1999.
(
Emphasis
added).
Significantly,
the
discussion
makes
no
distinctionbetween
development
of
tribal
implementation
plans
under
RHR
55
308
and
309.
Also
significantly,
nowhere
in
the
quoted
passage
or
the
entire
discussion
of
tribal
implementation
of
the
RHR
is
any
mention
made
of
consequences
to
tribes
of
failing
to
submit
TIPs
by
the
state
deadlines.
The
integration
and
coordination
of
state
and
tribal
planning
efforts
is
cited
as
a
positive
incentive
for
early
development
of
visibility
TIPs,
but
nowhere
is
the
possibility
of
any
negative
consequences
discussed.
If
EPA
had
intended
the
state
309
deadline
to
serve
as
a
cut
off
point
for
tribal
implementation
of
8
309,
it
is
reasonable
to
expect
that
it
would
have
written
such
a
provision
into
the
rule
that
or
at
least
discussed
in
the
preamble
the
rationale
for
such
an
effect.

Taken
together,
EPA s
assurances
that
tribes
may
choose
between
5
308
and
$
309
independently
of
state
decisions,
and
that
tribes
 
where
necessary
may
take
additional
time
to
submit
implementation
plans, 
create
a
strong
implication
that
tribes
may
submit
implementation
plans
under
0
309
after
the
state
implementation
plan
deadline
for
that
section.

c.
Loss
of
the
5
309
option
upon
failure
to
meet
the
2003
deadline
would
effectively
constitute
a
sanction
to
tribes
and
thus
run
F­
4
T
I
counter
to
the
spirit
of
the
TAR.

In
explaining
the
rationale
for
not
subjecting
tribes
to
SIP
submittal
deadlines,
EPA
in
the
preamble
to
the
TAR
noted
among
other
things
that:

[
Slince
..
.
tribal
authority
for
establishing
CAA
programs
was
expressly
addressed
for
the
first
time
in
the
1990
CAA
Amendments,
in
comparison
to
states,
tribes
in
general
are
in
the
early
stages
of
developing
air
planning
and
implementation
expertise.
Accordingly,
EPA
determined
that
it
would
be
infeasible
and
inappropriate
to
subject
tribes
to
the
mandatory
submittal
deadlines
imposed
by
the
Act
on
states,
and
to
the
related
federal
oversight
mechanisms
in
the
Act
which
are
triggered
when
EPA
makes
a
finding
that
states
have
failed
to
meet
required
deadlines
or
acts
to
disapprove
a
plan
submittal.

63.
Fed.
Reg;.
at
7265.
The
federal
oversight
mechanism
referred
to
is
implementation
of
a
federal
implementation
plan
(
FIP)
pursuant
to
CAA
0
1lO(
c)(
l).
Id.(
providing
for
FIPs
within
2
years
of
state s
failure
to
submit
SIP
or
SIP
revision)
The
preamble
goes
on
to
explain
that
0
1lO(
c)(
1)
is
therefore
among
those
listed
in
the
TAR
as
inappropriate
for
application
to
tribes,
although
EP.
A
retains
its
obligation
to
promulgate
FIPs
in
Indian
country
as
necessary
and
appropriate.
Id.

Enforcement
of
a
FIP
against
a
state
is
commonly
perceived
as
a
sanction
against
the
state,
as
it
represents
an
assertion
of
federal
supremacy
over
considerations
of
state
sovereignty.
Furthermore,
CAA
110
provides
for
additional
sanctions
in
the
event
of
a
state s
failure
to
submit
a
complete
and
timely
SIP,
in
the
form
of
withheld
highway
funding
and
emission
offfset
requirements.
See
42
U.
S.
C.
6
7410(
m)
and
67509.

EPA
correctly
determined
that,
given
the
relative
inexperience
of
tribes
in
air
regulation,
and
the
recentness
of
Congressional
authorization
of
tribal
CAA
implementation,
it
is
inappropriate
to
subject
tribes
to
deadlines
and
sanctions.
For
similar
reasons,
and
for
the
reasons
related
to
future
uncertainty
discussed
in
part
LA.
1
above,
tribes
should
not
be
punished
for
failure
to1
meet
the
2003
deadline
by
losing
the
option
to
implement
0
309.
Therefore,
the
methodology
should
accommodate
post­
2003
entry
into
the
market
by
tribes.

B.
Accommodation
of
the
Multiple
Purposes
of
the
Tribal
Set
Aside
Tribal
participants
in
the
WRAP
cited
several
potential
uses
for
the
tribal
set
aside,
including
retirement
for
the
benefit
of
the
environment,
use
to
attract
development,
and
sale
for
revenue.
The
allocation
methodology
should
provide
for
all
these
needs
to
some
degree.
Naturally,
there
is
a
tension
between
these
purposes,
given
the
fact
that
there
are
many
tribes
who
may
have
differing
priorities.
There
are
many
ways
of
striking
a
balance
between
uses,
of
which
the
proposed
methodology
is
but
one.
For
example,
the
proposed
methodology
would
utilize
the
allowances
for
revenue
until
needed
for
development
(
with
individual
tribes
able
to
retire
a
F­
5
portion
at
their
discretion).
An
alternative
method
would
be
to
effectivelyretire
the
allowances
until
needed
for
development
or
sale.
The
former
method
is
put
forth
here
under
the
assumption
that
the
monetary
benefit
to
tribes
outweighs
the
marginal
environmental
benefit
of
retiring
this
small
portion
of
the
total
emissions.

C.
Flexibility
to
Allow
for
Changes
If
the
New
Source
Set
Aside
Is
Exhausted
or
in
Accordance
with
Market
Prices.

The
tribal
set
aside
is
designed
to
help
insure
equitable
treatment
for
tribal
economies
and
to
prevent
barriers
to
economic
development.
It
is
not
the
only
source
of
allowances
for
tribes,
as
tribal
sources
also
have
access
to
allowances
under
the
general
existing
and
new
source
provisions.
The
new
source
set­
aside
is
intended
to
be
sufficient
to
cover
all
new
sources
in
the
region,
whether
they
are
tribal
or
non­
tribal.
The
reallocation
concept
presented
here
is
based
on
the
assumption
that
the
new
source
set
aside
is
adequate.
However,
if
for
unanticipated
reasons
SO2
new
source
growth
exceeds
projections,
the
use
of
the
tribal
set
aside
should
be
subject
to
change.
Similarly,
the
methodology
should
be
flexible
to
allow
changes
in
strategy
based
upon
the
market
price
of
credits.
For
example,
if
credits
become
very
valuable,
tribes
who
have
retired
allowances
may
wish
to
reconsider
the
option
of
selling.
Provisions
for
flexibilitymust
be
consistent
with
the
general
allocation
methodology
of
the
program,
which
provides
certainty
in
allocations
for
5
year
increments.

D.
Maximization
of
Benefit
to
Tribes
in
the
Aggregate.

The
methodology
should
be
structured
so
that
the
maximum
benefit
is
gained
from
the
allowances,
and
they
are
not
so
distributed
as
to
be
of
no
practical
use
to
any
one
tribe.
For
this
reason,
a
simple
pro­
rata
distribution
is
not
proposed.
That
would
result
in
approximately
95
tondyear
per
tribe,
not
quite
enough
to
construct
a
 
major 
source
(
100
tpy).
It
is
felt
that
better
use
can
be
made
of
the
allowances
by
pooling
them
and
using
the
revenue
for
a
common
good,
with
the
pool
being
dipped
into
as
needed
for
individual
tribal
projects.
Again,
however,
the
calculus
may
change
according
to
according
to
market
prices
for
credits.

II
Proposed
Conceptual
Methodology
The
conceptual
framework
put
forth
here
for
comment
is
quite
simple.
Essentially,
it
consists
of
the
following:
(
1)
Initially
the
allowances
would
be
pooled
and
sold,
with
revenue
used
for
the
benefit
of
common
tribal
interests,
(
2)
Individual
tribes
could
draw
from
the
pool
for
the
purpose
of
(
A)
SO2
emitting
development
projects,
and
(
B)
retirement
of
allowances
for
the
environment.
The
allocation
scheme
would
be
subject
to
change
at
the
5
year
check
points
built
into
the
program,
in
response
to
changed
conditions.
These
concepts
are
described
in
more
detail
below:
­

1.
 
Unclaimed 
allowances
administered
as
pool
for
shared
revenue
F­
6
i
'

.,

..

I
This
provision
is
intended
to
insure
that
the
tribal
allowance
is
used
in
a
manner
which
will
provide
benefits
to
tribes,
regardless
of
whether
individual
tribes
have
decided
to
apply
for
an
allocation
of
allowances.

Upon
the
commencement
of
the
trading
program,
those
tribal
allowances
whch
have
not
been
allocated
to
individual
tribes
according
to
the
procedures
below
would
be
sold
on
the
open
market,
at
a
fair
market
price.
The
proceeds
would
be
transferred
to
a
trustee,
who
would
use
the
funds
for
a
purpose
determined
after
consultation
With
the
tribes
in
the
region.

The
use
to
which
funds
are
put
should
be
logically
grounded
in
the
rationale
for
creating
the
set
aside.
For
example,
they
could
be
used
to
fund
tribal
environmental
programs,
to
partially
compensate
for
the
fact
that
the
benefits
of
energy
and
industrial
development
have
not
been
proportional.
ly
shared
with
tribes.
This
could
be
accomplished
by
using
the
monies
to
supply
tribes
with
rnatching
funds
in
order
to
meet
federal
grant
requirements
(
e.
g.
under
sections
103
or
105
of
the
CIAA),
to
help
tribes
acquire
monitoring
or
other
equipment,
or
to
assist
tribes
in
establishing
tribal,
non­
federal
programs.
Another
promising
idea
which
has
been
suggested
is
the
establishment
of
a
scholarship
fund
to
encourage
the
development
of
tribal
environmental
professionals.

There
are
several
fundamental
issues
to
be
resolved
regarded
the
pooled
approach,
including:
the
mechanism
by
whch
tribal
allocations
would
be
sold
on
the
market
(
e.
g.,
by
the
program
administrator)
and
the
identity
or
method
of
selecting
the
trustee
to
administer
revenues
fiom
sales.

2.
Allowances
distributed
to
individual
tribes
via
application
process
A
p~
imarypurpose
of
the
tribal
set
aside
is
to
ensure
that
barriers
to
development
on
tribal
land
are
not
created,
where
such
development
is
desired
by
tribes.
Many
tribal
participants
also
insisted
that
tribes
should
be
able
to
retire
credits,
at
their
discretion.
In
order
to
accomplish
these
objectives,
there
must
be
means
for
individual
tribes
to
acquire
a
quantity
of
credits
over
which
the
tribe
has
sole
control.
A
method
for
doing
this
is
proposed
below:

A.
Retirement
quota
Tribes
would
be
able
to
apply
for
a
quota
of
allowances
for
the
express
purpose
of
retiring
them.
The
#
quotacould
be
either
a
flat,
pro
rata
amount
for
every
federally
recognized
tribe
in
the
region,
(
e.
g.,
20,000
tpy/
211
tribes
=
94.8
tpy/
tribe),
or
it
could
be
adjusted
on
a
tribe­
specific
basis,
such
as
tribal
population.
A
flat
amount
would
reflect
the
equality
of
all
federally
recognized
tribes
as
sovereign
domestic
nations,
while
a
population
based
allocation
would
perhaps
better
reflect
the
amount
of
development
a
tribe
is
willing
to
forego,
by
retiring
the
credits.

F­
7
Some
questions
raised
by
this
provision
are
whether
tribes
that
retire
credits
should
be
excluded
from
receiving
benefits
from
the
revenue
generated
by
the
sale
of
the
remainder
of
credits,
and
whether,
tribes
who
retire
credits
would
be
able
to
pursue
SO2
emitting
development
outside
of
the
trading
program?
(
E.
g.,
under
RHR
308).

 3.
Formula
for
allowances
to
tribal
projects
A
central
feature
of
the
tribal
allocation
scheme
is
the
methodology
for
allocating
allowances
to
tribes
for
the
purpose
of
energy
or
economic
development,
so
tribal
development
can
be
included
in
the
regional
cap
without
creating
an
extra
economic
burden
on
tribes.
This
use
is
supplemental
to
the
use
.
ofallowances
from
the
new
source
set
aside
which
is
available
for
any
new
sources
in
the
region,
whether
tribal
or
not.

Under
this
provision,
at
the
time
a
proposed
new
major
SO2
source
on
tribal
land
applies
for
applicable
permits
(
Prevention
of
Significant
Deterioration,
New
Source
Review,
Title
V,
etc.),
it
would
also
apply
for
a
share
of
the
tribal
allowances.
These
allowances
would
be
in
addition
to
the
allowances
the
source
would
receive
fiom
the
general
new
source
provisions,
and
would
comprise
an
additional
percentage
of
credits
needed
to
operate.
For
example,
the
source
would
receive
100%
of
credits
needed
to
operate
under
applicable
control
requirements
from
the
new
source
set
aside,
and
an
additional
10%
(
a
purely
hypothetical
number)
from
the
tribal
set
aside.
The
extra
allowances
could
not
be
used
to
circumvent
applicable
control
requirements
or
permit
conditions.
They
could
be
banked
according
to
the
general
banking
provisions
of
the
program
to
provide
the
source
with
additional
flexibility,
or
sold,
in
effect
creating
a
small
economic
subsidy
to
the
source,
in
order
to
encourage
its
location
on
tribal
land.
(
Of
course,
this
provision
would
only
be
utilized
when
a
tribe
desired
to
attract
development).

3.
New
distribution
Methodology
if
new
source
set­
aside
exhausted
Under
the
WEB
provisions,
allowances
would
be
allocated
to
sources
for
5
year
periods,
in
order
to
provide
sufficient
certainty
for
fbture
planning.
This
periodic
system
of
allocations
affords
anopportunity
to
change
the
tribal
allocation
scheme
in
response
to
changed
conditions.
Specifically,
if
the
new
source
set
aside
is
exhausted,
use
of
the
tribal
set
aside
could
be
shifted
from
retirements
or
revenue
towards
tribal
new
source
allocations,
in
order
to
ensure
economic
barriers
are
not
created.
By
tying
decisions
to
change
the
tribal
methodology
to
the
five
year
­
cycle,
all
parties
would
know
how
many
tribal
credits
would
be
in
play
and
how
many
will
be
retired
for
each
five
year
period.
i
1
!

F­
8
